Our Group Instincts: Hidden In Plain Sight

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Human Group Instincts: Hidden in Plain Sight Thomas G. Parsons To suspect that group formation and group-related behaviours are instinctive in humans requires no new data - just a fresh look at the extensive body of knowledge gathered by anthropologists, social psychologists, and sociologists. In his book The Rise and Fall of the Third Chimpanzee, Jared Diamond (Diamond, 1992, p161) notes, "Humans have always formed competing groups whose survival is essential if the individuals in that group are to pass on their genes. Human history largely consists of the details of groups killing, enslaving, or expelling other groups. The winner takes the loser's land, sometimes also the loser's women, and thus the loser's opportunity to perpetuate genes." Although the phenomenon of group selection was seriously attacked in the 1960s, renowned naturalist and biologist E O Wilson insisted in 1980 that "Selection can be said to operate at the group level, and deserves to be called group selection, when it affects two or more members of a lineage group as a unit" (Wilson, 1980, p50). In his recent book, Guns, Germs and Steel, Diamond shows how individual survival can depend on group status and inter-group relations in a society that most likely resembles that of our ancestors. "If a New Guinean happened to encounter an unfamiliar New Guinean while both were away from their respective villages, the two engaged in a long discussion of their relatives, in an attempt to establish some relationship and hence some reason why the two should not attempt to kill each other."(Diamond, 1998)

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Travel beyond a radius of a few miles was tantamount to suicide, as a local contact explained to Diamond "Of course the Fayus will kill any trespasser; you surely do not think they are so stupid that they would admit strangers to their territory? Strangers would just hunt their game animals, molest their women, introduce diseases, and reconnoitre the terrain to stage a raid later"(Diamond, 1992). Diamond notes that the isolation resulting from this inability to travel has produced numerous different languages, each typically spoken by at most a few thousand people living within a ten mile radius. Such isolation was sufficient to produce local diseases, local genetic mutations, and radically different local customs, yet all local groups were still just that: groups, which had to function effectively or die out. Their common features must be a showcase of the fundamental essentials of human group life. It was under such conditions that our ancestors lived for most of the life of our species. A New Zealand reader will have noticed some similarity with Maori protocol for arrival at a marae, developed independently thousands of miles from New Guinea. The visitor acknowledges the potential enmity of his prospective hosts, and their power over him. He identifies himself not by his given personal name and IRD number, but by his group affiliations and geographical origin, in an attempt to establish a basis for non-lethal interaction. An American passport contains essentially two messages. One identifies the person who was issued the passport. The other is a request from the individual's group: "The Secretary of State of the United States of America hereby requests all whom it may concern to permit the citizen/national of the United States named herein to pass without delay or hindrance and in case of need to give all lawful aid and protection". A New Zealand passport contains the same request from "the Governor-General in the Realm of New Zealand . . .in the Name of Her Majesty The Queen". The technology has changed since the neolithic, but the message is remarkably similar.

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Wouldn't it be surprising if natural selection had not produced humans who are especially predisposed to form groups, and to function optimally in a group environment? Should we not also presume that many millennia of selection among groups has produced groups that are designed for optimum function in a world resembling that of highland New Guinea or pre-1800 New Zealand in its limited technology and small group size? Subsequent history has unfortunately not been long enough for us to evolve effective and instinctive ways of participating in large groups since discovering the technology that made large groups essential. The isolated human is an anomaly, and always was. The few solitary humans ever reported have displayed noteworthy psychopathology (Singh & Zingg, 1928). Furthermore, the prevalence of groups is nothing new in our time, or even in the lifetime of our species: "The most striking feature of our primate heritage is life in social groups, and that such groups may have been a feature of our ancestors' lives for the past 30 million years, long predating even the genus homo " (Lancaster, 1975, p12). Aronson begins his book "The Social Animal" (Aronson, 1988) with a quote from Aristotle: "Man is by nature a social animal . . . Society is something in nature that precedes the individual". Before language was, social groups were. Before any human was, social groups were. Before the conscious individual was, social groups were. Anthropologists tell us of different levels of human group organisation: families, bands, tribes, and clans. However, the individual is not studied by anthropologists, because they do not find individuals to study – only groups. In contrast, psychology, does study individuals, having been founded by therapists whose goal was to provide treatment for the troubled (Rosenhan & Seligman, 1995). Thus psychologists may have a predisposition to examine the world through

