Turkey SEB MERCHANT BANKING – COUNTRY RISK ANALYSIS
June 12, 2008
Analyst: Rolf Danielsen. Tel : +46 8 763 83 92. E‐mail :
[email protected]
The political storm is on – this time not only over headscarves but more ominously: the future of the efficient AKP government, investors’ darling for the sixth consecutive year. Where do we go from here? A best guess is that investors will stomach also this political turmoil as long as the economy survives unscathed, which could be the bigger question, though.
Country Risk Analysis
GDP
percent
Slowdown but growing deficits. New data for 10 2007 show the economy 8 decelerated to only 4,3% 6 expansion last year, 4 sharply down from 6,7% 2 the year before. That was 0 due to weakening private consumption and 2002 2004 2006 2008 negative contributions GDP (change) Forecast from net exports mainly reflecting buoyant imports, but also drought which reduced agricultural output. As a result, the current account deficit widened $ 6 bill. further to $37 bill. although that represented a slight improvement in terms of GDP (from 6% to 5,7% according to recently revised national accounts methodology which all of a sudden has made Turkey’s economy some 30% larger in statistical terms). 1 According to the old methodology (before March 2008) the deficit to GDP ratios would have been around 8% in both years. For 2008, these trends are set to continue as judged by numbers so far in the year. Consumer confidence and purchasing power are weakening while global turbulence is taking its toll on investors. Exports growth held up quite well in the first quarter, despite a sharp slowing in March, but the external sector could once again become a drag on the economy. If oil prices remain at present high levels the current account deficits could widen to as much as $50 bill. (7%/GDP). That would act as a tax, reducing private consumption further and leaving GDP growth at below 4%, perhaps giving the final blow to the “Anatolian tiger”. That is despite an ongoing fiscal easing that started 1
This is because as the official statistical services have begun to include estimates for the assumedly large informal sector.
important your attention is drawn to the statement on the back cover of this report which affects your rights.
SEB Merchant Banking Country Risk Analysis June 12, 2008
$Bill./quarter
last year, as the government appeared to have abandoned its previous good intentions of fiscal Current account deficit stricture. -12,5 Soaring inflation. In -10,0 early May, the central -7,5 bank, which so far was -5,0 believed to be not only operationally but also -2,5 politically independent, 0,0 surprised markets by 2,5 renouncing its strict 2000 2002 2004 2006 2008 inflation target of 4% p.a. (+/‐ 2 p.p.), and instead opting for a much higher medium‐term inflation trajectory with the end goal of 4% inflation within reach only by 2012.. As recent data showed inflation already reaching into double digit levels (latest CPI‐number for May is 10,7% up from same period of 2007), the new targets are clearly much more realistic, but a the same time the timing of this announcement could probably not have been much worse. Late 2007 it appeared that the central bank was about to win the battle against inflation, prompting an aggressive easing of interest rates. At that time it could be excused for not foreseeing the later surge in international energy and commodity prices, including food stuff, which make up some 27% of the consumer basket. What it might have seen, though, was the ongoing rise in services prices, which were predominantly home‐made and reflected underlying price pressure in the economy. As a consequence, and as price acceleration became too evident during the early spring, the central Consumer Prices bank was forced to 12,0 change tack. In March, it raised policy rates ‐‐ the 11,0 expected response, but 10,0 then also abandoned its inflation target to the 9,0 disappointment of many 8,0 observers and reportedly 7,0 also to the IMF, with which the government 6,0 2005 2006 2007 2008 had just concluded a stand‐by program from 2005. Softer fiscal policy targets: The recent easing of monetary policy targets was all the more astonishing as it came on the heels of a significant fiscal policy easing. Since the AKP government took office in 2002 following the deep financial and economic crisis of 2000/2001, fiscal stricture had been the linchpin of its economic policies, a stance that had been met with admiration and great respect from almost all quarters. In early 2008, however, the government announced a long term fiscal program which set new targets for %-change year on year
Source: Reuters EcoWin
a r 1 2 mon ths
S ou rce: R e uters EcoWin
2
SEB Merchant Banking Country Risk Analysis June 12, 2008
