Sbsp Neg
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Will Malson
SBSP NEG
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SBSP NEG -- Index (1/2) SBSP NEG -- Index (1/2)...................................................................................................1 T – Minor Repair – Significantly (1/2)...............................................................................2 A. Interp ....................................................................................................................................2 B. Standard ...............................................................................................................................3 C. Violation ...............................................................................................................................3
T – Minor Repair -- Significantly (2/2)..............................................................................3 D. Impacts/Voters .....................................................................................................................3 1. A priori issue...................................................................................................................................3 2. Prima facie burden..........................................................................................................................4 3. Destroys debate...............................................................................................................................4 4. Sets a bad precedent........................................................................................................................4
Solvency -- Launch Costs (1/1)..........................................................................................4 SBSP launch costs are huge - $135 billion just to get it into space.....................................................4
Solvency -- Electricity Costs (1/1).....................................................................................5 A. SBSP would have to sell electricity at $5 per kWh to break even (kWh = kilo-watt hour)..............5 B. The National “Average Retail Price of Electricity to ,,, Consumer” is less than 10¢ per kWh.......6
Solvency -- International Restrictions (1/1)........................................................................6 International barriers to SBSP are: (1) geosynchronous orbit restrictions, & (2) jurisdiction concerning satellite placement...............................................................................................................................6
Solvency -- Weather Modification (1/2).............................................................................7 A. SBSP is capable of modifying the weather via access to storm systems..........................................7 B. Weather modification via SBSP is not only possible, but anticipated.............................................8
Solvency -- Weather Modification (2/2).............................................................................8 C. Weather modification is prohibited under international treaties....................................................8
Weaponization DA (1/2) ...................................................................................................9 A. Link: SBSP sparks weaponization .....................................................................................9 Space weaponization is not an inevitability; satellites required for SBSP would cause international resentment and a perpetuation of an arms race..................................................................................9
Weaponization DA (2/2) .................................................................................................10 B. Impact: lots of goodies (prolif etc) ....................................................................................10 Space weaponization undermines US military readiness, leads to arms race, and increased prolif..10
Weaponization Link Extension .......................................................................................11 The DOD participating in SBSP production or development would signal the internat community that we were making space-based weapons...................................................................................................11
Multilateral CP (1/4) .......................................................................................................12 Contention 1 is Counter-plan Text........................................................................................12 Plan Text...........................................................................................................................................12
Multilateral CP (2/4) .......................................................................................................13 Contention 2 is solvency of the CP: 4 points. .......................................................................13 1. Multilateral space co-op exists in SQ; A break away from this approach hinders the necessary approach to make space colonization a sustainable option ..............................................................................13
Multilateral CP (3/4)........................................................................................................14
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C2: Solvency.............................................................................................................................14 2. Only internat cooperation can create a long term, effective SPS system with a global market.....14
Multilateral CP (4/4)........................................................................................................15 C2: Solvency.............................................................................................................................15 3. Contributors to the ISS..................................................................................................................15 4. Empirics: China example: a multilateral approach leads to sustainable space cooperation and maintains U.S. tech hegemony...........................................................................................................................16
Credentials: Electricity Costs B. ......................................................................................16 EIA credentials..................................................................................................................................16
Credentials: Weather Modification C. (1/2).....................................................................17 Credentials: Weather Modification C. (2/2).....................................................................18
T – Minor Repair – Significantly (1/2) A. Interp Our interp of the resolution is that the aff has to significantly reform the USFG’s environmental policy: significantly is defined as “sufficiently great or important to be worthy of attention; noteworthy” (Oxford American Dictionaries)
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----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------B. Standard Our standard, or why our interpretation of the resolution should be used, is contextuality: For example, if you wanted to reform your house, all you would have to do is move some furniture around. However, if you wanted to significantly reform your house, you wouldn’t call moving some furniture around a significant reform. In order to call it a significant reformation, it would have to be sufficiently great or important to be worthy of attention, noteworthy in its reform.
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------C. Violation Instead of providing us with a plan that significantly reforms the USFG’s environmental policy, the aff has provided us with a plan that only slightly reforms policy. We call this a Minor Repair: Profs. David Thomas and John Hart from Richmond and Northeast Missouri Universities, “Advanced Debate,” 1996 (HEG) “A minor repair is considered to be anytime that the solvency can be achieved with either an increase of funding or an increase of enforcement.” In other words, the aff team claims to achieve solvency or a comparative advantage over the squo with an merely an increase in funding/enforcement.
T – Minor Repair -- Significantly (2/2) D. Impacts/Voters 1. A priori issue.
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Topicality is an issue that is evaluated before any other contention is addressed. If they aren’t topical, you should vote negative without considering any other issue. 2. Prima facie burden. The Affirmative team’s obligation is to present a case on its face that defends the truth of the resolution. Regardless of whether their plan is a good or bad idea, they have failed to uphold their prima facie burden if it does not mirror the terms of resolution. 3. Destroys debate. If non-topical cases are allowed, the entire foundation for academic debate is destroyed. The most important thing to consider in academic debate is the resolution. If the resolution does not matter, why debate? If non-topical cases are the norm, people will stop debating, because what’s the point? 4. Sets a bad precedent. Voting in favor of a blatantly non-topical case sets a precedent. It says to our league, “This practice is okay.” As the judge, it is your job to vote against cases that set a bad precedent of non-topical cases being okay. A negative ballot based on topicality sends a message discouraging teams from running non-topical cases. 5. No affirmative. A minor repair is negative ground. The affirmative team has employed a negative strategy and therefore is an additional negative team – since we’re both negative, you should still check that negative box at the end of the round.
Solvency -- Launch Costs (1/1) SBSP launch costs are huge - $135 billion just to get it into space Paul Roseman [long time member of the National Space Society, ran a track of the 1996 International
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Space Development Conference in New York, and gave a paper at the 1997 Space Studies Institute conference on a business plan outline to recycle space debris in LEO to LEO], “Barely affordable SPS using ISRU in LEO”, May 2007, http://crowlspace.com/?page_id=50 (HEG) “One part of a solar power satellite is solar cells. One way to rate these cells is in kilowatts of power collected per kilogram of weight of the cell (Kw/Kg ). Current cells are 2 Kw/Kg. To launch 5 gigawatts of solar cells to low earth orbit would cost $22.5 billion at $5,000 per pound launch costs, and that is just for the solar cells. If you launch them to geosynchronous orbit, where they need to be, the cost doubles to $45 billon. That is why it is so expensive to do this project. To compare, the solar cells cost about $1 apiece or about $5 billion for 5 gigawatts of collecting capacity. The hardware that has to be delivered to geosynchronous orbit and assembled to do this project consists of the solar cells, the wiring and power management hardware, the structural parts, and the transmitter. The total weight that goes to geosynchronous orbit comes to about 3 times that of the solar cells, making the cost of delivering just the parts to geosynchronous orbit about $135 billion. And they still have to be bought, and assembled. How can we make those costs less?”
