Objection To Dirty Trick Scheduling Order

United States District Court For the District of Columbia DON HAM RICK , U.S. MERCHANT SEAMAN 5860 Wilburn Road Wilburn, AR 72179 PLAINTIFF, pro se v. PRESIDENT GEORGE W. BUSH White House 1600 Pennsylvania Ave. Washington, DC 20500 ALBERTO GONZALES , ATTORNEY GENERAL U.S. Department of Justice 950 Pennsylvania Ave., NW Washington, DC 20530-0001 MICHAEL CHERTOFF , SECRETARY Department of Homeland Security Washington, DC 20528 ADM . THOM AS H. COLLINS Commandant (G-C) U.S. Coast Guard Washington, DC 20593-0001 CAPT . SALERNO , DIRECTOR , Field Activities, Marine Safety, Sec, & Environmental Protection Commandant (G-MO) U.S. Coast Guard Washington, DC 20593-0001 REP . FRANK LO BIONDO (R-NJ) House Subcommittee on Coast Guard and Maritime Transportation Washington, DC RESPONDENTS

) ) ) ) CIVIL RIGHTS COMPLAINT ) ) 42 U.S.C. § 1981, 1983, 1985, 1986, 1988 ) ) CIVIL ACTION #: 03-2160 RBW ) ) ) ) ) ) ) ) ) UNITED STATES AS DEFENDANT ) Any civil action in a district court against ) the United States under subsection (a) of ) section 1346 of this title may be prosecuted ) only: (1) Except as provided in paragraph (2), ) in the judicial district where the plaintiff ) resides; ) ) ) ) ) ) ) ) See also 28 U.S.C. § 1404(a) ) ) CHANGE OF VENUE ) ) )

This Case Is Void for Lack of Jurisdiction

28 U.S.C. § 1402(a)(1)

The Plaintiff Resides in Arkansas!

PLAINTIFF’S NOTICE OF ADJUDICATIVE FACTS BECAUSE THE PLAINTIFF IS A RESIDENT OF ARKANSAS THE U.S. DISTRICT COURT FOR DC DOES NOT HAVE JURISDICTION

Plaintiff’s Cases Nos. 02-1434, 02-1435, 03-2160, and all Subsequent Appeals are Void for Lack of Jurisdiction P LAINTIFF’S M OTION FOR C URE U NDER 28 U.S.C. § 1406(a), IN THE INTEREST OF JUSTICE T HE P LAINTIFF D EMANDS T HAT H IS C ASE B E IMMEDIATELY T RANSFERRED T O T HE U.S. D ISTRICT C OURT FOR THE E ASTERN D ISTRICT OF A RKANSAS , N ORTHERN D IVISION 1

NOTICE! The Plaintiff will immediately re-file his updated (new) Mandamus & Civil RICO Act cases with the U.S. District Court for the Eastern District of Arkansas, Northern Division (Little Rock/Batesville, Arkansas) whether or not Judge Reggie B. Walton recognizes that this case (No. 03-2160) is VOID FOR LACK OF JURISDICTION under 28 U.S.C. § 1402(a)(1). “In the interest of justice,” Judge Walton, among others, will be named as co-defendants in Plaintiff’s new Civil RICO Act case. CASE LAW FOR THIS MOTION “It is said that absolute judicial immunity is favored as public policy, so that judges may fearlessly, and safe from retribution, adjudicate matters before them. True. But equally important, is the public expectation that judicial authority will only be wielded by those lawfully vested with such authority.” MY CASE IS VOID FOR LACK OF JURISDICTION

judicial immunity of judicial acts. See: Forrester v. White, 484 U.S. 219, 98 L.Ed.2d 555, 108 S.Ct. 538 (1988); Atkinson-Baker & Assoc. v. Kolts, 7 F.3d 1452 at 1454, (9th Cir. 1993).

Under federal Law, which is applicable to all states, the U.S. Supreme Court stated that “if a court is without authority, its judgments and orders are regarded as nullities. They are not voidable, but simply void, and form no bar to a recovery sought, even prior to a reversal in opposition to them. They constitute no justification and all persons concerned in executing such judgments or sentences are considered, in law, as trespassers.” Elliot v. Piersol, 1 Pet. 328, 340, 26 U.S. 328, 340 (1828)

JUDICIAL ACTION WITHOUT JURISDICTION IS LAW LESS VIOLENCE “No judicial process, whatever form it may assume, can have any lawful authority outside of the limits of the jurisdiction of the court or judge by whom it is issued; and an attempt to enforce it beyond these boundaries is nothing less than lawless violence.” Ableman v. Booth, 21 Howard 506 (1859).