the primary balance in coming years, despite the recommendation of the IMF report of late 2007 not to change the target at least for the coming year. The government’s argument may nevertheless be reasonable seen in isolation. By persevering with tight fiscal policies since 2003, targeting a primary surplus in government finances (that is the budget balance stripped of net interest payments) of 6,5% of GDP government debt has come down from 90% of GDP in 2002 to 48% (gross) in 2007 (both according to unrevised GDP) thereby reducing the likelihood of a new fiscal crisis anytime soon. At the same time the external environment was turning for the worse calling on the government to stimulate demand. But as with the monetary policy change, the timing seemed to be unfortunate against the background of the new and unpredictable state of international capital and money markets since the global financial turbulence erupted in 2007 and the still untamed inflation pressure in the economy. External vulnerability remains high. For several years the large current account deficit has been willingly financed by professional investors eagerly buying the Turkish growth story, and others, including retail investors, happy to se their money earn a very decent double digit return in Turkish assets relative to yen, Swiss Franck an now also dollars. FDI has flowed in and last 25 000 year financed more 20 000 than half of the deficit. 15 000 However, not much of 10 000 that has gone into export oriented green‐ 5 000 field investments, but 0 rather into merger 2002 2004 2006 2008 and acquisition activities and FDI Forecast government privatization schemes, particularly into banks, or into real estate developments, activities that do not immediately create dollar earnings to help pay dividend to its foreign investors. That would not matter much if the money freed up in this manner to former domestic owners, had been used for other investments. Unfortunately, there is limited evidence of that. Even though the investment to GDP ratio rose from 22% to 25% during the year of high FDI inflows, 2004‐ 2007, the savings ratio stayed at a low 18‐19%/GDP. That is a level proved to be insufficient to keep up the high growth momentum in other emerging market countries. – Apart from FDI, the other main current account financing item of the balance of payments has been short term capital inflows, including into the stock exchange or to private sector entities raising loans of shorter maturities from abroad. Last year, as international interbank markets dried up, Turkish companies themselves increased their activity on global credit markets thereby raising their short FX position from $37 bill to $61 bill. ‐‐ a level that has begun to
$ m ill.
FDI inflows
3
SEB Merchant Banking Country Risk Analysis June 12, 2008
Ind ex
raise concerns among observers. All considered, that implies continued high external balance of payment vulnerability even though short term debt has not increased much. Rapidly rising loan repayments this and next year and the rising current account deficit have lifted the total refinancing need in 2008 to more than $100 bill. That could present a bigger challenge than last year. Recent developments in the domestic stock market have not been too encouraging and will probably attract less foreign money. Like all emerging markets it experienced a sharp fall in late 2007, but unlike the others, did not see any rebound this spring. In addition, delays in the government privatization program combined with possible flagging investor enthusiasm could reduce FDI inflows sharply. The reform Istanbul Stock Exchange program National 100-index hangs in the 2250 60k balance. In 55k 2000 2007, the Turkey 50k reform 1750 45k program 1500 suffered 40k Emerging Markets serious delays, 35k 1250 not all of them 30k 1000 to be blamed 25k on the 750 20k government as 2005 2006 2007 2008 also trade unions tried to uphold several privatization deals by court actions. Hopes have been that 2008 would see a new push, in particular with regard to further disinvestment of government shares in banks, telecom, tobacco manufacturing, sugar refineries and the national lottery. Last March, it eventually succeeded in passing the bill on reforming the social security system which is overly generous and has become a mill‐stone around the neck of the finance minister representing a deficit for the overall budget equal to 3,5% of GDP. In January, it also made good on its promise to raise electricity tariffs more than 16% for end users to reduce the burden of utility subsidies on the budget, and also to prepare the power sector for eventual privatization. Markets are now waiting to see the government fulfil its commitment also to free administratively set electricity prices as promised beginning July 1, which eventually means 30‐60% price hikes over the next 1‐2 years. That will not only help change the general sentiment that the government has begun to dither on its erstwhile reform vigour, but also bring forward a solution to the country’s pending power crisis as present supply is unable to keep up with demand with black‐outs hitting industries and consumers already in 2009 as a threatening consequence. The political battle is heating up between secularists and Islamists. At the outset, the prospects for the government to take unpopular measures should E m e rg i n g Ma r ke t s ,M S C I F , r e e US
D In d e x , Gr o s s T o ta l Re t u rn , U S
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SEB Merchant Banking Country Risk Analysis June 12, 2008