Solvency -- Electricity Costs (1/1) A. SBSP would have to sell electricity at $5 per kWh to break even (kWh = kilo-watt hour) Gene Meyers [CEO The Space Island Group, Inc.], "Frequently Asked Questions About the Space
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Island Group's Solar Power Satellite Program", Page 5, Prepared Exclusively for the Executives of Utility Companies By The Space Island Group, Inc. [uses existing technologies, vehicles and procedures developed by NASA, Russia, and other commercial aerospace companies], April 20, 2009, http://www.spaceislandgroup.com/pdf/SSPS%20Presentation%204-18-09.pdf, italics in original (HEG) “Why Haven’t Solar Sats Been Built in Orbit Until Now? The single hurdle is the economics of launching them. Based on estimates we have gotten from several aerospace firms, the total cost of mass producing all the solar sat components (including the cells, the guidance and transmitting equipment) works out to about $2,000 per pound. It takes about 2 pounds of these components to generate and transmit 1 kilowatt of electricity to the antenna. But it costs $10,000 to $20,000 per pound to get these components up to this 22,000 mile altitude. Launching robot assemblers controlled from Earth to put these components together nearly double this cost. Launching and housing astronauts in orbit to do this assembly would double it again. Solar satellites can physically be built, but at the above costs their electricity would have to sell for $5 per kWh to even approach breakeven.” B. The National “Average Retail Price of Electricity to ,,, Consumer” is less than 10¢ per kWh [NOTE: you can’t really READ a chart. Suggestion: Say this: “According to the EIA, the “average retail price of electricity to ultimate costumers over the entire country for April 2008-2009 was 9.69¢ (that is not a typo).”] Energy Information Administration, Table 5.6.A. Average Retail Price of Electricity to Ultimate Customers by End-Use Sector, by State, April 2009 and 2008 (Cents per kilowatthour), Report Released: July 10, 2009, http://www.eia.doe.gov/cneaf/electricity/epm/table5_6_a.html (HEG)
[Connecticut, Maine, Massachusetts, New Hampshire, Rhode Island, & Vermont omitted] [New Jersey, New York, & Pennsylvania omitted] [Illinois, Indiana, Michigan, Ohio, & Wisconsin omitted] [Iowa, Kansas, Minnesota, Missouri, Nebraska, North Dakota, & South Dakota omitted] [Delaware, DC, Florida, Georgia, Maryland, North Carolina, South Carolina, Virginia, & West Virginia omitted] [Alabama, Kentucky, Mississippi, & Tennessee omitted] [Arkansas, Louisiana, Oklahoma, & Texas omitted] [Arizona, Colorado, Idaho, Montana, Nevada, New Mexico, Utah, & Wyoming omitted] [California, Oregon, & Washington omitted] [Alaska & Hawaii omitted]
Solvency -- International Restrictions (1/1) International barriers to SBSP are: (1) geosynchronous orbit restrictions, & (2) jurisdiction concerning satellite placement Office of Technology Assessment, CHAPTER 7: “THE INTERNATIONAL IMPLICATIONS OF SOLAR
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POWER SATELLITES”, Page 154, Report on SPS by Office of technology Assessment, Solar Power Satellites, 1981, http://www.princeton.edu/~ota/disk3/1981/8124/812409.PDF, brackets and expansions not in original (HEG) “The United States and other space-capable states are currently bound by a number of agreements that would affect S[olar] P[ower] S[atellite] development. 25 Much of existing international law has been formulated at the United Nations (U. N.) by the Legal Subcommittee of the Committee on the Peaceful Uses of Outer Space (COPUOS). COPUOS has been in existence since 1959, when it began with 24 members. It now has 47, with membership expanding as international interest in space matters has increased. COPUOS decisions have been made by consensus rather than by outright voting.26The most important and comprehensive of the currently applicable agreements, all of which have been ratified by the major space powers, is the 1967 Treaty on Principles Governing the Activities of States in the Exploration and Use of Outer Space, Including the Moon and other Celestial Bodies . In 1979, COPOUS agreed on a final version of a new treaty, the so-called “Moon Treaty, ” which has so far not been signed by the United States or other major powers. The Moon Treaty applies to the Moon and other celestial bodies, but not to Earth orbit. In addition to COPUOS, important decisions on frequency allocations and orbital positioning are made by the International Telecommunications Union (ITU), a specialized U. N. agency. As a new arena of human exploration, legal norms with respect to outer space have had to be defined. This has been done through a gradual process shaped by actual usage, the extension of existing law, and the explicit adoption of common principles and regulations. The outstanding international legal issues that might affect S[olar] P[ower] S[atellite] development are:1. the status of the geosynchronous orbit, and the source of jurisdiction over the placement of satellites; 2. provisions against environmental disturbances;”
Solvency -- Weather Modification (1/2) A. SBSP is capable of modifying the weather via access to storm systems Insert Dr. Bernard J. Eastlund 08 from Ethos: Ethos Neg – SBSP Disadvantages 2. Weather Manipulation B. Internal Link 7.
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B. Weather modification via SBSP is not only possible, but anticipated Insert Dr. Bernard J. Eastlund 08 from Ethos: Ethos Neg – SBSP Disadvantages 2. Weather Manipulation B. Internal Link 8.
Solvency -- Weather Modification (2/2) C. Weather modification is prohibited under international treaties Members from the Argonna National Laboratory, the Letterman Army Institute of Research, the EPA, NASA, the U.S. Dept. of Energy, the Office of Technology Assessment, & the Alamos Scientific
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Laboratory, “Solar Power Satellites”, CHAPTER 7: THE INTERNA TIONAL IMPLICATIONS OF SOLAR POWER SATELLITES, Pages 756-757 of “SPS”, Pages 156-157 of Chapter 7, NTIS order #PB82-108846, Library of Congress Catalog Card Number 81-600129, August 1981, brackets added (HEG) Military and Arms Control Issues The 1967 treaty [Treaty on Principles Governing the Activities of States in the Exploration and Use of Outer Space, Including the Moon and other Celestial Bodies] commits states “not to place in orbit around the Earth any objects carrying nuclear weapons or any other kinds of weapons of mass destruction” (art. IV) and in general to carry on activities “in the interest of maintaining international peace and security and promoting international cooperation and understanding” (art. III).34 The 1977 “Conven-tion on the Prohibition of Military or Any Other Hostile Use of EnvironmentaI Modifi- cation Techniques” prohibits the activities im- plied, with “environmental modification tech- niques” defined as “any technique for chang- ing the dynamics, composition or structure of the Earth, including its biota, lithosphere, hydrosphere and atmosphere.” (art. 11).35 These general principles obviously allow for criticism of some SPS designs as having weather modifi- cation potential, requiring restrictions or redesign to reduce such effects. Whether an SPS’s microwave or laser capabilities would class it as a weapon of “mass destruction” and hence make it illegal under the 1967 treaty is unclear, but it is very likely that such charges would be made in the event of SPS deploy- ment. Development of an SPS might entail re- negotiation of relevant treaties or special sys- tem design to minimize its usefulness as a weapon.
Weaponization DA (1/2) A. Link: SBSP sparks weaponization Space weaponization is not an inevitability; satellites required for SBSP would cause international resentment and a perpetuation of an arms race.
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MARC LALLANILLA [Master's Degree Candidate, Department of Journalism and Mass Communications, New York University, Master's Degree, Environmental and Urban Planning, University of California at Berkeley], “Shooting Stars: U.S. Military Takes First Step Towards Weapons in Space”, Published by ABCnews.com, March 30, 2004, http://abcnews.go.com/Health/Technology/Story?id=165290&page=1 (HEG) “"Weapons in space are not inevitable. If it were, it would have happened already," argued the senior defense expert, adding, "We should instead be taking the lead to make [weapons] agreements with other countries." Indeed, other nations have moved for the non-militarization of space. As early as 1967, for example, the United Nations brokered the Outer Space Treaty, which prohibits the use of weapons of mass destruction in space. The United States is a signatory to the treaty. Summarizing the differences between the United States and European views on space was Jean-Jacques Dordain, head of the European Space Agency, who said in a recent interview: "For the U.S., space is an instrument of domination -- information domination and leadership. Europe should be proposing a different model -space as a public good." Criticism of the U.S. plans to weaponize space is not limited to Europeans. The Washington, D.C.-based Center for Defense Information, a non-governmental organization founded by retired senior U.S. military offices, said in a 2002 report, "Space is already 'militarized' by both military and commercial satellites. The only practical place to draw the line today is space weaponization." Concluded the report: "The United States has and will continue to have more interests in space assets both civil and military than most countries, and it will retain a net benefit if no one [including the United States itself] has weapons in space."”
