Pub Corp.docx

G.R. No. 177597

July 16, 2008

BAI SANDRA S. A. SEMA, Petitioner, vs. COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS and DIDAGEN P. DILANGALEN, Respondents. FACTS: The Ordinance appended to the 1987 Constitution apportioned two legislative districts for the Province of Maguindanao. The first legislative district consists of Cotabato City and eight municipalities.3 Maguindanao forms part of the Autonomous Region in Muslim Mindanao (ARMM), created under its Organic Act, Republic Act No. 6734 (RA 6734), as amended by Republic Act No. 9054 (RA 9054).4 Although under the Ordinance, Cotabato City forms part of Maguindanao’s first legislative district, it is not part of the ARMM but of Region XII, having voted against its inclusion in the ARMM in the plebiscite held in November 1989. On 28 August 2006, the ARMM’s legislature, the ARMM Regional Assembly, exercising its power to create provinces under Section 19, Article VI of RA 9054,5 enacted Muslim Mindanao Autonomy Act No. 201 (MMA Act 201) creating the Province of Shariff Kabunsuan composed of the eight municipalities in the first district of Maguindanao. MMA Act 201 provides: Except as may be provided by national law, the existing legislative district, which includes Cotabato as a part thereof, shall remain. In answer to Cotabato City’s query, the COMELEC issued Resolution No. 07-0407 on 6 March 2007 "maintaining the status quo with Cotabato City as part of Shariff Kabunsuan in the First Legislative District of Maguindanao." Resolution No. 07-0407, which adopted the recommendation of the COMELEC’s Law Department under a Memorandum dated 27 February 2007,7 provides in pertinent parts: However, in preparation for the 14 May 2007 elections, the COMELEC promulgated on 29 March 2007 Resolution No. 7845 stating that Maguindanao’s first legislative district is composed only of Cotabato City because of the enactment of MMA Act 201.8 (1) Sema contended that Section 19, Article VI of RA 9054 is constitutional (a) as a valid delegation by Congress to the ARMM of the power to create provinces under Section 20 (9), Article X of the Constitution granting to the autonomous regions, through their organic acts, legislative powers over "other matters as may be authorized by law for the promotion of the general welfare of the people of the region" and (b) as an amendment to Section 6 of RA 7160.17 However, Sema concedes that, if taken literally, the grant in Section 19, Article VI of RA 9054 to the ARMM Regional Assembly of the power to "prescribe standards lower than those mandated"

in RA 7160 in the creation of provinces contravenes Section 10, Article X of the Constitution.18 Thus, Sema proposed that Section 19 "should be construed as prohibiting the Regional Assembly from prescribing standards x x x that do not comply with the minimum criteria" under RA 7160.19 (2) Respondent Dilangalen contended that Section 19, Article VI of RA 9054 is unconstitutional on the following grounds: (a) the power to create provinces was not among those granted to the autonomous regions under Section 20, Article X of the Constitution and (b) the grant under Section 19, Article VI of RA 9054 to the ARMM Regional Assembly of the power to prescribe standards lower than those mandated in Section 461 of RA 7160 on the creation of provinces contravenes Section 10, Article X of the Constitution and the Equal Protection Clause; and ISSUE: Whether Section 19, Article VI of RA 9054, delegating to the ARMM Regional Assembly the power to create provinces, cities, municipalities and barangays, is constitutional; and HELD: p.28-30 There is neither an express prohibition nor an express grant of authority in the Constitution for Congress to delegate to regional or local legislative bodies the power to create local government units. However, under its plenary legislative powers, Congress can delegate to local legislative bodies the power to create local government units, subject to reasonable standards and provided no conflict arises with any provision of the Constitution. In fact, Congress has delegated to provincial boards, and city and municipal councils, the power to create barangays within their jurisdiction,25 subject to compliance with the criteria established in the Local Government Code, and the plebiscite requirement in Section 10, Article X of the Constitution. However, under the Local Government Code, "only x x x an Act of Congress" can create provinces, cities or municipalities.26 Under Section 19, Article VI of RA 9054, Congress delegated to the ARMM Regional Assembly the power to create provinces, cities, municipalities and barangays within the ARMM. Congress made the delegation under its plenary legislative powers because the power to create local government units is not one of the express legislative powers granted by the Constitution to regional legislative bodies. 27 In the present case, the question arises whether the delegation to the ARMM Regional Assembly of the power to create provinces, cities, municipalities and barangays conflicts with any provision of the Constitution. Clearly, a province cannot be created without a legislative district because it will violate Section 5 (3), Article VI of the Constitution as well as Section 3 of the Ordinance appended to the Constitution. For the same reason, a city with a

