Provrem Unedited

THIRD DIVISION HILARION M. HENARES, JR., VICTOR C. AGUSTIN, ALFREDO L. HENARES, DANIEL L. HENARES, ENRIQUE BELO HENARES, and CRISTINA BELO HENARES, Petitioners, - versus -

G.R. No. 158290 Present: QUISUMBING, J., Chairperson, CARPIO, CARPIO MORALES, TINGA, and VELASCO, JR., JJ.

LAND TRANSPORTATION FRANCHISING Promulgated: AND REGULATORY BOARD and DEPARTMENT OF TRANSPORTATION October 23, 2006 AND COMMUNICATIONS, Respondents. x- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -x RESOLUTION QUISUMBING, J.: Petitioners challenge this Court to issue a writ of mandamus commanding respondents Land Transportation Franchising and Regulatory Board (LTFRB) and the Department of Transportation and Communications (DOTC) to require public utility vehicles (PUVs) to use compressed natural gas (CNG) as alternative fuel. Citing statistics from the Metro Manila Transportation and Traffic Situation Study of 1996, the Environmental Management Bureau (EMB) of the National Capital Region, a study of the Asian Development Bank, the Manila Observatory and the Department of Environment and Natural Resources (DENR) on the high growth and low turnover in vehicle ownership in the Philippines, including diesel-powered vehicles, two-stroke engine powered motorcycles and their concomitant emission of air pollutants, petitioners attempt to present a compelling case for judicial action against the bane of air pollution and related environmental hazards.

Petitioners allege that the particulate matters (PM) – complex mixtures of dust, dirt, smoke, and liquid droplets, varying in sizes and compositions emitted into the air from various engine combustions – have caused detrimental effects on health, productivity, infrastructure and the overall quality of life. Petitioners particularly cite the effects of certain fuel emissions from engine combustion when these react to other pollutants. For instance, petitioners aver, with hydrocarbons, oxide of nitrogen (NOx) creates smog; with sulfur dioxide, it creates acid rain; and with ammonia, moisture and other compounds, it reacts to form nitric acid and harmful nitrates. Fuel emissions also cause retardation and leaf bleaching in plants. According to petitioner, another emission, carbon monoxide (CO), when not completely burned but emitted into the atmosphere and then inhaled can disrupt the necessary oxygen in blood. With prolonged exposure, CO affects the nervous system and can be lethal to people with weak hearts. Petitioners add that although much of the new power generated in the country will use natural gas while a number of oil and coal-fired fuel stations are being phased-out, still with the projected doubling of power generation over the next 10 years, and with the continuing high demand for motor vehicles, the energy and transport sectors are likely to remain the major sources of harmful emissions. Petitioners refer us to the study of the Philippine Environment Monitor 2002, stating that in four of the country’s major cities, Metro Manila, Davao, Cebu and Baguio, the exposure to PM10, a finer PM which can penetrate deep into the lungs causing serious health problems, is estimated at over US$430 million. The study also reports that the emissions of PMs have caused the following: · Over 2,000 people die prematurely. This loss is valued at about US$140 million. · Over 9,000 people suffer from chronic bronchitis, which is valued at about US$120 million. · Nearly 51 million cases of respiratory symptom days in Metro Manila (averaging twice a year in Davao and Cebu, and five to six times in Metro Manila and Baguio), costs about US$170 million. This is a 70 percent increase, over a decade, when compared with the findings of a similar study done in 1992 for Metro Manila, which reported 33 million cases. Petitioners likewise cite the University of the Philippines’ studies in 199091 and 1994 showing that vehicular emissions in Metro Manila have resulted to the prevalence of chronic obstructive pulmonary diseases (COPD); that pulmonary tuberculosis is highest among jeepney drivers; and there is a 4.8 to 27.5 percent prevalence of respiratory symptoms

among school children and 15.8 to 40.6 percent among child vendors. The studies also revealed that the children in Metro Manila showed more compromised pulmonary function than their rural counterparts. Petitioners infer that these are mostly due to the emissions of PUVs. To counter the aforementioned detrimental effects of emissions from PUVs, petitioners propose the use of CNG. According to petitioners, CNG is a natural gas comprised mostly of methane which although containing small amounts of propane and butane, is colorless and odorless and considered the cleanest fossil fuel because it produces much less pollutants than coal and petroleum; produces up to 90 percent less CO compared to gasoline and diesel fuel; reduces NOx emissions by 50 percent and cuts hydrocarbon emissions by half; emits 60 percent less PMs; and releases virtually no sulfur dioxide. Although, according to petitioners, the only drawback of CNG is that it produces more methane, one of the gases blamed for global warming. Asserting their right to clean air, petitioners contend that the bases for their petition for a writ of mandamus to order the LTFRB to require PUVs to use CNG as an alternative fuel, lie in Section 16, Article II of the 1987 Constitution, our ruling in Oposa v. Factoran, Jr., and Section 4 of Republic Act No. 8749 otherwise known as the “Philippine Clean Air Act of 1999.” Meantime, following a subsequent motion, the Court granted petitioners’ motion to implead the Department of Transportation and Communications (DOTC) as additional respondent. In his Comment for respondents LTFRB and DOTC, the Solicitor General, cites Section 3, Rule 65 of the Revised Rules of Court and explains that the writ of mandamus is not the correct remedy since the writ may be issued only to command a tribunal, corporation, board or person to do an act that is required to be done, when he or it unlawfully neglects the performance of an act which the law specifically enjoins as a duty resulting from an office, trust or station, or unlawfully excludes another from the use and enjoyment of a right or office to which such other is entitled, there being no other plain, speedy and adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law. Further citing existing jurisprudence, the Solicitor General explains that in contrast to a discretionary act, a ministerial act, which a mandamus is, is one in which an officer or tribunal performs in a given state of facts, in a prescribed manner, in obedience to a mandate of legal authority, without

regard to or the exercise of his own judgment upon the propriety or impropriety of an act done. The Solicitor General also notes that nothing in Rep. Act No. 8749 that petitioners invoke, prohibits the use of gasoline and diesel by owners of motor vehicles. Sadly too, according to the Solicitor General, Rep. Act No. 8749 does not even mention the existence of CNG as alternative fuel and avers that unless this law is amended to provide CNG as alternative fuel for PUVs, the respondents cannot propose that PUVs use CNG as alternative fuel. The Solicitor General also adds that it is the DENR that is tasked to implement Rep. Act No. 8749 and not the LTFRB nor the DOTC. Moreover, he says, it is the Department of Energy (DOE), under Section 26 of Rep. Act No. 8749, that is required to set the specifications for all types of fuel and fuel-related products to improve fuel compositions for improved efficiency and reduced emissions. He adds that under Section 21 of the cited Republic Act, the DOTC is limited to implementing the emission standards for motor vehicles, and the herein respondents cannot alter, change or modify the emission standards. The Solicitor General opines that the Court should declare the instant petition for mandamus without merit. Petitioners, in their Reply, insist that the respondents possess the administrative and regulatory powers to implement measures in accordance with the policies and principles mandated by Rep. Act No. 8749, specifically Section 2 and Section 21. Petitioners state that under these laws and with all the available information provided by the DOE on the benefits of CNG, respondents cannot ignore the existence of CNG, and their failure to recognize CNG and compel its use by PUVs as alternative fuel while air pollution brought about by the emissions of gasoline and diesel endanger the environment and the people, is tantamount to neglect in the performance of a duty which the law enjoins. Lastly, petitioners aver that other than the writ applied for, they have no other plain, speedy and adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law. Petitioners insist that the writ in fact should be issued pursuant to the very same Section 3, Rule 65 of the Revised Rules of Court that the Solicitor General invokes.

In their Memorandum, petitioners phrase the issues before us as follows: I. WHETHER OR NOT THE PETITIONERS HAVE THE PERSONALITY TO BRING THE PRESENT ACTION II. LAW

WHETHER OR NOT THE PRESENT ACTION IS SUPPORTED BY

III. WHETHER OR NOT THE RESPONDENT IS THE AGENCY RESPONSIBLE TO IMPLEMENT THE SUGGESTED ALTERNATIVE OF REQUIRING PUBLIC UTILITY VEHICLES TO USE COMPRESSED NATURAL GAS (CNG) IV. WHETHER OR NOT THE RESPONDENT CAN BE COMPELLED TO REQUIRE PUBLIC UTILITY VEHICLES TO USE COMPRESSED NATURAL GAS THROUGH A WRIT OF MANDAMUS Briefly put, the issues are two-fold. First, Do petitioners have legal personality to bring this petition before us? Second, Should mandamus issue against respondents to compel PUVs to use CNG as alternative fuel? According to petitioners, Section 16, Article II of the 1987 Constitution is the policy statement that bestows on the people the right to breathe clean air in a healthy environment. This policy is enunciated in Oposa. The implementation of this policy is articulated in Rep. Act No. 8749. These, according to petitioners, are the bases for their standing to file the instant petition. They aver that when there is an omission by the government to safeguard a right, in this case their right to clean air, then, the citizens can resort to and exhaust all remedies to challenge this omission by the government. This, they say, is embodied in Section 4 of Rep. Act No. 8749. Petitioners insist that since it is the LTFRB and the DOTC that are the government agencies clothed with power to regulate and control motor vehicles, particularly PUVs, and with the same agencies’ awareness and knowledge that the PUVs emit dangerous levels of air pollutants, then, the responsibility to see that these are curbed falls under respondents’ functions and a writ of mandamus should issue against them. The Solicitor General, for his part, reiterates his position that the respondent government agencies, the DOTC and the LTFRB, are not in a position to compel the PUVs to use CNG as alternative fuel. The Solicitor General explains that the function of the DOTC is limited to implementing the emission standards set forth in Rep. Act No. 8749 and the said law only

