Projct 002

Ali Ajaz

ANALYSIS OF MANAGERIAL AND TECHNICAL ASPECTS OF TAUNSA BARRAGE EMERGENCY REHABILITATION AND MODERNIZATION PROJECT

TAUNSA BARRAGE EMERGENCY REHABILITATION AND MODERNIZATION PROJECT

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Ali Ajaz

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Chronology of Creative Events

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Discharge Capacities

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Drafting Methodolgy

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Project Players

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Historical Background

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Need of Rehabilitation and its Possible Benefits

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Project Duration & Cost

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Environmental Impact Assessment of Project and Mitigation Measures

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Operations Phase Impacts

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Construction Phase Impacts

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Concerns related to Resettlement Plans

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Effects of Project on Indus Dolphin

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D.G. Khan Canal Closure during 2005-06 Rabi season

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Taunsa Canal Operation Schedule for 2006-07 Rabi Season

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Impact of the cofferdam breach and the consequences

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Problems & Proposed Remedial Measures

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Additional Modifications

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New Works

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Rehabilitation Works

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Monitoring & Evaluation

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Performance Review

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Services by Directorate General Monitoring & Evaluation

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Quality Assurance and Control

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Project Quality Management System

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Source Approvals

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Steel Reinforcement

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Cement

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Quality Assessment

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Quality Control (QC) Data

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Summary of Tests Conducted On Construction Materials

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Weather Data

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Cumulative Status of Compressive Strength Test Result (Class A)

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Cumulative Status Of Compressive Strength Test Result (Class B)

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Management & Economical Review

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Constraints for ICB – 01

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Overall Progress Summary

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Glossary

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References 30 TAUNSA BARRAGE EMERGENCY REHABILITATION AND MODERNIZATION PROJECT

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CHRONOLOGY OF CREATIVE EVENTS 1. 2. 3. 4. 5.

Design phase – 1950–1953 Construction started – 15.9.1953 Main barrage structure completed – 7.1.1958 River diverted through the barrage – 11.4.1958 Inauguration ceremony – 3.3.1959

DISCHARGE CAPACITIES 1. 2. 3. 4. 5.

Barrage DG Khan Canal Muzaffargarh Canal Taunsa Panjnad Link Canal Normal Pond Level

10, 00,000 cusecs 8,301/14,200 cusecs 8,285 cusecs 12,000 cusecs 446.00 ft.

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DRAFTING METHODOLGY FOR CONTRACTING OF TAUNSA BARRAGE EMERGENCY REHABILITATION AND MODERNIZATION PROJECT

TYPE OF CONTRACT: UNIT ITEM RATE CONTRACT

PROJECT DELIVERY METHOD: DESIGN BID BUILD

PROJECT PLAYERS

OWNER: PAKISTAN IRRIGATION AND POWER DEPARTMENT GOVERNMENT OF THE PUNJAB.

CONTRACTORS: A Joint Venture of: M/s Descon Engineering Ltd. Pakistan & M/s China Gezhouba Water & Power Group Company (China)

CONSULTANT: NATIONAL DEVELOPMENT CONSULTANTS (NDC) & NATIONAL ENGINEERING SERVICES PAKISTAN (NESPAK) In Association With ATKINS GLOBAL (WATER) UK

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Historical Background: The Taunsa Barrage on the River Indus (see map) was completed in 1958 to divert water to two large areas on the left and right banks of the river making irrigated agriculture possible for about 1.18 Mha of this arid landscape in Punjab Province. Indus River waters are diverted into the Dera Ghazi Khan (D. G. Khan) canal that runs for over a hundred miles north-south along the Indus River right bank irrigating about 400,000 ha, and into the Muzaffargarh canal along the Indus River left bank to irrigate about 385,000 ha. Water is also diverted at Taunsa through the Taunsa-Punjnad (T.P.) Link canal to supplement the water supply for an additional 394,000 ha land along the lower reaches of the Chenab River. The Taunsa Barrage has helped some 6 million Pakistanis, ranging from rich landholders to poor subsistence farmers to make a living growing wheat and cotton on an otherwise bone-dry plain. In addition to regulating the waters of the Indus River, the barrage also carries a critical road link, a gas and oil pipeline, and telecom links across the river. This makes the Taunsa structure a major conduit between Southern Punjab and the provinces to the south (Sindh) and west (Baluchistan). Need of Rehabilitation and its Possible Benefits: Design deficiencies and aging have resulted in numerous structural weaknesses in the barrage and an unstable hydraulic situation exists in the downstream portion of the barrage. Although it is difficult to determine exactly when or how the Taunsa Barrage might fail, experts were of the view that the weaknesses were so serious that failure could conceivably occur in the near future. An international panel of independent experts established to review the project feasibility study and design concluded in August 2004 that “the present condition of the Barrage has deteriorated to an extent where the failure of the structure is highly probable”. Failure of the barrage would not only cause immediate flood damage and potential loss of life but also cause total crop failure in the 785,000 ha irrigated directly by water from the barrage as well as cause an extended interruption of drinking water supply in the canal command areas. As a result, its immediate rehabilitation was considered an emergency. In addition to these dangers, the barrage was operating below its potential efficiency because faulty design prevented it being used to its limits (i.e., it could not be operated in a way that would provide full water supply to each of the three canals). This meant that for some considerable time the canals on either side had been unable to withdraw water at their design capacities and could not serve their full command areas. A rehabilitated Taunsa Barrage will benefit a total of 1,179 million ha, including direct benefits for about 725,000 ha. The main crops grown in this area are wheat in rabi season (dry season) and cotton in kharif season (wet season). Rehabilitation will enable the diversion of water at the original design capacity of these canals, significantly increasing water supply and improving its reliability for irrigation and drinking benefiting some 8 million people. TAUNSA BARRAGE EMERGENCY REHABILITATION AND MODERNIZATION PROJECT

