Moral Reasoning And Concern For The Environment

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Journal of Environmental Psychology 28 (2008) 203–208 www.elsevier.com/locate/jep

Moral reasoning and concern for the environment Christie P. Karpiak, Galen L. Baril Department of Psychology, University of Scranton, 206 Alumni Memorial Hall, Scranton, PA 18510-4596, USA Available online 27 December 2007

Abstract The relation between Kohlberg’s cognitive moral reasoning and concern for the environment was measured in 158 college students. Rest’s Defining Issues Test and Thompson and Barton’s measure of environmental attitudes were administered. Principled moral reasoning, the weighted ranking of responses at the most advanced level of moral development, correlated positively with ecocentrism (belief in the intrinsic importance of nature), negatively with environmental apathy, and was unrelated to anthropocentrism (belief that nature is important because it is central to human wellbeing). Ecocentrism, the only attitude that has been found in previous research to correspond with environmentally friendly behavior, was predicted by principled moral reasoning, gender, and college major. r 2007 Elsevier Ltd. All rights reserved.

1. Introduction 1.1. Moral reasoning and concern for the environment Philosophical, moral, and religious considerations of the relationship between humans and the rest of nature date back thousands of years to the major eastern religions as well as tribal religions world wide (Nash, 1989). The history of scientific research on these issues, embodied in the areas of environmentalism, conservation, and sustainability, is much shorter; it is nevertheless quite extensive. For example, Vining and Ebreo’s (2002) review of the range of theories that have been applied to this field contains 165 references and at least 26 distinct theories. Much of the research in this area has involved the measurement of attitudes and opinions about the environment and conservation. Initially, these were somewhat unsophisticated measures consisting of one or a few face valid items. Dunlap and Van Liere (1978) developed and later revised (Dunlap, Van Liere, Mertig, & Jones, 2000) one of the first psychometrically and conceptually sophisticated instruments to assess positivity toward the environment: the New Ecological Paradigm (NEP) scale, now consisting of 15 items that generate a single score representing attitude toward the environment. Corresponding author. Tel.: +1 570 941 5886; fax: +1 570 941 7899.

E-mail address: [email protected] (C.P. Karpiak). 0272-4944/$ - see front matter r 2007 Elsevier Ltd. All rights reserved. doi:10.1016/j.jenvp.2007.12.001

However, a pro-environmental attitude may result from different motivations that could have very different implications for behavior and cognitive process. For example, Stern, Dietz, and Kalof (1993) and Schultz (2000) proposed the value–belief–norm (VBN) theory that identifies three types of environmental concerns: egoistic, social-altruistic, and biospheric. Related to this concept, Thompson and Barton (1994) developed a scale to measure ecocentrism (the importance of the environment for its own sake, similar to biospheric concerns), anthropocentrism (the importance of the environment for use by humans, which is similar to some combination of social-altruistic and egoistic values), and finally apathy toward environmental issues. They found ecocentrism to be positively related to conserving behaviors and membership in environmental organizations and negatively related to environmental apathy. Anthropocentrism is positively related to environmental apathy and negatively related to conserving behaviors and membership in environmental organizations. Schultz and Zelezny (1999) found that ecocentrism is also negatively associated with the values of power and traditionalism while anthropocentrism is positively associated with the values of power, tradition, security and, like ecocentrism, the value of conformity. They also found the NEP is positively related with ecocentrism, as might be expected since the NEP showed exactly the same pattern of relationships found for ecocentrism.