be the best against its strong 62% majority in Parliament after it won a landslide victory last summer in snap elections. That rosy picture is again being challenged by the new battle heating up with the so‐called secularists, who represent the old political elite of urban westernizers, in contrast to the government, which has its roots in traditional Islam as presented by the impoverished country side in particular. The opposition has charged the government of having acted against the constitution secularist orientation on several instances, including when it proposed a law amendment to let women wear the headscarf, a symbol of religious piety for many people, at the state universities. The opposition regarded that as an attack on the secularist values of the state. The case is now in the hands of the Constitutional Court, CC, and could end in the dissolution of the ruling party AKP and the banning of some 80 of its most prominent members, including the Prime Minister, Mr. Erdogan, from political life. While most observers had first thought this was one of the many political brawls that in the end come to nothing, many were taken by surprise as the CC in early June actually ruled the law amendment over headscarf as unconstitutional. That was clearly a shot above the bow to the government, and many see this as the first sign that the future of the government and the present political order actually are hanging in a thin thread. Others point out that this may still just be a warning from the secularist establishment (some may say the “deep state”) to the government of toning down its Islamic credentials and focus on the economy. Much now depends on the response of the government. If it complies, the CC may let it survive. Few observers believe in the allegations that the PM himself is a fundamentalist masked as pragmatist, but his party is a large one and contain also extremist elements. Some have pointed out that this may be a defining moment for the future of Turkish democracy and political stability, even though any threat of civil strife is still on only on the horizon. For the nearer term future, the danger is that the government will be hamstrung by these legal battles, unable to focus on the urgent needs of the economy and the reform program. Recent market reactions. Markets have responded to the CC ruling on the headscarf issue with a mixed response. The government securities market took an immediate hit sending the JP Morgan’ s EMBI index for Turkish sovereign bonds down several points, implying a higher risk premium. The foreign exchange market, by contrast, has continued to stay quite impervious to political news. The domestic money market remains forex liquid, and such may be the case until a bunch of government foreign debt falls due in late August. Many observers see that time as the real test of the resilience of the present exchange rate. Since the beginning of the current year, it has regained strength vis‐à‐vis the euro, boosting the argument that is may be as much as 20‐30% overvalued, reflecting the higher Turkish inflation than of its most important export markets, the EU and the US. Others point to still good export performance as a sign of continued competitiveness. Both arguments have their merits, but at the end of the day what matters is the current 5
SEB Merchant Banking Country Risk Analysis June 12, 2008
account deficit and what a country can persuade markets to finance. That has undoubtedly become more challenging this year, and investors should be braced for increased exchange rate volatility during the fall. ‐*‐ Turkey seems like a country with a never‐ending ability to surprise. Not long ago we thought the worst was over when the country weathered the sub‐prime crisis reasonably well, its military incursion into Northern Iraq (hunting down Kurdish separatist rebels) was handled in an excellent manner by its diplomacy, and the government had solved a political brawl with the secularist opposition last summer by winning snap elections. But then, once again the political tensions are now coming close to the boiling point. One could be excused to ignore this development as a farce, if the issues at stake were not quite important. After all this is a question of the judiciary closing down a democratically elected government which is doing nothing but implementing a political program on which it was elected into office. One may draw parallels to other countries, including in the region, where similar developments have ended in increased instability. This comes on top of flagging growth, rising inflation, a soaring current account deficit on the back of higher oil prices, and the threat of much less favourable international market conditions to refinance more debt than usual falling due through the rest of the year. So far, however, we do not want to sound the alarm bells, but simply note that over the last 12‐ months period two rating agencies have changed their rating outlook in negative direction: Fitch from BB‐ positive to stable in June 2007 and Standard and Poors from BB‐ stable to negative in last May.
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Graph: The pentagon shows Turkey's risk relatively strong on resilience, but weak on macro balance and liquidity. It is stronger than the Ukraine on resilience but weaker on event risk.
