Security Requirements in the supplyChain
ISO 28000: Security Requirements in The Supply Chain -Challenge and ChancesAshraf El Sherbiny
Lecturer •
Ashraf A. El Sherbiny
•
M.Sc. Naval Archetect and Marine Engineering
•
Country Manager, UAE • Senior serveyor • Lead Auditor ISO, ISM and ISMA • Maritime Security Auditor • GL Academy
• •
Phone: + 971 4 3328842 Email:
[email protected]
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Security Requirements in the supplyChain
Topics •
Security in the The International transport chain
• • •
Threats to the transport chain ISO 28000 series Opportunities
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The International transport chain Networked package of resources and processes
→ starting with the procurement of materials → via the distribution of products or services → to the consignee, and → pertains to all international means of transport
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The International transport chain (2) •
Participants of the transport chain are:
• • • • • • •
Manufacturers Trading houses Service provider Shipping and transporting Organizations National and International distribution center Wholesaler and distributors Other assets on the way to the final consumer
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The Container Supply Chain IT-based accompanied information chain – going ahead (documentation) customs (export)
Empty Container Provision
manufactor/ freightterminal
Depot
Shipper
Packing Container
customs (export)
inlandtransport
Loading Port
customs (import)
Container Terminal Handling Ship Loading
Pick-up Container
Discharge Port
Sea Transport
Delivery Port
manufactorer / Empty Container Freight(Redelivery) terminal
Inland Transport
Container Terminal Handling Pick-Up Ship Port Loading
Consignee Delivery Inland
Depot
Re-Delivery Empty
security relevant supply chain sections and handling intersections
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The transport chain Services offered in the transport chain
Cargo owner
Packingstation
Regionaltransport
TAPA, C-TPAT, ISO PAS 28000
Port Terminal
Intl. Seatransport
Port Terminal
ISPS-Code, CSI
Regionaltransport
Cargo consingee
TAPA, C-TPAT, ISO PAS 28000
Totally appx. 4.5- 4.7 Million participants in EU Turnover in EU 2004: appx. € 400 bn. (estimated)
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Physical threats and Vulnerabilities in the supply chain
•
Production, warehousing & distribution
• • • •
Road transport Rail transport Air transport Sea transport
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Production & warehousing/distribution •
Optimized for good process and materials flows
• •
Environmental constraints Target products:
• • • • •
Consumer electronics Cigarettes Perfumes Computers and parts Pharmaceuticals
No. 11 No. 11
Road transport •
Road transport is associated with about 87% of the total direct-cost value of lost cargo.
•
Losses through
• • •
Robberies Theft Highjack or cargo deviation
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Rail transport •
In some countries like India, 30% of goods volume is moved by rail.
• •
Railway routes and time tables are predictable. Many railway trunk routes pass through populated areas
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Air cargo •
26% of the value of all goods imported into the USA
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40% of air cargo travels on passenger planes
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Only 5-10% of air cargo is screened prior to loading.
Source: CRS Report for Congress on Air Cargo Security, 30 July 2007.
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Ports and maritime services • • •
Ports are choke points of global trade. Ports are part of just-in-time supply chains 13-day US West Coast ports lockout in 2002 caused:
• •
•
$ 500 million in delivery delay costs 0.4 -1% of GDP loss to Asian economies
Over 90% of cargo theft in maritime transport occurs in ports.
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Security Equipment and Port Screening
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Threats – Cargo Theft •
80% of all corporate losses to theft occur in the supply chain. Yet companies spend only about 5% of their security budget on supply chain security.
Source: Dan Purtell and James B. Rice, Jr.: “Assessing Cargo Supply Risk” in Security Management Online, November 2006.
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Cargo Theft
The total value of goods stolen in transit world wide is estimated to be in the order of $ 30-50 bn, about 8% of which are in maritime transit. Source:“The Detection and Prevention of Cargo Theft“ in: Trends and Issues in Crime and Criminology No. 214 (September 2001), published by the Australian Institute of Criminology.
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Example: Drug smuggling Panamanian motor vessel "Gating" during the largest cocaine bust in United States Coast Guard history (20 tons), off the coast of Panama Protection officers at the Calexico, Calif. east commercial facility detained a Mexican truck driver after they discovered 8.85 tons of marijuana commingled with a shipment of television screens at the port.
