Philosophy Essay 1

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Jeïner Andræs Ramirez Buckhardt Philosophy 106-51 04 October 2009 Suicide and Active Euthanasia: A Defence Suicide is difficult to explore ethically because it often connotes frightening ideas: mutilation, intoxication, asphyxiation; this intrusive imagery often transforms any reasonable examination of suicide into an argument of fear. Suicide need not be this severe; the extremity by which most victims go about their suicides results from a lack of accessible alternatives: a woman may shoot herself in the head because a firearm is the only device available to her. It begs the question: should medical establishments be encouraged to perform active euthanasia by request of their patients, providing humane alternatives to an act that may result in horrifying transgressions against others and themselves? But would making euthanasia1 more medically correct in turn present the solution more accessible to the general population, ignoring preventive therapeutic programmes and by that token multiply the suicide casualties? Further, suppose that a figure like Mother Teresa would have submitted herself to euthanasia in response to some political statement, would she be followed? If it is susceptible to bandwagon, then some corporations may effectively advertise, compete and capitalise on euthanasia. If this seems unethical, then let us suppose the opposite: should such individuals be instead persuaded to rely not on their immediate desires but on cultural principles or religious faiths to coerce them into living? That is, should we devise a polarity in society that defines suicide negatively and therefore forbidden, unlawful and punishable? But then, should individuals be imprisoned for attempting suicide and their doctors for assisting it? Should we force individuals to exist without alternative, to suffer without remedy and to find only partial comforts in medicines and the symbols imagined by their countries? Consider the dying veteran who is told to exist merely to 1 ‘Euthanasia’ meaning active euthanasia performed to assist planned suicide.

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symbolise a celebrated act and supplied sedatives to assist him –if living presents for him great misery, is assisting him with sedatives worse than assisting him with suicide? Euthanasia presents an inconclusive problem in ethics. In this paper, I shall expose the apparent flaws in euthanasia as observed from normative ethics; then I shall explore an alternative theory by which I illustrate how euthanasia can be applied constructively and serve as a suitable next step in the ladder of social evolution. There are two prominent arguments against euthanasia in normative ethics. The first concerns the social collective, the second addresses the individual. In the first argument, the person being euthanatised (henceforth, ‘the individual’) is a figure of certain responsibility: she is assumed the head of a household in which only she has the ability to work; the individual finds herself helplessly in debt and disgusted by the events that have placed her in the immediate circumstances. She considers suicide and consults a doctor who will perform euthanasia before she spirals into further depression and possibly harm her family and friends. The argument asks: ‘is this doctor morally justified in assisting her with suicide, or should he immediately order her institutionalised and medicated?’ This argument supposes that this woman is no one in particular and that whatever is concluded of her should be a categorical imperative to be observed by all members of that population. The argument then concludes that suicide should be universally forbidden because if every individual were to find herself in a similar situation, all would have themselves euthanatised, leaving behind an incapacitated society that could not work and would inevitably succumb to extinction. Such individuals, by this argument, should consider primarily the necessities of their dependants and rely firmly on some devised code of ethics from which common notions may be extracted and, by formed bureaucracy, imposed. Medical conventions would be further derived, and medicines would be developed to suppress feelings of depression; the argument then concludes that this doctor is morally incorrect in euthanatising her and that he

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should order her corrected at an institution that modifies that particular mental state, or, in his implied vocabulary, illness. The second argument presumes a suffering man incapable of making decisions. The argument asks whether it is more ethically correct to euthanatise him or to administer at the expense of a more profitable investment (like funding scholarships for potential doctorate students) all the resources available in that society in spite of its ultimate futility: the man will die regardless. This argument appeals to moral realism at varying intensities; at its most intense: moral absolutism: killing is wrong, therefore euthanasia is wrong because euthanasia causes death, and all should be done to save him, because saving individuals regardless of outcome is morally correct; moral objectivism: euthanasia might be acceptable in some cases, but every man is equal as well, so if this man cannot decide that he should like to be euthanatised, there is no reason why someone should decide for him, and since there is a moral truth in altruism, he should be assisted to the available extend; at its subtlest: moral nihilism: killing someone is neither right nor wrong, so euthanasia is not wrong, but it cannot be justified either. This argument refutes euthanasia at every level; even at its subtlest it manages to declare the act morally unjustifiable. These constitute the two independent normative structures against euthanasia: one, S, considering the social welfare (utilitarianism, Kantianism, universal ethical egoism) and the other, M, considering the individual through varying degrees of moral realism (absolutism, objectivism, nihilism). Combined, they form a mechanism SM2 capable of foiling any defence for euthanasia in the ethical domain as follows: it renders euthanasia unjustifiable by M and unbeneficial through S: by utilitarianism, S argues that a categorical imperative about assisted-suicide would render it morally acceptable (and therefore proper) for all men to be euthanatised should these meet depressing circumstances and that, given that suicide casualties may skyrocket due to ease-of-access and bandwagon, would potentially harm the population, so 2 Note that to avoid future redundancy, italicised letters like S, M and SM have been devised as placeholders for their respective ideas.