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SEB Merchant Banking Country Risk Analysis June 12, 2008
Key data: 2002 2003 GDP (mill. US$) 231556 307067 GDP/capita (US$) 3302 4320 GDP (change) 6,2% 5,3% Investments/GDP 17% 19% Budget balance/GDP -11,2% -8,8% Govt debt/GDP 71% 67% CPI inflation (%) 45,1% 25,3% Money demand (%) -12,8% 5,9% Stock prices 11008 12312 Interest rates 86,0% 34,3% Exch. Rate ($) 1,50 1,50 Trade/GDP (%) 38% 39% Oil price (Brent) $25 $29 Millions US $ Export of goods 40 719 52 394 Imports of goods 47 109 65 883 Other: 5 764 5 974 -626 -7 515 Current account (% of GDP) -0,3% -2,4% FDI 958 1 253 Loan repayments -22 052 -21 546 Net other capital flows 27 228 35 131 5 508 7 323 Balance of payments Reserves OP=SNR PM=VPU Total debt 124 280 139 326 o/w short term debt 16 394 20 542 Sources: Oxford Economics and SEB estimates Rating history Fitch (eoy) Moody's (eoy) S&P (eoy)
B+ B1 B+
Type of government: Next elections
2004 392374 5448 9,4% 22% -5,4% 61% 8,6% 31,0% 19903 20,5% 1,42 41% $38
2005 483820 6630 8,4% 24% -1,5% 54% 8,2% 24,4% 29362 14,4% 1,34 39% $54
2006 529201 7159 6,9% 26% -0,7% 47% 9,6% 21,8% 39861 16,4% 1,43 43% $65
2007 662970 8854 4,5% 25% -1,7% 43% 8,8% 9,6% 48275 17,0% 1,30 42% $73
2008 778537 10267 3,8% 25% -1,8% 38% 9,6% 10,1%
2009 813592 10597 4,5% 26% -1,1% 35% 7,2% 5,2%
15,9% 1,25 42% $112
14,9% 1,34 45% $106
68 535 91 271 8 305 -14 431 -3,7% 2 006 -25 640 41 392 3 327 PQ=OSR 154 789 28 567
78 365 111 353 10 852 -22 136 -4,6% 8 962 -32 837 54 300 8 288 QO=RRP 166 194 35 150
93 611 134 552 9 048 -31 893 -6,0% 18 988 -31 012 60 036 16 119 RU=STO 193 388 40 359
115 304 162 090 9 352 -37 434 -5,6% 19 856 -38 314 67 258 11 366 TM=MPU 231 854 40 788
136 588 189 747 11 090 -42 069 -5,4% 16 404 -43 245 74 168 5 258 TR=OVS 260 868 43 921
157 152 208 830 12 722 -38 956 -4,8% 13 712 -44 496 74 201 4 462 TV=TRU 270 962 44 165
B+ B1 BB-
B B2 B+
B B1 B+
BBBa3 BB-
BBBa3 BB-
Parliamentary Democracy Legislative: 2012; Presidential: 2014 (provided courts do not overturn the latest)
Other: Latest PC deal 1980/fully repaid Latest IMF arrangements 2005 (SBA), Completed
E x c h a n g e ra te s
E x t e r n a l tr a d e
R e a l e f fe c tiv e a n d s p o t e u r /T .L ir a
200 190 180 170 160
40 30 20 10 0
01
02
03
04
05
06
07
Im p o rts E x p o r ts Im p o rts O IL
150 140 130
2 ,1 2 ,0
T R Y /E U R
1 ,9 1 ,8 1 ,7
REER
1 ,6 1 ,5
2004
2005
Lo c a l I n d i c e s , C B R T C P I R e a l E f fec ti ve E xc h a n ge R a te In d ex, A ve ra g e, TRY
2006
2007
2008
S p o t R a te s , E U R /T R Y , C l ose
S o u rc e : R e u te r s E c o W i n
S o u rc e : R e u te rs E c o W in
S tr ip p e d S p r e a d
In te r e s t r a te s
400
25
350 Basis Points
EUR/TRY
USD (billions)
50
20 T u rk e y
300
15
250
10 5 ja n
200 E m e r g in g M a rk ets
150
2006 T urk e y
2007
m aj sep 2006
ja n
m aj sep 2007
ja n
m aj 2008
G o v e rn m e n t B e n c h m a rk s , B id , 5 Y e a r, Y ie ld , C lo s e , T In te rb a n k R a te s , T R L IB O R , 3 M o n th , F ix in g , T R Y P o lic y R a te s , C e n tra l B a n k O /N L e n d in g R a te
2008
C o m p o s i te S o u rc e : R e u te r s E c o W i n
S o u rc e: R e u te rs E c o W in
7
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SEB Merchant Banking Country Risk Analysis June 12, 2008
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