Strategic Bombing Of Axis Europe January 1943 September 1944_1

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STRATEGIC BOMBING OF AXIS EUROPE JANUARY 1943

SEPTEMBER 1944

BOMB DAMAGE TO AXIS TARGET SYSTEMS

-*

Office of the *

i~ Assistant

Chief of Air Staff, Intelligence

Analysis Division, European Branch

Washington,

D.C.

15 November 1944

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MEMC.UAHDU?i FOR Command and General Staff School, Att: Library Subject:

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herowith ocpy of the' eubjeot report. duaia^e to strti^egic fcßrget ayat*>m«

c : TKia raoort is; oroaoatod &s a rac'-url record of the effect of tho Coabi nad Borabor Offensive uurinj:; 1940 :;nci the i'irst -'•­ coapreher.;Sive liol- of : T?portant damaged dine' months of 1944pltmr,s,. with the racorcl of attacks on them.., in irio^udsaU '6,It ia felt that the roport will be sr.round. \nforrsatioaal and research purposes

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*^r STRATEGIC BOMBING OF AXIS LUROFE

- SEPTEMBER

JANUARY 1943

194-4

BOMB DAMAGE TO AXIS TARGET SYSTEMS

•

Office of the

Assistant Chief of Air Staff, Intelligence

Analysis Division, European Branch

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Washington,

D. C,

1 December

1944

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INTRODUCTION This study is presented

as a factual record of the effect

of the Combined Bomber Offensive during 1943 and the first nine months

of 1944-

.

It is considered

that this report will be of

value to the offices of the Assistant Chiefs of Air Staff and agencies

other interested research

for background,

informational and

purposes.

In general,

the Combined Bomber Offensive directives

assign­

ed to the R.A.F. Bomber Command the task of destroying German

•

cities, dispossessing man morale.

the working population and breaking Ger­

To the U.S. Strategic Air Forces

destroying key industries

fell the task of

in the German War Economy.

The results of this combined program of precision and area bombardment

of Germany is the subject of this report.

all evaluation

of bombing and statements

each major target system are presented

An over­

of results achieved in in the following sections.

A comprehensive

list of important damaged plants also is included

in the attached

Appendix.

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TABLE OF

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Page

-

I Introduction

II ITI IV

Summary

-— — — ~ *-

i

•

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—

VITI IX

X XI

#

XII

XV JJJ J

XVII

Armaments

Machine Tools and Precision

Electrical Equipment

- Steel

Chemicals

-,

r-.—

Instruments

,--,

,„—^-^^.^

Transportation

~

Military Installations

— — „»­

,

Bomb Damage

,

.

,, — — ._

to Axis

,-t~­

—^

26

30 31 31 32

,

-.*.,

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P

General Level of Industrial Output--,

25

27

—

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w-,^-p-,«,w-,^-p-,«,

and Explosives

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Engireering

and Non-Ferrous

22

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and Miscellaneous

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Tanks and Motor Transport

Appendix A

+

—— — ——

~—

r—»

Rubber and Tires

XITIMetals XIV

"

ards

19

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yardsv

6 13

,

Oil

VT I Submarine

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Anti-Friction Bearings.-. VI

1

ard Target Pattern

Bombing Operations

Aircraft

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Industries^

33 34. 39

42 43

-

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ii.SUMMARY

+

A. Bombing Operations

and Target Pattern

At the end of September 1944 the weight of bombs dropped byAllied Air Forces in Europe since the beginning of the war reached a total of 1,704,470 tons. The RAF Bomber Command accounted for 40 percent of this total, U.S. Strategic Air Forces 33 percent, U.S. Tactical Forces 17 percent and RAF Tactical Forces 10 percent. The growth of both U.S. and 3ritish strategic bombing has been in­ creasingly rapid in the last two years. US3TAF tonnages averaging 73,160 tons per month in the summer of 1944 were sixteen times \u25a0greater than in 1943. RAF tonnages of 65,700 per month in the summer of 1944 were more than three times as great as in 1943 • The target pattern for U.S. Strategic Air Force attacks has in­ These in­ volved successive priorities for several target systems. cluded submarine installations in earl}' 1943, aircraft and antifriction bearing factories in late 1943 and early 1944, and oil installations, tank factories and motor transport plants in mid-1944. During the first nine months of 1944 these high-priority industries absorbed 27.4 percent of the USSTAF bombing effort. Railway instal­ lations absorbed an equivalent amount, while airfields, other tacti­ cal targets and area attacks accounted for the remaining 45 percent, Bomb- tonnages dropped on targets in Germany have of the tonnage. steadily increased, and in the third quarter of 1944 amounted to 60 percent of the USSTA.F total effort.

'•

RAF Bomber Command attacks in 1943 were directed mainly against German cities. During 1944, on the other hand, such attacks were limited to about 25 percent of the total RAF effort. Attacks against railway installations in occupied countries, counter measures against flying borab installations on the Channel Coast and bombing of troop concentrations absorbed more than half of this 1944 RAF effort. Oil installations and miscellaneous targets accounted for the balance of about 20 percent of 1944 t,onnages

.

.

B. Aircraft Between late July 1943, when attacks upon the German aircraft industry were launched, and 30 September 1944, a large number of attacks were made on Gernan assembly, component, repair and aeroengine factories. Plants damaged by bombing totalled 58 in 1943, and 146 in 1944. Single-engine fighter aircraft factories bore the brunt of attacks, but production of twin-engine fighters, bombers Practically and miscellaneous types also was materially reduced. all the important aero-engine producers likewise suffered bomb damage

.

#

As a result of bombing attacks it is estimated that up to 30 September 1944 the GAF had been deprived of 10,000 aircraft that would hava been produced in the absence of aerial attacks. Bombing prevented a large planned increase of single-engine fighter output, and until the summer of 1944 held production below the level prevail­ ing in mid-1943. From T'arch to September 1944 aircraft output rose sharply from a low of 1320 to 1950 combat aircraft, most of which were single-engine fighters. This rise in production, in spite of greatly increased bombing of aircraft factories, reflects a success­ ful dispersion and expansion of the German aircraft industry follow­ ing the vury successful 1943 attacks. Although this expansion pro-

C5-5268.AF

gram was in considerable measure successful, the increased output came too late to build up a successful aerial defense of Germany,

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Combat losses of German aircraft during the period August 1943­ Soptember 1944 are estimated at about twice the losses of factory production. A sizeable part of this combat wastage, however, was accounted for by the strategic bombers and their fighter escorts. Bombing and strafing attacks on GAF repair depots and airfields also destroyed aircraft and in addition lowered serviceability of remain­ ing aircraft through destruction of hangars, repair facilities, supplies, etc. The reduction of fuel supplies following successful bombing of Axis oil installations also contributed to lowered activity of the GAF.

i \

C. Anti-Friction Bearings

Attacks on anti-friction bearing targets resulted in damage to 14 Axis factories. The resulting production loss, together with loss of imports, averaged 20 percent of pre-attack supply during the period August 1943 February 1944, and 50 percent during the following 7 month period. The cumulative loss of bearings in the 14-month period ending 30 September 1944 is estimated at the equiva­ lent of 5 months normal supply.

-

The effects of these bearing shortages were cushioned to a con­ siderable extent by a reduction of requirements resulting from direct damage to user industries producing aircraft, tanks, etc., and by .. .'. redesign of equipment. Effects were also postponed to some extent by reduction of industrial allocations, use of pipe-line stocks and inten­ sified salvage t Nevertheless it is estimated that only 90 percent of vital requirements were covered in the first seven months of this offen­ September 19Uu These sive and about two-thirds in the period March shortages are believed to have resulted 'in reduced assemblies of tanks, trucks, machine tools, etc., in addition to the losses caused by direct bomb damage to these industries.

-

D. Oil

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The heavy aerial offensive against Axis oil installations, launched April in 19hk, caused widespread damage and a rapid drop in production. Up to 30 September 2k synthetic plants, 6° refineries, numerous storage installations and a number of miscellaneous liquid fuel plants were Production dropped to 50 percent of predamaged by aerial attack. 1; output attack in July and to a low of 23 percent in September following occupation of the remaining refineries in Ploesti, Cumulative losses of oil products by 30 September are estimated at 3*660,000 tons, or the equivalent of 23 A months pre-attack output.

Reduced production of oil has forced the enemy to lower military and industrial consumption and to draw upon accumulated stocks. Local shortages of fuel have frequently appeared and have been an important

C5-52f8,AF

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Attacks against GAF factories and operational installations can be credited with (l) holding down production of the latest type German aircraft, (2) reducing GAF resistence to a point where wide­ spread strategic bombing of Axis target systems became feasible, (3) forcing a concentration of GAF fighters in Western Europe at the expense of Italian and Russian fronts and (4) aiding greatly in the landings and subsequent invasion operations in Western Surope.

