Spouses-latip-malimit-nia-people-vs-castaneda.docx

SPOUSES OMAR & MOSHIERA LATIP v. ROSALIE CHUA FACTS: Rosalie is the owner of Roferxane Building in Baclaran. Spouses Latip entered into a lease contract with Rosalie. A year after the commencement of the lease, Rosalie, through counsel, sent the spouses a letter demanding payment of back rentals and should they fail to do so to vacate the leased cubicles.

The entire lease rentals for the 2 cubicles for 6 years had already been paid in the amount of P2M+. RTC shot down Rosalie’s claim that the P2M+ was simply goodwill payment by by prospective lessees to their lessor, and not payment for the purchase of lease rights. The court said that apart from her bare allegations, Rosalie did not adduce evidence to substantiate this claim. CA’s Ruling:

When spouses did not heed Rosalie’s demand, she filed a complaint for unlawful detainer + damages against them. She attached to the complaint a contract of lease over 2 cubicles in Roferxane Bldg.

Reversed RTC’s decision and reinstated METC’s decision. The alleged defects in the contract of lease did not render the contract ineffective.

Spouses Latip argues that he lease of the 2 cubicles had already been paid in full as evidenced by receipts showing payment to Rosalie of the total amount of P2,570,000. There were 3 receipts in Rosalie’s handwriting. 1. P2M 2. P500K 3. P70K Spouses also averred that sometime in October 1999, Rosalie offered for sale lease rights over 2 cubicles. Having in mind the brisk sale of goods during the Christmas season, they readily accepted Rosalie’s offer to purchase lease rights. The immediate payment of P2M+ would be used to finish construction of the building giving them first priority in the occupation of the finished cubicles. And as soon as the 2 cubicles were finished, Spouses occupied them.

On the issue of whether the amount of P2M+ merely constituted payment of goodwill money, the CA took judicial notice of this common practice in the area of Baclaran, especially around the Redemptorist Church. According to CA, this judicial notice was bolstered by the Joint Sworn Declaration of the stallholders at Roferxane Bldg. that they all had paid goodwill money to Rosalie prior to occupying the stalls thereat. Spouses Latip appealed. ISSUE: Whether the payment of 2M can be considered as judicial notice constituting goodwill money? SC DECISION:

Spouses averred that the contract of lease they signed had been novated by their purchase of lease rights of the subject cubicles. Thus, they were surprised to receive a demand letter from Rosalie’s counsel.

NO. Sections 1 and 2 of Rule 129 of the Rules of Court declare when the taking of judicial notice is mandatory or discretionary on the courts, thus State Prosecutors v. Muro is instructive.

METC’s Ruling: In favor of Rosalie. It ordered the spouses to vacate and pay rent arrearages, 10% increase in the rent, atty’s fees and cost of suit. RTC’s Ruling: Reversed MTC’s ruling. Spouses Latio could not be ejected until the expiration of the lease period. It did not give credence to the contract of lease since it was not notarized and incomplete, lacking: 1. Signature of Ferdinand, Rosalie’s husband 2. Signatures of Spouses Latip on the 1st page 3. Specific dates for the term of the contract 4. Exact date of execution of the document 5. Provision for payment of deposit or advance rental which is supposedly uncommon in big commercial lease contracts

The power to take judicial notice is to be exercised by courts with caution; care must be taken that the requisite notoriety exists; and every reasonable doubt on the subject should be promptly resolved in the negative. Generally speaking, matters of judicial notice have three material requisites: (1) the matter must be one of common and general knowledge; (2) it must be well and authoritatively settled and not doubtful or uncertain; and (3) it must be known to be within the limits of the jurisdiction of the court. The principal guide in determining what facts may be assumed to be judicially known is that of notoriety. The matter which the CA judicial notice of does not meet the requisite of notoriety. Only CA took judicial notice of this supposed practice to pay goodwill money to the lessor in the Baclaran area. Rosalie, apart from her bare allegation, adduced no evidence to prove her claim that the amount of P2M+ simply constituted the payment of goodwill money. Subsequently, Rosalie attached an

annex to her petition for review before the CA, containing a joint declaration under oath by other stallholders in Roferxane Bldg. that they had paid goodwill money to Rosalie as their lessor. The reason why our rules on evidence provide for matters that need not be proved under Rule 129, specifically on judicial notice, is to dispense with the taking of the usual form of evidence on a certain matter so notoriously known, it will not be disputed by the parties.