Ali Ajaz 6 In a region where annual rainfall is only 150mm, the summer and winter crops are almost entirely dependent on irrigation. The failure of Taunsa would cause annual agricultural losses of an estimated $300 million. In addition, there would be the cost of temporary repairs to restore irrigation service and then the cost of full rehabilitation. In carrying out an economic analysis of the project, the benefits were taken as the value of the avoided crop losses and the costs associated with the failure, and compared with the investment cost of immediate rehabilitation. For example, if Taunsa were to fail in the next five years, the economic rate of return (ERR) on the investment in rehabilitation today would be 42 percent, or if failure should occur in ten years, the estimated ERR would be 17 percent. Both economic rates of return are quite acceptable for public investment in Pakistan. The people who will benefit from the optimal functioning of the barrage are the farmers and residents of the two canal command areas; they will have much more reliable irrigation and drinking water supply not only in the winter or rabi crop season but also in the summer or kharif season. In addition, heavy siltation has plagued the D.G.Khan canal for years. A silt excluder is now added to the barrage to decrease sediment inflow into the canal during operations and reduce the water supply disruptions siltation causes. Project Duration & Cost: The Project has three components:   

Rehabilitation and strengthening works Renovation of gates and hoists and strengthening O & M facilities Consulting services and implementation support

The project is being implemented by pre-qualified construction firms contracted through international open competitive bidding. The total implementation period is three and half years. The Bank-supported project will be completed in slightly over three years at an estimated total cost of US$134 million, of which US$ 123 million is being provided through a World Bank loan. The loan became effective in April 2005, and is due to close in December 2008. Overall, the implementation of the project is on schedule and monitoring reports indicate that the quality of the engineering work has been satisfactory. Safety of the structure will be monitored by instruments installed in the barrage structures and its foundations. The project will also strengthen operation and maintenance (O&M) through staff training and modernization of all aspects of O&M with a special emphasis on safety management and emergency preparedness. During project implementation, the Government will prepare an Operation and Maintenance (O&M) manual for the barrage. These along with the increased capacity and specialized monitoring and maintenance equipment provided under the project should enable the Punjab Government to sustain the economic life and performance of the barrage.

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Environmental Impact Assessment of Project and Mitigation Measures: An EIA was prepared and cleared by the Bank before loan negotiations (November 22, 2004). The EIA was made publicly available at the office of the District Officer (Environment) in Dera Ghazi Khan District, and the Punjab Public Library, Lahore. A public hearing to discuss the EIA was held in Dera Ghazi Khan on August 23, 2004. The EIA foresaw two types of impact from the project: o Operations Phase Impacts Since 1972 the pond and shore area behind the barrage (an area of about 6,567 ha) have been a protected game and wildlife sanctuary, and in 1996 it was declared to be a RAMSAR site. The site is an important wintering, nesting and resting area for migratory and resident waterfowl (it is located on the Indus Flyway) including several rare species. The rare Indus dolphin and otter are also present there. The EIA determined that operational pond levels will remain within current seasonal ranges when the rehabilitation is completed and that there will be no significant ecological impact from the rehabilitation. o Construction Phase Impacts Potential construction phase impacts identified in the EIA included temporary land acquisition, local labor, canal closures, access and vehicle impacts (dust, noise and safety) and safety and health (particularly sexually transmitted infections (STI) and HIV/AIDS). At the time of the EIA a detailed site and construction plan was not available. The Government assured the Bank that no land acquisition and hence no involuntary resettlement would be necessary. The government also gave assurances that the duration and timing of closures would remain the same as under the pre-project regime, and that the other identified issues would be addressed as indicated in the Environmental Management Plan (EMP). An Environmental Management Plan (EMP) was prepared in the form of guidelines that were incorporated into the bidding documents and contracts for construction, and were to be incorporated into the new O&M Manual for the barrage when the project was completed. The Government agreed to implement the EMP, constantly monitor the key indicators given in the EMP, and provide the Bank with an annual environmental monitoring or audit reports. The Bank received the first environmental audit report for the project in August, 2006. After the project was launched in May 2005 and more detailed construction program were prepared by the contractor after its mobilization, the determination that no land acquisition would be needed proved inaccurate. About 160 households were moved from the construction site between late July, 2005 and early August, 2005 to a location selected in consultation with the project affected people (PAP). In order to ensure that the impact of these types of significant changes from those represented in the EIA and EMP are recognized and mitigation actions taken in a timely manner, the Bank required that the Project Management Office (PMO) prepare a Change Management Statement (CMS) to update the EIA. The first such CMS was prepared by the project authorities with the TAUNSA BARRAGE EMERGENCY REHABILITATION AND MODERNIZATION PROJECT

Ali Ajaz 8 assistance of an international wetlands expert and submitted to the Bank in March 2006. The CMS (2006) is available in the Bank’s public information center. Concerns related to Resettlement Plans: The contractor is responsible for the care of water during construction, the safety of the site and areas that could be affected by a failure and for logistical arrangements (material and equipment storage, worker housing, etc.) that ensure that the construction is carried out and completed in the most cost efficient and timely manner. The contractor was mobilized at the site in June and July, 2005. The relocation of about 160 households, which was not anticipated at the time of the EIA, was carried out in late July and early August, 2005. The affected community comprises predominantly Mohanas, who call themselves Sheikh. In addition, there are some Bhattis, Khetrans, and Chandios sub-community groups as well. The community does not have an indigenous leadership structure. Their common language is Saraiki, generally spoken in Southern Punjab. The livelihoods of a significant majority of affected households are connected to the river. The men spend their time collecting river grass and twigs from the bushes that women use to make traditional jhaarus (brooms) and to weave baskets. Most households are involved in more than one occupational activity with broom making, basket making and fishing constituting about 85% of average household income with respective shares of 33, 32 and 20 percent. Overall reported average monthly household income is at Rs.11,613. Average monthly household income of the affected community on the Right Bank is comparatively lower (Rs. 8,630/month) than that of the Left Bank (Rs. 12,078/month). The only apparent difference between the two communities is the larger household size of the community on the Right Bank at 11.1 compared to 4.8 on the Left Bank. The displacement of these families was carried out between late July and early August, 2005 without prior notification to or approval of the World Bank. The Bank learned about the displacement from a local NGO and within weeks visited the site and required that a resettlement action plan (RAP) be prepared by the project authority. The RAP was approved by the Bank in November 2005. Prior to displacement, the people were living on the river banks in houses and dwellings made of mud walls and brick masonry laid with clay mortar. Few of them had in-house toilets, electricity, and collective or individual water pumps. At the new resettlement sites all the affected households have access to these facilities. The new resettlement sites are furnished with electricity, collective or individual water pumps, and toilets. Complaints of police coercion of the people to be relocated were lodged with the Government and the Bank. As the Bank was not a witness to the initial relocation process and had not approved it, the Bank has not been able to determine a single verifiable version of events. The Bank was concerned about allegations of police enforcement during the resettlement and requested an investigation by a third party. The investigation by the Muzaffargarh District Coordination Officer found that no police intimidation took place but this could not be further verified. TAUNSA BARRAGE EMERGENCY REHABILITATION AND MODERNIZATION PROJECT

