Reseña De La Gènese Et Le Trace - Paola Marrati.pdf

Husserl Studies 16: 77–81, 1999. © 1999 Kluwer Academic Publishers. Printed in the Netherlands.

77

Book Review Paola Marrati-Guénon, La genèse et la trace. Derrida lecteur de Husserl et Heidegger. Dordrecht: Kluwer Academic Publishers, 1998. Phaenomenologica 146, 244 pp., $100. Just as the phenomenological reduction makes Husserl great and just as the ontological difference makes Heidegger great, contamination makes Derrida great. It is well known that Derrida first developed this idea systematically in his 1967 study of Husserl, La voix et le phénomène. Until, however, Paola Marrati-Guénon’s excellent book, no one had ever traced the development of the idea of contamination comprehensively through Derrida’s corpus on Husserl. Indeed, because she also puts Derrida’s Husserl reading alongside Derrida’s somewhat later reading of Heidegger, La genèse et al trace is the best book to date on Derrida’s interpretation of Husserl. Unlike so many of the essays and books written over the last thirty years, La genèse et al trace falls neither into the trap of dismissing Husserl’s through as the last version of the metaphysics of presence nor into the trap of trivializing Derrida’s scholarship in the light of the Husserliana. Marrati-Guénon is sensitive to the subtleties of both Derrida’s thought and that of Husserl. In fact, I think that Marrati-Guénon’s greatest achievement is that she sheds a lot of light on the most obscure passages in Derrida’s early thinking: for instance, not only Derrida’s comment on the transcendental sense of death in section seven of The Introduction to the Origin of Geometry (p. 48), but also his comment in the seventh chapter of La voix et le phénomène about infinite différance being finite (pp. 97–98). Marrati-Guénon herself, however, sees the principal contribution of her book to lie in the fact that she orients her investigation from Derrida’s very clearly (1953–54) Le problème de la genèse dans la philosophie de Husserl. According to Marrati-Guénon, in Derrida’s first Husserl book we see Derrida following the guiding thread of the problem of genesis through Husserl’s development; what is important for Derrida in Husserl’s development is that Husserl never abandons his starting point in a geneticism (psychologism), even when he turns to a structuralism (transcendentalism). As Marrati-Guénon puts it, “C’est la question de la genèse du transcendental, et de son échec, qui aura donné à penser à Derrida cette ‘contamination’ irréductible qui est au coeur de son travail” (p. 6, Marrati-Guénon’s emphasis). Specifically, she stresses that the problem of genesis for Derrida discloses a tension between “origin and becoming” (p. 11). Every genesis

78 refers to an absolute emergence of a sense which is nevertheless still relative to a becoming; in other words, the sense must be at once originary insofar as it cannot be reduced to what precedes it – otherwise it would not be a sense, that is, ideal – and derived insofar as it must be carried into the present by a past – otherwise it would seem to drop from the sky ready-made (p. 11). Derrida’s idea of contamination, therefore, results from the attempt to conceive the autonomy of sense and its birth in time (p. 11). Marrati-Guénon refers to the guiding thread of the problem of genesis continuously in her book, even and especially when she turns to Derrida’s reading of Heidegger (see especially, pp. 143–150). For Marrati-Guénon, Derrida’s reading of Heidegger is inspired by what he learned from Husserl early on, especially from Husserl’s descriptions of internal time consciousness where the tension between becoming and origin seems to be most evident (p. 143). For Derrida, according to Marrati-Guénon, origin or gathering or openness in Heidegger is an unconditioned and nonderived, autonomous and absolute beginning (p. 150, n. 51). She claims that “Heidegger déplace du niveau de l’analytique du Dasein à celui de l’hisstorialité de l’être le modèle origine/recouvrement, B ouverture/fermature, si on veut B, toujours guidé par la préoccupation d’une pensée plus originaire de l’être et du temps. Mais aucune question génétique ne vient compliquer un modèle essentiellement statique” (p. 130). Derrida shows that this static origin or gathering or openness is always marked by an irreducible passivity or by an irreducible alterity (p. 144). To use the terminology that comes to replace Derrida’s early Husserlian geneticist language, the Heideggerian origin is marked by the trace. Marrati-Guénon therefore claims that Derrida’s indirect but continuous reliance on a sort of geneticism results in a profound dissymmetry between Derrida’s relation to Husserl and his relation to Heidegger (p. 208). The question of a genetic becoming never stops haunting Husserl’s phenomenology (p. 131), while “cette dimension génétique est complètement absente de la pensée de Heidegger” (p. 148). Despite the fact that the orientation from Le problème de la genèse allows Marrati-Guénon to clarify much in Derrida, this orientation limits her book. The 1962 Introduction to the Origin of Geometry demonstrates a more profound understanding of Heidegger than Le problème de la genèse. We see this in particular in The Introduction’s final section eleven where Derrida raises a series of questions which could arise only from ontology in a “nonHusserlian,” that is, Heideggerian sense. The clearest evidence of Derrida’s growing understanding of Heidegger, however, is in his 1964 “Violence and Metaphysics”; like the end of The Introduction, this essay begins with questions, in fact, with the question. Then we have the end of the 1967 La voix et le phénomène, where Derrida speaks of the openness of an unheard-of question which occurs after the closure of absolute knowledge. Derrida’s con-