goes as far as setting the maximum limit for the emission of vehicles, but it does not recognize CNG as alternative engine fuel. The Solicitor General avers that the petition should be addressed to Congress for it to come up with a policy that would compel the use of CNG as alternative fuel. Patently, this Court is being asked to resolve issues that are not only procedural. Petitioners challenge this Court to decide if what petitioners propose could be done through a less circuitous, speedy and unchartered course in an issue that Chief Justice Hilario G. Davide, Jr. in his ponencia in the Oposa case, describes as “inter-generational responsibility” and “intergenerational justice.” Now, as to petitioners’ standing. There is no dispute that petitioners have standing to bring their case before this Court. Even respondents do not question their standing. This petition focuses on one fundamental legal right of petitioners, their right to clean air. Moreover, as held previously, a party’s standing before this Court is a procedural technicality which may, in the exercise of the Court’s discretion, be set aside in view of the importance of the issue raised. We brush aside this issue of technicality under the principle of the transcendental importance to the public, especially so if these cases demand that they be settled promptly. Undeniably, the right to clean air not only is an issue of paramount importance to petitioners for it concerns the air they breathe, but it is also impressed with public interest. The consequences of the counterproductive and retrogressive effects of a neglected environment due to emissions of motor vehicles immeasurably affect the well-being of petitioners. On these considerations, the legal standing of the petitioners deserves recognition. Our next concern is whether the writ of mandamus is the proper remedy, and if the writ could issue against respondents. Under Section 3, Rule 65 of the Rules of Court, mandamus lies under any of the following cases: (1) against any tribunal which unlawfully neglects the performance of an act which the law specifically enjoins as a duty; (2) in case any corporation, board or person unlawfully neglects the performance of an act which the law enjoins as a duty resulting from an office, trust, or station; and (3) in case any tribunal, corporation, board or person unlawfully excludes another from the use and enjoyment of a right

or office to which such other is legally entitled; and there is no other plain, speedy, and adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law. In University of San Agustin, Inc. v. Court of Appeals, we said, …It is settled that mandamus is employed to compel the performance, when refused, of a ministerial duty, this being its main objective. It does not lie to require anyone to fulfill contractual obligations or to compel a course of conduct, nor to control or review the exercise of discretion. On the part of the petitioner, it is essential to the issuance of a writ of mandamus that he should have a clear legal right to the thing demanded and it must be the imperative duty of the respondent to perform the act required. It never issues in doubtful cases. While it may not be necessary that the duty be absolutely expressed, it must however, be clear. The writ will not issue to compel an official to do anything which is not his duty to do or which is his duty not to do, or give to the applicant anything to which he is not entitled by law. The writ neither confers powers nor imposes duties. It is simply a command to exercise a power already possessed and to perform a duty already imposed. (Emphasis supplied.) In this petition the legal right which is sought to be recognized and enforced hinges on a constitutional and a statutory policy already articulated in operational terms, e.g. in Rep. Act No. 8749, the Philippine Clean Air Act of 1999. Paragraph (a), Section 21 of the Act specifically provides that when PUVs are concerned, the responsibility of implementing the policy falls on respondent DOTC. It provides as follows: SEC 21. Pollution from Motor Vehicles. - a) The DOTC shall implement the emission standards for motor vehicles set pursuant to and as provided in this Act. To further improve the emission standards, the Department [DENR] shall review, revise and publish the standards every two (2) years, or as the need arises. It shall consider the maximum limits for all major pollutants to ensure substantial improvement in air quality for the health, safety and welfare of the general public. Paragraph (b) states: b) The Department [DENR] in collaboration with the DOTC, DTI and LGUs, shall develop an action plan for the control and management of air pollution from motor vehicles consistent with the Integrated Air Quality Framework . . . . (Emphasis supplied.) There is no dispute that under the Clean Air Act it is the DENR that is tasked to set the emission standards for fuel use and the task of developing an action plan. As far as motor vehicles are concerned, it

devolves upon the DOTC and the line agency whose mandate is to oversee that motor vehicles prepare an action plan and implement the emission standards for motor vehicles, namely the LTFRB. In Oposa we said, the right to a balanced and healthful ecology carries with it the correlative duty to refrain from impairing the environment. We also said, it is clearly the duty of the responsible government agencies to advance the said right. Petitioners invoke the provisions of the Constitution and the Clean Air Act in their prayer for issuance of a writ of mandamus commanding the respondents to require PUVs to use CNG as an alternative fuel. Although both are general mandates that do not specifically enjoin the use of any kind of fuel, particularly the use of CNG, there is an executive order implementing a program on the use of CNG by public vehicles. Executive Order No. 290, entitled Implementing the Natural Gas Vehicle Program for Public Transport (NGVPPT), took effect on February 24, 2004. The program recognized, among others, natural gas as a clean burning alternative fuel for vehicle which has the potential to produce substantially lower pollutants; and the Malampaya Gas-to-Power Project as representing the beginning of the natural gas industry of the Philippines. Paragraph 1.2, Section 1 of E.O. No. 290 cites as one of its objectives, the use of CNG as a clean alternative fuel for transport. Furthermore, one of the components of the program is the development of CNG refueling stations and all related facilities in strategic locations in the country to serve the needs of CNGpowered PUVs. Section 3 of E.O. No. 290, consistent with E.O. No. 66, series of 2002, designated the DOE as the lead agency (a) in developing the natural gas industry of the country with the DENR, through the EMB and (b) in formulating emission standards for CNG. Most significantly, par. 4.5, Section 4 tasks the DOTC, working with the DOE, to develop an implementation plan for “a gradual shift to CNG fuel utilization in PUVs and promote NGVs [natural gas vehicles] in Metro Manila and Luzon through the issuance of directives/orders providing preferential franchises in present day major routes and exclusive franchises to NGVs in newly opened routes…” A thorough reading of the executive order assures us that implementation for a cleaner environment is being addressed. To a certain extent, the instant petition had been mooted by the issuance of E.O. No. 290.

Regrettably, however, the plain, speedy and adequate remedy herein sought by petitioners, i.e., a writ of mandamus commanding the respondents to require PUVs to use CNG, is unavailing. Mandamus is available only to compel the doing of an act specifically enjoined by law as a duty. Here, there is no law that mandates the respondents LTFRB and the DOTC to order owners of motor vehicles to use CNG. At most the LTFRB has been tasked by E.O. No. 290 in par. 4.5 (ii), Section 4 “to grant preferential and exclusive Certificates of Public Convenience (CPC) or franchises to operators of NGVs based on the results of the DOTC surveys.” Further, mandamus will not generally lie from one branch of government to a coordinate branch, for the obvious reason that neither is inferior to the other. The need for future changes in both legislation and its implementation cannot be preempted by orders from this Court, especially when what is prayed for is procedurally infirm. Besides, comity with and courtesy to a coequal branch dictate that we give sufficient time and leeway for the coequal branches to address by themselves the environmental problems raised in this petition. In the same manner that we have associated the fundamental right to a balanced and healthful ecology with the twin concepts of “inter-generational responsibility” and “inter-generational justice” in Oposa, where we upheld the right of future Filipinos to prevent the destruction of the rainforests, so do we recognize, in this petition, the right of petitioners and the future generation to clean air. In Oposa we said that if the right to a balanced and healthful ecology is now explicitly found in the Constitution even if the right is “assumed to exist from the inception of humankind,… it is because of the well-founded fear of its framers [of the Constitution] that unless the rights to a balanced and healthful ecology and to health are mandated as state policies by the Constitution itself, thereby highlighting their continuing importance and imposing upon the state a solemn obligation to preserve the first and protect and advance the second, the day would not be too far when all else would be lost not only for the present generation, but also for those to come. . .” It is the firm belief of this Court that in this case, it is timely to reaffirm the premium we have placed on the protection of the environment in the landmark case of Oposa. Yet, as serious as the statistics are on air pollution, with the present fuels deemed toxic as they are to the environment, as fatal as these pollutants are to the health of the citizens, and urgently requiring

resort to drastic measures to reduce air pollutants emitted by motor vehicles, we must admit in particular that petitioners are unable to pinpoint the law that imposes an indubitable legal duty on respondents that will justify a grant of the writ of mandamus compelling the use of CNG for public utility vehicles. It appears to us that more properly, the legislature should provide first the specific statutory remedy to the complex environmental problems bared by herein petitioners before any judicial recourse by mandamus is taken. WHEREFORE, the petition for the issuance of a writ of mandamus is DISMISSED for lack of merit. SO ORDERED.

LEONARDO A. QUISUMBING Associate Justice WE CONCUR:

ANTONIO T. CARPIO Associate Justice CONCHITA CARPIO MORALES Associate Justice PRESBITERO J. VELASCO, JR. Associate Justice

DANTE O. TINGA Associate Justice

ATTESTATION I attest that the conclusions in the above Resolution had been reached in consultation before the case was assigned to the writer of the opinion of the Court’s Division.

LEONARDO A. QUISUMBING Associate Justice Chairperson CERTIFICATION Pursuant to Section 13, Article VIII of the Constitution, and the Division Chairperson’s Attestation, I certify that the conclusions in the above Resolution had been reached in consultation before the case was assigned to the writer of the opinion of the Court’s Division.

ARTEMIO V. PANGANIBAN Chief Justice

Rollo, p. 4. Id. at 6. Id. Id. Id. at 7. Id. at 5, 7-8. Id. at 9. Id. at 10. Id. at 9-10. Id. at 11, citing Alternative Fuels: A Key to Reducing Air Pollution. The Environmental Education and Information Division Environmental Management Bureau-DENR. Id. at 11-12, citing Bacallan, J.J. Alternative Fuels for Vehicles. Business and Environment. First Quarter 2003. Volume 8, No. 1, page 12. Section 16. The State shall protect and advance the right of the people to a balanced and healthful ecology in accord with the rhythm and harmony of nature. G.R. No. 101083, July 30, 1993, 224 SCRA 792.

