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BREAKING THE DEFINITIONAL CIRCLE Four Theories of Meaning
Explanations of meaning in terms of meanings are circular ………….
When we propose a definition in a metalanguage as an analysis of the meaning of an object language term, the more basic questions, ‘what is meaning?’ and ‘what is it to understand a meaning?’ are left unanswered. All definitions of meaning in language, therefore, are ultimately circular because they use one kind of meaning to explain another.
So we are in a CIRCLE Probably something essentially wrong with DEFINITION We will talk about it in detail later How to get out of this circle???????????
Four ways of breaking the circle There are four important answers to the question ‘what is meaning?’ 1. The referential/denotational theory 2. The conceptual theory 3. The brain states theory 4. The use theory
The Two Entity Theories
The referential/denotational theory The conceptual theory Why??????? Because both these theories take meaning as THINGS (mental or physical)
Meaning as Denotation/Reference
The meaning of an expression is what it refers to, or names, is often called referential theory or naming theory. The word tree, for example, names the object tree in the real world. The object tree is called the referent. The word tree stands for the properties that all trees have or for the class of trees. Nouns name objects or events and adjectives name the properties of those objects or events. Verbs name actions and adverbs name their properties. In this view, words are “names” or “labels” for things
in
our mind or in our experience. unicorn
The Reference Theory of Meaning
Initially proposed by Aristotle (384-322BC) Other famous proponents of this view include J. S. Mill (1806-1873), Bertrand Russell (1872-1970), (the early) Ludwig Wittgenstein (1889-1951), Saul Kripke (1940- ) The basic idea is that meaning = reference. What a word or sentence refers to is what that word of sentence means.
The Reference Theory of Meaning
“What does ‘Aristotle’ mean?” can be rephrased as “What does ‘Aristotle’ refer to?” Hence, names mean what they denote or refer to. With respect to names, the reference theory seems to work very well!
The Reference Theory of Meaning
But it falters when we get to phrases, expressions, other subsentential components, and also when we get to whole sentences. What does “the oldest person in this class” mean? Well, it refers to the oldest person (J. Cook), but although “J. Cook” and “the oldest person in this class” refer to the same person, they don’t mean the same thing. And what about sentences? What do sentences mean? What do they refer to?
The Reference Theory of Meaning
Despite what your text says (p. 35: “many philosophers regard them as untenable”), this is still the most dominant theory of meaning in the philosophy of language today.
Meaning as concept
Def.: Expressions actually mean the concept or idea associated with them. Any particular sound image is psychologically associated with a particular concept. [chair]→{chair}(signifier vs signified)
Merits: The classification of objects in the world, for example, need not be natural or universal, but only conceptual. So it solves the concrete and abstract ideas. Demerits: Yet still not the functional word classes in language such as and or but.
Meaning as Ideas
Initially developed by John Locke (1632-1704) Current proponents include Noam Chomsky (1928- ) and Jerry Fodor (1935 - ), and many other cognitive scientists and other cognitive semanticists. The basic idea is that meaning = idea. What a word or sentence means is the idea in my head that I am trying to convey with that word or sentence. Locke’s view was that an idea was an (visual) image.
The Idea Theory of Meaning
So, when I use the word, e.g., “Santa” I form an image in my mind, and the meaning of the word just is that image or idea. If you want to know what I mean by a word you need to identify the ideas that I associate with them.
The Idea Theory of Meaning
Some problems: How
does this theory fare with respect to mass terms (or abstract terms, as George Berkeley (`1685-1753) refers to them? E.g., what idea do I associate with “dog”? “Dog”
is a term that denotes all dogs, so the meaning must be general enough to encompass all of them—but we can only form ideas of particular things! I.e., we cannot have an idea of a general dog.
The Idea Theory of Meaning
Some problems: Another major problem with this view is that since we cannot access someone’s ideas or mental images, we can never be sure that we know what their words mean. When you say “The flower is yellow”, how do I know that our words “yellow” mean the same thing? I know what my word means since I have access to my mental images, but I don’t have access to yours. Hence, how can I be sure that we mean the same thing?
Meaning as Brain States
Whatever is occurring, it must be represented through our mind consequently through our brains. So why to look here or there in search of meaning??? Lets look into brain and find the meaning their. But there are certain problems and serious ones!!!