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Implementation of the Resettlement Action Plan (RAP) for 150 households started in November 2005 and is now completed satisfactorily: compensation payment, housing construction, provision of community facilities including streets and open drains, mosques, shared toilets and hand pumps, etc. Using a grievance mechanism established under the plan, a further 10 households qualified for resettlement bringing the total households resettled to 160. In addition to compensation for physical assets, all the affected households are paid an income disturbance allowance varying between Rs. 10,000 to Rs 26,000 depending upon the household size. Additional cash allowances were paid to especially vulnerable households identified by the community’s Committee. Furthermore, some community members have received work and training from the contractor at the project site. The mid-term review in April 2007 indicates that the living conditions for the resettler households have clearly improved in terms of housing, infrastructure and public service facilities and that the resettler and host villagers are generally satisfied with the resettlement progress and outcome. The entire community of relocated households is represented by 13 community leaders elected by them to take decisions. This group includes two women. Five of these representatives, including one Imam who leads prayers in a mosque, were interviewed by the Bank in mid-May 2006. They told the Bank that the decision to move was taken by the community itself which asked the Irrigation Department for assistance. They also said that the identification of the new sites was done collectively by the project authorities and the community and that no force was used during the relocation. The list of affected households and their losses was prepared and endorsed by the community leaders and the compensation is based on the list provided to the project authorities. They found the Rs 40,000 compensation for structures was rather low but nonetheless acceptable, they said. Among some concerns the five leaders raised was that the new settlement was a little farther from the river causing worry about their hold over fishing access they had enjoyed previously. All the legitimate applications of the affected communities members have been or are being processed by the 1st and 2nd tier grievance redress committees set up for the project. One issue which is being addressed as a high priority through PRSP initiative is the livelihood/business development assistance. A total of 17 Community Organizations have been formed at the relocated and neighboring communities. The land belongs to the Irrigation Department. The Irrigation Department discussed the proposal of providing land titles to the project affected persons (PAPs) with the Land Revenue Department but was informed that it was not possible. Ultimately Irrigation Department prepared a site layout/plan showing both the locations of resettlement and neighboring communities in consultation with the local communities concerned. This site plan is to be shared with the communities. Based on information gathered by a Bank team of social development experts, the displaced community at Taunsa does not possess the characteristics given in the Bank policy on Indigenous Peoples. They are an occupational group living near the barrage for its access to the river and flood protection. Their livelihoods are based primarily on fishing and gathering reeds. Many of them are also seasonal or itinerant workers. They do not maintain distinct social institutions from their neighbors and do not speak a distinct language. TAUNSA BARRAGE EMERGENCY REHABILITATION AND MODERNIZATION PROJECT

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Effects of Project on Indus Dolphin: In January 2006, it was brought to the attention of the Bank team that two Indus Dolphins were alleged to have died near the project site. The timing and causes of these incidents were unknown. The Bank requested the Irrigation Department (IPD) to investigate these claims. The supervisory consultant attached to the Project Management Office (PMO) completed an investigation and its report, which was received in March 2006, could only verify the death of one dolphin downstream of the barrage and there was no evidence that its death was caused by project activities. The Bank also received a report from the Punjab Wildlife Department (PWD) prepared at the request of the IPD, which found no evidence for dolphin deaths in the project area In September, 2006, WWF-Pakistan provided a report on the alleged deaths of one or more Indus Dolphins at Taunsa. The original report of the dolphin deaths claimed a dolphin had become stranded in the D.G. Khan canal. The WWF report concludes that there was no evidence of a dolphin becoming stranded in the D. G. Khan Canal; however, interviews indicated that a dolphin became entangled in a fishing-net near gate number 45 of the barrage on December 7, 2005. Apparently, it was released from the net, photographed outside the water, and released back into the river. Its subsequent survival is uncertain. Following this incident, the Contractor has set up and organized basic training to a Dolphin Rescue Team, and employed a game watcher to ensure the protection of the Indus Dolphin and other species. It was agreed with IPD in September 2006 that WWF – Pakistan and PWD will assist in such initiatives in the future. In early 2007, the Sociologist of the Supervising Consultant and four persons from the fishing community settled at Taunsa Barrage attended 2-day training in dolphin handling at the Dolphin Rescue Center, Sukkur, Sindh, Pakistan. D.G. Khan Canal Closure during 2005-06 Rabi season: Nearly the entire Indus Basin irrigation system consists of earthen canals with some among the largest and longest in the world. Such canals, for which the science of their design was done in Punjab in the early 20th century, are remarkably stable if well maintained and operated as designed. Efficient and effective maintenance is enhanced if the canal is closed for a brief period every year. The canals in Punjab are normally closed in the dry season each year, usually for a period of 4 weeks in December and January, to carry out annual maintenance and repair, after an initial watering of the predominant winter wheat crop. Not all canals receive water in the winter or rabi season. Before storage was built to provide regulation of the Indus River and its tributaries in the 1970s (at Tarbela and Mangla dams), the limited water available in the rivers in the dry season had to be allocated to a few canals. Historically, these canals were called perennial canals because they were entitled to water in both the wet and dry seasons and commonly had water in them year round. The remaining canals were called non-perennial canals, and these were TAUNSA BARRAGE EMERGENCY REHABILITATION AND MODERNIZATION PROJECT