SEC. 4. Recognition of Rights. – Pursuant to the above-declared principles, the following rights of citizens are hereby sought to be recognized and the State shall seek to guarantee their enjoyment: a) The right to breathe clean air; b) The right to utilize and enjoy all natural resources according to the principle of sustainable development; c) The right to participate in the formulation, planning, implementation and monitoring of environmental policies and programs and in the decision-making process; d) The right to participate in the decision-making process concerning development policies, plans and programs, projects or activities that may have adverse impact on the environment and public health; e) The right to be informed of the nature and extent of the potential hazard of any activity, undertaking or project and to be served timely notice of any significant rise in the level of pollution and the accidental or deliberate release into the atmosphere of harmful or hazardous substances; f) The right of access to public records which a citizen may need to exercise his or her rights effectively under this Act; g) The right to bring action in court or quasi-judicial bodies to enjoin all activities in violation of environmental laws and regulations, to compel the rehabilitation and cleanup of affected area, and to seek the imposition of penal sanctions against violators of environmental laws; and h) The right to bring action in court for compensation of personal damages resulting from the adverse environmental and public health impact of a project or activity. Rollo, p. 64. SEC. 26. Fuels and Additives.- Pursuant to the Air Quality Framework to be established under Section 7 of this Act, the Department of Energy (DOE), co-chaired by the Department of Environment and Natural Resources (DENR), in consultation with the Bureau of Product Standards (BPS) of the DTI, the DOST, the representatives of the fuel and automotive industries, academe and the consumers shall set the specifications for all types of fuel and fuel-related products, to improve fuel composition for increased efficiency and reduced emissions: . . . SEC. 21. Pollution from Motor Vehicles. - a) The DOTC shall implement the emission standards for motor vehicles set pursuant to and as provided in this Act. To further improve the emission standards, the Department [DENR] shall review, revise and publish the standards every two (2) years,

or as the need arises. It shall consider the maximum limits for all major pollutants to ensure substantial improvement in air quality for the health, safety and welfare of the general public. . . . SEC. 2. Declaration of Principles. - . . . ... Finally, the State recognizes that a clean and healthy environment is for the good of all and should therefore be the concern of all. SEC. 21. Pollution from Motor Vehicles. - a) The DOTC shall implement the emission standards for motor vehicles set pursuant to and as provided in this Act…. Rollo, pp. 93-94. Supra note 12. Oposa v. Factoran, Jr., supra note 13. Supra note 14. Oposa v. Factoran, Jr., supra note 13. G.R. No. 100588, March 7, 1994, 230 SCRA 761, 771-772. Oposa v. Factoran, Jr., supra note 13 at 805, 808. Dwikarna v. Domingo, G.R. No. 153454, July 7, 2004, 433 SCRA 748, 754. Oposa v. Factoran, Jr., supra note 13 at 803. Id. at 805.

Alejandro, Rodolfo, and Romeo. Rodolfo and Romeo are the respondents in this petition. Upon the death of Felicidad in 1949, Nicomedes married Maria Rosario de Castro (Maria Rosario) on 14 October 1964. The couple did not have any children. During the marriage of Nicomedes and Maria Rosario, they acquired certain properties including those hereinbelow described:

THIRD DIVISION CAROLINA B. VILLENA, Petitioner,

- versus -

G.R. No. 167620 Present: YNARES-SANTIAGO, J., Chairperson, AUSTRIA-MARTINEZ, CALLEJO, SR., CHICO-NAZARIO, and NACHURA, JJ.

ROMEO Z. RUPISAN and RODOLFO Promulgated: Z. RUPISAN, Respondents. April 4, 2007 x- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -x DECISION CHICO-NAZARIO, J.: This is a Petition for Review on Certiorari under Rule 45 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure assailing the Decision of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 79405 dated 10 November 2004 granting the petition of the herein respondents Romeo and Rodolfo Rupisan and the Resolution dated 1 April 2005 denying the Motion for Reconsideration filed by herein petitioner Carolina B. Villena. The factual antecedents are: The late Nicomedes T. Rupisan was first married to Felicidad Zamora. Their union bore five children namely: Consuelo, Erlinda,

A parcel of land (Lot 3 of subdivision plan (LRC) Psd-180944, being a portion of Lot 3-A-2-B (LRC) Psd-140722, LRC Record No. 19405), situated in Poblacion, Municipality of Alcala, Province of Pangasinan, Island of Luzon. Bounded on the NE., points 1 to 2 by Lot 2 of the subdivision plan, and points 3 to 4 by property of the Heirs of Luis Soriano; on the SE., points 4 to 5 by property of the Heirs of Luis Soriano, and points 5 to 6 by property of Andres Dumpao; on the SW, points 6 to 7 Lot 3-B (LRC) Psd54161; and on the NW., points 7 to 1 by Burgos street, 15.00 M. wide, and points 2 to 3 by Lot 2 of the subdivision plan. Containing an AREA OF ONE THOUSAND FOUR HUNDRED NINETY TWO (1,492) Square Meters, more or less. Its technical description appears on TRANSFER CERTIFICATE OF TITLE No. 101871 – Register of Deeds for Pangasinan. Its assessed value is P9,600.00 as per Tax Dec. No. 6599 of Alcala. (a) A parcel of residential land (Lot 1, Plan Psu-79891), situated in Poblacion, Alaminos, Pangasinan, containing an area of two hundred ninety-two (292) square meters and covered by TCT No. 1037 of the Register of Deeds of Pangasinan, issued to the names of Nicomedes and Ma. Rosario. (b) A parcel of land (Lot 3, Plan Psu-79891) situated in Poblacion, Alaminos, Pangasinan, containing an area of sixteen (16) square meters and covered by TCT No. 1037 of the Register of Deeds of Pangasinan. As to the above properties, Nicomedes and Maria Rosario apparently executed an Agreement on Separation of Conjugal Properties which reads: I. MAIN MOTIVE OF THE AGREEMENT. Because of the absence of descendant, WE the undersigned spouses have adopted this AGREEMENT, in order to provide a Guidance and to prevent any possible misunderstanding and litigation between the surviving Spouse and the

Heirs and successors of the predeceased Spouse. WE HOPE that the Courts of Justice will give legal value to these Agreements. xxxx V. The parcel of land in No. 2 SECTION A, including the House of strong materials built thereon and all Furnitures to be found therein, will belong exclusively to the Husband. VI. The parcels of lands (Lot No. 1 and Lot No. 3) in SECTION B, including the House of strong materials built thereon and all Furnitures to be found therein, will belong exclusively to the Wife. On 22 June 1981, Maria Rosario caused the annotation and registration of the said agreement on Transfer Certificate of Title (TCT) No. 1037. On 20 March 1984, Nicomedes died intestate. On 18 May 1984, Maria Rosario executed an Affidavit of Self-Adjudication adjudicating to herself alone the subject properties covered by TCT No. 1037. Maria Rosario then caused the cancellation of TCT No. 1037 and a new one, TCT No. 8177, issued in her name. Similarly, she caused the cancellation of tax declaration covering the subject properties. On 24 April 1992, Maria Rosario died at the age of 83 years old allegedly leaving behind a holographic will dated 3 October 1989 wherein she devised the properties under TCT No. 8177 to her niece, petitioner Carolina Villena. Petitioner immediately took possession of the properties. Respondents Romeo and Rodolfo Rupisan, sons by the first marriage of Nicomedes, filed Civil Case No. A-2106 for Partition, Annulment of title/documents and/or Recovery of possession/ownership and damages. On the other hand, petitioner filed Special Proceedings No. A-1278 for the probate of the will of Maria Rosario in her capacity as devisee of the deceased, Maria Rosario. Both cases were filed before the Regional Trial Court of Alaminos, City Pangasinan, Branch 54. The cases were consolidated on 18 November 1999.

On 25 September 2002, a Decision on the consolidated cases, was rendered, the dispositive portion of which reads: WHEREFORE, premises considered, JUDGMENT is hereby rendered as follows: 1. Allowing and granting the probate of the Holographic Will of Maria Rosario Braganza De Castro Rupisan (Spl. Proc. Case No. A-1278) and a certificate of its allowance to be attached to the Holographic Will is accordingly hereby issued, attested by the seal of this Court, pursuant to and in consideration with Section 13, Rule 76 of the Rules of Court and which must be duly recorded with the Office of the Clerk of Court, as well as in the Office of the Registry of Deeds, Alaminos, Pangasinan; 2. Dismissing the Complaint in Civil Case No. A-2106 for utter lack of merit, and 3. Ordering plaintiffs in Civil Case No. A-2106 to jointly and solidarily pay defendant moral damages in the sum of TWO HUNDRED THOUSAND PESOS (P200,000.00); the reduced sum of exemplary damages in the amount of SEVENTY THOUSAND PESOS (P70,000.00), including attorney’s fees and costs of litigation in the sum of FIFTY THOUSAND PESOS (P50,000.00). Respondents, through counsel Atty. Jose Antonio M. Guillermo (Atty. Guillermo), filed a Notice of Appeal dated 5 October 2002. On 22 November 2002 the RTC issued an Order denying respondent’s appeal in Civil Case No. A-2106 due to late payment of appellate docket fees but allowed the appeal in Special Proceeding No.A1278, subject to certain conditions. The RTC held: To emphasize the point, if it is true indeed that the plaintiff received through counsel on October 2, 2002, the Decision of this Honorable Court, then he has (sic) up to October 17, 2002 within which to perfect the appeal in Civil Case No. 2106 which is the timely filing of the Notice of Appeal, together with the payment to the Clerk of Court of the full amount of the appellate court docket and other lawful fees.

xxxx However, with respect to Special Proceeding Case No. 1278, considering that Rule 141 Sec. 3 of the Revised Rules of Court provides that: “where a record on appeal is required, the appellant shall file a notice of appeal and a record on appeal within thirty days from notice of judgment or final order” and in which case therefore, with respect to Special Proceeding Case No. A-1278, the Notice of Appeal is deemed perfected except for the approval of the Record on Appeal. WHEREFORE, Civil Case No. A-2106, not having been perfected within the time provided for by law in accordance with Rule 41, Sec. 4 of the Revised Rules of Court, the said appeal is DENIED for lack of merit. Respondents filed a Motion for Reconsideration of the Order dated 22 November 2002 insofar as it dismissed their appeal in Civil Case No. A2106. Acting on this motion, the trial court in an Order dated 16 July 2003 dismissed both appeals including that in Special Proceedings No. A-1278. The Court ruled that inasmuch as respondents’ counsel of record, Atty. Guillermo, already filed his Withdrawal of Appearance on 4 October 2002, the Notice of Appeal filed on 5 October 2002, signed by said counsel, was invalid and no longer bound his clients, respondents therein. The RTC ratiocinated: During the January 20, 2003 hearing which are for purposes of approval of the record on appeal and to determine whether such record on appeal filed by the oppositor in Special Proceeding Case No. A-1278 is in order and whether or not the other matters treated in the Opposition to the Motion for Approval of the Record on Appeal filed by petitioner are impressed with merit, the following facts surfaced, to wit: 1. That on October 4, 2002, as shown by the date of the pleading entitled “Withdrawal of Appearance” filed by Atty. Jose Antonio M. Guillermo and which contained the conformity of no less than the oppositor himself, Romeo Rupisan, the said counsel, Jose Antonio M. Guillermo, stated as follows: “the undersigned attorney upon the request and conformity of plaintiff/oppositor respectfully withdraws his appearance as counsel for plaintiffs/oppositor in the above-entitled cases” and prayed that his Withdrawal of Appearance be noted by this Court;

