In The Pursuit Of The European Union’s Lisbon Goal, Is Social Cohesion Losing Out To Competitiveness?

In the pursuit of the European Union’s Lisbon goal, is social cohesion losing out to competitiveness?

Tom May 30 August 2007

MA in Comparative Education (MMACOM_99 Dissertation) Institute of Education University of London

This dissertation may be made available to the general public for borrowing, photocopying or consultation without the prior consent of the author.

Words:

Abstract The challenge of the European Union’s Lisbon goal for 2010: ‘to become the most competitive and dynamic knowledge-based economy in the world, capable of sustainable economic growth with more and better jobs and greater social Cohesion’, is to increase economic competitiveness while implementing social values, so that all may benefit from the prosperity that competitiveness should bring. Increasing costs of providing social protection and declining labour-force populations, in the face of global competition, make reaching this balance harder. This dissertation considers the factors that influence both competitiveness and social cohesion and the relating theories and seeks evidence of changing policy emphases. This is mainly done through critical textual analysis of the main policy documents at European level from 2000 to 2007. One theme within the dissertation is on the social model. National reports and Eurostat Structural Indicators are used as evidence that there are different European social models which achieve differing emphases between competitiveness and cohesion. As a third strand of information, and to allow some limited triangulation between sources, three semi-structured interviews have been conducted to gain the personal perspectives of professional policymakers/ researchers. The analysis finds that there has been a definite shift in emphasis towards competitiveness. However this shift is conceptually blurred. This blurring starts because social inclusion and social cohesion are not clearly distinguished between each other within the policy literature and greater levels of social inclusion are assumed to lead to greater levels of social cohesion. The main method of increasing inclusion is through increasing employability. Increased employment leads to both increased levels of competitiveness and social inclusion. There is an emphasis on lifelong learning to achieve both within the context of an ageing population. While competitiveness and social cohesion are regarded as mutually supporting, economic growth is seen as a precondition for greater social cohesion therefore there is a greater emphasis on the former.

Contents European Union Abbreviations and Member States Country Codes..............5 SECTION 1: background....................................................................................6 Introduction........................................................................................................6 Approach and methodology................................................................................6 Research questions.........................................................................................7 Methodology...................................................................................................8 Definitions and concepts....................................................................................9 Europe...........................................................................................................10 Globalization.................................................................................................11 Competitiveness............................................................................................15 The knowledge economy and knowledge society........................................16 Social Cohesion............................................................................................17 The European Social Model.........................................................................19 Modernising the European Social Model: The European Social Agenda....22 Flexicurity.....................................................................................................23 Drivers and theories..........................................................................................24 Globalization................................................................................................24 Social Capital theory....................................................................................26 Capability theory..........................................................................................29 Emergence theory.........................................................................................31 The Open Method of Coordination (OMC)..................................................32 Demographic change: ageing population and migration..............................34 The media and European public awareness of social cohesion....................41 Relationships between drivers, competitiveness, social cohesion and education.......................................................................................................41 SECTION 2: the policy literature.....................................................................44 Lisbon is launched - 2000.............................................................................44 2001..............................................................................................................46 2002..............................................................................................................49 Risk factors for poverty and social exclusion...............................................50 2003..............................................................................................................51 Lisbon stalls and the Mid-term review - 2004..............................................51 Lisbon re-launched with a new emphasis – 2004.........................................55 2005..............................................................................................................55 2006..............................................................................................................59 2007..............................................................................................................60 Summary...........................................................................................................60 SECTION 3: alternative sources and perspectives on Lisbon ......................62 Emphasis within Lisbon below EU level.........................................................62 What does the data say?....................................................................................64 Conclusions from the Structural Indicators..................................................78 Individual perspectives on Lisbon....................................................................78 Respondent A:...............................................................................................79 Respondent B:...............................................................................................79 Respondent C:...............................................................................................80

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SECTION 4:........................................................................................................82 Limitations of the study....................................................................................82 Discussion/Analysis..........................................................................................83 Ambiguous terminology and blurred concepts.............................................83 The causal relations between social cohesion and competitiveness.............84 Importance of employment...........................................................................85 The emphasis on competitiveness and social cohesion at EU level.............85 The emphasis on competitiveness and social cohesion at Member State level ......................................................................................................................86 The influence of the Open Method of Coordination....................................87 The role of education and training in increasing competitiveness and social cohesion........................................................................................................87 Conclusion:.......................................................................................................89 The future for the Lisbon Agenda?...............................................................90 Bibliography........................................................................................................91

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European Union Abbreviations and Member States Country Codes Belgium Bulgaria Czech Republic Denmark Germany Estonia Ireland Greece Spain France Italy Cyprus Latvia Lithuania Luxembourg Hungary Malta Netherlands Austria Poland Portugal Romania Slovenia Slovakia Finland Sweden United Kingdom

BE BG CZ DK DE EE IE EL ES FR IT CY LV LT LU HU MT NL AT PL PT RO SI SK FI SE UK

EU27: All of the above countries. EU15: BE, DK, DE, IE, EL, ES, FR, IT, LU, NL, AT, PT, FI, SE, UK. EU10: CZ, EE, CY, LV, LT, HU, MT, PL, SI, SK, Source: European Union Publications Office. 2007.

SECTION 1: background Introduction Of all European policy, the Conclusions of the 2000 European Spring Council in Lisbon is the most ambitious and probably the most quoted, ‘to become the most competitive and dynamic knowledge-based economy in the world, capable of sustainable economic growth with more and better jobs and greater social Cohesion’ (European Council. 2000, article five) by 2010. This, the Lisbon goal, is pursued through the range of policies known as the Lisbon Agenda.

The challenge of the Lisbon goal is to increase economic competitiveness while implementing social values, so that all may benefit from the prosperity that competitiveness should bring. The two should be balanced. However, increasing costs of providing social protection and declining labour-force populations, in the face of global competition, make reaching this balance harder. This dissertation considers the factors that influence both competitiveness and social cohesion. It looks for evidence of changing policy emphases on the two and how they are portrayed in the main policy literature.

Approach and methodology Michael Crossley has observed that comparative research has tended to focus on either theory or policy rather than achieving a balance (Crossley, M. 2001). While this dissertation is about policy, it tries to draw from theory in order to help provide the necessary context within with the policy operates. An initial

survey of the main and recent policy documents suggests that the emphasis is economic rather than social. However, this dissertation seeks to confirm if this view passes more detailed scrutiny. Patricia Broadfoot notes that, ‘…comparative education is something of a cornucopia when it comes to methodologies…’ (Broadfoot, P. 2001. p. 101). The principle research method used here is a critical textual analysis of the main policy documents. This is similar to the approach used by David Phillips and Anastasia Economou (Phillips, D. and Economou, A. 2001.). This topic is subject to similar conceptual and linguistic problems, though these have been reduced by concentrating at the European level. While this is essentially an empirical approach, it tries to observe the basic argument of Critical Realism: that our knowledge (model) of reality is imperfect and, while we can update that model, its application changes the nature of reality and so the model remains flawed (see for example, the Web Site for Critical Realism. 2007. or Collier, A. 1994). Hence, while we can observe, remain with an imperfect knowledge.

Research questions In approaching and answering the title of this dissertation, this leads to a number of questions: 

How is competitiveness and social cohesion conceptualised?



How do they sit within the context of the EU, what drivers act on them and what is the role of education and training?



How do competitiveness and social cohesion relate to each other?



What have been the relative policy emphases on competitiveness and social cohesion within the Lisbon agenda?

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o How has this changed at European level? o Is the emphasis the same at Member State level? 

Are there European models on the relations between the two and how do they compare in terms of emphasis on competitiveness and social cohesion?

Methodology In order to answer these questions, most information is gathered through the available literature, therefore there is no separate literature review. A combination of literature from academic and policy sources is used to set out the definitions and conceptualisations of the related terms. These look at how terms are defined and conceptualised generally, at European Union level and for this dissertation. The drivers on the Lisbon Agenda, competitiveness and social cohesion and the theories relating to them are considered in a similar manner.

Having set out the context, the main European policy documents are considered in chronological order, through a critical contextual analysis. This is not carried out through a discourse analysis, principally because the scope and volume of the documents considered is too great to carry out within the size of this dissertation. This section forms the main analytical part of the project.

Two other sources of information are considered much more briefly. Though short they provide a limited means to triangulate the conclusions drawn from the previous section. They also give an insight into how the policy emphasis within the Lisbon Agenda compares at the level below the EU level. The first source

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considers the information that can be drawn from the European Union Structural Indicators. It is not possible to consider countries individually so countries are grouped in terms of social models. The second draws from the personal perspectives of three individuals who have been involved over the duration of the Lisbon Agenda.

Some limitations of this dissertation are considered before discussing the conclusions from the three sources, (policy literature, quantitative indicators, personal perspectives). It links these to the drivers discussed earlier and considers the role of education and training. The conclusion covers also asks briefly what the future of the Lisbon Agenda might be.

Definitions and concepts The aim of this subsection is to sufficiently define and conceptualize terms in order to address the title. It covers the following terms: 

Europe;



Globalization (also covered later as a driver);



Competitiveness; o Knowledge Economy/ Knowledge Society;



Social Cohesion;



The European Social Model – the balance between economic and social values; o The European Social Policy Agenda – updating the European Social Model; and,

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o Flexicurity.

Europe The easiest way of defining Europe, from a political perspective, is as the Member States that comprise the European Union (EU). However, such an obvious definition excludes certain European countries, notably Switzerland. There are also the: Candidate (Croatia, Turkey and the Former Yugoslav republic of Macedonia); Acceding; and, European Economic Area Countries (Iceland, Liechtenstein and Norway), who are neither in nor out of the EU and participate in EU policies1. This blurring of EU membership is illustrated by Jarle Trondal’s work, which compared Norway and EU policies on the subject of convergence within research and higher education. He found that EU membership versus nonmembership is a continuum rather than a clear dichotomy (Trondal, J. 2002).

Since I am looking at progress towards the Lisbon goal, for the purpose of this dissertation, Europe will be defined primarily as the EU Member States. These have grown from the EU15 in 2000 to the EU27 today, which means that the EU covered by the policy documents in 2000 is not the same as now.

The state is the default unit of comparison, in Comparative Education system studies, as it is the level at which education policy is usually directed and governed. However, as a unit of comparison, countries vary considerably in size, type of governance and detail of involvement in the design and delivery of education at the local level. For example, French-speaking Belgium and Wallonia 1

A list of all the countries in Europe and their status with the EU can be found on the Europa website: http://europa.eu/abc/european_countries/index_en.htm . Last accessed 11 06 07.

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complete separate national reports to the European Commission. Similarly, much of the responsibility for education is devolved to the Länder in Germany and to the regions in Spain. However, while acknowledging the limitations of the nation state as equating to the national education system, it will remain the unit of choice (Green, A. 1997.). It remains the easiest unit of comparison when looking at European issues. It is also the nation state, rather than its regions, that has signed up to the Lisbon Agenda and sits on the EU’s Council of Ministers.

Globalization While definitions of Globalization vary, their origins relate to increased flows of financial capital at a supranational level, leading to increasing economic integration (for example: Visco, I. 2001. Dollar, D. 2004). However, it is the associated suite of secondary effects that makes it so pervasive. These include the effects on the labour market, labour-force mobility and societies. Anthony Giddens emphasizes the social aspects, he defines globalization as the: ‘Growing interdependence between different peoples, regions and countries in the world as social and economic relationships come to stretch worldwide’(Giddens, A. 2001. p. 690.). In 2007 he had added that this increasing interdependence isn’t just economic but, ‘involves accelerated and universal communication, and concerns also political and cultural dimensions’ (Giddens, A. 2007. p. xii). He cites two drivers, the first is communications technology which ‘compresses time and space’, the second is the integration of the world economy – currently, often referred to as the “knowledge economy” (ibid. p. 53).

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The idea of globalization is not that new. Sceptics within the globalization debate note that it is only the ‘intensity of interactions between nations’ (ibid. p. 58) that differs from the flows and connections of the 19th Century. Perhaps this is why Anthony Giddens explains the causes of ‘contemporary globalization’ which he attributes to three factors: political changes; information flows; and, transnational corporations. Within the first he picks out two things, the political change associated with the fall of the Berlin Wall and the increasing numbers and development of ‘international and regional mechanisms of government (ibid). (This is picked up by David Held et al.) Examples of this are international governmental organisations such as APEC or OECD. The strongest example of this, cited by David Held et al (Held, D. et al.1999) and Anthony Giddens, is the European Union. Another category consists of international non-governmental organisations, such as Medicins San Frontiers or Green Peace. In terms of information flows, it is not their volume and speed across the world that Anthony Giddens highlights but attitudinal changes towards a global outlook. This global outlook relates to a sense of community that is not primarily defined by physical geography. He states that: People increasingly perceive that social responsibility does not stop at national borders…[and] …people are increasingly looking to sources other than the nation state in formulating their own sense of identity. (Giddens, A. 2001. p. 56) Transnational corporations (TNCs) are an obvious and strong component of globalisation, Anthony Giddens states: ‘Even when TNCs have a clear national base, they are orientated towards global markets and global profits’ (ibid. p. 57).

