Questioning the Decentralization System in Managing Public Sector Integrity in Indonesia I Made Bram Sarjana The Government of Badung Regency, Bali Presented on EROPA Conference 2018 in Nusa Dua, Bali, Indonesia
Background • Trust is an essen+al element for public sector integrity • Without trust there will be no par+cipa+on, without par+cipa+on there will be no development • Public trust shall grow when government works: public services running well, responsive, easy to access, effec+ve, and accountable. • An interes+ng fact on trust was revealed by Transparency Interna+onal : most of the people do not trust the government.
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• Transparency Interna+onal through their TwiCer status in 29 June 2018 at 2:00 AM • hCps://twiCer.com/ an+corrup+on/status/ 1012621747600941057 3
• In Indonesia, public trust is also an important issue • The abundance of public distrust has even driven the people movement for change in Indonesia: the change of regime • Reforma+on movement reached its peak in 1998, by the stepping down of President Soeharto • The spirit of reforma+on movement was to create a trustworthy government and democra+c system • A new system was then assembled and prepared: decentralizaJon, believed and expected to answer the need for democra+za+on, good governance, economic and poli+cal stability 4
Indonesia before decentraliza6on • Before decentraliza+on everything was about chain of command, from central government to local, from president to the people (very strong state control over people) • A very strong state however, brings nega+ve side: lack of check and balances mechanism, monopolis+c governance, tends to corrupt • Under such system transparency, accountability and integrity as basic principles of public administra+on (Armstrong, 2005) were not able to be established. • Decentraliza+on then was chosen as a new path for a reformed Indonesia, star+ng in 1999 5
Theories of decentraliza6on • General defini+ons: transfer of authority and money from na+onal to sub na+onal level; consists of administraJve, poliJcal, and fiscal decentraliza+on • Decentraliza+on includes the transfer the responsibility star+ng from planning stage, execu+on, and accumula+on of financial resource, flowing from naJonal into lower level (Rondinelli in Tambulasi & Kayuni, 2007) • An instrument to manage policy governance with bigger authoriJes distributed to local governments in order to make governance and development becomes more effecJve and efficient (Kumolo, et. al., 2017). 6
Why decentraliza6on? • Decentraliza+on is essenJal to implement good governance principles (Green, 2005; Bevir, 2009) • Decentraliza+on associated with the process of democraJzaJon and empowerment in developing countries (Bardhan & Mokherjee, 2006) • An instrument to build trust between central and local government, increases government’s accountability, efficiency, and becomes closer to the people (Crook, 2003)
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Precondi6ons for an effec6ve decentraliza6on • World Bank (Green, 2005): • • • • •
ensuring local financial resources match the ability to provide local public services local community should be aware of the cost of services community should be able to express their desires in a meaningful way transparency and accountability of local government ac+vi+es the legal and ins+tu+onal system should match the poli+cal objec+ves
• Bevir (2009):
• the func+oning of local democracy which make local government legi+mate • fiscal autonomy that meet local needs • competent local governments’ officials
• (Keban, 1999):
• capacity building should be improved at local level, enabling them to formulate and implement policies correctly 8
Indonesia Under Decentraliza6on
• Decentraliza+on was not long and well planned before implemented • During the first phase there was a euphoria of decentraliza+ons • Poli+cal elites proposed the crea+on of federal states • Chain of command were shortened; head of local governments become “small kings”
• Decentraliza+on in some degrees have been introduced during the Netherlands and Japan occupancy; but only to serve the interests of the colonial authority • In the independence era un+l Soeharto era; decentraliza+on was to consolidate the layers of government 9
• Afer reforma+on movement (1998), some new laws were set up to implement poli+cal, administra+ve and fiscal decentraliza+on • The first package was Law Number 22 Year 1999 on regional autonomy and Law Number 25 Year 1999 on Financial Balance Between Center and Local Government. • In 2004, Law Number 22 Year 1999 on regional autonomy was changed by Law Number 32 Year 2004, and recently changed by Law Number 23 Year 2014. • Following the improvement of law concerning poli+cal decentraliza+on, Law Number 25 Year 1999 on Fiscal Balance Between Central and Local Government also changed by Law Number 33 Year 2004 Fiscal Balance Between Central and Local Government 10
• Decentraliza+on occurring since 1999 un+l present day in Indonesia can be considered as a revolu+onary one • Under this new system, people use their rights to build the government
• directly vote their member of house of representa+ves at local and center level, their senator to represent their indigenous rights, vote for the governor, vote for the head of regency or mayor, and also vote for the president.