JUDGE WALTON HAS NO JUDICIAL IM M UNITY FROM RICO ACT CIVIL LAW SUIT

JUDGE WALTON IS NOT ABOVE THE LAW

When a judge knows that he lacks jurisdiction, or acts in the face of clearly valid statutes expressly depriving him of jurisdiction, judicial immunity is lost. Rankin v. Howard, (1980) 633 F.2d 844, cert den. Zeller v. Rankin, 101 S.Ct. 2020, 451 U.S. 939, 68 L.Ed 2d 326. Zeller v. Rankin, 101 S.Ct. 2020, 451 U.S. 939, 68 L.Ed 2d 326

“No man in this country is so high that he is above the law. No officer of the law may set that law at defiance, with impunity. All the officers of the government, from the highest to the lowest, are creatures of the law are bound to obey it. It is the only supreme power in our system of government, and every man who, by accepting office participates in its functions, is only the more strongly bound to submit to that supremacy, and to observe the limitations which it imposes on the exercise of the authority which it gives.” United States v. Lee,

Administrative-capacity torts by a judge do not involve the “performance of the function of resolving disputes between parties, or of authoritatively adjudicating private rights,” and therefore do not have the 2

106 U.S. 196, 220 1 S. Ct. 240, 261, 27 L. Ed 171 (1882)

Federal Courts and ultimately, disrespect for the law.” Roadway Express v. Pipe, 447 U.S. 752 at 757 (1982)

THE CORRUPT U.S. DEPARTM ENT OF JUSTICE

PLEADING FOR PROPER JUSTICE

“It is deeply distressing that the Department of Justice, whose mission is to protect the constitutional liberties of the people of the United States, should even appear to be seeking to subvert them by extreme and dubious legal argument.” United States v. Chadwick, 433 U.S. I at 16 (1976)

“Pleadings are intended to serve as a means of arriving at fair and just settlements of controversies between litigants. They should not raise barriers which prevent the achievement of that end. Proper pleading is important, but its importance consists in its effectiveness as a means to accomplish the end of a just judgment.” Maty v. Grasselli Chemical Co., 303 U.S. 197 (1938)

“I do not understand the government to contend that it is any less bound by the obligation than a private individual would be...” “It is not the function of our government to keep the citizen from falling into error; it is the function of the citizen to keep the government from falling into error.” Perry v. United States, 204 U.S. 330, 358

“The assertion of federal rights, when plainly and reasonably made, are not to be defeated under the name of local practice.” Davis v. Wechler, 263 U.S. 22, 24; Stromberb v. California, 283 U.S. 359; NAACP v. Alabama, 375 U.S. 449

“Crime is contagious. If the Government becomes a lawbreaker, it breeds contempt for law; it invites every man to become a law unto himself; it invites anarchy.” Olmstad v. United States, (1928) 277 U.S. 438

Pro se pleadings are to be considered without regard to technicality; pro se litigants’ pleadings are not to be held to the same high standards of perfection as lawyers. Jenkins v. McKeithen, 395 U.S. 411, 421 (1959); Picking v. Pennsylvania R. Co., 151 Fed 2nd 240; Pucket v. Cox, 456 2nd 233

“Due to sloth, inattention or desire to seize tactical advantage, lawyers have long engaged in dilatory practices... the glacial pace of much litigation breeds frustration with the

“Even where the shoot ‘em up TV News is concerned, any highjacked plane whatsoever is considered big news, but when a ship is taken forever, and its crew murdered — no one seems to care.” Eric Ellen International Maritime Bureau

Society’s commitment to institutional justice requires that judges be solicitous of the rights of persons who come before the court. Geiler v. Commission on Judicial Qualifications, (1973) 10 Cal.3d 270, 286