Ali Ajaz 11 entitled to water only in the wet season. This classification and corresponding entitlements were enshrined in the original irrigation acts adopted in the late 19th century. The rules in these acts were quite strict. For example, the amended Canal and Drainage Act (1973) states that " no claims shall be made against the government for compensation in respect to losses caused by the failure or stoppage of the water in a canal for the purpose of any repairs, alterations or additions to the irrigation infrastructure" . Since the construction of storage reservoirs at Tarbela and Mangla, more water has generally been available for irrigation in the dry season, and many non-perennial canals have regularly received water since that time. However, the position of the IPD is that this condition has not changed the original legal entitlements, or in the case of nonperennial canals, their lack of a legal entitlement in the dry season. They receive a water allocation only in those months and years when water availability exceeds the entitlement of the perennial canals. The determination of water availability and its allocation among the canals is made by the Indus River System Authority (IRSA) based on the interprovincial Water Apportionment Accord and estimated demands provided by the respective provincial irrigation departments. Hence, the period during which a nonperennial canal does not operate (has no water flowing in it) each year depends not only on the time it takes to complete scheduled maintenance, but also on the availability of water for the canal, i.e., in a water short year these canals would generally not operate for a period longer than is required for maintenance because water availability is less than they would expect to receive in a normal year. The D.G. Khan Canal and Muzaffargarh Canal fed by Taunsa Barrage are both nonperennial canals. They both had received water allocations in the dry season every year over the period 1995-2004 and they both are regularly closed for annual maintenance and lack of water, especially the D. G. Khan canal which has had chronic sedimentation problems that have limited its capacity. Over the period 1995-2004, the average number of days in the dry season during which the D. G. Khan canal is not operational or without water was about 63 days (ranging from 20 to 88 days), and for Muzaffargarh canal 99 days (ranging from 33 to 135 days). The high variability of these periods without water and their length are most strongly influenced by limited water availability. The winter low flow season in the Indus River is the critical construction period for emergency repair of the Taunsa Barrage. In 2005-2006 work was planned for the right side of the barrage (repair of the damaged downstream floor of the barrage) and the D.G Khan headworks requiring closure of the D.G. Khan canal for a longer period than the normal closure period for maintenance. Moreover, water availability in the 2005-2006 rabi season was low. Only 1.036 million acre feet (Maf) was available for D.G Khan and Muzaffargarh canals (50% of the total water allocation is given to each canal) in comparison to the long term average of 1.5 Maf, and the allocation of 1.36 Maf in 20062007. Subsequently, in 2005-06, the D.G. Khan canal was closed from November 15December 16, 2005 and January 1-February 23, 2006 (86 days) and the Muzaffargarh Canal from December 17, 2005 to February 23, 2006 (69 days). During the 2005-06 rabi season, the Irrigation Department supplied water to the D.G. Khan canal to facilitate wheat sowing from October 15 to November 14, 2005 along the D.G. Khan Canal and drinking water supply through an existing feeder channel from December 17-31, 2005. It was reported that the farmers concerned were informed of the TAUNSA BARRAGE EMERGENCY REHABILITATION AND MODERNIZATION PROJECT

Ali Ajaz 12 canal operation schedule through Agriculture and Irrigation Departments’ field staff but some farmers in the canal command areas interviewed by the Bank team either did not receive the information or did not receive it in time to make adjustments. The long history of canal closure for maintenance in Pakistan has resulted in farmer's adoption and development of a variety of coping mechanisms. For example, in more recent times with the great expansion of tube wells in usable groundwater areas, farmers have an important alternative to canal water to irrigate their winter crops. Of critical importance to the farmer is timely knowledge that there will be a closure, when it will begin, and how long it will last. Adjustments such as harvesting the preceding kharif season crop, what crop and what variety to grow, when to plant, or whether to leave all or a part of the land fallow depends on this information. Despite the reported efforts of the IPD to inform farmers about the canal operation schedule in the 2005-2006 rabi season, it was not effective, and some claims of damages ensued. The Bank team endeavored to investigate the effect of the long non-operational period of D.G.Khan Canal in 2005-2006 on rabi crops in the canal command area. Production data from the Agriculture Department for the districts included in the canal command areas suggests that overall there was not a significant reduction in wheat production in the area in comparison with previous years. The exception is some union councils of Rajanpur district in the D. G. Khan canal command, which is a saline groundwater area, where it appears farmers had few if any alternatives once it became clear that no canal water would be available. In contrast, farmers in fresh groundwater areas, even if they did not own a tube well would commonly be able to buy tube well water in lieu of the canal water (groundwater markets are quite common in fresh groundwater areas of Punjab ). Data collected by the Bank mission indicates that the long non-operational period of canal could have contributed to the adverse impact on some farmers. However, available data is not adequate to determine with any precision which farmers were impacted and the extent or nature of those impacts. The Provincial Government launched a poverty targeted program (Punjab Rural Support Program, PRSP), which is an integrated pro-poor rural development program for four southern districts of Punjab, namely Layyah, D.G.Khan, Rajanpur and Muzaffargarh, of which the last three districts constitute the Taunsa command area, in the summer of 2006. This program, supported by about US$5 million, is planned to run for four years. The Bank requested that this program give a special emphasis to the four union councils (UCs) in Jampur tehsil of Rajanpur district where a significant decrease in wheat area sown during the 2005-06 rabi season was observed. The immediate assistance to the 4 UCs targets small farmers (with landholding size of 12.5 acres or less). In these four UCs, wheat seeds have been distributed to 7,047 small farmers owning 40,593 acres of land in the 2006-07 rabi sowing season. Over 100 hand pumps were installed to improve drinking water supply. A large number of Community Organizations (COs) have been formed whose members will benefit from the routine programs of PRSP, namely construction of physical infrastructure, provision of micro credit, skill training etc. The PRSP activities have now been expanded to other areas of the DG Khan and Muzarffagarh canal command as well as Taunsa project site.