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Drug smuggling routes High drug smuggling risks: • Container services South America • Bulk from Brazil • Charters from/via Jamaica • Any ship from the Caribbean • Northwest Africa • Cambodia/North Korea flag
Source (map): Washingtonpost.com
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People smuggling
• Above: Over a thousand men, smuggled into Oman, return to Pakistan by boat after they were arrested and imprisoned. – Picture by Ansar Burney Trust
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People Smuggling - UK Disincentives for Companies • Fine of GBP 2000 for each illegal immigrant • Cost of detention and repatriation – up to GBP 25000 • Damage to cargo & delays
Source: UK P & I Clubs
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Natural Disaster
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Fraud and Corruption. Fraudulent activities may involve: • Deviation Fraud • Insurance Fraud • Charter Party Fraud • Bill of Lading Fraud • Other Documentary Fraud • Agency Fraud • False Identities and Certificates of Competency No. 24 No. 24
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Other specific threat types •
Threat identification, examining:
• Physical • Biological • Chemical • Cyber (information security) • Radiological
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Biological Agents •
Infectious and toxic substances
Viruses Bacteria Toxins • usually require controlled • •
environment packed in vials or petri-dishes & protective containers many are commercially available
Above: poorly secured biological agents at Pokroy biological facility, Russia
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Example: Pandemics •
The majority of the 225 human cases of H5N1 Avian Flu are concentrated in South-East Asia.
•
21 percent of the survey respondents had a business continuity plan in place to deal with a pandemic.
•
24 percent felt they could continue operations elsewhere.
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External biological risks to the supply chain •
It is only a matter of time before an Avian Flu virus acquires the ability to be transmitted humanto-human, thereby sparking an influenza pandemic. Dr Lee Jong-wook, former DirectorGeneral of the World Health Organization,
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Chemical Agents •
Chemical Agents
Nerve agents Lung/Skin (blistering) agents Blood agents • Corrosive • Hygroscopic • Most have high vapour pressure • Mostly in liquid or syrupy form • Many can be home-made
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Radiological substances •
Uranium – Natural or depleted Uranium U 92 or enriched Uranium U 235/238 • Commercially available • Moderate to low radioactivity • Very heavy • Control over raw U 92 questionable
Top right: depleted U 238; bottom left: raw Uranium “yellowcake” U 92
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Radiological substances •
Plutonium Pu 94
• • • •
By-product of Uranium enrichment highly radioactive very heavy small quantities available from uncontrolled nuclear arsenals
Top left: Plutonium ring from dismantled nuclear weapon – 11cm diameter, weight 5.3 kgs; Bottom left: Plutonium pellet – ca. 1.5cm diameter
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Bacteriological, chemical and radiological substances •
Dangerous goods or potential weapons?
•
Trust v suspicion in the supply chain
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Cyber threats
• Data theft • Data manipulation • Hacking
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Who may be affected by cyber crime in the supply chain? • • • • • • • •
Traffic infrastructures Logistics management systems (RFID!) Personnel Data Payment and booking systems Inventory control systems Facility infrastructures Security infrastructures (CCTV over IP) Digital communications No. 34 No. 34
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IT Threats and vulnerabilities: The Asian Example • Only 33 percent of companies doing business in Asia • • •
have specific IT security protection. 19 percent have product tracking systems. 12 percent have no security at all. This risk will continue to grow in the area with the European Commission reporting that 71 percent of counterfeit goods entering the EU originated in Asia, with 54 percent from China alone.
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Maritime Security
Relevant Maritime Cases
M/V “Achille Lauro”, Mediterranean, 1985
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Piracy Attacks - 2001
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World Trade Centre, September 11, 2001
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Maritime Security
Relevant Maritime Cases
M/T “Limburg”, Off Yemen, 2002
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Maritime Security
Relevant Maritime Cases
USS „Cole“, Port of Aden, 2000
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Maritime Security
Relevant Maritime Cases
M/V “Superferry 14”, Manila Bay, 2004
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Security in the global trade system • • •
•
Today's logistics and supply chain security challenge is to meet the security needs of a nation while improving logistics and growing commerce. The challenge is not just container security, consolidated shipment security, or bulk shipment security, neither is it the sole creation of shipping corridors. It is the ability to engage the world in a global trade, development and security solution that is good for all nations; a solution that does not favour one nation, one port, one vendor or one individual over another. The challenge is to prepare the world for the near future in which development must occur in third world nations as well.