population of 250,000 or more cannot also be created without a legislative district. Thus, the power to create a province, or a city with a population of 250,000 or more, requires also the power to create a legislative district. Even the creation of a city with a population of less than 250,000 involves the power to create a legislative district because once the city’s population reaches 250,000, the city automatically becomes entitled to one representative under Section 5 (3), Article VI of the Constitution and Section 3 of the Ordinance appended to the Constitution. Thus, the power to create a province or city inherently involves the power to create a legislative district. Under the present Constitution, as well as in past28 Constitutions, the power to increase the allowable membership in the House of Representatives, and to reapportion legislative districts, is vested exclusively in Congress. Section 5, Article VI of the Constitution provides: The creation of the ARMM, and the grant of legislative powers to its Regional Assembly under its organic act, did not divest Congress of its exclusive authority to create legislative districts. This is clear from the Constitution and the ARMM Organic Act, as amended. Thus, Section 20, Article X of the Constitution provides: Nothing in Section 20, Article X of the Constitution authorizes autonomous regions, expressly or impliedly, to create or reapportion legislative districts for Congress. However, a province cannot legally be created without a legislative district because the Constitution mandates that "each province shall have at least one representative." Thus, the creation of the Province of Shariff Kabunsuan without a legislative district is unconstitutional. In summary, we rule that Section 19, Article VI of RA 9054, insofar as it grants to the ARMM Regional Assembly the power to create provinces and cities, is void for being contrary to Section 5 of Article VI and Section 20 of Article X of the Constitution, as well as Section 3 of the Ordinance appended to the Constitution. Only Congress can create provinces and cities because the creation of provinces and cities necessarily includes the creation of legislative districts, a power only Congress can exercise under Section 5, Article VI of the Constitution and Section 3 of the Ordinance appended to the Constitution. The ARMM Regional Assembly cannot create a province without a legislative district because the Constitution mandates that every province shall have a legislative district. Moreover, the ARMM Regional Assembly cannot enact a law creating a national office like the office of a district representative of Congress because the legislative powers of the ARMM Regional Assembly operate only within its territorial jurisdiction as provided in Section 20, Article X of the Constitution. Thus, we rule that MMA Act 201, enacted by the ARMM Regional Assembly and creating the Province of Shariff Kabunsuan, is void.

G.R. No. 135927

June 26, 2000

SULTAN USMAN SARANGANI, SORAIDA M. SARANGANI and HADJI NOR HASSAN, petitioners, vs. COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS and HADJI ABOLAIS R. OMAR, MANAN OSOP and ATTY. NASIB D. YASSIN, respondents. FACTS: On September 15, 1997, a petition for annulment of several precincts and annulment of book of voters in Madalum, Lanao Del Sur was filed with the COMELEC by, among others, Hadji Oblais R. Omar thru counsel Atty. Nasib D. Yasin, herein private respondents. Among the precincts sought to be annulled was (Barangay) Padian Torogan, subject matter of the present petition for certiorari.1 On October 31, 1997, the incumbent mayor of Madalum, Lanao Del Sur, Usman T. Sarangani, herein petitioner, together with other oppositors who were allegedly barangay chairmen of the twenty three (23) barangays the "Books of Voters" and precincts of which were sought to be annulled and abolished, respectively, filed an "Answer in Opposition"3 which included the affidavits of the barangay chairmen of the affected precincts attesting to the fact that the move to annul the book of voters and abolish the questioned election precincts were for the purpose of diminishing the bailiwicks of the incumbent mayor of Madalum, Lanao del Sur. 4 After hearing and submission of formal offer of exhibits and memoranda by the parties, the COMELEC issued an Order 5 dated February 11, 1998, referring the case to its Law Department for appropriate investigation. The COMELEC Law Department conformably issued a memorandum dated April 29, 1998 directing Atty. Muslemin Tahir, the Provincial Election Supervisor of Marawi City, Lanao del Sur "to conduct a rigorous incisive investigation on the alleged ghost precincts and thereafter submit a report on the investigation conducted."6 Consequently, Atty. Tahir created a TASK FORCE INVESTIGATION TEAM by virtue of a memorandum dated June 13, 1998 directing Election Officers Casan Macadato, Sacrain Guro and Anuar Datudacula "to conduct ocular inspection on the alleged twelve (12) ghost barangays in the Municipality of Madalum, Lanao Del Sur." 7 On the basis of the foregoing, Election Officer Casan Macadato submitted to the Provincial Election Supervisor of COMELEC in Marawi City its 1st Indorsement dated June 19, 1998 reporting the results of the ocular inspection that Padian Torogan and Rakutan were uninhabited.9 On June 29, 1998, the COMELEC issued the assailed Order finding "Padian Torogan as ghost precinct." The dispositive portion of the COMELEC Order reads:

