Notas De Comunicacion Intercultural Iii

Notas de comunicación intercultural III Ovidi Carbonell ESTEREOTIPOS ¿Qué son los estereotipos? Definición El término estereotipo procede del nombre que se le daba a una impresión tomada de un molde de plomo utilizado en las imprentas. Fue adaptado por los científicos sociales en 1922, a cargo del periodista Walter Lippmann. De acuerdo con Lippmann, estos son "imágenes en nuestras cabezas" (p. 3) que reflejan nuestras tendencias a pensar que las personas o cosas que pertenecen a la misma categoría comparten características similares. A pesar de no ser psicólogo, realizó aportaciones interesantes a la Psicología social, como que tendemos a prestar más atención a la información que confirma nuestros estereotipos, y a hacer menos caso a la que es inconsistente con ellos, o que los estereotipos están influidos por la cultura. Sin embargo, su aportación no tuvo en cuenta que los estereotipos también existen desde el punto de vista de la persona o grupos que son estereotipados. Resulta complejo dar una definición de estereotipo que englobe todas las que se han presentado en la literatura (véase, por ejemplo, Hamilton y Sherman, 1994; Hilton y Von Hippel, 1996; Huici, 1999). Tal es la cantidad de definiciones que se han desarrollado, que el concepto en sí ha sido objeto de revisión teórica en nuestro país por parte de varios autores (Huici, 1999). Al menos, parece existir consenso en que son esquemas cognitivos. […] Partimos de la concepción de McGarty, Yzerbyt y Spears (2002b, pp. 2-6), quienes manifiestan que es necesario conocer los tres principios que han guiado la investigación sobre estereotipos: • Son una ayuda para explicar la realidad social. • Son un mecanismo de ahorro de energía (véase el Cuadro 8.1). • Son creencias compartidas sobre un grupo. Es decir, serían las creencias compartidas sobre un grupo que sirven como ahorro de energía para explicar la realidad social. (Morales et al. 2007: 214)

Los estereotipos como fuente de ahorro de energía. Macrae, Hewstone y Griffiths (1993) realizaron un experimento en el que presentaban un vídeo donde aparecía una mujer hablando de su estilo de vida. A la mitad de los participantes se les dijo que era peluquera y a la otra mitad que era doctora. Durante su discurso (el mismo para los dos grupos) la mujer afirmaba que tenía creencias y comportamientos que pertenecían al estereotipo de las peluqueras (le gustan las discotecas, llevar minifalda, etc.), y creencias y comportamientos más propios de un médico (interés por la política, ir a la ópera, etc.). Cuando los participantes se concentraban en el vídeo, recordaban mejor la información inconsistente con la supuesta profesión de la mujer. Es decir, a los que se les decía que era una peluquera recordaban las características sobre "interés por la política", etc., mientras que ocurría lo contrario con los participantes a quienes se les indicada que la mujer era médico. Sin embargo, cuando tuvieron que realizar una tarea compleja que les distraía, recordaban mejor la información consistente con el estereotipo. Esto significa que cuando estaban ocupados, lo que hacían era ahorrar recursos cognitivos, por ello utilizaban la información consistente con los estereotipos. Este es sólo un ejemplo. Existen otras investigaciones en las que también se demuestra que las personas se dejan llevar más por los estereotipos cuando están "mentalmente ocupados" (Bodenhausen y Lichtenstein, 1987; Bodenhausen y Wyer, 1985; van Knippenberg, Dijksterhuis y Vermeulen, 1999).

(Morales et al. 2007: 215)

O’Sullivan et al. estereotipo/estereotipar *La clasificación social particularizada de grupos y personas por medio de signos a menudo muy simplificados y generalizados, que implícita o explícitamente representan un conjunto de valores, juicios y suposiciones acerca de su conducta, sus características o su historia. * Se trata de un concepto extraído del lenguaje de la imprenta e incorporado al de las ciencias sociales por

stereotype/stereotyping* The social classification of particular groups and people as often highly simplified and generalized signs, which implicitly or explicitly represent a set of values, judgements and assumptions concerning their behaviour, characteristics or history. * Initially introduced from the language of printing into that of the social sciences by Lippmann (originally published 1922; 1965), the concept has been developed