79 tinuous focus on the question in the Sixties (just as Merleau-Ponty’s definition of Being as interrogation in The Visible and the Invisible) is due to Heidegger’s discussion in Being and Time’s Introduction (Chapter 1) of the question of Being, a discussion which turns out to provide us with the Being of the question. When Derrida takes up Heidegger, therefore, he is using the openness of the question as the very model of genesis. (This same appropriation of Heidegger occurs in Deleuze’s 1968 Difference and Repetition.) So, Marrati-Guénon’s orientation from Le problème de la genèse keeps her from realizing that Derrida’s geneticisim stems just as much from Heidegger’s ontology as it does from Husserl’s phenomenology. Marrati-Guénon is right, however, to stress that Derrida’s recent writings on Heidegger, like “Sendings: On Representation,” aim to criticize Heidegger’s concept of gathering by means of a concept of alterity. But this type of criticism arises in Derrida not because of his Le problème de la genèse reflections on Husserlian temporalization but because of his somewhat later reflections on language in Husserl. Nowhere in Le problème de la genèse does Derrida discuss language, not even in its brief examination of “The Origin of Geometry.” He examines language for the first time only in the later Introduction to The Origin of Geometry. As Marrati-Guénon stresses, the discussion of écriture in The Introduction’s section seven forms the basis for the concept of the trace which is not presented until 1967. But the section seven concept of écriture must be understood through Derrida’s claim in section six that, for Husserl, fundamental subjectivity is ineffable for a direct, univocal, and rigorous language. Fundamental subjectivity is, of course, for Husserl, transcendental intersubjectivity. So, écriture, which is essentially equivocal, is Derrida’s attempt to reconceive intersubjectivity. This attempt to reconceive transcendental intersubjectivity is why the first sentence of Of Grammatology says that “the problem of language will never [be] simply one problem among others.” But, if the trace really concerns transcendental intersubjectivity, then one has to take into account that a shift occurs in Derrida’s thinking from Le problème de la genèse to La voix et le phénoméne, a shift from temporalization to intersubjectivity. This shift is the real reason why there is a dissymmetry which favors Derrida’s relation to Husserl over his relation to Heidegger. In Le problème de la genèse, part three, where Derrida examines the Cartesian Meditations, he focuses on the Fourth Meditation’s descriptions of passive genesis which imply, for Derrida, that passive genesis and temporalization is prior to intersubjectivity. In The Introduction, although in his analysis he virtually identifies intersubjectivity and temporalization, Derrida still maintains the priority of temporalization over intersubjectivity (see particularly the last note of section six). But, in La voix et le phénomène B after the

