Ny B10 Ny Times Questions Fdr- Entire Contents- Memos- Chronology- Newsday Article (1st Pg For Reference) 511

1. According to the the McKinsey report, the first helicopter arrived at 8:52. The commission says the helicopter (called Aviation 14) arrived at 8:58. All we want to know is how the commission went about determining that time. Review of Aviation Unit Flight Data Sheet shows 2 helicopters takeoff from Floyd Bennett Field in Bklyn at 08:50hrs. Then a review of the SOD

radio tapes revealed the following. 08:58:30

Aviation 14 Be advised that we are 84 at this time we have people falling out of the building at this time. It looks like all 4 sides are cut open. A lot of flames we are going to be landing at the downtown heliport as soon as emergency services are 84.1 don't believe at this time that we are going to be able to land on the roof, central it's too engulfed in flames. Central 10-4. (Radio code 10-84 or 84 to arrive at scene.)

2. Similarly, the McKinsey report has the first NYPD emergency service unit, Truck 1, arriving at 8:52. The 9-11 Commission has the time as 8:56. Again, what is the basis for which this time determination was made. Review of SOD radio tapes shows the following.

08:54:10

Unk Any 1 trucks at the scene. Central Any 1 trucks available at the scene, at this time, any 1 trucks 84 at the scene Truck 1.... Was about 1 minuet out

08:56:22 Unk Adam/Boy is 84 central; we are going to go to Tack 2 Central 10-4 I have all available ESU responding there aviation and all specialty units. Responding out their right now plus EMS, FD and everyone else.

August 19, 2002

RESCUE On 9/11, the NYPD rescue function consisted of three primary components: the rescue of civilians from inside the towers prior to the building collapses, the post-collapse search for survivors, and the evacuation of civilians from southern Manhattan. We found that the Department performed the precollapse rescue and evacuation of civilians effectively; however, the postcollapse search for survivors proved extremely risky given the lack of equipment, training, and supervision among the hundreds of responders.

Tasks • Pre-collapse rescue of civilians in and around WTC

Post-collapse search for and rescue of survivors

• Evacuation of all non-emergency personnel from southern Manhattan

Assessment ESU and other first responders responded to site at 0852 hours and effectively carried out rescue operations in WTC complex - 5 ESU teams deployed into buildings and plaza; sixth team prepared for helicopter rescue (which was ultimately deemed impossible) - 40 ESU personnel on site prior to collapse of WTC2 - Many non-ESU MOS also assisted in pre-collapse rescue Department demonstrated strong discipline, evidenced by measured response Hundreds of untrained, under-equipped, and unsupervised MOS (both onand off-duty) formed bucket brigades on site which, while admirable, exposed large numbers to high level of risk Estimated 600-700 NYPD officers searched for survivors each day for several weeks following attacks Thousands of civilians calmly and rapidly evacuated northwards, across bridges and by Harbor Unit boats and other vessels - As many as 5,000 civilians evacuated by Harbor Unit to New Jersey and Staten Island

15

August 19, 2002

CHRONOLOGY (1) 09:02

08:55

08:46 • 08:46 Right AA11 crashes into WTC1 between 85th and 90th floors

Events

• 08:52 Aviation 14 arrives at scene and examines possibility ol roof rescue

Rescue

* NYPD begins evacuating civilians from WTC area

• 08:56 ESU sends team • 08:59 First to meet helicopters for ESU team possible roof rescue enters WTC1

* Main highways in lower Manhattan closed except to emergency vehicles

Transportation

•

HOV lanes of major routes to lower Manhattan designated emergency vehicles only

Site security Investigation • 08:54 PAPD notified to shut down all PATH tunnels and trains

Citywide security

* 08:52 Truck 1 establishes ESU CP at Church/Vesey

Operational command

• Chief of Dept. * First Deputy Comm. (CoD) arrives at (FDC) arrives at Church/Vesey Church/Vesey

* 30 extra Metrotech staff assigned to 911 calls. Many calls are received from people trapped in WTC

Communications •

Personnel

08:47 Level 1 mobilization called; Level 3 mobilization called 8 seconds later

• 09:00 ESU ordered to go to Tactical Channel 'G'

• 08:54 All ESU units advised to respond to Church/Vesey

• 08:58 CoD • 09:01 1st and 5m Pet. XOs calls Level 4 advise new mobilization mobilization point at Vesey/West •

Logistics/ equipment

Responding ESU units bring rescue equipment to WTC

Intelligence

48

Source: NYPD transcnpts; Operations log; McKinsey interviews; media reports

August 19, 2002

CHRONOLOGY (1) •

Events Rescue

09:02

08:55

08:46 08:46 Flight AA1 1 crashes into WTC1 between 85th and 90th floors

• 08:52 Aviation 14 arrives at scene and examines possibility of roof rescue •

Transportation

• NYPD begins evacuating civilians from WTC area

• 08:56 ESU sends team • 08:59 First to meet helicopters for ESU team possible roof rescue enters WTC1

Main highways in lower Manhattan closed except to emergency vehicles

•

HOV lanes of major routes to lower Manhattan designated emergency vehicles only

Site security Investigation • 08:54 PAPD notified to shut down all PATH tunnels and trains

Citywide security Operational command

• 08:52 Truck 1 establishes ESU CP at Church/Vesey •

Communications Personnel

• Chief ol Dept. • First Deputy Comm. (CoD) arrives at (FDC) arrives at Church/Vesey Church/Vesey

30 extra Metrotech staff assigned to 91 1 calls. Many calls are received from people trapped in WTC

• 08:47 Level 1 mobilization called; Level 3 mobilization called 8 seconds later

Logistics/ equipment

•

• 08:54 All ESU units advised to respond to Church/Vesey

09:00 ESU ordered to go to Tactical Channel 'G'

• 08:58 CoO • 09:01 1st and 5" Pet. XOs calls Level 4 advise new mobilization mobilization point at Vesey/West •

Responding ESU units bring rescue equipment to WTC

Intelligence

Source: NYPD transcripts; Operations log; McKinsey interviews; media reports

48

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Newsday (New York) May 23, 2004 Sunday CITY EDITION SECTION: NEWS; Pg. A02 LENGTH: 904 words HEADLINE: When silence is deadly BYLINE: JIMMY BRESLIN BODY: The five central communications offices are located in parks. The idea is to keep them isolated," the Fire Department communications man was explaining. "I know the dispatch center on Woodhaven Boulevard," I said. "Woodhaven and Park Lane," he said. "That's a big difference from Giuliani's command center at 7 World Trade Center. Sure it blew up. I guess it was a real estate deal that put it there. Over a million in rent. That had to be the reason. Why would you ever go there otherwise?" "The commission didn't ask anything about it," I said. "He talked about how he had to walk the streets looking for a new one. He made it sound like he was alone in the Sahara. They never asked him what happened to the first command center." "That's your politicians," my friend said. "I'm glad I've never been around them. What about all that diesel fuel in the bunker. It came spilling down." We were talking about the deaths of 343 firefighters at the World Trade Center because they couldn't hear a police radio from a helicopter advising everybody that the north tower was unstable. Everybody should get out. "How did they miss the helicopter call?" I asked. "Because they didn't use the radio that could let them talk to the police. In each of the five central communications centers, there is a Motorola Transceiver, which operates on 470.8375 megahertz, used by special operations such as police aviation. I could've picked it up and talked to the Aviation One up there over the tower.

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5/25/2004