Norris Clarke

XIV. Being as Good, or Valuable Status of the pueaion. So far we have uncovered three great transcendenta/ prEer-

of berng (i.e., one that is co-extensive with being, found wherever being is found, hence one that "ttanscends" or leaps over all boundaries of class ot kitrd of being): namely, every being is one, actiue, innlligible. Now, after examining being as goal-oriented, striving dynamically for its own self-realizadon, and as ptoceeding ftom the one Ultimate Source of all perfection, we are in a position to bring out into explicit focus the next great transcendental property, the good. This coresponds to the other great drive of the human spirit one aspect oithis unified ddve is the ddve of the intellect towards being as intelligible (the truth of being): the other, which we will now examine, is that of the will toward being as good, ualuable. (fhe good could be examined before the discovery of God as Source, but it can be done more adequately afterwards.) Main Pmblens, A. !7hat is the meaning and natur of the good? B. \what are the main kinds of good? C. Is every being as being good, and if so, why? ties

A. Meaning

and Nature of the Good

(1) Discouery: $7e discover the good from our experience of desiring, lovrng, valuingvarious berngs, i.e., from the dvnamic ap€titiue side of o* nrt*. (rn the odginal root meaning of "appetite": from ad-peto, to tend toward something). Thus the good appears as the corelative of this ddve, i.e., as the object of ir apetitive dynamisms of desiring, loving, valuing, admiring, both sensitive and spiritual. Thus Aristode defines it as "that which all things ieek." Let us call this apetitive tendency toward, or response to, something as an act of ua/uing ot ua/uation. Hence the good appears as the aaluable: that which is, or can be, the object of any positive act of valuing ot valuation, which in a very wide analogous sense can be called an act of lorting. Hence the good is that which is in some way louable.

Note here the intrinsically relational character of the good. It does not signify some character of a thing considered purely in itself without reference to any valuet (which can be identical with itself). Then we would speak of it merely as a mode of "being" or "perfection." To call something "good" connotes some kind of at least implicit valuation. ffhis relational character was not always clearly understood or brought out rn the Neoplatonic and early medieval tteatments of the good, which Lnded to treat the Good as an ultimate Absolute in itself, without reference to anything else. The telational chatacter, alteady present in Aristotle, comes into frrll explicil recognition with St. Thomas and after him.) Q) Relation to being The good does not add something on to being that is really distinct from it as an absolute or non-relative quality. It is the ieing itnlf that is valued, called "good," not something else that is not it. Hence th.-g""d

Centtal Ptoblems of Metaphysics

-

(106)

signifies the object or being itself that is valued, precisely as the object of ualuation, i.e., considercd in relation to some aalaer. Uke the other transcendental properties of being, it is identical in reality with being, but is distinct in concept ftom being and the other properties because it adds on or connotes the special relation of being valuable ta something (whether to itself or to another). Hence the good is being as ualuable, loaable.

p)

out descripdon as in the history of and exploited noted often above, it contains an ambiguity, thought. If the good is "what we seek or love," then it is a circle to say that we seek the good, fot the good is simply whatevet we seek. Hence the question arises: "Is something good (or called good) simply because we seek it, or do we seek it because it is good?" In a word, is the good a purely subjectiue asPect that we confer on things precisely by our seeking them, without it being at all objectively grounded in the thing sought itselP Or does the good sigru& something intrinsically in things that makes them porth valuing by us or the valuer in question? Subjectiuist ualue theoies. Spinoza seems to have held this: that "things are good precisely because we seek them." Many modern value theorists also hold this: thete are no objective values in things, value is a purely subjective property confered on things by the valuer's interest in them. Critique: If this means merely that nothing can be called good save in relation to some valuer, there 'would be no problem. But if it also means, as seems clear enough, that there ts no objectiue ground for their being valued within the being valued, making it truly worthy of being valued, then it becomes putely arbitrary, irrational, and contrafy to our actual experience and ordinary meaning of the good and the valuable. For then someone could value anything at all, declate it truly good, for no reason or ground in reality at all, simply hrs sheerfat or decree. But this is clearly against our expedence. We strive for most things because we really believe they will obiectively fulfill us, make us happy, be good for us, so that without them we will not be as happy; it is not enough fot us simply to decree that something is good for it to turn out truly valuable for us (then we could all be "rich" with a few pieces of dust, declared to be precious stones); and we also argue with, try to petsuade others, that such and such is truly good, wortbl of betng loued, and that if I am wise, reasonable, in tune with reality, I should value Good as gtnthesis of objectiue and subjertiue poles. lf. we leave

it. Hence the proper understanding of the meaning of the good should include both the objertiue and subjectiue poles. We are norv ready to define it finally:

Defnition:

The good

is that which is aaluable. i.e., possesses

some

positiue qualitjt (or

"perfection") that renders it apt or worth1 tu be ualued b1 some ualuer (some appetite de-

sfuing or loving it).