• Local governments have authori+es to develop their economic poten+al • Decentraliza+on also open opportunity for the forma+on of new autonomous governments at provincial and regency level • Since the star+ng of decentraliza+on in 1999 un+l December 2017 there are 34 Province, 416 regencies and 98 ci+es in Indonesia 11
Number Regencies in Every Province, 2013-‐2017 Province (1)
Aceh North Sumatera West Sumatera Riau Jambi South Sumatera Bengkulu Lampung Kepulauan Bangka Belitung Kepulauan Riau DKI Jakarta Jawa Barat Jawa Tengah DI Yogyakarta Jawa Jmur Banten Bali West Nusa Tenggara East Nusa Tenggara West Kalimantan Central Kalimantan South Kalimantan East Kalimantan North Kalimantan North Sulawesi Central Sulawesi South Sulawesi South East Sulawesi Gorontalo Sulawesi Barat Maluku North Maluku West Papua Papua Indonesia
2013 (2) 18 25 12 10 9 13 9 13 6 5 1 18 29 4 29 4 8 8 21 12 13 11 7 4 11 12 21 12 5 6 9 8 12 28 413
2014 (3) 18 25 12 10 9 13 9 13 6 5 1 18 29 4 29 4 8 8 21 12 13 11 7 4 11 12 21 15 5 6 9 8 12 28 416
2015 (4) 18 25 12 10 9 13 9 13 6 5 1 18 29 4 29 4 8 8 21 12 13 11 7 4 11 12 21 15 5 6 9 8 12 28 416
2016 (5) 18 25 12 10 9 13 9 13 6 5 1 18 29 4 29 4 8 8 21 12 13 11 7 4 11 12 21 15 5 6 9 8 12 28 416
2017 (6) 18 25 12 10 9 13 9 13 6 5 1 18 29 4 29 4 8 8 21 12 13 11 7 4 11 12 21 15 5 6 9 8 12 28 416
Source: Sta+s+cs Indonesia 12
• A wide power and authori+es given to local governments should be able to boost the development of regions in Indonesia and the na+on. • Unfortunately, study shows that the crea+on of these new autonomous regions have not fulfill the desire to improve regional development, economic disparity among regions remains high. • The decentraliza+on of power and finance to local governments do not necessarily improve the regional economic development. • Study by Wahyuntari and Pujia+ (2016) explains during 2009 to 2013, economic disparity in Central Java Province was the second highest afer DKI Jakarta Province, among other provinces in Java Island 13
Economic Growth and Williamson Index Among Province in Java Island in 2009-‐2003
Province
Regional GDP (%)
Rank
Williamson Index
Rank
DKI Jakarta
6,18
2
0,89
1
East Java
5,85
3
0,14
3
Central Java
5,83
5
0,21
2
Jogjakarta Special Region
5,04
6
0,05
5
East Java
6,55
1
0,02
6
Banten
5,84
4
0,10
4
Source: Wahyuntari and Pujia+ (2016)
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Challenges to Integrity Under Decentraliza6on
• New leaders who were born through direct general elec+ons were expected to become beCer leaders, more responsible and accountable to their cons+tuent. • The rise of these new local authori+es, formed through direct elec+ons somehow does not necessarily correlate with the improvement in public services and public sector integrity. • The problem is the recruitment mechanism for the candidate of head of local governments or house of representa+ves. • These new poli+cal elites are pragma+sts and short term oriented, with the goal only to win the next general elec+on. 15
• Poli+cal recruitment that spends a lot of moneys resulted in the existence of groups of governors, head of local governments, member of house of representa+ves who have invested a lot of moneys to win the elec+on. • Some who are successfully take the office, use their power to regain the moneys they have spent or if possible, even to gain profit. • Corrup+ve behavior is then decentralized and spreaded from central to local
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• The Corrup+on Eradica+on Commission Annual Report 2016 reported that poli+cal actors involved in 32% of corrup+on cases (2004 -‐2016) • The Corrup+on Eradica+on Commission Annual Report 2017 reported that the commission has caught 144 members of house of representa+ve at central and local level, 18 governors, 71 head of regencies and mayors, and 175 high level bureaucrats were caught for corrup+on cases (2004-‐2017). • Recently, 40 members of local house of representa+ve of Malang District were caught by The Corrup+on Eradica+on Commission for corrup+on. • Corrup+on cases were found in public goods and services procurements, public budget execu+on, licensing, fees and money laundering. 17
• Even common ci+zen cannot escape from the corrup+ve behaviors • in private sectors, the +ght compe++on in business environment makes businessmen tend to pay bribes to head of local governments of head of agencies in order to win goods and services procurements • Other corrup+ons cases also involving non-‐governmental organiza+on or societal organiza+ons ac+vists by ac+ng as if they are pressure groups.
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Promising Trends Under Decentraliza6on
• Decentraliza+on rise awareness for compe++on among local governments in developing their region • S+mulates local governments to innovate many kinds innova+on of public services delivery in accordance to their poten+als and compe++ve advantages. • State Employment Agency, will block civil servants’ employee iden+fica+on number, verdict by court decision with permanent legal force for corrup+on. The blocking is expected to deter and prevent corrup+on among civil servants in Indonesia. 19
Conclusions • Decentraliza+on have not sa+sfactorily resulted in boos+ng the development because it was implemented in a very limited +me. • Decentraliza+on was forced and served only as an instrument to answer student reforma+on movement, poli+cal and economic crisis and threat of disintegra+on in 1998. • Precondi+ons for a successful implementa+on of decentraliza+on; a good governance principles need to be developed further. • Ci+zens, private sectors and civil society organiza+on should also push public sector integrity as important agenda. They should take an ac+ve part in shaping reformed governance system under good governance principles. 20