Nation Building

Washingtonpost.Newsweek Interactive, LLC

Nation Building Author(s): Marina Ottaway Source: Foreign Policy, No. 132 (Sep. - Oct., 2002), pp. 16-18+20+22+24 Published by: Washingtonpost.Newsweek Interactive, LLC Stable URL: http://www.jstor.org/stable/3183443 Accessed: 09/09/2009 09:49 Your use of the JSTOR archive indicates your acceptance of JSTOR's Terms and Conditions of Use, available at http://www.jstor.org/page/info/about/policies/terms.jsp. JSTOR's Terms and Conditions of Use provides, in part, that unless you have obtained prior permission, you may not download an entire issue of a journal or multiple copies of articles, and you may use content in the JSTOR archive only for your personal, non-commercial use. Please contact the publisher regarding any further use of this work. Publisher contact information may be obtained at http://www.jstor.org/action/showPublisher?publisherCode=wpni. Each copy of any part of a JSTOR transmission must contain the same copyright notice that appears on the screen or printed page of such transmission. JSTOR is a not-for-profit organization founded in 1995 to build trusted digital archives for scholarship. We work with the scholarly community to preserve their work and the materials they rely upon, and to build a common research platform that promotes the discovery and use of these resources. For more information about JSTOR, please contact [email protected].

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THINK ByMarinaOawayN By Marina

Ottaway

BUILD ING Once, nationswere forgedthrough"blood and iron." Today,the world seeks to build them through conflict resolution,multilateral aid, and free elections. But this more civilizedapproachhas not yielded many successes.For nation buildingto work, some harsh compromises are necessary-including military coercion and the recognitionthat democracyis not always a realisticgoal. "Nation

Building

Not necessarily.

Nation building is difficult, but it need not become a quagmire as long as the effort has clear goals and sufficient resources. Compare Somalia and East Timor: The United States and the United Nations stumbled into Somalia without a plan. As a result, what began as a humanitarianmissionto feed people starvedby rival warlords became a misguided attempt at ad hoc nation building as U.S. troops sought to capture SomaliwarlordMohammedFarahAidid. The United States extricated itself from that quagmire by leaving Somalia to its fate in 1994, and the United Nations later did the same. Marina Ottaway is a senior associate at the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace and codirector of its Democracy and Rule of Law Project.

16

FOREIGN

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Is

a

Quagmire"

In East Timor, by contrast, the international community followed a plan and was not dragged into a situation it could not control. Right from the start, the United Nations sought consensus for nation building by organizing an unprecedented plebiscite on independence from Indonesia. Learning from the mistakes of the Balkans and elsewhere, peacekeepers (led by Australia) were authorized to use deadly force against pro-Indonesia militias who sought to disrupt East Timor's bid for autonomy through a campaign of violence, looting, and arson. At the time of this writing, the East Timorese have democratically elected a new government, which has hired more than 11,000 civil servants and retrained former guerillas as soldiers for the country's nascent defense force. East Timor is still a construction site, but it is not a quagmire.

"Nation

Building

Is

About

No.

Nationhood, or a sense of common identity, itself does not guaranteethe viability of a state. In by for Haiti, example, citizens alreadyshare a common identity, but the state has collapsed nevertheless. Other states are so deeply divided along ethnic (Bosnia), religious (Northern Ireland), or clan (Somalia)lines that forginga common identityis currently out of the question. The internationalcommunity cannot hope to make Muslims, Croats, and Serbs in Bosnia forget their differences, nor can it compel Catholics and Protestants in Northern Irelandto bridgethe religiousgulf. Even successfulstates are less homogeneousthan they claim. Many Europeancountries,such as France and Spain,grudginglyhave recognizedthe existenceof regionalcultures.In the UnitedStates,the notion of the meltingpot has been debunked,particularlyas a new wave of immigrantsfrom the developing world has