Note 1: Something does not have to be actually valued by something to be propedy called good. It is enough for it to be apt or worthy of being valued.

Good - (107)

Note 2: This definition allows us to make sense out of what we call an "apparent good,r' i.e., something that seems good to someone but in fact is not. If the good were purely a subjective creation this would not make sense. Whatever appeffed to be good would be good, as long as the valuer valued it. Note 3: The good does not have.to be consciousl1valued. Any positive tendency towatd something as a goal is enough to frrlfill the notion of rppeite analogous/1. Thus we say "Water is good for a plant." (4) Two main grvunds for valuing something as good: (a) as somethngperfectiue of the ualuer, to be possessed by the valuer the goodfor-me;

(b) as something to be admired, approued, esteemed in an objective and disinterested way, as perfecting another, or simply the universe as a whole, as good for being itself (better that it be than not be): thegoodfor another, or the goodfor, orin itftlf, the good from the universal viewpoint of being itself. The love appropdate to (a) is the loue of possession (often called the love of concupiscence of desne); the love appropdate to @) is the loae of beneuolence, wishing well to another for its own sake, or simply admiring something for its perfecrion, its beauty, nobiJity, etc. St. Thomas sometimes calls it love of coruplacenq4 or approval: we delight in the good, nttfy or affirm it for its own sake. Note that this second kind of self-forgettinglove is possible only when a human being dses above his/her biological drives, oriented towards his/her own selfperfection, to live with his/he1 inlslligence and will in the wide horizon of being itself, becoming able to recognize and approve the good wherever and for whomevet it is, taking the ultimate supra-subjecttve uiewpoint of beingitself,which teally means that of its Ultimate Source, shadng in the all-embracing viewpoint of God himself. For just as the adequate object or horizon of the intellect is simply being itself in all its fullness and participations. In a signifrcant sense, then, one can say that since the goal ot object of the will is this universal, untestricted good, to love whatever is good, for itself, is precisely the highest selffulfillment and self-perfection of this faculty and hence of the human being. Thus the metaphysical and psychological paradox that the highest self-perfection fot the human being is precisely to go beyond his/her own pardcular finite self and its immediate concerns in univetsal self-forgetting love. "He who loses himself shall frnd himself." Aristode's analysis of the good tended to be restricted to the more biological viewpoint of self-petfection: the good is the actuality that fulfills our potency or need. St. Thomas, following him, seems at times to do the same, as in his famous definitlon: "Bonum est qaod est perfertum in se et perfectiuun alicttius" -- (the good is that which rs perfect in itself (ptossesses some positive perfection) and perfettiue of some appetite (capable of fulfrlling, enriching something). If one takes the perfectiue tn the widest sense as the goal of intellect and will--to embrace the totality of being and the good--his definition can include good as obiect of the love of

Central Problems of Metaphysics

-

(108)

benefi.cence, altruistic love. He comes perfecdy clear when he takes up the theologrcal virtues of charity, etc. or love of God for his own sake, and love of friendship, which loves one's friend for his own sake and not merely fot the good one gets out of him.

B. Kinds of Good it is as wide as being, is analogous like being, just as is the of which it is the object, depending on the varying kinds of

