Spl-arson Digests.docx

ESTIPONA V. LOBRIGO (G.R. NO. 226679; AUGUST 15, 2017) FACTS: Estipona was charged with an offense under RA 9165. He wants to enter into a plea bargaining agreement but Judge Lobrigo did not allow him to do so because Section 23 specifically prohibits plea bargaining in drugs cases. Estipona argues that Section 23 is unconstitutional. ISSUE: Is Section 23 of RA 9165, which prohibits plea-bargaining in drugs cases, unconstitutional? HELD: Yes, Section 23 of RA 9165 is unconstitutional for two reasons. First, it violates the equal protection clause since other criminals (rapists, murderers, etc.) are allowed to plea bargain but drug offenders are not, considering that rape and murder are more heinous than drug offenses. Second, it violates the doctrine of separation of powers by encroaching upon the rule-making power of the Supreme Court under the constitution. Plea-bargaining is procedural in nature and it is within the sole prerogative of the Supreme Court.

Colinares vs. People of the Philippines Facts: Arnel Colinares was charged and found guilty beyond reasonable doubt of frustrated homicide by the RTC of Camarines Sur. He was sentenced to suffer imprisonment from two years and four months of prison correccional, as minimum, to six years and one day of prison mayor, as maximum. Since the maximum probationable imprisonment under the law was only up to six years, Arnel did not qualify for probation. On appeal by Colinares, the Court of Appeals sustained the RTC’s decision. Unsatisfied with the Court of Appeal’s decision, petitioner then appealed to the Supreme Court and took the position that he should be entitled to apply for probation in case the Court metes out a new penalty on him that makes his offense probationable, which was strongly opposed by the Solicitor General reiterating that under the Probation Law, no application for probation can be entertained once the accused has perfected his appeal from the judgment of conviction. The Supreme Court, however, found that Colinares is guilty of attempted homicide and not of frustrated homicide. Issue: Whether or not Arnel Colinares may still apply for probation on remand of the case to the trial court Ruling: Yes, The Supreme Court ruled that Colinares may apply for probation upon remand of his case to the RTC. Ordinarily, an accused would no longer be entitled to apply for probation, he having appealed from the judgment of the RTC convicting him for frustrated homicide. But in this case the Supreme Court ruled to set aside the judgment of the RTC and found him only liable for attempted homicide, if the Supreme Court follows the established rule that no accused can apply for probation on appeal, the accused would suffer from the erroneous judgment of the RTC with no fault of his own, therefore defying fairness and equity. Case Digest Buebos vs People GR 163938 03/28/2008 FACTS Adelina Borbe was in her house watching over her sick child. She heard some nose, got up and saw the petitioners congregating in front of her hut. When she went out, she saw the roof of her hut on fire. Instead of helping her, petitioners fled. ISSUE Whether or not petitioners are liable for simple arson or for destructive arson of an inhabited house which merits a penalty of up to reclusion perpetua. RULING: 1. The nature of Destructive Arson is distinguished from Simple Arson by the degree of perversity or viciousness of the criminal offender. The acts committed under Art. 320 of the Revised Penal Code (as amended) constituting Destructive Arson are characterized as heinous crimes for being grievous, odious and hateful offenses and which,

by reason of their inherent or manifest wickedness, viciousness, atrocity and perversity are repugnant and outrageous to the common standards and norms of decency and morality in a just, civilized and ordered society. 2. On the other hand, acts committed under PD 1613 constituting Simple Arson are crimes with a lesser degree of perversity and viciousness that the law punishes with a lesser penalty. In other words, Simple Arson contemplates crimes with less significant social, economic, political and national security implications than Destructive Arson. However, acts falling under Simple Arson may nevertheless be converted into Destructive Arson depending on the qualifying circumstances present.

Prescinding from the above clarification vis-à-vis the description of the crime as stated in the accusatory portion of the Information, it is quite evident that accused-appellant was charged with the crime of Simple Arson — for having "deliberately set fire upon the two-storey residential house of ROBERTO SEPARA and family . . . knowing the same to be an inhabited house and situated in a thickly populated place and as a consequence thereof a conflagration ensued and the said building, together with some seven (7) adjoining residential houses, were razed by fire." Now, to the penalty. Applying the Indeterminate Sentence Law, the maximum of the indeterminate penalty should range from six (6) years and one (1) day to twelve (12) years. Considering that no aggravating or mitigating circumstance attended the commission of the offense, the penalty should be imposed in its medium period [eight (8) years and one (1) day to ten (10) years]. The minimum of the indeterminate sentence is prision correctional,which has a range of six (6) months and one (1) day to six (6) years, to be imposed in any of its periods. The CA sentence is in accord with law and jurisprudence. We sustain it. WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED. The appealed judgment is AFFIRMED in full. SO ORDERED. PEOPLE VS. JESSIE MURCIA