2. The aforesaid pleading was received and docketed in this court on November 12, 2002; 3. However, notwithstanding the aforesaid withdrawal, the aforesaid counsel, Atty. Jose M. Guillermo, submitted and filed with this Court, without the conformity of oppositor, Romeo Rupisan, a “Notice of Appeal” dated October 5, 2002 in the above-consolidated cases and which was received by this Court on October 9, 2002; 4. In the meantime, on November 8, 2002, this Court is in receipt of a “Motion for Approval of Record on Appeal” filed by Seguion Reyna Montecillo and Ongsiako, which motion is dated October 29, 2002; 5. Subsequently on November 11, 2002 (the same date of receipt by this court of Atty. Guillermo’s Withdrawal of Appearance), this Court received the “notice of Appearance” dated November 5, 2002 of Seguion Reyna Montecillo and Ongsiako, as counsel for the plaintiffs/oppositor in the above-captioned cases; 6. Thereafter, on November 12, 2002, Atty. Jose M. Guillermo, filed with this court an “Opposition” dated November 12, 2002, to defendant/petitioner’s Motion to Dismiss Appeal, alleging among others as follows: (a) that he is still the counsel of record for plaintiffs/oppositor in the above-captioned cases inasmuch as his Withdrawal of Appearance has not yet been acted upon by this court and considering that to his own knowledge, no new counsel has yet entered its appearance for plaintiffs/oppositor in the above-captioned cases; (b) That a record on appeal is not required in the instant case. xxxx Verily, this Court has not acted on Atty. Guillermo’s Withdrawal of Appearance dated October 4, 2002 and received by this court on November 12, 2002 considering that same is not a motion and he prayed that his Withdrawal of Appearance be just noted by the court while the Notice of Appeal dated November 5, 2002 was received by this Court on October 9, 2002. Thus, it appears that with reference to date, the Withdrawal of Appearance came ahead before the Notice of Appeal.

However, with respect to the filing, the Notice of Appeal was filed ahead than the Withdrawal of Appearance. Rupisan alleged on his Notice of Appeal that he received a copy of the Decision rendered by this Court dated September 25, 2002 on October 2, 2002 which means therefore that he has (sic) until October 17, 2002 within which to file his appeal. Although his Notice of Appeal dated October 5, 2002 and was received by this Court on October 9, 2002, the appeal/docket fee was paid late as payment was made only on October 23, 2002.

WHEREFORE, the foregoing premises considered, the petition is GRANTED. The assailed resolutions of the respondent court denying the notice of appeal filed by petitioners for late payment of docket fees are hereby ANNULLED and SET ASIDE. The respondent trial court is directed to give due course to petitioners’ notice of appeal. The Court of Appeals applied a liberal interpretation of the rules. It found the delay excusable as respondents demonstrated their willingness to pay the docket fees as manifested in their immediate compliance with the said requirement.

Anent Special Proceedings Case No. A-1278, the RTC disallowed the appeal thereon on the ground that respondents did not comply with the requirements provided by law. It said that aside from the fact that the documents involved were not arranged in chronological order the same also did not contained any data that will show the court that the appeal was perfected on time. It added that neither the Compliance dated February 11, 2003 filed by respondents contained any data showing that the appeal was perfected on time. The trial court said that these requirements are mandatory and non-compliance therewith is fatal to the appeal.

Petitioner filed a Motion for Reconsideration which was denied in a Resolution of the Court of Appeals dated 1 April 2005. Hence, this Petition.

The RTC declared that since no Notice of Appeal has effectively been filed even up to the present, its decision dated 25 September 2002, has become final and executory.

2. CAN A LAWYER WHO WAS PRIORLY DISMISSED BY HIS CLIENT STILL INTERVENE IN THE CASE BY FILING A NOTICE OF APPEAL WITHOUT THE CONFORMITY OF HIS FORMER CLIENT? STATED DIFFERENTLY, IS THERE A VALID NOTICE OF APPEAL IN THE INSTANT CASE.

The dispositive portion of the Order dated 16 July 2003 reads: WHEREFORE, for reasons above-stated, including those stated in the Order of this court dated November 22, 2002, which are not in conflict with the above, plaintiff/oppositor’s appeal is denied. Accordingly, the decision of this Court dated September 25, 2002, has now become final and executory. Respondents hastily filed a Petition for Certiorari before the Court of Appeals which was given due course. A Decision was rendered on 10 November 2004, the dispositive portion of which provides:

The following issues are for our resolution: 1. DID THE COURT OF APPEALS VALIDLY ACQUIRE JURISDICTION OVER RESPONDENTS’ PETITION FOR CERTIORARI IN CA-G.R. SP No. 79405 NOTWITHSTANDING RESPONDENTS FAILURE TO FILE A PRIOR MOTION FOR RECONSIDERATION AS AGAINST THE JULY 16, 2003 ORDER OF THE REGIONAL TRIAL COURT A QUO.

3. EVEN ASSUMING ARGUENDO THAT THE NOTICE OF APPEAL WAS VALIDLY FILED, WERE RESPONDENTS IN THE PRESENT PETITION ABLE TO PERFECT THEIR APPEAL ON TIME AS CONTEMPLATED BY LAW AND JURISPRUDENCE. 4. WHETHER OR NOT THE COURT OF APPEALS IS GUILTY OF GRAVE ABUSE OF DISCRETION AMOUNTING TO LACK OR IN EXCESS OF JURISDICTION IN PLACING THE SELF-SERVING AND GRATUITIOUS EXPLANATION OF RESPONDENTS AS REGARDS THEIR DELAY IN THE PAYMENT OF DOCKET FEES, WITHIN THE REALM OF THE EXCEPTIONAL CIRCUMSTANCES JUSTIFYING THE LATE PAYMENT OF APPELLATE COURT DOCKET AND OTHER LAWFUL FEES.

5. WHAT IS THE LEGAL STANDING OR HOW SHOULD THE MOTION FOR APPROVAL OF THE RECORD ON APPEAL TOGETHER WITH THE RECORD ON APPEAL FILED BY SIGUION REYNA MONTECILLO AND ONGSIAKO BE TREATED IN THE ABSENCE OF A VALID SUBSTITUTION OF COUNSEL? Petitioner faults respondents for not filing a Motion for Reconsideration on the assailed RTC order of 16 July 2003. Petitioner’s theory is that a Petition for Certiorari before the Court of Appeals may be availed of only after having earlier filed a motion for reconsideration before the trial court. We disagree. The filing of a Motion for Reconsideration before resort to certiorari will lie is intended to afford the public respondent an opportunity to correct any actual or fancied error attributed to it by way of re-examination of the legal and factual aspects of the case. Respondents actually filed a Motion for Reconsideration. It must be noted that the 16 July 2003 Order of the trial court is in itself an order resolving the motion for reconsideration dismissing the respondents’ Notice of Appeal in Civil Case No. A-2106. In any event, the filing of a Motion for Reconsideration before availing of the remedy of certiorari is not always sine qua non. The rules admit of certain exceptions. The instant case is one of those. In this case, a motion for reconsideration would be useless in the light of the declaration of the RTC that the Order of 16 July 2003 is final and executory. We now proceed to resolve the second and fifth issues. Taken together, the question to be resolved is: what is the effect of the withdrawal of Atty. Guillermo as respondents’ counsel of record on the Notice of Appeal which he had filed for both Civil Case No. A-2106 and Special Proceedings No. A-1278.

The Rule regarding change of counsel is provided under Rule 138, Section 26 thereat. It states: SEC. 26. Change of attorneys. – An attorney may retire at any time from any action or special proceeding, by the written consent of his client filed in court. He may also retire at any time from an action or special proceeding, without the consent of his client, should the court, on notice to the client and attorney, and on hearing, determine that he ought to be allowed to retire. In case of substitution, the name of the attorney newly employed shall be entered on the docket of the court in place of the former one, and written notice of the change shall be given to the adverse party. Admittedly, Atty. Guillermo filed a Notice of Withdrawal on 4 October 2002. The withdrawal notwithstanding, the trial court in its Order dated 22 November 2002 initially allowed the appeal of the respondents in Special Proceedings No. A-1278, although it rejected the appeal in Civil Case No. A-2106. Be that as it may, we are inclined to allow the Notice of Appeal for both cases inspite of the obvious procedural lapse. When non-compliance with the Rules of Court is not intended for delay or does not prejudice the adverse party, the dismissal of an appeal on a mere technicality may be stayed and the court may, in its sound discretion, exercise its equity jurisdiction. This lack of intention to delay is shown by the fact that the Notice of Appeal was filed on 5 October 2002, or only a difference of one day from the filing by Atty. Guillermo of his Notice of Withdrawal. The emerging trend in our jurisprudence is to afford every party-litigant the amplest opportunity for the proper and just determination of his cause free from the constraints of technicalities. While it is desirable that the Rules of Court be faithfully and even meticulously observed, courts should not be so strict about procedural lapses that do not really impair the administration of justice especially when such strict compliance was apparently relaxed by the trial court itself when it initially gave due course to the Notice of Appeal. If the rules are intended to insure the orderly conduct of litigation it is because of the higher objective they seek which is the protection of the substantive rights of the parties. Under the circumstances we find that the notice of appeal signed by Atty. Guillermo should be considered valid.