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All of these measures and much of the associated research have an explicit or implicit foundation in moral/ethical considerations. In fact, Kahn (2006) looks at the extent to which explicit moral concepts and theories apply to environmental/conservation research in general. His literature review is set in a broad context that includes ‘‘the traditional moral-developmental view, as circumscribed by Piaget and Kohlberg, that focuses on justice, rights and obligations’’ (p. 461). However, there is no other reference to either Piaget or Kohlberg in the article except for a mention of ‘‘Kohlberg’s just community’’ (p. 464). In addition, Vining and Ebreo’s (2002) review of theories that have been applied to conservation research has no reference whatsoever to Kohlberg or Piaget. Finally, our extensive literature search did not uncover any research at all on environmental, conservation or sustainability issues that involved Kohlberg’s (1984) theory of moral development or derivatives of it, e.g. Rest’s (1993) Defining Issues Test (DIT). Kohlberg’s theory postulates the development of moral reasoning based on the concepts of justice, fairness, rights, and obligations. Such reasoning develops with age, education, and experience from relatively primitive, selfserving levels (Preconventional Stages 1 and 2) focused on punishment and rewards, to reasoning that focuses on personal relationships (Conventional Stage 3) and societal rules and laws (Conventional Stage 4), and finally to reasoning that takes into account the broader moral principles of justice and fairness that underlie these rules and laws (Postconventional Stages 5 and 6) (Kohlberg, 1984; Thoma, 2006). For a critique of Kohlberg’s theory, see Lapsley (2006). It seems obvious that the development of moral reasoning should be related to views about whether and why (e.g., ecocentrism versus anthropocentrism reasons) conservation and sustainability are important. Anthropocentrism seems to be in part related to the pure self-serving concerns of Kohlberg’s Preconventional Level because of the egocentric component of anthropocentrism. However, there is also the social-altruistic component, which is likely to be related to higher levels of moral reasoning. Ecocentrism would seem to be the most advanced level of environmental concern and would therefore be associated with the highest level of moral reasoning: the Postconventional Level. Support can be found for this proposed connection between Kohlberg’s justice reasoning and sustainability attitudes in the research using Schwartz’s Value Survey (Schultz et al., 2005; Schultz & Zelezny, 1999; Schwartz, 1994), showing that the dimension of Universalism, which contains social justice and equality as components, is positively related to ecocentrism. This study is a test of the relationship between Kohlbergian moral reasoning and environmental opinions. Specifically, we predicted that ecocentered attitudes would be positively related to Postconventional (justice) moral reasoning and that anthropocentric views and environmental apathy would be negatively or unrelated to Postconventional reasoning.

2. Method 2.1. Participants One hundred sixty-four students (60% female) enrolled in various sections of the introductory psychology course at a comprehensive Jesuit University in Pennsylvania received credit for participating in this study. Of these, six turned in incomplete measures and were not included in the current analyses. A wide array of academic majors were represented, including biological sciences (17%), arts and humanities (16%), social sciences (16%), nursing (13%), occupational and physical therapy (11%), communication (10%), business (8%), education (6%), and undecided/ other (2%). Students were predominantly white, Catholic (67%), and of middle (48%) and upper-middle (38%) socioeconomic class. 2.2. Measures and procedure We administered a packet of tests and questionnaires to groups of students. Demographic information included academic major, gender, socioeconomic status (rated low, mid-low, middle, mid-high, and high) and religious affiliation. The three-scenario version of Rest’s (1993) DIT was used to measure participants’ cognitive moral reasoning. Participants read the Heinz, Escaped Prisoner, and Newspaper dilemmas. For example, the Heinz dilemma is about a husband whose wife is dying and needs a drug for which the husband does not have enough money to pay. Since the druggist will not reduce the price, the husband is considering stealing the drug. Participants ranked their top four considerations in reaching a solution for each dilemma from a list of 12 considerations per scenario. These rankings were converted into scores for Stages 2 through 6 based on the weighted rankings of chosen considerations from each stage (Rest, 1993). A P-score (principled moral reasoning) was then generated from a combination of Stages 5 and 6 scores (Postconventional reasoning). For instance, one P-score item (Stage 5) is ‘‘Would stealing in such a case bring about more total good for the whole society or not?’’ Ranking this as one of the top four considerations in making the decision to steal the drug or not would contribute to a high P-score. ‘‘Whether a community’s laws are going to be upheld’’ is an example of the Stage 4 item, and ‘‘Whether Heinz is stealing for himself or doing this solely to help someone else’’ typifies Stage 3. Finally, ‘‘Is Heinz willing to risk getting shoty’’ is Stage 1/2. Following Rest’s (1993) recommendations, only the P-score from this 3-scenario ‘short form’ version of the DIT was used in subsequent analyses. We measured attitudes toward the environment using the instrument developed by Thompson and Barton (1994) discussed in the introduction. This measure consists of 30 statements about the environment, each rated from 1