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factor in limiting vehicular traffic and restricting German panzer and air force operations. In view of Germany's critical oil stock position, continued attacks against the industry will further re­ strict mobility of German ground and air forces. E. Submarines During the early part of 19ii3 v/hen U-boat installations were top priority targets, 12 German shipyards assembling submarines and the 5 large operational bases in France were damaged by bombing, These attacks v/ere only moderately successful and were abandoned following spectacular successes of anti-submarine operations at sea f Attacks were resumed in 19hh 9 however, when damage was inflicted on 17 German shipyards and several important operational bases. These attacks may serviceability remaining have reduced of the German submarine fleet. F, Rubber

and Tires

Synthetic rubber plants at Kuls, Ludwigshafen and Oswiecim and several tire factories have been damaged during Allied bombing missions. In view of Germany's relatively large synthetic output and excess pro­ cessing capacity it is not believed that damage to these factories materially hampered the German war effort. G, Tanks and

Motor Transport

*

»

Bombing attacks on this industry, though limited in 19h3 resulted in widespread damage during the spring and summer of 19hhj Damage to 6 of the 9 known major tank assembly factories combined with damage to important producers of engines, gear assemblies and other components reduced tank production by an estimated 20 to 25 percent during the summer and early fall of 19U* f

Production of trucks and other motor transport also suffered in 19hh as a result of damage to 23 producers of motorized equipment, including the 5> main truck assembly plants, numerous components plants and several ordnance depots Production of trucks half tracks and miscellaneous vehicles in mid-l^Ui was reduced an estimated 15 to 20

.

,

4

percent below the former rate of lit,ooo monthly. Occupation of im­ French and Belgian plants in August 19 hh increased this loss of trucks and miscellaneous AFV equipment to at least 140 percent of previous production levels f

portant

The effect of these losses on German military operations is diffi­ cult to evaluate since shortages of fuel have already restricted use of available motorized equipment. However, if fuel output is increased during the winter months, losses of tanks and trucks as a result of bomb damage v/ill constitute serious blows to German forces already operating with inadequate equipment

.

•

H. Armaments and Miscellaneous Engineering Production of artillery, shells and various other armament and engineering products has suffered considerably from bombing. At least hh factories in this category were damaged in 19h3, and 89 in 19J414, including such. large plants as Krupp at Essen and Rheinmetall Borsig at Dusseldorf t Losses of engineering equipment 'and armaments components have supplemented specific losses of aircraft, bearings, oil, etc, and have contributed to the overall reduction of German fighting strength,

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The production losses in these industries resulting from damage to 15 plants in*l°li3 and 21 plants in 19hh has intensified recon­ struction problems in bomb damaged industries f Lowered machine tool production has also limited normal reequipment of plants and prevented the use of former excess capacity for direct armaments production

.

J # Electrical Equipment Damage to 25 plants in 1910 and 30 to have reduced output of the electrical least 10 to 15 percent. It is possible necks were created, particularly by the and important plants in Berlin,

X , Metals

- Steel

plants in 19hh is estimated equipment industry by at that certain equipment bottle­ heavy damage

inflicted on large

and Non-ferrous \u26 6

•

Damage to 16 steel plants in 19h3 and 17 plants in 19hh is be­ lieved to have reduced ortput, but only in- moderate degree because of the existence of excess capacity in the industry and the general invulnerability of steel plants. The loss of industrial plants in 'western Europe and loss of imports of iron ore from Sweden and other sources has far overshadowed losses from bomb damage, and must soon lower Gorman steel production to a fraction of former levels. Non­ ferrous metal producers also neve been damaged by Allied bombings, but it is doubtful if German war production has thereby been materi­ ' ally damaged, 1

L, Chemicals and Explosives Fairly widespread damage has been inflicted on German chemical factories. Included in the list of 37 plants damaged in 19hh were 6 plants producing hydrogen peroxide, used by rockets and robot air­ craft. Five large explosives plants in France also were knocked out by RAF attacks. Other bomb damage contributed somewhat to the over­ all decline of Axis industrial output. M,

General Level of Industrial Output

,

Damage to German industries as outlined in preceding sections, combined with damage to residential property, public utilities and administrative agencies, has reduced overall industrial output in Ger­ many by an estimated average of 12/15 percent during the period under review. Factories damaged by bombing in 19h3 included 252 of the more important plants in Axis Europe, In 19hh such damaged plants totalled 536, In addition, hundreds of small factories, mostly unidentified, ' were damaged or destroyed by bombing. Damage to housing by 30 Septem­ ber I9IUI is estimated at a total of 2,600,000 units destroyed or ren­ dered uninhabitable.

•

German industrial output has been greatly enhanced during the war by the impressment of foreign labor into service in Germany, by acquisition of strategic resources in conquered territory, and by receipt, of contributions from occupied and satellite countries. Foreign workers have comprised about 20. percent of Germany's labor force, and contributions from occupied countries, in financial terms, have amounted to as rcuch as 30 percent of the total Axis outlays for war purposes. The recent losses of European territory have deprived Germany of most of these contributions and practically all of certain

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production. al to war The combined efTect" »-*aoJ strategic materials vital war production. of materials heavy damage important bomb and the even more loss raw of and industrial contributions from occupied countries is rapidly in­ creasing Allied superiority in production and must seriously weaken German military resistance in corning months.

N.

Transportation

In addition to the strategic bombing of industrial objectives, the strategic air forces have devoted a large percentage of their efforts to the bombing of rail centers, road and rail bridges and port facilities. This bombing has supplemented tactical air force ' missions in several programs of interdiction. In Italy, the .Bal­ kans, Southern France and "Western Europe the bombing of transport facilities has slowed the movement of German supplies and reinforce­ ments and materially aided in the success of Allied ground operations.

Air action and mining operations by British Air Forces have des­ troyed or damaged shipping, port facilities and inland waterways. This has cost the Axis valuable cargoes, disrupted his industrial plans and slowed military traffic. As the weight of tactical and strategic air force attacks against transport shift into German territory, the enemy's industrial power and economic system,, as well as bis military strength and mobility, will be increasingly impaired by bombing, 0, MilitaryInstallations

#

During amphibious landing operations and subsequent advances in Italy, Southern France and Normandy, heavy bombers operating with medium and fighter bomber forces have contributed materially to the success oi ground operations. Co inter action against launch­ ing and supply sites for flying bombs required diversion of a- size­ able portion of the strategic air forces efforts but aided in res­ tricting robot bombing attacks against England.

•

C5~5268,AF

—5—

111. BOKBING OPERATIONS AND TARGET PATTERN

A. Weight of Attack Bombs dropped by Allied Air Forces ning of the war reached

19kk«

For detailed

total of 1,70k,k70 tons on 30 Sept'mber

?

data

table 1.

see

This total effort was divided

U.S. and British forces,

almost equally between

U.S. Strategic Air Forces U.S. Tactical Air Forces U.S. Total

RAF Bomber Command

RAP Tactical Air Forces

RAF Total

Total

Strategic

bomber forces accounted

percent.

A considerable

for

part of t lnis

however, was devoted to tactical bombirg,

ing sections

The monthly weight of attack by t he

showed an impressive increase dropped

in

19UU

on Axis Europe by British and

3>0,570 tons in 19U5, an average of 108,990 tons

ped in the first half of

of

I9UU.

revealed

19141+, and 177,930 tons

The spectacular

incrcrse in weight of

by tie fact that 70 percent of the tot

dropped in 19kU, compared

with 21 percent

prior years.

U.S. Strategic Air Forces. bombers

committed

Although p.ttecks

to strategic bombardment

were on

minor scale until late in 19U^, these

percent of Allied strategic

tons on

30

September

(USSTAF ] increased

19UU-

air force

Attacks by the U.S.

sharply in 19hh, e.s shown in T

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TABLE 1

BOMB TONNAGE ALLIED AIR FORCES IN EUROPE

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JJ

U. S. Air Forces

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Bth

Period

R. A. F.

; n

v

AFilsth AF :l2th AF: 9th AF:

*Tacti-; . : kJ x : ;Command: A F Med. Total

:

1942

:'

1,713:

Total

\u26 6

: :

739;

— — — —

«

;

— — — ——

705:

1,530:

: 1,130: : 2,677: j

2,468:

: 1,983: : 1,773: : 2,773: :

5,042:

: 7,436: : 8,409; : 13,850: : 02, 460:

~~­

3,171:

Dec.

: 4,103: : 3,779: :. : 5,743: : 5,132: : 6,868: : 12,577:

4,368:

4,087: 5.815:

Total

: 47,451:

7,539:'

86,484:

Jan.

Feb. Mar.

.

:

:

: 12,397: 11,051: : 19,146; 6,747: : 21,346: 10,376:

13,941:

8,915:

8,0-46; 4,848:

14,632:

2,828: 17,460

35,508:

14,317: 49,825

6,123-::' 51,028:

4,410:*

1943 Jan. Feb. Mar. Apr. May June July Aug. Sept. Oct. Nov.

—

— ——

\

Bomber, cal

1939-40: 1941

"

249:

25,258^

76,535

—

: 2,722:: 4,868: : 1,368: 2,478:: 12,274:-— : : 832: : 4,303:: 11,858: -.- : 2,752: : 6,172:: 12,843: 83: 3,332:

—

6,236 13,106 14,610

16,258

11: 10,134:: 14,460: 52: 2,978: 17,490 : 10,877;: 17,101: 282: 2,938: 20,321 263: 18,216:: 18,852: 491: 4,688: 24,031 1,292: 17,531:: 22,569: 531: 5,429; 28,529 2,777: 22,4-61:: 16,642: 1,239: 4,786: 22,667 882: 14,929:: 15,428: 363: 2,829; 18,620 1,444: 15,570:; 16,236: 1,370: 2,350: 19,956 1,541: 24,301: t 13.221: 1,054: 1,001: 15,276

8,210 i 149,684: -176, 352

\

5,465: 35,283:217,100 .