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T HE B IAS OF JUDGE R EGGIE B. W ALTON ! Written directly to Judge Reggie B. Walton in the first person: To use an analogy from the old western cowboy movies there is presently a litigious bar room brawl going on in the federal courts over the Second Amendment and I am in the midst of it fighting for the American merchant seamen’s perspective. But while everyone else, judges and lawyers, are volleying their legal arguments point blank like civil war canon fire I am ignored, left with no one to engage with my own legal artillery simply because I am an unrepresented plaintiff. This is judicial bigotry of the most egregious kind. Your SCHEDULING ORDER , Judge Walton, whether written by you or your clerk, displays an incorrect date of August 16, 2006, for the Court’s dismissal of the Plaintiff’s case with prejudice. The correct date is August 26, 2004. Because August 16, 2006 is more than a month into the future the lack of attention to accuracy this exemplifies is more than a simple typo. This Freudian slip indicates, you have a general bias against Second Amendment cases and/or against unrepresented plaintiffs. You have allowed an simple chronological error to be entered into the record of my case. This error is evidence of a sloppiness with which my present case and my original cases under Judge Edith Segal Huvelle have been handled. Judge Edith Segal Huvelle dismissed my original cases with prejudice in 2002. But the Docket Report for my case No. 02-1435, shows that the case was dismissed “without” prejudice. Just how sloppy is the U.S. District Court for DC? On January 26, 2006 the U.S. Court of Appeals for the DC Circuit issued their order affirming the lower Court’s dismissal of my RICO Act claims but “remanded for further proceediongs” on Second Amendment grounds. The following is excerpted from the DC Circuit’s FURTHER ORDERED, on the court’s own motion, that appellant’s Second Amendment claims against the non-judicial defendants, challenging federal firearms statutes and the denial of his “National Open Carry Handgun” endorsement be remanded for further1 proceedings. Compare United States v. Miller, 307 U.S. 174 (1939), and United States v. Haney, 264 F.3d 1161 (10th Cir. 2001), with U.S. v. Emerson, 270 F.3d 203, 227, 260-61 (5th Cir. 2001). The evidence suggests appellant filed an opposition to appellees’ motion to dismiss. See, e.g., Case No. 03cv2160, Docket No. 64, Appellees’ Reply to Opposition to Motion to Dismiss. Furthermore, these Second Amendment claims are not barred by res judicata. See Hoffman v. Blaski, 363 U.S. 335, 340 n.9 (1960); United States v. Dean, 752 F.2d 535, 541 (11th

1

My emphasis.

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Cir. 1985); see also SEC v. Bilzerian, 378 F.3d 1100, 1102 n.1 (D.C. Cir. 2004). It is

Definition of “Further” Oxford Diction defines “further” to be: used as comparative of far.

>adverb (also farther) 1 at, to, or by a greater distance. 2 over a greater expanse of space or time. 3 beyond the point already reached. 4 at or to a more advanced or desirable stage. 5 in addition; also.

>adjective 1 (also farther) more distant in space.

**2 additional.** >verb help the progress or development of.

The DC Circuit used the phrase “remanded for further proceedings” in their order. The word “proceedings” is a noun. That makes the word “further” an adjective synonymous with the word “additional.” Therefore, my case is “remanded for additional proceedings.”

To my understanding I beat the Government’s Motion to Dismiss on Second Amendment grounds. And to my understanding “further proceedings” (additional proceedings) means that my case moves forward to the Discovery Phase if the U.S. District Court for DC had jurisdiction. Your SCHEDULING ORDER clearly subjects me to REPEATING RULE 7 PROCEEDINGS as the following excerpt from your Scheduling Order undeniably proves: ORDERED that the defendants shall file an answer or otherwise respond to the plaintiff’s complaint by August 4, 2006. The plaintiff shall file an opposition to any motion filed by the defendants by September 1, 2006 and the defendants reply shall by filed by September 15, 2006. You are violating not only my right to due process but the Canons of ethics as a judge. How corrupt can you get jerking around an unrepresented civil plaintiff

preventing me from

proceeding to the Discovery Phase by giving the United States another chance to file a Motion to Dismiss? 5

