Rwanda - Political Science Perspective

Rwanda: The Political Science Perspective Class: Critical Issues: Violent Conflict, War and Genocide Instructor: Richard McCutcheon By Carsten Kaefert (3012875)

Table of Contents Rwanda: The Political Science Perspective.....................................................................................1 Abstract.......................................................................................................................................1 Explaining the Rwandan Genocide.............................................................................................2 Explanatory Variables for Genocide.......................................................................................2 1. Presence of an Exclusionary Ideology...........................................................................2 2. Ethnic “Capture” of the State........................................................................................3 3. Lack of Democratic Institutions....................................................................................3 4. International “openness”................................................................................................3 Modern War and Genocide.....................................................................................................4 Lessons for Genocide Prevention................................................................................................5 Bibliography................................................................................................................................7

Abstract There are various ways of analyzing genocide. Political Science, at least within the liberal school mainly focusing on power and its distribution, has to offer two: The empirical way of explaining genocide via a set of prerequisites or “explanatory variables”1 and in the context of 21st century warfare or “war among the people”2, as Smith calls it. Political Science also has a widely preventionist view on genocide, especially within the field of International Relations (IR), focusing mainly on the positive or adverse effects of international regimes. Here the concept of state sovereignty is under special scrutiny.

1 2

Adam Jones, Genocide: A Comprehensive Introduction (New York: Routledge, 2007), 310. Rupert Smith, The Utility of Force: The Art of War in the Modern World (London: Penguin Books, 2006), 183.

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Explaining the Rwandan Genocide Explanatory Variables for Genocide Empirically, all but one of the genocides and politicides that began between 1955 and 1998 occurred during or immediately after political upheavals[...] 3 This quote by Barbara Harff shows the importance of conflict in explaining genocide. She did a comprehensive empirical study determining factors prevalent in countries where a genocide occurred and rates how those affect the risk of genocide. According to Jones, she identifies five basic explanatory variables for genocide4, out of which at least four5 apply to the case of Rwanda:

1. Presence of an Exclusionary Ideology According to Harrf, countries with a governing elite adhering “to an exclusionary ideology ideology [are] two and a half time as likely”6 to experience genocide than others. With the prevalence of a Hutu Power ideology in Rwanda in the years leading to 1994, this was definitely given. Gourevitch identifies this elite as the akazu, which “tightened its grip of the state”7. He describes its ideology as one identifying Tutsi (and moderate Hutu) as “internal enemies” and “RPF 'accomplices'”8 as early as 1990, thus providing the pretext for mass murder.

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4 5

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Barbara Harrf, “No Lessons Learned from the Holocaust? Assessing Risks of Genocide and Political Mass Murder since 1955,” American Political Science Review, 97: 1 (February 2003): 62, as quoted in: Jones, Genocide..., 310. cf. Jones, Genocide..., 310. The variable left out is “presence or absence of genocidal precedents”, as Rwanda has had a history of violence between Hutus and Tutsis, but (arguably) not a previous genocide. Harrf, No Lessons..., as quoted in: Jones, Genocide..., 310. Philip Gourevitch, We Wish to Inform You that Tomorrow We Will Be Killed with Our Families (New York: Picador, 1998), 82. Ibid., 83.

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2. Ethnic “Capture” of the State The Hutu government in the years before 1994 has been described as “between Modernization and Ethnocracy”9. Debiel dates this (Hutu ruling Tutsi) ethnocratic side of Rwandan politics back to the social revolution of 1961, when the Hutu majority overthrew the feudal Tutsi government (which has been backed by the colonial power Belgium for the better part of a century).10 Taking into consideration the strong influence of the aforementioned akazu (ethnical Hutus), it becomes obvious, how deeply ethnicised the Rwandan state was – according to Harrf a fact making “the risks of geno-/politicide two and a half times more likely”11 compared to other states.

3. Lack of Democratic Institutions Following a military coup in 1973, Habyarimana governed the country basing his power to a large part on the military and political violence. According to Debiel, he chose officials mainly based upon their ethnicity and regional background, further securing his influence by outlawing political parties and having potential enemies murdered.12 Given that Harrf finds that “once in place, democratic institutions – even partial ones – reduce the likelihood of armed conflict and all but eliminate the risk that it will lead to geno-/politicide”13, this can be counted as a strong contributor to the genocide.

4. International “openness” Harrf states that “the greater the interdependence with the global economy, the les likely that [national] elites will target minorities […] for destruction”14. As Debiel explains, there was 9

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Tobias Debiel, UN-Friedensoperationen in Afrika. Weltinnenpolitik und die Realität von Bürgerkriegen (Bonn: Stiftung Entwicklung und Frieden, 2003), 163. Translated from “zwischen Modernisierung und Ethnokratie”. cf. ibid., 164 Harrf, No Lessons..., as quoted in: Jones, Genocide..., 310. Debiel, UN-Friedensoperationen..., 165. Harrf, No Lessons..., as quoted in: Jones, Genocide..., 310. Ibid.