The next issue relates to docket fees, and the effect of the belated payment by the respondents. The records show that on 2 October 2002, the respondents received a copy of the decision. They had up to 17 October 2002 to file a Notice of Appeal and to pay the appropriate docket fees. It is not disputed that said docket fees were paid only 23 October 2002, or six days after the lapse of the period within which to pay the said docket fees. The reason advanced by respondents for the delayed payment is poverty and ignorance of legal procedures. Rule 41, Section 4, of the Revised Rules of Civil Procedure, states: SEC. 4. Appellate court docket and other lawful fees. – Within the period for taking an appeal, the appellant shall pay to the clerk of court which rendered the judgment or final order appealed from, the full amount of the appellate court docket and other lawful fees. Proof of payment of said fees shall be transmitted to the appellate court together with the original record or the record on appeal. xxxx SEC. 9. Perfection of appeal; effect thereof. – A party’s appeal by notice of appeal is deemed perfected as to him upon the filing of the notice of appeal in due time. A party’s appeal by record on appeal is deemed perfected as to him with respect to the subject matter thereof upon the approval of the record on appeal filed in due time. In appeals by notice of appeal, the court loses jurisdiction over the case upon the perfection of the appeals filed in due time and the expiration of the time to appeal of the other parties. In appeals by record on appeal, the court loses jurisdiction only over the subject matter thereof upon the approval of the records on appeal filed in due time and the expiration of the time to appeal of the other parties. In either case, prior to the transmittal of the original record or the record on appeal, the court may issue orders for the protection and preservation of the rights of the parties which do not involve any matter

litigated by the appeal, approve compromises, permit appeals of indigent litigants, order execution pending appeal in accordance with Section 2 of Rule 39, and allow withdrawal of the appeal. The failure of the appellant to pay the docket fees is a ground for the dismissal of the appeal under Section 1(c), Rule 50 of the same rule which states: SECTION 1. x x x. (c) Failure of the appellant to pay the docket and other lawful fees as provided in section 5 of Rule 40 and section 4 of Rule 41. From the foregoing, it can be gleaned that the payment of docket fees within the prescribed period is mandatory for the perfection of an appeal. This is so because a court acquires jurisdiction over the subject matter of the action only upon the payment of the correct amount of docket fees regardless of the actual date of filing of the case in court. In the case of Gegare v. Court of Appeals, this Court upheld the appellate court’s dismissal of an appeal for failure of petitioner to pay the docket fees within the reglementary period despite a notice from the Court of Appeals informing him that such fees had to be paid within 15 days from receipt of such notice. Denying petitioner’s plea for judicial leniency, we held that – Also without merit, in our view, is petitioner’s plea for a liberal treatment by the said court, rather than a strict adherence to the technical rules, in order to promote substantial justice. For it has consistently held that payment in full of docket fees within the prescribed period is mandatory. As this Court has firmly declared in Rodillas v. Commission on Elections [245 SCRA 702 (1995)], such payment is an essential requirement before the court could acquire jurisdiction over a case: The payment of the full amount of the docket fee is an indispensable step for the perfection of an appeal (Dorego v. Perez, 22 SCRA 8 [1968]; Bello v. Fernandez, 4 SCRA 135 [1962]). In both original and appellate cases, the court acquires jurisdiction over the case only

upon the payment of the prescribed docket fees as held in Acda v. Minister of Labor, 119 SCRA 306 (1982). The requirement of an appeal fee is by no means a mere technicality of law or procedure. It is an essential requirement without which the decision appealed from would become final and executory as if no appeal was filed at all. The right to appeal is merely a statutory privilege and may be exercised only in the manner prescribed by, and in accordance with, the provision of the law.”

In Lazaro v. Court of Appeals, decided 6 April 2000, the private respondents therein failed to pay the docket fees within the reglementary period. They paid the fees only after the Court of Appeals had dismissed the appeal, that is, six months after the filing of the Notice of Appeal. The Court of Appeals reinstated the appeal “in the interest of substantial justice” without other justification. This Court, through then Chief Justice Artemio V. Panganiban, though not persuaded, recognized that there are exceptions to the stringent requirements of the law on payment of the docket fees. thus: We must stress that the bare invocation of “the interest of substantial justice” is not a magic wand that will automatically compel this Court to suspend procedural rules. “Procedural rules are not to be belittled or dismissed simply because their non-observance may have resulted in prejudice to a party’s substantive rights. Like all rules, they are required to be followed except only for the most persuasive of reasons when they may be relaxed to relieve a litigant of an injustice not commensurate with the degree of this thoughtlessness in not complying with the procedure prescribed.” (Emphasis supplied.) Sure enough, the foregoing jurisprudence truly blazed the trails for a liberal application of the strict interpretation of the law. In Mactan Cebu International Airport Authority v. Mangubat, the payment of the docket fees was delayed by six days, but the late payment was accepted because the party showed willingness to abide by the Rules by immediately paying those fees. The Court also took note of the

importance of the issues in this case involving as it does the entitlement or not of the respondents to properties involved. Of similar import is the ruling of the court in the case of Ginete v. Court of Appeals where we held that aside from matters of life, liberty, honor or property which would warrant the suspension of the rules of the most mandatory character and an examination and review by the appellate court of the lower court’s findings of fact, the other elements that should be considered are the following: (1) the existence of special or compelling circumstances; (2) the merits of the case; (3) a cause not entirely attributable to the fault or negligence of the party favored by the suspension of the rules; (4) a lack of any showing that the review sought is merely frivolous and dilatory, and (5) the other party will not be unjustly prejudiced thereby. Yambao v. Court of Appeals saw us again relaxing the Rules when we declared therein that “the appellate court may extend the time for the payment of the docket fees if appellant is able to show that there is a justifiable reason for the failure to pay the correct amount of docket fees within the prescribed period, like fraud, accident, mistake, excusable negligence, or a similar supervening casualty, without fault on the part of the appellant. In Go v. Tong, reiterated in Heirs of Bertuldo Hinog v. Melicor, it was held that while the payment of the prescribed docket fee is a jurisdictional requirement, even its nonpayment at the time of filing does not automatically cause the dismissal of the case, as long as the fee is paid within the applicable prescriptive or reglementary period; more so when the party involved demonstrates a willingness to abide by the rules prescribing such payment. In Planters Products, Inc. v. Fertiphil Corporation, the Court stated that failure to pay the appellate docket fee does not automatically result in the dismissal of an appeal, dismissal being discretionary on the part of the appellate court. And in determining whether or not to dismiss an appeal on such ground, courts have always been guided by the peculiar legal and equitable circumstances attendant to each case. In Camposagrado v. Camposagrado, the case involved a deficiency in the payment of docket fees in the amount of Five Pesos (P5.00). This

Court called for the liberal interpretation of the rules and gave due course to the appeal. In brief, the Court said that the failure to pay the appellate docket fee does not automatically result in the dismissal of the appeal, dismissal being discretionary on the part of the appellate court. A party’s failure to pay the appellate docket fee within the reglementary period confers only a discretionary and not a mandatory power to dismiss the proposed appeal. Such discretionary power should be used in the exercise of the court’s sound judgment in accordance with the tenets of justice and fair play with great deal of circumspection, considering all attendant circumstances and must be exercised wisely and ever prudently, never capriciously, with a view to substantial justice. In the subsequent case of Far Corporation v. Magdaluyo, this Court, while reiterating that the payment of docket and other legal fees within the prescribed period is both mandatory and jurisdictional, in the same vein, recognized that the existence of persuasive and weighty reasons call for a relaxation of the rules. In La Salette College v. Pilotin, notwithstanding the mandatory nature of the requirement of payment of appellate docket fees, we also recognized that its strict application is qualified by the following: first, failure to pay those fees within the reglementary period allows only discretionary, not automatic, dismissal; second, such power should be used by the court in conjunction with its exercise of sound discretion in accordance with the tenets of justice and fair play, as well as with a great deal of circumspection in consideration of all attendant circumstances. In all, what emerges from all of the above is that the rules of procedure in the matter of paying the docket fees must be followed. However, there are exceptions to the stringent requirement as to call for a relaxation of the application of the rules, such as: (1) most persuasive and weighty reasons; (2) to relieve a litigant from an injustice not commensurate with his failure to comply with the prescribed procedure; (3) good faith of the defaulting party by immediately paying within a reasonable time from the time of the default; (4) the existence of special or compelling circumstances; (5) the merits of the case; (6) a cause not entirely attributable to the fault or negligence of the party favored by the suspension of the rules; (7) a lack of any showing that the review sought is merely frivolous and dilatory; (8) the other party will not be unjustly prejudiced thereby; (9) fraud, accident, mistake or excusable negligence

without appellant’s fault; (10) peculiar legal and equitable circumstances attendant to each case; (11) in the name of substantial justice and fair play; (12) importance of the issues involved; and (13) exercise of sound discretion by the judge guided by all the attendant circumstances. Concomitant to a liberal interpretation of the rules of procedure should be an effort on the part of the party invoking liberality to adequately explain his failure to abide by the rules. Anyone seeking exemption from the application of the Rule has the burden of proving that exceptionally meritorious instances exist which warrant such departure. In the case at bar, respondents were delayed in the payment of docket fees for six (6) days only. The reason advanced by them was because of poverty. Evidently, in the cases where the Supreme Court disallowed the late payment of docket fees, the tardiness was for a significant period of time. Guided by the foregoing jurisprudential pronouncements, it will be extremely harsh for the Court to take a lackadaisical attitude towards the cause of the respondents. We are convinced of the fastidiousness of the Court of Appeals’ decision.

WHEREFORE, premises considered, the instant petition is DENIED for lack of merit. The assailed Decision of the Court of Appeals dated 10 November 2004 and Resolution dated 1 April 2005 are AFFIRMED. Costs against petitioner. SO ORDERED. MINITA V. CHICO-NAZARIO Associate Justice

WE CONCUR:

CONSUELO YNARES-SANTIAGO

Associate Justice Chairperson

MA. ALICIA AUSTRIA-MARTINEZ Associate Justice

Pursuant to Section 13, Article VIII of the Constitution, and the Division Chairperson’s Attestation, it is hereby certified that the conclusions in the above Decision were reached in consultation before the case was assigned to the writer of the opinion of the Court’s Division. ROMEO J. CALLEJO, SR. Associate Justice REYNATO S. PUNO Justice

Chief

ANTONIO EDUARDO B. NACHURA Associate Justice

ATTESTATION I attest that the conclusions in the above Decision were reached in consultation before the case was assigned to the writer of the opinion of the Court’s Division.