"Nation

Building

not. Take a look at how the the world has changed in every cenof political map the since tury collapse of the Roman Empire-that should be proof enough that nation building has been aroundfor quite a while. Castinga glance at the 19th and 20th centurieswill reveal that the types of nation building with the most lasting impact on the modern world are nationalism, colonialism, and post-World War II reconstruction. Nationalismgave rise to most Europeancountries that exist today. The theory was that each nation, embodyinga sharedcommunityof cultureand blood, was entitledto its own state. (In reality,though, few beyondthe intellectualand politicaleliteshareda common identity.)Thisbrandof nationalismledto the reunificationof Italyin 1861 andGermanyin 1871 andto the breakupof Austria-Hungaryin 1918. This processof nationbuildingwas successfulwheregovernmentswere relativelycapable, where powerful states decided to makeroom for new entrants,and wherethe population of new stateswas not deeplydivided.Germanyhad a capablegovernmentand succeededso well in forginga common identitythat the entireworld eventuallypaid Absolutely

Building

a

Nation"

shunnedoutrightassimilationby forminga mosaic of hyphenatedAmericans.And contraryto the mythology inheritedfrom 19th-centuryEurope,historicalevidence reveals that the common identity,or sense of nationhood,that exists in many countriesdid not precede the state but was forgedby it throughthe imposition of a commonlanguageand culturein schools.The Gauls were not France'sancestorsuntil history textbooks decidedso. Thus, the goal of nation buildingshould not be to imposecommonidentitieson deeplydividedpeoplesbut to organizestatesthatcanadministertheirterritoriesand allow peopleto live togetherdespitedifferences.And if recorganizingsucha statewithinthe old internationally borders does not seem the international ognized possible, community should admit that nation building may of old statesandthe formation requirethe disintegration of new ones.

Is

a

Recent

Idea"

for it. Yugoslavia,by contrast,failedin its efforts,andthe internationalcommunityis still sortingout the mess. Colonialpowersformeddozensof new statesas they conqueredvast swaths of territory,tinkeredwith old political and leadership structures, and eventually replacedthem with new countriesand governments. Most of today's collapsed states, such as Somalia or Afghanistan,are a productof colonial nation building. The greaterthe differencebetweenthe precolonialpoliticalentitiesandwhatthe colonialpowerstriedto impose, the higherthe rate of failure. Thetransformation of WestGermanyandJapaninto democraticstatesfollowingWorldWarIIis the mostsuccessfulnation-building exerciseeverundertakenfromthe outside.Unfortunately, thisprocesstook placeundercircumstancesunlikelyto be repeatedelsewhere.Although defeatedand destroyed,thesecountrieshad strongstate traditionsand competentgovernmentpersonnel.West Germanyand Japan were nation-statesin the literal sense of the term-they were ethnicand culturalcommunitiesas well as politicalstates.And they were occupied by the U.S. military,a situation that precluded choices otherthan the democraticstate. SEPTEMBER

IOCTOBER

2002

17

Think Again

"Only

War

Not quite.

The most successfulnations,including the United States and the countries of Europe, were built by war. These countries achieved statehood because they developed the administrative capacity to mobilize resources and to extract the revenuethey needed to fight wars. Some countries have been created not by their own effortsbut by decisionsmadeby the international community.The Balkansoffer unfortunateexamples of states cobbled together from pieces of defunct empires.Many Africancountriesexist becausecolonial powers chose to grant them independence.The British Empire created most modern states in the MiddleEastby carvingup the territoryof the defeated Ottoman Empire. The Palestinian state, if it becomesa reality,will be anotherexampleof a state that owes its existence to an internationaldecision. Such countries have been called quasi statesentitiesthat exist legallybecausethey are recognized internationallybut that hardly function as states in

"Nation

Building 82nd

Is

18

FOREIGN

POLICY

practicebecausethey do not have governmentscapable of controlling their territory.Some quasi states succeedin retrofittinga functioningcountryinto the legalisticshell. The state of Israel,for example, was formedbecauseof an internationaldecision,andIsrael immediatelydemonstratedits stayingpower by waging a successfulwar to defendits existence.Butmany quasi states fail and then becomecollapsedstates. Today, war is not an acceptable means of state building.Instead,nation buildingmust be a consensual, democraticprocess. But such a process is not effective against adversarieswho are not democratic, who have weapons, and who are determinedto use them. The world shouldnot be fooled into thinking that it is possibleto buildstateswithout coercion. If the internationalcommunityis unwillingto allow states to be rebuilt by wars, it must provide the military muscle in the form of a sufficiently strong peacekeepingforce. Like it or not, militarymight is a necessarycomponent of state building.