1,618: 33,1125: 20,639: 1,696: 34,161:: 13,500: 1,781:

3,420:

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2,279: 24,614 1,819: 17,100 3,240: 35,434 4,465:. 43,941 7,150: 54,046 4,451: 74,293 23,404:249,428 7,584: 77,236

7,064: 5,193: 43,979:: 31,021: 1,173: 27,576: 21,253: 8,603: 10,964: 68,396:: 37,515: 1,961: 38,029: 30,355: 15,720: 18,845:102,949:: 41,722: 5,174: June 59,625: 24,465: 11,821: 26,023:121,934: : 64,139: 5,703: 6 Mo. :178,119: 104,247: 56,102: 66,063:404,531: :208,536:17,485: July : 46,605: 32,183: 9,586 : 16,457:104,831:: 64,528: 5,124: Aug. : 49,305: 28,230: 12,441: 18,272:108,248:: 73,760: 6,561: 8,796: 89,117 Sept, : 42,162: 20,971: 8,394:" 8,946: 80,473: : 58>89&: ~3,9OO: 11,082.: 73,880 Mo, ;316, 191; 185,631: 86, 523; 109, 738; 698 ,083:; 405, 722; 33, 073: 50,866:4-89,661 .9 ' • • • 1939-Sept. 1944 * : : i : Total :365, 355:193,170:177,417:117,948:853, 890; :683,242;'38, 787:*128,552i850,581 * • Apr. May

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1/ 2/ 2/ 4/

—

1

,

L.

:

:

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;

Data from Statistical Control Division, Office of Management Includes 9th Air Force when in Mediterranean Theater

Control

Includes Air Support Command of Bth Air Force in early 1943 Includes Mediterranean Strategic Air Force.

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percent of the total for these air forces

was concentrated

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in the

third quarter of 19hh, 50 percent in the first half of I9kh, and only

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10 percent in the preceding

months.

17

tons of bombs dropped in the summer of than in

19U3

73 »160

The monthly average of

19UU

was sixteen times greater

<­

Attacks b;/ British heavy bombers

RAF Bomber Command.

f

account

ing for 55 percent of the total Allied strategic effort, up to

30 September 19UU, also increased greatly in 19W4, as- shown in Table 1. Nearly

30

percent of the RA.F 5-year total was dropped in the third

quarter of

in

19U3,

19UU» 30

a^d

percent in the first half of the year,

percent in preceding years.

15

26

percent

The monthly average of

65,700 tons reached in the sumner of 19Uil- was more than three times

•

as great as in

19U3»

U.S. Tactical Air Forces. . Attacks by t c U.S. 9th and 12th Mr Forces have accounted

for nearly two-thirds of the tonnage dropped

by Allied tactical air forces in Europe during the war.

were not begun until late in 19U2,

U.S. tactical air force operations

the growth of these forces has rapidly overshadowed particularly in 1914i|-»

U.S. tactical forces

dropped about the same tonnage in

Although

Vshh

in the Mediterranean

as in

Force based in Britain showed large increases

RAF operations,

19U3»

area

"but the 9"th Air

to a peak effort of

26,020 tons in the invasion month of June 1914J4.

About

25

percent of

the^ total U.S. tactical effort was dropped in the third quarter of

19141+, I+l

percent in the first he. lf of 19W+, p.nd

3U percent

in the pre

ceding fourteen months.

British Tactical Air Forces.

•

Britain and the Mediterranean naval forces) have accounted

tical air force tonnages.

British forces operating from

area (excluding Coastal Command and for somewhat more than one-third of tac­

The long participation of these

air forces in the war is shown- by the fact that only

26

British

percent of a

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\u25a0*\u25a0 "W W 'O' U. S. ,STRATEGIC AIR FORChS 15th)

' ' (Bth and 15th) HEIGHT OF ATTACK BY TYPE OF TARGET TARGET

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1943 1943

°

1944

T_-_

;an-Mar:i :• Jan-Mar June ne ; iJulyc juiy-Sept apr-jui apr-jui :Apr-

Type of Target Target

Tons

A/C

:Percent: Percent:

Tons

-

y

a

*«\u25a0_\u25a0_

j

Tons

Jan- Sept

:

Tons

Tons; Percent

Construction

: 2,419

" "

4.4

9,542

19,431

19,323^ 48,796

9.7

Repair Repair

: 3,208

5.8 : 1,512

2,273

: 3,785

0.8

."

Airfields

s

8,623

28,767

20,038. 57,428

11.4

! 19,677

50,471

39,86i;i10,009

21.9

!

150

20,436

44,018* 64,604

12.9

1,080

Total

5,135

9.4

! 10,762

19.6

;

Oil Oil

'!

Bearings Bearings

: 2,235

4.1 : 1,906

I-ST-AFV-Rubber

: 1,223

\u25a02.2 :

•

Total

424

3,832

0.8

7.1

\

130 2,186

756 22,272

—

1,311*

4,297

0.9

13,366: 14,252

2.8

58,695

\

53,153

16.6

•.

*

8,440

15.3 : 22,342

64,408

Sub Yds-Naval Bases

: 20,490

37.3 : • 3,467

1,622

Flying Bomb Sites

: 2,274

RR Installations

:

52,003:138,753

27.7

«,

Defenses

- Troops Troops

•

Total Area

- T.O. - Misc.

31,204

: 9,142

9,665

1.9

16,337

9,104: 33,843

6.7

9,131

20,832: 29,963

6.0

34,211

91,498

86,515.!212,224 212,224

42.3

16.6 : 24,989

37,062

34,385: 96,436

— —-— -— —. .

19.2

4.1

56.7

•

8,402

;

4,576:

\u25a0\u25a0! \u25a0\u25a0\u25a0'

All Targets . Source of data;

: 54,990

100,0 :

81,063

,201,303

\u2666

\u25a0 \u25a0 I

}l

\u25a0

219,456.501,822

Statistical Control Division,

Office of I4magement Control

1

Prepared

•

by

Office of the Assistant Chief of Air Staff, Intelligence Analysis Division, European Branch, Target Section

C5-5268,AF

9

100.0

TABLE 3

r<

—

**:—:

1

RAF BOMBER COMMAND COMMAND

UVEIGHT OB .ATTACK BY TYPE 1OF TARGET

•

1943

*

i

1944

.

Type' of Target

-L,

July—Sept July— Sept r Tons sj

Jan-Mar: Apr- June Tons • Tons

;

Tons :Percent:

Jan-Sept Tons :Percent

Precision Attacks «

A/c Repair Airfields Oil RR Installations Sub Bases Ports

3,374*:

1,234

p/A/C Installations - Troops Defenses

197

0.1

2,676 10,966 506

.1.5

:

ither Industry ither

17,869

Total

3,715:

4,253.

6,608

6.2 0.3

509 10,285 21,735

54,641 : 17,639 3,236

1,634

2.0

t

238

10.1

\

9,714

5,U7

1.3

14,000 25,993

6.4

3.5

19,4

20,020:

48,111

24,351:

50,277

78,558 3,236 69,765 : 74,628

1,3X5:

2,681

: 4,234

0.8 17.2 18 r4 1^

:275,86l

68.

111,6741 154,473

*.

. Major City

«

Attacks

Rhine land : 37,094 Ruhr : 29,322 Berlin : 21,952 Hamburg, Kiel, Wil­ helmshafen, Bremen-, "s 14,495 : Emden ; 1,006 Stettin, Rostock, Konigsberg : Hanover-Kassel 12-\»339 Brunswick- Magdeburg Frankfurt-Nuremberg :: 10,806 Gtuttgart-Leipzig: Munich \u25a0:

11,339:

21.0 :

6,228:

16.7. : 3,042 12.5 :16,435

11,824

8.2 0.6 : 1,252

4,067

:

7.0 :

:"4,513 6.1 : 7,711

1,498: .

-

•

.--

Prepared

*g<\

S-*" ifj llh T

•.:

: 18,349 : 9,270 : 16,435*

2.3 4.1

U,824

2.9

: 5,319

1.3

\u25a0:

917j-:

1,712

4.5

6,928

: 9,423

1.7 .

Statistical Control Division,

Office of Management Control

Source of data:

¥*> V-'

—

7,010

J

"

rwpa, "''\l \^ *'J

by

Office uiiiue of ox the one Assistant as sis baa 0 Chief oniei of Air Staff Intelligence Analysis Division, European Branch, Target Section

'

­ 10

2,3

***$'&%$
5-year total was dropped during the third quarter of percent in the first half of 19141+, compared

vious years

#

8., Target

i

19UU snet!^

«

•*

with 50 percent in pre

.

Pattern The industrial pattern of U.S

Air Forces.

U.S. Strategic

Strategic Air Force attacks during

191+3

and

37

U-bost more than

In "the crucial battle against

19U3*

19U3

percent of total

.

ped on naval installations

of

, accounting

also accounting

19^3

in the

the

was drop­

USSTAF tonnages

Of next iirroortance

were airfields and aircraft repair depots and railway installations

is shown in Table 2.

were the chief targets

Submarine building yards and naval bases these forces during early

19JJ+

for

program

15

percent,

19U3

for 15 percent of the

total bomb tonnage. of USSTAF attacks

The emphasis

+

in

I9WI was

shifted to railway

installations, synthetic oil plants and refineries, airfields and repair depots and aircraft factories. target systems

first nine months of

63

for

accounted

1914J1.

As shown in Table 2, these

percsnt of the total effort in the

The balance of the tonnage

w*.s

directed

at pilotless aircraft installations, troops and coastal defenses, targets.

area and miscellaneous The geographical increasing

of

19UU

pattern of USSTAF attacks

concentration

of attacks

on Germany.

the first he. lf of

19141+

Command attacks

55

and

RAF Bomber Command.

•

an

In the third quarter

about 60 percent of the total tonnage was dropped in the less than UO percent in

greater Reich, compared with considerably

.it

in I9UU showed

percent

in

19U3.