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individual-coloured glasses, even when dealing with acknowledged group phenomena. For example, Zimbardo's development of the term "de-individuation" to describe one type of group phenomenon both implicitly and explicitly asserts that the individual is the norm, or default condition of humanity, and group action an aberration, or a temporary cloak that hides the individual (cited in Vaughan & Hogg, 1988) Before proceeding farther along this road, we should establish what we mean by "group". Groups? What groups? Vaughn & Hogg (Vaughan & Hogg, 1998) note that "there are almost as many definitions of the social group as there are social psychologists who research social groups". These authors define a group thus: "Two or more people who share a common definition and evaluation of themselves and behave in accordance with such a definition." They then go on to discuss a number of other definitions, each with its own virtues and shortcomings. Following this tradition, I will here propose my own definition: A group is a set of people whose members would under some circumstances identify themselves as members of said group by agreeing with the statement "I am a [group name]", even if only in the privacy of their own minds, or who would be identified by others, perhaps including non-members, as members of said group. All definitions appear to agree that one basic essential of a group is a person's emotional orientation, or feeling that he (or another) is identified with the group. An emotion is thus fundamental to group membership and identity. Identification with an otherwise unpopulated group or even a principle or creed is sufficient; no second living person is required. One may be, for instance, the last Jedi Knight. Furthermore, no time duration is specified; a group may last for moments or millennia. Evolution of group instincts? Such distant relatives of humanity as capuchin monkeys display a familiar range of group behaviour that includes payment for work done, which may imply a

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sense of social obligation (deWaal & Berger, 2000). These monkeys also show such group-optimising activities as conflict management and coalition building (Boehm, 2000), food sharing (deWaal, 1997), reconciliation, consolation, conflict intervention, and mediation (Flack & deWaal, 2000). Our closest relative, the common chimpanzee, like us and like capuchins, also forms hierarchical groups which exhibit familiar behaviour, including moderated intra-group competition, coalition formation, perimeter defense, and inter-group conflict that can end in genocide (Boehm, 2000; Goodall, 1986). Have these primate species (and many more) independently developed these social behaviours and chosen to practice them? Unlikely in the extreme. Have they evolved them and passed them along as learned cultural traditions? Few would find this an acceptable explanation. What other explanation is left? Only the explanation that the behaviours are favoured, perhaps strongly, by an inheritance coded in the DNA. In other words, that group behaviour has been positively selected for, and is instinctive. To dismiss group instincts in the same way that group selection was dismissed in the 1960s would be a mistake. First, reports of the death of group selection have been greatly exaggerated (Sober & Wilson, 1998; Wilson, 1980). The logic that shows individual selection invariably dominating and eliminating group selection can be used to show that social insects did not evolve, a patent absurdity that demonstrates the fallacy of the argument. Second, we do not need to demonstrate group selection per se, but need only note that there could be selection for individuals who have traits that make them likely to form groups, and to function and respond in certain ways in relation to those groups. Whether the inheritance of such traits involves specific physiological mechanisms that predispose us to certain responses, or whether we have been selected to be especially receptive to training and cultural inheritance that favours the formation of groups is a question that can be addressed separately. Edward O. Wilson, the founder of sociobiology (which has recently been reincarnated as evolutionary psychology) was quite explicit: "According to evolutionary theory, desirability [of a goal or reward] is measured in units of

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genetic fitness, and the emotive centers have been programmed accordingly" (Wilson, 1980, p275). It is precisely at the level of emotions that we find some of the strongest empirical evidence for group instincts. Disproportionate response One way to distinguish an inborn from a trained response might be the demonstration of a disproportionate magnitude or type of response to a key stimulus. Just as the kick that is elicited by a small tap on the patellar tendon tells us that a reflex is operating, other responses that exceed anything likely to have been produced by applied stimuli may tell us that an instinct is operating. At least our training as scientists should make us look for some explanation of the disproportionate response. Many such disproportionate responses to a mild stimulus for group formation are known. The following four examples suggest that a complex and powerful set of group-related behaviours and emotions can be elicited by relatively small stimuli. 1. Sherif's studies of young boys in summer camps in the US demonstrated that even a short-term and arbitrary division of the boys into groups set the stage for many typical group behaviours such as ethnocentrism, strong inter-group competition, and even inter-group hostility. These responses were so intense and potentially so harmful that the studies were terminated (Sherif, 1966, cited in Vaughan & Hogg). 2. Zimbardo also had to call a halt to an experiment involving prisoner/guard role-playing by university students, because the "dramatic changes in virtually every aspect of their behavior, thinking, and feeling" were "frightening" (quoted in Aronson, p10). The original report of the study states that "The extreme pathological reactions which emerged in both groups of subjects testify to the power of the social forces operating" (Haney, Banks, & Zimbardo, 1973). 3. Teacher Ron Jones also found the children in his school frighteningly susceptible to the lure of a group that he created almost casually, without advance planning (Jones, 1980). He too, had to terminate his "Third Wave" group quickly to avoid serious consequences, as the Third Wave disrupted the school, ballooning