The Problem of Synonymy The brain is just physical matter; it makes as little sense to say that a state of brain matter is the opposite of, or synonymous with, another as it does to say the same of the state of the electrons in my computer at any one time. It therefore seems that meanings have a property which prevents them from being completely identified with brain states. (Reimer, 2010) This is because of INETENTIONALITY which is the “aboutness or contentful nature of language”
Intentionality: The Problem
Intentionality is distinctively mental. Purely physical things like brain or computer, which consist of configurations of electrons, just aren’t the types of thing which can possess intentionality. Electrons, whether in brain or in computer, aren’t about anything; they’re just there. As a result, any attempt to simply identify something intentional like language with something nonintentional like a brain state cannot be successful.
Meaning as Use
L. Bloomfield: meaning exists in the relation between speech and the practical events that precede and follow it. The meaning of a linguistic form is thus defined as observable behavior. Such an approach to meaning is called behaviourism, or behaviorist theory, which clearly draws on psychology. Jack & Jill
Physical
physical/linguistic
linguistic/physical
physical
Problems: the practical stimulus S is not always obvious, so how to identify it?
Meaning as Use
Another version of USE theory developed by (the later) Wittgenstein (1889-1951) and J. L. Austin (1911-1960). The basic idea is that meaning = use. On this view, if we want to know what a particular word or sentence means, we are to ask what that word or sentence is used for. What is the speaker trying to accomplish by using those words or sentences?
Meaning as Use
On this view, it makes no sense to ask for the meaning of a word in isolation. We first need to look at the role it plays in the sentence, and then determine what the sentence is being used for.
Meaning as Use
Context is essential in determining use (= meaning) Important contextual features include: Social setting Speaker’s personal goals Nature and expectations of the audience What has already been said in the conversation Intentions of the speaker on a particular occasion Gestures
Meaning as Use
Examples (a) Hold it. (What does “hold” mean here? “It”?) (b) The queen is in a vulnerable position. (What does “queen” mean?) (c) The President has been shot and died a few minutes ago. (d) Let me go. (“Me”? “Go”?)
Meaning as Use
Some Problems: this theory is not immune from problems In particular, knowing how a word or sentence is being used in a particular context is sometimes a function of the meaning of the words themselves. E.g., if I say: “You are a son of a stickleback fish” there are really two questions here:
What are you using that sentence for? (to insult someone, maybe) What do those words mean? (a stickleback is a species of Gasterosteidae, found in northern temperate climates)
Conclusion We do not have to categorically choose between these theories. Instead, recognizing that the notion of meaning in linguistics is a way of talking about the factors which explain language use, we can see referents, concepts, brain states and uses as all relevant to this task. (Reimer: 2010)
Explanations of meaning in terms of meanings are circular ………….
When we propose a definition in a metalanguage as an analysis of the meaning of an object language term, the more basic questions, ‘what is meaning?’ and ‘what is it to understand a meaning?’ are left unanswered. All definitions of meaning in language, therefore, are ultimately circular because they use one kind of meaning to explain another.
So we are in a CIRCLE Probably something essentially wrong with DEFINITION We will talk about it in detail later How to get out of this circle???????????
Four ways of breaking the circle There are four important answers to the question ‘what is meaning?’ 1. The referential/denotational theory 2. The conceptual theory 3. The brain states theory 4. The use theory
The Two Entity Theories
The referential/denotational theory The conceptual theory Why??????? Because both these theories take meaning as THINGS (mental or physical)
Meaning as Denotation/Reference
The meaning of an expression is what it refers to, or names, is often called referential theory or naming theory. The word tree, for example, names the object tree in the real world. The object tree is called the referent. The word tree stands for the properties that all trees have or for the class of trees. Nouns name objects or events and adjectives name the properties of those objects or events. Verbs name actions and adverbs name their properties. In this view, words are “names” or “labels” for things
in
our mind or in our experience. unicorn
The Reference Theory of Meaning
Initially proposed by Aristotle (384-322BC) Other famous proponents of this view include J. S. Mill (1806-1873), Bertrand Russell (1872-1970), (the early) Ludwig Wittgenstein (1889-1951), Saul Kripke (1940- ) The basic idea is that meaning = reference. What a word or sentence refers to is what that word of sentence means.
The Reference Theory of Meaning
“What does ‘Aristotle’ mean?” can be rephrased as “What does ‘Aristotle’ refer to?” Hence, names mean what they denote or refer to. With respect to names, the reference theory seems to work very well!
The Reference Theory of Meaning
But it falters when we get to phrases, expressions, other subsentential components, and also when we get to whole sentences. What does “the oldest person in this class” mean? Well, it refers to the oldest person (J. Cook), but although “J. Cook” and “the oldest person in this class” refer to the same person, they don’t mean the same thing. And what about sentences? What do sentences mean? What do they refer to?
The Reference Theory of Meaning
Despite what your text says (p. 35: “many philosophers regard them as untenable”), this is still the most dominant theory of meaning in the philosophy of language today.