TAUNSA BARRAGE EMERGENCY REHABILITATION AND MODERNIZATION PROJECT

Ali Ajaz Taunsa canal operation schedule for 2006-07 Rabi season:

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To minimize construction-related interruptions to canal operation, the Irrigation Department engaged an independent international panel of experts to review and optimize the project construction program. Related project construction this rabi season was planned to be undertaken when the canals are non-operational due to lack of water availability. At the same time, preventive measures such as repair of damaged state tube wells, and installation of hand pumps, to mitigate possible impact on farmers in brackish groundwater zones of Muzaffargarh Canal Command were undertaken Accordingly, 42 state-owned tube wells were made operational thus augmenting water supplies, 30 COs were formed to undertake developmental activities as aforementioned, and 126 hand pumps were installed for increasing the drinking water supply. Furthermore, a multimedia communication strategy and program was implemented for wide and timely consultation and information dissemination in the canal command areas well in advance of the planned closure period that year. The canal operation schedule for 2006-07 rabi season was disseminated at the beginning of the rabi season to the farmers concerned through different media (27,000 pamphlets, loud speakers in village mosques, radio and press conference, IPD and Agriculture Department staff, District Nazims, Tehsil Nazims, Nazims and members of Union Councils etc.). The canal operation schedule was virtually in accordance with the Indus water allocation plan proposed by Punjab and approved by IRSA based on its forecast a 14% shortfall in water availability for the 2006-07 rabi season, before it was publicly disclosed. The actual closure period of the two canals emanating from Taunsa Barrage during the dry winter season (rabi), were as follows: The D.G. Khan Canal, from December 11, 2006 to January 27, 2007, and Muzaffargarh Canal, from December 11, 2006 to February 21, 2007 respectively. This schedule was also the result of the cofferdam breach which took a few days to fill. Impact of the cofferdam breach and the consequences: The upstream cofferdam breached on January 15 at about 7:15 pm, at a distance of about 300 feet from the left bank of the river and inundated ongoing grouting and concreting work on the downstream barrage floor on two bays; breached a small coffer dam enclosing the work area; and damaged part of main downstream cofferdam (without breaching it) which encloses the area where the downstream sub-weir is under construction. No casualties occurred and no damage to private land and/or assets was reported. The breach was closed on January 19 and measures are being taken to strengthen the cofferdam and prevent recurrence of similar incidents. The Irrigation Department and its contractor/consultants endeavored to minimize the delays in canal water supply. Reportedly drinking water supplies to DG Khan canal resumed on January 27 against the original date of January 16 – a delay of 11 days. The delay of irrigation supplies was announced and publicized widely as was done for drinking water supplies. The irrigation water supply was started on February 15 in place of February 11 - a delay of 4 days. In terms of mitigation measures, installation of hand pumps continued in the four union councils of Rajanpur district and Thal branch of Muzarffagarh Canal.

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Problems & Proposed Remedial Measures

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Retrogression of levels on the downstream of barrage and consequential issues  Construction of a subsidiary weir to raise tail water levels

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Repeated damages to stilling basin appurtenances including rupture of skin concrete and leaking joints of mass concrete  Grouting of leaking joints and removal of weak concrete from top of existing d/s floor and laying of thick new concrete of 4000 psi strength

• Sedimentation problems in DG Khan Canal  Construction of silt excluder and raising of crest of head regulator of D.G Khan canal by 1 ft

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Repeated subsidence of the backfill of left and right flared out walls on the downstream  Provision of a proper filter and pressure release pipes behind the flared out walls

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 Additional Modifications Provision of vibrating wire (electronic) piezometers Replacement of 11 gates of under sluices Modification of remaining 53 gates of main weir Replacement of hoisting system of all the barrage gate Replacement of 7 gates of TP Link and 7 gates of DG Khan canals along with modification of 5 gates of Muzaffargarh canal  Automation with central control mechanism     

New Works:     

A 4,347.5 ft long Sub-weir 920 ft d/s of the Barrage Provision of Two Fish Ladders and a Navigation Lock Protection Works u/s and d/s of Sub-weir Instrumentation Installation of Gates for Navigation Lock and Fish Ladder

Rehabilitation Works:       

Strengthening of Barrage Chute and Stilling Basin Floor Grouting of Cavities under the Floor and voids in the Floor Installation of Instruments in the Floor Provision of Silt Excluder in the Right Under-Sluice of the Barrage Raising the Sill of the DGK Canal Head Regulator Extension of downstream Guide Banks. Relocation of Silt Ejector Disposal Channel of DGKC

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Monitoring & Evaluation: PROJECT OVERVIEW

Performance Review: Notice to commence was given by the Engineer to the Contractor for construction of civil works of Taunsa Barrage Emergency Rehabilitation Project (ICB-1) on May 10, 2005. The project duration is 36 months, however, major works are planned to be completed in first two years. The Project’s first year works started on September 01, 2005. The works under this contract were done on the right side of the Barrage where downstream sub-weir and allied structures were constructed. The downstream sub-weir would help in raising tail water level and will ensure proper dissipation of energy in periods of high flood. Right Fish Ladder structure was also remodeled and extended to allow easier movement of fish through the Barrage structure. A Silt Excluder was constructed and the DG Khan Canal Head-Regulator was rehabilitated for better strength and modernization. The Main Barrage body was also strengthened during this period and right half of the Main Barrage structure, i.e. bay 32 to bay 65, was rehabilitated. The major activities planned for the first year were successfully completed in time. The Project started its second year on September 01, 2006. During the second year, civil works on the left side upstream and downstream of the main Barrage are being done. The Sub-weir and allied structures for the left side downstream of the main Barrage will be constructed during this year. Additionally, the Guide Banks will be extended and new ones will be constructed for the Abutment and Flared Out walls. Also, the settled blocks in the downstream right half will be rehabilitated. The main Barrage bays 01 to 31 will be rehabilitated during this period. In addition to this, the mechanical and electrical (E&M) portion of rehabilitation of main Barrage and Under Sluice gates is also in progress. As of March 15, 2007, the Project’s Civil works (ICB-01) portion is lagging from its plan for the second year by 45% (SPI = 0.547). Although the progress delay has been somewhat covered during this period as compared to the previous report (SPI = 0.512 as of February 19, 2007), still there is a lot of work remaining to be completed during the TAUNSA BARRAGE EMERGENCY REHABILITATION AND MODERNIZATION PROJECT