On November 3, 1998, Sultan Usman Sarangani, Soraida M. Sarangani and Hadji Nor Hassan, in their respective capacity as former Municipal Mayor, incumbent Mayor and Vice-Mayor of Madalum filed the instant petition for certiorari and mandamus urging us to nullify the Order issued by the COMELEC, for having been issued with grave abuse of discretion. Likewise, petitioners moved to consolidate this case with G.R. No. 134456 entitled "Sultan Sarangani, et. al vs. COMELEC, et. al" alleging that G.R. No. 134456 also involves a COMELEC decision declaring the precinct corresponding to eight (8) barangays in Madalum, Lanao del Sur as ghosts precincts. ISSUE: Whether or not the respondent COMELEC committed grave abuse of discretion in declaring Padian-Torogan as ghost precinct. 12 HELD: NO. The findings of the administrative agency cannot be reversed on appeal or certiorari particularly when no significant facts and circumstances are shown to have been overlooked or disregarded which when considered would have substantially affected the outcome of the case. The COMELEC has broad powers to ascertain the true results of an election by means available to it. 17 The assailed order having been issued pursuant to COMELEC's administrative powers and in the absence of any finding of grave abuse of discretion in declaring a precinct as non-existent, said order shall stand. Judicial interference is unnecessary and uncalled for. 18 No voter is disenfranchised because no such voter exist. The sacred right of suffrage guaranteed by the Constitution 19 is not tampered when a list of fictitious voters is excluded from an electoral exercise. Suffrage is conferred by the Constitution only on citizens who are qualified to vote and are not otherwise disqualified by law. On the contrary, such exclusion of non-existent voters all the more protects the validity and credibility of the electoral process as well as the right of suffrage because the "electoral will" would not be rendered nugatory by the inclusion of some ghost votes. Election laws should give effect to, rather than frustrate the will of the people. 20 G.R. No. 103328 October 19, 1992 HON. ROY A. PADILLA, JR., In his capacity as Governor of the Province of Camarines Norte, petitioner, vs. COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS, respondent.

Tulay-Na-Lupa and the remaining areas of the mother Municipality of Labor, Camarines Norte (Tan vs. COMELEC, G.R. No. 73155, July 11, 1986). In the plebiscite held on December 15, 1991 throughout the Municipality of Labo, only 2,890 votes favored its creation while 3,439 voters voted against the creation of the Municipality of Tulay-Na-Lupa. Consequently, the day after the political exercise, the Plebiscite Board of Canvassers declared the rejection and disapproval of the independent Municipality of Tulay-Na-Lupa by a majority of votes. 3 Thus, in this special civil action of certiorari, petitioner as Governor of Camarines Norte, seeks to set aside the plebiscite conducted on December 15, 1991 throughout the Municipality of Labo and prays that a new plebiscite be undertaken as provided by RA 7155. It is the contention of petitioner that the plebiscite was a complete failure and that the results obtained were invalid and illegal because the plebiscite, as mandated by COMELEC Resolution No. 2312 should have been conducted only in the political unit or units affected, i.e. the 12 barangays comprising the new Municipality of Tulay-Na-Lupa namely Tulay-Na-Lupa, Lugui, San Antonio, Mabilo I, Napaod, Benit, Bayan-Bayan, Matanlang, Pag-Asa, Maot, and Calabasa. Petitioner stresses that the plebiscite should not have included the remaining area of the mother unit of the Municipality of Labo, Camarines Norte. 4 ISSUE: Whether or not the plebiscite conducted in the areas comprising the proposed Municipality of Tulay-Na-Lupa and the remaining areas of the mother Municipality of Labo is valid. HELD: YES. It stands to reason that when the law states that the plebiscite shall be conducted "in the political units directly affected," it means that residents of the political entity who would be economically dislocated by the separation of a portion thereof have a right to vote in said plebiscite. Evidently, what is contemplated by the phase "political units directly affected," is the plurality of political units which would participate in the plebiscite. 10 Logically, those to be included in such political areas are the inhabitants of the 12 barangays of the proposed Municipality of Tulay-NaLupa as well as those living in the parent Municipality of Labo, Camarines Norte. Thus, we conclude that respondent COMELEC did not commit grave abuse of discretion in promulgating Resolution No. 2312. G.R. No. L-114783 December 8, 1994

FACTS: Pursuant to Republic Act No. 7155, the Commission on Elections promulgated on November 13, 1991, Resolution No. 2312 which reads as follows: 1. The plebiscite shall be held on December 15, 1991, in the areas or units affected, namely the barangays comprising he proposed Municipality of

ROBERT V. TOBIAS, RAMON M. GUZMAN, TERRY T. LIM, GREGORIO D. GABRIEL, and ROBERTO R. TOBIAS, JR. petitioners, vs. HON. CITY MAYOR BENJAMIN S. ABALOS, CITY TREASURER WILLIAM MARCELINO,

and THE SANGGUNIANG PANLUNGSOD, all of the City of Mandaluyong, Metro Manila, respondents.

the inhabitants of San Juan were properly excluded from the said plebiscite as they had nothing to do with the change of status of neighboring Mandaluyong.