The industrial pattern of

in 19U3 arid

19UU

is shown in Trble

trial cities in Germany bore the brunt of

19U3

Bomber

3° Lprge indus­

attacks,

cities in

the Rhineland and Ruhr, Berlin and various other large industrial centers tonnage.

for the

accounting

for more then three-fourths

of the total

Submarine bases and various miscellaneous

remaining

--

r

"

19U3

targets accounted

W^ W\

05^5268, AF

Ljs £*ar J^ff

-

v

181 « v

than in 1943 and accounted

#

RAF effort.

for only one— fourth of the total

Bombing of railway installations

port of the invasion of -France represented

Counter action against

RAF tonnage.

,„

involve*!* less J

In the first 9 months of 1944, major city attacks tonnage

k,

38

in sup­

and defenses

percent of the total

pilotless aircraft installa­

More

tions forced the diversion of 17 percent of the RAF total*

than 6 percent of RAF tonnage was aimed at oil installations in a program supplementing

aneous

targe

the heavy USSTAF offensive against

oil

The remaining 14 percent was dropped on miscell-

installations*

ts\

The geographical

pattern of RAF Bomber Command attacks

showed a heavy concentration

of attacks on Germany

three-fourths of the total tonnage.

- more

In 1944* however

f

in 1943

than

when support

of the invasion and counter action against flying bombs took first

priority-, attacks on Germany decreased.

W

Only 40-percent

of RAF

tonnage was dropped on German targets in the first half of

and only

23

1944

percent in the third quarter.

The effects of these Allied bombing operations upon the out­ put of various German war industries

sections.

are described

A list of the priority factories damaged

attack in 1943 and

1944 also is

in following by aerial

given, in Appendix A..

• VJ 11

*\u25a0

'

\u25a0"

w

C5~526g,AF

12

.-v

'ffl

tm

"/Ts*/5*/

IV AIRCRAFT A» Attacks on Aircraft Factories Since the middle of 194-3 factories

producing German fighter air­

tJSTAAF

craft have been high priority targets for and operational

weather

conditions permitted*

attacks

whenever

Up to 30 September

194-4 U.S» Strategic Air Forces had made 254 attacks upon the Axis aircraft industry, including 177 attacks ents factories

.

factories

, 50

against

On 53 occasions

against

aero-engine plants

the RAF damaged

assembly

and 27 against repair

aircraft factories

course of area and precision bombing attacks.

components

in the

In addition to these

a large number of engineering industries

factories

and compon­

producing minor

such as spark plugs, oil filters, propellors, metal cast­

ings, etc., also were attacked. By 30 September

bombers

a total of 56,450 tons had been dropped by U.S.

on GAF factories; large RAF tonnages

also had been dropped

on French plants and German aircraft centers. attacks

against

The weight of USTAAF

the German aircraft industry averaged only 400 tons

monthly in the second half of 1943 but increased

month in 1944.

6,500 tons

to

Th^ maximum weight of U.S. attacks

per

occurred In April

1944 when 9,850 tons were dropped on German aircraft plants. As a result of this offensive against

aircraft production a

total of 58 aircraft plants were damaged in 1943 and A list of these damaged

1944.

Single-engine

attacks

against

factories

plants in

is given in Appendix A.

fighter aircraft have borne the brunt of USTAAF

the Axis aircraft industry.

by US bombing in 1943 were increased

9 months of 1944.

146

to

Seven SEF plants damaged

38 plants during the first

These included twenty-one factories

ponents for or assembling ?!e 109s and seventeen

All the important known SEF aircraft factories

producing com­

producing FW 190s.

were attacked

from

one to seven times and production materially reduced at all locations.

"m

m

G5-5 26&,AF

- ->J damage list be-"" ** aß *<*& addfiri tn list be-" *aB Twin-engine fighter factories wfirfi were added to the the damage 1 I

ginning in January 1944.

#

attacked

By

30 September 16 TEF factories had been Seven long-range

from one to five times each.

bomber plants

producing He 177 and He 111 aircraft were damaged during 194-4 attacks.

Production of transports, bers also

yras

dive bombers

and Italian fighters and bom­

curtailed as a result of a number of attacks

producing these aircraft.

became priority targets

In early 1944 aero-engine

for USSTAF attacks.

on plants

factories

also

In the following months

21 of 22 factories producing BI.IW, Daimler Benz and Jumo engines

damaged,

and supplies

of this major

A/C

component restricted for both

installation in new aircraft .and replacement B,

•

were

in older aircraft.

Results of Attacks- on Aircraft Factories Attacks upon German aircraft production have prevented

planned increase

in output and until the summer of 1944 held production

below the level prevailing in mid-1943 when attacks It is estimated

a large

that up to 30 September

were initiated.

1944 the G.A.F. has been de­

prived of 10,000 new planes that would otherwise have been produced in the absence

of aerial attacks.

the GAF have been single-engine fighters also has been

Most of the aircraft thus lost to fighters.

Output of twin-engine

cut, however, and bomber output likewise mat­

erially reduced both through direct damage

to plants and through con­

version of facilities to sorely needed fighter production.

Tilhen strategic attacks were launched against the German aircraft industry in July 1943, German production of operational

types had in­

to about 1740 monthly, including 910 single-engine

creased

Having recognized

launched

the threat

of Allied strategic bombing,

fighters.

the GAF had

a program of expansion that called for a monthly output

rising to nearly 3,000 operational planes in late 1944, including

#

about 1,700 single-engine

*•

:;

.;\u25a0.

-'

fighters.

'M i

C5-5268,AF 14

This schedule however.

#

nvprisinn bombing, of precision bnmbi n? . of

rT'r-.knn nn did not reckon on thp the suocpss success

As a result of aerial attacks

duced below the July level to a low of 1,320 planes percent

was re­

output of combat types

in I larch 1944.

- 24

below July output and less than half of planned production.

From !'arch 1944 onwards production of operational planes rose sharply to 1950 aircraft in September,

of which 1400 were single-engine

The weight of aircraft produced

fighters.

943, i

was no greater than in July

how­

ever, for the gain in fighter production was offset by a reduction of heavy bomber output.

The estimated

output of combat types by months

is shown in the following table;

All Combat Types

Month

•

: Est. Outputl./: » :

1943

July Aug. Sept. Oct. Nov. Dec.

1944 Jan. Feb. Mar. Apr. May June July Aug. Sept. Oct.

. . .-. .

:

:

:

j

:

•

: : j

t

:

1740 1530 1520 1540 1550 1480

%of

Planned Output

Single-engine

: :

Est. Output

910

85

675

79

of Planned Output

100

70

630 645 690

•

77 71

i6s t

100 81

Fighters

63

61

63

65

740 0

M5O 1430 1320

1385 1480 1665

67 64 58 59 61

67

1740 1930 1945 2015

68 73

25,720

71

:

72 72

68

805 785 680 705 790

925

63

53

50

49 51

55

1100

63

1375 1500

uoo

58

59

14,355

60

#

Total

1/

•

Based on British Air Ministry Figures.

The rise in aircraft production since "'arch 1944 large increase

in weight of Allied bombing attacks

cessful reorganization

- in spite

- reflects

of the German aircraft industry,

of a

a suc­

"i/hen attacks

were initiated in 1943, the German aircraft industry was organized

C5-5268,AF

' :"\ &m .fri**en )-'i . '";' into a relatively few highly integrated complexes of assNs&hly jand coispJ/M

ponents plants utilizing mass production methods

.

The 194-3 precision

attacks, involving a total of only 2,420 tons, resulted in very con­

#

damage

siderable

and large production losses.

These attacks

proved

the vulnerability of the existing industrial plan, and compelled a reorganization

wholesale

of the German aircraft industry.

fort to expand single-engine was dispersed

fighter output, production of components

to many small plants,

including unused textile mills.

GAF airfields were pressed into use for assembly.

fighters to

New facilities were

Bomber plants were converted to production of

developed underground. fighter aircraft.

New plans raised production goals for single-engine

more than 2,000 per month in late 194-4 •

Expansion of German SEF production, however,

came too late to

save the German war effort from heavy Allied bombing.

«

of output of defensive conservation sistance

In an ef­

The reduction

fighter planes forced upon the GAF a policy of

to retain an air force in being.

in turn made possible successful

Lack of adequate

re­

strategic bombing of Axis

industries producing oil, bearings and other vital war materials. C.

Factory

Losses

in Relation to Combat Losses

The loss of aircraft production at bombed factories at 10,000 planes between 1 August

1943 and 30

September

- estimated - was 1944

roughly half of the somewhat more than 20,000 aircraft lost to the

GAF in combat in this period. considerable

part of these

The bomber offensive accounted for a

combat losses, however.

was inflicted on the GAF by Allied bombers during bombing missions.

•

pair depots accounted

Heavy wastage

and by escorting fighters

Allied bombing of GAF airfields and re­

for additional sizeable losses

of German air­

craft, as well as a lowering of serviceability. The remainder of the GAF wastage resulted largely from aerial combat with tactical air

forces, strafing of airfields and capture of GAF airfields with im­ mobilized aircraft.

C5-52^8,AF

MSat

_

OB iA NJt,^

, !tyl

.