This right, as put by Mr. Justice Holmes in Holt vs. United States, 26 ". . . is a prohibition of the use of physical or moral compulsion, to extort communications from him . . ." It is simply a prohibition against legal process to extract from the [accused]'s own lips, against his will, admission of his guilt. 27

However, in this case, the requisite of notoriety is belied by the necessity of attaching documentary evidence, i.e., Joint Affidavit of the stallholders. In short, the alleged practice still had to be proven by Rosalie; contravening the title itself of Rule 129 of the Rules of Court—What need not be proved.

Thus, the wallet is admissible to establish the fact that it was the very wallet taken from Malaki on the night of the robbery. The identification card, residence certificate and keys found inside the wallet, on the other hand, are admissible to prove that the wallet really belongs to Malaki. Furthermore, even assuming arguendo that these pieces of evidence are inadmissible, the same will not detract from appellant's culpability considering the existence of other evidence and circumstances establishing appellant's identity and guilt as perpetrator of the crime charged.

In the end, the court ruled that the amount of P2,570,000 shall be considered as advance rentals.

National Irrigation Administration vs Gamit

People v Malimit FACTS:  Onofre Malaki (victim) was attending to his store. Malaki's houseboy Edilberto Batin, was busy cooking supper at the kitchen located at the back of the store.  He proceeded directly to the store to ask Malaki if supper is to be prepared. As Batin stepped inside the store, he saw accused Encarnacion “Manolo” Malimit coming out of the store with a bloodied bolo while his boss, bathed in his own blood, was sprawled on the floor.  He also noticed that the store's drawer was opened and ransacked and the wallet of Malaki was missing from his pocket Malimit was then captured. He pointed to the police officers where he hid the wallet. He was subsequently convicted of the special complex crime of robbery with homicide. He argues that the wallet of Malimit should not be admitted as evidence since it violates his right against self-incrimination. ISSUE: WON the wallet may be admitted as evidence? HELD: YES. The wallet is considered as Object Evidence and NOT AN INCRIMINATING STATEMENT. The right against self-incrimination guaranteed under our fundamental law finds no application in this case. The evidence (Wallet) sought to be excluded is not an incriminating statement but an object evidence.

Facts: Estanislao Gamit filed a complaint against the defendant National Irrigation Administration for reformation of contract, recovery of possession and damages. Gamit alleges that in the contract of lease entered into, the real agreement or intention of the parties was only for the lease of the twenty five (25,000) thousand square meters by defendant at the rate of P0.10 centavos per square meter, for a period of ten (10) years from date of execution with the right of defendant to purchase the area upon the termination of the lease, on a price to be negotiated and agreed upon, by and between the parties after the lapse of the ten (10) year period. Gamit alleges that there was a mistake in its part and that NIA fraudulently inserted in the contract the provision that after 10 years of lease, the rentals paid forms part of the purchase price which shall not exceed P25,000.00. National Irrigation argues that there was no fraud in the agreement which was signed by Gamit and his wife and it clearly stated that after 10 years of lease, the rentals paid forms part of the purchase price which shall not exceed P25,000.00. RTC did not order the reformation of the instrument since it is only a question of law and not a question of fact. It then interpreted the contract as contract of lease with right to purchase. CA affirmed. Issue: Whether or not the court of appeals has properly interpreted the contract. Held: NO. As a general rule, parol evidence is not admissible for the purpose of varying the terms of a contract. However, when the issue that a contract does not express the intention of the parties, the court should hear the evidence for the purpose of ascertaining the true intention of the parties. A perusal of the complaint at bar and the relief prayed for therein shows that this is clearly a case for reformation of instrument.