Lippmann (1965; originalmente publicado en 1922), que fue elaborado sobre todo en psicología social y llegó a ocupar un lugar central en el estudio de procesos cognitivos, actitudes y prejuicios (véanse Tajfel, 1963, y Cau-then, 1971). «Estereotipar» ha sido definido en gran parte de este libro como una extensión particular del proceso cognitivo fundamental de categorización por el cual imponemos una estructura y darnos una interpretación a sucesos, objetos y experiencias. En sí mismo, este proceso exige simplificar y organizar series complejas y diversas de fenómenos generales en categorías rotuladas. Para ello dirigimos la atención exclusivamente a ciertas características identificato-rias similares o a ciertos rasgos distintivos y los consideramos opuestos a muchas otras diferencias. Aun así, los estereotipos identifican no sólo categorías generales de personas: poblaciones nacionales (por ejemplo, los irlandeses), razas (por ejemplo, la raza latina), clases (por ejemplo, la clase obrera), género (por ejemplo, hombres y mujeres), ocupaciones (por ejemplo, los contadores) y grupos desviados (por ejemplo, los consumidores de drogas), sino que son distintivos también en tanto portadores de juicios indiferenciados acerca de sus referentes. Y si bien pueden variar mucho en su apelación emocional y su intensidad, generalmente representan relaciones, tensiones o conflictos de poder subyacentes (por ejemplo, los «tontos» irlandeses, los «exaltados» latinos, la imagen del obrero «con gorra de paño», la rubia «boba», el contador «aburrido», o los «malvados» drogadictos). En suma, los estereotipos funcio nan para definir e identificar grupos de personas como parecidos en ciertos aspectos: comprometidos con valores particulares, motivados por objetivos semejantes, poseedores de una personalidad y una apariencia similares, etc. En este sentido, los estereotipos alientan una creencia intuitiva en las suposiciones en las que se basan, y cumplen una función central en la organización del discurso de sentido común. El grado en que se cree en los estereotipos, se los acepta de una manera tácita o se los rechaza y contraría ha suscitado muchas investigaciones en psicología social. Trabajos recientes en estudios culturales se han dedicado a investigar la circulación política y social y la importancia de los estereotipos en los medios masivos, sobre todo en el contexto de las representaciones mediáticas de la raza, las mujeres, las relaciones políticas e industriales y las formas de desviación. Tales estudios han mostrado, por ejemplo, que las convenciones y los códigos de la producción de noticias pueden promover formas particulares de estereotipar, como resultado lógico de la orientación que tienen en el interior de un contexto institucional particular y de una serie de nuevos valores de las noticias profesionales. La búsqueda de lo «extraordinario» (citado como «un valor cardinal o fundamental de la noticia» por Hall et al, 1978, pág. 53) y las consiguientes tendencias a la exageración y la dramatización

particularly in social psychology, occupying a central place in the study of cognitive processes, attitudes and prejudice (see Tajj 1963, and Cauthen 1971). Stereotyping in much of this work has been defined as a particular extension of the fundamental cognitive process of categorization, whereby we impose structure and make sense of events, objects and experience. This process in itself requires the simplification and organization of diverse and complex ranges of phenomena into general, labelled categories. In so doing attention is focused on certain similar identifying characteristics or distinctive features, as opposed to many other differences. Stereotypes, however, not only identify general categories of people: national populations (e.g., the Irish), races (e.g., the Latin race), classes (e.g., the working class), genders (i.e. men or women), occupations (e.g., accountants) and deviant groups (e.g., drug-takers), etc., they are distinctive in the way that the carry undifferentiated judgements about their referents. Whilst they may vary widely in terms of their emotional appeal and intensity they generally represent underlying power relations, tensions or conflicts (i.e. the 'stupid' Irish, the 'excitable' Latins, the 'cloth cap' image, the 'dumb' blonde, the 'boring' accountant, the 'evil’ junkie and so on). In short, they operate to define and identify groups of people as generally alike in certain ways - as committed to particular values, motivated by similar goals, having a common personality, make-up and so on. In this way stereotypes encourage an intuitive belief in their own underlying assumption and play a central role in organizing common sense discourse

The degree to which they are believed in, tacitly accepted or rejected and countered, has promoted a great deal of research in social psychology. Recent work in cultural studies has turned their social and political circulation and significance in the mass media, notably in the context of media representations of race, women, political and industrial relations, and forms of deviance. Such studies have, for example, pointed to the ways in which the conventions and codes of news production encourage particular forms of stereotyping as a logical outcome of their orientation within a particular institutional context and set of professional news values. The search for 'extraordinariness' (cited as 'the primary or cardinal news value' by Hall et al. 1978, p. 53) and subsequent tendencies towards exaggeration and dramatization are capable not only of generating stereotypes, but also of giving or

pueden no sólo generar estereotipos, sino además dar o negar legitimidad a aquellos otros estereotipos que ya circulan generalmente. Este interés reciente sobre todo trajo la consecuencia de reunir el concepto de estereotipo con las teorías de la ideología y la hegemonía. A pesar de su connotación de sencillez, el término estereotipo es un concepto difícil y exigente que plantea algunos problemas importantes y alimenta un provechoso tema de discusión.

denying legitimacy to those commonly in circulation. Crucially this recent attention has brought together the concept of stereotype with theories of ideology and hegemony. Despite its simple appeal, the term is a difficult and demanding one which raises some important problems, and serves as a useful point for discussion.