80 investigation of Levinas in “violence and Metaphysics” – the Fifth Meditation descriptions of Fremderfahrung frame the entire discussion of “the solitary life of the soul.” In fact, Husserl’s basic phenomenological insight in section 50 of the Fifth Meditation that the interiority of the other is never presented to me immediately but always only mediately (never only Gegenwärtigung but always involving Vergegenwärtigung) determines Derrida’s entire deconstruction of Husserl’s alleged metaphysics of presence. If any Husserlian concept anticipates the Derridean trace, it is appresentation as described in the Fifth Meditation. But this realization implies that, in La voix et le phénomène, the crucial definition of the trace occurs not in Chapter five’s discussion of retention but in Chapter six’s discussion of auto-affection, where Derrida equates the movement of the trace with the order of signification. If we recall that the subtitle of la voix et le phénomène is le problème du signe, then we must recognize that Derrida’s thought even today is a sort of formalism, as Derrida himself admits as recently as Specters of Marx (Chapter 2). Repeatedly Marrati-Guénon claims that Derrida is not a Kantian formalist. This claim is undoubtedly true since (as Fink showed) it is impossible to be a Kantian formalist and be a phenomenologist. Yet, Derrida is not a phenomenologist in the strict sense because of the idea of contamination. The Derridean idea of contamination always includes two components. There is always, on the one hand, a minimally iterable form (a sort of sign) and, on the other, singular experience. The necessary inclusion of a minimally repeatable form is why singular experience is never, for Derrida, full presence. This lack of full presence is why the experience of the trace implies neither a pure empiricism nor even a “superior empiricism.” Indeed, because écriture is the model for the trace, Derrida’s thought must be characterized as a sort of technologism. This technologism is really what determines Derrida’s difference from Heidegger. Moreover, since the minimally iterable form is indefinitely iterable, it can always pass over any limit and take in what was outside. So, Marrati-Guénon is entirely correct to stress Derrida’s claim from The Introduction that “The Absolute is passage.” But, in 1962 (after studying with Hyppolite), Derrida is giving this claim a Hegelian sense; it refers to what Hegel called the Absolute form, which includes difference and its overcoming. It seems to me that the following note from “Violence and Metaphysics” is the seed for Derrida’s idea of contamination: “La différence pure n’est pas absolutement différent (de la non-différence). La critique par Hegel du concept de différence pure est sans doute ici, pour nous, le thème le plus incontournable. Hegel a pensé la différence absolue et a montré qu’elle ne pouvait êtant impure.” Perhaps, therefore, we have to speak of a second dissymmetry in Derrida; he is perhaps even more indebted to Hegel than to Husserl (just as he is more indebted to Husserl than to Heidegger). Derrida’s

81 “Hegelianism” differentiates him from Deleuze and Foucault, and from Levinas. Unlike these thinkers of the outside, Derrida is a thinker of the inside: il n’y a pas de hors-texte. But, like Levinas, he is a thinker of transcendence, not immanence (unlike Deleuze and Foucault). What defines Derrida’s thought is the attempt to constrain the outside to come inside (in contrast to a thought which forces the inside to go outside). This thought which constrains the outside to come inside determines Derrida’s ethico-political thought. It seems to me that here Marrati-Guénon’s orientation from La problème de la genèse takes its heaviest toll. She is correct, of course, that Derrida’s idea of contamination implies that death contaminates life; that the contamination of life with death in turn implies that experience is always an experience of mourning; and that the experience of mourning implies that the other survives memorially. In fact, in her Conclusion, Marrati-Guénon repeatedly stresses this world “survie.” But, Derrida’s more recent reflections on mourning and memory are based in another shift in his thinking. Probably due to this renewed investigations of Levinas, Derrida has moved away from the Heideggerian conception of the question to a conception of the promise, the messianic promise. The promise constrains one to keep the promise. For Derrida, mourning and memory refer us to the past and passivity but understood as a past promise to do something – a deathbed promise; but, understood as a promise, the past refers us to the future activity in which I keep the promise and perhaps risk my life doing so. This futurity of the promise means that Derrida’s though is always a thought of the end, of the end to come, in other words, a thought of salvation. When someone comes and keeps the promise, I will be saved from suffering. “Survie” therefore means not simply passing over a limit towards death, but superlife as in “le surnaturel.” Salvation is always “of spirit,” as Derrida says in De l’esprit. Despite the limitations we have indicated here, we must stress that MarratiGuénon’s La genèse et la trace is unrivaled; it must be read if we want to begin to understand Derrida’s thought. But, its limitations restrict it to being only the beginning. Only by going beyond these limitations can we start to pose the questions of the future of philosophy. Does the future of philosophy lie in the reconception of the question in terms of the promise or in terms of the problem? Does the future of philosophy lie in a reconception of life in terms of spirit or in terms of matter? Finally does the future of philosophy arise from a return to phenomenology or from a return to Bergsonism? As the generation of philosophers that includes Derrida dies out, these questions demand our most urgent attention. Leonard Lawlor, University of Memphis USA

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Husserl Studies 16: 77–81, 1999. © 1999 Kluwer Academic Publishers. Printed in the Netherlands.