FACTS: Pursuant to the Local Government Code of 1991, a plebiscite was held on April 10, 1994. The people of Mandaluyong were asked whether they approved of the conversion of the Municipality of Mandaluyong into a highly urbanized city as provided under R.A. No. 7675. The turnout at the plebiscite was only 14.41% of the voting population. Nevertheless, 18,621 voted "yes" whereas 7,911 voted "no." By virtue of these results, R.A. No. 7675 was deemed ratified and in effect.

G.R. No. 40243 March 11, 1992

Petitioners now come before this Court, contending that R.A. No. 7675, specifically Article VIII, Section 49 thereof, is unconstitutional for being violative of three specific provisions of the Constitution. Petitioners argue that the division of San Juan and Mandaluyong into separate congressional districts under Section 49 of the assailed law has resulted in an increase in the composition of the House of Representatives beyond that provided in Article VI, Sec. 5(1) of the Constitution. Furthermore, petitioners contend that said division was not made pursuant to any census showing that the subject municipalities have attained the minimum population requirements. And finally, petitioners assert that Section 49 has the effect of preempting the right of Congress to reapportion legislative districts pursuant to Sec. 5(4) as aforecited. ISSUE: Is the inexistence of mention of census in the law show a lack of constitutional requirement? HELD: NO. Proceeding now to the other constitutional issues raised by petitioners to the effect that there is no mention in the assailed law of any census to show that Mandaluyong and San Juan had each attained the minimum requirement of 250,000 inhabitants to justify their separation into two legislative districts, the same does not suffice to strike down the validity of R.A. No. 7675. The said Act enjoys the presumption of having passed through the regular congressional processes, including due consideration by the members of Congress of the minimum requirements for the establishment of separate legislative districts. At any rate, it is not required that all laws emanating from the legislature must contain all relevant data considered by Congress in the enactment of said laws. Petitioners contend that the people of San Juan should have been made to participate in the plebiscite on R.A. No. 7675 as the same involved a change in their legislative district. The contention is bereft of merit since the principal subject involved in the plebiscite was the conversion of Mandaluyong into a highly urbanized city. The matter of separate district representation was only ancillary thereto. Thus,

CELESTINO TATEL, petitioner, vs. MUNICIPALITY OF VIRAC, SALVADOR A. SURTIDA, in his capacity as Mayor of Virac, Catanduanes; GAVINO V. GUERRERO, in his capacity as Vice-Mayor of Virac, Catanduanes; JOSE T. BUEBOS, in his capacity as Councilor of Virac, Catanduanes; ANGELES TABLIZO, in his capacity as Councilor of Virac, Catanduanes; ELPIDIO T. ZAFE, in his capacity as Councilor of Virac, Catanduanes; MARIANO ALBERTO, in his capacity as Councilor of Virac, Catanduanes; JULIA A. GARCIA, in her capacity as Councilor of Virac, Catanduanes; and PEDRO A. GUERRERO, in his capacity as Councilor of Virac, Catanduanes, respondents. FACTS: It appears from the records that on the basis of complaints received from the residents of barrio Sta. Elena on March 18, 1966 against the disturbance caused by the operation of the abaca bailing machine inside the warehouse of petitioner which affected the peace and tranquility of the neighborhood due to the smoke, obnoxious odor and dust emitted by the machine, a committee was appointed by the municipal council of Virac to investigate the matter. The committee noted the crowded nature of the neighborhood with narrow roads and the surrounding residential houses, so much so that an accidental fire within the warehouse of the petitioner occasioned by the continuance of the activity inside the warehouse and the storing of inflammable materials created a danger to the lives and properties of the people within the neighborhood. Resultantly, Resolution No. 29 was passed by the Municipal Council of Virac on April 22, 1966 declaring the warehouse owned and operated by petitioner a public nuisance within the purview of Article 694 of the New Civil Code. 2 Respondent municipal officials contend that petitioner's warehouse was constructed in violation of Ordinance No. 13, series of 1952, prohibiting the construction of warehouses near a block of houses either in the poblacion or barrios without maintaining the necessary distance of 200 meters from said block of houses to avoid loss of lives and properties by accidental fire. On the other hand, petitioner contends that said ordinance is unconstitutional, contrary to the due process and equal protection clause of the Constitution and null and void for not having been passed in accordance with law.