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Sceptics of globalization suggest that what we are experiencing is regionalization rather than a truly integrated global economy, which is evidenced by uneven levels of involvement between different countries. One sceptic is Justin Rosenberg, who pronounces Globalization Theory as conceptually and empirically flawed: One can readily see how and why such an idea rose to the level of a Zeitgeist. Yet as a causal process in its own right, ‘globalization’ had no momentum of its own. In fact, if the conjunctural analysis developed in this article is broadly correct, ‘globalization’ did not even exist. (Rosenberg, J. 2005. p. 65) He states that the ‘international system itself’ did undergo a major restructuring. However, he argues the underlying belief that, ‘this restructuring was a spatiotemporal transformation of human existence, ‘globalization’… …seems now to be passing away.’ (ibid. p. 4). He cites the problems that international agreements and organizations have experienced (from Kyoto to the International Criminal Court and the UN, EU and NATO in the launch of the invasion of Iraq) as being symptomatic of ‘a vigorous re-assertion of great power national interests’ (ibid. p. 3). He argues that, ‘An entire academic literature - the literature of Globalization Theory - has arguably been left high and dry by this turn of events’ (ibid. p. 4). He explains that the conceptual ‘folly’ started: …by attempting to transform this Zeitgeist into a social scientific concept, the Globalization Theorists were led to do the opposite of what social theorists are supposed to do. Instead of acting as interpreters to the spirit of the age, they became its ideological amplifiers. Instead of deconstructing the popular Zeitgeist, they elevated it to the role of an intellectual Weltgeist. (ibid. p. 7) He argues that globalization is a descriptive term and that a more basic social theory is required to explain how globalization

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has become such a feature of today’s world – and it is that explanation, which will match all that Globalization theorists attribute to it, that is lacking (Rosenberg, J. 2000.).

This opposes the view of what Anthony Giddens calls the hyper-globalists who describe a borderless world. This is based on the premise that nation states can no longer control their own economies: they are constrained by the flows of capital and information from below and by the controls imposed by supra national organisations such as the World Trade Organisation and the European Union. The “middle way” is offered by the transformationalists. This stance suggests that, ‘the global order is becoming transformed, but many of the old patterns still remain’ (ibid. p59). It portrays globalization as a dynamic system, where nation states are both influenced and influencers, rather than as a one way process of influence.

Whatever the status of Globalization as a true theory, it is the perception of globalization as an influence on the wealth and well being of nations that is important for this dissertation. For without that perception of globalization there would be no emphasis on competitiveness to maintain strong national economies or concern over levels of social cohesion: there would be no requirement to set the Lisbon goal and no European Union (as we know it) within which the goal would be set and progress to it monitored.

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Competitiveness As with many other terms in this dissertation “Competitiveness” does not have an agreed definition, even within economic thinking, it has many aspects. This is because competitiveness cannot be reduced to productivity or profits and must also include the economic consequences of non-economic factors such as politics, value systems and of course education (Garrelli, S. 2006.). The World Economic Forum defines competitiveness as: …that collection of factors, policies and institutions which determine the level of productivity of a country and that, therefore, determine the level of prosperity that can be attained by an economy. (World Economic Forum. 2005. p xiii.) The

Commission

Staff

Working

Document

on

the

2006

European

Competitiveness Report uses the following working definition: Competitiveness in this Report is understood to mean a sustained rise in the standards of living of a nation or region and as a low a level of involuntary unemployment. (European Commission. 2006. p. 7.) Competitiveness has to do with a nation’s ability to manage what it can to ensure prosperity, which itself is assumed to be linked to well being. The role of education is something that Stéphane Garrelli emphases: The ability of a nation to develop an excellent education system and to improve knowledge in the labor force through training is vital to competitiveness… Knowledge is perhaps the most critical competitiveness factor. (Garrelli, S. 2006. p. 4.) It is expected that competitiveness will be achieved within the “knowledge economy”, where technology and knowledge replace labour and capital as the key factors of production (ITAG. 1999.). The Economic and Social Research Council (ESRC) notes that economic success is increasingly based upon the

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effective utilization of intangible assets such as knowledge, skills and innovative potential as the key resources for competitive advantage (ESRC. 2006.).

The knowledge economy and knowledge society The knowledge economy is driven by increasing globalization and knowledge intensity of economic activities: both have been powered through the rate of technological progress in ICT. (Houghton, J. Sheehan, P. 2000.).

Peter Drucker developed the “knowledge economy” into the “knowledge society” (Drucker, P. 1968). He predicted that, ‘The new economy may or may not materialize, but there is no doubt that the next society will be with us shortly.’ (Drucker, P. 2001.). This society will be: borderless, because knowledge is even more mobile than money; socio-economically mobile via “easily acquired formal education”2; and, will be competitive, because anyone can acquire the means of production, but not everyone can win.

Knowledge workers will dominate the labour market. Traditional knowledge workers (such as accountants), will be joined by a growing group of what he calls “knowledge technologists”. These people are as much manual workers as knowledge workers; yet their manual work is based on the considerable theoretical knowledge they have acquired.

Andy Green et al. have defined the knowledge economy and knowledge society by tying them to overall productive and social outcomes. These can be indicated 2

He states that this can only be acquired through formal education and not through apprenticeship – though doesn’t justify why.

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and therefore measured in some way through labour productivity, employment rates, wage equality, skills distribution and socialization. (Green, A. et al. 2006.).

In Sweden the knowledge society is now regarded by the National Board of Education in Sweden (Skolverket) as a reality (Skolverket. 2000. p. 12). However, while the knowledge society is generally seen as a positive phenomenon, Carl Anders Säfström is far more pessimistic. He sees it as an indication of the ‘…death of the Enlightenment as the prime motif for educating the citizen’ (Säfström, C. A. 2005. p. 583.). As responsibility for education moves from the state to the citizen, individuals’ freedom to exercise choice is diminished: education understood only in economic terms. While this may be good for competitiveness, it appears to go against the spirit of social cohesion.

Social Cohesion Social cohesion has gained in prominence at national and European policy levels over the past decade. Yet it is an ambiguous concept. It draws from various societal traits and relations and is a proxy for collective quality of life. Its elements may be mutually influencing but not in a transparent way.

Finding something that approaches a textbook definition is difficult, the closest is provided by Andy Green et al.: ‘To most people it probably signifies, at the minimum, a relatively harmonious society characterized by low rates of crime and high levels of civic co-operation and trust’ (Green, A. Preston, J. Janmaat, G. J. 2006. p. 5.). Anthony Giddens uses the term “social justice”: the reduction of economic and social inequalities and the equalising of life chances to produce a

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more socially just society (Giddens, A. 2007. p. 72.). Robert Putnam’s work on social cohesion – Social Capital theory - is explained in a later section. This concentrates on social cohesion at an individual to community level. Andy Green et al. conclude that this does not aggregate up to a societal level. Instead they explain that a societal approach to social cohesion assumes that there must be not only bonding and trust within communities or groups but also between them. This must then connect to shared values and a sense of citizenship. Also it must concern the distribution of resources and power, the means of conflict resolution and the institutions, cultures and ideologies that influence these shared values and citizenship (Green, A. et al. 2006.). Another important point that they make is that social cohesion might be viewed as a process rather than an end state, as it has never been fully achieved.

There is not a clear operational definition of social cohesion available from the European Commission or its agencies. The Europa website defines cohesion as ‘sticking together’ so that ‘everyone has a place in society’ (Eurojargon Europa Website. 2007). While social cohesion forms half of the Lisbon goal and the term cohesion is used frequently – what is actually covered in much of the European Union literature pertains to inclusion. It is interesting that the more technical version of the Eurojargon guide – the Europa glossary - does not include social cohesion. While a clear definition may be lacking, a communication from the Commission explains that: ‘A high level of social cohesion is based on the principles of solidarity and social inclusion.’(European Commission. 2003. p. 17.).

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Andy Green at al. state that unlike social capital (covered in the following section), which appears to undergo large fluctuations within short timeframes, changes in social cohesion can only be seen over much longer periods of time. They explain that within the period they study and have data for (1960 - 1990) might be, ‘thought to be insufficiently long’ (Green, A. et al. 2006. P55). If so, then the achieving-greater-social-cohesion aspect of the Lisbon goal may be fundamentally flawed. Even if sufficient changes are implemented, the impact on social cohesion may not manifest itself in time, especially given the time lag involved in data collection and analysis. The concept of social cohesion for the European Union is encompassed by the European Social Model (ESM).

The European Social Model The European Social Model ‘…is characterised by the indissoluble link between economic performance and social progress.’ (European Commission. 2004. p. 108). It is defined by Anthony Giddens as depending ‘fundamentally upon economic

prosperity

and

redistribution…

…a

mixture

of

values,

accomplishments and aspirations, varying in form and degree of realisation among European States’ (Giddens, A. 2007. p. 1.). The European Economic and Social Committee (EESC) has published an opinion paper on this subject: Social Cohesion: fleshing out a European social model (EESC. 2006.). They explain the model as a set of values and visions as well as a reality state that its strength comes from the dynamic interaction of competitiveness, solidarity and mutual trust. Social policy is seen as a productive factor: within the model economic (competitiveness)

considerations

cannot

be

divorced

from

social

or

environmental considerations. This raises the question of whether social cohesion

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and economic competitiveness must be in tension with each other, or whether they are mutually beneficial. The EESC point towards the latter, citing the Nordic countries.

An aspect of the relationship between social cohesion (social inclusion) and competitiveness has been explored by Torben Iversen and David Soskice. They use individual level and country level data to demonstrate that the nature of the state social security helps to determine the form of the capitalism that operates (and vice versa). Workers can earn income via skills that can be classed as mainly general or specific (which can only be applied in a particular sector, occupation or job). Workers with general skills will enjoy a greater probability of gaining employment. Conversely, the risk of not finding a job is greater for workers with specific skills. Therefore workers will choose to develop specific skills over general skills if the levels of social protection (for unemployment, early retirement etc) are sufficiently high enough to mitigate the risk of a longer period of unemployment. At enterprise level, companies that extensively use specific skills to compete will benefit from high levels of social protection.

Conversely, companies that rely on general skills will be harmed by the associated costs of social protection and cannot benefit from the supply side benefits of having high levels of social protection. As they summarize: ‘Whether social protection undermines international competitiveness therefore depends entirely on the position of countries in the international division of labor’ (Iversen, T. Soskice, D. 2001. p. 10). At the macro level they statistically compare “specific skills” countries (Germany, Sweden, Norway, France, Italy)

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with “general skills” countries (Ireland, Britain, New Zealand, Australia, Canada, USA). They state that, ‘What stands out from this comparison is that all the specific skills countries have notably higher levels of protection than any of the general skills countries’ (ibid. p. 17).

This leads to the observation that there must be more than one ESM. Anthony Giddens states that there are many European Social Models and while some fare better than others they are all mutually supportive (Giddens, A. 2007. P. xxi). Andy Green et al. identify three: Anglo-saxon, Germanic and Nordic (Green, A. 2007 P16). There is very little in the literature on the nature of the ESM within the newer Member States. A European think-tank essay points to an Eastern and Central European Social Model, based on the observations that flat rate income tax systems have been introduced and high levels of social protection are provided (Barysch, K. 2006.).

The alternative argument is that the ESM does not exist because there is too much variety between the Member States to allow for a significant level of similarity. The EESC reject this by stating that the between-group differences (ie between the EU and other advanced capitalist countries) are greater than the within-group differences (between member states). They also say that the Member States are more integrated, than other groups of countries. They also cite the “European dimension” of national social policies, of which an established “social acquis”3 is an artefact. The EESC have identified a set of core elements to the ESM. These include: 3

A collection of directives in subjects such as individual employment conditions, parental leave, working time etc.

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

State responsibility for the promotion of social cohesion, including high employment rates, high quality public services and, redistribution of wealth;



Social protection (social economic benefits, healthcare);



Social partnership, in particular the role of employers and unions in collective agreements;



Social and employment legislation to ensure equal opportunities; and,



A sustainable single European market.

(EESC. 2006.)

The achievements of the ESM include a path taken away from ‘belligerent nationalism’ and the observation that European countries top the world rankings on key welfare indicators. However, unemployment, particularly youth unemployment, remains a real challenge to the ESM. (EESC. p.10).

Modernising the European Social Model: The European Social Agenda The European Social Agenda is an acknowledgement that, in its current form, the ESM is failing, too many remain unemployed and in poverty. National social protection systems face common challenges. (European Commission. 2000.). These include the changing nature of the workplace as traditional manufacturing and agriculture have shrunk and service-based employment has grown, in structural changes towards the knowledge economy. The nuclear family is no longer the “default” assumption, yet gender inequalities remain persistent. Demographic changes are changing the structure of the labour pool while increasing demand on health and pensions.

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The Agenda states that a key challenge is to change emphasis from reducing social exclusion to fostering social inclusion as an integral part of all policy making. Here, employment is highlighted as a major factor. This is partly because of the strong association between unemployment, poverty and social exclusion, and partly because increased employment reduces costs to the state (ibid). This leads to the concept of “flexicurity”.