Ali Ajaz 19 second year of the project (2006 – 2007). Breakdown of Batching Plant No. 2 (100 cum capacity) for 10 days during March 2007 and consistent breakdown of one of the two Sheet Piling Hammers is contributing to the delay in the progress. Current trend indicates that the Main Barrage Rehabilitation Works will be successfully completed before start of the flood season (July 2007), however some portion of Sub-Weir Construction might be delayed to the next working season (October 2007 onwards) due to the current delay and slow pace of the work. ICB-02 and JICA Contractors are working on the relevant E&M works and are making satisfactory progress in their respective areas. Services by Directorate General Monitoring & Evaluation (DGM&E): DGM&E has contributed to the Taunsa Barrage Emergency Rehabilitation Project in a number of ways: A. Facilitation in Creation of Project Management Office (PMO) for Barrages B. Preparation of Contract Documents (Drafting of Clause SP-11) The Directorate General of Monitoring & Evaluation has helped in the preparation of the Contract Documents by drafting the Clause SP-11 of the Contract Documents. This clause was approved by the World Bank without any changes to it. Clause SP-11 is the project control clause which enumerates as to how the project will be planned and the progress monitored. This Project Control Clause can be used in other ICB contracts of the Punjab Government. C. Preparation of Project Plan As per clause 11 of Special Provisions of the Contract Documents, the Contractor has to submit a detailed construction schedule within 28 days starting from the Letter of Acceptance. In order to facilitate stakeholders of the project, the Directorate General of Monitoring & Evaluation, in consultation with the Project Management Consultant, has prepared a detailed project plan for the Taunsa Barrage Emergency Rehabilitation Project. The project plan document was submitted by the DGM&E to the Secretary I&P Department on 17th May, 2005. The project plan was developed using the available project information from; PC-1 Document, Engineer Estimate, Contractor's bid, Contractor's method statement, Contractor's initial project plan, Historical data from Irrigation Department, Books/Material related to Irrigation Engineering and Discussions with the Client and the Consultant. The plan prepared by the DGM&E will help parties involved in the project to understand the underlying scope, constraints, problems, risks, assumptions and other aspects of the project while finalizing the project plan submitted by the Contractor. D. Vetting of the Contractors Project Plan The Contractor submitted his construction schedule on 11th May, 2005. After reviewing the plan of the Contractor, comments of the DGM&E were conveyed on 21st May, 2005. It was observed that the schedule submitted by the Contractor can not be termed as a Baseline Construction Schedule as the Contractor failed to break-up any further the Tender schedule already submitted by him meaning there by that his understanding of the project is pretty much the same as was developed by him during his bid preparation stage. TAUNSA BARRAGE EMERGENCY REHABILITATION AND MODERNIZATION PROJECT

Ali Ajaz 20 It was suggested that regular meetings be conducted between the PMO for Barrages, Punjab Barrages Consultants, the Contractor and the DGM&E, P&D Department for Project Plan development and its finalization. It was iterated that the services of the DGM&E may be utilized to facilitate the PMO for Barrages, Punjab Barrages Consultants and the Contractor for development of construction schedule acceptable to all the stake holders. E. Project Status Reports In order to apprise the I&P Department as well as the P&D Board of the developments of the project, the following project status reports have been generated by the DGM&E from time to time: SN Project Status Report No. Issue Date Data of Report 1 TBRP-023 January 19, 2007 January 15, 2007 2 TBRP-024 February 28, 2007 February 19, 2007 3 TBRP-025 March 20, 2007 March 15, 2007 Quality Assurance and Control: THE ISO 9000 DEFINITION IS, TOTLITY OF FEATURE AND CHARACTERISTICS OF A PRODUCT OR SERVICE THAT BEARS ON ITS ABILITY TO SATISFY STATED OR IMPLIED NEEDS. Project Quality Management System:             

Organization Resources Quality Plan and Management Procedures Specifications Design Control Construction Completion Monitoring, Inspection and Testing Periodical Reports Inspection, Measuring and Test Equipment Non Conformance Reports and Actions Quality Record Control Internal Quality Audits Personnel Training and Management Statistical Techniques

TAUNSA BARRAGE EMERGENCY REHABILITATION AND MODERNIZATION PROJECT

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Source Approvals Steel Reinforcement       

ASTM-615-81(a) Diameter & Weight X-sectional Area Ultimate strength Percentage elongation Bend test Regular quality tests are conducted in accordance with Contract Provision on samples collected from stock at site

Approved sources – Fazal and Pak Steels Steel Sheet Piles  

Mill Test Certificate from M/s ARCELOR RPS including Heat Analysis, Tensile Tests etc After delivery of sheet piles at site, samples got tested for tensile strength and percentage elongation from Pakistan Standard Quality Control Authority, Lahore Pakistan

CEMENT •

Approved sources    

Askari Cement Maple Leaf DG Khan Cement Javedan Cement

Quality Assessment •

References and Quality Assurance (QA) Standards     

Standard References Contract References Quality System References Definitions and Abbreviations Frequency of Testing for Construction Material o Testing Frequency For Soils o Testing Frequency For Cement

TAUNSA BARRAGE EMERGENCY REHABILITATION AND MODERNIZATION PROJECT

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•

Testing Frequency For Steel Reinforcement Testing Frequency For Fine Aggregate Testing Frequency For Coarse Aggregate Testing Frequency For Concrete Testing Frequency For Admixtures

Quality Control (QC) Data       

Summary of Quality Tests Weather Data Production of Concrete Tests Conducted on Fine Aggregate Tests Conducted on Coarse Aggregate Tests Conducted on Concrete Tests Results Conducted on Soil for Earthwork Excavation and Filling

Summary of Tests Conducted On Construction Materials:

Laboratory Tests Sr. No. 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 1 2 3 4