Weaponization DA (2/2) B. Impact: lots of goodies (prolif etc) Space weaponization undermines US military readiness, leads to arms race, and increased prolif. Michael Krepon [president emeritus of the Henry L. Stimson Center, is the author of Space Assurance
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or Space Dominance? The Case Against Weaponizing Space with Christopher Clary (Henry L. Stimson Center, 2004), Cooperative Threat Reduction, Missile Defense, and the Nuclear Future (Palgrave Macmillan, 2003), and editor of Nuclear Risk Reduction in South Asia (Palgrave Macmillan, 2004)], "Weapons in the Heavens: A Radical and Reckless Option”, The Arms Control Association (ACA) [a national nonpartisan membership organization dedicated to promoting public understanding of and support for effective arms control policies. Through its public education and media programs and its magazine, Arms Control Today (ACT), ACA provides policy-makers, the press and the interested public with authoritative information, analysis and commentary on arms control proposals, negotiations and agreements, and related national security issues. In addition to the regular press briefings ACA holds on major arms control developments, the Association's staff provides commentary and analysis on a broad spectrum of issues for journalists and scholars both in the United States and abroad], November 2004, http://www.armscontrol.org/act/2004_11/Krepon (HEG) Weaponizing space would poison relations with China and Russia, whose help is essential to stop and reverse proliferation. ASAT weapon tests and deployments would surely reinforce Russia’s hair-trigger nuclear posture, and China would likely feel compelled to alter its relaxed nuclear posture, which would then have negative repercussions on India and Pakistan. The Bush administration’s plans would also further alienate America’s friends and allies, which, with the possible exception of Israel, strongly oppose the weaponization of space. The fabric of international controls over weapons of mass destruction, which is being severely challenged by Iran’s and North Korea’s nuclear ambitions, could rip apart if the Bush administration’s interest in testing space and nuclear weapons is realized.This highly destabilizing and dangerous scenario can be avoided, as there is no pressing need to weaponize space and many compelling reasons to avoid doing so. If space becomes another realm for the flight-testing and deployment of weapons, there will be no sanctuary in space and no assurance that essential satellites will be available when needed for military missions and global commerce. Acting on worst-case assumptions often can increase this likelihood. Crafting a space assurance[6] posture, including a hedging strategy in the event that others cheat, offers more potential benefits and lower risks than turning the heavens into a shooting gallery.
Weaponization Link Extension The DOD participating in SBSP production or development would signal the internat community that we were making space-based weapons Justin Skarb [BS in political science, a BA in history, a MA in political communication, and currently
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serves as an independent policy analyst],“Space-based solar power: right here, right now?” Published by The Space Review [an online publication whose focus is on publishing in-depth articles, essays, editorials, and reviews on a wide range of space-related topics. Focuses on articles that will provide a deeper examination of key space issues, events, history, and related topics], April 27, 2009, http://www.thespacereview.com/article/1359/1 This issue has little to do with the actual need for space-based weapons systems. Even for proponents of building and deploying space-based weapons doing otherwise makes little sense. Were the DOD to create the international perception that it is purchasing or funding space-based solar power systems, it is likely to fuel the fear that the DOD is actively pursuing the weaponization of space. Sending such a signal to the international community is likely to give further impetus for countries to develop their own brands of space-based weapons as well as the capabilities to destroy space-based systems from Earth. The danger is, then, that other countries are forced into a position of weaponizing space before the United States embarks on such a path but is then forced to in an attempt to respond to the actions of other nations. This scenario could set off an action-reaction cycle that heightens the risk of a spacebased arms race and all of the dangers that would pose to international stability. As such, preventing the international community from misinterpreting our interests in pursuing SBSP could be seen as an important means of preserving our dominance in space simply by not giving potential military competitors reason to ramp up their own space-based weapons programs. This, then, will allow the United States to pursue, if it chooses such a path, a space weapons program at its own pace instead of having its hand dictated by the actions of other nations.
Multilateral CP (1/4) Contention 1 is Counter-plan Text. Plan Text
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Agency & Enforcement: The USFG. Mandates: 1. The USFG will lobby for joint development of SBSP technology with the international community, to be implemented as each country sees fit or as negotiations allow. The USFG will not pursue SBSP technology unless multilateral negotiations fail or until specifics have been agreed to. 2.
Any necessary Funding will come from ______________ (same as AFF) Timeline: Work to achieve the mandates will begin immediately. All Negative speeches may clarify the plan as needed.
Multilateral CP (2/4) Contention 2 is solvency of the CP: 4 points. 1. Multilateral space co-op exists in SQ; A break away from this approach hinders the necessary
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approach to make space colonization a sustainable option Cheryl Pellerin [Staff Writer for America.gov], “World Space Agencies Coordinate on Future Exploration”, America.gov [delivers information about current U.S. foreign policy and about American life and culture,
produced by the U.S. Department of State's Bureau of International Information Programs], July 16, 2008, http://www.america.gov/st/space-english/2008/July/20080716155656lcnirellep0.3303034.html (HEG) Representatives of 11 space agencies met in Montreal July 10-12 to discuss the best ways to share resources and capabilities in their efforts to reach destinations in the solar system where people may someday live and work. This gathering is the latest in a series of meetings that is moving international cooperation in space beyond bilateral projects and multilateral partnerships, like that among the United States, “Washington --
Russia, Japan and several European nations to build the International Space Station. In 2006, NASA hosted a meeting of 13 other space agencies to discuss international interests in space exploration. Together, in The Global Exploration Strategy: The Framework for Coordination, released in May 2007, agency representatives articulated a vision for peaceful robotic and human
exploration and developed a common set of exploration themes. The agencies were Agenzia Spaziale Italiana, the British National Space Centre, France’s Centre National d’Etudes Spatiales, the China National Space Administration, the Canadian Space Agency, Australia’s Commonwealth Scientific and Research Organization, Germany’s Deutsches Zentrum für Luft- und Raumfahrt, the European Space Agency, the Indian Space Research Organisation, the Japan Aerospace Exploration Agency, the Republic of Korea Aerospace Research Institute, NASA, the National Space Agency of Ukraine and Russia’s Roscosmos. “We considered [the Framework document],” Neal Newman, senior international relations specialist at NASA headquarters, told America.gov, “a shared vision of the role of governments around the world to extend human and robotic presence throughout the solar system.”PEACEFUL PURPOSES The International Space Exploration Coordination Group
(ISECG), as the effort is formally titled, first met in Berlin in November 2007. “The ISECG is open to space agencies which have or are developing space exploration capabilities for peaceful purposes and which have a vested interest to participate in the strategic coordination process for space exploration,” the Framework document reads. “In sum, it is not an exclusive club of the 14 agencies that developed the Framework document.”At the meeting in Montreal, participants established an ISECG secretariat, to be hosted for the first two years by the European Space Agency, and discussed developing tools for sharing information across agencies on exploration capabilities and mission plans. STANDARDS IN SPACE In Montreal, participants took initial steps to identify critical space-
infrastructure interfaces -- such as connections among spacecraft, lunar rovers and lunar habitats -- that, if standardized, would increase opportunities for international cooperation. Standards are requirements that establish uniform engineering or technical criteria, methods, processes and practices, and make it possible to interchangeably use electronics, drive cars and build cities or space stations. One example of an ad hoc standard today involves the docking mechanism on the International Space Station. The space shuttle uses a Russian-designed mechanism -- the androgynous peripheral attach system -- that was designed for the Soyuz spacecraft.To build scientific bases or habitats on the moon or Mars, nations must use
standardized docking systems, common atmospheric standards, communication protocols and more. ISECG’s job will be to identify all the critical interfaces that should be standardized. “We may have a habitation module on the surface of the moon that needs to connect to a European-developed habitation module,” Newman said. “There may be a Japanese pressurized rover with people inside that needs to drive across the surface and plug into the habitation module, and there may be a French-developed power station that needs to be able to provide power to all users.” Standardization also is linked to safety.“If three countries have the capability to send humans to the lunar surface,” he said, “and only two of them can rescue one another in an emergency and a third one can’t, that’s not good.” The next step, planned for early 2009, is to have space architects
from the space agencies meet to determine how a multilateral outpost might look, then determine the most critical interfaces. More information on the Global Exploration Strategy is available at the NASA Web site.”