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(strongly disagree) to 5 (strongly agree), and results in scores on three scales. The ecocentrism scale provides information about an individual’s degree of belief that the environment, including animals and plants, is valuable in its own right, separate from its utility for humans. The anthropocentrism scale indexes a person’s concern about the environment for its importance to human survival and industry. The apathy scale is a measure of general lack of concern about the environment and environmental issues. Information about the reliability and validity of this measure may be found in Thompson and Barton (1994). 3. Results Means and standard deviations are presented in Table 1 for the three scales of the environmental attitudes measure and for the principled moral reasoning score (the P-score) from the DIT. Means and standard deviations for each environmental scale were similar to average results from the samples presented by Thompson and Barton (1994), and data from the anthropocentrism and ecocentrism scales presented for a large sample of the United States college students by Schultz and Zelezny (1999). Internal consistency was fully consistent with reports by Thompson and Barton (1994), with Cronbach’s a ¼ .83 for ecocentrism, .70 for anthropocentrism, and .81 for apathy. The apathy scores evidenced moderate negative skew and a square root transformation was conducted prior to the linear analysis. The transformed variable was used in all linear analyses involving the apathy scale. Pearson correlations were run between the three environmental scales, the principled moral reasoning score, and the demographic and background variables of gender, major, socioeconomic group (SES), and religion. Major, SES, and religion were dummy-coded into specific contrasts (e.g., upper-middle SES versus all other SES) prior to analysis for all groups that contained at least 16 participants, based on Tabachnick and Fidell’s (2001) warning regarding problems posed for linear analyses by markedly uneven distributions of dichotomous variables Table 1 Means, standard deviations, and correlations for primary variables

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(90% or more in one category). Correlations between the variables from our a priori hypotheses are reported in Table 1, along with significant demographic variables. Ecocentrism correlated positively with principled moral reasoning. Anthropocentrism was unrelated to principled moral reasoning, and apathy toward the environment correlated negatively with principled moral reasoning. The lack of relation between principled moral reasoning and anthropocentric reasons for concern about the environment is interesting and perhaps counterintuitive, but is consistent with reports from Schultz and Zelezny (1999) regarding related values. With regard to demographic and background factors, only gender and major were related to the variables of interest. Women were higher in ecocentrism and lower in apathy than men. Consistent with much of the literature, there was no relation between gender and principled moral reasoning. Majors in biological sciences evidenced higher principled moral reasoning and ecocentrism, and lower anthropocentrism and apathy, than other majors. A conservative statistical approach, standard multiple regression with simultaneous entry of all independent variables, was employed to examine the relative importance of these correlates in predicting environmental attitudes. Regression analyses were conducted separately for each of the three environmental scales, with P-score, gender, and biology major as predictors. Multiple R, R2, and adjusted R2 for each dependent variable are presented in Table 2, as are standardized regression coefficients (b) for each independent variable. These analyses indicated that principled moral reasoning contributes to the prediction of ecocentrism and of apathy. Ecocentrism was predicted by the model, F(3, 154) ¼ 6.48, po.001, and each of the three predictor variables contributed significantly to its prediction. Apathy was also predicted by the model, F(3, 154) ¼ 8.57, po.001, but only gender and P-score were significant contributors. In both Table 2 Standard multiple regression analyses for variables predicting environmental attitudes Variable

R

R2

Adjusted R2

.34

.11

.10

DIT moral reasoning 1. P-score 26.75 14.93

Ecocentrism P-score Gender Biological science

Thompson and Barton 2. Ecocentrism 3. Anthropocentrism 4. Apathy

Apathy P-score Gender Biological science

.38

Anthropocentrism P-score Gender Biological science

.22

Variable

M

SD

1

2

environmental attitudes 3.85 .60 .21** 3.17 .55 .11 .00 2.02 .61 .29** .55**

Gender and relevant academic majors .01 .20* 5. Gendera 6. Biological science .22** .18* *po.05. **po.01. a Females ¼ 0 and males ¼ 1.