You are corruptively using Rule 7(a) Pleadings when you should be using Rule 16 Pretrial Conferences; Scheduling; Management and Rule 26 Discovery. You are bending over backwards to let the defendant United States have its way. You are pulling another dirty trick in a long chronology of dirty tricks between the bench and bar in the belief that the Plaintiff is too ignorant with the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure to know what is going on. The sentiments that I have just expressed above falls under Canon 1. All this if you had jurisdiction! CANON 1 A JUDGE SHALL UPHOLD THE INTEGRITY AND INDEPENDENCE OF THE JUDICIARY A. An independent and honorable judiciary is indispensable to justice in our society. A judge should participate in establishing, maintaining and enforcing high standards of conduct, and shall personally observe those standards so that the integrity and independence of the judiciary will be preserved. The provisions of this Code are to be construed and applied to further that objective. Commentary: Deference to the judgments and rulings of courts depends upon public confidence2 in the integrity and independence of judges. The integrity and independence of judges depends in turn upon their acting without fear or favor. A judiciary of integrity3 is one in which judges are known for their probity, fairness, honesty, uprightness, and sound-ness of character. An independent judiciary is one free of inappropriate outside influences. Although judges should be independent, they must comply with the law, including the provisions of this Code. Public confidence in the impartiality of the judiciary is maintained by the adherence of each judge to this responsibility. Conversely, violation of this Code diminishes public confidence in the judiciary and thereby does injury to the system of government under law. The evidence I have shows that you have no integrity. You were selected or you got yourself select to preside over my case by questionable methods. Because my opinion and lack of confidence in you are reasonably based on the record contained in my Docket Report you are obligated by law and ethics to recuse yourself. I vehemently demand that you immediately recuse yourself without hesitation or at least grant my MOTION

FOR

CHANGE OF VENUE in the interest of

justice to the Eastern District of Arkansas, Northern Division 1, Batesville, Arkansas, in accordance with the following federal laws: 28 U.S.C. § 1402(a)(1), UNITED STATES AS DEFENDANT : Any civil action in a district court against the United States under subsection (a) of section 1346 of this title may be prosecuted only:

2

My em phasis.

3

My em phasis.

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(1) Except as provided in paragraph (2), in the judicial district where the plaintiff resides; 28 U.S.C. § 1404(a), CHANGE OF VENUE : For the convenience of parties and witnesses, in the interest of justice, a district court may transfer any civil action to any other district or division where it might have been brought. 28 U.S.C. § 1406(a), CURE OR W AIVER OF DEFECTS : The district court of a district in which is filed a case laying venue in the wrong division or district shall dismiss, or if it be in the interest of justice, transfer such case to any district or division in which it could have been brought. M The Plaintiff resides in the State of Arkansas. M The Plaintiff’s case names the United States as Defendant. M The “interest of justice” has priority over “convenience of parties and witnesses” under 28 U.S.C. § 1404(a). On January 13, 2004, Judge Richard W. Reynolds, the original judge, granted my Motion for Recusal with his “ORDER OF RECUSAL .” On January 14, 2004, Judge Walton issued his Order dismissing Seegars v. Ashcroft, Case No. 03-834, a Second Amendment case challenging gun control laws of the District of Columbia, in which he ruled that “the Second Amendment does not apply to the District of Columbia.” On January 20, 2004, just one week later, Judge Reynolds revised his “ORDER OF RECUSAL ” by denying my Motion for Recusal but magnanimously recusing himself sua sponte as if to save face procedurally for the record at the expense of my right to due process.

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JUDGE R EYNOLDS’ O RDER OF R ECUSAL

JUDGE R EYNOLDS’ R EVISED O RDER OF R ECUSAL

January 13, 2004

January 20, 2004

Plaintiff Don Hamrick has filed an action against United States Attorney General John Ashcroft and others, and the action was randomly assigned to me. Plaintiff has filed a motion for recusal, alleging that an appearance of impropriety exists because I was appointed by former President Clinton. Plaintiff offers no evidence that could reasonably call into question my impartiality in these proceedings on the basis of my status as a Clinton appointee.

Plaintiff Don Hamrick has filed an action against United States Attorney General John Ashcroft and others, and the action was randomly assigned to me. Plaintiff has filed a motion for recusal, alleging that an appearance of impropriety exists because I was appointed by former President Clinton. Plaintiff offers no evidence that could reasonably call into question my impartiality in these proceedings on the basis of my status as a Clinton appointee. Accordingly, his motion will be denied.