La perspectiva de la lingüística cognitiva A young man and his father had a severe car accident. The father died, and the young man was rushed to the hospital. The surgeon at the emergency room refused to operate on him, saying: "I can't. He is my son." How is this possible? (Giora 2003:13)

What does that riddle tell us about the mind? What is (the mindset) ridiculed here? It is (among other things) our inability to instantly adjust to contextual information.

CATEGORÍA

Clasificación de entidades según unas características compartidas. PROTOTIPO

Representación mental relativamente abstracta que reúne los atributos que mejor representan los elementos de una categoría. Es una representación esquemática de las características más representativas (salientes) asociadas a los miembros de esa categoría. Proporciona una estructura y organiza la categoría según criterios de tipicidad (tipicality). ESTEREOTIPO

Modelo cognitivo idealizado de carácter metonímico que resulta de una convención social e ideológica. Define coherentemente la identidad de grupos de individuos o categorías sociales en contraste con otros, estableciendo por lo general un conjunto de creencias rígidas, articuladas por medio de una dialéctica de pertenencia / no pertenencia, basada a su vez en características consideradas positivas (“nosotros”)/ negativas (“ellos”). PREJUICIO

Tendencia a clasificar de modo desfavorable los individuos pertenecientes a determinada categoría social, basada en estereotipos culturales.

(Givon 2005:46) The articulation of the pragmatic middle-ground in both psychology and linguistics is due to the work of Eleanor Rosch (1973a, b, 1975), building on the semantic network model of Collins and Quillian (1972) as well as on earlier work on abstract concepts by Posner and Keel (1968). Four salient features characterize prototypelike categories: a.

Multiple criterial features:

Membership in a natural category, unlike a logical category, is not determined by a single criterial feature that is either present or absent, but rather by a large basket of features. Some of those features may be more central to the category, in the sense that more — or nearly all — members display them. Others may be more peripheral. Thus, for example, shape is much more central to the category'horse' than size, and size is yet more central than color. b.

Graded membership:

The most prototypical member of a category is the one displaying the largest number of criterial features. It is, presumably, the one that comes to mind most readily when the categorial name is invoked. That is,'horse'> 'quarterhorse';'apple' > 'red delicious'; 'flower'> 'rose'; 'bird' > 'sparrow'; etc. But less prototypical members, those that display fewer features, are still members of the category. c.

Strong feature association:

« The criterial features of a natural category tend to be strongly associated, so that in the majority of cases, having one feature implies having many of the others. Thus, a miniature horse may still have most of the other salient horse features, such as shape, color, behavior, etc. d.

Strong clustering around the mean:

As a logical consequence of (c), the vast majority of members of a natural category will tend to cluster around the categorial mean. That is, they tend to resemble the prototype (and thus each other). Outliers, odd and ambiguous members are a relatively small minority.

La perspectiva de los estudios culturales Citas de Pickering (2001), Stereotyping. The Politics of Representation (London: Palgrave)

xiii Representations consist of words and images which stand in for various social groups and categories. They provide ways of describing and at the same time of regarding and thinking about these groups and categories. They may also affect how their members view themselves and experience the social world around them. Public representations have the power to select, arrange, and prioritise certain assumptions and ideas about different kinds of people, bringing some to the fore, dramatising and idealising or demonising them, while casting others into the social margins, so that they have little active public presence or only a narrow and negative public image. These practices are central to the politics of representation. Representation involves processes of 'speaking for' and 'speaking of those who are represented. The politics of representation cover both the power to speak of and for others, whether in news narratives, social documentaries, feature films or advertising, all of which follow their own formal rules and conventions. The consequences of providing accounts and images of others for structures and relations of social power are central to the analysis of any study of symbolic representations, where questions of under-representation, over-representation and misrepresentation are necessarily high on the critical agenda.

(2) First, we need to distinguish more clearly between categories and stereotypes. This is important if we are to avoid using these two terms interchangeably in a way which renders one or the other of them potentially redundant. They have separate meanings. Insisting on these provides a way of countering the claim that we cannot live without stereotyping. As we shall see, such a claim is central to the approach to stereotyping taken in cognitive psychology, but it is commonly made in a variety of other fields of study, such as media and literary studies, sociology and political science (see for example, Gilman, 1985, discussed below; also Holquist, 1989; Potter, 1998: 53; Gillespie, 1999; Glynn et al., 1999: 147-58; Kolakowski, 1999: 139-43). Thinking in relation to categories is a necessary way of organising the world in our minds, creating mental maps for working out how we view the world and negotiating our ways through it in our everyday social relations and interactions. It would be difficult to imagine how the world would seem without using categories in general speech and writing as basic tools for organising our understanding. […] (3) Second, we need to bring back into the frame the central dilemma at the heart of stereotyping. […] It is, at base, to do with questions of order and power. Stereotyping may operate as a way of imposing a sense of order on the social world in the same way as categories, but with the crucial difference that stereotyping attempts to deny any flexible thinking with categories. It denies this in the interests of the structures of power which it upholds. It attempts to maintain these structures as they are, or to realign them in the face of a perceived threat. The comfort of inflexibility which stereotypes provide reinforces the conviction that existing relations of power are necessary and fixed.