The damage to aircraft factories was qualitatively of greater

than the 1:2 ratio of "lost" production to combat losses

importance

m

Factory attacks

indicates..

in conjunction with other counter .air

force -action (l) reduced German defensive resistance strategic

losses,

on Axis target systems

attacks

(2) forced the GAF to concentrate

to a point where

could be made without undue fighter aircraft in Western

Germany at the expense of German military capabilities

in Russia and the Mediterranean,

on land fronts

(3) aided in whittling down the GAF

to a point where it could not combat Allied land invasions, and (4) assured

unhampered

and minimum losses

Allied lines of communications

of men and material atf the vast military depots built up in Britain for continental invasion. Repair Depots

D. Attacks on GAF Bases and Since the early part of

1943 , 34 factories

repairing aircraft

and producing spare parts have been damaged by USAAF and RAF aerial

<J

attacks

involving a total of 12,100 tons of bombs.

Damage

to these

factories, most of which were French or Belgian, has slowed the re­ turn of repaired aircraft to front-line units and has reduced strength thru loss of planes

GAF

and parts.

Attacks upon airfields up to 30 September 194-4- have accounted for a material part of the Allied bombing effort

- 76,700

tons.

Since the first of 1944 U. S. Strategic and RAF bombers made attacks

531

on

" " " tt

"

H

!I

it

Total

135 airfields in i1i ranee and the Low Countries

75 47

257

•

These attacks

1

Germany and Austria Italy and the Balkans

have destroyed aircraft, and by damaging or destroy­

ing repair facilities, hangars

and other airfield installations

have seriously lowered the' combat serviceability of aircraft re­ maining to the GAF.

Numerous

strafing attacks,

been made on airfields, with resultant

in addition, have

claims of several thousand air

craft destroyed. »­

v*-% a

% I*®} *

C5-52£8,AF

w&0

i£sf&

.

E

Effect upon GAF jpomping .avoacKs xecx. of .Bombing Attacks Upon uax 1

oj.

.

s£ren|;ftr j^s * &'£E\u25a0"ir,- \ ' « DurengwH' «&% >

HL>

As a result of the Allied Bomber Offensive since July 1943 the GAF has been decisively weakened.

#

Tff .' rf H ,*»

.\

.''

"***\u25a0»\u25a0

This has been accomplished

through the combined effect of (1) bomb damage

to aircraft fac­

tories, (2) bomb damage to repair factories and airfields, (3) combat losses

imposed on the GAF during strategic

strafing attacks,

bombing and

and (4) reduction of aviation fuel supplies

through bombing of synthetic oil plants and refineries

.

' The inferiority of the GAF has become increasingly evident in its reduced resistence

to Allied air and ground forces.

In the

summer of 1944 fighter aircraft strength of the GAF was great enough to permit an estimated 1,200 sorties per day, but actual sorties

flown were far below this level.

The inability of the GAF to fly

the sorties permitted by available numbers of German aircraft may be traced to a forced policy of conservation,

%

planes, and shortages

low serviceability of

of fuel and suitable pilots.

The overwhelm­

ing superiority of Allied air power and the disorganization by

abandonment

contributed

caused

of airfields during rapid Allied ground advances

also

to the decline of the once great GAF.

It may be concluded

that the Allied bomber offensive has ac­

complished the task of reducing the GAF to a state where it has

been unable to oppose effectively either the amphibious and ground operations

of land forces or the increasingly heavy bombing of

German industry.

•

1

C5-5268,AF 7 J&>jsr

r

/

P-

<

'\u25a0' t

'"

\u25a0

•

n»

[TI-FRICTIJNI BEAfiINGS ANTI-FRICTION BEAJTOGS

A. Attacks on Bearing factories On 17 .August

194-3 Bth Air

na iorce bombers

opened an offensive

the: Axis anti-friction bearing industry by bombing Schwein-r

against

furt, center of European bearing production.

30 September 1944

a total of

made by U.S. air forces.

Between this date and

26 attacks on bearing factories was

Bombs dropped totalled

tons., or 1.2

6^530

percent of the total U.S. Strategic Air Force effort in this fourteen-

month period.

also were made on Schweinfurt

RAF attacks

and Stuttgart

and two French -factories. This offensive against damage

on 14 factories

the bearing industry inflicted considerable

which before damage

cent of total Axis bearing supplies. tacks accounted plants

U.S.

84

accounted

for about

Strategic

Air Force at­

for all or most of the damage

per­

suffered by 12 of these

.

B. Pre-Attack Bearing Position In the building and maintenance large numbers

of a war machine Germany used

of ball arid roller bearings.

military equipment

Every type of mobile

and the industrial machinery needed

for the pro­

duction and distribution of war materials and civilian goods utilized anti- friction bearings.

Prior to attacks

on this industry Germany's

bearing supply position was a comfortable

one according to available

evidence.

Bearings were widely used in military equipment and there

was no apparent

attempt

nation of bearings. use of bearings tion.

to economize

The considerable

through substitution or elimi­

time* lag between

production and

in finished equipment indicated an easy stock posi­

Available sources

of imports were not fully utilized as would

have been the case with inadequate

production.

The anti-friction bearing industry was nevertheless a high-priority target system because

of several

selected

outstanding

as

character

istics :

- 19 -

£5-5268,AF

UliiilLiriw»w-- nd^ll 1. Attacks on bearing plants offered possibilities of cutting

•

across

German industry and, with the limited forces

available, affecting output ol items not easily reached by direct aerial attacks.

2. Production was concentrated plants readily accessible

Schweinfurt

/

in a

relatively

to Allied bombers,

plants alone accounted

ror example,

for approximately 40

percent of Axis supplies.

3- The

small number of

f/

.

industry used a great deal of highly specialized machinery

difficult of replacement

and vulnerable

to fire and high

explosives.

C. Results

of Aerial Attacks

Bombing attacks

on the Axis bearing industry

gradual loss of imports that had accounted, pre-attack

#

supply

- reduced

2 of the following, table.

with the

for 9 percent of Germany 1 s

Axis bearing supplies as shown in column >

Supply as PerRequirements"*

Month

(1)

1943 August September October November December

1944 January February Average

•

- combined

March April May June July August September Average

1/

\u25a0

(2) (3) (in percent of pre-attack

cent of Requirements •

(4)

level)

93

97

95

92 89

99 87 80

35

91

85 85 89

87

79 79 74 73

78 81

84 78

.

84 90 73 59

64

67

63 59 _62

v

Requirements reduced through attacks on user industries such as aircraft, etc., and lower civil-industrial allocations.

C5-5268,AF

As shown in this table, supplies during the first seven months the bearing industry averaged

campaign against

#

of the

about SO percent of

Following a heavier scale of attack beginning in

former levels.

February 1944 supplies dropped still further to less than half of pre-attack

levels, in spite of dispersal oi plants and strenuous The cumulative loss of bearings in the

efforts to restore output.

fourteen month period ending 30 September 1944 is estimated at the equivalent of five months pre-attack

of bearing shortages

The effects

tanks and other end-products

reduction of requirements

on assembly

to this r^elay.

following bomb damage

and other industries, reduced allocations

•

of aircraft, trucks,

apparently were minor until well into

Several factors contributed

1944.

production.

These included a

to aircraft, tank

for civil-industrial uses

and the redesign of equipment to curtail use oi bearings. extent to which requirements column 3 of the above

The

were thus reduced is indicated in In addition, the normal time la? be­

table.

tween production and iinal use oi bearings,

the utilization of pipe­

line and reserve stocks and intensified salvage further delayed the of bearing losses.

effects

Although

effects. were thus

bearings ultimately appeared

since supplies

siderably more than reouirements

table above, August

1943 and

September

reduced

•

only 90 percent

.

1944.

of requirements

These shortages

significant

shortages

64

of

of bearings declined con­

As indicated in column

February 1944, and

assemblies

to losses

postponed,

4of the

were covered between

percent in the period March-

are believed to have resulted in

oi tanks, trucks and other equipment in addition

of these items caused

by direct bomb damage.

'While the

highest priority itetas, such as aircraft, have undoubtedly

been

pro-*

tected, it is doubtful if any major item of military equipment could

have been completely shielded in view oi the extensive damage to the more important bearing factories 1

types.

Bearing shortages

producing a id.de range oi precision

thus have undoubtedly contributed

somewhat

to the decline oi German industrial output.

Ilil^ih^Z*¥ls^lW^^Bß

C5-5268,aF

W' '-iJ

VI OIL

l&iiHft

r* M

lH

i?iF

»tl l«li

it'll

A. Attacks Upon, the Industry

19U^

Attacks

-

Prior to Aprii IQU'-t. attacks upon the Axis oil

industry/ were small scale or sporadic.

war British bombers made numerous upon oil storage

ing

19U3

plants,

damage

spectacular

the early years of the

but re.lativelv ineffective

and refining; installations

in Western

\u25a0

Europe

attacks

.

Dur­

was confined to two of the smaller synthetic oil in Western Europe, end refining installations

six refineries

at Ploesti.

Ir,

These latter refineries

in Romania were targets

low-level attack on 1 August

19U-3?

for a

during which an esti­

mated k,000, 000 tons of refining capacity was knocked out for varying periods. \u25a0was

The chief result of the damage inflicted by this attack

to eliminate temporarily a large cushion of excess

pacity. ducts

Except for an estimated

7 0,000

refining ca­

tons of oil and refined pro­

destroyed by fire, output was not materially affected.

191411smashing

Attacks

- In Aprii19LJ4

aerial offensive

allied bomber Forces

against Axis sources

launched a

of oil products.

Following initial bombing of refir.ery and railway installations Ploesti, the pattern

"Balkan refineries in Germany,

spread over li/urone

of attacks

and oil stores,

and storage

German

installations

at

to include other

synthetic; plants, refineries

in France.