As a general rule, when the terms of an agreement have been reduced to writing, it is considered as containing all the terms agreed upon and there can be, between the parties and their successors in interest, no evidence of such terms other than the contents of the written agreement, EXCEPT when it fails to express the true intent and agreement of the parties thereto, in which case, one of the parties may bring an action for the reformation of the instrument to the end that such true intention may be expressed. The lower court erred in not conducting a trial for the purpose of determining the true intention of the parties. It failed to appreciate the distinction between interpretation and reformation of contracts. While the aim in interpretation of contracts is to ascertain the true intention of the parties, interpretation is not, however, equivalent to reformation of contracts. Since the complaint in the case at bar raises the issue that the contract of lease does not express the true intention or agreement of the parties due to mistake on the part of the plaintiff (private respondent) and fraud on the part of the defendant (petitioner), the court a quo should have conducted a trial and received the evidence of the parties for the purpose of ascertaining the true intention of the parties when they executed the instrument in question.

People vs Castaneda Facts: Victoria filed a complaint for Falsification of Public Document against her husband, Benjamin. Victoria alleged that Benjamin falsified her signature in a deed of sale of a house belonging to the conjugal partnership, making it appear that she gave her marital consent to said sale. At the trial, the prosecution called to the witness stand Victoria, but the defense moved to disqualify her as a witness, invoking the rule that a spouse cannot be examined without the consent of the other spouse, except in a civil case by one against the other or in a criminal case for a crime committed by one against another. The prosecution opposed the motion on the ground that the case falls under the exception, contending that it is a criminal case committed by one against the other. The trial court granted the motion, disqualifying Victoria from testifying against Benjamin. Their motion for reconsideration denied, the prosecution elevated the case to the Supreme Court on pure question of law

Issue: Whether or not the criminal case for Falsification of Public Document may be considered as a criminal case for a crime committed by a husband against his wife and, therefore, an exception to the rule on marital disqualification.

Held: Yes. The case is an exception to the marital disqualification rule, as a criminal case for a crime committed by the accused-husband against the witness-wife.

The act complained of as constituting the crime of Falsification of Public Document is the forgery by the accused of his wife's signature in a deed of sale, thereby making it appear therein that said wife consented to the sale of a house and lot belonging to their conjugal partnership when in fact and in truth she did not. It must be noted that had the sale of the said house and lot, and the signing of the wife's name by her husband in the deed of sale, been made with the consent of the wife, no crime could have been charged against said husband Clearly, therefore, it is the husband's breach of his wife's confidence which gave rise to the offense charged. And it is this same breach of trust which prompted the wife to make the necessary complaint with the Office of the Provincial Fiscal which, accordingly, filed the aforesaid criminal case. To rule, therefore, that such criminal case is not one for a crime committed by one spouse against the other is to advance a conclusion which completely disregards the factual antecedents of the instant case. It is undeniable that the act complained of had the effect of directly and vitally impairing the conjugal relation. This is apparent not only in the act of the wife in personally lodging her complaint with the Office of the Provincial Fiscal, but also in her insistent efforts in connection with the instant petition, which seeks to set aside the order disqualified her from testifying against her husband. Taken collectively, the actuations of the witness-wife underscore the fact that the martial and domestic relations between her and the accused-husband have become so strained that there is no more harmony to be preserved said nor peace and tranquility which may be disturbed. In such a case, the "identity of interests disappears and the consequent danger of perjury based on that identity is nonexistent. Likewise, in such a situation, the security and confidence of private life which the law aims at protecting will be nothing but Ideals which, through their absence, merely leave a void in the unhappy home. Thus, there is no reason to apply the martial disqualification rule.