Multilateral CP (3/4) C2: Solvency 2. Only internat cooperation can create a long term, effective SPS system with a global market
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Office of Technology Assessment, CHAPTER 7: “THE INTERNATIONAL IMPLICATIONS OF SOLAR POWER SATELLITES”, Page 154, Report on SPS by Office of technology Assessment, Solar Power Satellites, 1981, http://www.princeton.edu/~ota/disk3/1981/8124/812409.PDF, brackets and expansions not in original (HEG) “There are three reasons why interested parties may wish to abandon their preference for autonomy in favor of an international effort. These are: 1) to share the high costs and risks; 2) to expand the global market; 3) to forestall foreign opposition and/or promote international cooperation. Costs The exact costs of developing, manufacturing, and operating a SPS are unknown; NASA estimates a 22-year, $102 billion program for the reference design.52 (See ch. 5, Costs. ) Although the R&D costs would be much lower than construction costs, they would be the hardest to finance, and the ones where international cooperation would be most valuable. The number of satellites needed for a global system would clearly be much larger than for a U.S. system alone. However, the R&D/prototype costs are essentially the same whether the system is unilateral or multilateral. Since the very long 30-year period of investment before payback is the project’s weakest link, it would be desirable to spread these costs between a large number of possible investors. And by widening the available pool of capital and expertise, an international effort would have less of an inflationary impact on resources, thus keeping costs down. However, it should be realized that an international consortium, whether involving private firms or government agencies, will tend generally to increase the overall costs. Under the best of circumstances there are costs associated with doing extensive business across borders, with coordinating efforts in different languages and geographic areas, and with balancing the divergent national interests of foreign partners. Without careful management and a high degree of cooperation from the states involved, these extra inefficiencies can eliminate any advantage gained from internationalizing the project. The experience of European collaborative efforts has been that costs rise as the large number of participants increases the managerial superstructure and project complexity .53 The Global Market We have previously discussed the SPS’s potential global market. An international venture may improve the marketing prospects of the system. First of all, potential users and buyers wouId be less concerned about becoming dependent on a particular country or corporation, which may infringe on national sovereignty. Many states, especially LDCs, are concerned about such a situation, particularly with regard to U.S. firms. Over the past 15 to 20 years, LDCs have made great efforts to gain indigenous control over local industries and resources, often resorting to nationalization and expropriation. The accumulation of financial and legal expertise by LDC governments means that future dealings with foreign firms will be more cautious and equitable than in the past. Also, it is often politically more feasible for a neutral or nonalined state to deal with an internationally controlled consortium than with a U.S. or Japanese or West European firm, especially when internal opposition to such relationships is strong. A consortium that offered direct participation and ownership to a large number of states would improve its marketing position even more. Such participation/ownership, even if on a small scale, would help to familiarize members with the organization’s operation and finances, and assure potential buyers that they were not being deceived. A financial stake would provide an incentive to see that the system worked efficiently and was suited for the needs of a variety of users.”
Multilateral CP (4/4) C2: Solvency 3. Contributors to the ISS
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NASA, "International Partners and Participants", updated October 1, 2008, http://www.nasa.gov/mission_pages/station/structure/elements/partners.html (HEG) “Launched in 1998 and involving the U.S., Russia, Canada, Japan, and the participating countries of the European Space Agency—the International Space Station is one of the most ambitious international collaborations ever attempted. The largest space station ever constructed, the ISS continues to be assembled in orbit. It has been visited by astronauts from 14 countries—and counting.” 4. Empirics: China example: a multilateral approach leads to sustainable space cooperation and maintains U.S. tech hegemony Jeffrey Logan [Specialist in Energy Policy, Resources, Science, and Industry Division], “China’s Space Program: Options for U.S.-China Cooperation”, Congressional Research Service (CRS) Report for Congress, Order Code RS22777, September 29, 2008, http://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/row/RS22777.pdf, bold and bullet-points in original (HEG) “Benefits of Cooperating with China. The potential benefits of expanded cooperation and dialogue with China include: • Improved transparency. Regular meetings could help the two nations understand each others’ intentions more clearly. Currently, there is mutual uncertainty and mistrust over space goals, resulting in the need for worst-case planning. • Offsetting the need for China’s unilateral development. Collaborating with China — instead of isolating it — may keep the country dependent on U.S. technology rather than forcing it to develop technologies alone. This can give the United States leverage in other areas of the relationship. • Cost savings. China now has the economic standing to support joint space cooperation. Costsharing of joint projects could help NASA achieve its challenging work load in the near future. Some have argued that U.S. space commerce has suffered from the attempt to isolate China while doing little to keep sensitive technology out of China. Options for Possible Cooperation. • Information and data sharing. Confidence building measures (CBMs) such as information exchange on debris management, environmental and meteorological conditions, and navigation, are widely considered an effective first step in building trust in a sensitive relationship. NASA has done some of this with CNSA in the past, but more is possible. • Space policy dialogue. Another area of potential exchange could begin with “strategic communication,”24 an attempt for each side to more accurately understand the other’s views, concerns, and intentions. Dialogue on “rules of the road,” a “code of conduct,” or even select military issues could be included. • Joint activities. This type of cooperation is more complex and would probably require strong political commitments and confidence building measures in advance. Bi- and multi-lateral partnerships on the international space station, lunar missions, environmental observation, or solar system exploration are potential options. A joint U.S.-Soviet space docking exercise in 1975 achieved important technical and political breakthroughs during the Cold War.”
Credentials: Electricity Costs B. EIA credentials
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http://tonto.eia.doe.gov/abouteia/, italics in original (HEG) “EIA, the Energy Information Administration. Provides policy-neutral data, forecasts, and analyses to promote sound policy making, efficient markets, and public understanding regarding energy and its interaction with the economy and the environment. The Department of Energy Organization Act (Public Law 95-91) allows EIA's processes and products to be independent from review by Executive Branch officials; specifically Section 205(d) says: "The Administrator shall not be required to obtain the approval of any other officer or employee of the Department in connection with the collection or analysis of any information; nor shall the Administrator be required, prior to publication, to obtain the approval of any other officer or employee of the United States with respect to the substance of any statistical or forecasting technical reports which he has prepared in accordance with law."”