(1) The good, since

dynamic act of ualaing appetites, kinds of objects valued, and lcnds of perfective relations involved. Q) Moral and ontological goodness Moral goodness is that propff to a moral act, as conforming to the moral norm of what oaght to be done here and now by a free and responsible person. This is the concetn of Ethics. Ontological goodness belonss to the order of the zq not the ought, and signifies that which is rn fact valuable or perfective of someone in the exrstential order, whethet he ought morally to seek it now or not. Our concern here. Thus a glass of beer is an ontological good of a modest order, but it might not be morally good to go for one here and norv. Among the onlologira/ goodr (a) Useful goals those that are not valued for themselves but only as means torvard the achieving of some other good. E.g., shovel, a can opener. ^ @) Intnnsicgoodr. those valued for themselves, as in themselves good, not for the sake of something else. E.g., knowledge, love, happtness, beauty, friendship. These in turn can be valued eitber as to be possessedby the valuer, goods-for-me, or to be admired, approued in themselves or fot others, willed for others.l Analog of ualuing lowng In addition to various types of human ot petsonal love, love ranges over a wide spectrum, from the conscious free love of persons at the top, down through the conscious but non-ftee, instinctual love of animals, to the unconscious blind striving of plants for their fulfillment, all the way to the sheer natural drive of inanimate entities toward their self-unfolding and selfexpression in action. Every action, as we have seen, is governed by a ltnal cause as a goal, and every goal has the nature of a good. Since the final cause is at the root of all action of any kind, it is true, as Dante said, that "Love makes the world go round." "Each being," St. Thomas says, "loves and seeks to preserve as far as it can, its own being, as a good." When love is of an absent good, it has the character of desire. When of z presenl good, it takes on the character of fraition or de/ight rn the good as possessed. Thus God's love for Himself, the plenitude of all goodness. The only adeqaate object the divine love is His own infinite goodness, but He that can "draw" or ^tft^ct can love his goodness in two ways: as to eryo1 or as to sbare with others, as in creation.

'See corresponding kinds of love in previous discussion.

Good - (109)

.hJa/e

extraaerted character of love compared to knowledge. object into itself, into its own mental world. Love draws the

the existential,

I(nowledge dtaws its lover out towards the obiect of his love as it is in itnlf n the real otder, to be united with it in its reality. As known, I turn ice cream into a mental being; as a good, I want to eat it in its reality. Thus we draw up to our own level whatever we know that is below us; we dtaw down what is above us. But love draws us down to what is below us, up to what is above us. That is why it is better, the medievals said, to love God than to know Him, bettet to know lower things than to love them (for themselves).

C. How to Judge Obiective Goodness or Value

If

goodness, value, is not something purely arbitnary or subjective, but has some objective gtounding or foundation in things themselves, which makes them intrinsically apt tobe valued, desired, loved, then the quesdon alises, What is the objertiue ground, tbe objectiue reasons,for diverningandjudgingthis aalue in things? There are two main orders of objectiae ua/ue: (1) The Relatiae Order, where the good in question is restricted to the horizon of a particulat being or qrpe of beings. Such goods are expressed linguistically in such ways as this: "This is a good nan. This is a good friendship, a good p^irtiog, good Scotch, etc." Or it can also be expressed in "good-for" teffis, such as: 'Joggrng is good for John. Friendship is good for man, etc.; water and sun are good for plants, etc." Q) Tbe Absolute Order of Being itrelf. Tl:us occurs where a being or kind of being is declared to be in itself without qualification a good or value in itself, as seen within the whole horizon of being, i.e., on the absolute scale of all being as intrinsically good. This is expressed linguistically in such ways as: "Friendship is good. Love is good. Beauty is good. Humanity is good. Plant and animal life are

good. God is good."

Note

1:

in the Relatiue Orden Here is where the good arises naturally out of the basic metaphysics of natue as dynamic center of action, with natural potentialities, final causality, etc., in a wotd, nature as naturally oriented towards its own self-fulfillment or zct:gahzatfon. An objective good or value for a given being is wbateuer fulflls in some signficant wa1 its natural potentialities--always with a view, of course, toward the integated harmony of these potentialities contributing toward the unified perfection or firlfillment of the whole beins as such. Thus a sood man or sood woman is one who haS achieved a high degtee of firlfillment or actualizatfon of his or her natural potentialities as a human being, either man or woman. A gd-apple-u"" is one that has firlfilled its natural potentialities as an apple tree. A good friendship is one that fulfills the natute ot basic potentialities of friendship as such. So too for a good painting, good Scotch, good milk, etc. Objectiue Cmund of the Cood

.