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within a week to a membership of 200, from the original 30 students in his class. Certain characteristic group phenomena emerged spontaneously, such as a "bodyguard" for the leader. Jones also found that regular school work was performed better during the time of the Third Wave, suggesting a facilitating effect of group membership that should be investigated further. 4. Dawes et al. (cited in Aronson, p379) found that some participants in an experiment involving social dilemmas were seriously stressed by "defection" from groups. These groups comprised only the otherwise unrelated strangers who happened to participate, and were intended to exist only for the period of the experiment. However, traumatic stress was evident in at least one subject who played the part of a defector, and felt such guilt that he lost sleep and wanted to make amends to the 'group' the next day. Another participant failed to profit by defection, and felt so victimised by those who had done so that she declared her view of herself and humanity to have been altered. Although Aronson describes the experimental scenario as "seemingly benign", and "innocuous", in actuality "the experiments had a powerful effect on subjects that could not have been easily anticipated" [emphasis in the original]. Aren't such surprising and disproportionate effects exactly what every scientist hopes to find? Such surprises point to the flaws in our theoretical framework, indicating the most productive areas of investigation. They are the essence of what is ostensibly sought but seldom desired: falsification of the schema under investigation. In this case, the magnitude and complexity of responses to group/individual interactions seem to shout aloud for more attention. Here there be mysteries. Have we failed to understand individuals? Groups? The individual-group interaction? All of these? Psychologists in denial? We tend to regard drives such as those that favor personal survival and reproduction as the strongest and most fundamental. Maslow's hierarchy, for example, ranks physiological needs and physical security as more fundamental than "belonging". Somehow we lose sight of the fact that familiar groups such as cults and

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armies routinely cause people to ignore the supposedly most fundamental drives and act counter to the demands of personal survival and reproduction. How, then, can those drives be regarded as fundamental? Is Maslow entirely wrong? His views are still taught in undergraduate psychology classes without refutation, and an internet search finds many professionals who earn their livelihoods offering services based on his hierarchy. Why do we not consider the possibility that cults and armies can command individuals to sacrifice their "most basic" needs because they are calling on instincts even more basic than those they countermand? When Aronson writes of group influences on the individual, he treats groups as collections of individuals. Haney et al. wrote of "powerful social forces", but never mentioned instinct, or the possibility that group identity occupies a special place in our psyche. Personally, I suspect that the group can usefully be viewed as an entity in its own right: a coherent set of memes that has shaped us by selection to be good hosts (Blackmore, 1999; Lynch, 1996). I suspect that the study of the structure and function, or to put it more tendentiously the anatomy and physiology of these entities, would be quite productive. However, even without entertaining such radical hypotheses it is clear that there is more to groups than the interaction of individuals uninfluenced by anything beyond culture or training. Perhaps the competition among rival explanatory schemes has produced in psychologists a sensation of belonging to a group that is perpetually in territorial combat with others in the explanatory landscape. Is it unreasonable to wonder whether "powerful social forces" was a deliberately vague phrase designed to avoid a usage that might sound like social identity theory, or some other explanation belonging to a competing group? Flippen (Flippen, 1999), for instance, analyses the concept of "groupthink" (introduced by Janis in 1972) in terms of the self-regulation model. Groupthink can be defined as the premature arrival at consensus by a group that has failed to adequately consider all relevant factors when deciding on a course of action. Flippen's discussion of this group phenomenon improves when she goes beyond the jargon of self-regulation and status characteristic theory. When she