Not

a

Task

for

the

Airborne"

but it's certainly a task for a with U.S. participation. force strong military National Current White House Security Advisor Condoleezza Rice had a point when she quipped during the 2000 presidential campaign that the 82nd Airborne has more important tasks than "escorting kids to kindergarten." But no one ever said that the primary task of U.S. troops should be babysitting. If the international community does not want to give war a chance by allowing adversaries to fight until someone prevails, then it has to establish control through a military presence willing to use deadly force. And if nation building is in the interests of the United States (as the Bush administration has reluctantly concluded), then the United States must participate in imposing that control. It is not enough just to participatein the initial effort (in the war fought from the sky), becausewhat

Maybe not,

Nations"

Builds

counts is what happens on the ground afterward. Newly formed states need long-term plans that go beyondthe recentmission statementoutlinedby one U.S. diplomat:"Wego in, we hunt down terrorists, and we go out as if we'd neverbeenthere."Evenif the UnitedStatessucceedsin eliminatingthe last pockets of the Talibanand al Qaeda in Afghanistan,Americans could face another threat in a few years. And althoughwarringarmiesareno longeractivein Bosnia, the countrywould splinterapartif internationaltroops went home. The United Statesdoes not have to take the central role in peacekeepingoperations,but U.S. participation is importantbecausethe countryis the most powerful member of the internationalcommunity. Otherwise,the UnitedStatessendsthe messagethat it doesn'tcare what happensnext-and in doing so, it underminesfragilenew governmentsand encourages the emergenceof feudingfactions and warlords.

Think Again

"The

International Nations

Build

to

CommunityKnows but

It has neither

the will nor the way. of the nation-building methods used in Many the past are inconceivable today, but the international community has yet to find effective substitutes. For instance, the first step colonial powers took when engaging in nation building was "pacification," invariably a bloody undertaking described by the British writer Rudyard Kipling as "the savage wars of peace." In today's gentler world of nation building, such violent means are fortunately unacceptable. Instead, peacemakers usually try to mediate agreements among rival factions, demobilize combatants, and then reintegrate them in civilian life-a theoretically good idea that rarely works in practice. Political will for state reconstruction is also in short supply nowadays. That's hardly surprising, given that countries expected to help rebuild nations are the same ones that until recently were accused of neoimperialism. SierraLeoneans today welcome the British peacekeeping force with open

"NGOs

Play

a

Key

Role

but only when a functioning state exists. Large international nongovernmental organizations (NGOs), such as Oxfam or CARE,are vital in distributing humanitarian assistance in collapsed states. They go into high-risk, lawless regions where international agencies and bilateral donors are unwilling to operate. But these organizations can also become part of the problem. In Somalia, for instance,protection money paid by international NGOsto gain safe passage for food and medical supplies financed the purchaseof weapons by warlords and contributedto the escalation of violence. To operate effectively,internationaland national NGOs need the stability that only states can provide. These organizations must also coordinate their activities with states so as not to undermine reconstruction efforts. For example, NGOs

Yes,

20

FOREIGN

POLICY

Lacks

Political

How

Will"

arms and even wax nostalgic about the old days of British rule. But they revolted against Britishcolonialismin the 1950s, and not so long ago, they condemned it as the root cause of all their problems. Should we be surprised that the British are, at best, ambivalent about their role? And even when the international community demonstratesthe will to undertakenation building, it's not always able to figure out who should shoulder the burden. The internationalcommunity is an unwieldy entity with no single center and lots of contradictions. It comprises the major world powers, with the United States as the dominant agent in some situations and as a reluctant participantin others. In Afghanistan, for instance, the United States wants to have complete control over war operations but refuses to have anything to do with peacekeeping. Meanwhile, the multilateral organization that by its mandate should play the dominant role in peacekeeping and state reconstruction-the United Nations-is the weakest and most divided of all.