People of the Philippines vs. Ferdinand Baluntong G.R. No. 182061 March 15, 2010 Facts: Ferdinand Baluntong set on fire, the house of Celerina Solangon, causing the complete destruction of the said house and the death of Celerina Solangon and Alvin Savarez, and inflicting serious physical injuries on Joshua Savarez, thereby performing all the acts of execution which would produce the crime of murder as a consequence but which, nevertheless do not produce it by reason of causes independent of the will of the perpetrator. The Trial Court found accused guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the complex crime of double murder and frustrated murder. He is sentenced to suffer the supreme penalty of death. The Court of Appeals affirmed the decision of the trial court but in light of the passage of R.A. 9346, it reduced the sentence from death to reclusion perpetua. Issue: Where the courts correct in charging the accused the complex crime of double murder and frustrated murder? Ruling: The Court of Appeals Decision is REVERSED and SET ASIDE , and a NEW one is rendered finding appellant, Ferdinand T. Baluntong, GUILTY beyond reasonable doubt of Simple Arson under Sec. 3(2) of P.D. No. 1613 and is sentenced to suffer the penalty of reclusion perpetua with no eligibility for parole and other civil damages modified. In determining the offense committed by appellant, People v. Malngan teaches: In cases where both burning and death occur, in order to determine what crime/crimes was/were perpetrated ± whether arson, murder or arson and homicide/murder, it is de rigueur to ascertain the main objective of the malefactor: (a) if the main objective is the burning of the building or edifice, but death results by reason or on the occasion of arson, the crime is simply arson and the resulting homicide is absorbed; (b) if, on the other hand, the main objective is to kill a particular person who may be in a building or edifice, when fire is resorted to as the means to accomplish such goal the crime committed is murder only; lastly, (c) if the objective is, likewise, to kill a particular person, and in fact the offender has already done so, but fire is resorted to as a means to cover up the killing, then there are two separate and distinct crimes committed ± homicide/murder and arson . Presidential Decree (P.D.) No. 1613, ³Amending the Law on Arson,´ reads: Section 3. Other Cases of Arson. The penalty of Reclusion Temporal to Reclusion Perpetua shall be imposed if the property burned is any of the following: (2) Any inhabited house or dwelling; The Court finds that there is no showing that appellants main objective was to kill Celerina and her housemates and that the fire was resorted to as the means to accomplish the goal. Absent any concrete basis then to hold that the house was set on fire to kill the occupants, appellant cannot be held liable for double murder with frustrated murder. Celerina was outside the house at the time it was set on fire. She merely entered the burning house to save her grandsons. While the above-quoted Information charged appellant with ³Double Murder with Frustrated Murder,´ appellant may be convicted of Arson. For the only difference between a charge for Murder under Article 248 (3) of the Revised Penal Code and one for Arson under the Revised Penal Code, as amended by Section 3 (2) of P.D. No. 1613, lies in the intent in pursuing the act. As reflected above, as it was not shown that the main motive was to kill the occupants of the house, the crime would only be arson, the homicide being a mere consequence thereof, hence, absorbed by arson. When there is variance between the offense charged in the complaint or information and that proved, and the offense charged is included or necessarily includes the offense proved, conviction shall be for the offense proved which is included in the offense charged, or the offense charged which is included in the offense proved. Under Section 5 of P.D. 1613, the

penalty of Reclusion Perpetua to Death is imposed when death results. In the light of the passage of Republic Act No. 9346, the penalty should be reclusion perpetua.

People v. Macabando (Arson) FACTS: At 4:00pm on December 21, 2001, appellant broke bottles on the road holding G.I. pipe, and shouted that he wanted to get even (“manabla ko”). Afterwards, he uttered that he would burn his house. At 6:35 pm, Cornelio saw smoke coming from appellant’s house. He got a pail of water, and poured its contents into the fire. Eric Quilantang, a neighbor, ran to the Barangay headquarters to get a fire extinguisher. When Eric approached the burning house, the appellant, who was carrying a traveling bag and a gun, told him not to interfere; the appellant then fired 3 shots in the air. The appellant also told the people around that whoever would put out the fire would be killed. Appellant’s Defense: He admitted that he felt angry because one of his radio cassettes for sale had been stolen. He appellant claimed that he went to sleep after looking for his missing radio cassette, and that the fire had already started when he woke up. He denied making a threat to burn his house and maintained that he did not own a gun. He added that the gunshots came from the explosion of firecrackers that he intended to use during the New Year celebration. The prosecution charged the appellant with the crime of destructive arson under Article 320 of the RPC. The RTC found him guilty and sentence him to suffer the penalty of reclusion perpetua. The CA affirmed. ISSUE: W/N he was guilty? Yes. HELD: The following circumstances constitute an unbroken chain of circumstantial events that leads to an unavoidable conclusion that the appellant, to the exclusion of others, set fire to his house. The combination of these circumstances, indeed, leads to no other conclusion than that the appellant set fire to his house. We find it unnatural and highly unusual for the appellant to prevent his neighbors from putting out the fire in his house, and threaten to kill them if they did, if he had nothing to do with the crime. The first impulse of an individual whose house is on fire is to save his loved ones and/or belongings; it is contrary to human nature, reason and natural order of things for a person to thwart and prevent any effort to put out the fire in his burning property. By carrying (and firing) a gun during the fire, the appellant showed his determination to repel any efforts to quell the fire. Important to note, too, is the fact that the appellant carried a traveling bag during the fire which, to our mind, showed deliberate planning and preparedness on his part to flee the raging fire; it likewise contradicted his statement that he was asleep inside his house when the fire broke out, and that the fire was already big when he woke up. Clearly, the appellant’s indifferent attitude to his burning house and his hostility towards the people who tried to put out the fire, coupled with his preparedness to flee his burning house, belied his claim of innocence. ISSUE: What is the crime he is guilty of? Arson under PD 1613. HELD: Article 320 contemplates the malicious burning of structures, both public and private, hotels, buildings, edifices, trains, vessels, aircraft, factories and other military, government or commercial establishments by any person or group of persons. PD 1613 governs simple arson. Section 3. Other Cases of Arson . The penalty of Reclusion Temporal to Reclusion Perpetua shall be imposed if the property burned is any of the following: 2. Any inhabited house or dwelling ; P.D. No. 1613 contemplates the malicious burning of public and private structures, regardless of size, not included in Article 320 of the RPC, as amended by Republic Act No. 7659. This law punishes simple arson with a lesser penalty because the acts that constitute it have a lesser degree of perversity and viciousness. Simple arson contemplates crimes with less significant social, economic, political, and national security implications than destructive arson.