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dependence of Rwanda on foreign aid, but no mutual interdependence, as Rwanda – despite reform efforts by the Habyarimana regime – was a “poor agrarian state”15. Foreign aid and arms shipments continuing to flow in to the perpetrators even during the genocide, especially from France and Egypt,16 relieved the regime (and its supporters in the region) from the pressures of international accountability, thus further fueling the conflict.17,18 Altogether, it becomes obvious that Rwanda in 1994 was highly vulnerable to genocide – the aforementioned facts adding up to a risk of political mass killing at least six and a quarter times higher than normal by a rough estimate.

Modern War and Genocide War has changed its face since World War II and especially since the Cold War ended – and with it the perspective of genocide has changed, as the two are closely related to each other. War from a western, European perspective used to be a clash of two professional armies, not including the civilian population.19 World War I ended this by introducing industrial warfare, which still dominates our image of war – although it is as obsolete as classic napoleonian warfare.20 With the nuclear bomb and the policy of mutually assured destruction arose another kind of warfare: war among the people.21 Most wars are now civil wars and have a strong ethnic component. 22 They thereby prepare the grounds for genocide or blur the distinction between genocide and the mere horrors of war15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22

Debiel, UN-Friedensoperationen..., 165. Linda Melvern, Conspiracy to Murder. The Rwandan Genocide (London, New York: Verso, 2006), 338-347. Gourevitch, We Wish to Inform You..., 281. Jones, Genocide..., 238. Ibid., 311. Smith, The Utility..., 188. Ibid.,183. Jones, Genocide..., 311.

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fare. Although they are not necessarily “more likely to produce genocide, but at the very least, they contain a strong genocidal potential.”23 This in turn creates a “genocidal dynamic”24, which tends to become central to the conflict. This frame set applies all too well to the Rwandan genocide. In 1990, the Rwandese Patriotic Front (RPF), a mainly expatriate Tutsi rebel army, started an invasion of Rwanda, thus providing a pretext for stepping up the persecution of Tutsis within the country. 25 This was the background for some of the most extreme and influential exterminationist propaganda, prominently the Ten Hutu Commandments.26 Thus a spiral of violence was created, fueled mainly by Hutu Power extremists, who diligently prepared the genocide in the following years.

Lessons for Genocide Prevention Both perspectives provide essential knowledge for the prevention of future genocides. Harrf's set of variables provides an useful tool for the identification of countries and populations at risk, thus enabling preventive action before killing occurs. But to put this knowledge to an effective use, lessons from the second part have to be learned: war is not usually happening between nations anymore, but within countries. Assuming the international community's intent to prevent future genocides (which, given the incidents in Sudan, has to be doubted), a thorough change in the way international relations are perceived has to happen. This is the paradigm shift away from the focus on state sovereignty to human security. The idea of state sovereignty, as formulated for the first time in the Peace of Westphalia of 1648, has “to be eroded”27. With the rise of international regimes, most importantly in this context the Genocide Convention of 1948, this process 23 24 25 26 27

Ibid., 314. Ibid. Ibid., 236f. Ibid., 237. Ibid., 317.

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has begun. In the wake of the violent conflicts of the 1990s a new approach to international relations arose, showing a possible way past the doctrine of state sovereignty: Responsibility to Protect.28 It redefines state sovereignty as a double-edged sword by adding a states responsibility to protect its population to the definition.29 Arguing “there must be no more Rwandas”30, it tries not only to make intervention easier, but even turn it into a responsibility of the international community.31

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International Commission on Intervention and State Sovereignty, The Responsibility to Protect (Ottawa: International Development Research Centre, 2001), VII. Ibid., 69. Ibid., 70. Ibid.

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Bibliography Tobias Debiel, UN-Friedensoperationen in Afrika. Weltinnenpolitik und die Realität von Bürgerkriegen (Bonn: Stiftung Entwicklung und Frieden, 2003), 163-165 Philip Gourevitch, We Wish to Inform You that Tomorrow We Will Be Killed with Our Families (New York: Picador, 1998), 82-83, 281 International Commission on Intervention and State Sovereignty, The Responsibility to Protect (Ottawa: International Development Research Centre, 2001), VII, 69-70 Adam Jones, Genocide: A Comprehensive Introduction (New York: Routledge, 2007), 236-238, 310-311, 314 Linda Melvern, Conspiracy to Murder. The Rwandan Genocide (London, New York: Verso, 2006), 338-347. Rupert Smith, The Utility of Force: The Art of War in the Modern World (London: Penguin Books, 2006), 183, 188

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