Credentials: Weather Modification C. (1/2)
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SBSP NEG -- Index (1/2) SBSP NEG -- Index (1/2)...................................................................................................1 T – Minor Repair – Significantly (1/2)...............................................................................2 A. Interp ....................................................................................................................................2 B. Standard ...............................................................................................................................3 C. Violation ...............................................................................................................................3
T – Minor Repair -- Significantly (2/2)..............................................................................3 D. Impacts/Voters .....................................................................................................................3 1. A priori issue...................................................................................................................................3 2. Prima facie burden..........................................................................................................................4 3. Destroys debate...............................................................................................................................4 4. Sets a bad precedent........................................................................................................................4
Solvency -- Launch Costs (1/1)..........................................................................................4 SBSP launch costs are huge - $135 billion just to get it into space.....................................................4
Solvency -- Electricity Costs (1/1).....................................................................................5 A. SBSP would have to sell electricity at $5 per kWh to break even (kWh = kilo-watt hour)..............5 B. The National “Average Retail Price of Electricity to ,,, Consumer” is less than 10¢ per kWh.......6
Solvency -- International Restrictions (1/1)........................................................................6 International barriers to SBSP are: (1) geosynchronous orbit restrictions, & (2) jurisdiction concerning satellite placement...............................................................................................................................6
Solvency -- Weather Modification (1/2).............................................................................7 A. SBSP is capable of modifying the weather via access to storm systems..........................................7 B. Weather modification via SBSP is not only possible, but anticipated.............................................8
Solvency -- Weather Modification (2/2).............................................................................8 C. Weather modification is prohibited under international treaties....................................................8
Weaponization DA (1/2) ...................................................................................................9 A. Link: SBSP sparks weaponization .....................................................................................9 Space weaponization is not an inevitability; satellites required for SBSP would cause international resentment and a perpetuation of an arms race..................................................................................9
Weaponization DA (2/2) .................................................................................................10 B. Impact: lots of goodies (prolif etc) ....................................................................................10 Space weaponization undermines US military readiness, leads to arms race, and increased prolif..10
Weaponization Link Extension .......................................................................................11 The DOD participating in SBSP production or development would signal the internat community that we were making space-based weapons...................................................................................................11
Multilateral CP (1/4) .......................................................................................................12 Contention 1 is Counter-plan Text........................................................................................12 Plan Text...........................................................................................................................................12
Multilateral CP (2/4) .......................................................................................................13 Contention 2 is solvency of the CP: 4 points. .......................................................................13 1. Multilateral space co-op exists in SQ; A break away from this approach hinders the necessary approach to make space colonization a sustainable option ..............................................................................13
Multilateral CP (3/4)........................................................................................................14
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C2: Solvency.............................................................................................................................14 2. Only internat cooperation can create a long term, effective SPS system with a global market.....14
Multilateral CP (4/4)........................................................................................................15 C2: Solvency.............................................................................................................................15 3. Contributors to the ISS..................................................................................................................15 4. Empirics: China example: a multilateral approach leads to sustainable space cooperation and maintains U.S. tech hegemony...........................................................................................................................16
Credentials: Electricity Costs B. ......................................................................................16 EIA credentials..................................................................................................................................16
Credentials: Weather Modification C. (1/2).....................................................................17 Credentials: Weather Modification C. (2/2).....................................................................18
T – Minor Repair – Significantly (1/2) A. Interp Our interp of the resolution is that the aff has to significantly reform the USFG’s environmental policy: significantly is defined as “sufficiently great or important to be worthy of attention; noteworthy” (Oxford American Dictionaries)
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----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------B. Standard Our standard, or why our interpretation of the resolution should be used, is contextuality: For example, if you wanted to reform your house, all you would have to do is move some furniture around. However, if you wanted to significantly reform your house, you wouldn’t call moving some furniture around a significant reform. In order to call it a significant reformation, it would have to be sufficiently great or important to be worthy of attention, noteworthy in its reform.
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------C. Violation Instead of providing us with a plan that significantly reforms the USFG’s environmental policy, the aff has provided us with a plan that only slightly reforms policy. We call this a Minor Repair: Profs. David Thomas and John Hart from Richmond and Northeast Missouri Universities, “Advanced Debate,” 1996 (HEG) “A minor repair is considered to be anytime that the solvency can be achieved with either an increase of funding or an increase of enforcement.” In other words, the aff team claims to achieve solvency or a comparative advantage over the squo with an merely an increase in funding/enforcement.
T – Minor Repair -- Significantly (2/2) D. Impacts/Voters 1. A priori issue.
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Topicality is an issue that is evaluated before any other contention is addressed. If they aren’t topical, you should vote negative without considering any other issue. 2. Prima facie burden. The Affirmative team’s obligation is to present a case on its face that defends the truth of the resolution. Regardless of whether their plan is a good or bad idea, they have failed to uphold their prima facie burden if it does not mirror the terms of resolution. 3. Destroys debate. If non-topical cases are allowed, the entire foundation for academic debate is destroyed. The most important thing to consider in academic debate is the resolution. If the resolution does not matter, why debate? If non-topical cases are the norm, people will stop debating, because what’s the point? 4. Sets a bad precedent. Voting in favor of a blatantly non-topical case sets a precedent. It says to our league, “This practice is okay.” As the judge, it is your job to vote against cases that set a bad precedent of non-topical cases being okay. A negative ballot based on topicality sends a message discouraging teams from running non-topical cases. 5. No affirmative. A minor repair is negative ground. The affirmative team has employed a negative strategy and therefore is an additional negative team – since we’re both negative, you should still check that negative box at the end of the round.
Solvency -- Launch Costs (1/1) SBSP launch costs are huge - $135 billion just to get it into space Paul Roseman [long time member of the National Space Society, ran a track of the 1996 International
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Space Development Conference in New York, and gave a paper at the 1997 Space Studies Institute conference on a business plan outline to recycle space debris in LEO to LEO], “Barely affordable SPS using ISRU in LEO”, May 2007, http://crowlspace.com/?page_id=50 (HEG) “One part of a solar power satellite is solar cells. One way to rate these cells is in kilowatts of power collected per kilogram of weight of the cell (Kw/Kg ). Current cells are 2 Kw/Kg. To launch 5 gigawatts of solar cells to low earth orbit would cost $22.5 billion at $5,000 per pound launch costs, and that is just for the solar cells. If you launch them to geosynchronous orbit, where they need to be, the cost doubles to $45 billon. That is why it is so expensive to do this project. To compare, the solar cells cost about $1 apiece or about $5 billion for 5 gigawatts of collecting capacity. The hardware that has to be delivered to geosynchronous orbit and assembled to do this project consists of the solar cells, the wiring and power management hardware, the structural parts, and the transmitter. The total weight that goes to geosynchronous orbit comes to about 3 times that of the solar cells, making the cost of delivering just the parts to geosynchronous orbit about $135 billion. And they still have to be bought, and assembled. How can we make those costs less?”