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Global Trade System attributes • • • • • • • • • •
Be available for adoption by all nations. Apply to all commercial shipments by all modes of transport. Be useful to discover all contrabands. Be structured to accept global acceptance and use. Be universally useful, not designed for one user or a single purpose. Improve commerce without imposing additional costs. Significantly reduce delays. Provide a global response to deal with any transportation incidents. Provide reliable and accurate data Provide information for validation/verification of manifest
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Target of ISO 28000
g existin specific Other eveloped. to be d rd standa s or th ose
858: M ariti Asses me Port Fa sm cil e n ts and Se ity Security curity Plan
ISO 28001: Best Practices Custody in Supply Chain Security
ISO 2 0
Enclosure of existing security management Systems under the roof of ISO 28000
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Current Developments •
ISO PAS 28000, 28001 and 28004
•
Target:
• To enhance the security within the transport chain. • To ‚‘‘bundle“ existing security-management systems under one „roof“ (ISPS, C-TPAT, TAPA ,etc.).
• To improve the so far unincisive security consciousness. • Harmonisation of security relevant processes. • 28004 Guidelines for accomplishment (in process)
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ISO 28000
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Security Requirements in the supplyChain
ISO 28000 •
ISO 28000 was prepared by Technical Committee ISO/TC 8, Ships and marine technology, in collaboration
•
with other relevant technical committees responsible for specific modes of the supply chain.
•
This first edition of ISO 28000 cancels and replaces ISO/PAS 28000:2007, which has been technically revised
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ISO 28000 – understood? •
The International Standards Organisation (ISO) has endeavoured to introduce a series of international standards implementing the individual Codes.
•
ISO 28000 requires each exporter to ensure that all consignments being exported are subject to a series of checks prior to the goods being packed and containerised for security purposes.
•
The purpose of the implementation of such a set of procedures is to anticipate any potential risk and reduce or eliminate it at the point of the goods being despatched from the exporters premises.
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ISO 28000 - Scope • • • • • • • •
This International Standard is applicable to all sizes of organizations, from small to multinational, in manufacturing, service, storage or transportation at any stage of the production or supply chain that wishes to: a) establish, implement, maintain and improve a security management system; b) assure conformance with stated security management policy; c) demonstrate such conformance to others; d) seek certification/registration of its security management system by an Accredited third party Certification Body; or e) make a self-determination and self-declaration of conformance with this International Standard. No. 49
The International transport chain System •
refers to the actions, processes and movements of the cargo in the supply chain that occur before (Upstream), at and after (Downstream) the cargo comes under the direct operational control of the organization
•
including but not limited to insurance, finance, data management, and the packing, storing and transferring of cargo
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Security management system elements
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ISO 28000 - Index Scope of the standard. Ch 2: Normative references. (none in this standard) Ch 3: Terms and definitions. Ch 4: Security management system elements 4.1:General requirements 4.2:Security management policy 4.3:Security risk assessment and planning 4.4:Implementation and operation 4.5:Checking and corrective action 4.6:Management review and continual improvement Annex A: Correspondence between ISO 28000:2007, ISO 14001:2004 and ISO 9001:2000 (informative)
Ch 1:
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ISO 28001
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ISO 28001-Best practices for implementing supply chain security assessments and plans. Ch 1: Ch 2: Ch 3: Ch 4: Ch 5:
• • • • • • • •
Scope of the standard. Normative references. Terms and definitions. Field of application. Supply chain security process. 5.1 General 5.2 Identification of the scope of security assessment 5.3 Conduction of the security assessment 5.4 Development of the supply chain security plan 5.5 Execution of the supply chain security plan 5.6 Documentation and monitoring of the supply chain security process 5.7 Actions required after a security incident 5.8 Protection of the security information
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ISO 28001-Best practices
• • • • • • • •
Annexe A: Supply chain security process (informative) A.1 General A.2 Identification of the scope of the security assessment A.3 Conduction of the security assessment A.4 Development of the security plan A.5 Execution of the security plan A.6 Documentation and monitoring of the security process A.7 Continual improvement
Annexe B: Methodology for security risk assessment and development of countermeasures
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Risk Management •
The assessment of Security Risks is part of the overall risk management process.
