Notterman, Joseph M. - Reductionism And Dialectical Materialism

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Reductionism and Dialectical Materialism Joseph M. Notterman Princeton University Abstract Psychological explanations of how behavior is acquired are compared between the U.S. and pre- and post-Soviet. The comparison is drawn in terms of communist theories of 1-way and 2-way dialectical materialism. Evidence is brought to bear that physiological, necessary and sufficient interpretations (i.e., 1-way), not only still exist in the former Soviet, but—for reasons other than communist theory—are on the upswing in the U.S. An advantage of America’s more open society is that investigators are encouraged to challenge existing theories. An experimental example is described in which conditioning influences underlying neurology, thereby demonstrating that the relation is not just unidirectional. While such findings are important, they do not diminish the need for psychology to maintain its own enterprise. The purpose of these brief remarks is to comment on possibly the earliest, clear-cut effort to counter reductionist, “overly simplistic” tendencies in psychological science; namely, that of the Soviet psychophysiologists. There are three reasons why such an observation is salient: 1) A major thrust in American psychology today is in the direction of seeking neurological and biochemical (more generally, physiological) explanations of behavior. In this, the efforts of early Soviet reflexologists and reactologists are perhaps being emulated. 2) Insufficient treatment is accorded the debate within Soviet psychology that led to the distinction between 1-way and 2-way dialectical materialism. This may be why some American psychologists seek answers in the brain, and in the process may be confusing the necessary with the sufficient (Notterman, 2000). 3) The dissolution of the U.S.S.R has made it possible for Russian psychologists to be frank about the state of their field. In examining their conclusions, we may profit from their experience. Indeed, we may find that we are already in the process of doing so.

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Journal of Theoretical and Philosophical Psy. Vol. 21, No. 2, 2001

THE CURRENT U. S. EMPHASIS EXPLANATIONS

UPON

PHYSIOLOGICAL

Before going further, it is appropriate to establish that there is, indeed, a current American emphasis upon “solid” explanations of human behavior, including especially the neurological and biochemical frames of references a) Toward that end, the author requested that the Librarian of Princeton’s Psychology Library (Ms. Mary Chaikin) survey the titles of journals appearing in the oldest (1980) and most recent (2000) PsychINFO Coverage Lists available. She was asked to highlight the names of journals containing words referring in any way to physiology-neurology-biochemistry, and similar such terms. A tally of the results indicated that there were 60% more such titles in 2000 than in 1980. b) Robinson (1995, p. 6) comments on the current trend toward neurological reductionism as follows: . . . reductive strategies of the materialistic stripe have always been either declared or undeclared wars on psychology, for such strategies have as their principle objective the elimination of all psychological entities from the domain of the actually existing. That is why it is so ironic, if not pathetic, to witness contemporary psychology lusting after them. c) Two more items are selected to illustrate the currency of reductionism in the U.S. One is taken from a Letter to the Editor appearing in the NY Times, the other from The Chronicle of Higher Education. The letter was prompted by an article published in the Times concerning the “pushing” by school authorities of amphetamines upon overly active children. Elio Frattaroli, M.D., comments as follows: In a managed care environment, how many doctors who prescribe analeptic drugs like Ritalin take the time to learn about the child, his parents and his home life, and to talk to his teachers? . . . The best doctors do that routinely. They know that many things besides attention deficit disorder can lead to disruptive behavior and inattention in class: chronic anxiety; a chaotic home situation; . . . a bad or spiteful teacher. The problem isn’t Ritalin. . . . It’s a society that assumes that anything we don’t like about ourselves or our children was caused by a chemical imbalance for which we have no personal responsibility ( August 21, 2001; emphasis added). Nor does the problem end with the child leaving for college. Carter and Winesman observe in The Chronical of Higher Education:

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A steadily growing number of students who are struggling with depression, anxiety, sleep disorders, and other problems visit campus health-care services for the sole purpose of refilling prescriptions. Many of those students tell us they are not interested in working toward an understanding of their lives. They ask only that their regimens of psychotropic medications — antidepressants, Ritalin, tranquilizers, and others — be continued or adjusted (August 3, 2001, p. B3). 2.