77

Book Review Paola Marrati-Guénon, La genèse et la trace. Derrida lecteur de Husserl et Heidegger. Dordrecht: Kluwer Academic Publishers, 1998. Phaenomenologica 146, 244 pp., $100. Just as the phenomenological reduction makes Husserl great and just as the ontological difference makes Heidegger great, contamination makes Derrida great. It is well known that Derrida first developed this idea systematically in his 1967 study of Husserl, La voix et le phénomène. Until, however, Paola Marrati-Guénon’s excellent book, no one had ever traced the development of the idea of contamination comprehensively through Derrida’s corpus on Husserl. Indeed, because she also puts Derrida’s Husserl reading alongside Derrida’s somewhat later reading of Heidegger, La genèse et al trace is the best book to date on Derrida’s interpretation of Husserl. Unlike so many of the essays and books written over the last thirty years, La genèse et al trace falls neither into the trap of dismissing Husserl’s through as the last version of the metaphysics of presence nor into the trap of trivializing Derrida’s scholarship in the light of the Husserliana. Marrati-Guénon is sensitive to the subtleties of both Derrida’s thought and that of Husserl. In fact, I think that Marrati-Guénon’s greatest achievement is that she sheds a lot of light on the most obscure passages in Derrida’s early thinking: for instance, not only Derrida’s comment on the transcendental sense of death in section seven of The Introduction to the Origin of Geometry (p. 48), but also his comment in the seventh chapter of La voix et le phénomène about infinite différance being finite (pp. 97–98). Marrati-Guénon herself, however, sees the principal contribution of her book to lie in the fact that she orients her investigation from Derrida’s very clearly (1953–54) Le problème de la genèse dans la philosophie de Husserl. According to Marrati-Guénon, in Derrida’s first Husserl book we see Derrida following the guiding thread of the problem of genesis through Husserl’s development; what is important for Derrida in Husserl’s development is that Husserl never abandons his starting point in a geneticism (psychologism), even when he turns to a structuralism (transcendentalism). As Marrati-Guénon puts it, “C’est la question de la genèse du transcendental, et de son échec, qui aura donné à penser à Derrida cette ‘contamination’ irréductible qui est au coeur de son travail” (p. 6, Marrati-Guénon’s emphasis). Specifically, she stresses that the problem of genesis for Derrida discloses a tension between “origin and becoming” (p. 11). Every genesis

78 refers to an absolute emergence of a sense which is nevertheless still relative to a becoming; in other words, the sense must be at once originary insofar as it cannot be reduced to what precedes it – otherwise it would not be a sense, that is, ideal – and derived insofar as it must be carried into the present by a past – otherwise it would seem to drop from the sky ready-made (p. 11). Derrida’s idea of contamination, therefore, results from the attempt to conceive the autonomy of sense and its birth in time (p. 11). Marrati-Guénon refers to the guiding thread of the problem of genesis continuously in her book, even and especially when she turns to Derrida’s reading of Heidegger (see especially, pp. 143–150). For Marrati-Guénon, Derrida’s reading of Heidegger is inspired by what he learned from Husserl early on, especially from Husserl’s descriptions of internal time consciousness where the tension between becoming and origin seems to be most evident (p. 143). For Derrida, according to Marrati-Guénon, origin or gathering or openness in Heidegger is an unconditioned and nonderived, autonomous and absolute beginning (p. 150, n. 51). She claims that “Heidegger déplace du niveau de l’analytique du Dasein à celui de l’hisstorialité de l’être le modèle origine/recouvrement, B ouverture/fermature, si on veut B, toujours guidé par la préoccupation d’une pensée plus originaire de l’être et du temps. Mais aucune question génétique ne vient compliquer un modèle essentiellement statique” (p. 130). Derrida shows that this static origin or gathering or openness is always marked by an irreducible passivity or by an irreducible alterity (p. 144). To use the terminology that comes to replace Derrida’s early Husserlian geneticist language, the Heideggerian origin is marked by the trace. Marrati-Guénon therefore claims that Derrida’s indirect but continuous reliance on a sort of geneticism results in a profound dissymmetry between Derrida’s relation to Husserl and his relation to Heidegger (p. 208). The question of a genetic becoming never stops haunting Husserl’s phenomenology (p. 131), while “cette dimension génétique est complètement absente de la pensée de Heidegger” (p. 148). Despite the fact that the orientation from Le problème de la genèse allows Marrati-Guénon to clarify much in Derrida, this orientation limits her book. The 1962 Introduction to the Origin of Geometry demonstrates a more profound understanding of Heidegger than Le problème de la genèse. We see this in particular in The Introduction’s final section eleven where Derrida raises a series of questions which could arise only from ontology in a “nonHusserlian,” that is, Heideggerian sense. The clearest evidence of Derrida’s growing understanding of Heidegger, however, is in his 1964 “Violence and Metaphysics”; like the end of The Introduction, this essay begins with questions, in fact, with the question. Then we have the end of the 1967 La voix et le phénomène, where Derrida speaks of the openness of an unheard-of question which occurs after the closure of absolute knowledge. Derrida’s con-