CONSUELO YNARES-SANTIAGO Associate Justice Chairperson, Third Division

CERTIFICATION

Rollo, pp. 69-80. Penned by Associate Justice Jose L. Sabio, Jr. with Associate Justices Eubulo G. Verzola and Noel G. Tijam concurring. Id. at 11. CA rollo, Vol. II, p. 612. Id. at 665. Rollo, p. 142. CA rollo, Vol. II, p. 665. Rollo, p. 142. CA rollo, Vol. II, p. 632. Id. at 640. Id. at 635. Id. at 625. Id. at 786; Only Romeo and Rodolfo Rupisan filed the Complaint in view of the Deed of Renunciation of Real Rights executed by their other siblings, Consuelo Z. Rupisan, Erlinda R. Lirag and Alejandro Z. Rupisan (Id. at 797). Id. at 793; Section 1. Who may petition for the allowance of will. – Any executor, devisee, or legatee named in a will, or any other person interested in the estate, may, at any time after the death of the testator, petition the court having jurisdiction to have the will allowed, whether the same be in his possession or not, or is lost or destroyed. (Rule 76, Rules of Court.) Rollo, pp. 94-95. CA rollo, Vol. II, p. 621. The RTC held: In Civil Case No. 2106, what was submitted before this Honorable Court was only a Notice of Appeal, however, it was only on

October 23, 2002, that an appeal fee of Forty Eight Pesos (P48.00) covered by O.R. No. 15919947 and the amount of Four Hundred Fifty Two Pesos (P452.00) covered by O.R. No. 1591854 and another amount of Twenty Pesos (P20.00) covered by O.R. No. 15918522 which were paid to the Clerk of Court, in the manner therefore that the payment of appeal fees prescribed under Rule 41 Sec. 4 of the Revised Rules of Court was after the expiry of the fifteen days period to perfect the appeal. The RTC Order on this point reads: However, with respect to the appeal filed by the Oppositor in Special Proceeding Case No. A-1278, the appeal is considered seasonably filed upon the timely filing of the Record of Appeal, inclusive of the required appeal fees, but in accordance with Sec. 7 of Rule 41 of the Revised Rules of Court, let the records on appeal be submitted for consideration by the Honorable Court for purposes of its approval. Let there be a hearing on Special Proceeding Case No. A-1278 for the purpose of determining whether or not there are incidents to be included in the record of appeal or there are amendments thereto which the Court orders therefore the parties to appear on December 18, 2002 at 2:00 o’clock in the afternoon for purposes of approval of the record of appeal submitted by the Oppositor in Special Proc. Case No. 1278. CA rollo, Vol. I, pp. 51-52. Rollo, pp. 99-101. Sec. 6, Rule 41, 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure. Rollo, p. 101. Id. at 79. Id. at 78. CA rollo, Vol. II, p. 104. Rollo, pp. 257-259. The new counsel of respondents, Siguion Reyna Montecillo & Ongsiako, filed its entry of appearance on 5 November 2002 (Rollo, p. 296). Sevillana v. I.T. (International) Corporation, G.R. No. 99047, 16 April 2001, 356 SCRA 451, 462. Chas Realty and Development Corporation v. Talavera, 445 Phil. 43, 53 (2003). The recognized exceptions where the special civil action for certiorari will lie even without filing a motion for reconsideration includes: (a) where the order is a patent nullity, as where the court a quo has no jurisdiction; (b) where the questions raised in the certiorari proceeding have been duly raised and passed upon by the lower court, or

are the same as those raised and passed upon by the lower court; (c) where there is an urgent necessity for the resolution of the question and any further delay would prejudice the interests of the government or of the petitioner or the subject matter of the action is perishable; (d) where, under the circumstances, a motion for reconsideration would be useless; (e) where petitioner was deprived of due process and there is extreme urgency for relief; (f) where, in a criminal case, relief from an order of arrest is urgent and the granting of such relief by the trial court is improbable; (g) where the proceedings in the lower court are a nullity for lack of due process; (h) where the proceedings was ex parte or in which the petitioner had no opportunity to object; and (i) where the issue raised is one purely of law or public interest is involved. (Sevillana v. I.T. [International] Corp., supra note 26 at 462.) Rule 41, Section 9, of the 1997 Revised Rules of Court states that: Sec. 9. – Perfection of appeal; effect thereof. – A party’s appeal by notice of appeal is deemed perfected as to him upon the filing of the notice of appeal in due time. A party’s appeal by record on appeal is deemed perfected as to him with respect to the subject matter thereof upon the approval of the record on appeal filed in due time. In appeals by notice of appeal, the court loses jurisdiction over the case upon the perfection of the appeals filed in due time and the expiration of the time to appeal of the other parties. In appeals by record on appeal, the court loses jurisdiction only over the subject matter thereof upon the approval of the records on appeal filed in due time and the expiration of the time to appeal of the other parties. In either case, prior to the transmittal of the original record or the record on appeal, the court may issue orders for the protection and preservation of the rights of the parties which do not involve any matter litigated by the appeal, approve compromises, permit appeals of indigent litigants, order execution pending appeal in accordance with Section 2 of Rule 39, and allow withdrawal of the appeal. Parañaque Kings Enterprises, Inc. v. Court of Appeals, 335 Phil. 1184, 1194 (1997). Cojuangco v. Court of Appeals, 369 Phil. 41, 52. Rinconanda Telephone Co., Inc. v. Buenviaje, G.R. Nos. 49241-42, 27 April 1990, 184 SCRA 701, 706.

358 Phil. 228 (1998). 386 Phil. 412 (2000). Id. at 417. Mactan International Airport v. Mangubat, 371 Phil. 393 (1999); Ginete v. Court of Appeals, 357 Phil. 36 (1998); Yambao v. Court of Appeals, 399 Phil. 712 (2000). Id. Supra note 36. Supra note 36. G.R. No. 151942, 27 November 2003, 416 SCRA 557, 567. G.R. No. 140954, 12 April 2005, 455 SCRA 460, 475. Go v. Tong, supra note 40 at 567; Heirs of Bertuldo Hinog v. Melicor, supra note 41 at 475. G.R. No. 156278, 29 March 2004, 426 SCRA 414, 420. G.R. No. 143195, 13 September 2005, 469 SCRA 602, 608. Id. G.R. No. 148739, 19 November 2004, 443 SCRA 218. 463 Phil. 785 (2003). Enriquez v. Enriquez, G.R. No. 139303, 25 August 2005, 468 SCRA 77, 86. See cases of La Salette College v. Pilotin, supra note 47 at 387388; Lazaro v. Court of Appeals, supra note 34; Barangay 24 of Legazpi City v. Imperial, 393 Phil. 357 (2,000); Enriquez v. Enriquez, id; Far Corporation v. Magdaluyo, supra note 46; Tamayo v. Tamayo, Jr., G.R. No. 148482, 12 August 2005, 466 SCRA 618.

x ---------------------------------------------------------------------------------- x EN BANC HOLY SPIRIT HOMEOWNERS G.R. No. 163980 ASSOCIATION, INC. and NESTORIO F. APOLINARIO, in his personal capacity and as President of Holy Spirit Homeowners Association, Inc., Present: Petitioners, PANGANIBAN, C.J., PUNO, QUISUMBING, YNARES-SANTIAGO, SECRETARY MICHAEL DEFENSOR, SANDOVAL-GUTIERREZ, in his capacity as Chairman of the CARPIO, Housing and Urban Development AUSTRIA-MARTINEZ, Coordinating Council (HUDCC), CORONA, ATTY. EDGARDO PAMINTUAN, CARPIO MORALES, in his capacity as General Manager of CALLEJO, SR., the National Housing Authority (NHA), AZCUNA, MR. PERCIVAL CHAVEZ, in his TINGA, capacity as Chairman of the Presidential CHICO-NAZARIO, Commission for the Urban Poor (PCUP), GARCIA, and MAYOR FELICIANO BELMONTE, in VELASCO, JR., JJ. his capacity as Mayor of Quezon City, SECRETARY ELISEA GOZUN, in her capacity as Secretary of the Department of Environment and Natural Resources (DENR) and SECRETARY FLORENTE Promulgated: SORIQUEZ, in his capacity as Secretary of the Department of Public Works and Highways (DPWH) as ex-officio members of the NATIONAL GOVERNMENT August 3, 2006 CENTER ADMINISTRATION COMMITTEE, Respondents. - versus -

DECISION TINGA, J.: The instant petition for prohibition under Rule 65 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure, with prayer for the issuance of a temporary restraining order and/or writ of preliminary injunction, seeks to prevent respondents from enforcing the implementing rules and regulations (IRR) of Republic Act No. 9207, otherwise known as the “National Government Center (NGC) Housing and Land Utilization Act of 2003.” Petitioner Holy Spirit Homeowners Association, Inc. (Association) is a homeowners association from the West Side of the NGC. It is represented by its president, Nestorio F. Apolinario, Jr., who is a co-petitioner in his own personal capacity and on behalf of the association. Named respondents are the ex-officio members of the National Government Center Administration Committee (Committee). At the filing of the instant petition, the Committee was composed of Secretary Michael Defensor, Chairman of the Housing and Urban Development Coordinating Council (HUDCC), Atty. Edgardo Pamintuan, General Manager of the National Housing Authority (NHA), Mr. Percival Chavez, Chairman of the Presidential Commission for Urban Poor (PCUP), Mayor Feliciano Belmonte of Quezon City, Secretary Elisea Gozun of the Department of Environment and Natural Resources (DENR), and Secretary Florante Soriquez of the Department of Public Works and Highways (DPWH). Prior to the passage of R.A. No. 9207, a number of presidential issuances authorized the creation and development of what is now known as the National Government Center (NGC). On March 5, 1972, former President Ferdinand Marcos issued Proclamation No. 1826, reserving a parcel of land in Constitution Hills, Quezon City,

covering a little over 440 hectares as a national government site to be known as the NGC. On August 11, 1987, then President Corazon Aquino issued Proclamation No. 137, excluding 150 of the 440 hectares of the reserved site from the coverage of Proclamation No. 1826 and authorizing instead the disposition of the excluded portion by direct sale to the bona fide residents therein. In view of the rapid increase in population density in the portion excluded by Proclamation No. 137 from the coverage of Proclamation No. 1826, former President Fidel Ramos issued Proclamation No. 248 on September 7, 1993, authorizing the vertical development of the excluded portion to maximize the number of families who can effectively become beneficiaries of the government’s socialized housing program.

SEC. 4. Disposition of Certain Portions of the National Government Center Site for Local Government or Community Facilities, Socioeconomic, Charitable, Educational and Religious Purposes. – Certain portions of land within the aforesaid area for local government or community facilities, socioeconomic, charitable, educational and religious institutions are hereby reserved for disposition for such purposes: Provided, That only those institutions already operating and with existing facilities or structures, or those occupying the land may avail of the disposition program established under the provisions this Act; Provided, further, That in ascertaining the specific areas that may be disposed of in favor of these institutions, the existing site allocation shall be used as basis therefore: Provided, finally. That in determining the reasonable lot allocation of such institutions without specific lot allocations, the land area that may be allocated to them shall be based on the area actually used by said institutions at the time of effectivity of this Act. (Emphasis supplied.)