in

Nation

Building"

can play an essential role in administering healthcare in countries where the government has little outreach, but they can also create havoc if they insist on operating independently of the central government and of each other. That's what happened in Mozambique during the 1980s, when NGOs diverted funds from the public sector and fragmented the national health system. In Afghanistan right now there is considerable tension between the central government(which has little capacityto deliverhumanitarianreliefand services but feels that it should coordinatethe effort)and internationalNGOs (whichhave greatercapacityand experience).For the time being, NGOs are the most effectivechannelfor deliveringaid, but if government institutionsare not allowed to take more long-term responsibility,nation buildingwill fail.

Think Again

"Nation

Be Building Should Important Strategically

Only if anyone can determine

which ones they are. "No sane person opposes nation-buildingin placesthat count,"writesconservativecolumnistCharlesKrauthammer. "The debate is about nation-buildingin places that don't." But this type of reasoning eventually forced the United States to fight a war in Afghanistan,a country deemed so unimportant after the Soviets departed that it was left to become a battlegroundfor warlordsand a safe haven for al Qaeda. In 1994, the United States abandoned strategically insignificant Somalia, too, only to start worryingafter September11, 2001, whetherthat countryhad also been infiltratedby terroristnetworks. For most countries,strategicsignificanceis a variable, not a constant. Certainly,some countries, such as China, are always significant.But even countries that appear of marginal or no

"The

Goal

of

Nation

Democratic

Let us not indulge in fantasy. It

Limited

to

States"

importance can suddenly become crucial. Afghanistanis not the only example.In the days of the Cold War,countriesor regions suddenly becameprominentwhen they were befriendedby the SovietUnion. "SALT," thenNational Security Advisor Zbigniew Brzezinskideclaredin 1980, "wasburiedin the sandsof the Ogaden"-referring to the cooling of U.S.-Sovietrelationswhen the countries were dragged in to support opposite sides in a war betweenEthiopiaand Somalia.A few years later, the Reagan administrationsent peoplescramblingfor small-scalemapsof Lebanon by declaringthatSoukel-Gharb,an obscurecrossroads town, was vital to U.S. security. Thelessonbynow shouldbe clear:No countryis thatit canneverbecomeimportant. so insignificant So, by allmeans,let us focusoureffortsonlyon strategicallyimportantcountries,as long as we can predict whichonestheyare.(Goodluck.)

Building

Is

a

State"

the civil service, and establishing a central bankis politicallycorrectto equatestatereconstruction thus creating all the institutions deemed necessary with democracybuilding.Indeed,the internation- to run a modern state. modelfor demThis model is enormously expensive, requiral communityhasa one-size-fits-all ocratic reconstruction,so that plans devisedfor ing majorcommitmentsof money and personnelon to those the part of the international community. As a Afghanistanbeara disturbingresemblance of the for the Democratic Congo result, this approach has only been implemented Republic designed a This model (DRC). usuallyenvisages negotiated seriously in the case of Bosnia, the only country settlement to the conflict and the holding of a where the international community has made an nationalconferenceof majordomesticgroups(the open-ended commitment of money and power to loya jirga in Afghanistan and the Inter-Congolese see the job through to the end. Six years into the Dialogue in the DRC) to reach an agreementon the process, progress is excruciatingly slow and not structureof the politicalsystem,followedby elec- even a glimmer of light is waiting at the end of the tions.In additionto thesecoreactivities,the model tunnel. But elsewhere in the world, including callsfor subsidiarybutcrucialundertakings, begin- Afghanistan, the international community preformer the of combatants scribes this model without providing the resources. with demobilization ning and the developmentof a new nationalarmy,then The most obvious missing resource in Afghanistan extending to reforming the judiciary,restructuring is a robust international peacekeeping force. 22