79 tinuous focus on the question in the Sixties (just as Merleau-Ponty’s definition of Being as interrogation in The Visible and the Invisible) is due to Heidegger’s discussion in Being and Time’s Introduction (Chapter 1) of the question of Being, a discussion which turns out to provide us with the Being of the question. When Derrida takes up Heidegger, therefore, he is using the openness of the question as the very model of genesis. (This same appropriation of Heidegger occurs in Deleuze’s 1968 Difference and Repetition.) So, Marrati-Guénon’s orientation from Le problème de la genèse keeps her from realizing that Derrida’s geneticisim stems just as much from Heidegger’s ontology as it does from Husserl’s phenomenology. Marrati-Guénon is right, however, to stress that Derrida’s recent writings on Heidegger, like “Sendings: On Representation,” aim to criticize Heidegger’s concept of gathering by means of a concept of alterity. But this type of criticism arises in Derrida not because of his Le problème de la genèse reflections on Husserlian temporalization but because of his somewhat later reflections on language in Husserl. Nowhere in Le problème de la genèse does Derrida discuss language, not even in its brief examination of “The Origin of Geometry.” He examines language for the first time only in the later Introduction to The Origin of Geometry. As Marrati-Guénon stresses, the discussion of écriture in The Introduction’s section seven forms the basis for the concept of the trace which is not presented until 1967. But the section seven concept of écriture must be understood through Derrida’s claim in section six that, for Husserl, fundamental subjectivity is ineffable for a direct, univocal, and rigorous language. Fundamental subjectivity is, of course, for Husserl, transcendental intersubjectivity. So, écriture, which is essentially equivocal, is Derrida’s attempt to reconceive intersubjectivity. This attempt to reconceive transcendental intersubjectivity is why the first sentence of Of Grammatology says that “the problem of language will never [be] simply one problem among others.” But, if the trace really concerns transcendental intersubjectivity, then one has to take into account that a shift occurs in Derrida’s thinking from Le problème de la genèse to La voix et le phénoméne, a shift from temporalization to intersubjectivity. This shift is the real reason why there is a dissymmetry which favors Derrida’s relation to Husserl over his relation to Heidegger. In Le problème de la genèse, part three, where Derrida examines the Cartesian Meditations, he focuses on the Fourth Meditation’s descriptions of passive genesis which imply, for Derrida, that passive genesis and temporalization is prior to intersubjectivity. In The Introduction, although in his analysis he virtually identifies intersubjectivity and temporalization, Derrida still maintains the priority of temporalization over intersubjectivity (see particularly the last note of section six). But, in La voix et le phénomène B after the