Tests

No. of Tests Performed (This month) 46 22 23 23 12

Gradation of Coarse Aggregate Gradation of Fine Aggregate Unit Weight of Coarse Aggregate Unit Weight of Fine Aggregate Specific Gravity of Coarse Aggregate Specific Gravity of Fine Aggregate 15 Sand Equivalent 14 Los Angles Abrasion 10 Absorption of Coarse Aggregate 12 Absorption of Fine Aggregate 15 Soundness of Coarse Aggregate 2 Soundness of Fine Aggregate 2 Cylinder Testing 426 Cylinder Casting 510 Compressive Strength of Bricks 4 Atterburg limits 11 Field Tests Temperature 85 Slump of Concrete 85 Cylinder Moulding 510 Field Density Tests 101

No. of Tests Performed (To date) 1046 494 595 362 449

No. of Tests Required 872 425 431 237 406

260 274 330 449 260 46 51 17,736 17,874 184 40

209 233 212 406 209 68 48 17,193 17,418 As per requirement

2979 2979 18210 949

2903 2902 17754 As per requirement

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Weather Data (January-2006):

Discharge Record Gauge (ft) Date Remarks Discharge (Cfs) o o Max (C ) Min (C ) U/S D/S U/S D/S 1 1-Jan-2006 22 12 Cloudy 77 18140 18140 430 419 2 2-Jan-2006 21 12 Cloudy 87 16373 16373 430 419.7 3 3-Jan-2006 22 8 Cloudy 80 15742 15742 430.2 419.7 4 4-Jan-2006 20 7 Cloudy 86 16444 16444 429.9 420.1 5 5-Jan-2006 22 8 Sunny 86 15778 15778 429.9 420.1 IRRIGATION AND POWER DEPARTMENT GOVT. OF PUNJAB PBC 6 6-Jan-2006 23 6Taunsa Barrage Sunny Emergency 74 Rehabilitation 15778 15778 429.9 420.1 And Modernization Project 7 7-Jan-2006 22 5 Status Sunnyof Compressive 68 15315 Strength 15315 429.8 420.3 Comulative Test Results (Class-A) IRRIGATION AND POWER DEPARTMENT GOVT. OF PUNJAB PBC 8 8-Jan-2006 24 4Taunsa Barrage Cloudy/DustyEmergency 14863 0714863 429.8 420 After 775Days AFTER DAYS Rehabilitation And Modernization Project 9 9-Jan-2006 23 8 Status Cloudyof Compressive 74 17233 Strength 17233 429.8 420.1 Comulative Test Results (Class-B) 10 10-Jan-2006 23 8 Cloudy AFTER 74 07 DAYS 17233 17233 430.2 420.1 11 11-Jan-2006 21 8 Sunny 76 17474 17474 430.2 420.1 12 12-Jan-2006 22 9 Sunny 75 1747 17474 430.3 420.1 13 13-Jan-2006 25 8 Cloudy 81 17474 17474 430.3 420.1 14 14-Jan-2006 23 9 Cloudy 82 17233 17233 430.3 420.1 Lab. # 15 15-Jan-2006 21 11 Sunny 74 16512Test 16512 430.2 Strength) 420.1 (Achieved Average Achieved Average StrengthAchieved Strength 7Days7Days (Achieved Strength) Req. Str. Req. Str. 16 16-Jan-2006 19 11 Cloudy 87 16512 16512 430.1 420.1 AFTER 28 DAYS # 17 17-Jan-2006 21 12 Cloudy 82 Lab. 16512Test 16512 430.1 420.1 180% Average Achieved Strength % 07 Days Achieved Strength % Req. Str.% 160% 18 18-Jan-2006 18 8 Sunny/Dusty 81 16512 16512 430.1 420.1 140% AFTER 120% 19 19-Jan-2006 13 9 Sunny/Dusty 85 1651228 DAYS 16512 430.1 420.1 100% 2080% 20-Jan-2006 12 8 Sunny 82 16512 16512 430.1 420.1 2160% 21-Jan-2006 20 12 Cloudy 78 16512 16512 430.1 420.1 40% 20% 220% 22-Jan-2006 23 9 Sunny 76 16997 16997 430.2 420.1 10 20 110 120 130 23 0 23-Jan-2006 2430 4011 50 60 Sunny 70 8077 9016976100 16976 430.35 420.2 140 150 160 170 180 Lab Test NO. 24 24-Jan-2006 25 10 Sunny 81 16976 16976 430.35 420.2 28 Days (Achieved Strength) Req.Str. Average Achieved Strength 28 Days (Achieved Strength) Req.Str. 25 25-Jan-2006 24 10 Sunny 81 18222 Average 18222 Achieved 430.4 Strength 420.3 26 26-Jan-2006 25 10 Sunny 81 18222 18222 430.4 420.3 28 Days Achieved Strength % Req.Str. % 27 27-Jan-2006 26 10 Sunny 81 18222 18222 430.4 420.3 Average achieved Strength % 28 28-Jan-2006 27 12 Sunny 76 18222 18222 430.4 420.3 29 29-Jan-2006 23 12 Sunny 77 18222 18222 430.4 420.3 30 30-Jan-2006 25 13 Sunny 78 18222 18222 430.4 420.3 31 31-Jan-2006 24 12 Sunny 76 18466 18466 430.45 420.4 Avg. Temperature

Humidity Weather Condition %

Compressive Strength %

140% 140% 130% 120% 120% 110% 100% 100% 180% 90% 80% 170% 80% 160% 70% 60% 150% 60% 140% 130% 40% 50% 120% 40% 110% 20% 30% 100% 90% 20% 0% 80% 10% 70% 20 30 40 0% 60% 50% 0 5 10 15 20 25 30 40% 30% 20% 10% 0% 0 10 20 30

Compressive Strength %

CompressiveCompressive Strength % Strength %

Compressive StrengthStrength % Compressive %

Sr. No.