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ISO 28001-Best practices •
Annexe B: Methodology for security risk assessment and development of countermeasures • B.1 General • B.2 Step one – Consideration of the security threat scenarios • B.3 Step two – Classification of consequences • B.4 Step three – Classification of likelihood of security incidents • B.5 Step four – Security incident scoring • B.6 Step five – Development of countermeasures • B.7 Step six – Implementation of countermeasures • B.8 Step seven – Evaluation of countermeasures • B.9 Step eight – Repetition of the process • B.10 Continuation of the process Annexe C: Guidance for obtaining advice and certification No. 57
Security Risk “equation” • Risk (general) = Likelihood x Consequence • Likelihood (security) • Threat [T] • Vulnerability [V]
= Vulnerability [V] x Threat [T] = probability of an attack occurring = probability that security measures fail, leading to a successful attack
• Security Risk = (Threat [T] x Vulnerability [V]) x Consequence [C] 58
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Risk Acceptance: The ALARP Principle Unacceptable region
Risk cannot be justified save in extraordinary circumstances
ALARP region
Tolerable only if risk reduction is impracticable or if its cost is grossly disproportionate to the improvement gained
(risk has been reduced “as low as reasonably practicable” practicable”)
Tolerable if cost of reduction would exceed the improvement gained
Broadly acceptable region Negligible risk
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ISO 28004-Guidelines for the implementation of ISO 28000 Ch 1:
Scope
Ch 2: Normative references Ch 3: Terms and definitions; Ch 4: Security management systems elements. 4.1: 4.2: 4.3: 4.4: 4.5: 4.6:
General requirements Security management policy Security risk assessment and planning Implementation and operation Checking and corrective action. Management review and continual improvement
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ISO management systems complementary to ISO 28000. • • • • •
ISO 9001:2000 ISO 14001:2004 BS OHSAS 18001:2007 ISO/IEC 27001:2005 ISO 10015
Quality Management Environmental Health & Safety Information Security Training & Education
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Existing Certification Standards •
ISPS Code International Ship and Port Facility Security Code (mandatory for ships and port facilities)
•
C-TPAT Customs-Trade Protection Against Terrorism (voluntary standard especially in the US-trade)
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Existing Certification Standards (2) •
TAPA Technical Asset Protection Association (voluntary standard developed by the high-tech industry)
•
CSI Container Security Initiative (bilateral Agreement with the US to enhance the security in the container transport) No. 63
Road cargo transportation and TAPA • • • • •
Technology Asset Protection Association (TAPA) founded in 1997
•
TAPA members have on average reduced their losses through cargo theft by 40%.
A tested security management system Certification through TAPA-accredited bodies. Certifies individual facilities rather than entire company. Freight Security Requirements (FSR) and Trucking security requirements (TSR) address handling, warehousing and transportation.
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TAPA scoring mechanism. Scoring Matrix TAPA Trucking Security Requirements
•
1.
• •
•
2.
• • • •
Physical security: 1.1 1.2
Truck security Trailer security
Security systems: 2.1 2.2 2.3 2.4
Truck security systems Tracking and tracing Alarms Vehicle immobilisation
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TAPA scoring mechanism. Scoring Matrix TAPA Trucking Security Requirements
•
3.
• • • • • • • • • •
Security procedures: 3.1 3.2 3.3 3.4 3.5 3.6 3.7 3.8 3.9 3.10
Collection and delivery: Pre alerts: Scheduled routing: Incident event and action reporting: Vehicle maintenance programmes: Stops Secure parking: Contingency planning: Key management: Unauthorised persons:
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TAPA scoring mechanism. Scoring Matrix TAPA Trucking Security Requirements
•
4.
• •
•
5.
• •
•
6.
• •
Personnel security: 4.1 4.2
Screening and vetting Hiring and termination procedures
Training: 5.1 5.2
Security awareness Robbery response procedures
Enhanced security measures: 6.1 6.2
Double drivers Truck escorts
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C-TPAT supply chain security measures • • • • • • • •
Business partner requirements Container & trailer security Physical access control Personnel security Procedural security Physical security Information technology security Security Awareness and training No. 68 No. 68
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New Developments •
WCO Framework of Standards
•
Target:
• Harmonization of the application procedure for import, export and transit.
• Obligation to implement a risk management system. • Strengthening the cooperation between customs and industry.
• Promotion of time saving goods movement in the secure transport chain.