3

4

5

.23** .06 .20* .21** .17* .12

*po.05. **po.01.

b

.18* .22** .17* .14

.13 .26** .22** .14

.05

.03 .07 .04 .19*

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cases the contribution was small, with the P-score independently accounting for approximately the same amount of variability in these attitudes as gender. Anthropocentrism was also predicted by the model, F(3, 154) ¼ 2.71, p ¼ .047. However, as expected based on the zero-order correlations, the actual amount predicted was very small (adjusted R2 ¼ .03), and biological science major was the only significant predictor. 4. Discussion The relationships we observed between the three scales of the environmental measure are fully consistent with those reported by Thompson and Barton (1994). Ecocentrism is strongly negatively correlated with apathy, while anthropocentrism is unrelated with ecocentrism and positively correlated with apathy. Individuals who assign intrinsic value to the environment are less likely to be apathetic, while those who value the environment for its utility to humans are more likely to be apathetic. These results regarding anthropocentric motivations are consistent with analyses by Schultz and Zelezny (1999), and with the findings of Axelrod (1994), who used ecological dilemmas to test hypotheses about value orientations and found that socially oriented individuals ‘‘appear to place the needs of many before the needs of any one individual or the natural environment (p. 101).’’ A better understanding of these intriguing patterns is potentially important in promoting environmentally friendly behavior, since Thompson and Barton (1994) found that ecocentric attitudes are predictive of such behavior while anthropocentric attitudes are not. We found women to be higher on ecocentrism and lower on apathy than men. These findings are consistent with popular conceptions about varying levels of concern for others in women and men, with the environmental literature (see Stern & Dietz, 1994), and with recent meta-analyses (Zelezny, Chua, & Aldrich, 2000). None of the publications that include the full scales of the Thompson and Barton measure report their results for gender, and Zelezny et al.’s (2000) results for a subset of items of the ecocentrism scale were generally supportive of higher scores for women, but did not evidence significant differences between women and men in the United States. Gender in our sample accounted for approximately 5% of the variability in both ecocentric and apathetic attitudes toward the environment, an amount that is fully consistent with the large-scale data reported by Zelezny et al. (2000). One of our primary predictions was that anthropocentrism would be negatively or unrelated to principled moral reasoning. We found that it was unrelated. Our reasoning was that anthropocentrism is thought to be composed of not only a concern for human kind generally but also an egocentric concern (see Thompson & Barton, 1994; Schultz & Zelezny, 1999) which is unlikely to be congruent with the Postconventional level of moral reasoning. In fact, some of the anthropocentrism items reflect a particularly callous

attitude toward the intrinsic importance of the environment (e.g., ‘‘The worst thing about the loss of the rain forest is that it will restrict the development of new medicines’’) that makes it surprising that ecocentrism and anthropocentrism are not negatively related. Interestingly, in our sample, students majoring in the biological sciences evidenced less anthropocentric attitudes than students in other majors. Self-selection into the field of biology probably contributes to this relationship, but it is also likely that the study of biology decreases anthropocentrism through enhanced understanding of nonhuman life. Biology majors also evidenced higher ecocentrism than other majors. As predicted, apathy was negatively related to principled moral reasoning. People who are relatively low on principled moral reasoning evidence higher levels of apathy about the environment. Finally, we predicted and found that ecocentrism is positively related to Kohlberg’s principled moral reasoning. The basis of our prediction was that we thought that justice-oriented morality would extrapolate from humans to nature. However, most of the ecocentrism items seem to reflect an emotional affinity toward nature (e.g., ‘‘Sometimes it makes me sad to see forests cleared for agriculture’’) rather than the extrapolation from humans to nature of an impartial and universal justice orientation (Postconventional reasoning). In fact, a strong philosophical, even religious, aspect of the environmental movement is the importance of an affectively based realization of the ‘‘oneness’’ of everything (see Suzuki, 2002). Schultz’s (2000) study of the relationship between ‘‘perspective taking’’ and biospheric concerns is congruent with this conceptualization. Given these considerations, perhaps it is counterintuitive that the cognitive justice orientation, the product of rational thought, is positively related to ecocentrism. Why, then, are Stages 5/6 related to ecocentrism? Because perspective taking is absolutely essential for the application of fairness and justice to moral dilemmas involving competing interests and rights, the core concern of Kohlberg’s theory. In his chapter on ‘‘Justice as Reversibility’’ (Kohlberg, 1981, pp. 190–230) and elsewhere (Kohlberg, 1986), Kohlberg describes in detail how ‘‘ideal role taking’’ and a ‘‘‘second-order’ use of the Golden Rule’’ (p. 203) are necessary to fairly resolve moral dilemmas. This perspective taking goes well beyond what occurs at Stage 3 (where the basic Golden Rule is applied in the context of a concern over the evaluation of significant others). It involves a complex multiple reversing of perspectives and the weighing of individual rights based on these perspectives: for example, the perspectives of the dying wife, the druggist, and the husband in the Heinz dilemma. To extrapolate the rights of humans to the ‘‘rights of nature’’ requires both empathizing with nature (Nash, 1989) and a clear understanding of ‘‘rights’’ in general. Also, Walker (2006) finds that those at the higher moral Stages are ‘‘more likely to be split in their moral