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by utilitarianism, S reasons that suicide and any system that assists it is negative. This makes the conclusion seem inevitable: suicide is harmful to society (S) and euthanasia is immoral (M). At first we might conceive of numerous counterarguments; a simple observation in subjectivism appears to extinguish the alleged beast contrived above: ‘there are no correct morals; therefore, any moral evaluations made by SM could not be possibly correct’. Subjectivism results from the single assumption that everything is subjective; by virtue of this premise, an advocate of SM points out that although subjectivism reveals their ethical standpoint on euthanasia impotent against all the possible ethical frames of reference, subjectivism does not itself apply to the entire ethical realm because it limits itself as follows: if p is an ethical truth belonging to the set of all ethical truths E, then p is ethically true; if one assumes also that subjectivism is true, then subjectivism must be a member of the set E. Since p and subjectivism are both subsets of E, then it is acceptable to suppose that p = subjectivism. Since subjectivism states that all ethical truths are subjective, then ‘p is subjective’; however, since p = subjectivism, then ‘subjectivism is subjective’. The non-subjectivist adds that since subjectivism is subjective, it is true for only the portion of E that accepts subjectivism (relative to itself), and that beyond it must exist a region of E that comprises non-relative, absolute truths that do not accept subjectivism and that are necessarily inaccessible to any subjective treatise. SM therefore liberates itself from subjectivism by pointing out its own objective nature. The subjectivist defence against SM, thus, fails. In consequentialist moral theory, we attempt two arguments in utilitarianism; the first concerns active euthanasia: if in a population of i individuals, h were happy and m were miserable, then the population would be (i-m)/i per cent happy.3 Since the goal of utilitarianism is to render the population one-hundred per cent happy, we strive to make the fraction (i-m)/i

3 Since i = h+ m, then h = i-m; since h/i represents the per cent of happy individuals in the population, then so does (i-m)/i

(since i-m = h).

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produce the number 1.4 We notice that if m=0, then (i-m)/i becomes (i-0)/i which equals (i)/i which is 1.5 Therefore, if we eliminate all or most of the agonising individuals from the population, we would produce a happier population; and since active euthanasia abets us in this elimination, then euthanasia offers an advantage to society and therefore S has been defeated by counterexample. 6 The second argument against MS states that maintaining sickly, unproductive individuals alive wastes valuable resources that could be better distributed over the population to maximise the overall happiness; for example, a terminal cancer victim squanders thousands of dollars each month on treatments that will ultimately fail; had these dollars fed homeless kids around the world we would have happy, healthy children ready to grow into effective leaders and inventors; euthanasia would cheaply and effectively discard the hopeless individuals and direct social funding to enterprises that will yield greatest revenues. The SM categorical imperative easily thwarts the first utilitarian opposition; the categorical imperative demands certain symmetry in the design of moral matrices; men’s individual views are forced to reflect a collective morality inherited from one master shape, as if they were objects casted from a common mould. When euthanasia is proposed in any isolated example, the categorical imperative forces us to consider it over all the possible situations; it points to all men in all conditions. One can conceive of all the ethical defences for euthanasia –there have been entire books7 written about its morality and utility –but S overcomes them by one argument: if suicide holds moral for m miserable individuals, it must hold moral for everybody in that population who experiences profuse misery (by its categorical imperative); in the span of t years, over which all the individuals in such an imperfect society will experience temporary states of suffering in their

4 Since 1 = 1/1 = 100%. 5 Since anything divided by itself is always 1. 6 Recall that the S portion of MS asserts the social disadvantages of euthanasia, whilst the M portion asserts its moral violations. 7 Excellent read: D Humphry, Final exit: the practicalities of self-deliverance and assisted-suicide for the dying, Dell Publishing, New York, 2002.