Central Problems of Metaphysics

-

(110)

The same basic rule applies for judgrng whether something is g:ood-for a given being. It is objectively good for the being in question if it frrlfills in some sigruficant way the latter's natural potentialities, brings it to a fuller completion or actualizauon of its own dynamic nature, oriented towards the frrllest participation rn the perfection of being that is possible fot its given essence. Thus health is good, for man, animals, plants. !?isdom, love, friendship ate good for man. Scotch whiskey may be goodfor some people, not good for others, and cetainly not fot plants, though it may still be "good Scotch" as Scotch goes. Hence wch judgnents arc not arbitrary, purefi subjectiae. The structure of the nature and natutal potentialities of a being is something quite real and objective in itself, independent of merely subjective whim or decision. Hence one can argue with others about the objectivity of such value judgments, which can therefore be true ot false. Thus the basic potentialities of the human being, ranging from biological survival, up through his spiritual natute as knowing and loving, to his radical orientation towatd the Infinite Good, yield a whole spectrum of objective values for the human being, which must be ordered to form a total integated hatmony. Note 2: Objectiue GmundforAbsolun Eualuation in Order of Being Here the basic norm is simply how much a being paticipates in the basic perfection of existence in the univetse, the degree of its fullness of being in relation to the Infinite perfection ( = Goodness) of God as Ultimate Source of all being. This degree of perfection is then objectively recognized, valued, admired for its own sake by ont inlglligence and will, ordered towatd universal being and goodness in themselves.

Note 3: Relation of Relatiae to Absolute Order of Good: The Relative order of Good must ultimately be based on the Absolute Good. Rcason: The firlfillment of a particular being is itself a good only because it is a degtee of paticipation in the absolun aalae of beingitself,by which all particular goods are good.

D.

Every Being is Good

This means: (1) Only eistentialbeing, being in the strong sense, is properly good, St. Thomas insists, and precisely because of its act of existence, the root of all perfecdon, of which essence is only a limiting mode. Hence mental beings (ideas, numbers, possibles, logical entities) are not goods and subject to being loved in themselves as mental, except in so far as the projection of them as real draws us and we want to make tbem nal. otherwise, we could be perfectly h"ppy noutitthilIovpossibk wealth, friends, etc. The good, unlike truth, is radically existential for Thomas. Q) Eaery nal being is good in some way This is one of the most profound and ultimate metaphysical and personal quesd.ons, affecting one's whole outlook on the univetse according to one's answer.

(a)

Opinions,

Good - (111)

Ancient Manicheans, There are two Gods, one the soutce of all good things, the other of evil. Beings made by the latter; princrpally matter, are intrinsically evil. The wodd is a warfare between the two Principles; the human being's destiny is to collaborate with the God of Good for ultimate victory. Matter is the main source of evil, hence the body and sex, maniage, which piopagates bodies. St. Augustine first held this, struggled long to get out of it. Nnplatonism: Plotinus and followers - Matter is the great source of evil, the absence of form, where the radiation of Goodness and U"ity fiom the Source

through form finally dies out in sheer multiplicity. Most Jewish and ChiCIian tbinkers, All being is good because they are made by a good God in His image. This derives pardy ftom Old Testament Revelation (Genesis 1:21: "God looked upon all that He had made, and behold, it was very good."), and partly from philosophical reasoning, trfing to show how reason confirmed reveladon. St. Aagustine worked out the fust philosophical explanation of evil as negation, allowing all being to be good. one of the great daring optimistic affrmations of medieval Chdstian thought, that all being as being is good, and evil is a form of non-being, the pdvation or absence of some good that ought to be present and is not. Many empiicistt and other modern philosophers (atheistic existentialists like Sattte, etc.): Being as such is purely a brute fact, neuftal, neither good nor bad, "value-ftee." Goodness and value are not in being itself naturally but imposed from without by the human being, the valuet, the "creator of values," of for some German idealist schools, is derived from a higher realm of ideal being distinct from real being. Evil is also a quite positive mode of being, for many, who considet the medieval and modem scholastic position outrageously optimistic, untealistic, and callously indifferent to the reality of evil. Note that if one holds that evil is something real, he cannot hold that all being is good. @) Argunent wb1 eaery being as being is good: To see the point of this argument, it is essential to meditate on beings precisely in their positivity as what actually exists, not in what they lack which should be there ( = .nil) or in some evil effects they may ptoduce. To see being in its positivity is to see it as good. (i) Every being, precisely insofar as it er, is a paricipation (no matrer how limited) in the great central perfection of the universe, the act of existence, the source of all perfection, value, goodness, hence an image of the Infinite Plenitude of all goodness ftom which all existence ultimately comes. As such every positive bit of it has its own perfection thtough and through. This intdnsic perfection is both good, vahtrble,for its own self, consideted as a dynamic act or energy embracing its own being and striving to preserve and increase its own existence and perfection; and also deserves to be acknowledged, admired, esteemed, appreciated fot its participated perfection by any rational being uritl intellect and will capable of knowing it for what it is.