Solvency -- Electricity Costs (1/1) A. SBSP would have to sell electricity at $5 per kWh to break even (kWh = kilo-watt hour) Gene Meyers [CEO The Space Island Group, Inc.], "Frequently Asked Questions About the Space
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Island Group's Solar Power Satellite Program", Page 5, Prepared Exclusively for the Executives of Utility Companies By The Space Island Group, Inc. [uses existing technologies, vehicles and procedures developed by NASA, Russia, and other commercial aerospace companies], April 20, 2009, http://www.spaceislandgroup.com/pdf/SSPS%20Presentation%204-18-09.pdf, italics in original (HEG) “Why Haven’t Solar Sats Been Built in Orbit Until Now? The single hurdle is the economics of launching them. Based on estimates we have gotten from several aerospace firms, the total cost of mass producing all the solar sat components (including the cells, the guidance and transmitting equipment) works out to about $2,000 per pound. It takes about 2 pounds of these components to generate and transmit 1 kilowatt of electricity to the antenna. But it costs $10,000 to $20,000 per pound to get these components up to this 22,000 mile altitude. Launching robot assemblers controlled from Earth to put these components together nearly double this cost. Launching and housing astronauts in orbit to do this assembly would double it again. Solar satellites can physically be built, but at the above costs their electricity would have to sell for $5 per kWh to even approach breakeven.” B. The National “Average Retail Price of Electricity to ,,, Consumer” is less than 10¢ per kWh [NOTE: you can’t really READ a chart. Suggestion: Say this: “According to the EIA, the “average retail price of electricity to ultimate costumers over the entire country for April 2008-2009 was 9.69¢ (that is not a typo).”] Energy Information Administration, Table 5.6.A. Average Retail Price of Electricity to Ultimate Customers by End-Use Sector, by State, April 2009 and 2008 (Cents per kilowatthour), Report Released: July 10, 2009, http://www.eia.doe.gov/cneaf/electricity/epm/table5_6_a.html (HEG)
[Connecticut, Maine, Massachusetts, New Hampshire, Rhode Island, & Vermont omitted] [New Jersey, New York, & Pennsylvania omitted] [Illinois, Indiana, Michigan, Ohio, & Wisconsin omitted] [Iowa, Kansas, Minnesota, Missouri, Nebraska, North Dakota, & South Dakota omitted] [Delaware, DC, Florida, Georgia, Maryland, North Carolina, South Carolina, Virginia, & West Virginia omitted] [Alabama, Kentucky, Mississippi, & Tennessee omitted] [Arkansas, Louisiana, Oklahoma, & Texas omitted] [Arizona, Colorado, Idaho, Montana, Nevada, New Mexico, Utah, & Wyoming omitted] [California, Oregon, & Washington omitted] [Alaska & Hawaii omitted]
Solvency -- International Restrictions (1/1) International barriers to SBSP are: (1) geosynchronous orbit restrictions, & (2) jurisdiction concerning satellite placement Office of Technology Assessment, CHAPTER 7: “THE INTERNATIONAL IMPLICATIONS OF SOLAR
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POWER SATELLITES”, Page 154, Report on SPS by Office of technology Assessment, Solar Power Satellites, 1981, http://www.princeton.edu/~ota/disk3/1981/8124/812409.PDF, brackets and expansions not in original (HEG) “The United States and other space-capable states are currently bound by a number of agreements that would affect S[olar] P[ower] S[atellite] development. 25 Much of existing international law has been formulated at the United Nations (U. N.) by the Legal Subcommittee of the Committee on the Peaceful Uses of Outer Space (COPUOS). COPUOS has been in existence since 1959, when it began with 24 members. It now has 47, with membership expanding as international interest in space matters has increased. COPUOS decisions have been made by consensus rather than by outright voting.26The most important and comprehensive of the currently applicable agreements, all of which have been ratified by the major space powers, is the 1967 Treaty on Principles Governing the Activities of States in the Exploration and Use of Outer Space, Including the Moon and other Celestial Bodies . In 1979, COPOUS agreed on a final version of a new treaty, the so-called “Moon Treaty, ” which has so far not been signed by the United States or other major powers. The Moon Treaty applies to the Moon and other celestial bodies, but not to Earth orbit. In addition to COPUOS, important decisions on frequency allocations and orbital positioning are made by the International Telecommunications Union (ITU), a specialized U. N. agency. As a new arena of human exploration, legal norms with respect to outer space have had to be defined. This has been done through a gradual process shaped by actual usage, the extension of existing law, and the explicit adoption of common principles and regulations. The outstanding international legal issues that might affect S[olar] P[ower] S[atellite] development are:1. the status of the geosynchronous orbit, and the source of jurisdiction over the placement of satellites; 2. provisions against environmental disturbances;”
Solvency -- Weather Modification (1/2) A. SBSP is capable of modifying the weather via access to storm systems Insert Dr. Bernard J. Eastlund 08 from Ethos: Ethos Neg – SBSP Disadvantages 2. Weather Manipulation B. Internal Link 7.
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B. Weather modification via SBSP is not only possible, but anticipated Insert Dr. Bernard J. Eastlund 08 from Ethos: Ethos Neg – SBSP Disadvantages 2. Weather Manipulation B. Internal Link 8.
Solvency -- Weather Modification (2/2) C. Weather modification is prohibited under international treaties Members from the Argonna National Laboratory, the Letterman Army Institute of Research, the EPA, NASA, the U.S. Dept. of Energy, the Office of Technology Assessment, & the Alamos Scientific
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Laboratory, “Solar Power Satellites”, CHAPTER 7: THE INTERNA TIONAL IMPLICATIONS OF SOLAR POWER SATELLITES, Pages 756-757 of “SPS”, Pages 156-157 of Chapter 7, NTIS order #PB82-108846, Library of Congress Catalog Card Number 81-600129, August 1981, brackets added (HEG) Military and Arms Control Issues The 1967 treaty [Treaty on Principles Governing the Activities of States in the Exploration and Use of Outer Space, Including the Moon and other Celestial Bodies] commits states “not to place in orbit around the Earth any objects carrying nuclear weapons or any other kinds of weapons of mass destruction” (art. IV) and in general to carry on activities “in the interest of maintaining international peace and security and promoting international cooperation and understanding” (art. III).34 The 1977 “Conven-tion on the Prohibition of Military or Any Other Hostile Use of EnvironmentaI Modifi- cation Techniques” prohibits the activities im- plied, with “environmental modification tech- niques” defined as “any technique for chang- ing the dynamics, composition or structure of the Earth, including its biota, lithosphere, hydrosphere and atmosphere.” (art. 11).35 These general principles obviously allow for criticism of some SPS designs as having weather modifi- cation potential, requiring restrictions or redesign to reduce such effects. Whether an SPS’s microwave or laser capabilities would class it as a weapon of “mass destruction” and hence make it illegal under the 1967 treaty is unclear, but it is very likely that such charges would be made in the event of SPS deploy- ment. Development of an SPS might entail re- negotiation of relevant treaties or special sys- tem design to minimize its usefulness as a weapon.
Weaponization DA (1/2) A. Link: SBSP sparks weaponization Space weaponization is not an inevitability; satellites required for SBSP would cause international resentment and a perpetuation of an arms race.
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MARC LALLANILLA [Master's Degree Candidate, Department of Journalism and Mass Communications, New York University, Master's Degree, Environmental and Urban Planning, University of California at Berkeley], “Shooting Stars: U.S. Military Takes First Step Towards Weapons in Space”, Published by ABCnews.com, March 30, 2004, http://abcnews.go.com/Health/Technology/Story?id=165290&page=1 (HEG) “"Weapons in space are not inevitable. If it were, it would have happened already," argued the senior defense expert, adding, "We should instead be taking the lead to make [weapons] agreements with other countries." Indeed, other nations have moved for the non-militarization of space. As early as 1967, for example, the United Nations brokered the Outer Space Treaty, which prohibits the use of weapons of mass destruction in space. The United States is a signatory to the treaty. Summarizing the differences between the United States and European views on space was Jean-Jacques Dordain, head of the European Space Agency, who said in a recent interview: "For the U.S., space is an instrument of domination -- information domination and leadership. Europe should be proposing a different model -space as a public good." Criticism of the U.S. plans to weaponize space is not limited to Europeans. The Washington, D.C.-based Center for Defense Information, a non-governmental organization founded by retired senior U.S. military offices, said in a 2002 report, "Space is already 'militarized' by both military and commercial satellites. The only practical place to draw the line today is space weaponization." Concluded the report: "The United States has and will continue to have more interests in space assets both civil and military than most countries, and it will retain a net benefit if no one [including the United States itself] has weapons in space."”