Meaning as concept
Def.: Expressions actually mean the concept or idea associated with them. Any particular sound image is psychologically associated with a particular concept. [chair]→{chair}(signifier vs signified)
Merits: The classification of objects in the world, for example, need not be natural or universal, but only conceptual. So it solves the concrete and abstract ideas. Demerits: Yet still not the functional word classes in language such as and or but.
Meaning as Ideas
Initially developed by John Locke (1632-1704) Current proponents include Noam Chomsky (1928- ) and Jerry Fodor (1935 - ), and many other cognitive scientists and other cognitive semanticists. The basic idea is that meaning = idea. What a word or sentence means is the idea in my head that I am trying to convey with that word or sentence. Locke’s view was that an idea was an (visual) image.
The Idea Theory of Meaning
So, when I use the word, e.g., “Santa” I form an image in my mind, and the meaning of the word just is that image or idea. If you want to know what I mean by a word you need to identify the ideas that I associate with them.
The Idea Theory of Meaning
Some problems: How
does this theory fare with respect to mass terms (or abstract terms, as George Berkeley (`1685-1753) refers to them? E.g., what idea do I associate with “dog”? “Dog”
is a term that denotes all dogs, so the meaning must be general enough to encompass all of them—but we can only form ideas of particular things! I.e., we cannot have an idea of a general dog.
The Idea Theory of Meaning
Some problems: Another major problem with this view is that since we cannot access someone’s ideas or mental images, we can never be sure that we know what their words mean. When you say “The flower is yellow”, how do I know that our words “yellow” mean the same thing? I know what my word means since I have access to my mental images, but I don’t have access to yours. Hence, how can I be sure that we mean the same thing?
Meaning as Brain States
Whatever is occurring, it must be represented through our mind consequently through our brains. So why to look here or there in search of meaning??? Lets look into brain and find the meaning their. But there are certain problems and serious ones!!!
The Problem of Synonymy The brain is just physical matter; it makes as little sense to say that a state of brain matter is the opposite of, or synonymous with, another as it does to say the same of the state of the electrons in my computer at any one time. It therefore seems that meanings have a property which prevents them from being completely identified with brain states. (Reimer, 2010) This is because of INETENTIONALITY which is the “aboutness or contentful nature of language”
Intentionality: The Problem
Intentionality is distinctively mental. Purely physical things like brain or computer, which consist of configurations of electrons, just aren’t the types of thing which can possess intentionality. Electrons, whether in brain or in computer, aren’t about anything; they’re just there. As a result, any attempt to simply identify something intentional like language with something nonintentional like a brain state cannot be successful.
Meaning as Use
L. Bloomfield: meaning exists in the relation between speech and the practical events that precede and follow it. The meaning of a linguistic form is thus defined as observable behavior. Such an approach to meaning is called behaviourism, or behaviorist theory, which clearly draws on psychology. Jack & Jill
Physical
physical/linguistic
linguistic/physical
physical
Problems: the practical stimulus S is not always obvious, so how to identify it?
Meaning as Use
Another version of USE theory developed by (the later) Wittgenstein (1889-1951) and J. L. Austin (1911-1960). The basic idea is that meaning = use. On this view, if we want to know what a particular word or sentence means, we are to ask what that word or sentence is used for. What is the speaker trying to accomplish by using those words or sentences?
Meaning as Use
On this view, it makes no sense to ask for the meaning of a word in isolation. We first need to look at the role it plays in the sentence, and then determine what the sentence is being used for.
Meaning as Use
Context is essential in determining use (= meaning) Important contextual features include: Social setting Speaker’s personal goals Nature and expectations of the audience What has already been said in the conversation Intentions of the speaker on a particular occasion Gestures
Meaning as Use
Examples (a) Hold it. (What does “hold” mean here? “It”?) (b) The queen is in a vulnerable position. (What does “queen” mean?) (c) The President has been shot and died a few minutes ago. (d) Let me go. (“Me”? “Go”?)
Meaning as Use
Some Problems: this theory is not immune from problems In particular, knowing how a word or sentence is being used in a particular context is sometimes a function of the meaning of the words themselves. E.g., if I say: “You are a son of a stickleback fish” there are really two questions here:
What are you using that sentence for? (to insult someone, maybe) What do those words mean? (a stickleback is a species of Gasterosteidae, found in northern temperate climates)
Conclusion We do not have to categorically choose between these theories. Instead, recognizing that the notion of meaning in linguistics is a way of talking about the factors which explain language use, we can see referents, concepts, brain states and uses as all relevant to this task. (Reimer: 2010)
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