.

Central Problems of Metaphysics

-

(112)

To thus appreciate the goodness of certain types of berngs it may take a great effort to detach oneself enough ftom the particular effects of this being on me to reach a disinterested contemplative oudook that can see it as it is in itself, not just in what it means to me, especially my body (e.g., mosquitoes, which seen in themselves where they can't hurt me as marvels of delicate and elegant biological engrneering, etc.). But it can be done, and this opens up a whole world. Mystics (both natural and religious), poets, artists, contemplatives, childten have found the way to do this. It requires a non-pragmatic, non-utiJitarian oudook on being, sharing the divine viewpoinu "God saw all that He had made and that it was very good." A succinct way of summing up this latter ground for the value of all being is this: It is the goal or perfection of every intellectual knowing to know the whole range of being, whatever is insofar as it is. Hence to know any being (though not necessadly to possess it or be united with it) is a patial fulfillment, therefore good, for such a knowing power. To know as such is a good, an enrichment, if it is a knowledge of real being. (ii) In addition, it is an empirical fact that every being we know seems to have some aspect under which it is petfective or good in some way fot at least some othet being(s): e.g., to be eaten, used, a source of pleasure, etc. Nola that the success of the above arguments depends upon the success if a complementary tbeory of eril as piuation of being, as a form of non-being, the absence of some mode of being that shou/dbe present, er'il as the "holes" in being.2 If the theories of good and evil are taken together, it does not seem that they depend on belief in God as creator of the universe (a good God). 'Ihey are illumined and reinforced by such a belief (philosophical ot religious), but even without holding this it does not make sense to hold that evil is a positive berng, and if not, then all being as being is necessarily good, though clearly not alwa1s good in euery walfor euery beingj (c) How do we judge beings as higher or lower, better or less goo& This problem causes gteat difficulty to many modern people: by what tght do we, finite human beings with a limited human perspective, rank other things as lower or higher than ourselves in any objective scale of goodness or value? Isn't a rabbit lowet than a human being only from a human point of view? Isn't all value judgment relatiue to the point of view of the valuer? This position, which sounds plausible at first, cannot be thought through. Thete ate, of course, very relative points of view for human valuation, from the point of view of sense pleasute, making money, etc. But it is the \rery nature of inlslligence as a spiritual power ordered to being as such, the ultimate and unlimited horizon, that it can know things as tbel stand in the order of being itself, and hence can value them accordirgly. It is of the essence of any intellect and 2See

next section.

Good - (113)

will to be able to rise above the merely self-centered viewpoint of the knowrngwilling subject to a transcendent viewpoint of being itself. If rabbits had rntelligence they too could do the same. If they do not have it, they cannot eaen raise the question of comparative value outside their own narrow hodzon of sense knowledge, hence we alone on this earth as possessing inlslligence and will can and must value everything on it. But if more tntelligent beings from another planet came in, we could quite easily judge them to be higher than ourselves.

What is the niteion for judgrng petfection? A thing's ontological perfecuon is it can do, action. Thus a human being can know with intellectual knowledge and love, transcending time and space and merely sense objects, although he can also know and love these; an animal cannot do the former, and a plant can do neither. Objection: Does not the quality, not merely physical quantity, of an action have to be taken into account? But thrs implies that rve already have a critenon for perfection. Response: True. Therefore it seems the ultimate cr-iterion is really how somethmg compares with the radical exigenry for tllal perfecliln rn the unrestricte,i drive of our intellects and wills. Tlus is the ultrmate court of appeal, beyond which there is in principle no criterion that can be shared by different knowers. But in terms of this ddve we can judge that we oarselues are imperfect, both telatively and absolutely. It is the nature of every intellect and will, ordered to being and the good as such, that it be a parlicipation in absolute knowledge and loue, hence has both the right and the duty to judge every being, even God! as being and good. To hold the opposite cannot be thought through without absutdity. Try! judged by what

E.

Summary of Transcendental Ptopeties of Being

Every being as being, insofat as it is being, is actiue, 0n€, true (intelligible), gaal. Many hold it is also beaatiful, following the Neoplatonists. The lteautful = is that whose contemplation @eing as known) gives--or is intrinsically apt to glve--delight (b.itg as good). It is the indescribable "splendor or light" shining out from the existence of such a teal being through its form. God as pure existence would be pure beauty.