80 investigation of Levinas in “violence and Metaphysics” – the Fifth Meditation descriptions of Fremderfahrung frame the entire discussion of “the solitary life of the soul.” In fact, Husserl’s basic phenomenological insight in section 50 of the Fifth Meditation that the interiority of the other is never presented to me immediately but always only mediately (never only Gegenwärtigung but always involving Vergegenwärtigung) determines Derrida’s entire deconstruction of Husserl’s alleged metaphysics of presence. If any Husserlian concept anticipates the Derridean trace, it is appresentation as described in the Fifth Meditation. But this realization implies that, in La voix et le phénomène, the crucial definition of the trace occurs not in Chapter five’s discussion of retention but in Chapter six’s discussion of auto-affection, where Derrida equates the movement of the trace with the order of signification. If we recall that the subtitle of la voix et le phénomène is le problème du signe, then we must recognize that Derrida’s thought even today is a sort of formalism, as Derrida himself admits as recently as Specters of Marx (Chapter 2). Repeatedly Marrati-Guénon claims that Derrida is not a Kantian formalist. This claim is undoubtedly true since (as Fink showed) it is impossible to be a Kantian formalist and be a phenomenologist. Yet, Derrida is not a phenomenologist in the strict sense because of the idea of contamination. The Derridean idea of contamination always includes two components. There is always, on the one hand, a minimally iterable form (a sort of sign) and, on the other, singular experience. The necessary inclusion of a minimally repeatable form is why singular experience is never, for Derrida, full presence. This lack of full presence is why the experience of the trace implies neither a pure empiricism nor even a “superior empiricism.” Indeed, because écriture is the model for the trace, Derrida’s thought must be characterized as a sort of technologism. This technologism is really what determines Derrida’s difference from Heidegger. Moreover, since the minimally iterable form is indefinitely iterable, it can always pass over any limit and take in what was outside. So, Marrati-Guénon is entirely correct to stress Derrida’s claim from The Introduction that “The Absolute is passage.” But, in 1962 (after studying with Hyppolite), Derrida is giving this claim a Hegelian sense; it refers to what Hegel called the Absolute form, which includes difference and its overcoming. It seems to me that the following note from “Violence and Metaphysics” is the seed for Derrida’s idea of contamination: “La différence pure n’est pas absolutement différent (de la non-différence). La critique par Hegel du concept de différence pure est sans doute ici, pour nous, le thème le plus incontournable. Hegel a pensé la différence absolue et a montré qu’elle ne pouvait êtant impure.” Perhaps, therefore, we have to speak of a second dissymmetry in Derrida; he is perhaps even more indebted to Hegel than to Husserl (just as he is more indebted to Husserl than to Heidegger). Derrida’s

81 “Hegelianism” differentiates him from Deleuze and Foucault, and from Levinas. Unlike these thinkers of the outside, Derrida is a thinker of the inside: il n’y a pas de hors-texte. But, like Levinas, he is a thinker of transcendence, not immanence (unlike Deleuze and Foucault). What defines Derrida’s thought is the attempt to constrain the outside to come inside (in contrast to a thought which forces the inside to go outside). This thought which constrains the outside to come inside determines Derrida’s ethico-political thought. It seems to me that here Marrati-Guénon’s orientation from La problème de la genèse takes its heaviest toll. She is correct, of course, that Derrida’s idea of contamination implies that death contaminates life; that the contamination of life with death in turn implies that experience is always an experience of mourning; and that the experience of mourning implies that the other survives memorially. In fact, in her Conclusion, Marrati-Guénon repeatedly stresses this world “survie.” But, Derrida’s more recent reflections on mourning and memory are based in another shift in his thinking. Probably due to this renewed investigations of Levinas, Derrida has moved away from the Heideggerian conception of the question to a conception of the promise, the messianic promise. The promise constrains one to keep the promise. For Derrida, mourning and memory refer us to the past and passivity but understood as a past promise to do something – a deathbed promise; but, understood as a promise, the past refers us to the future activity in which I keep the promise and perhaps risk my life doing so. This futurity of the promise means that Derrida’s though is always a thought of the end, of the end to come, in other words, a thought of salvation. When someone comes and keeps the promise, I will be saved from suffering. “Survie” therefore means not simply passing over a limit towards death, but superlife as in “le surnaturel.” Salvation is always “of spirit,” as Derrida says in De l’esprit. Despite the limitations we have indicated here, we must stress that MarratiGuénon’s La genèse et la trace is unrivaled; it must be read if we want to begin to understand Derrida’s thought. But, its limitations restrict it to being only the beginning. Only by going beyond these limitations can we start to pose the questions of the future of philosophy. Does the future of philosophy lie in the reconception of the question in terms of the promise or in terms of the problem? Does the future of philosophy lie in a reconception of life in terms of spirit or in terms of matter? Finally does the future of philosophy arise from a return to phenomenology or from a return to Bergsonism? As the generation of philosophers that includes Derrida dies out, these questions demand our most urgent attention. Leonard Lawlor, University of Memphis USA

82