During the ensuing

five month period, a total of 9?, 780 tons of bombs were dropped on Axis oil installations. tons, or

September

1?«3

U.S* Strategic A? r Forces

dropped

6h$U5Q

percent of their total bombing effort in the lay-

period.

RAF bombers dropped

2r,3 02r ,33O tons,

chiefly in at­

tacks against Ruhr synthetic plahts and French oil stores. As a result of 270 attacks

on oil-producing

total of 2)4 synthetic oil plants and been damaged. southern vegetable

In addition, numerous

'France,

Romania

69

- 22 -

crude oil refineries have

storage depots in western and

erd Germany,

oil plants have sustained'

installations, a

and a number of coal tar and

damage

from aerial attacks.

C5-5268,AF

B. Results

of Attacks on 4xis Oil Industries

Pre-Attack Position

#

-

19UU

In the first quarter of

Axis pro-

du-ction of synthetic fuels and refined petroleum products reached level estimated

at

1,3U4-,000 tons

monthly, made up as follows:

1+30,000 •tons 698,000 166,000

Synthetic Oil Oil Crude Refined.

Benzol, Alcohol, Etc. Etc.

1,31^,000

.

percent

35 »7 51.9

12 .k

""

nee^s for military

and civilian purposes a.nd still permit , accumulation

19^4

- including

variously estimated quantities

at;

of oil reserves.

3 to U million tons on 1 Apri

tied up ini the distribution system

distributed throughout Europe in accordance and industrial needs.

"

100.0

This production was sufficient to meet ; Germany's

These reserves,

a

- wer

with anticipated military

While oil was never plentiful for German

armed forces and industrial users,

supplies were sufficient to' support

heavy fighting and a high level of industrial production.

Post-Attack Position

- The

offensive against oil, mounted at a

time when Allied air strength permitted heavy, concentrated peated attacks,

cut deeply into Axis oil output.

duction is estimated

I'onth

(percent of

pre-attack

95 90

85 76

June July August

5U

82 82

50

69

September

39

52

23

U5

October Aye

.

ko ko 63

30

3U

November

•

Consumption

100

!
April-Fov.

I9hh,

During

pro­

as follows:

Production

Farch April

and re­

U9

Difference

production)

-* 55

.

6 -28

-19 -13

-22 -10

- 6

-11+

Output of gasoline

and lubricating oils, of particular importance

for GAF and Panzer

operations,

these averages

was reduced to a greater

extert than

for all products.

C5-5268,AF

s*f?

_ . . . losses of oil products by \u0084

Cumulative estimated

m

3»660

at

normal output.

._

30

_

.

.

September

rel="nofollow"> 000 tons, or the equivaleht of 2

This reduction of

30

to meet minimum requirements.

September

stocks

1,200,000 tons.

are

3 A- months d^sW

ar^ to

It is estimated

that by

were thus drawn upon to the extent of at least

Local fuel shortages

have frequently appeared

have been a most important factor in limiting, German vehicular fie in France and other war theaters of the GA.F

.

** "

,

oil production has forced the

enemy to restrict consumption by all possible means, upor stocks

._>

19UU

Continued shortages

and traf

and in restricting* operations

of oil as a result of sustained

will force depletion of repairing stocks and will

aerial attacks

further limit mobile warfare on the part of the Herman army.

•

I

•

..

-

'•>

r ft*^^^^PV

C5-5268,AF

By

''tS 7 I'^f l' *% F%

"'i

fil E?

ly

JP^^i ißi &3^l im.

mi

1W

-I

VII SUBMARINE YA.RDS During the early part of

19U3>

when the German U-boat menace

building yards and operating bases

at its peak, submarine

priority targets

for Allied borbing attacks.

yards assembling

submarines

against

Twelve German ship­

were subsequently

mainly by Bth

damaged,

the orircipal submarine

at Brest, Lorient,

bases

St. Nazaire, La Pallice and Bordeaux in Western France. forts against naval installations Strategic

f ir

top-

became

Allied air forces also directed a heavy weight

Air Force bombing. of attacks

was

Force tonnages

in

nearly two-fifths of U.S.

absorbed

19U5, and

These ef­

nearly one-fifth of RAF

bomb tonnages.

Bombing of submarine

installations

was abandoned

objective in the summer of 19U3, parti/ because

effectiveness success

of the relrtive in­

of such attacks but mainly because

of anti-submarine

warfare at sea.

RAF area attacks.

installations

the Mediterranean

area,

additional damage in­

during both U.S. precision and

In the first nine months

forces damaged 17 shipyards

of the spectacular

Attacks were resumed in

the summer of 19UU, however, and considerable flicted on submarine

as a primary

of

19^4 Allied bomber

in G rmnny and 2 operational bases

as well

s the French bases

in

which the Allies

stormed during the invasion of W stern EuroD e. Since the enemy had already greatly reduced boats

prior to these

construction

19^1- attacks it is doubtful if U-boat

was materially hampered by the recent bombing. may have been restricted

somewhat

of TJ-

building

Naval operations

through the destruction

of U-boats

and the lowering of serviceability of that part of the underseas fleet which the Nazis shifted from the lost Fremch ports to safer German North Sea bases

.

<

C5-5268,AF

o

VIII RUBBER AT D TIRES

During, a period in 19Uj> when rubber factories constituted

*

high priority target

made on Germany's

system,

V^\\h, damage

rubber plants

successful

attack was

second largest synthetic rubber producer at Huls.

Several other processing ing

an especially

a

plants were damaged

was corfir.ed

to

h,

in varyirg degree.

Axis tire plants

Dur­

and synthetic

at Ludwigsnafen and Osweicim.

Attacks on the rubber industry apparently fect on German military operations. capacity has been available

have had little ef­

P- large excess

of tire making

in Germany and France.

Though lack­

ing natural crude rubber, supplies of synthetic and. reclaimed rubber apparently have been adequate

for all military needs,

in view of the reduction of requirements

particularly

following bomb damage

to

aircraft and motor vehicle industries.

>

- 26 -

wKF^^^^^^^^^^^

C5-5268,AF

i m mM ft IX

M

-i*si

TANKS AND MOTOR TRANSPORT

The German AW industry did not become a hig^-priority target system until the

sumirer

of

19UU

when a number

of successful

cut sharply into enemy production of mechanized

attacks

equipment.

Prior to

this time bomber forces were insufficient to permit concentrated or the industry.

tacks

widely dispersed

etc. necessitated

capacity was large, plants were

Productive

of large pools of trucks, tanks,

ard the existence large-scale

at­

attacks

to materially reduce output

and affect military operations.

.

A

Tanks

During

the course

of RAF attacks

in 19U3 damage

components

tank assembly plants and a number of

on three

This damage

was inflicted producers.

is believed to have curtailed an expansion of the indus­

try but probably had relatively little effect on German fighting strength

.

Attacks in

19hJk

included a successful

bombirg of Friedrichs­

hafen in April during which the principal plants producing tank engines months

and gear assemblies

damaged.

severely

six of the nine known tank assembly

Additional producers

hulls, ordnance laneous

were

engineering

of damage. assemblies

factories

of principal components

depots

used for storage

and steel plants

succeeding

were damaged.

such as engines

and

and ropair, and miscel­

also suffered varying degrees

As a result of these attacks in the third quarter of

in

19UU

it is estimated dropped 20 to

25

that tank percent

below the rate of about 600 tanks monthly that would otherwise have prevailed.

estimated

Monthly losses

in percentages

of potential output are

as follows:

l

- 27 -

C5-5268,AF

JV.

19U3 September October November December

#

7

Percent

February

13 15

March April May June July July

August September

Average

11

Average

5

11

lU

January-

B.

19Uh

Percent

Trucks ard Miscellaneous

2U 2U

20

21 21

19

19U3

amplified in

by

damage

2k

2k 23 23

, and

#

to these

.

of the

including the

This

55 5

t>larts and to various corroorerts

an estimated

15

to 20 percent

producers

was reduced

Production of

20 percent below former levels

monthly.

through bomb damage

by Allied occupation of French

tant factories

U0

AFV equipment.

cars was reduced an estimated

Losses

19UL

As a

below tV e previous monthly rate of

about l[;,000 trucks and miscellaneous

3*500

dsra^e was

main plants.

depots, output in the third quarter of

of about

factories

principal producers

and ordnance

personnel

tractors

to 11 assembly

components

19' 'L when 25

of motor transport were damaged, result of damage

'

AFVs

'and various plants producing; minor considerably

>

17

Production of trucks, armored cars, half-tracks was cut somewhat during

5^

in these

were overshadowed

during August

ard "Belgian plants.

countries

percent of Axis light trucks,

A number of impor­

formerly accounting

25

19^*U

for more than

percent of medium trucks and 20

percent of heavy trucks were lost to Germany during Allied advances.

As a combined

result of territorial losses

and bomb damage

factories,, output of Axis trucks and miscellaneous

•

ing the summer and early fall of

19^U

to Herman

AFV equipment dur­

was reduced more than J.iO per­

cent below former production levels. The effects equipment

of these losses

of tanks, trucks and other AFV

on German military operations

is somewhat

difficult to

*£*!)

m

evaluate

in view of the restrictions

fuel following attacks anized equipment

\u2666

already^niosecr

upon the Axis oil industry.

ay shortages

Losses

of

of mech­

through aerial attack may in fact have but little

effect on the duration of German defense the full use of the equipment

if fuel shortages

that is already available.

prevent

However,

should production of fuel recover during the winter mortbs, the loss of badly needed constitute

tanks and the depletion of the Axis truck dool must

serious blows to German military forces already operat­

ing with inadequate

AFV

equipment.