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explains the details of the process by which a group can reach a very poor decision, the phenomenon is clearly understandable without reference to special theories or specialist vocabulary. Unfortunately, Flippen stops short of examining groupthink with evolutionary psychology, which would have related the phenomenon to the larger picture of hominid group behaviour. Her discussion thus ignores the natural selection that (in less complicated times) might have favoured a speedy consensus and swift action at the command of a leader. Her suggested remedies for groupthink include the replacement of physical meetings with teleconferenced "virtual meetings", making group members individually accountable for outcomes, and removing the power of the group leader to reward or punish group members. However, this amounts to a dismantling of group structure rather than a reform of group decision making. Several years ago, Cherry wrote both an article and a book on a "socialization instinct" that drives the formation of social bonds (Cherry, 1992; Cherry, 1994). He rated his model as more useful than conventional ones, since it was based on biological, as well as psychological and sociological aspects of human nature. However, although the Social Science Citation Index shows that Cherry's studies of troubled youth have been cited repeatedly by other writers, his works on the social bond instinct appear not to have been cited at all. Cherry's use of a psychosocial/biological approach to explore the influence of instinct on human groups has apparently found no audience in the profession. Does it matter? Apparently, it does. A recent review in American Psychologist indicates that practising professionals who routinely use groups in therapy nonetheless continue to underestimate the power of groups (Dishion, McCord, & Poulin, 1999). When teenagers with similar behaviour problems were grouped together for treatment, their behaviour problems were exacerbated. Dishion formulates an explanation in the vocabulary of conventional and individual psychology, speaking of peer reinforcement, social attention and emerging norms. However, it seems more

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parsimonious simply to say that in both studies that were reviewed, troubled teenagers rejected the therapist's leadership and formed their own group, using their own values. Their group responses were more powerful than any techniques that the professionals could bring to bear, even when nominally in control of the situation. It appears that psychologists as a group resist the idea that the group is as fundamental a phenomenon as the individual psyche. Why might this be? In their Primer on Evolutionary Psychology, Cosmides and Tooby (Cosmides & Tooby, 1999) suggest that we suffer from "instinct blindness", which has caused psychologists to neglect some of the most interesting machinery in the human mind. Group structure and function – clans, cults, and rugby clubs. The emotional importance of group membership, even in stylised artificial combat, is illustrated by the recent prominence of geneological arguments in the debate over allowable membership on a rugby team. New Zealander Shane Howarth will apparently be required to prove that at least one of his grandfathers was Welsh, or be ruled off a team.(Fowler, 2000) Cosmides and Tooby, following E. O. Wilson, suggest that emotions evolved as the motivators of instinctive response. That is, a beaver will feel pleasure, or a sensation of "this is the right thing to do" when it fells a tree to improve its dam. Consistent with the instinct hypothesis, abundant evidence indicates that people experience just such emotions when they join and participate in groups.

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Buford experiences group emotions Consider Bill Buford's experience as a soccer hooligan, recounted in his book Among the Thugs (Buford, 1991): I am attracted to the moment when consciousness ceases: the moments of survival, of animal intensity, of violence. . . . Violence is one of the most intensely lived experiences and, for those capable of giving themselves over to it, it is one of the most intense pleasures. There on the streets of Fulham, I felt that I had literally become weightless. I had abandoned gravity, was greater than it. . . .I realized later that I was on a druggy high, in a state of adrenaline euphoria. And for the first time I am able to understand the words they use to describe it. That crowd violence was their drug. What was it like for me? An experience of absolute completeness. (Buford, p205) To appreciate his commentary, it helps to know that Buford was neither British nor a soccer fan nor a thug, but an American academic, the editor of a literary magazine, who set out to investigate the soccer hooligan phenomenon from the inside. His description of this particular experience as simply adrenaline euphoria should be tempered by consideration of the absence of euphoria that accompanies an adrenaline rush in a dentist's chair, or upon missing one's footing on a stairway. Clearly, adrenaline alone does not explain the pleasure. Those of us with more scientific than literary training might think first of endorphins, our own endogenous opioids. Whatever the neurochemistry, surely Buford has given an account that suggests how it might feel to experience the working of an instinct – an unlearned behaviour that operates with consciousness minimised, giving pleasure and a feeling of rightness or completion when exercised. Elsewhere Buford expands on this theme, describing events that clearly had an emotional significance that he had not anticipated when he began his research into crowd violence:

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"I was surprised by what I found; moreover, because I came away with a knowledge I had not possessed before, I was also grateful, and surprised by that as well. I had not expected the violence to be so pleasurable. I would have assumed, if I had thought to think about it, that the violence would be exciting – in the way that a traffic accident is exciting – but the pure elemental pleasure was of an intensity that was unlike anything I had foreseen or experienced before. But it was not just any violence. It wasn't random violence or Saturday night violence or fights in the pub; it was crowd violence – that was what mattered: the very particular workings of the violence of numbers." (Buford p217) Buford was convinced that the emotion was like a drug high "generated by the body itself". He was concerned because he could identify none of the classical reasons for crowd violence. He saw no political or economic cause, no grievance or injustice or feeling of social frustration. I couldn't get away from the starkness of the conclusion I kept reaching: that there was no cause for the violence; no "reason" for it at all. If anything there were "unreasons": rather than economic hardship or political frustration, there was economic plenty and an untroubled, even complacent faith in a free market and nationalistic politics that was proud of both its comforts and its selfishness. No novice to the scene, at that point, Buford had been "going around with violent people for around four years."(Buford, p218) Besides suggesting the operation of an instinct, Buford's experience might well be regarded as falsifying some of social psychology's explanations of group violence. Certainly he found no support for relative deprivation theory, even though he was expecting it and looked for it. Instead he found pleasure that was unrelated to anything beyond simple membership in a group that did battle with non-members or another group, exactly what one might expect from the operation of an instinct.

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In his discussion of genocide as a typical human trait, Diamond (1992) recounts a similar pleasure in a native of New Guinea, although in this case it was associated with a recognised inter-group casus belli. A "gentle" man whom Diamond had worked with for years, whom he liked and respected, told him of participating in the near-total eradication of a neighbouring village as part of an ongoing feud. Diamond recalls "Since that evening I have often found myself shuddering as I recalled the details of it – the glow in Kariniga's eyes as he told me of the dawn massacre; those intensely satisfying moments when he finally drove his spear into some of his people's murderers" (Diamond, p276). Note that this was a happy memory of a pleasant emotion, in contrast to the feeling of distaste for a nasty but necessary job that we might feel when exterminating a pest or punishing a criminal. How can we distinguish between explanations based the operation of group instincts and those based on the current view: conformity, peer pressure, etc ? Are these not just the names we have already assigned to the individual drives anyway? Am I proposing a distinction without a useful difference? Even a simple experiment hints otherwise. When presented with a pattern consisting of an irregular cluster of X's (approximately 3x6 cm) and a lone X that was 6 cm away from the cluster (Appendix 1), 8 of 11 responding class members interpreted the pattern as a group of people standing in some social relationship to a single person. Typical comments were "a person isolated from a group", "a group of people with one person excluded", "leader", "social ostracism". Three responders said they saw only some X's on a piece of paper, despite the request to "interpret" what they saw. Their responses are thus not compliant with instructions, and can be interpreted as attempts to play "Mr Spock" and defeat the purpose of the experiment. [The test page was neither handed out nor collected by me, but by another student not associated in anyone's mind with concerns about groups.] I suggest that this response indicates a predisposition to interpret ambiguous information as representing a group, and displaying common group phenomena. This may be similar to our inborn tendency to interpret as a face any random collection of

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features that can be seen as eyes and mouth, which is responsible for the Man in the Moon, the face on Mars, and the utility of Mr Yuck (the poison warning face). Granted, the responders were students in a social psychology class and may have had a mindset favouring group interpretations. Such a test might well get different responses among different highly selected groups. Still, that other research remains to be done. Until contradicted by better-controlled studies, this one stands as a demonstration of our predisposition to see groups as a likely default interpretation of the world, which seems consistent with the operation of group instincts. Criteria for acceptance of group instincts Any justification for such a new way of regarding and organising well-known facts must lie in at least one of three areas: (a) experts in the field may come to agree that the instinct hypothesis is a superior explanatory framework, providing the most parsimonious unifying principle to simplify the explanation of disparate phenomena, or (b) the hypothesis must suggest new experiments that are productive and new phenomena that might not have been noted or discovered except for the inspiration of the instinct hypothesis, or (c) experiments or observations must be capable of falsifying the instinct hypothesis itself and fail to do so, or must falsify competing viewpoints. I believe that at least some of these criteria can be met for the group instinct hypothesis. So what? If human behaviour in fact reflects the operation of group instincts, not only the science of psychology, but all of society needs urgently to know more about those instincts. Despite repeated and well-publicised tragedies, cults flourish, continuing to claim headlines and victims. Genocide is a continuing threat in several areas of the world. Gangs are a major social problem in industrialised society, as are tribes in Africa and Asia.