On May 14, 2003, President Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo signed into law R.A. No. 9207. Among the salient provisions of the law are the following: In accordance with Section 5 of R.A. No. 9207, the Committee formulated the Implementing Rules and Regulations (IRR) of R.A. No. 9207 on June 29, 2004. Petitioners subsequently filed the instant petition, raising the following issues: SEC. 2. Declaration of Policy. – It is hereby declared the policy of the State to secure the land tenure of the urban poor. Toward this end, lands located in the NGC, Quezon City shall be utilized for housing, socioeconomic, civic, educational, religious and other purposes. SEC. 3. Disposition of Certain Portions of the National Government Center Site to Bona Fide Residents. – Proclamation No. 1826, Series of 1979, is hereby amended by excluding from the coverage thereof, 184 hectares on the west side and 238 hectares on the east side of Commonwealth Avenue, and declaring the same open for disposition to bona fide residents therein: Provided, That the determination of the bona fide residents on the west side shall be based on the census survey conducted in 1994 and the determination of the bona fide residents on the east side shall be based on the census survey conducted in 1994 and occupancy verification survey conducted in 2000: Provided, further, That all existing legal agreements, programs and plans signed, drawn up or implemented and actions taken, consistent with the provisions of this Act are hereby adopted.

WHETHER OR NOT SECTION 3.1 (A.4), 3.1 (B.2), 3.2 (A.1) AND 3.2 (C.1) OF THE RULES AND REGULATIONS OF REPUBLIC ACT NO. 9207, OTHERWISE KNOWN AS “NATIONAL GOVERNMENT CENTER (NGC) HOUSING AND LAND UTILIZATION ACT OF 2003” SHOULD BE DECLARED NULL AND VOID FOR BEING INCONSISTENT WITH THE LAW IT SEEKS TO IMPLEMENT. WHETHER OR NOT SECTION 3.1 (A.4), 3.1 (B.2), 3.2 (A.1) AND 3.2 (C.1) OF THE RULES AND REGULATIONS OF REPUBLIC ACT NO. 9207, OTHERWISE KNOWN AS “NATIONAL GOVERNMENT CENTER (NGC) HOUSING AND LAND UTILIZATION ACT OF 2003” SHOULD BE DECLARED NULL AND VOID FOR BEING ARBITRARY, CAPRICIOUS AND WHIMSICAL. First, the procedural matters. The Office of the Solicitor General (OSG) argues that petitioner Association cannot question the implementation of Section 3.1 (b.2) and Section 3.2 (c.1) since it does not claim any right over the NGC East Side. Section 3.1 (b.2) provides for the maximum lot area that may be awarded to a

resident-beneficiary of the NGC East Side, while Section 3.2 (c.1) imposes a lot price escalation penalty to a qualified beneficiary who fails to execute a contract to sell within the prescribed period. Also, the OSG contends that since petitioner association is not the duly recognized people’s organization in the NGC and since petitioners not qualify as beneficiaries, they cannot question the manner of disposition of lots in the NGC. “Legal standing” or locus standi has been defined as a personal and substantial interest in the case such that the party has sustained or will sustain direct injury as a result of the governmental act that is being challenged…. The gist of the question of standing is whether a party alleges “such personal stake in the outcome of the controversy as to assure that concrete adverseness which sharpens the presentation of issues upon which the court depends for illumination of difficult constitutional questions.” Petitioner association has the legal standing to institute the instant petition, whether or not it is the duly recognized association of homeowners in the NGC. There is no dispute that the individual members of petitioner association are residents of the NGC. As such they are covered and stand to be either benefited or injured by the enforcement of the IRR, particularly as regards the selection process of beneficiaries and lot allocation to qualified beneficiaries. Thus, petitioner association may assail those provisions in the IRR which it believes to be unfavorable to the rights of its members. Contrary to the OSG’s allegation that the failure of petitioner association and its members to qualify as beneficiaries effectively bars them from questioning the provisions of the IRR, such circumstance precisely operates to confer on them the legal personality to assail the IRR. Certainly, petitioner and its members have sustained direct injury arising from the enforcement of the IRR in that they have been disqualified and eliminated from the selection process. While it is true that petitioners claim rights over the NGC West Side only and thus cannot be affected by the implementation of Section 3.1 (b.2), which refers to the NGC East Side, the rest of the assailed provisions of the IRR, namely, Sections 3.1 (a.4), 3.2 (a.1) and 3.2 (c.1), govern the disposition of lots in the West Side itself or all the lots in the NGC.

We cannot, therefore, agree with the OSG on the issue of locus standi. The petition does not merit dismissal on that ground. There are, however, other procedural impediments to the granting of the instant petition. The OSG claims that the instant petition for prohibition is an improper remedy because the writ of prohibition does not lie against the exercise of a quasi-legislative function. Since in issuing the questioned IRR of R.A. No. 9207, the Committee was not exercising judicial, quasijudicial or ministerial function, which is the scope of a petition for prohibition under Section 2, Rule 65 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure, the instant prohibition should be dismissed outright, the OSG contends. For their part, respondent Mayor of Quezon City and respondent NHA contend that petitioners violated the doctrine of hierarchy of courts in filing the instant petition with this Court and not with the Court of Appeals, which has concurrent jurisdiction over a petition for prohibition. The cited breaches are mortal. The petition deserves to be spurned as a consequence. Administrative agencies possess quasi-legislative or rule-making powers and quasi-judicial or administrative adjudicatory powers. Quasi-legislative or rule-making power is the power to make rules and regulations which results in delegated legislation that is within the confines of the granting statute and the doctrine of non-delegability and separability of powers. In questioning the validity or constitutionality of a rule or regulation issued by an administrative agency, a party need not exhaust administrative remedies before going to court. This principle, however, applies only where the act of the administrative agency concerned was performed pursuant to its quasi-judicial function, and not when the assailed act pertained to its rule-making or quasi-legislative power. The assailed IRR was issued pursuant to the quasi-legislative power of the Committee expressly authorized by R.A. No. 9207. The petition rests mainly on the theory that the assailed IRR issued by the Committee is invalid on the ground that it is not germane to the object and purpose of the statute it seeks to implement. Where what is assailed is the validity or

constitutionality of a rule or regulation issued by the administrative agency in the performance of its quasi-legislative function, the regular courts have jurisdiction to pass upon the same. Since the regular courts have jurisdiction to pass upon the validity of the assailed IRR issued by the Committee in the exercise of its quasilegislative power, the judicial course to assail its validity must follow the doctrine of hierarchy of courts. Although the Supreme Court, Court of Appeals and the Regional Trial Courts have concurrent jurisdiction to issue writs of certiorari, prohibition, mandamus, quo warranto, habeas corpus and injunction, such concurrence does not give the petitioner unrestricted freedom of choice of court forum. True, this Court has the full discretionary power to take cognizance of the petition filed directly with it if compelling reasons, or the nature and importance of the issues raised, so warrant. A direct invocation of the Court’s original jurisdiction to issue these writs should be allowed only when there are special and important reasons therefor, clearly and specifically set out in the petition. In Heirs of Bertuldo Hinog v. Melicor, the Court said that it will not entertain direct resort to it unless the redress desired cannot be obtained in the appropriate courts, and exceptional and compelling circumstances, such as cases of national interest and of serious implications, justify the availment of the extraordinary remedy of writ of certiorari, calling for the exercise of its primary jurisdiction. A perusal, however, of the petition for prohibition shows no compelling, special or important reasons to warrant the Court’s taking cognizance of the petition in the first instance. Petitioner also failed to state any reason that precludes the lower courts from passing upon the validity of the questioned IRR. Moreover, as provided in Section 5, Article VIII of the

Constitution, the Court’s power to evaluate the validity of an implementing rule or regulation is generally appellate in nature. Thus, following the doctrine of hierarchy of courts, the instant petition should have been initially filed with the Regional Trial Court. A petition for prohibition is also not the proper remedy to assail an IRR issued in the exercise of a quasi-legislative function. Prohibition is an extraordinary writ directed against any tribunal, corporation, board, officer or person, whether exercising judicial, quasi-judicial or ministerial functions, ordering said entity or person to desist from further proceedings when said proceedings are without or in excess of said entity’s or person’s jurisdiction, or are accompanied with grave abuse of discretion, and there is no appeal or any other plain, speedy and adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law. Prohibition lies against judicial or ministerial functions, but not against legislative or quasi-legislative functions. Generally, the purpose of a writ of prohibition is to keep a lower court within the limits of its jurisdiction in order to maintain the administration of justice in orderly channels. Prohibition is the proper remedy to afford relief against usurpation of jurisdiction or power by an inferior court, or when, in the exercise of jurisdiction in handling matters clearly within its cognizance the inferior court transgresses the bounds prescribed to it by the law, or where there is no adequate remedy available in the ordinary course of law by which such relief can be obtained. Where the principal relief sought is to invalidate an IRR, petitioners’ remedy is an ordinary action for its nullification, an action which properly falls under the jurisdiction of the Regional Trial Court. In any case, petitioners’ allegation that “respondents are performing or threatening to perform functions without or in excess of their jurisdiction” may appropriately be enjoined by the trial court through a writ of injunction or a temporary restraining order. In a number of petitions, the Court adequately resolved them on other grounds without adjudicating on the constitutionality issue when there were no compelling reasons to pass upon the same. In like manner, the instant petition may be dismissed based on the foregoing procedural grounds. Yet, the Court will not shirk from its duty to rule on the merits of this petition to facilitate the speedy resolution of this case. In proper cases, procedural rules may be relaxed or suspended in the interest of substantial justice. And the power of the Court to except a particular case from its rules whenever the purposes of justice require it cannot be questioned.