Flexicurity This is the balance between flexible labour markets and a high level of employment and income security thus maintaining both competitiveness and the ESM (Directorate General Employment & Social Affairs. 2007.). Flexicurity has four components: 

Flexible and secure contractual arrangements and work organisations – from employer and employee perspectives;



Effective active labour market policies – to help people cope with labour market transitions, be that between jobs or unemployment;



Modern social security arrangements – including provisions for people to combine work and personal commitments (ie child care), it also aims to increase labour market mobility; and,



Reliable and responsive lifelong learning systems – to ensure adaptability and employability at an individual level in the labour market and to maintain productivity levels at an enterprise level.

(European Expert Group on Flexicurity. 2007. p. 15).

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Drivers and theories Having defined and conceptualised the terms within the title, this section considers the drivers and their effects on social cohesion and competitiveness. The first driver to be considered is globalization. This is followed by the theories of: social capital; capability; and, emergence. The second driver considered is the EU’s policy coordination and monitoring tool, the Open Method of Coordination (OMC). Thirdly, the effects of demographic change, both of ageing population and migration, are discussed. The influence of the media as a driver on the awareness of social cohesion is introduced before discussing the relations of all of these to Lisbon and education and training.

Globalization The phenomenon of globalization has a wealth of literature on it (for example: Kofman, E. Youngs, G. (eds). 2003; Shaw, M. 1997; Richardson, P. (ed) 1997; and, Brahmbhatt, M. 1998.), ranging from the economic to sociological, academic to policy. Though some have argued that its influence has been overstated, it still has had a significant effect upon the emphasis on national education as governments have sought to maximise their impact through education and training as their influence and autonomy has diminished in other policy areas, (Green, A. 1997.). Education and training is perhaps the one area of policy where national governments are the most dominant and have the most control.

This example raises the question of whether the power of the state has been constrained by globalization, or if it is globalization that has been generated from

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nation states. It seems to be logically more likely that the state lies between, the national and the international, and mediates influence from one area to the other; it both shapes globalization and is shaped by it (Clark, I. 1998.). The idea that processes and actors are simultaneously influencing and being subject to the influences of each other is a theme that runs through this dissertation. It also makes attributing cause and separating it from effect very difficult.

Globalization is also the driver of international competitiveness. The OECD asserts that globalization, ‘is without doubt a powerful motor of prosperity and poverty reduction’ (Gurría, A. 2006.) though the management of globalization is becoming more complex. In order to reap the benefits of globalization ‘a full range of macro economic and structural policies’ as well as open markets are needed, this includes ‘human capital development’. The ‘dark side’ of globalisation is mentioned - bribery and corruption, tax evasion, money laundering, counterfeiting and piracy, and human trafficking (ibid). However, the dark side of globalization appears to the OECD to be very different (at least in this example) to the dark side of globalisation highlighted by Antonia Juhasz who contests the OECD’s assertions: Globalisation rests on the theory that a ‘rising tide’ of wealth generated by global corporations will ‘trickle down’ to the rest of society and ‘lift all boats’… …However the wealth does not trickle down. Rather, the globalisation model locks the wealth at the top, removing from governments and communities the very tools necessary to ensure equity and to protect workers, sustainable and traditional livelihoods, access to food and vital social services and democracy. In these ways, globalisation has increased poverty and inequality, both within and between nations. (Juhasz, A. 2002. p. 412.) Globalization emphasizes the need for social cohesion. This is because common experiences, common culture etc that made high levels of social cohesion more

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likely are reduced by increased global flows of information and people. One mechanism by which Globalization can reduce levels of social cohesion is explained by John Adams’s hypermobility theory. It observes that on average we travel greater distances each day than we used to – we spread ourselves further. However, time remains fixed therefore we spread ourselves more thinly in terms of time and attention devoted to each person we interact with. (There is also a strongly positive correlation with electronic mobility whose growth rate is much higher) (Adams, J. 2001). The result is that we move from hypomobile to hypermobile societies. He describes these as characterised by a “mobility apartheid” between those who have cars and those who don’t and struggle in a car-orientated world. The increasing gap between the haves and have-nots are manifested in increasing levels of crime and even higher levels of fear of crime.

Globalization has also made societies that used to be homogenous more heterogeneous. ‘How our societies should react to their new-found cultural and ethnic diversity?’ Is what Anthony Giddens defines as the social problem of today. (Giddens, A. 2007. p. 100). This contrasts with Andy Green’s observation on the influence of Globalization as a force for inter-cultural blending. He points out that while similar products and services can be found worldwide, this mixing happens at only a superficial level. Global items are taken under more local ownership and are adapted to meet the local context (Green, A. 1997).

Social Capital theory Mentioned earlier under social cohesion, social capital can be divided into three categories, economic, cultural and social (Bourdieu, P.1986). As with

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globalization, there isn’t a universally agreed definition. It refers to the institutions, relationships, and norms that shape the quality and quantity of a society's social interactions (World Bank 2002.). While individuals may be able to gain tangible benefits, social capital itself is intangible and cannot be held by individuals. This is because, ‘social capital inheres in the structure of relations between actors and among actors. It is not lodged either in the actors themselves or in physical implements of production’. (Coleman, J. S. 1988). The modern economic perspective regards social capital as: …primarily the accumulation of obligations from others according to the norm of reciprocity. In this version, donors provide privileged access to resources in the expectation that they will be fully repaid in the future. (Portes, A. 1998. p. 7.) Trust is an integral aspect of social capital. Robert Putman proposes: “thick trust” - between members of a social network who know each other well; and, “thin trust” – held for example, at community level. This is similar to Anthony Giddens’ concept of “Active trust” and “Passive trust” (which he links to “Social Solidarity”). The first has to be earned, involves two-way negotiation and must be regularly renewed, the second is an acceptance of established systems and status (Giddens, A. 2007). Social capital is also classified by Robert Putnam into: 

Bonding - strong relations within a homogenous group (“important for getting by”);



Bridging - between actors not in the same homogenous group (weaker than bonding but “important for getting ahead”); and,



Linking - between actors who are at different levels of social strata or hierarchy.

(Portes, A. 1998. p. 9. Putnam, R. 2004. P5)

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Social bonding is positively regarded, although Alejandro Portes points out that it can ‘…restrict individual freedoms and bar outsiders from gaining access to [the same] resources…’ (Portes, A. 1998. p. 22). It is interesting to see that the World Bank claims Social Capital is equally important for economic and political well being4: Increasing evidence shows that social cohesion is critical for societies to prosper economically and for development to be sustainable. …Social networks can increase productivity by reducing the costs of doing business. Social capital facilitates coordination and cooperation. (World Bank, 2002.) But how is Social Capital related to competitiveness and social cohesion? The knowledge economy relies on the collection, trading and exchanging of knowledge therefore it needs social capital. (Putnam, R. 2004.). This suggests that greater accumulation and better use of social capital will give a competitive advantage. Robert Putnam explains that social capital, pertaining to a fair, equitable and well-integrated society, is a constituent of social cohesion. He states that in his ‘…view abundant social capital of the right sort can best be seen as an intermediate policy target’ to social cohesion (ibid. p. 3). He also states that the contribution of education in increasing social capital and social cohesion is, ‘the single most important and effective policy lever’ that any government can use (ibid. 2004. p. 5).

Robert Putnam’s work on social cohesion has gained the attention of policy makers in the UK and at European level (see for example, European 4

It should also be said that (to fairly represent the World Bank’s position) that it recognises Social Capital as neutral – it can exert both economically and socially positive and negative effects (cooperatives versus cartels).

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Commission. 2005). However, Andy Green et al. note that Social Capital theory has little to say about how whole societies operate (Green, A. et al. 2006. p. 4). While it is an attractive theory at an individual level, the links between education and social cohesion at the macro-societal level are missing. Working from individual effects to societal effects may require more than aggregating individual outcomes (ibid. p. 20) (see emergence theory below). They find strong correlations between educational inequality and income equality and between income equality and social cohesion. However, ‘average levels of skills show no relationship with measures for social cohesion’ (ibid. p. 14).

Capability theory While Social Capital refers to the opportunities available through social bonds and reciprocity, Capability theory (developed by Amartya Sen) is more strongly orientated towards social cohesion. It encompasses all opportunities available to and achievements by people and centres on capability and functioning. A capability is a potential functioning – an opportunity to achieve. A functioning is an actual achievement. The range of capabilities and functionings is open ended (Walker, M. 2006)

The sum of someone’s capabilities forms their capability set, which is that individual’s real or substantive freedom to be and do what they want (Robeyns, I. 2003.). Therefore, capability is about more than attainment of skills, it is about freedom to achieve well-being. Another central idea is substantive freedom, which Sen calls agency, this is, ‘one’s ability to pursue goals that one values and that are important for the life an individual wishes to lead’ (Walker, M. 2006. p.

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3). Therefore, people are valued through the extent to which they are able to achieve their goals, rather through their financial wealth. Similarly, resources are not valued intrinsically but for of the opportunities they create (Saito, M. 2003.). Likewise, capabilities need to be considered against both current and future freedoms (Walker, M. 2005.).

Education, while not directly addressed by Sen, clearly cannot be separated from capability theory (Walker, M. 2006. Saito, M. 2003). It is both a capability in its own right and a combination of constituent capabilities. Rather than being very dictatorial, education must be delivered in a way that makes people able to act autonomously (Saito, M. 2003. p. 27). Also, developing an individual’s capabilities requires capability and functioning in that person as a child, for that capability to mature as an adult (Walker, M. 2006). ‘Lifelong education then begins with the very young child…’ (Walker, M. 2006. p. 165). ‘In short, education in the capability approach is an unqualified good for human development freedom’ (ibid. p. 168).

Anthony Giddens notes that capability relates closely to individual performance within the Knowledge Economy. Within the network labour market a minimum level of social capital or capability is required to afford an individual with enough self-reliance to cope with change. This involves taking advantage of the possibilities offered and might even extend to engineering change (Giddens, A. 2007. p. 99).

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Emergence theory It is worth briefly introducing emergence theory as its core informs some of the other theories and concepts. The basis of this theory is that properties or behaviours that occur in systems at higher levels cannot be predicted from the properties or patterns of interaction of lower levels. An example is the emergence of the mind from neurons. Another characterisation of emergence is the idea of downward causation (supervenience), where a higher-level emergent property causes effects at a lower level – either within single components or in their interaction (Sawyer, K. R. 2002. Corning, P. A. 2002.).

It has been adopted in various academic fields and while it has been recently popularised (Johnson, S. 2002) its roots are not new. A sociology journal article argues that Durkheim was an emergent theorist. While he did not use the term “emergence” the phrase “sui generis” conveys the same meaning and the constructs that he proposed, such as “social facts”, are emergent phenomena. For example, in his Rules of Sociological Method, he states that society is not a mere sum of individuals, yet he also maintains that social things are actualized only through men – they are a product of human activity (Sawyer, K. R. 2002). Sawyer argues that the idea of emergence or sui generis – individual actions result in the independent existence of a social level of analysis - has been picked up in contemporary sociological work (ibid).

The idea that new things will be identified at higher levels that are not apparent from lower levels, has important implications for a comparative education. It

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emphasises the need to compare between units of education at difference scales/ levels and the dangers of generalising.

The Open Method of Coordination (OMC) With the declaration of the Lisbon goal, European governance shifted from traditional top-down methods using (agreed) directives to decentralised “soft coordination” methods, with the Open Method of Coordination (OMC). It is described by the Lisbon European Council as a ‘means of spreading best practice and achieving greater convergence towards the main EU goals’. (European Council. 2000. article 37) The OMC has been used to coordinate Education & Training since the 2000 Lisbon Spring Council. It consists of four stages: 1. Identifying priorities; 2. Benchmarking; 3. Identifying good/ next /best practice; and, 4. Policy/peer learning.

The OMC provides a means of monitoring the implementation of European policy while respecting the sovereignty of Member States. This is enshrined in the principle of subsidiarity, which states that EU decisions must be taken as closely as possible to the citizen. In other words, the Union does not take action (except on matters for which it alone is responsible) unless EU action is more effective than action taken at national, regional or local level (Europa Glossary. 2007).

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As a soft means of coordination, the OMC cannot be used to force Member States into specific action, however it does exert a similar force to that of international surveys (such as PISA): peer pressure - created by benchmarking. Thus, while the OMC does not, at least in broad principle, break subsidiarity it exerts a strong pressure on national policy makers. Antonio Novoa asserts that, ‘In fact, one needs to look at “benchmarking” not as technique or method, but as a political position.’ (Novoa, A. Lawn, M. (eds). 2002. p. 136).

Stijn Smismans has argued (regarding employment policy) that the OMC could be dubbed the ‘Open Method of Centralisation’. It radicalises subsidiarity: from a static principle focussed on hierarchy of government, to a dynamic principle that is decentred and not dominated by any single policy objective. The OMC does not define the level of power most appropriate for decision making and therefore does not priviledge lower decision-making levels: decision making has remained top-down rather than bottom-up (Smismans, S. 2004).