However, there is now pending in the United States Court of Federal Claims a class action lawsuit filed by a class of present and former Department of Justice attorneys seeking damages against the United States for alleged violations of the Federal Employees Pay Act, 5 U.S.C. §§ 5541-97 (1994). See John Doe, et al., on behalf of themselves and all other similarly situated v. United States, Civil Action No. 98-896C. I am currently a member of that class. Since Canon 3C(1) of the Code of Conduct for United States Judges requires a judge to “disqualify himself . . . in a proceeding in which the judge’s impartiality might reasonably be questioned,” the Committee on Codes of Conduct of the Judicial Conference of the United States has opined that recusal is required from any proceeding in which the Attorney General appears as a real party in interest, unless a waiver of such disqualification pursuant to Canon 3D1 is submitted by all parties involved in the suit.

However, there is now pending in the United States Court of Federal Claims a class action lawsuit filed by a class of present and former Department of Justice attorneys seeking damages against the United States for alleged violations of the Federal Employees Pay Act, 5 U.S.C. §§ 5541-97 (1994). See John Doe, et al., on behalf of themselves and all other similarly situated v. United States, Civil Action No. 98-896C. I am currently a member of that class. Since Canon 3C(1) of the Code of Conduct for United States Judges requires a judge to “disqualify himself . . . in a proceeding in which the judge’s impartiality might reasonably be questioned,” the Committee on Codes of Conduct of the Judicial Conference of the United States has opined that recusal is required from any proceeding in which the Attorney General appears as a real party in interest, unless a waiver of such disqualification pursuant to Canon 3D 1 is submitted by all parties involved in the suit.

Plaintiff’s motion for recusal makes plain that he would not waive my disqualification under Canon 3C(1). Thus, my recusal from this case is now appropriate. For the reasons stated above, it is therefore

Plaintiff’s motion for recusal makes plain that he would not waive my disqualification under Canon 3C(1). Thus, my recusal from this case is now appropriate. For the reasons stated above, it is therefore

ORDERED that plaintiff’s motion for recusal [4] be, and hereby is, GRANTED. The Clerk of the Court is directed to reassign this matter to the Calendar Committee. Because United States District Judge Ellen Segal Huvelle of this Court is also a named defendant in this suit, I recommend to the Calendar Committee that it seek to have a judge from another district assigned to this matter.

ORDERED that plaintiff’s motion for recusal [4] be, and hereby is, DENIED. However, I am recusing myself sua sponte. The Clerk of the Court is directed to reassign this matter to the Calendar Committee. Because United States District Judge Ellen Segal Huvelle of this Court is also a named defendant in this suit, I recommend to the Calendar Committee that it seek to have a judge from another district assigned to this matter.

1.

1.

When the general provisions of Canon 3C(1) serve as the basis for disqualification, Canon 3D permits a judge to continue to participate in a proceeding if all of the parties and lawyers, after notice of the basis for the disqualification, agree in writing to waive the disqualification under a procedure independent of the judge’s participation.

When the general provisions of Canon 3C(1) serve as the basis for disqualification, Canon 3D permits a judge to continue to participate in a proceeding if all of the parties and lawyers, after notice of the basis for the disqualification, agree in writing to waive the disqualification under a procedure independent of the judge’s participation.

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EVIDENCE OF CORRUPTION WITH JUDGE REGGIE B. WALTON The Plaintiff notes that Judge Roberts recommended to the Calendar Committee that they “seek to have a judge from another district assigned to this matter.” This recommendation is in compliance with 28 U.S.C. § 1402(a)(1), UNITED STA TES

AS

DEFENDANT ; 28 U.S.C. § 1404(a),

CHANGE OF VENUE ; and 28 U.S.C. § 1406(a), CURE OR W AIVER OF DEFECTS . However it happened that you got yourself assigned to my case in defiance of Judge Roberts’ recommendation to the Calendar Committee and in defiance of my questioning your suitability to preside over my case because federal laws were broken and this criminal conduct deserves an investigation by the Inspector General of the U.S. Department of Justice. On February 27, 2004, in denying my Motion for Recusal you patently lied (perjured yourself) about the facts for recusal in your Order. Excerpted from your Order: . . . In addition, the Court notes that it appears that the plaintiff is seeking for this judge to recuse himself from this case because of an opinion that this judge issued in Seegars v. Ashcroft, 297 F. Supp. 2d 201 (D.D.C. 2004), involving a challenge pursuant to the Second Amendment to the United States Constitution.1 The plaintiff apparently seeks for this judge to recuse himself because his claims either involve or are related to the Second Amendment. Because such a request has no merit, the Court would also deny this request. Accordingly, it is hereby this 27th day of February 2004