(10) One aspect of the classical view of stereotypes has already been mentioned. This is the idea that social stereotypes exaggerate and homogenise traits held to be characteristic of particular categories and serve as blanket generalisations for all individuals assigned to such categories. The images and notions connected with them are then consensually shared in the interests of the social group among whom they are widely utilised and diffused. Such images and notions are usually held to be simplistic, rigid and erroneous, based on discriminatory values and damaging to people's actual social and personal identities. In the classical view, stereotypes have been regarded as necessarily deficient. They distort the ways in which social groups or individuals are perceived, and they obscure the more complex and finite particularities and subjectivities tangled up in the everyday lives of groups and individuals. They are seen as deficient either because they encourage an indiscriminate lumping together of people under overarching group-signifiers, often of a derogatory character, or because they reduce specific groups and categories to a limited set of conceptions which in themselves often contradict each other. Stereotypes are

also discriminatory because the stunted features or attributes of others which characterise them are considered to form the basis for negative or hostile judgements, the rationale for exploitative, unjust treatment, or the justification for aggressive behaviour. In a word, stereotypes are bad. Politically, they stand in the way of more tolerant, even-handed and differentiated responses to people who belong to social or ethnic categories beyond those which are structurally dominant. Intellectually, they are poor devices for engaging in any form of social cartography, and for this reason should be eradicated from the map of good knowledge. […] (11) Nonetheless, the classical view of stereotyping raises certain perhaps less obvious problems. To begin with, taking stereotypicality as indicative of a misinformed attitude, irrational value or inaccurate representation implies that there are always firm grounds for rectifying it. It is by no means certain that this will necessarily follow, once the critique has been conducted. Instead of assuming that it will, we need to ask if we are faced with the rhetoric of realism, facticity, authenticity and rationality operating imperially to guarantee the truth of arguments against bigotry and intolerance. For some, the remedy lies in the provision of more ample information and more representative images. (12) The reasoning behind its advocacy is that if stereotyping's error of description and judgement is based on a lack of information, of detailed empirical evidence, then surely the error will evaporate once such information and evidence are supplied. Maybe, but unless there is a ready predisposition to stand corrected, this remedy amounts to little more than wishful liberal thinking. If its logical premises were generally valid, then misogyny or homophobia would soon become as psychologically outmoded as the four cardinal humours. […] While the empirical demonstration of falsification does not guarantee any necessary diminution of stereotyping, particular instances of it may of course prove vulnerable to modification or erosion. If this was not the case the political purpose of this book would be instantly cut from under its feet. One reason they are so vulnerable is that they always operate within a given ideological field, not for all time but in relation to definite social needs and conditions which may change. The degree to which stereotypes of black people or any other people have proved resistant or responsive to change has depended on the social and historical circumstances in which they have operated, their rhetorical status in cultural processes of meaning-construction, and the extent of the self-rewarding emotional, moral, political or other investments which their perpetrators have had in their long-term preservation. Stereotypes remain fairly stable for quite considerable periods of time, and tend to become more pronounced and hostile when social tensions between different ethnic or other groupings arise. 'They do not present much of a problem when little hostility is involved, but are extremely difficult to modify in a social climate of tension and conflict' (Tajfel and Fraser, 1978: 427). (14) Clearly, there are ways in which stereotypes can be shown to be inadequate as representations when they stand in for the many aspects of social life, experience and identity which are ignored, marginalised or distorted in mainstream culture and mainstream channels of communication. The importance of this kind of critique is indisputable, as for instance is exemplified by the contribution of feminist scholarship to media studies. Before this contribution was made, stereotypes of women and the media's role in their development, reinforcement and maintenance went largely unquestioned. But while female stereotypes are now contested, it remains the case that detailed comparison does not provide a straight road either to the opposite of error or to its dissolution. Resting one's case on the empirical establishment of stereotypical error considerably underestimates the play of ideological forces set in motion by processes of stereotyping. It is not as if there is any direct, unilinear connection between stereotypical images, social roles and relations, and patterns of enculturation. In the past, the comparative study of stereotypes and social experience has tended to assume a pre-existent 'reality-out-there' against which images and representations can be transparently measured and found wanting. Underpinning the classical view, this assumption has been responsible for the empiricism inherent in much of the thinking on stereotyping.