In contrast, Roger Dale appears to take a more neutral line. While he concludes that the process of governing is no longer the exclusive preserve of the state he explains also that: …the OMC processes seem likely to have a ‘depoliticising’effect… …This also makes education policy making at the EU level a matter for technical problem solving between stakeholders within the system, rather than the result of the political resolution of the political conflicts between different interests. Further, the process will tend to converge around the economic interests of the already strong, rather than around their own or anyone else’s political priorities. Finally the OMC will tend to operate on the basis of proscription rather than prescription; that is to say, it will tend to patrol the boundaries of the possible rather than defining precisely what the territory thus defined should contain. (Dale, R. 2005.)

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The relationship of subsidiarity and European governance is paradoxical, the EU reiterates the importance of national decision making and recognizes the need for diversity, yet it simultaneously strives towards greater unity (Livingston, K. 2003).

It may be that the OMC has so far received slightly negative judgments because the focus has been on the benchmarking stage - Anthony Giddens, for example, describes the OMC as essentially a benchmarking process (Giddens, A. 2007. P15). This in turn can be used to “name and shame” Member States whose progress has been poor. This forms the “stick” part of the OMC which can then exercise peer pressure on these Member States to follow EU prescribed policies rather devise their own. Conversely, the latter two stages of the OMC, identifying good practice and peer learning, which might form the “carrot” part of the OMC has been slow in starting and thus, at least until recently, has not enjoyed the same emphasis as the first two stages. Tom Leney et al note that the move from the first two stages to the latter two, ‘seems predictably to be a difficult transition’ (Leney T. et al. Forthcoming. p. 15).

Demographic change: ageing population and migration. Demographic change is a major issue for Europe and this is emphasized by the fact that in 2006 and 2007 the Commission announced biennial European reports and major European Forums on the demographic situation, (European Commission. 2005a. European Commission. 2006a.). There are three components (drivers) of demographic change: mortality (life expectancy);

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fertility; and, migration. Current projections to 2050 predict that the total population size will remain approximately what it is today. However: 

Fertilty: women are having fewer children and they are having them at a later age;



Mortality: people are living longer; and so,



Migration is a major determinant of European demographic change.

Fertility The estimated fertility rate required to maintain a static population is 2.1 births per woman. The European Commission categorizes the Member States’ total fertility rates (TFRs) as either moderately low (1.6 – 1.9 births per woman) or low (1.5 births or less). This averaged in 2005 to 1.5 for the EU25 (and 1.29 for Romania and Bulgaria). It is interesting to note that the EU10 had, in 2005, an even lower TFR of 1.25. This demonstrates that an ageing European population cannot be changed simply through EU enlargement. (European Commission. 2007. Table 2.1.). However, while average fertility rates are below the population replacement level, the increase in the other two factors (mortality and migration) mean that the fertility rate would have to be even lower to cause population decline. Also, the trend and therefore impact of fertility rates is not as clear as might be assumed and this is to do with the indicator itself.

The Total Fertility Rate (TFR) is based on age specific rates in a particular year. It assumes future fertility rates of younger women based on the observed probability of giving birth amongst older cohorts of women. If a cohort of women have children at a later age the TFR will initially decrease – the tempo

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effect. The TFR will then increase when these children are then born – the quantum effect. The tempo effect is evidenced by the observation that since the 1970s the fertility rates of women aged 30 or younger have declined while since the 1980s the fertility rates of women aged over 30 have increased. There are indications that the declining TFR is not just through the tempo effect. In most EU countries there appear to be more single children while there is a greater incidence of women in their 30s and 40s who do not have children (ibid. p. 20.).

There are various hypotheses as to why women are having fewer children and at a later age. These will not be covered here except to note that there is a drive to encourage more female participation in higher education and in the labour market.

Mortality While fertility has reduced, mortality rates have decreased and so life expectancy has increased. In 1969/64 life expectancy for men in the EU-25 countries was 67.3, for women this was 73.0. This increased in 2004 to 75.6 for men and for 81.8 women. and is projected in 2050 to be 81.8 for men and 86.9 for women. To put this into context, at present a man of 60 still has 20% of his total lifespan and a woman of 60 still has 25% of hers. The trend of increasing life span continues, since 1980 there has been an annual increase of nearly two and a half months of life expectancy at birth in the EU-25. This increase is mostly due to declining mortality at higher ages, though there has also been a significant decline in mortality from cardiovascular diseases in late middle age.

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Migration In 2005 the United Nations estimated there to be about 40 million migrants in the EU27, out of a total population of about 728 million (ibid. p. 28.). Social and labour market integration are the main factors that govern the impact of migration on competitiveness and social cohesion. Educational attainment of non-nationals within EU countries tends to be significantly lower than that of nationals, though where high-skilled migrants have been attracted this is an exception. However, migrants are often under-employed compared to the level of skills they possess, this means that donor countries lose high-skilled workers while EU countries fail to make use of these skills that could increase productivity. Migrants also have lower employment rates than native workers. (ibid. p. 109). With regards to social cohesion it is worth noting that these lower employment rates may well act negatively on social cohesion. A Eurobarometer survey in 2006 found that in only Ireland, Luxembourg, the Netherlands, Portugal, Finland and Sweden did more than 50% of the respondents feel that immigrants contribute a lot to their country (ibid. p. 109).

The baby boomers One way to consider the impact of these three drivers is to consider one dominant group of the population. This group is a large cohort that forms a “bulge” within the population structure known as the baby boomers. The Commission defines the baby boomers as those born between 1945 and 1965 (ibid. p. 32.). As this group reaches retirement age it will cause the working age population (15 to 64) to peak at a predicted 67% of the European population by 2010. This demographic “dividend” means that at present the old-age dependency rate is

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four (people of working age) to one (person aged 65 or over). However, after 2010 the effect of the baby boomers retiring will cause the working age population to decrease annually by one million. The median age in the EU will also increase by ten years from 39 in 2004 to 49 in 2050. This ageing population will change the old-age dependency rate to two to one. In short, the baby boomers will change from being net contributors (ie an asset) to the social protection systems to being net receivers from social protection systems (ie a burden). This effect will be so large that increased migration cannot prevent population ageing; though it can help in reducing labour market bottlenecks. The European Commission states that, ‘The changes in demography therefore constitute a major challenge for public finances and social cohesion’ (ibid. p. 61.).

After 2010 the European population is also projected to decline from 331 million to 268 million in 2050. This has important implications for the achievement of the Lisbon goal because while the EU will remain the region with the third biggest population (after China and India), it is the only one whose total population is predicted to decline in the next four decades (ibid. 2007. p. 44). The baby boomer retirement should reduce the employment rate. However, this is expected to increase from 63% in 2004 to 70% in 2020 (ibid. p. 49.). This is due to increasing female employment rates (from 55% in 2004 to nearly 65% in 2025) and employment rates for older workers (from 40% in 2004 to 59% in 2025).

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To meet the challenges of demographic change the EU needs to increase the labour market pool. Since most of the future members of this pool are already here, much of this increase must come from higher levels of female (and older worker) participation. In order to encourage both high rates of female participation in the labour market and higher rates of fertility, flexible and attractive child care and family-friendly measures are vital. Another issue that reduces the attractiveness of employment for women is the gender gap in pay. In 2004 the difference across the EU equated to 15% lower gross hourly earnings compared to men (though this ranged from 4% in Malta to 25% in Cyprus) (ibid. p. 83). Anthony Giddens cites the promotion of family friendly policies as being crucial for the adaption to change and part of the reason that the Nordic countries have been as successful as they have. He also asserts that family friendly policies do not have to be incompatible with business friendly policies, especially if parttime work engenders much of the status and privileges of full time work. Women he says, ‘emerge as the lynch pin of any new equilibrium between households and the economy. The knowledge/ service economy has the household as its hub’ (Giddens, A. 2007. p 72.).

As they are the dominant population group, increasing the employment rates of older workers is perhaps even more important. Recently, older workers have accounted for three-quarters of all employment growth. This has come about through making remaining in work more attractive, including pension reform and reducing the attractiveness of early retirement.

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While increasing employment is regarded as a means of increasing social inclusion (and thus somehow social cohesion) it is also linked to economic productivity (and hence competitiveness). It has been suggested that productivity declines with age and that older workers are less likely to engage with innovation and new ways of working. However, a joint European Commission and Economic Policy Committee projection shows that a decline in productivity with age is likely to be limited. Productivity is a system rather than an individual attribute, hence stocks of human and social capital are more important than individuals’ ages per se. Educational attainment is another important factor which might effectively compensate for age-related reductions in productivity. (European Commission. 2007. p. 55.). In fact the same source states that, ‘Instead of focussing on whether productivity declines with age, a more relevant question is how to adapt education and lifelong learning policies in the context of the ageing society.’ (ibid. p. 59). Yet, Tom Leney at al. conclude that: With a few notable exceptions, little research and development activity has asked seriously what skills older people will need to develop and how work organisations can accommodate their needs. (Leney, T. et al. Forthcoming. p. 59). Another related issue is labour force matching to employment. The Commission notes that young labour forces tend to have high job turnover, something that an older workforce need not have. Therefore, industrial restructuring and matching of labour to jobs are likely to be more important than the age profile of the labour force for productivity. At the other end of the age scale, Tom Leney et al. point out that for many young people the transition from education and initial training into the labour market is difficult. This is evidenced by the fact that youth unemployment has been more than double that of those aged over 25.

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The media and European public awareness of social cohesion This fourth driver will be introduced rather than considered as fully as the others, but it is worth mentioning as it directly highlights the human costs when social cohesion disintegrates. There have been, since 2000, graphic examples of the break down of social cohesion. These grab the attention of citizens and the concerns of their politicians who are obliged to do what they can to rectify the situation. Examples of this are: 

The murder of Swedish Foreign Minister Anna Lindh, stabbed while shopping (September 2003);



Social tensions within the Netherlands, including the murders of politician Pim Fortuyn (May 2002) and the film maker Theo van Gogh (November 2004);



The July 7th suicide bombings in London carried out by British Citizens (with British accents), 2005; and,



Sustained rioting in French cities, including Paris and Marseilles (October and November 2005).

Relationships between drivers, competitiveness, social cohesion and education. The preceding pages show that education and training has a key role in increasing competitiveness and social cohesion. In turn, globalization requires increased competitiveness in order to provide the prosperity to meet the increasing costs on social protection systems caused by an ageing population.

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Globalization and migration can lead to greater societal heterogeneity within Member States – this places greater pressure on social cohesion.

All of the drivers and the subjects (competitiveness, social cohesion and education) are dynamic and interlinked. An OECD published brief states that countries that invest heavily in education and skills benefit most in both economic and social terms (Schleicher, A. 2006.). Education plays a vital role in preventing poverty but as Anthony Giddens states, ‘it does not automatically act to equalise life chances’ (Giddens, Anthony. 2007. p. 78). Also the population in poverty changes, therefore those who are at risk of poverty need to be targeted in addition to those in it. The provision of second chances, to help individuals benefit from, rather than loose out to, is increasingly important (ibid. P84.).

How education and training increases competitiveness is obvious; how it helps to increase social cohesion isn’t quite so clear. Andy Green et al. state that while the level of education may affect an individual’s attitudes: …what matters most however, and what best explains the variations countries in how education impacts on society, is how education and skills are distributed and the values that children and adults learn in education. (Green, A. et al. 2006. p. 4) They hypothesize firstly that education affects national levels of cohesion through socialization. They state that, ‘those who are at the top of the qualification distribution are increasingly active in political life, whereas those at the bottom are increasingly disaffected and marginalized’ (ibid. p. 57). Secondly, education exerts indirect effects on social cohesion. This is through the distribution of educational outcomes and their effect on the distribution of

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income. This means countries that have education systems that produce more equal outcomes, compared to other countries - in terms of the distribution of qualifications and skills - are more likely to have a more equal distribution of income. It is this that will promote greater social cohesion at a societal level. Conversely, while higher levels of migration would logically lead to lower levels of social cohesion, they find that the ethno-linguistic composition of a country, whatever the level of development, is not clearly supported by the data (ibid. p. 100).

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SECTION 2: the policy literature

This section scrutinises the Lisbon policy literature to compare the emphasis on social cohesion and competitiveness. It considers the links made to, and expectations placed on, education and training. This section is organised into three chronological parts: the launch and initial period (2000 - 2003); the point at which Lisbon stalls (2004) including the Mid-term review; and, the latest period - 2004 to 2007. References to the full titles of documents are italicised in order to help the reader to distinguish more easily between them.

Lisbon is launched - 2000 The “launch” document for the Lisbon goal is the Presidency Conclusions from the Lisbon European Council 23 and 24 March 2000 (European Council. 2000), though

much

comes

from

the

Commission’s

contribution

(European

Commission. 2000a). The Conclusions have an equal emphasis, declaring it is right to ‘undertake both economic and social reforms as part of a positive strategy which combines competitiveness and social cohesion’ (European Council. 2000. p. 2). It is notable that the term “social cohesion” is used generally or to refer to the overall goal. Details on the relationships between the social aspects use the terms “inclusion” or “exclusion”. The three terms are not explained and appear at times to be used almost interchangeably, for example, under paragraphs 31 (Modernising social protection) and 32 (Promoting social inclusion). Within these two paragraphs the role of employment is spelt out, ‘the best safeguard against social exclusion is a job’(ibid. p. 10. Paragraph 32). The Social Policy Agenda states that nearly two thirds of those unemployed are at

risk of poverty (European Commission. 2000. p. 12). This means that social protection systems need to be reformed, ‘…as part of an active welfare state to ensure that work pays’ (European Council. 2000. p. 9. Paragraph 31). As mentioned earlier in this dissertation, the Social Policy Agenda sees social policy as a productive factor and as a means to ‘…retain the European social values of solidarity and justice while improving economic performance.’ (European Commission. 2000. p. 6). This needs to happen because the labour force must be enlarged to help make these social protection systems financially sustainable (ibid. p. 7). This should involve the mainstreaming of inclusion within employment, education and training, health and housing policies at Member State level (European Council. 2000. p. 10. Paragraph 33).