You noted the existence of my November 10, 2003 Motion for Recusal against Judge Roberts containing my apprehension about your impartiality because of the Seegars case in footnote 1 on page 1 of your Order denying recusal. The truth isthat Judge Reynolds recommended “to the Calendar Committee that it seek to have a judge from another district assigned to this matter” and this recommendation is in compliance with federal law, 28 U.S.C. § 1402(a)(1), UN ITED STATES AS DEFENDANT . How you got assigned to my case is cause enough for change of venue to Arkansas!

1

The Court notes that in a Novem ber 10, 2003 motion, the plaintiff requested that Judge Richard Roberts of this Court recuse himself from this case and that this case not be assigned to this judge because of the Seegars case.

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CANON 3 A JUDGE SHALL PERFORM DILIGENTLY

THE

DUTIES

OF JUDICIAL

OFFICE IM PARTIALLY

AND

B. Adjudicative Responsibilities. (1) A judge shall hear and decide matters assigned to the judge except those in which disqualification is required. (2) A judge shall be faithful to the law* and maintain professional competence in it. A judge shall not be swayed by partisan interests, public clamor or fear of criticism. (3) A judge shall require* order and decorum in proceedings before the judge.

CONTEMPTUOUS DENIAL OF STATUTORY RIGHT UNDER 28 U.S.C § 1916. You, and every other judge of the U.S. District Court for DC and the DC Circuit have refused to rule on my Motions concerning the statutory right of the Seamen’s Suit law, 28 U.S.C. § 1916 and whether or not Docket Report fees of PACER Service, Inc. are including in that statutory right. This too is judicially criminal behavior when viewed with all the other dirty tricks pulled by the bench and bar to keep my case from proceeding to trial. My statutory right as a seaman to file cases without prepaying filing fees or court costs under the Seamen’s Suit law, 28 U.S.C. § 1916, has been denied by the DC Circuit and the U.S. Supreme Court on more than one occasion. I have taken every conceivable recourse to correct this injustice. I have filed motions with the U.S. District Court/DC, the U.S. District Court in Charlotte, NC, the DC Circuit, and the U.S. Supreme Court for a determination on whether compulsory payment of filing fees at the time of filing at the DC Circuit and the U.S. Supreme Court is extortion under 18 U.S.C. § 872. Every motion filed is either denied, ignored or ruled moot upon dismissal. I have pursued this matter by filing complaints with the FBI, U.S. Marshals Service, House and Senate Judiciary Committees all without success of governmental action. The U.S. Government has taken and continues to take full advantage of the my extremely limited finances to the extent that I have gone broke from time to time having to ship out again and again earning wages solely for the purpose of continuing my case. Apparently the U.S. Department of Justice’s agenda is to win by out-spending a financially strapped unrepresented civil plaintiff. This is not the way justice is suppose to work.

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TITLE 28 - JUDICIARY AND JUDICIAL PROCEDURE PART V - PROCEDURE CHAPTER 123 - FEES AND COSTS

26 U.S.C. § 1916. Seamen’s Suits “In all courts of the United States, seamen may institute and prosecute suits and appeals in their own names and for their own benefit for wages or salvage or the enforcement of laws enacted for their health or safety without prepaying fees or costs or furnishing security therefor.”

Clarifications: (1) “In all courts of the United States” = includes the DC Circuit and the U.S. Supreme Court. (2) “the enforcement of laws enacted for their . . . safety” = includes civil lawsuits for Second Amendment rights of the American seafarer at sea aboard U.S. flag vessels and ashore in the United States in intrastate and interstate travel. (3) “without prepaying fees or costs or furnishing security therefor.” = means not to pay the filing fees of the DC Circuit or the U.S. Supreme Court AND the billing fees of PACER for access to the Docket Report. Extorted Fees The DC Circuit and the U.S. Supreme Court extorted from the Appellant a combined about of $1,065 in filing fees in violation of the above noted federal law from 2002 to the present. DC Circuit, Case No. 02-5334 DC Circuit, Case No. 03-5021 DC Circuit, Case No. 04-5316 U.S. Supreme Court, Case No. 03-145, U.S. Supreme Court, (DC Circuit Case No. 04-5316) Extorted Payment of PACER Fees Paid to Date