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The World Customs Organisation (WCO) •
Framework of Standards to Secure and Facilitate Global Supply Chain Security.
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Four Core Elements of the WCO Framework 1. 2. 3.
4.
The Framework harmonizes the advance electronic cargo information requirements on inbound, outbound and transit shipments. Each country that joins the Framework commits to employing a consistent risk management approach to address security threats. The Framework requires that at the reasonable request of the receiving nation, based upon a comparable risk targeting methodology, the sending nation's Customs administration will perform an outbound inspection of high-risk containers and cargo, preferably using non intrusive detection equipment such as large-scale X-ray machines and radiation detectors. The Framework defines benefits that Customs will provide to businesses that meet minimal supply chain security standards and best practices.
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•
The Taxation and Customs Union will contain the following criteria:
• • • • • •
Customs related security initiatives in the EU. A Customs Security Programme (CSP) Authorised Economic Operator (AEO) Transport related security initiatives in the EU Security cooperation with third countries Security initiatives of non EU states: • The USA • Canada • Australia • New Zealand No. 72 No. 72
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•
EU regulations allow for ISO 28000 certification to be partly accepted as prima facie evidence that AEO S criteria have been met The AEO risk mapping process
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US Customs & Border Protection • •
CBP is part of the Department of Homeland Defense Administers (together with other elements of the DHS) a range of inter-governmental and governmental security initiatives, including:
• • •
Container Security Initiative (CSI) C-TPAT SAFE Ports Act (national US legislation)
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Incident planning: preparedness response and post incident recovery •
Emergency Preparedness & Response: • Contingency planning • Crisis management • Business continuity and business resumption • Disaster recovery • The role of the emergency services
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Contingency planning flow chart Impact assessment
Plan development
Plan testing
Personnel training
Plan evaluation
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Contingency planning Security
Prevention
Mitigation
Detection
Response No. 77 No. 77
Contingency planning Bloody rail worker strike!!
A suitcase bomber No. 78 No. 78
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What is Business Continuity Management (BCM)?
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Why BCM? •
Physical security measures may be impracticable or commercially not viable
• • •
Reduce incident consequences Powerful mitigation/response tool Can be part of – or related to – contingency planning or crisis management function
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Finally... •
Decisions for BCM strategies have to be grounded in a Risk Assessment
•
BCM covers contingencies for many types of risks – not just security
•
A BCM strategy/system needs to be documented either separately or as a part of another management system, ie contingency planning or ISO 28000.
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Disaster recovery •
What is the difference to Business Continuity Management?
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Example: Disaster Recovery Planning •
Deutsche Bank, New York, 11 Sept 2001
• • •
Global finances office knocked out. Recovery through other sites. Backlog of US$ 300 million of outstanding transactions cleared within 24 hrs.
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Emergency services • •
Emergency services procedures will differ dependant on the country.
•
Other countries will show a huge disparity of police forces. In Italy there are five different types of police force.
•
Wherever the supply runs, the emergency services, in particular the police force will always have the ultimate authority.
In some countries the emergency services may include national forces such as the army; navy and air force.
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What’s next ? •
IMO Secretary-General General, Mr. E. Mitropoulos, (27th “World Maritime Day“)
•
“Now that the new international maritime security measures are in force, we must not make the mistake of resting on our laurels and assuming the work has been completed.” ….
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What’s next (2) ?
Learn from the mistakes and experience gained. Improve security systems constantly by promoting security awareness of the individual. Include security into the management system routine for safeguarding those on board and ashore.
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Advantages through Implementation of Security Standards - Reduction of events of damages or losses - Advantage in competition by utilizing existing and acknowledged standards - Timely benefits when border crossing trade is executed
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Advantages through Implementation of Security Standards •
EU-Commission favours at the time the voluntary implementation of any security standard.
•
The target is the enhancement of the sensibilty towards security within all logistic service providers, this leads to
•
Improvement of security within the entire transport chain.
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Further Advantages •
Voluntary certification with an international acknowledged security standard is awarded with the so called “Green Flag”, i.e. European wide preferred costumes clearance. - less time loss at the borders, - timely performance of transport service
•
Self presentation as quality partner by the status “Secure Operator”.
•
Long lasting client liaison through more efficient security management.
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Germanischer Lloyd – Your Reliable Partner for Certifications
Thank you very much for your Attention No. 91
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