An emphasis at European level on employment is not new to Lisbon, it was made central to the economic policy agenda by the Amsterdam Treaty (Euopean Union. 1997.) which also addressed aspects of social exclusion and anti-discrimination (ibid. p. 8). What appears to be new, though, is the linking of employment to social inclusion.

Within this context, the 2000 Spring Presidency Conclusions firmly link the role of education and training to increasing employability of the labour force, ‘Europe’s education and training systems need to adapt both to the demands of the knowledge society and to the need for an improved level and quality of employment’ (European Council. 2000. p. 8. Paragraph 25). The logic is that education and training will improve cohesion by improving the skills of the labour force, which will lead to greater employment and therefore inclusion. The

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assumption being that inclusion leads to cohesion – though how this works is not explained. Within the context of globalization, where “employability” replaces “employment”, and with an ageing population, lifelong learning becomes more important. The Presidency Conclusions call for lifelong learning to be given higher priority, ‘as a basic component of the European Social Model’ (ibid. p. 9. Paragraph 29). The 2000 Commission memorandum on lifelong learning, which argues that lifelong learning should equally promote active citizenship and employability, goes further stating that, ‘it [lifelong learning] must become the guiding principle [their emphasis] for provision and participation across the full continuum of learning contexts’ (European Commission. 2000b. p. 3.). It also notes that, ‘a noticeable shift towards more integrated policies that combine social and cultural objectives with the economic rationale for lifelong learning is taking place’ (ibid. p. 9), though the social side of what it discusses concerns social inclusion rather than cohesion.

2001 This is followed in 2001 by the Commission’s Concrete Future Objectives of Education Systems (European Commission. 2001.) whose message is echoed by the report from the Education Council to the European Council (European Council. 2001). In concluding, it follows a reiteration of the Lisbon goal with rhetoric which concerns employability and social inclusion rather than social cohesion. Even though it aims to, ‘reach out to everyone in society’ this is to be done ‘with ways of developing their skills and making best use of them’ (European Commission. 2001. p. 15. Paragraph 36). This report states, albeit briefly, that as well as reaching out to all individuals, the content must be adapted

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to the requirements of different groups and that, ‘the picture of society which it conveys…[through its curricula content and teaching materials] is that which society itself would wish’ (ibid. p. 8. Paragraph 17). The emphasis however, remains on education for employability for inclusion - rather than as a means to inform individual social values. Within this literature, there appears to be a “rising tide” approach to the provision of skills - providing more and better qualifications will benefit all (presumably either directly, through better employment, or indirectly, social protection financed from those with better employment). In contrast there is little on equity of training other than to emphasize greater gender equality. (This is also demonstrated in the 2000 Commission Communication on Social Inclusion, which talks of moving away from redistribution of prosperity via passive benefits to, ‘fostering active participation, ...to achieve a fair distribution of opportunities’ (European Commission. 2000c. p. 8.))

The 2001 Commission Communication to the European Spring Council in Stockholm (European Commission. 2001a) concentrates on the economic aspects of Lisbon. Where it deals with social aspects it mainly concerns ageing population and the sustainability of social protection systems, poverty and exclusion – issues primarily of inclusion rather than cohesion. It also proposes a social inclusion action programme and sets out a list of Structural Indicators. The 2001 Stockholm Presidency Conclusions (European Council. 2001a) concentrate on employment. Education and training is covered in terms of basic skills and lifelong learning which are vital for employability and therefore inclusion.

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The 2001 Draft Detailed Work Programme for the follow-up of the Report on the Concrete Objectives of Education and Training Systems sets out the objectives, indicators and benchmarks of the education and training component of the Lisbon Agenda. In section 41 it raises the issue of equity within education and training systems. In addition to reiterating the importance of training establishments promoting a positive picture of society, it also states that Lisbon obliges us to work towards, ‘integrating fully equity considerations in the objectives and functioning of education and training systems and establishments’ (European Commission. 2001b. p. 12) Within the final version of the work programme, adopted in 2002, this is changed to, ‘integrating fully equal opportunity considerations in the objectives and functioning of education and training’ the importance of equity appears to be slightly downplayed (European Council. 2002. P13). This work programme became known as the Education & Training 2010 Programme; the objectives are listed in the table below. Though only objective 2.3 explicitly mentions social cohesion, the rest cannot be easily classified as supporting either competitiveness or social cohesion (or inclusion). Objectives of the Detailed work programme on the follow-up of the objectives of Education and training systems in Europe. 1 1.1 1.2 1.3 1.4 1.5 2

IMPROVING THE QUALITY AND EFFECTIVENESS OF EDUCATION AND TRAINING SYSTEMS IN THE EU Improving education and training for teachers and trainers Developing skills for the knowledge society Ensuring access to ICT for everyone Increasing recruitment to scientific and technical studies Making the best use of resources

2.1 2.2 2.3

FACILITATING THE ACCESS OF ALL TO EDUCATION AND TRAINING SYSTEMS Open learning environment Making learning more attractive Supporting active citizenship, equal opportunities and social cohesion

3 3.1 3.2 3.3 3.4

OPENING UP EDUCATION AND TRAINING SYSTEMS TO THE WIDER WORLD Strengthening the links with working life and research and society at large Developing the spirit of enterprise Improving foreign language learning Increasing mobility and exchange

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3.5

Strengthening the European co-operation

Source: European Council. 2002. 2002 The Commission’s 2002 Communication to the Spring European Council in Barcelona (European Commission. 2002), like the previous one, has a focus on economic issues – though this is in part a reaction to the global economic slowdown and an interruption to the four-year trend of falling unemployment. It raises three priority areas: employment policies and active labour market policies; reforms to integrate economic markets; and, increasing knowledge for competitiveness and employment. Where it concerns cohesion, it states that concrete measures have been agreed to fight poverty, discrimination and social exclusion: the focus is on inclusion rather than cohesion. It is notable that lifelong learning is raised under competitiveness and employment rather than cohesion (this is in contrast to the Copenhagen Declaration which links lifelong learning to employability, active citizenship, social inclusion and personal development (Copenhagen Declaration. 2002.)). The assumed causal relations between education, competitiveness and cohesion are also spelt out with the communication: Improved economic and social cohesion results from the combination of stronger economic performance, the delivery of a knowledge-based society and long-term structural support of investment in infrastructures and people, notably in the least developed regions. It builds on the strength and ambition of the European social model and the welfare state. (European Commission. 2002. p. 16) It also contained an amended list of Structural Indicators, which was expanded to include 76 different indicators. Much of these cover economic aspects, where it covers the social aspects and only one (inequality of income distribution) details

49

equity of distribution, none cover equity of the distribution of educational outcomes. (which as noted in section 1, Andy Green at al. described as the main way in which education effects national levels of social cohesion). The 2002 Spring Council Presidency Conclusions (European Council. 2002a), while concentrating on economic aspects, including competitiveness, states the importance of social cohesion. This includes the importance of employment to protect against social exclusion, it also affirms that, ‘The European social model is based on good economic performance, a high level of social protection and education and social dialogue.’ And that. ‘The Lisbon goals can only be brought about by balanced efforts on both the economic and social fronts.’ (ibid. p. 8).

Also published in 2002 was the first Joint report on social inclusion, it identified, in the national action plans against poverty and social exclusion, a number of risk factors for poverty and social exclusion. Education and training clearly has a role in reducing some of the risk factors shown in the table below, through raising expectations and removing barriers or in engendering positive social values. Risk factors for poverty and social exclusion Primary risk factors Unemployment (especially long term) Secondary risk factors low income low quality employment homelessness, weak health immigration

discrimination and racism disability old age family break-ups drug abuse and alcoholism living in an area of multiple disadvantage

low qualifications and early school leaving gender inequality Source: Directorate General Employment & Social Affairs. 2002. p. 10.

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2003 The 2003 Commission communication to the Spring European Council (European Commission. 2003a) retains a general emphasis seen in the two previous years. It notes that a lack of data hampers the monitoring of progress for the social cohesion aspects (something mentioned in the previous year). This suggests that if there is little to benchmark - use of the OMC here must be limited. The 2003 Spring Council Presidency Conclusions note that many structural things have been achieved (such as agreeing a Community patent) but much remains. They state that, ‘We reaffirm our strong personal commitment to the timely and effective delivery of reforms across the three pillars of the Lisbon strategy - economic, social, and environmental.’ (European Council. p. 2) Though this is followed by the assertion that: ‘The promotion of sustainable growth and the creation of more and better jobs must remain firmly at the top of the Union’s agenda.’ (ibid. p. 3).

Lisbon stalls and the Mid-term review - 2004 The 2004 Commission communication to the European Spring Council, delivered before enlargement on 1st May 2004, marks the formation of a watershed within the Lisbon Agenda. It confirms that progress is not being made quickly enough. This includes: employment and productivity rates; reform of the internal markets to increase competitiveness; and, levels of investment in human capital (education). It expresses concerns for increasing poverty rates because of the continuing lack of sustainability of social protection and pensions systems. The Commission recommends to the Council that investment, competitiveness and employment should be priorities for 2004. (European Commission. 2004a. p. 18).

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The March 2004 Presidency Conclusions agree with the Commission Communication and, after acknowledging that there must be faster translation of policy into concrete measures, state that, ‘The most important policy issues that deliver higher growth and employment must be prioritised’ (European Council. 2004. p. 4). While it declares that ‘Social cohesion is central’ this is not until page nine of a 23 page document (ibid. p. 9).

The Joint interim report of the Council and the Commission on the implementation on the Education and Training 2010 programme (European Council. 2004a) carries a similar tone on the rate of progress. It acknowledges that transforming education and training systems is a medium or longer term process and that it needs time for reforms to take effect (a point raised in the previous section). Even so, it states that the available information leads to the conclusion that the pace of reform must be accelerated for the objectives in education and training to be achieved.

The report raises three priority areas. The first is for higher levels of investment (both public and private – which is much lower compared to the United States). This should be more efficiently and effectively spent in improving human resources and involves mainly higher education and adult education/ Vocational Education Training (VET). It states that higher education is, ‘at the crossroads of research, education and innovation’ (ibid. p. 12) and is therefore integral to the knowledge society and competitiveness. VET is quoted as being vital in providing people with specific competences and qualifications for a labour market whose demands for skills can quickly evolve. Complementing this is the

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development of principles for the validation of non-formal and informal learning.; while the emphasis of the report is on competitiveness, this clearly supports inclusion as well as employability. The second priority is the implementation of, ‘coherent and comprehensive national lifelong learning strategies’ (ibid. p. 5). The third priority is recognition of qualifications and certificates across Europe, which is, ‘essential for the development of a European labour market and European citizenship’ (ibid. p. 5). The validation of nonformal and informal learning and the third priority are important for both an ageing workforce and for labour mobility.

The logical causal relationship is also restated within the report, namely that: Investment in education and training is a key factor of the Union's competitiveness, sustainable growth, and employment and therefore a prerequisite for achieving the economic, social and environmental goals set in Lisbon for the European Union. …For the Union to perform better than its competitors in the knowledge-based economy, investing more and more effectively in education and training is of paramount importance. … At the same time, the knowledge-based society generates new needs in terms of social cohesion, active citizenship and personal fulfilment to which education and training can make a significant contribution. (ibid. p. 4. p. 8) The message here is clear, the social aims of Lisbon are important but cannot be achieved without first achieving the economic aims; competitiveness must be achieved in order to afford the means of achieving greater social cohesion (or inclusion).

In November 2004 the independent, Mid-term review was published by the High Level Group chaired by the former Prime Minister of the Netherlands Wim Kok – known as the “Kok” report (High Level Group. 2004). The Kok report offers a

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blunt assessment of progress, while acknowledging the global events and trends have not helped, it states that the European Union and Member States have failed to act with, ‘sufficient urgency’ (ibid. p. 6). This is due to, ‘an overloaded agenda, poor coordination and conflicting priorities.

…[and] the lack of

determined political action’ (ibid. p. 6). Though they agree that the direction of the Lisbon strategy is right, the report explains that: The problem is, however, that the Lisbon strategy has become too broad to be understood as an interconnected narrative. Lisbon is about everything and thus about nothing. Everybody is responsible and thus no one. The end result of the strategy has sometimes been lost. (ibid. p. 16) While there has been, ‘incoherence and inconsistency, both between participants and policies’(ibid p. 40), the gap between the EU and the US and Asian competitor economies has grown.