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orientation, that is, to evidence substantial amounts of both care and justice reasoning’’ (p. 105). One limitation of this study is that our sample is demographically restricted in two ways. First, no attempt was made to proportionally sample, much less randomly sample, demographic categories. Our sample came solely from introductory psychology classes, although a wide variety of majors are represented. In addition, the sample and the university in general are predominately white, middle and upper-middle class, and Catholic. However, as reported in the results section, the means of our measures were comparable to the results of a broad, international sample of college students obtained by Schultz and Zelezny (1999). The amount of variability in environmental attitudes accounted for by gender in our sample also matches well with reports from the same broad, international sample (Zelezny et al., 2000). In addition, our sample shows wide variation for all of the relevant variables. Nonetheless, caution is warranted, and further studies are needed with more diverse samples. Another concern is that the relationships we found, although statistically significant, are small in terms of effect sizes. This is typical of the current literature on demographic and psychological predictors of environmental attitudes and behaviors, and we believe it probably reflects real complexity in the development of these attitudes and behaviors. A recent follow-up to our study (Irace, Cannon, Karpiak, Baril, & Melone, 2007) replicated our basic results with another, similar sample of university students, adding strength to our assertions about the relations between moral reasoning and environmental attitudes. Still, further replication and extension to more diverse samples are clearly needed. Finally, like most of the relevant literature, our study is neither experimental nor longitudinal and thus cannot provide clear indication of causal sequence. How then can this study contribute to the understanding and development of environmentally responsible attitudes and behaviors? First, it provides an empirical connection to a well-developed area of theory and research: moral reasoning and behavior. Although such a connection has been alluded to by Kahn (2006) as mentioned above, it has never been established. Our discussion above would be an initial step in developing the theoretical links between the two lines of research and an expansion of our understanding environmentalism. In addition, new directions for increasing sustainable attitudes and behavior might be suggested by successful education programs used to increase moral reasoning. For example, Rest and Thoma (1986) reviewed 55 studies of moral reasoning interventions for college students. This review was updated by King and Mayhew (2002) and extended to programs for professionals by Rest and Narvaez (1994) and Bebeau (2002). These reviews showed, for example, that the ideal duration of such programs for college students is between 4 and 12 weeks; shorter durations are not effective and longer ones do not add

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anything. Also, the strongest effects are found at the adult levels. They also found that moral reasoning educational programs that focus on dilemma discussion were effective, while general academic courses on ethics were not. This is of particular interest since Axelrod (1994) developed ‘‘ecological’’ dilemmas to study the relationship between value orientation, economic and social conditions reflected in the dilemmas, and decision making. Such dilemmas and similar ones could easily be incorporated into a section of a course to develop environmental reasoning. These reviews also showed that personality and social development programs such as interventions that emphasized empathy training, communication skill training, cooperation simulation games, and volunteer service work, improved moral reasoning. Even though causal sequence is not established by our study, our results suggest the possibility that improving moral reasoning with regard to humans might generalize to nature. If so, it is not such a leap to entertain the intriguing possibility that increasing sensitivity to humans might increase sensitivity to the environment.

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