ISSUE: Whether Ordinance No. 13, S. 1952 of the Municipality of Virac is unconstitutional and void. HELD: NO. Ordinance No. 13, series of 1952, was passed by the Municipal Council of Virac in the exercise of its police power. It is a settled principle of law that municipal corporations are agencies of the State for the promotion and maintenance of local self-government and as such are endowed with the police powers in order to effectively accomplish and carry out the declared objects of their creation. 3 Its authority emanates from the general welfare clause under the Administrative Code, which reads: For an ordinance to be valid, it must not only be within the corporate powers of the municipality to enact but must also be passed according to the procedure prescribed by law, and must be in consonance with certain well established and basic principles of a substantive nature. These principles require that a municipal ordinance (1) must not contravene the Constitution or any statute (2) must not be unfair or oppressive (3) must not be partial or discriminatory (4) must not prohibit but may regulate trade (5) must be general and consistent with public policy, and (6) must not be unreasonable. 5 Ordinance No. 13, Series of 1952, meets these criteria. G.R. No. 136349

January 23, 2006

LOURDES DE LA PAZ MASIKIP, Petitioner, vs. THE CITY OF PASIG, HON. MARIETTA A. LEGASPI, in her capacity as Presiding Judge of the Regional Trial Court of Pasig City, Branch 165 and THE COURT OF APPEALS, Respondents. FACTS: Petitioner Lourdes Dela Paz Masikip is the registered owner of a parcel of land with an area of 4,521 square meters located at Pag-Asa, Caniogan, Pasig City, Metro Manila. In a letter dated January 6, 1994, the then Municipality of Pasig, now City of Pasig, respondent, notified petitioner of its intention to expropriate a 1,500 square meter portion of her property to be used for the "sports development and recreational activities" of the residents of Barangay Caniogan. This was pursuant to Ordinance No. 42, Series of 1993 enacted by the then Sangguniang Bayan of Pasig. Again, on March 23, 1994, respondent wrote another letter to petitioner, but this time the purpose was allegedly "in line with the program of the Municipal Government to provide land opportunities to deserving poor sectors of our community."

On May 2, 1994, petitioner sent a reply to respondent stating that the intended expropriation of her property is unconstitutional, invalid, and oppressive, as the area of her lot is neither sufficient nor suitable to "provide land opportunities to deserving poor sectors of our community." In its letter of December 20, 1994, respondent reiterated that the purpose of the expropriation of petitioner’s property is "to provide sports and recreational facilities to its poor residents." In this case, petitioner contends that respondent City of Pasig failed to establish a genuine necessity which justifies the condemnation of her property. While she does not dispute the intended public purpose, nonetheless, she insists that there must be a genuine necessity for the proposed use and purposes. According to petitioner, there is already an established sports development and recreational activity center at Rainforest Park in Pasig City, fully operational and being utilized by its residents, including those from Barangay Caniogan. Respondent does not dispute this. Evidently, there is no "genuine necessity" to justify the expropriation. ISSUE: WON there is genuine necessity to expropriate petitioner’s property. HELD: NO. The power of eminent domain is lodged in the legislative branch of the government. It delegates the exercise thereof to local government units, other public entities and public utility corporations,9 subject only to Constitutional limitations. Local governments have no inherent power of eminent domain and may exercise it only when expressly authorized by statute.10 Section 19 of the Local Government Code of 1991 (Republic Act No. 7160) prescribes the delegation by Congress of the power of eminent domain to local government units and lays down the parameters for its exercise, thus: Applying this standard, we hold that respondent City of Pasig has failed to establish that there is a genuine necessity to expropriate petitioner’s property. Our scrutiny of the records shows that the Certification14 issued by the Caniogan Barangay Council dated November 20, 1994, the basis for the passage of Ordinance No. 42 s. 1993 authorizing the expropriation, indicates that the intended beneficiary is the Melendres Compound Homeowners Association, a private, non-profit organization, not the residents of Caniogan. It can be gleaned that the members of the said Association are desirous of having their own private playground and recreational facility. Petitioner’s lot is the nearest vacant space available. The purpose is, therefore, not clearly and categorically public. The necessity has not been shown, especially considering that there exists an alternative facility for sports development and community recreation in the area, which is the Rainforest Park, available to all residents of Pasig City, including those of Caniogan.