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lives’ vicissitudes, a number of them may request assisted suicides, potentially enough as to endanger the workforce and function of the population. By utilitarianism, a potential threat to the entire population represents an inexcusable evil; thus, active euthanasia is refused. Our second defence concerning passive euthanasia8 remains, but quickly falls to M, which by moral realism cancels it and by moral nihilism renders it at least unjustifiable. The combined SM, then, maintains that everything that can be done should be done to prevent individuals from deciding their self-destruction; it maintains that values, gods and chemicals should be invented, imposed and controlled –all to alter how these individuals, by the cause of nature, arrive at their decisions. In a way it surrenders history to Darwin, forcing us to die when time, disease and war desire it rather than at the moment of our choosing. It takes away a human faculty, the ability to die; it imprisons, prohibiting escape. It is necessary to understand that SM is not a basic ethical element; it is not a separate school of thought like Kantianism, egoism or utilitarianism; instead, it is an architecture that builds on all of them. It represents, not a theoretical ideal, but the functioning mind of a breathing philosopher; it is something that is created by thinking about ethics. SM appears to have conquered the current ethical domain thus examined: all our previous endeavours in ethics have failed. At this point, we cannot attack SM in any way except by dismantling it and eliminating each of the individual normative tools that made it possible in the beginning; that is, we may only assert the wrongness of SM by showing that its Kantian, utilitarian and other normative foundations were each internally inconsistent.9 The only problem is that as we eliminate each of these tools, we ourselves become incapable of using them (we have nothing to lose here however, since we have failed against S by using them in the first place). Suppose that 8 Passive euthanasia as a categorical imperative would concern only individuals who die on their own due to severe medical conditions; this form of euthanasia does not directly violate S because it does not alter any statistic, but merely diminishes the interval of time before the individual perishes (which can be seen as pro-S even).

9 Like one can refute the statement x+1 = x+2 by reducing it to 1 = 2 and showing that it contains the contradictory structure x ≠ x (ie. x is not x).

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we finally manage to silence S by destroying all the normative tools disposable to the ethical philosopher10 –SM would reduce to M. M consists of a moral perspective asserted at three different intensities; the nihilistic form of M presents no problem for euthanasia, it merely implies its neutrality; the upper two intensities, do. We can think of the objective and absolute intensities of M as a singular energy, both refusing euthanasia by their shared embrace of altruism, attempting to protect the individual from himself in hindering his suicide. Altruism, then, presents euthanasia’s final opposition; M reduces to a single sentence in ethics: ‘Altruism is morally good; therefore euthanasia is morally bad’. All the normative elements disposed, our only retaliation against M must itself be an absolute that says the opposite, –M (‘counter-M’), which is a sentence reading: ‘Altruism is NOT morally good; therefore euthanasia is NOT morally bad’;11 in other words, counter-M reads: ‘Individual selfishness is morally good; therefore euthanasia is morally good’. Nothing stands between the two; as we approach the end, by counteraction they mutually annihilate: –M + M = 0. Ethical examination leaves us with nothing further to do; our last step pitted the two premises and returned nothing. If M represents a sector of society that morally opposes euthanasia, our only way of undoing their ethical opinion is by directly imposing counter-M: it would require forces of propaganda and militias, affairs beyond the world of questions and rational methods. Ethics surrenders our discussion to the blind businesses of history, ceding it to the palates of masters, their media and their militaries. A utilitarian may say that currently there is a pervasive opinion about anti-euthanasia, and that this should be the truth, because it would enhance the general well-being; but this is hypocrisy, utilitarianism relegates the separate collectives to the ruling dogma, animating oppositions, wars between the few and the many, the new and the old; this is that vendetta between the infinites, the immortals, God and Beast, altruist and egoist. Ethics is that same language where the 10 A proof showing that all the ethical (and philosophical) methods are meaningless is constructible in symbolic logic by extending on the Heisenberg Uncertainty Principle.

11 Notice that M and –M are both absolute, moral statements. Any ethical construct eventually reduces to such a statement. This is called the ethical premise of the argument.