THE DISTINCTION MATERIALISM

BETWEEN

1-WAY

AND

2-WAY DIALECTICAL

The Soviet psychophysiologists perceived a separation between mind and body that does not fit conveniently into dualisms such as Cartesian interactionism, Wundtian parallelism, or Kohlerian psychophysical isomorphism. Their approach, termed “dialectical materialism,” was based upon the theoretical contributions of the German philosopher George W. F. Hegel (1770-1831). Hegelian “dialectics” consists of the logical process by which a thesis is advanced, then contravened by an equally tenable antithesis, with the resolution of the two providing an acceptable synthesis. The synthesis is considered to be a new thesis, with attending antithesis, synthesis, and so on. “Materialism” is the belief that reality consists of matter and its motions. “Dialectical materialism” has both philosophical and economic meanings. The philosophical is concerned with ongoing changes in matter, with each successive change setting the stage for the next. The economic version of dialectical materialism was proposed by Marx and other communist theoreticians. They held that the possessors of natural resources (i.e., matter, or more generally, capital) established the values of a society. Capitalists treated their workers as if they were robots, programmed to act reflexively — to do their work without dispute. But later founders of communism held that there also was another dimension to man’s behavior; namely, that in addition to acting reflexively, man can learn to become purposeful, as abetted by language development— free will is not implied. Lenin clarified the distinction between the reflexive and independent characteristics of human behavior. The reflexive (thesis and antithesis) was called 1-way dialectical materialism; the independent, which incorporated the reflexive, 2-way dialectical materialism. One-way dialectical materialism asserts that an understanding of anatomy and physiology is both necessary and sufficient for an understanding of human behavior . . . Two-way dialectical materialism holds that while a knowledge of the brain’s material qualities is necessary . . . , it is

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not sufficient. Mentation has its own representative reality (albeit within the constraints mandated by anatomy, physiology, heredity, environment, and past experience), and exerts a perceived autonomous influence on an individual’s personal and social behavior.(Notterman, 1985, p. 80).1 Elsewhere in the same source, attention is drawn to the position of Hermann von Helmholtz, and its close relation to 1-way dialectical materialism. He held what came to be known as the Helmholtz Doctrine, that “. . . mind must be reduced to physiological, physical, or chemical events” (op. cit., p.23). Psychology dealt with “epiphenomena.” 3.

POST-U.S.S.R DEVELOPMENTS. The dissolution of the U.S.S.R, with the accompanying evolution of a new political system tilted more toward the Western tradition of individual liberty and private enterprise, has had a profound effect upon Russian psychology. Now that it is much freer, it is possible that we can anticipate the resolution of tensions here in the U.S. involving contemporary, residual tendencies toward materialism, by observing lessons drawn from the Russian frank confrontation with its past. A valuable description of recent developments is provided by Oleinik (1996). The author is an historian of psychology, and member of the Russian Academy of Sciences. He holds that theoretical trends in Soviet psychology were paradoxically static during the height of their international influence (1960-1990). The opening of Soviet psychology to Western influence “. . . has not resulted in original, comprehensive theories [being developed which are] totally independent of Marxist-Leninist doctrine” (pp.54-55). The reason for this paradox is that psychological fundamentalists were solidly ensconced; innovation is being held back by non-creative, communist diehards. He goes on to remark: “. . . contemporary Russian psychology is in transition from a deep-rooted and materialistic monolithic system to one built on fundamentally new principles. Relative to the Russian psychology of the future, we predict (with some confidence): Research will be scientific but practical and applied in orientation . . . various forms of professional training and applications of knowledge and skill will be available . . . there will be a pragmatic convergence of psychologists” (pp. 58-59). Nissin-Sabat’s (1996) assessment is in keeping with Oleinik’s prediction. He served on the American Psychological Association’s Committee on International Relations, and lectured in Russia. His remarks bring us close to the current American scene:

1 For much fuller accounts, see Cole and Maltzman (1969) and Wolman (1981).

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Russian psychology is witnessing the defection of a significant number of psychologists from scientific and academic posts to positions with practical application. As salaries within the institutes fail to keep up with . . . the country’s economic turmoil, psychologists are seeking employment in clinical practice or consulting work (p. 142). Is the U. S. encountering the same drift toward application? It would seem so, based upon a 1998 survey by the National Science Foundation: “The number of faculty jobs in the sciences is not keeping pace with the number who seek them . . . the total number of science and engineering faculty jobs at universities dropped by 1,800 from 1991 to 1995, a time when the number of postdocs [most of them in the life sciences] increased by 7,000.”2 Since there is a limit to how long one can or even should remain a postdoc, the drift is in the direction of positions in applied areas. DISCUSSION There appear to be two ways in which the U.S. is emulating current psychological developments in the former U.S.S.R. First, there is the continuing “lusting” after materialistic explanations of psychological events. Second, there is the paucity of available academic positions, and the consequent search for applied work. Do these developments entail dire consequences for American graduate students and faculty? Hardly a sure thing. The main reason is that psychology in the U. S. is not as solidly entrenched in materialism as is the case in Russia. American psychologists can more readily absorb the contributions of brain and biochemical scientists without confusing the necessary with the sufficient. For example, the interaction between neurogenesis and learning – a closing of the loop, as it were – is nicely demonstrated in Gould, Tanapaat, Hatings, and Shors (1999). They note that although “Several thousand new cells are produced [routinely] every day in the dentate gyrus of adult rats; hippocampal-dependent training more than doubled that number” (emphasis added). Their research (eyeblink conditioning and water maze training) permitted them to attribute this phenomenon to “. . . learning, and not merely general experience, because exposure of animals to the same environment and conditions in the absence of overt learning had no effect on the number of new neurons generated” (p. 189). It remains, however, that even the exciting tying together of neurons and acquired behavior does not vitiate the overriding fact that “Mentation has its own representative reality . . .” To the extent that we allow 2

As reported in the NY Times, August 21, 2001 (emphasis added).

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means and mechanisms to become intellectually imprisoning explanations of experiential phenomena per se, we forfeit the field of psychology. SUMMARY The tension in the U.S. between materialistic explanations of psychological phenomena, and the desire to keep psychology as its own enterprise, is compared to that between 1-way and 2-way dialectical materialism in the former Soviet Union. The opening of society in the former U.S.S.R has made it possible to collate more directly the resolution of this tension with current developments in the U. S. Although both countries are experiencing a drift toward applied fields (mainly because of the paucity of academic positions), basic research is being accomplished in the U. S. that helps resolve the conflict between materialism and the world of psychological experience. An example of such research is briefly described. Notwithstanding such advances, psychology must maintain its own disciplinary integrity. References Cole, M., & Maltzman, I. (Eds.). (1969). A handbook of contemporary Soviet psychology. New York: Basic Books. Gould, E., Tanapat, P., Hastings, N. B., & Shors, T. J. (1999). Neurogenesis in adulthood: a possible role in learning. Trends in Cognitive Sciences, 3, 186-192. Nissin-Sabat, D. (1996) The American Psychological Association’s initiatives in the former Republic of Russia. In V. A. Koltsova, Y. N. Oleinik, A. R. Gilgen, & C. K. Gilgen (Eds.), Post-Soviet perspectives on Russian psychology (pp. 135-143). Westport, CT: Greenwood Press. Notterman, J. M. (1985). Forms of psychological inquiry. New York: Columbia University Press. Notterman, J. M. (2000). Note on reductionism in cognitive psychology: Reification of cognitive processes into mind, mind-brain equivalence, and brain-computer analogy. Journal of Theoretical and Philosophical Psychology, 20, 116-121. Oleinik, Y. N. (1996). Russian psychology at present: Trends and paradoxes. In V. A. Koltsava, Y. N. Oleinik, A. R. Gilgen, & C. K. Gilgen (Eds.), Post-Soviet perspectives on Russian psychology (pp. 53-59). Westport, CT: Greenwood Press. Robinson, D. N. (1995). The logic of reductionist models. New Ideas in Psychology, 13, 1-22. Wolman, B. B. (1981) Contemporary theories and systems in psychology (2nd ed., Revised). New York: Plenum.