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I suggest that cults, as examples of the strongest type of group, would make a good starting point for study. Experts have already determined that cults have certain organisational and psychological features in common, such as a charismatic leader, initiation rites, claims to possess a special truth or status, strict control of their boundaries (informational, physical, membership), strong social controls on members' behaviour, and a strong sense of isolation from (and persecution by) the rest of the world (Galanter, 1989; Lofland, 1977; Lynch, 1996; Singer, 1995; Sparks, 1977). Different cults (and gangs) display different levels of intensity in the function of these structures, and different levels of power over their members. I suggest that a study of the entire set of all such organisational and structural features that can be found in any cult (or gang) will yield an image of the set of group instincts that they use to gain such remarkable control over initially independent minds. Then those instincts can be systematically studied in individuals, and groups themselves will be a legitimate area of study for psychology (not just sociology) as a projection into the environment of a basic component of the human mind. Once we have a structural diagram of key features, groups as diverse as cults and chess clubs can be classified just as Linnaeus classified animals and plants, according to their structural features and the ways that their mechanisms operate. For example, group recognition signs are almost universal, but may be intended for outsiders or for members only. A group may use any or all of: flags, uniforms or other special clothing, gestures, hairstyles, secret handshakes, lapel pins, tattoos, jewellery, or special jargon. Such understanding of group technology should permit the design of socially constructive groups that could compete successfully with troublesome ones such as gangs and cults, depriving them of members and influence while helping to build safer communities. As preventive medicine, such constructive groups could be introduced into the schools to immunise children against the predatory groups. For too long the best group technologists have not been practising professional psychologists – they have been the Hitlers and the L Ron Hubbards, the Reverend Moons and the Reverend Joneses. Not until the professionals can routinely

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influence people as profoundly as can amateurs such as David Koresh1 or Marshall Applewhite2 can they claim to understand group phenomena well enough to dismiss alternative explanations such as the instinct hypothesis.

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Branch Davidians, Waco Heaven's Gate, San Diego

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Fowler, P. (2000, 19 March, 2000). Welsh or Maori. Yahoo! Australia & NZ News. Galanter, M. (1989). Cults: Faith, Healing, and Coercion. New York: Oxford University Press. Goodall, J. (1986). The Chimpanzees of Gombe. Cambridge: Harvard University Press. Haney, C., Banks, C., & Zimbardo, P. (1973). A Study of Prisoners andGuards in a Simulated Prison. Naval Research Review(September, 1973). Jones, R. (1980). The Third Wave. Whole Earth Review, The Next Whole Earth Catalog (Summer, 1980). Lancaster, J. B. (1975). Primate Behavior and the Emergence of Human Culture: Holt, Rinehart and Winston, United States of America. Lofland, J. (1977). Doomsday Cult: A Study of Conversion, Proselytization, and Maintenance of Faith. (Enlarged Edition ed.). New York: John Wiley & Sons. Lynch, A. (1996). Thought Contagion. New York: Basic Books, HarperCollins Publishers, Inc. Rosenhan, D. L., & Seligman, M. E. P. (1995). Abnormal Psychology. New York: W W Norton & Co. Singer, M. T. (1995). Cults in Our Midst. San Francisco: Jossey-Bass, Inc. Singh, J. A. L., & Zingg, R. M. (1928). Wolf Children and Feral Man. New York: Harper & Brothers Publishers. Sober, E., & Wilson, D. S. (1998). Unto Others: The Evolution and Psychology of Unselfish Behavior. Journal of Consciousness Studies, to appear. Sparks, J. (1977). The Mind Benders: A Look at Current Cults. Nashville, Tennessee: Thomas Nelson, Inc. Vaughan, G., & Hogg, M. A. (1998). Introduction to Social Psychology. (Second ed.). Sydney: Prentice-Hall. Wilson, E. O. (1980). Sociobiology. Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press.