Weaponization DA (2/2) B. Impact: lots of goodies (prolif etc) Space weaponization undermines US military readiness, leads to arms race, and increased prolif. Michael Krepon [president emeritus of the Henry L. Stimson Center, is the author of Space Assurance
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or Space Dominance? The Case Against Weaponizing Space with Christopher Clary (Henry L. Stimson Center, 2004), Cooperative Threat Reduction, Missile Defense, and the Nuclear Future (Palgrave Macmillan, 2003), and editor of Nuclear Risk Reduction in South Asia (Palgrave Macmillan, 2004)], "Weapons in the Heavens: A Radical and Reckless Option”, The Arms Control Association (ACA) [a national nonpartisan membership organization dedicated to promoting public understanding of and support for effective arms control policies. Through its public education and media programs and its magazine, Arms Control Today (ACT), ACA provides policy-makers, the press and the interested public with authoritative information, analysis and commentary on arms control proposals, negotiations and agreements, and related national security issues. In addition to the regular press briefings ACA holds on major arms control developments, the Association's staff provides commentary and analysis on a broad spectrum of issues for journalists and scholars both in the United States and abroad], November 2004, http://www.armscontrol.org/act/2004_11/Krepon (HEG) Weaponizing space would poison relations with China and Russia, whose help is essential to stop and reverse proliferation. ASAT weapon tests and deployments would surely reinforce Russia’s hair-trigger nuclear posture, and China would likely feel compelled to alter its relaxed nuclear posture, which would then have negative repercussions on India and Pakistan. The Bush administration’s plans would also further alienate America’s friends and allies, which, with the possible exception of Israel, strongly oppose the weaponization of space. The fabric of international controls over weapons of mass destruction, which is being severely challenged by Iran’s and North Korea’s nuclear ambitions, could rip apart if the Bush administration’s interest in testing space and nuclear weapons is realized.This highly destabilizing and dangerous scenario can be avoided, as there is no pressing need to weaponize space and many compelling reasons to avoid doing so. If space becomes another realm for the flight-testing and deployment of weapons, there will be no sanctuary in space and no assurance that essential satellites will be available when needed for military missions and global commerce. Acting on worst-case assumptions often can increase this likelihood. Crafting a space assurance[6] posture, including a hedging strategy in the event that others cheat, offers more potential benefits and lower risks than turning the heavens into a shooting gallery.
Weaponization Link Extension The DOD participating in SBSP production or development would signal the internat community that we were making space-based weapons Justin Skarb [BS in political science, a BA in history, a MA in political communication, and currently
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serves as an independent policy analyst],“Space-based solar power: right here, right now?” Published by The Space Review [an online publication whose focus is on publishing in-depth articles, essays, editorials, and reviews on a wide range of space-related topics. Focuses on articles that will provide a deeper examination of key space issues, events, history, and related topics], April 27, 2009, http://www.thespacereview.com/article/1359/1 This issue has little to do with the actual need for space-based weapons systems. Even for proponents of building and deploying space-based weapons doing otherwise makes little sense. Were the DOD to create the international perception that it is purchasing or funding space-based solar power systems, it is likely to fuel the fear that the DOD is actively pursuing the weaponization of space. Sending such a signal to the international community is likely to give further impetus for countries to develop their own brands of space-based weapons as well as the capabilities to destroy space-based systems from Earth. The danger is, then, that other countries are forced into a position of weaponizing space before the United States embarks on such a path but is then forced to in an attempt to respond to the actions of other nations. This scenario could set off an action-reaction cycle that heightens the risk of a spacebased arms race and all of the dangers that would pose to international stability. As such, preventing the international community from misinterpreting our interests in pursuing SBSP could be seen as an important means of preserving our dominance in space simply by not giving potential military competitors reason to ramp up their own space-based weapons programs. This, then, will allow the United States to pursue, if it chooses such a path, a space weapons program at its own pace instead of having its hand dictated by the actions of other nations.
Multilateral CP (1/4) Contention 1 is Counter-plan Text. Plan Text
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Agency & Enforcement: The USFG. Mandates: 1. The USFG will lobby for joint development of SBSP technology with the international community, to be implemented as each country sees fit or as negotiations allow. The USFG will not pursue SBSP technology unless multilateral negotiations fail or until specifics have been agreed to. 2.
Any necessary Funding will come from ______________ (same as AFF) Timeline: Work to achieve the mandates will begin immediately. All Negative speeches may clarify the plan as needed.
Multilateral CP (2/4) Contention 2 is solvency of the CP: 4 points. 1. Multilateral space co-op exists in SQ; A break away from this approach hinders the necessary
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approach to make space colonization a sustainable option Cheryl Pellerin [Staff Writer for America.gov], “World Space Agencies Coordinate on Future Exploration”, America.gov [delivers information about current U.S. foreign policy and about American life and culture,
produced by the U.S. Department of State's Bureau of International Information Programs], July 16, 2008, http://www.america.gov/st/space-english/2008/July/20080716155656lcnirellep0.3303034.html (HEG) Representatives of 11 space agencies met in Montreal July 10-12 to discuss the best ways to share resources and capabilities in their efforts to reach destinations in the solar system where people may someday live and work. This gathering is the latest in a series of meetings that is moving international cooperation in space beyond bilateral projects and multilateral partnerships, like that among the United States, “Washington --
Russia, Japan and several European nations to build the International Space Station. In 2006, NASA hosted a meeting of 13 other space agencies to discuss international interests in space exploration. Together, in The Global Exploration Strategy: The Framework for Coordination, released in May 2007, agency representatives articulated a vision for peaceful robotic and human
exploration and developed a common set of exploration themes. The agencies were Agenzia Spaziale Italiana, the British National Space Centre, France’s Centre National d’Etudes Spatiales, the China National Space Administration, the Canadian Space Agency, Australia’s Commonwealth Scientific and Research Organization, Germany’s Deutsches Zentrum für Luft- und Raumfahrt, the European Space Agency, the Indian Space Research Organisation, the Japan Aerospace Exploration Agency, the Republic of Korea Aerospace Research Institute, NASA, the National Space Agency of Ukraine and Russia’s Roscosmos. “We considered [the Framework document],” Neal Newman, senior international relations specialist at NASA headquarters, told America.gov, “a shared vision of the role of governments around the world to extend human and robotic presence throughout the solar system.”PEACEFUL PURPOSES The International Space Exploration Coordination Group
(ISECG), as the effort is formally titled, first met in Berlin in November 2007. “The ISECG is open to space agencies which have or are developing space exploration capabilities for peaceful purposes and which have a vested interest to participate in the strategic coordination process for space exploration,” the Framework document reads. “In sum, it is not an exclusive club of the 14 agencies that developed the Framework document.”At the meeting in Montreal, participants established an ISECG secretariat, to be hosted for the first two years by the European Space Agency, and discussed developing tools for sharing information across agencies on exploration capabilities and mission plans. STANDARDS IN SPACE In Montreal, participants took initial steps to identify critical space-
infrastructure interfaces -- such as connections among spacecraft, lunar rovers and lunar habitats -- that, if standardized, would increase opportunities for international cooperation. Standards are requirements that establish uniform engineering or technical criteria, methods, processes and practices, and make it possible to interchangeably use electronics, drive cars and build cities or space stations. One example of an ad hoc standard today involves the docking mechanism on the International Space Station. The space shuttle uses a Russian-designed mechanism -- the androgynous peripheral attach system -- that was designed for the Soyuz spacecraft.To build scientific bases or habitats on the moon or Mars, nations must use
standardized docking systems, common atmospheric standards, communication protocols and more. ISECG’s job will be to identify all the critical interfaces that should be standardized. “We may have a habitation module on the surface of the moon that needs to connect to a European-developed habitation module,” Newman said. “There may be a Japanese pressurized rover with people inside that needs to drive across the surface and plug into the habitation module, and there may be a French-developed power station that needs to be able to provide power to all users.” Standardization also is linked to safety.“If three countries have the capability to send humans to the lunar surface,” he said, “and only two of them can rescue one another in an emergency and a third one can’t, that’s not good.” The next step, planned for early 2009, is to have space architects
from the space agencies meet to determine how a multilateral outpost might look, then determine the most critical interfaces. More information on the Global Exploration Strategy is available at the NASA Web site.”