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infinites exist, breaking the fine structures of reason that are necessary for humans to communicate effectively. As SM evades subjectivism by asserting its objectivism, we liberate ourselves from morality by asserting our complete relation to a Universe in which nothing can be known beyond the self;12 objective theories cannot apply to our condition. The immortals, therefore, are expelled. Euthanasia has become an issue of the mortals addressing that which makes us mortal. Fear is the basis of this controversy; it was said from the start. The egoist fears that death may be his end; the altruist fears that death may be the end of others. Both fear the unknown; the unknown is the truth that hasn’t been discovered. But the cosmos has nothing to reveal; where nothing can be known, nothing can be unknown; a man cannot disprove himself by yielding to the external dimensions: the truth is in him, resulting from the particular chemistry that constructs him.13 Beings from opposite extremes of the Universe are detached by an intermediate subjectivity: both engage in incompatible thinking; when juxtaposed, these contradict, like M and counter-M. But human individuals are not separated by infinity: men are linked by a common understanding stringed between them by similar biology: this is our DNA, the human limb that unites the generations. Men begin as atoms, indivisibles, feeding on the elements to assume the anatomy required for their work on Earth; they live and recreate themselves in the subsequent generation, continually recycling, by decomposition, the matter that embodies them. But matter is energy divided by a calculated number;14 an individual is an ephemeral condensation of the flowing power of the Earth. Energy cannot be created or destroyed, it can only be transferred from one object to the next; thus, man cannot die –he can only fail to recreate himself through time. If men cannot die, but convert back into energy, then what is euthanasia? Death is the 12 Refer to footnote 10: since the Heisenberg Uncertainty Principle is a property of our Universe, it prohibits the formation of absolute truths (as shown by expanding on the principle), so the Universe must be subjective.

13 It is no coincidence that psychiatric therapies often require prescribed chemicals to force patients from carrying forwards with their suicides. 14 Since e = mc2, and c = 299 792 458, then m = e/299 792 4582, where m and e are quantities of matter and energy respectively and c is the known speed of light in a vacuum.

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exchange of energy between man and the environment. Euthanasia, then, concerns the deliberate transfer of energy; euthanasia is a topic on energy efficiency. All men posses an equal energy, but some employ it more effectively than others: euthanatising the man incapable of making decisions discussed at the beginning of this paper liberates his energy and offers it an opportunity to produce something more meaningful; the efforts supplied in keeping him alive would go towards funding the research necessary to effectively cure the next case –and the man would still be there, manifested in the cure. Industries will advertise and capitalise on active euthanasia: one might visualise an advert depicting a rather unfortunate woman transforming magically into some model and an injection between them with a caption reading: ‘Euthanasia: painless, peaceful, beautiful. Because death is not the end, but only the beginning’ –or perhaps: ‘FREEDOM: don’t let the world enslave you. Every day thousands of people around the world are being euthanised. Call 1800.FREEDOM’. And the men to call that number are the same who aspire to own diamonds: the superficial society that has always been enslaved by corporations; the ones with no fixed passion, led from one fashion to the next, one lie after another; these are the consumers, working for money and spending it to fuel tobacco, drugs and the unregulated industries, thus ruining the idea of capitalism. The consumer wastes energy: he contributes nothing. But he cannot be eliminated by force: doing so would spark great wars and this is inefficient: this is what results from totalitarian regimes; men cannot be suppressed by men because they possess corresponding energies. Euthanasia is the only valid form of murder: it skips the chase, presenting predator and prey with a common solution: the prey preys on himself –his death occurs, not because the predator imposed that state upon him, but because his current condition seems unsatisfactory and unproductive, and for this reason alone he dies, not to die, but to contribute his raw materials to the cycle of life. It is efficient to find life and death indistinguishable but by the explicit function they perform: death transfers energy to Earth; life converts this power into art. The suicide dies

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an altruist, sacrificing his own energy for other use. The creator lives an egoist, orchestrating the available materials to pleasure his imagination. Their combined function optimises civilisation, leaving finer creations for posterity. Euthanasia is a tool, designed as any other tool: for energy manipulation. We have concluded this because we ventured beyond ethics, understanding that any moral framework constructible is delimited by its position: soldiers from opposite nations may inherit differing virtues, but both can stand united in calculating numbers by appealing to their common mathematics: we are not as different as we think. Euthanasia can be measured. We have discovered that its advantage far outweighs its disadvantage, and by this measure alone we base our verdict: euthanasia is correct. □