#

#

- 29 -

C5-5268,aF

X

|J|lfSff j§4

ARMAMEHTS AND ICISCELLANEOUS ENG TIBERTNG

ll~'

' \ 38* I §

Xk

and various engineering products has

Production of armaments

suffered heavily from bobbing, particularly as a result of RIF area Forty-four factories

attacks.

as priority targets

19141+

at least

89

in this category, most of them rated

by the MEW, suffered bomb

important

category were plants

factories

were damaged.

the large armament

such as

damage

in

19U3 •

I?1

Included in this

works of TfruDp at

Essen and Rheinmetall Borsig at Dusseldorf, steel fabrication plants producing guns, shells, etc., heavy engineering plants producing loco­ motives and railway equipment,

boilers, diesel engines, etc., and

light engineering plants manufacturing

motor transport

small arms and various other engineering products.

components,

Many of these

plants could be considered

part of specific industries

craft and motor transport,

were itnot for the fact that several

products

are usually produced

such as air­

and that definite information on

output

is usually lacking. Losses

Pmented

of output of these

the specific damage

bearings,

tanks, etc.

engineering industries

to industries

producing aircraft, oil,

Practically all branches

tion have been affected.

of German war produc­

although no critical shortages

and military equipment have appeared,

have supple-

of armaments

the fighting strength of German

armed forces has been impaired and the task of Allied ground forces thus made easier.

:np

**\u25a0

- 30 -

C5~5268,AF

lEMs%m mnl*lf« a INSTRUMENTS ijiu'gf

B

XI.I ACFIIB TOCLS MD PHEC7SIOTST

producing rachine

Fifteen factories

and various precision instruments attacks,

Twenty one plants,

191|3» suffered

bomb damage

'^ *

/I % %

tools, abras^

damaged

yore

—

A

ff*f^

S^^'Tahe^^

ye

jP

in 1,9^3 during RfiF

including; several of those damaged in

19 4--.

in the first nine months of

The resulting loss of production in this industry ha.t intensi­ fied the difficulties of r<3pla6in£ irachine tools and equipment damaged

factories

IPJ+3

by

aerial attacks.

mo-re than half of the machine

used to replace bomb -damaged

equipment.

industry's

output

has been

The lowering of" machine

production es s r: suit of direct damage to the

restricted

that sirce early

It is estimated

tool

in

tool

has not only

industry

of de.maged slants but hag also limited

such re-equipment

of tools and removed any surplus industrial capa­

normal replacement

city that might have boon used for direct production of armaments.

XII* ELECTRICAL EQU TPI^NT

Plant? producing various types of electrical frequently damaged Berlin,

in

19U5

of air attacks, particularly ir.

during tic course

Twenty-five important plants a n--l about

30

Between 1 I/arch

equipment have been

in this industry

plants in the first nine months

19U3

&&d 30 June

of

by bombing.

15

by the

of the

was seriously

plan

damaged

Output of the industry over this period was reduced

percent below tht

absence

factories

damaged

l^l+'-i.

I9LLI it is estimrted

British Ministry of Fome Security that about 20 percent rea. of German electrical equipment

i?'ere

of bombing.

Iqv©l

that probably would have prevailed in the

The production of particular item? has suffered

more than this average, led to bottlenecks

10­

particularly in the Berlin area, and may have

in the production of certain military equipment.

-

31

-

C5-5268,AF

a

R Pi

XIII.METALS

- STEEL AND NOM^'gRROUS

m

1111 Ull Ug

v

on the Ruhr area in 1943, a total of 16

During RAF attacks

steel plants were damaged by bombing.

In 194-4- a total of 17

steel plants, including some of those hit in 194-3, were damaged. Non-ferrous

plants also have suffered,

metal

being damaged

8 important plants

in 1943 and 9 plants in 194-4.

Damage to German steel plants in conjunction with the ex­

tensive area damage caused by RAF attacks

reduced German steel

output in 1943 by an estimated 10 percent. large amount of excess

with only moderate measure

cushioned

Existence of a

capacity in the steel industry, combined

vulnerability to damage,

in considerable

the effects of attacks and

mins_mized

losses.

In 1944 production was also lost as a result of bombing, but reduction of output from this cause

was far overshadowed

by the

loss of industrial plants in France, Luxembourg and Belgium and by the loss of imported ores from Sweden and other sources. The consequent

decline in German steel production,

well under way by 30 September

194-4, must soon critically re­

strict output of shells, mechanized materials

already

equipment

and other war

.

Damage to German plants refining copper, zinc, aluminum

metals has been on a relatively small

or other non-ferrous scale.

In view of the large output of aluminum and the exist­

ence of excess

capacity in the non-ferrous

metal industry, it

is doubtful if German war production has been materially affected by this damage.

HI

r.

_ _ 09

C5-5268,AF

\u25a0

XIV CHEMICALS AMD EXPLOSIVES

wmju#

\u25a0

/^

" t

9

The German chemical industry, though not a priority target system, has suffered

aerial attacks.

considerable

damage, mainly through RAF

A total of 14- rated or important chemical

plants were damaged

with 37 plants, two-thirds

in 194-3 compared

of which have MEW ratings, in 1944.

Included in this latter

group were 6 plants producing hydrogen peroxide, used by rocket

and robot aircraft.

Five large explosives plants in France,

taken over by the Germans

for propellant manufacture,

knocked out by devastating

RAF attacks

.

also were

It is doubtful if damage to the chemical industry has created any significant bottlenecks

in German war production.

Bomb damage to chemical plants has contributed,

however, to

the overall decline of German industrial output.

- - 33 -

*3a

C5-5268,AF

Ll

rm

XV

GENERAL LEVEL OF INDUSTRIAL OUTPUT

II

I

X

Allied strategic bombing of Germany has seriously impaired her war making potential. damage,

Attacks have resulted in enormous

widespread devastation

industrial

of residential and commercial property

in an ever increasing list of German cities, and the loss of millions of man hours of productive effort.

In addition to creating shortages

of aircraft, oil and other specific items, every branch of Germany's war effort has been affected, reduced.

and the level of total war production

The reduction of general industrial output may be attri­

buted in large measure

to RAF attacks against

the larger

German

cities. A,

Industrial Damage Damaged industrial installations

relatively important factories damaged

in Axis Europe include 252 in 1943 and

53&

i n 1944.

Most of these plants have been "rated" as priority targets British Ministry of Economic Warfare. plants and a statement

A classified list of these

of the extent of damage

according to the following categories:

- 34 -

by the

appear in Appendix A

T In addition to these

•

factories, hundreds of small plants, mostly

unidentified, have been damaged I

*^ ®^ l ail^^ lll^^l I

or destroyed during area attacks.

In 1943 at least 1,200 such plants sustained varying degrees of damage,

and in 1944 it is believed that comparable

inflicted.

damage

has been

In view of the total gearing of the German economy to

war production, damage

to almost any plant would affect her war ef­

fort in some degree. B. Residential

and Commercial Damage

The destruction of civic and residential property in German cities has steadily spread under the impact of growing Allied at­ Damage in the more heavily damaged cities on

tacks.

(in terms of the percentages

30 June 1944

of buildings destroyed or rendered un­

inhabitable) was as follows:

•

City

Kassel Remscheid Hamburg

Population (Pre-war )

216,000 107,000

54

53 1 y/ 5i 1/

1,800,000

Aachen Cologne

49

164,000 906,000

Dusseldorf

530,000 450,000 570,000

570,000

Augsburg

44 44 42 y 40

Munchen Gladbach Ludwigshafen

37 37

Hannover

Frankfurt

Friedrichshafen Wuppertal

Schweinfurt

•

Percent of Property Seriously Damaged

46

.

186,000 186,000

130,000 430,000 25,000 411,000

36

33 32

60,000

720,000 550,000 170,000 1,139,000 4,400,000

Leipzig Dortmund Krefeld Essen Berlin

28

Mulheim

23

136,000

Total 21 cities

33

13,480,000

18 additional cities

10 (est.)

5,336,000

2 (est.)

16

13.957.000 32,773,000

9

69.622,000

Stettin

354 additional cities Total

393 German cities

Total German Reich

1/

25 25 24

23

y/ 1/ 20 1

Attacked by RAF between 1 JuLy^a|K|

380,000

3D

September 1944

\

kfi

Destruction of housing, estimated at the end of

#

s is believed

194-3

to

at 1,500,000 dwelling units

have reached a total of

nearly

2,000,000 units by 30 September 1944, and to have forced a -total of

6,000,000

persons

from their original living quarters.

The increasing weight of aerial attack on Germany combined with military defeats

and loss of territory

have reduced industrial out­

put but have not broken German morale, in large part because

controls and propaganda.

of Nazi

Strategic bombing has helped destroy

Germany's faith in victory, however, and by intensifying war weari-* ness and difficulties of production have cut deeply into Germany's industrial war effort. C. Effect of

Bombing

on Production

As a result of aerial attacks

•

estimated averaged

that German industrial production since April 1943 has

from 12 to 15 percent below the level that would have pre­

vailed in the absence of causes

on factories and cities, it is

of bombing.

This: loss -resulted from a number

including:

1. Loss of industrial man hours in destroyed and damaged

factor­

ies, and loss of time, and efficiency of workers as a result of repeated air raid warnings. 2. Shortages

of

materials, equipment, power, transport, etc.

resulting from damage

to raw material and component pro­

ducers, public utilities and administrative

agencies.

3- Diversion of manpower to repair of bomb damaged industrial, residential and other property, and replacement ery and materials

of machin­

destroyed by bombing.