As has been stated elsewhere, economic growth and increased employment is needed in order to provide the means to sustain the social aspects and the European Social Model. As the report emphasizes, ‘Europe, in short, must focus on growth and employment in order to achieve the Lisbon ambitions’ (ibid. p. 16). However, what is new about the Kok report is that it appears to be the first time in a major policy document that the social aspects are explicitly described as means to increase competitiveness: ‘In their turn, social cohesion and environmental sustainability can contribute to a higher growth and employment’ (ibid. p. 6). This happens through helping to reduce levels of poverty and helping to increase labour supply. Thus social cohesion can be, ‘a means of growth rather than a claim on it’ (ibid. p. 39). The theme of economic growth coming first but social cohesion contributing to it is summarized:

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It [Lisbon] wants to embed Europe’s commitment to social cohesion and the environment in the core of the growth and jobs generation process so they are part of Europe’s competitive advantage. This cannot be done against a background of stagnating or slowly rising demand. The wider macroeconomic framework, both the pursuit of monetary and fiscal policy, must be as supportive of growth as possible. (ibid. p. 16) Lisbon re-launched with a new emphasis – 2004 Even prior to the Kok report there appears to be an increasing emphasis on competitiveness and employment. The May 2004 Presidency Conclusions (European Council. 2004b) state that: The most important policy issues that deliver higher growth and employment must be prioritised. Accordingly, this year's Spring European Council focuses on two issues: sustainable growth and more and better jobs. (ibid. p. 4) Yet, later within the same conclusions it states that, ‘social cohesion must be central’ (ibid. p. 8) though much of what is described pertains primarily to social inclusion rather than cohesion.

2005 The Council (Education, Youth and Culture) conclusions, submitted to the 2005 Spring European Council, maintains this emphasis, asserting that, ‘education and training is therefore essential, as they provide the indispensable skills base and creative potential’ (European Council. 2005. p. 3). With regard to helping to increase levels of social cohesion, they conclude that this happens through promoting understanding and tolerance. Early education can help children develop social skills, while citizenship education, ‘…is a complementary means of combating cultural and social exclusion and facilitating the integration of

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young people as well as people with special needs into society’ (ibid. p. 4). This articulates, for the first time at this level, how education increases social cohesion.

In February 2005 the Commission issued a Communication on the second phase of the Social Agenda to 2010 (European Commission. 2005). This reaffirms social policy as an economically productive factor and conceptually binds them together. It also notes that the Social Agenda should lead towards improving human and social capital. Rather than “cohesion”, “solidarity” is the leading term here, which in practical terms encompasses equal opportunities and inclusion. The Communication also explicitly recognizes the ‘cost of the lack of social policy’ (ibid. p. 2) and that intergenerational poverty which permanently excludes from full participation in society, ‘…is socially and economically not sustainable’ (ibid. p. 9).

The 2005 Commission Communication to the Spring European Council (European Commission. 2005b) reiterates this position. Following the logic, employment must come first in order to resource the social aspects. Yet it seems almost contradictory to place growth and employment as the two priorities and keep social cohesion as central to the strategy. The March 2005 Presidency Conclusions of the European Council welcome the communication and reiterate the role of employment as a vehicle for increased social cohesion (European Council. 2005a. p. 9).

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In July 2005 the Commission issued a communication on Cohesion Policy in Support of Growth and Jobs: Community Strategic Guidelines, 2007 – 2013 (European Commission. 2005c). As the title suggests: …the limited resources available to cohesion policy should be concentrated on promoting sustainable growth, competitiveness and employment as set out in the renewed Lisbon strategy. Clearly, macroeconomic stability and structural reforms are a precondition for the success of cohesion policy along with a range of other conditions which favour investment (including effective implementation of the Single Market, administrative reforms, good governance, a business-friendly climate, and the availability of a highly skilled workforce. (ibid. p. 4) It sets out three priorities: 

Improving the attractiveness of Member States – by improving access, services and preserving environmental potential;



Encouraging innovation and entrepreneurship and the knowledge economy – including an increase in research and innovation capacity; and,



Creating more and better jobs – through increasing investment in human capital and adaptability of workers and enterprises. (ibid. p. 12)

The November 2005 communication from the Commission on the Draft 2006 progress report on the implementation of the Education & Training 2010 work programme (European Commission 2005d), as well as reiterating the jobs and growth (and social cohesion) message, expands on how education and training increases economic growth while increasing social cohesion. It states that the progress of reforms made in the Lisbon agenda will be a major determinant of the long-term sustainability of the European social model. Therefore, it observes 57

that, (with the exception of the increasing the numbers of mathematics, science and technology graduates), there has been little progress against the benchmarks most closely related to social cohesion (ibid. p. 10). It highlights equity and governance of national education and training systems as a necessary condition for Lisbon: …due attention needs to be paid to the whole lifelong learning continuum, and the efficiency, quality and equity objectives of the systems must be given equal consideration. This is the sine qua non of achieving the Lisbon goals while strengthening the European social model. (ibid. p. 10) According to the communication this, ‘…implies that the outcomes and benefits of education and training should be independent of socio-economic background and other factors that may lead to educational disadvantage’ (ibid. p. 11). Therefore it should be accessible to all and differentiated according to learners’ specific needs. The communication then states that, ‘Investments should be targeted on areas where the social and economic returns are highest, thereby effectively combining efficiency and equity’ (ibid. p. 11). This is hugely ambitious – it must be impossible to level the varying influences of socioeconomic background to ensure equity of education and training outcomes.

The communication also gives an insight into the progress of the Education & Training 2010 work programme through the OMC process. For the first time peer learning activities will be focussed on in lifelong learning and it marks a shift from benchmarking.

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2006 The 2006 Commission communication to the Spring European Council (European Commission. 2006b) differs from previous versions. It is the first one under the revamped Lisbon strategy – the “Lisbon Community programme”; it consists of three volumes and it analyses the Member States’ national reform programmes. Within this communication it concentrates on three areas: macroeconomic; micro-economic; and, employment. The emphasis is on economic and competitiveness issues, where social aspects are mentioned, it is under the topic of ageing population and the requirements for flexicurity and the European Social Agenda. The role of education and training within this concerns research and innovation – with a focus on higher education. These emphases are reiterated by the March 2006 Presidency Conclusions (European Council. 2006). The roots of these emphases can be seen in the Hampton Court Agenda which was launched in October 2005 and chose similar themes (work streams), to be mainstreamed in the Lisbon work programme (European Commission. 2005e).

The extremely ambitious nature of the aims of the Spring 2005 communication from the Commission to the Council– to balance the varying influences of socioeconomic background to ensure equity of education and training outcomes – appear to be recognised in 2006. The September 2006 communication, on the efficiency and equity in European education and training systems (European Commission. 2006c), calls on a coordinated approach with other policy areas such as housing and social security. The document also notes that free access to higher education alone is not sufficient to ensure equity, because earlier socioeconomic disadvantages can discourage participation. However, it does

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demonstrate an emphasis (albeit a lesser one compared to employability) on education and training to increase social cohesion.

2007 The Commission Communication to the 2007 Spring Council notes that the, ‘… renewed Strategy for Growth and Jobs is beginning to deliver results’ (European Commission. 2006d. p. 5). There is little on cohesion except to reference the cohesion policy (European Commission. 2005c.). The March 2007 Presidency Conclusions (European Commission. 2007.) are similar in emphasis; it is competitiveness that has the focus, with social cohesion not addressed until paragraphs 18 and 19. These concentrate on the European social model and flexicurity.

Summary From considering the policy literature covered in this section it is possible to draw a small number of points these are expanded within the discussion that follows in Section 4: 

The terms Social cohesion, social inclusion and social exclusion are used ambiguously;



Employment and employability are regarded as key for both increasing social cohesion and competitiveness;



Competitiveness and cohesion are seen as mutually reinforcing, but economic growth is seen as a precondition and cohesion is seen as an economically productive factor.

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

Education and training – particularly lifelong learning – are seen as key to improve employment rates as well as competitiveness and social cohesion



The emphasis between competitiveness and social cohesion appears to move towards competitiveness – however this is blurred by the emphasis on employment, which is seen to serve both.

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SECTION 3: alternative sources and perspectives on Lisbon Emphasis within Lisbon below EU level Having drawn some conclusions from the emphasis at European level this section considers, more briefly, what may be happening below this level.

In 2002, Cedefop published a report on the national response to the Commission’s memorandum on lifelong learning (Cedefop. 2002). It notes that around half of the national responses (AT, BE(-Wallonia), DK, FI, FR, DE, EL, IE, PT) agree with lifelong learning policies - equally favouring employability and active citizenship. Interestingly, the majority of the remainder put greater emphasis on active citizenship (BE (-French speaking), IS, IT, LU, NO, ES, SE). The reports from The Netherlands and the United Kingdom appear to place a stronger accent on employability issues, but this may be down to differences in understanding of the relationship between active citizenship and employability. There was also criticism that there wasn’t more explicit emphasis on social cohesion and that there seemed to be too little social responsibility for provision and access to, and outcomes of lifelong learning.

In 2005, the National Reform Programmes for Growth and Employment (NRPs) were produced by the Member States5. The NRPs were produced to the Commission integrated guidelines. These are economic in focus and do not directly cover social cohesion6. However, some countries refer to the social 5

Available on the EU Growth and Jobs website. http://ec.europa.eu/growthandjobs/key/nrp20052008_en.htm 6 This is most likely because the social inclusion aspects of the Renewed Lisbon Agenda are expected to be covered by the National Action Plans Against Poverty and Social Exclusion. Available at: http://ec.europa.eu/employment_social/social_inclusion/naps_en.htm . While these

dimension and the role of education. This can be used as an indication that countries have varying priorities between social cohesion and competitiveness and hence the priorities for education.

Lifelong learning features prominently as a means to increase levels of human capital and therefore employment. This in turn should reform the labour market and increase competitiveness (for example, PL, CZ, LV) (Poland. 2005. Czech Republic. 2005. P30. Latvia. 2005.). Some countries describe employment as a means to increase levels of inclusion (for example, CZ, LT, SK) (Slovak Republic 2005). Spain describes increasing human capital levels not only to increase competitiveness but to, ‘…achieve equality of opportunity…’ (Spain 2005. p. 73). Slovenia not only aims to increase levels of cohesion but regards the role of cohesion policy as providing conditions for economic growth and competitiveness (Slovenia. 2005).

While some countries emphasize competitiveness (for example, LT, LV, EE) others appear to see competitiveness and cohesion almost in tension with each other; and are trying to achieve economic reforms while maintaining social protection and social cohesion (BE, PT) (Belgium. 2005. Portugal. 2005. Estonia. 2005.). Some countries are more positive. Germany sees knowledge and skills as ‘the backbone of Germany’s economic and social prosperity’ (Germany. 2005. p. 7). Austria aims to safeguard its prosperity, which will be done via education for competitiveness (Austria. 2005.) .The Greek report sees that, ‘The effective operation of the labour market - at individual and corporate level - is both the

are available via the Growth and Jobs website they are not as prominent as the NRPs.

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outcome and a requirement for the success of all economic and social development objectives’ (Greece. 2005. p. 37).

The specific messages from these reports should be considered tentatively – they are only one source. However, they show that the Member States prioritise competitiveness and cohesion differently and therefore have differing policy emphases on competitiveness and cohesion. On one level this might be surprising, all the Member States have signed up to the common aims of Lisbon, all are subjected to the common drivers described earlier in this dissertation. However, there are differences, perhaps the most obvious are their social models.

What does the data say? The Structural Indicators provide possible evidence of the impact of policy emphasis on social cohesion and competitiveness. However, their use in comparisons over time is problematic. Enlargement means that the EU now compared to the EU in 2000 is not the same and missing data is an issue. Also, (drawing on the comments noted in Section 1) if the changes to be expected are subtle, then it will be difficult to identify them amongst the “noise” caused by other factors. However, they should capture the effect of the different European social models. If we accept that the European social model(s) is central to the Lisbon Agenda, then the indicators should reflect the priorities the different models place on competitiveness and social cohesion.

The table below compares the EU27 using a selection of Structural Indicators, some from the short-list of 14. Where the columns are shaded blue this indicates 64

that the lower the value the better the performance, conversely for those in green, the higher the value the better the performance. Years have been chosen as a compromise between latest data and reaching comparability between countries and indicators, despite missing data. They are grouped into six models: Core; Anglo; Nordic; Baltic; Mediterranean; and, Central. There are some countries that do not appear to fit in any, and the Central and Mediterranean countries exhibit more range than the others. Some are difficult to assign to just one group, for example, the Netherlands shares characteristics with the Nordic Countries (such as a low poverty rate) it has also followed some Anglo-Saxon ideas. Similarly, Slovenia shares some characteristics of the Core European countries. While these groups are orientated geographically, their groupings are based on their social, economic and cultural characteristics. The indicators below show the range and common characteristics between the groups. The Baltics, for example, are characterised by a relatively high level of early school leavers, but also by low long-term unemployment.