Multilateral CP (3/4) C2: Solvency 2. Only internat cooperation can create a long term, effective SPS system with a global market
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Office of Technology Assessment, CHAPTER 7: “THE INTERNATIONAL IMPLICATIONS OF SOLAR POWER SATELLITES”, Page 154, Report on SPS by Office of technology Assessment, Solar Power Satellites, 1981, http://www.princeton.edu/~ota/disk3/1981/8124/812409.PDF, brackets and expansions not in original (HEG) “There are three reasons why interested parties may wish to abandon their preference for autonomy in favor of an international effort. These are: 1) to share the high costs and risks; 2) to expand the global market; 3) to forestall foreign opposition and/or promote international cooperation. Costs The exact costs of developing, manufacturing, and operating a SPS are unknown; NASA estimates a 22-year, $102 billion program for the reference design.52 (See ch. 5, Costs. ) Although the R&D costs would be much lower than construction costs, they would be the hardest to finance, and the ones where international cooperation would be most valuable. The number of satellites needed for a global system would clearly be much larger than for a U.S. system alone. However, the R&D/prototype costs are essentially the same whether the system is unilateral or multilateral. Since the very long 30-year period of investment before payback is the project’s weakest link, it would be desirable to spread these costs between a large number of possible investors. And by widening the available pool of capital and expertise, an international effort would have less of an inflationary impact on resources, thus keeping costs down. However, it should be realized that an international consortium, whether involving private firms or government agencies, will tend generally to increase the overall costs. Under the best of circumstances there are costs associated with doing extensive business across borders, with coordinating efforts in different languages and geographic areas, and with balancing the divergent national interests of foreign partners. Without careful management and a high degree of cooperation from the states involved, these extra inefficiencies can eliminate any advantage gained from internationalizing the project. The experience of European collaborative efforts has been that costs rise as the large number of participants increases the managerial superstructure and project complexity .53 The Global Market We have previously discussed the SPS’s potential global market. An international venture may improve the marketing prospects of the system. First of all, potential users and buyers wouId be less concerned about becoming dependent on a particular country or corporation, which may infringe on national sovereignty. Many states, especially LDCs, are concerned about such a situation, particularly with regard to U.S. firms. Over the past 15 to 20 years, LDCs have made great efforts to gain indigenous control over local industries and resources, often resorting to nationalization and expropriation. The accumulation of financial and legal expertise by LDC governments means that future dealings with foreign firms will be more cautious and equitable than in the past. Also, it is often politically more feasible for a neutral or nonalined state to deal with an internationally controlled consortium than with a U.S. or Japanese or West European firm, especially when internal opposition to such relationships is strong. A consortium that offered direct participation and ownership to a large number of states would improve its marketing position even more. Such participation/ownership, even if on a small scale, would help to familiarize members with the organization’s operation and finances, and assure potential buyers that they were not being deceived. A financial stake would provide an incentive to see that the system worked efficiently and was suited for the needs of a variety of users.”
Multilateral CP (4/4) C2: Solvency 3. Contributors to the ISS
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NASA, "International Partners and Participants", updated October 1, 2008, http://www.nasa.gov/mission_pages/station/structure/elements/partners.html (HEG) “Launched in 1998 and involving the U.S., Russia, Canada, Japan, and the participating countries of the European Space Agency—the International Space Station is one of the most ambitious international collaborations ever attempted. The largest space station ever constructed, the ISS continues to be assembled in orbit. It has been visited by astronauts from 14 countries—and counting.” 4. Empirics: China example: a multilateral approach leads to sustainable space cooperation and maintains U.S. tech hegemony Jeffrey Logan [Specialist in Energy Policy, Resources, Science, and Industry Division], “China’s Space Program: Options for U.S.-China Cooperation”, Congressional Research Service (CRS) Report for Congress, Order Code RS22777, September 29, 2008, http://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/row/RS22777.pdf, bold and bullet-points in original (HEG) “Benefits of Cooperating with China. The potential benefits of expanded cooperation and dialogue with China include: • Improved transparency. Regular meetings could help the two nations understand each others’ intentions more clearly. Currently, there is mutual uncertainty and mistrust over space goals, resulting in the need for worst-case planning. • Offsetting the need for China’s unilateral development. Collaborating with China — instead of isolating it — may keep the country dependent on U.S. technology rather than forcing it to develop technologies alone. This can give the United States leverage in other areas of the relationship. • Cost savings. China now has the economic standing to support joint space cooperation. Costsharing of joint projects could help NASA achieve its challenging work load in the near future. Some have argued that U.S. space commerce has suffered from the attempt to isolate China while doing little to keep sensitive technology out of China. Options for Possible Cooperation. • Information and data sharing. Confidence building measures (CBMs) such as information exchange on debris management, environmental and meteorological conditions, and navigation, are widely considered an effective first step in building trust in a sensitive relationship. NASA has done some of this with CNSA in the past, but more is possible. • Space policy dialogue. Another area of potential exchange could begin with “strategic communication,”24 an attempt for each side to more accurately understand the other’s views, concerns, and intentions. Dialogue on “rules of the road,” a “code of conduct,” or even select military issues could be included. • Joint activities. This type of cooperation is more complex and would probably require strong political commitments and confidence building measures in advance. Bi- and multi-lateral partnerships on the international space station, lunar missions, environmental observation, or solar system exploration are potential options. A joint U.S.-Soviet space docking exercise in 1975 achieved important technical and political breakthroughs during the Cold War.”
Credentials: Electricity Costs B. EIA credentials
Will Malson
SBSP NEG
Page 17 of 19
http://tonto.eia.doe.gov/abouteia/, italics in original (HEG) “EIA, the Energy Information Administration. Provides policy-neutral data, forecasts, and analyses to promote sound policy making, efficient markets, and public understanding regarding energy and its interaction with the economy and the environment. The Department of Energy Organization Act (Public Law 95-91) allows EIA's processes and products to be independent from review by Executive Branch officials; specifically Section 205(d) says: "The Administrator shall not be required to obtain the approval of any other officer or employee of the Department in connection with the collection or analysis of any information; nor shall the Administrator be required, prior to publication, to obtain the approval of any other officer or employee of the United States with respect to the substance of any statistical or forecasting technical reports which he has prepared in accordance with law."”
Credentials: Weather Modification C. (1/2)
Will Malson
SBSP NEG
Credentials: Weather Modification C. (2/2)
Page 18 of 19
Will Malson
SBSP NEG
Page 19 of 19
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