170% 160% 150% 140% 130% 120% 200% 110% 190% 100% 180% 90% 170% 80% 160% 150% 70% 140% 60% 130% 50% 120% 40% 110% 30% 100% 20% 90% 80% 10% 70% 0% 60% 50% 0 40% 30% 20% 10% 0% 0

5

5

10

10

15

15

20

50 35

60

40

40

20

25

45

70

50

50

25

30

55

60

30

35

80

60

90

70

70

35

40

65

45

75

80

40

50

100

80

85

90

45

55

90

100

50

60

110

110

55

65

120

130

140

150

160

170

180

190

200

210

95 Lab 100 Test 105 NO. 110 115 120 125 130 135 140 145 150 155 160 165 170 175 180 185 190 195 200 205

120

130

60 65 Lab. TEST No.

70 75 80 Lab. TEST No.

140

70

85

150

75

90

95

80

100

160

85

105

170

180

90

110

95

115

120

190

100

125

TAUNSA BARRAGE EMERGENCY REHABILITATION AND MODERNIZATION PROJECT

200

105

130

210

220

190

110

135

140

115

145

230

200 120

150

Ali Ajaz

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Management & Economical Review:

Planned Value (%) Achieved Value (%)

100.00

60.00 40.00 20.00

9- GE

8-F.L

7-HR

6-D.C.

5-S.E.

4-D/S EB

3-G.B.

2-S.W.

0.00 1-G.I.

Weighted %

80.00

Bill Nos.

TAUNSA BARRAGE EMERGENCY REHABILITATION AND MODERNIZATION PROJECT

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CONSTRAINTS for ICB – 01: 1. Delay in approval of Variation Orders & works Delay in approval of Variation Orders & works against which have been completed, is resulting in crisis in the financial Management of the Works

Sr.#

Job Description

VO Amount

Job Duration

1

Telephone Exchange Building

4,716,889

Aug-05 ~ Feb-06

2

Reduced Closure Period

132,443,393

Dec-06 ~ Feb-07

3

Additional Works for the Safety of the Barrage

17,053,073

Apr-06 ~ May-06

4

Additional Works for Rehabilitation of Settled Blocks at Right Pocket

28,193,390

Jan-07 ~ Feb-07

5

Care and Handling of Water (Cofferdam and Unwatering/Dewatering) at Right Pocket.

109,277,014

Dec-06 ~ Feb-07

6

Right Guide Bank Compacted Sand Filling

4,131,659

Dec-05 ~ Feb-07

7

Additional Sand Filling underneath Sub Weir (L/S) Stage 02

80,309,320

Oct-06 ~ Nov-06

8

Additional Works for Rehabilitation of Existing Left Fish Ladder.

14,376,942

Mar-07 ~ Apr-07

Total

390,501,680

2. Delay in Formation of DRB: The disputed items of Claims and the Variation Orders pertaining to completed works are pending due to non formation of DRB till to date. The disputed sum is Rs. 1,773 M (approx.). This delay is resulting in financial crisis for the Contractor.

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Taunsa Barrage Emergency and Rehabilitation and Modernization Project Civil Works-ICB Contract 01 Overall Progress Summary (As of May 31, 2007) Provisions Items of Work/BOQ Bills 1-General Items 2-Subsidiary Weir 3-Guide Banks 4- Repair Works for Existing Barrage 5- Silt Excluder in U/S Right Pocket 6- Excavation of Diversion Channel 7- Remodeling of DGK Canal H/R 8- Remodeling of Fish Ladders 9- Gate Equipment for Subsidiary Weir Total

Payment to the Contractor /b

1,364,104,653 2,587,148,910 159,836,691

Planned Progress 1,278,330,621 2,587,148,910 155,499,274

Actual Progress /a 1,147,942,800 2,634,413,549 72,992,588

601,951,698

601,951,698

403,650,000

403,650,000

36,289,782

36,289,782

37,825,160

37,825,160

3,864,000

3,864,000

646,877

646,877

6,206,297

6,206,297

5,539,581

5,539,581

25,954,505

25,954,505

14,950,409

14,950,409

60,869,303

60,869,303

1,646,129

29,714

4,846,225,839

4,756,114,390

4,319,607,094

4,194,361,035

98.14%

89.13%

86.55%

253,766,361

253,766,361

253,766,361

BOQ

%age of Contract Price 10- Variation Orders

Progress

-

1,147,942,800 2,532,399,089 51,377,404

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Glossary: WEIR- The weir is the solid obstruction put across the river to raise water into the canal BARRAGE- The function of barrage is similar to that of weir but heading of water is effected by the gates alone DIVIDE WALL- A divide wall is an embankment protected by concrete block. it is build at right angle to the axis of the weir separating the weir and under sluice UNDER SLUICE- The under sluice maintain a deep channel in front of the head regulator and dispose off heavy silt and a part of food discharge on the d/s side of the barrage SILT EXCLUDER- Silt excluder is a device by which silt is excluded from water entering the canal. It is constructed in the bed in front of head regulator COFFER DAM- A cofferdam is an enclosure within a water environment constructed to allow water to be displaced by air for the purpose of creating a dry work environment. FISH LADDER- It is constructed along the divide wall. Itis a device designed to allow fish to negotiate the artificial barrier in either direction. In the fish ladder the optimum velocity is 6 to 8 m/sec. UNIT RATE CONTRACT- Unit rate contract types are an agreed to rate for the performance of specified work. Monetary exchange takes place when work is performed and is directly proportional to the volume and range of work. These types of contract are most prevalent in the building industry. DESIGN BID BUILD- Also known as Design-tender, is a project delivery method in which the agency or owner contracts with separate entities for each the design and construction of a project. ICB- International Competitive bidding PC-1- Preliminary Construction DRB- Design Review Board

TAUNSA BARRAGE EMERGENCY REHABILITATION AND MODERNIZATION PROJECT

Ali Ajaz References:

28



DESCON Engineering Limited www.descon.com



World Bank www.worldbank.org.pk



National Development Consultants www.ndcpak.com



Directorate General Monitoring & Evaluation, P&D Department, Govt. of Punjab www.pmupunjab.gov.pk

TAUNSA BARRAGE EMERGENCY REHABILITATION AND MODERNIZATION PROJECT