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Selected structural indicators on competitiveness and cohesion grouped by social model Inequality of income distributio n1 Code Year EU27 EU25

sc010 2005

At risk-ofpoverty rate after social transfers – total2 sc022 2005 16

4.9

Longterm unemploy ment rate – total3 sc061 2006

Jobless household s – total4

sc072 2006

Early school leavers – total5

3.6 3.6

9.8

sc051 2006 15.3 15.1

Employm ent rate – total6

em011 2006

Youth education attainment level – total7 ir091 2006

Lifelong Learnin g– total8

64.4 64.7

77.8 77.7

em051 2006 9.6 10.1

Science and technolog y graduates – total9 ir041 2005 13.2 13.4

Real GDP growth rate10

Labour product ivity per hour worked1

130 110.7 116.5 99.5 156 119.8 122.1

2

eb012 2006

eb022 2004 3 3

91.6

Core Be De Fr At Lu Nl Mean

4.1 4.1 4 3.8 3.8 4 4.0

15 13 13 12 13 11 12.8

4.2 4.7 4 1.3 1.4 1.7 2.9

14.3 10.6 10.9 8.8 6.7 7.4 9.8

12.6 13.8 13.1 9.6 17.4 12.9 13.2

61 67.5 63 70.2 63.6 74.3 66.6

82.4 71.6 82.1 85.8 69.3 74.7 77.7

7.5 7.5 7.5 13.1 8.2 15.6 9.9

10.9 9.7 22.5 9.8 8.6 12.3

3.2 2.8 2 3.3 6.2 2.9 3.4

Anglo Ie Uk Mean

5 5.5 5.3

20 18 19.0

1.4 1.2 1.3

7.9 10.7 9.3

12.3 13 12.7

68.6 71.5 70.1

85.4 78.8 82.1

7.5 26.6 17.1

24.5 18.4 21.5

6 2.8 4.4

119.3 92.2 105.8

Nordic Dk Fi Se

3.5 3.6 3.3

12 12 9

0.8 1.9 1.1

7.7 10.5

10.9 8.3 12

77.4 69.3 73.1

77.4 84.7 86.5

29.2 23.1

14.7 17.7 14.4

3.5 5.5 4.2

101.8 96.3 102.7

:

Mean

3.5

11.0

1.3

9.1

10.4

73.3

82.9

26.2

15.6

4.4

100.3

Baltic Lv Lt Ee Mean

6.7 6.9 5.9 6.5

19 21 18 19.3

2.5 2.5 2.8 2.6

6.8 7 6 6.6

19 10.3 13.2 14.2

66.3 63.6 68.1 66.0

81 88.2 82 83.7

6.9 4.9 6.5 6.1

9.8 18.9 12.1 13.6

11.9 7.5 11.4 10.3

35.7 44.1 41.4 40.4

Mediterr anean Es Pt Gr It Mean

5.4 8.2 5.8 5.7 6.3

20 20 20 19 19.8

1.8 3.8 4.8 3.4 3.5

6.3 5.8 8.1 9.2 7.4

29.9 39.2 15.9 20.8 26.5

64.8 67.9 61 58.4 63.0

61.6 49.6 81 75.5 66.9

10.4 3.8 1.9 6.1 5.6

11.8 12 10.1 11.6 11.4

3.9 1.3 4.3 1.9 2.9

89.2 56.7 72.2 91.6 77.4

Mt Cy

4.1 4.3

15 16

2.9 0.9

6.7 4.9

41.7 16

54.8 69.6

50.4 83.7

5.5 7.1

3.4 3.6

3.3 3.8

73.5 67.8

Central Hu Pl Cz Sk Si Mean

4 6.6 3.7 3.9 3.4 4.3

13 21 10 13 12 13.8

3.4 7.8 3.9 10.2 2.9 5.6

11.6 13.5 7.3 9.6 7.2 9.8

12.4 5.6 5.5 6.4 5.2 7.0

57.3 54.5 65.3 59.4 66.6 60.6

82.9 91.7 91.8 91.5 89.4 89.5

3.8 4.7 5.6 4.3 15 6.7

5.1 11.1 8.2 10.2 9.8 8.9

3.9 6.1 6.1 8.3 5.2 5.9

54.1 46 52.2 56.3 68.3 55.4

80.5 77.2

1.3 1.3

8.6 10.3

6.1 7.7

29.9

Bg : 5 11.6 18 58.6 Ro 4.9 18 4.2 9.7 19 58.8 Source: Eurostat Structural Indicators. 2007. Notes: Please refer to Eurostat for full details of the data above including caveats and on missing values.

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1

Income quintile share ratio. Ratio of the total income of the highest earning 20% compared to the lowest earning 20%. The higher the ratio the greater the inequality in income distribution. 2 The share of persons with an equivalised disposable income below the risk-of-poverty threshold, which is set at 60 % of the national median equivalised disposable income (after social transfers). 3 Long-term unemployed (12 months and more) as a percentage of the total active population. 4 Share of persons aged 18 - 59 who are living in households where no-one works. 5 Percentage of the population aged 18-24 with at most lower secondary education and not in further education or training. 6 The employment rate is calculated by dividing the number of persons aged 15 to 64 in employment by the total population of the same age group. 7 The number of young people aged 20-24 years having attained at least upper secondary education attainment level, i.e. with an education level ISCED 3a, 3b or 3c long minimum as a percentage of the total population of the same age group. 8 Persons aged 25 to 64 who stated that they received education or training in the four weeks preceding the survey as a percentage of the total population of the same age group. 9 Tertiary graduates in science and technology per 1 000 of population aged 20-29 years. 10 Growth rate of GDP volume - percentage change on previous year. 11 GDP in Purchasing Power Standards (PPS) per hour worked relative to EU-15 (EU15 = 100) 12 Eurostat Structural Indicator code

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The following tables compare the means between models, using independent samples T-tests, for eight of the variables listed in the table above. The values within the shaded cells are the P values. Those cells that are shaded a light grey have p values which show that the means of the two groups compared are not significantly different at 95% confidence. The cells shaded light yellow indicate that the two groups compared have means that are significantly different at 95% confidence. Difference of means between social models for Labour productivity per hour worked (GDP per hour in PPS) Models Core Anglo Nordic Baltic Mediterranean Central

Means 114.40 105.75 100.27 40.40 77.43 52.15

Core 114.40

Anglo 105.75

Nordic 100.27

Baltic 40.40

Mediterranean 77.43

0.69 0.408 0.002 0.036 0.002

0.635 0.009 0.128 0.004

0.000 0.067 0.000

0.013 0.17

0.024

Central 52.15

Difference of means between social models for Real GDP growth rate Models Core Anglo Nordic Baltic Mediterranean Central

Means 3.66 4.40 4.40 10.27 2.85 6.10

Core 3.66

Anglo 4.40

Nordic 4.40

Baltic 10.27

Mediterranean 2.85

0.585 0.459 0.001 0.407 0.037

1.000 0.072 0.353 0.365

0.018 0.183 0.206

0.004 0.046

0.031

Central 6.10

Difference of means between social models for Employment rate Models Core Anglo Nordic Baltic Mediterranean Central

Means 66.60 70.05 73.27 66.00 63.03 59.13

Core 66.60

Anglo 70.05

Nordic 73.27

Baltic 66.00

Mediterranean 63.03

0.352 0.062 0.839 0.233 0.029

0.390 0.137 0.097 0.037

0.053 0.023 0.008

0.321 0.065

0.255

Central 59.13

Difference of means between social models for long-term Unemployment rate Models Core Anglo

Means 2.9 1.3

Core 2.9 0.181

Anglo 1.3

Nordic 1.3

Baltic 2.6

Mediterranean 3.5

Central 5.6

Nordic Baltic Mediterranean Central

1.3 2.6 3.5 5.6

0.103 0.748 0.530 0.035

0.943 0.003 0.084 0.108

0.018 0.039 0.048

0.304 0.110

0.149

Difference of means between social models for inequality of income distribution Models Core Anglo Nordic Baltic Mediterranean Central

Means 3.89 5.25 3.47 6.50 6.28 4.55

Core 3.89

Anglo 5.25

Nordic 3.47

Baltic 6.40

Mediterranean 6.28

0.000 0.029 0.000 0.001 0.227

0.004 0.064 0.356 0.538

0.001 0.015 0.241

0.792 0.071

0.117

Central 4.55

Difference of means between social models for Risk-of-poverty rate after social transfers Models Core Anglo Nordic Baltic Mediterranean Central

Means 12.71 19.00 11.00 19.33 19.75 14.25

Core 12.71

Anglo 19.00

Nordic 11.00

Baltic 19.33

Mediterranean 19.75

0.000 0.111 0.000 0.000 0.422

0.013 0.822 0.355 0.256

0.003 0.000 0.315

0.623 0.139

0.060

Central 14.25

Difference of means between social models for Lifelong Learning rates Models Core Anglo Nordic Baltic Mediterranean Central

Means 10.63 17.05 26.15 6.10 5.55 4.60

Core 10.63

Anglo 17.05

Nordic 26.15

Baltic 6.10

Mediterranean 5.55

0.236 0.002 0.082 0.058 0.013

0.460 0.224 0.150 0.101

0.004 0.003 0.000

0.815 0.079

0.630

Central 4.60

Difference of means between social models for early school leaving rates Models Core Anglo Nordic Baltic Mediterranean Central

Means 12.09 12.65 10.40 14.17 26.45 7.48

Core 12.09

Anglo 12.65

Nordic 10.40

Baltic 14.17

Mediterranean 26.45

0.847 0.496 0.469 0.008 0.074

0.216 0.678 0.148 0.106

0.247 0.048 0.234

0.115 0.069

0.013

Central 7.48

Rather than use prose, the best way to summarise the significant characteristics of each group is in another table:

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Relative characteristics of the six identified European social models Core  Low inequality of income distribution  Relatively low real GDP growth rate  High productivity per hour worked  Low risk of poverty after social transfers Anglo  High risk of poverty after social transfers  Relatively high productivity per hour worked  High inequality of income distribution Nordic  Low inequality of income distribution  Low risk of poverty after social transfers  High employment rate  Low long-term unemployment  High lifelong learning rate

Baltic  High inequality of income distribution  High real GDP growth rate  Low productivity per hour worked  High long term unemployment Mediterranean  High risk of poverty after social transfers  High inequality of income distribution  High number of early school leavers Central  High long term unemployment  Relatively low rate of early school leavers  Low employment rate  High real GDP growth rate  Low productivity per hour worked  Low lifelong learning rate

Source: table above.

The table above brings out some interesting points particularly, about the Baltic and Central groups both of which have low productivity per employee but have high growth rates.

The four charts below show the distribution of both Member States and these typologies by the eight variables. These illustrate the relative characteristics, as well as similarities and differences listed in the tables above. The Baltic countries are closely clustered – often more so than the Nordics; who tend to score most favourably (though they are not as productive as the Core countries). The Central countries have a wide distribution; this might indicate that they form more than one social model. It is notable that the distribution showing rates of poverty after transfers (third chart) shows the six models are equally divided between low and high rates, rather than intermediate. It also illustrates a positive correlation between high risk of poverty and high income inequality. Data is from the table above.

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72

Comparison between indicators for productivity and economic growth

LV 11.5

EE Baltic

Real GDP growth rate

9.5

SK 7.5

LT

PL

CZ

5.5

FI

SI

Nordic

EL HU 3.5

LU

IE

Central

CY

ES

MT Mediterranean

AT

Anglo SE DK

Core

UK

NL

DE

BE

FR

IT 1.5 30

50

70

90

110

GDP per hour in PPS

130

150

170

74

Comparison between indicators for employment and long-term unemployment 10.5

SK

9.5

Longterm unemployment rate

8.5 PL

7.5 6.5

Central

5.5 BG 4.5

RO

3.5

HU

IT

EL BE

DE FR

CZ SI

MT 2.5

LT

Core Baltic ES

1.5

PT

Mediterranean

LV

LU

EE FI Anglo IE AT CY

UK

NL

SE Nordic

0.5 54

59

64

69

DK

74

Employment rate

75

Comparison between indicators for poverty and income inequality

PL

LT

20.5 IE

ES Anglo

EL IT

Baltic

Risk rate of poverty after social transfers

18.5 RO

UK

PT

Mediterranean LV

EE

16.5 CY BE

MT

14.5 AT LU DK

12.5 SI

FI

Central

HU DE

SK FR Core

Nordic

NL

10.5 CZ SE 8.5 3

4

5

6 Income inequality

76

7

8

Comparison between indicators for lifelong learning and early school leaving

39.5

MT

PT

34.5

ES

Early school leavers rate

29.5 Mediterranean

24.5 IT

19.5

RO BG

LV LU CY

EL 14.5

SE

Baltic EE FR HU IE

DE BE

UK DK

LT

9.5

Anglo NL

Core AT

Nordic

FI SK PL CZ

4.5 0

5

Central

SI 10

15

20

25

30

Lifelong learning rate

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Conclusions from the Structural Indicators The qualitative and quantitative information reviewed in this section considers some of the evidence for the emphasis on social cohesion and competitiveness below EU level. This shows that there are contrasts with the emphasis at European level, it also shows that there are significant differences between similar groups of Member States. This may illustrate variations in the European social model followed by these groups.