4. Evacuation of civilians and dispersal of industrial

The industrial

#

vital armaments

output lost through area attacks

and military equipment,

industrial supplies.

Overall losses

plants.

has included

as well as civilian and

of production have been dis­

tributed over many types of industry, and have thereby supplemented

—

?6

C5-5268,AF 36

am 1^

msi

of aircraft, oil and bearings.

the specific shortages

to a critical degree by area attacks,

industry has been damaged

the

of industrial output have weakened the Wehrmacht and

general losses

#

Although no

contributed thereby to military successes

of the Allies.

D. Non-German Contributions

The industrial might of Germany has been enormously enhanced during the course

of the war by the acquisition of satellites

foreign labor impressed into service in

occupied territories.-

Germany has accounted

and

for an estimated

20 percent

of the total gain­

fully employed in Germany. . Occupied countries have exported large

amounts of goods to Germany, supported German forces of occupation and satellite military forces, and provided labor for tasks such as These contributions,

building coastal defenses.

•

have amounted

in financial terms,

to as much as 30 percent of the Axis outlay for war

production, as shown below (data from FEA):

y.

Expenditures

(Billion R. !,'!.)

German

Other Europe

Other Europe as

% of Total

Total

70.0

22.6

75.0 93.0 95.0

30.5

105.5

19.0

114.0 :

92.6 :

40,0

133.0

assistance

30.1 16.6

;

While contributions from occupied countries of somewhat less importance

24.4

28.9

qualitatively were

than indicated in financial terms, the

exacted by Germany was nevertheless

very considerable.

The loss of most of the occupied territories and of the strategic materials essential

to German industry consequently

body blow to German war production. plies as of

30

September

These losses

constitute of strategic

a sup­

1944 include:

# C5-5268,AF

$S « k}l&aF%.%3%$ £

, I'i-&* \L$

35 percent of Axis ft it 35 tt it ft 80

60

ti

70

#

it

it

manganese

n

it

nickel

75 60

it

M

ft

chrome

ft

't

II

20

M

ft

ft

50 35

II

tt

ft

It

copper aluminum bauxite wood pulp

ft

It

tt

motor vehicles

It

ft

It

bearings

30

10

'

tt tt

.

The combined effect of bomb damage and the even greater losses of raw materials and industrial Contributions from other countries is

steadily and rapidly increasing Allied superiority in production

and must seriously weaken German military resistance ing

during the corn­

winter months.

• f

•

llMfl^ P-^^'^^l

C5-526a,AF 38

XVI TRANSPORTATION A. Rail and Road Installations

Attacks on transportation

objectives,

task of tactical air forces, have accounted bomb tonnage of the Strategic Air Forces system.

though primarily the

for more of the

than any other target

The 217,000 tons dropped on rail and road transpor­

tation targets

of 194-4- represented

in the first nine months

28 percent of the U.S. Bth and 15th Air Forces effort and 20 percent of RAF bombing attpcks.

sive against transportation

The main targets in this offen­

were rail centers

and rail and road

bridges in France, Belgium, Italy and the Balkans. September

194-4- * the transport system in Germany had not been

heavily attacked, transport

although some damage

had been inflicted on

installations, mainly by area attacks.

the German transport

\

Up to 30

requirements

These affected

situation chiefly by increasing

for relief, reconstruction

transport

and evacuation

of devas­

tated areas. to rail, shipping installations

As a result of damage

motor vehicles, the transport

system supplying Axis fighting

fronts has been unable to carry adequate even defensive

fighting.

and

Damage

interdiction v/hich is acknov/ledged

military supplies for

to transport,

including bridge

to be the most effective

form of attack on enemy transport, has been most effectively accomplished

by medium and fighter bombers.

The strategic air

forces, however, have done effective work in attacking rail

centers,

port facilities, bridges at extreme operational ranges

and heavily defended

objectives.

In Italy the strategic

air forces have supplemented

tacti­

cal air force interdiction by attacking ports and rail instal­ lations beyond the primary interdiction zone.

In the Balkans,

C5r5268.,AF

IJllv

•

where the Mediterranean Strategic Air Forces have been respon­ sible for all operations rail installations

except in Yugoslavia,

the bombing of

and mining of the Danube disrupted the flow

of German supplies to the Russian front and slowed the movement of oil and other vital raw materials

to central Europe.

Western France and Belgium the Allied Air Forces, strategic bombers,

were assigned

forcements

to the beachhead

transport

and transportation

rendered

and battle area by attacking his

facilities

.

Prior to t)-day the

Air Forces to the accom­

of these objectives was a series

of attacks

which

and heavily damaged

37 selected rail centers unusuable

23 more.

including

the task of slowing enemy rein­

principal contribution of the Strategic plishment

In

After D-day,- the restriction of enemy movement

in

the battle zone was largely the work of the tactical air forces, while the heavy bombers

#

combined with tactical bombers

to

and bridges in order to seal off the battle

attack rail centers

zone from supply and reinforcement.

The bombing of rail centers

and bridges in Southern France, most of which was done by stra* tegic air forces, denied freedom of movement

to the Nazi forces

and thereby greatly aided in the occupation of this part of the continent. Following the Allied advance

the major weight of attacks

to the frontiers of .the Reich

against

transportation

for the first time on German rail centers, waterways.

falls

bridges and inland

Attacks on the German transport system affects both

the enemy's military strength and deployment,

•

targets

his war industries

.

and the output of

Whereas the first impacts of previous air

attacks fell upon the economic traffic of occupied or satellite

countries, capacity,

or in some cases

upon a cushion of excess

transport

any reduction of traffic in the Reich affects vital

war production or the health and morale of the German homeland. 40

C5-S26B,AF

09

ttf

B. Ports and Naval Bases Hamburg, Attacks against port cities such as Smden, Hamburg^

at Kiel, Toulon, etc., and inland waterway ports and

naval bases

#

w'jpjkii

canals have constituted a significant part of the bombing offen­ sive against Axis transport.

Although the bomb tonnages

directed

against docks and shipping have been relatively small, the loss of ships and harbor facilities and the interruption of water­ borne traffic have affected both industrial output and military movements

.

C, Minelaying

I'ines laid by RAF Bomber Command since the beginning of the war

totalled

nearly 4-0,000 on

30 September 1944. Known casual­

ties from this effort included more than 450 ships sunk 'and nearly 400 damaged. transport

#

Other casualties

by mining operations

Danube River, and by surface

mand and other air forces.

were inflicted on Axis

in the Mediterranean operations

of the RAF Coastal Com­

The loss of vessels

air action has cost the Axis valuable cargoes the movement

of other industrial cargoes

Sea and the

by mining and by

and shipping, slowed

and disrupted the enemy's

military transport.

•

- 41 _

C5-5268,riF

XVII

Heavy ftomber forces operating in conjunction with medium and fighter bombers have played a vital role in amphibious operations

in Sicily, Italy, Normandy and Southern

breakthrough

success

in Normandy found heavy bombers

of Allied ground advances.

Strategic

France.

The

contributing to the

Allied

In such operations

Air Forces dropped 101j.,600 tons of bombs in the four

month period 1 June-30 efforts and

191+U

landing

19

September

About 6 percent

to the task of ground support.

Aircraft Installations

B. Pilotless

Defensive operations against for flying bomb attacks a considerable

launching

and supply sites

part of the strategic

bombing effort.

"feombs

this campaign.

During the first nine months of

""/ere

dropped by Allied Strategic

19hh>

cent of USSTAF tonrages

and 17 percent of WAF tonnages

on such installations.

As a result of these

was delayed and numerous

sites rendered

very large installations

intended

on England

used

ag?inst England required the diversion of

106,14.00 tons of

ing attacks

of USSTAF

of RAF efforts in the first nine months of

percent

were devoted

19i-|i4-«

attacks

unusable,

Forces in about 7

per­

were dropped construction

including four

for heavy rockets.

were restricted

About

Robot bomb­

although not eliminated by

these Allied bombing operations.

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APPENDIX A

BOMB DAMAGE TO AXIS INDUSTRIES The following table

lists important Axis plants that have been sig­

nificantly damaged by Allied aerial attacks

of

19^1-*

and indicates

in

19U3

an<3- the first 9 months

the relative importance and the damage

suffered by

'

I The "MEW ratings shown for most industrial plants

each of these plants. are defined as follows; Class 1 Class 1 Class 2 Class

3

-

Plants of primary importance in Germany's war effort

and possessing bottleneck characteristics

Major factories in industries of major importance.

Minor factories in industries of major importance,

or major factories in minor industries.

Subsidiary factories of small output.

Not included in the list of damaged plants are very large numbers of unrated sustained attacks;

and unidentified

varying degrees

hundreds

factories.

At least 1,200 of these

of damage in

19U3

small plants

during the course of R^F area

of similar plants were damaged

or destroyed in

Though individually small, these plants in the aggregate

account

19^4-N for a

significant part of German industrial output. Damaged plants in the following tables

are listed as follows:

IAircraft A. GAF Single^Engine Fighters B. GAP Twin-Engine Fighters C. GAF Jet-Propelled Fighters D. Bombers, Transport, Misc. E. Italian Aircraft F. Repair G. Aero-Engines H. Minor Aircraft Components II Anti-Friction Bearings

111 Oil

A. Synthetic Plants B. Refineries C. Miscellaneous

IV Rubber and Tires

V Submarine Yards and Bases

VI Tanks and Motor Transport

VII Armaments and Misc. Engineering

VIII Machine Tools and Precision Instruments

IX Electrical Equipment

X Metals Steel and Non-ferrous

XI Chemicals and Explosives

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i

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