Now, we turn to the substantive aspects of the petition. The outcome, however, is just as dismal for petitioners. Petitioners assail the following provisions of the IRR:

Section 3. Disposition of Certain portions of the NGC Site to the bonafide residents 3.1. Period for Qualification of Beneficiaries xxxx (a.4) Processing and evaluation of qualifications shall be based on the Code of Policies and subject to the condition that a beneficiary is qualified to acquire only one (1) lot with a minimum of 36 sq. m. and maximum of 54 sq. m. and subject further to the availability of lots. xxxx (b.2) Applications for qualification as beneficiary shall be processed and evaluated based on the Code of Policies including the minimum and maximum lot allocation of 35 sq. m. and 60 sq. m. xxxx 3.2. Execution of the Contract to Sell (a) Westside (a.1) All qualified beneficiaries shall execute Contract to Sell (CTS) within sixty (60) days from the effectivity of the IRR in order to avail of the lot at P700.00 per sq. m. xxxx (c) for both eastside and westside

(c.1) Qualified beneficiaries who failed to execute CTS on the deadline set in item a.1 above in case of westside and in case of eastside six (6) months after approval of the subdivision plan shall be subjected to lot price escalation. The rate shall be based on the formula to be set by the National Housing Authority factoring therein the affordability criteria. The new rate shall be approved by the NGC-Administration Committee (NGC-AC). Petitioners contend that the aforequoted provisions of the IRR are constitutionally infirm as they are not germane to and/or are in conflict with the object and purpose of the law sought to be implemented. First. According to petitioners, the limitation on the areas to be awarded to qualified beneficiaries under Sec. 3.1 (a.4) and (b.2) of the IRR is not in harmony with the provisions of R.A. No. 9207, which mandates that the lot allocation to qualified beneficiaries shall be based on the area actually used or occupied by bona fide residents without limitation to area. The argument is utterly baseless. The beneficiaries of lot allocations in the NGC may be classified into two groups, namely, the urban poor or the bona fide residents within the NGC site and certain government institutions including the local government. Section 3, R.A. No. 9207 mandates the allocation of additional property within the NGC for disposition to its bona fide residents and the manner by which this area may be distributed to qualified beneficiaries. Section 4, R.A. No. 9207, on the other hand, governs the lot disposition to government institutions. While it is true that Section 4 of R.A. No. 9207 has a proviso mandating that the lot allocation shall be based on the land area actually used or occupied at the time of the law’s effectivity, this proviso applies only to institutional beneficiaries consisting of the local government, socioeconomic, charitable, educational and religious institutions which do not have specific lot allocations, and not to the bona fide residents of NGC. There is no proviso which even hints that a bona fide resident of the NGC is likewise entitled to the lot area actually occupied by him.

Petitioners’ interpretation is also not supported by the policy of R.A. No. 9207 and the prior proclamations establishing the NGC. The government’s policy to set aside public property aims to benefit not only the urban poor but also the local government and various government institutions devoted to socioeconomic, charitable, educational and

religious purposes. Thus, although Proclamation No. 137 authorized the sale of lots to bona fide residents in the NGC, only a third of the entire area of the NGC was declared open for disposition subject to the condition that those portions being used or earmarked for public or quasi-public purposes would be excluded from the housing program for NGC residents. The same policy of rational and optimal land use can be read in Proclamation No. 248 issued by then President Ramos. Although the proclamation recognized the rapid increase in the population density in the NGC, it did not allocate additional property within the NGC for urban poor housing but instead authorized the vertical development of the same 150 hectares identified previously by Proclamation No. 137 since the distribution of individual lots would not adequately provide for the housing needs of all the bona fide residents in the NGC. In addition, as provided in Section 4 of R.A. No. 9207, the institutional beneficiaries shall be allocated the areas actually occupied by them; hence, the portions intended for the institutional beneficiaries is fixed and cannot be allocated for other non-institutional beneficiaries. Thus, the areas not intended for institutional beneficiaries would have to be equitably distributed among the bona fide residents of the NGC. In order to accommodate all qualified residents, a limitation on the area to be awarded to each beneficiary must be fixed as a necessary consequence. Second. Petitioners note that while Sec. 3.2 (a.1) of the IRR fixes the selling rate of a lot at P700.00 per sq. m., R.A. No. 9207 does not provide for the price. They add Sec. 3.2 (c.1) penalizes a beneficiary who fails to execute a contract to sell within six (6) months from the approval of the subdivision plan by imposing a price escalation, while there is no such penalty imposed by R.A. No. 9207. Thus, they conclude that the assailed provisions conflict with R.A. No. 9207 and should be nullified. The argument deserves scant consideration. Where a rule or regulation has a provision not expressly stated or contained in the statute being implemented, that provision does not necessarily contradict the statute. A legislative rule is in the nature of subordinate legislation, designed to implement a primary legislation by providing the details thereof. All that is required is that the regulation should be germane to the objects and purposes of the law; that the

regulation be not in contradiction to but in conformity with the standards prescribed by the law. In Section 5 of R.A. No. 9207, the Committee is granted the power to administer, formulate guidelines and policies, and implement the disposition of the areas covered by the law. Implicit in this authority and the statute’s objective of urban poor housing is the power of the Committee to formulate the manner by which the reserved property may be allocated to the beneficiaries. Under this broad power, the Committee is mandated to fill in the details such as the qualifications of beneficiaries, the selling price of the lots, the terms and conditions governing the sale and other key particulars necessary to implement the objective of the law. These details are purposely omitted from the statute and their determination is left to the discretion of the Committee because the latter possesses special knowledge and technical expertise over these matters. The Committee’s authority to fix the selling price of the lots may be likened to the rate-fixing power of administrative agencies. In case of a delegation of rate-fixing power, the only standard which the legislature is required to prescribe for the guidance of the administrative authority is that the rate be reasonable and just. However, it has been held that even in the absence of an express requirement as to reasonableness, this standard may be implied. In this regard, petitioners do not even claim that the selling price of the lots is unreasonable. The provision on the price escalation clause as a penalty imposed to a beneficiary who fails to execute a contract to sell within the prescribed period is also within the Committee’s authority to formulate guidelines and policies to implement R.A. No. 9207. The Committee has the power to lay down the terms and conditions governing the disposition of said lots, provided that these are reasonable and just. There is nothing objectionable about prescribing a period within which the parties must execute the contract to sell. This condition can ordinarily be found in a contract to sell and is not contrary to law, morals, good customs, public order, or public policy. Third. Petitioners also suggest that the adoption of the assailed IRR suffers from a procedural flaw. According to them the IRR was adopted and concurred in by several representatives of people’s organizations contrary to the express mandate of R.A. No. 9207 that only two representatives

from duly recognized peoples’ organizations must compose the NGCAC CONSUELO YNARES-SANTIAGO which promulgated the assailed IRR. It is worth noting that petitioner Associate Justice association is not a duly recognized people’s organization. In subordinate legislation, as long as the passage of the rule or regulation had the benefit of a hearing, the procedural due process requirement is deemed complied with. That there is observance of more than the minimum requirements of due process in the adoption of the questioned ANTONIO T. CARPIO IRR is not a ground to invalidate the same. Associate Justice

ANGELINA SANDOVAL-GUTIERREZ Associate Justice

MA. ALICIA AUSTRIA-MARTINEZ Associate Justice

In sum, the petition lacks merit and suffers from procedural deficiencies. WHEREFORE, the instant petition for prohibition is DISMISSED. Costs against petitioners. RENATO C. CORONA Associate Justice SO ORDERED.

DANTE O. TINGA Associate Justice

CONCHITA CARPIO MORALES Associate Justice

ROMEO J. CALLEJO, SR. Associate Justice

ADOLFO S. AZCUNA Associate Justice

MINITA V. CHICO-NAZARIO Associate Justice

CANCIO C. GARCIA Associate Justice

WE CONCUR:

ARTEMIO V. PANGANIBAN Chief Justice

REYNATO S. PUNO Associate Justice

PRESBITERO J. VELASCO, JR. Associate Justice LEONARDO A. QUISUMBING Associate Justice

CERTIFICATION Pursuant to Article VIII, Section 13 of the Constitution, it is hereby certified that the conclusions in the above Decision were reached in

consultation before the case was assigned to the writer of the opinion of the Court. ARTEMIO V. PANGANIBAN. Chief Justice

Smart Communications, Inc. v. National Telecommunications Commission, 456 Phil. 145, 155 (2003). Id. at 157. Id. at 158. Heirs of Bertuldo Hinog v. Melicor, G.R. No. 140954, April 12, 2005, 455 SCRA 460, 470. Fortich v. Corona, 352 Phil. 461, 480 (1998).

Rollo, p. 6.

Id. at 481.

Id. at 7.

Heirs of Bertuldo Hinog v. Melicor, supra.

Id.

Id. at 471.

SEC. 5. National Government Center Administration Committee. – There is hereby created a National Government Center Administration Committee to administer, formulate guidelines and policies, and implement the land disposition of the areas covered by this Act. xxx

CONSTITUTION, Art. VIII, Sec. 5 states: The Supreme Court shall have the following powers:

Rollo, p. 12. Id. at 80. Id. at 82. Sanlakas v. Executive Secretary, G.R. No. 159085, February 3, 2004, 421 SCRA 656, 665, citing IBP v. Zamora, G.R. No. 141284, August 15, 2000, 338 SCRA 81. Rollo, p. 81. Id. at 51. Id. at 66.

xxx (2) Review, revise, reverse, modify, or affirm on appeal or certiorari, as the law or the Rules of Court may provide, final judgments and orders of lower courts in: (a) All cases in which the constitutionality or validity of any treaty, international or executive agreement, law, presidential decrees, proclamation, order, instruction, ordinance, or regulation is in question. x x x RULES OF COURT, Rule 65, Sec. 2. David v. Rivera, G.R. Nos. 139913 & 140159, January 16, 2004, 420 SCRA 90, 100. Id.

Development Bank of the Phils. v. Commission on Audit, 424 Phil. 411 (2002); Planters Products, Inc. v. Court of Appeals, 375 Phil. 615 (1999); Spouses Mirasol v. Court of Appeals, 403 Phil. 761 (2001). Philippine National Bank v. Sanao Marketing Corporation, G.R. No. 153951, July 29, 2005. Republic Act No. 9207 (2003), Sec. 2, provides: Declaration of Policy. – It is hereby declared the policy of the State to secure the land tenure of the urban poor. Toward this end, lands located in the NGC, Quezon City shall be utilized for housing, socioeconomic, civic, educational, religious and other purposes. Commissioner on Internal Revenue v. Court of Appeals, 329 Phil. 987, 1006-1007 (1996), citing Misamis Oriental Association of Coco Traders, Inc. v. Department of Finance Secretary, 238 SCRA 63. Sigre v. Court of Appeals, 435 Phil. 711, 719 (2002). Philippine Communications Satellite Corporation v. Alcuaz, G.R. No. 84818, December 18, 1989, 180 SCRA 218, 225-226.