$105.00 105.00 255.00 300.00 300.00 348.00 ---------TOTAL: $1,413.00

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Case Law Hobbs Act Extortion under Color Of Official Right (DC Circuit & U.S. Supreme Court Re: Filing Fees & 28 U.S.C. § 1916) “In order to prove Hobbs Act extortion ‘under color of official right,’ the [plaintiff / prosecutor] need only show that a public official has obtained a payment to which he was not entitled, knowing that the payment was made in return for official acts.” United States v. Urban, 404 F.3d 754, 768 (3d Cir. 2005) (quoting Evans v. United States, 504 U.S. 255, 268 (1992)). Federal tort law: judges cannot invoke judicial immunity for acts that violate litigants civil rights; Robert Craig Waters. TORT & INSURANCE LAW JOURNAL, Spr. 1986 21 n3, p509-516 A Judge is not immune for tortious acts committed in a purely Administrative, non-judicial capacity. Forrester v. White, 484 U.S. at 227-229, 108 S.Ct. at 544-545; Stump v. Sparkman, 435 U.S. at 380, 98 S.Ct. at 1106. Mireles v. Waco, 112 S.Ct. 286 at 288 (1991). Administrative-capacity torts by a judge do not involve the “performance of the function of resolving disputes between parties, or of authoritatively adjudicating private rights,” and therefore do not have the judicial immunity of judicial acts. See: Forrester v. White, 484 U.S. 219, 98 L.Ed.2d 555, 108 S.Ct. 538 (1988); Atkinson-Baker & Assoc. v. Kolts, 7 F.3d 1452 at 1454, (9th Cir. 1993).

PREDICATE ACTS OF RACKETEERING ACTIVITIES UNDER 18 U.S.C. § 1961(1)(B): (1) 18 U.S.C. § 1028 Fraud and Related Activity in Connection with Identification Documents (2) 18 U.S.C. § 1512 OBSTRUCTION OF JUSTICE: Tampering with a Victim. See 18 U.S.C. § 1512(b)(1), (b)(2)(A), and (b)(3). (3) 18 U.S.C. § 872 Extortion by officers or employees of the United States. See 28 U.S.C. § 1916 (4) 18 U.S.C. § 1951(a) W hoever in any way or degree obstructs, delays, or affects commerce . . . by . . . extortion or attempts or conspires so to do, or commits or threatens physical violence to any person or property in furtherance of a plan or purpose to do anything in violation of this section shall be fined under this title or imprisoned not more than twenty years, or both. (5) 18 U.S.C. § 1961(4) “enterprise” includes any individual, partnership, corporation, association, or other legal entity, and any union or group of individuals associated in fact although not a legal entity; (6) 18 U.S.C. § 1961(5) “pattern of racketeering activity” requires at least two acts of racketeering activity, one of which occurred after the effective date of this chapter and the last of which occurred within ten years (excluding any period of imprisonment) after the commission of a prior act of racketeering activity;

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STATUTORY WAIVER OF SOVEREIGN IMMUNITY TITLE 46--SHIPPING CHAPTER I: COAST GUARD , DEPARTM ENT OF HOM ELAND SECURITY PART 1: ORGANIZATION , GENERAL COURSE AND METHODS GOVERNING MARINE SAFETY FUNCTIONS SUBPART 1.01 ORGANIZATION AND GENERAL FLOW OF FUNCTIONS

46 CFR § 1.01-30 JUDICIAL REVIEW . (a) Nothing in this chapter shall be construed to prohibit any party from seeking judicial review of any Commandant’s decision or action taken pursuant to the regulations in this part ...

RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED,

Don Hamrick 5860 Wilburn Road Wilburn, Arkansas 72179 Email: [email protected] Email: [email protected]

C ERTIFICATE OF S ERVICE I, Don Hamrick, unrepresented Plaintiff, hereby certify that on Thursday, July 26, 2006, I FedEx’d the above to Alberto Gonzales, Attorney General of the United States, to Dennis Barghaan, Assistant U. S. Attorney.

___________________________________ Don Hamrick 5860 Wilburn Road Wilburn, Arkansas 72179 Email: [email protected] Email: [email protected]

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