Individual perspectives on Lisbon I have collected a third source of information (in addition to the policy literature and the structural indicators) by approaching policy makers or researchers who have been either directly or indirectly involved in the Lisbon Agenda since 2000. Three people, from the European Training Foundation (A), Cedefop (B) and from the UK’s Joint International Unit7 (C) were asked from their personal perspective: Has the policy emphasis (mainly at European level) been equally placed, from the beginning, on achieving greater levels of competitiveness and social cohesion, or has one been favoured over the other? Has this emphasis changed since 2000 and if so, when and why? This was done through a combination of email and semi-structured interviews. While these are personal, rather than official views, their perspectives provide a third source of information. These three sources then allow for some triangulation of information between them.

7

Until recent government reforms, in June 2007, the Joint International Unit reported to the Department for Education and Skills and to the Department for Work and Pensions (DWP), it now reports to DWP, the Department for Innovation Universities and Skills and the Department for Business, Enterprise and Regulatory Reform.

Respondent A: Their view was that the emphasis has been economic since the start and that this was increased after the Mid-term review. The emphasis on equity in the distribution of educational outcomes has been triggered by the international surveys of education such as PISA. Putting aside declarations on priorities within the policy literature, their view was that the best means of identifying priorities is through tracking where the money is spent, in particular the European Structural Funds.

Respondent B: From involvement in drafting the memorandum on lifelong learning, and its accompanying Commission communication, they stated that, ‘it was an explicit aim to balance competitiveness and social cohesion’ (Email. 07 August 2007). They believe that this equal emphasis has had an impact in the “Objectives process” from 2001 and the Copenhagen process. He notes that convergence into the Education and Training 2010 programme, ‘…hasn’t really changed this emphasis very much, you will see that there’s quite a lot of continuity in terms of issues and objective’ (ibid). They confirm that since the mid-term review, there is a stronger emphasis on competitiveness and growth. However, they note that: ..the direct impact on the internal Education and training 2010 agenda is limited…In budgetary terms education and training has been strengthened (LLL [Lifelong learning] Programme). This is probably the most important indicator signalling that a balanced education and training policy has not been sacrificed…

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Respondent C: They noted first that the Lisbon Agenda marks a huge change in the direction of EU policy from structural issues towards policies that directly target, and appear to recognise the value (both economically and socially) of EU citizens.

They confirmed that different countries have differing views on the relationship between competitiveness and social cohesion. The UK takes an economic view of social cohesion, ‘competitiveness equals cohesion’ (Interview. 14 August 2007). They contrasted this with some of the Core and Southern European countries who see the two as being in tension. They confirmed that the UK and Nordic countries had a big influence in the change in emphasis in the renewed Lisbon Agenda.

Another aspect they raised related to coordination both at national level and at European level. They noted that because Lisbon is so broad it often spans more than one government department - usually the ministry for education and the ministry for labour. In a few countries coordination between the two may not only be poor but subject to active competition and rivalry between them. These differences also extend to the European level. The Employment and the Economic and Financial Affairs Committees have been dominated by the Anglo and Nordic countries – who have an applied view of education and training. This is in contrast to the Education Committee, who they described as being dominated by Core and Mediterranean countries. They take a more traditional view of the purpose of education (academic rather than economic). They explained that this is the reason why the emphasis within the Education and

80

Training Programme has not changed to the jobs and growth mantra (as observed by Respondent B).

They explained that a growing awareness of globalisation has led to an increased emphasis on citizenship, though this has also been emphasised by concern about levels of racism within the EU10.When asked about equity and efficiency within education and training systems, they explained it as a matter of semantics: ‘equity and efficiency equals cohesion and competitiveness’ (ibid).

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SECTION 4: Limitations of the study While the methodology and approach to answering the title of this dissertation has been carefully considered it is inevitably confronted by the same challenges that many studies in Comparative Education research face. The main difficulties in tackling this project concern the size of the Lisbon Agenda. It is difficult to balance breadth against depth and in many aspects of the study, such lifelong learning, detail has been limited to maintain breadth. Each aspect of this topic is broad: from the range of overlapping terms and concepts; to the number of programmes, policies and groups, reports and indicators; and the number of countries involved. One topic that deserves further attention is the European Social Agenda and the different social models across the Member States. There is not as much detail on education and training as could be provided in a longer study– there is so much context.

While an effort to achieve some triangulation on the topic has been made, the scope of the literature covered within Section 2 has necessitated a much more limited use of both the available statistical information and other qualitative sources. Sources such as the World Values Survey – which provides information on aspects of social cohesion such as tolerance have been left out. In a larger studies these would be used and the next logical step is to properly extent this study to Member State level.

In addition to size, time is another factor. The period over which Lisbon has run is a relatively short period over which to observe change. It is perhaps towards the limit in which the policy-making-implementation-impact cycle can be observed. Yet this cycle also appears to have been worked at a high rate and there is much information through which to sort. For example, there are already three cycles of PISA, though the wait for the results from PISA 2006 illustrates the time lag between data collection and dissemination of analysis and results.

Discussion/Analysis This subsection takes and builds on the conclusions drawn from Section 2 by enriching from Sections 1 and 3.

Ambiguous terminology and blurred concepts There is not a clear EU definition or concept of social cohesion demonstrated in the literature. The terms “inclusion”, “cohesion” and “exclusion” are conceptually blurred and appear to be used, at times, almost inter-changeably. Most of the detail on the social aspects tends to concern inclusion rather than cohesion. There is an assumption that greater social inclusion will lead to greater social cohesion, though how this happens is not explained until later on in the process – even then it is not clearly articulated. It is not until later on in the process that more complex aspects of social cohesion, notably tolerance are addressed. As has been discussed, in the first section, tolerance is a difficult characteristic to qualify or quantify, since strong levels of tolerance at community level can have negative or positive effects on social cohesion at societal and national levels. 83

This blurring extends to the policymaking and coordination itself. In terms of reporting, at EU level there has been a competitiveness report yet there is no clear group on competitiveness within the structural indicators. Conversely, there is a clear group of structural indicators on social cohesion and there are now strategic guidelines on cohesion policy (2007 - 2013). Yet at national level there are national inclusion and social protection strategies rather than cohesion strategies.

The causal relations between social cohesion and competitiveness As the policy literature progresses, the causal relationship from competitiveness to social cohesion is developed. At its most basic, competitiveness is required in order to generate the economic growth and therefore prosperity. This prosperity is required in order to finance the social protection systems, these in turn help to protect people from poverty (through redistribution of wealth) and therefore help increase inclusion. However, it is the causal relationship from social cohesion to competitiveness that is more interesting and which takes more time (until the Kok report in 2004) to be developed through the literature. Greater levels of social cohesion help to reduce levels of poverty and therefore reduce costs to social protection systems, they also help to increase labour supply. The Kok report appears to be the first major policy document to move from stating social policy as a productive factor to describing social cohesion as actively contributing to economic growth (rather than through just reducing the costs to the state).

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Importance of employment A constant theme throughout the literature is that the most effective means of inclusion is through employment. Therefore the primary role of education is to increase peoples’ employability since getting a job: 

increases social inclusion (and therefore, somehow, social cohesion);



improves the sustainability of social protection systems (and therefore the European social model); and,



increases competitiveness.

The emphasis on competitiveness and social cohesion at EU level At the beginning of the Lisbon Agenda, at EU level, there appears to be equal emphasis between competitiveness and the social aspects of the Lisbon Agenda. By 2003 this emphasis has started to shift towards the economic and competitiveness side and is confirmed after the Kok report. This direction is much closer to the Nordic and Anglo social models than to the Core and Mediterranean ones. However, social cohesion and competitiveness are closely linked and the distinction between them is not as clear as might be expected. Within the policy literature this is mainly because employment is the principle means to increase levels of both competitiveness and cohesion. There are also two other considerations.

The first is that social policy has been, from the start, seen as a productive factor - economically as well as socially. Indeed, the social policy side has been clearly driven by the economic pressures on Member States, via ageing population and globalisation. From this perspective, reforming social protection systems (as

85

outlined in the European Social Agenda) is an economic imperative. Secondly, macro-economic stability, structural reforms and increased levels employment – the foundations of competitiveness - are stated as a necessary condition for modernising the European social model and hence increasing social cohesion. It is also likely that there has been increased prominence of the economic side because Lisbon was launched just as there was a global slowdown in economic growth.

The emphasis on competitiveness and social cohesion at Member State level The review of a small amount of the policy literature at national level indicates that Member States prioritise competitiveness and cohesion differently, within the related policy making and implementation for Lisbon. Because they are all subject to common drivers this suggests that one of the principle reasons must be differences in social models. This is evidenced quantitatively by the statistically significant differences, between the six social models. It is also indicated qualitatively by the personal perspectives covered earlier.

Broadly, the Nordic and Anglo models view education (and training) as an economic issue and see competitiveness and cohesion as mutually supportive. This contrasts with a Mediterranean (and to an extent) a Core model view that the two are in tension and social protection must support those who do not have a job (rather than to get them into employment). The Central and Baltic models require more consideration and evidence.

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The influence of the Open Method of Coordination. The OMC relies on metrics to compare, benchmark and therefore exert peer pressure for change. This works better for factors relating to competitiveness, which more naturally lend themselves to measurement. Economic indicators have been available sooner than the social ones. This is because some aspects of social cohesion are more difficult to measure in a comparable way across Member States (such as equitable distribution of educational outcomes), while others (such as tolerance) are hard to even quantify. Delays in the earlier stages of the OMC may have slowed the start of the peer learning stage.

The role of education and training in increasing competitiveness and social cohesion Achieving the Lisbon goal is clearly impossible without the role of education and training; which supports both the economic and social elements. For the social side, the list of risk factors for poverty and social exclusion (listed in the previous section) demonstrate the potential contribution of education and training in reducing exclusion. This may be directly, such as early school leaving, or from the indirect or wider benefits from learning such as improved health or increased human and social capital. While it appears to be over-shadowed, there is some emphasis on education to promote values as well as skills. One of the main aspects of the education and training programme has been lifelong learning; with an ageing population, this is the only way to re-skill an ageing labour market pool. Though the commission suggests that lifelong learning can support social objectives, beyond the inclusion achieved with increased employability.

87

With the re-launch of the Lisbon Agenda there is an increased emphasis on the role of higher education, not only in producing skilled workers but as centres for research and innovation and therefore competitiveness. This is notable because much of the reform of HE lies within the domain of the Bologna process, which predates 2000 and is outside the Education & Training 2010 programme.

A third strand of education highlighted for competitiveness relates to qualifications, firstly making qualifications recognised across Europe and secondly, recognising informal and non-formal learning. This is important for an ageing population and helps to promote inclusion.

How education promotes social cohesion more directly is explained. This happens through promoting understanding and tolerance – citizenship. The emphasis on this is limited, perhaps because this is most likely to happen only in initial education and training and because growth and jobs are confirmed as the two priorities.

At the start of the process, and later on, the issue of equity within and efficiency of education systems is raised. It is recognised that equity of educational outcomes themselves influence levels of social cohesion. This is something that is highlighted by Andy Green et al. and is one of the reasons why a Nordic model, with comprehensive education, is more cohesive than an Anglo model whose education provision is highly selective. While this issue is discussed later on in the process it appears to be slow to ‘take off’; it is not until 2005 that its importance is highlighted and interest in it may lie more on the efficiency side.

88

Conclusion: The

policy

emphasis

and

relationship

between

social

cohesion

and

competitiveness can be framed through the European Social Agenda and the European social models. The policy emphasis within the Lisbon Agenda at EU level has changed since 2000; it has also blurred. It starts through the conceptual blurring between cohesion and inclusion. Since inclusion is regarded as leading to cohesion, employment is seen as critical. Greater employment leads to greater inclusion, it also leads to greater productivity and therefore competitiveness. It is through this dual role that employment plays within Lisbon that emphasis between the two becomes blurred. There is not a clear distinction on increasing employment rates for increased cohesion or increased competitiveness. From the mid-term review onwards there has been a clear change, at least in terms of presentation, of policy emphasis towards competitiveness and employment. This is driven by the realisation that while social protection is seen as a productive factor, Member States have to be “profitable” (ie competitive) enough to be able to afford to provide social protection in the first place.

The limited considerations in this dissertation at Member State level indicate that the pattern at EU level is not necessarily replicated. While the Nordic and Anglo countries may have pushed for the growth and jobs direction the reality in the Core and Mediterranean countries is significantly different. It is difficult to tell the significant policy differences in the Central and Baltic models and while they have higher unemployment and lower productivity their considerable growth rates suggest that they are catching up. The Central model countries already have a low average on early school leaving.

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The future for the Lisbon Agenda? The Lisbon Agenda will not meet its original goal by 2010 - but it does not mean that it has failed. The Agenda marks a fundamental change in the orientation of policy making at EU towards its citizens. Yet for what is hailed as such a vital goal, if we take the advice two of the expert individuals to follow the funding, then this does not compare favourably with the 33.75% of the 2007 EU budget to be spent on agriculture and direct aids (European Commission. 2006). The overall budget for 2007 – 2014 has already been agreed – but on the condition that the entire EU budget spending (including the Common Agricultural Policy) is reviewed for 2014 onwards. There have also been calls, that with enlargement the EU15 should no longer be in receipt of ESF money but that it should be spent on increasing the competitiveness and cohesion of the newer EU Member States. If this happens then perhaps this is a more realistic indication of the success of the Lisbon Agenda. Once this happens, the original goal may be within closer reach.

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