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Think Again

The issue here is not simply political will. The resourcesare just not available. Considerthe list of current nation-building projects: Bosnia, Kosovo, Afghanistan, SierraLeone, the DRC,and Burundi. Plus, Somalia is again on the international radar screen. If an agreementis reached, nation-building efforts will begin in Sudan. And should the Bush administrationsucceedin dislodgingIraqiPresident Saddam Hussein, the reconstruction of Iraq might be forthcoming. Meanwhile, the international community has yet to cough up the nearly $400 million it pledged to fund the budget of the nascent Afghanistan government. Consequently,the internationalcommunity has to set more modest goals for nation building and then tailor those goals to each country's reality. Unpleasantcompromisesare inevitable.If the inter-

national community is not going to disarm Afghanistan's warlords, it will have to deal with them in other ways because they will not just disappear on their own. It has to make at least some of them less dangerous and disruptive by using aid to co-opt them into the government. If nations do not want to occupy Somalia and impose state structures on warring clans, they should consider helpingthe regionalgovernmentsthat have emerged to fill the void, beginningwith Somaliland.In some cases, such as in the DRC,the international community should eitheracceptthe disintegrationof the countryor allow nondemocraticleadersto use force to put the state back together.These are all unpalatable choices. But those who believe that the international community knows how to turn collapsed states into democraciesshould think again. [ID

Want to Know More?

Robert D. Kaplan'sThe ComingAnarchy:Shatteringthe Dream of the Post Cold War (New York: Vintage,2001) providesa somewhatapocalypticview of what a futurewithout nation buildingmay hold and should convinceeven skepticsthat the internationalcommunitycannot avoid the task. For dismal views of state disintegrationin Africa,see KarlMaier'sThis House Has Fallen: Midnight in Nigeria (New York:PublicAffairs,2000) and Michela Wrong'sIn the Footsteps of Mr Kurtz:Living on the Brink of Disaster in Mobutu's Congo (New York:HarperCollinsPublishers,2001). Max Boot puts modern-daypeacekeepingin historicalcontext by chroniclingthe United States' 200-year historyof undeclared,smallwars abroadin The Savage Warsof Peace:Small Warsand the Rise ofAmerican Power (New York:BasicBooks, 2002). Imagesof nation buildingas a quagmireare largelyinfluencedby accountsof Somalia,such as MichaelMaren'sTheRoad to Hell: TheRavaging Effectsof ForeignAid and InternationalCharity(New York:FreePress,1997). For a detailedview of the challengeof nation building,the reportsof the InternationalCrisisGroup's(ICG)Balkansprogram,availableon its Website, are unparalleled.In "TrueBeliever"(FOREIGN POLICY,March/April 2001), GarethEvans,ICG'spresidentand formerAustralianforeignminister,offershis views on when the internationalcommunityshould intervenein civil conflicts.Go to the United Nations Transitional Administrationin East Timor Web site for an accountof nation buildingin East Timor. On the role of war in nation building,see The Formationof National States in WesternEurope (Princeton:PrincetonUniversityPress,1975), editedby CharlesTilly.RobertJackson'sQuasi-states: Sovereignty,InternationalRelations and the ThirdWorld(Cambridge:CambridgeUniversityPress, 1990) is the best account of the problemsof states establishedby internationalfiat. On the role that nongovernmentalorganizationsplay in nation building, see Joseph Hanlon's Mozambique: Who Calls the Shots?(Bloomington:IndianaUniversityPress,1991). MarinaOttaway and Anatol Lieven offer a skeptical perspective on the future of a democratic state in Afghanistan in "Rebuilding Peace,2002). CarnegieEndowmentfor International Afghanistan:FantasyversusReality"(Washington: & For links to relevant Web sites, access to the FP Archive, and a comprehensive index of related FOREIGN POLICY articles, go to www.foreignpolicy.com.

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