Methodology-science Dict Soc Sci Gould

A Dictionary of Social Science, Ed.by J.Gould, W.L.Kolb, USA. 1967.

Methodology (p. 425-6) A. Methodology is the systematic and logical study of the principles guiding scientific investigation. It must not be confused with (a) substantive theory since it is only interested in the general grounds for the validity of theories, not in their content; (b) research procedures (general modes of investigation) and techniques (specific fact-finding or manipulating operations) themselves, since the methodologist evaluates procedures and techniques as to their ability to provide us with certain knowledge. Finally, methodology as a normative discipline differs sharply from the factual study of scientists at work as conducted e.g. by the sociology of knowledge, history of science. 1. The term methodology in its original and proper usage refers to the systematic study of principles guiding scientific and philosophical investigation. Traditionally this discipline was seen as a branch of philosophy, more particularly as a branch of logic. Since philosophical methodology failed to answer many questions of practical importance to social scientists, they tended to become their own methodologists. As a consequence methodology in the social sciences came to be seen by many as a 'bent of mind' (P. F. Lazarsfeld & M. Rosenberg (eds.), The Language of Social Research, Glencoe, 111.: The Free Press, 1955, p. 4) rather than an independent discipline, and the term came to be applied by some in a loose fashion to anything having to do with procedures or techniques of investigation. Today it is sometimes applied in a colloquial sense to the totality of investigative procedures and techniques customary in a specific science (an informal plural of 'method') or the set of research techniques used in one piece of research. In this second, informal sense the term methodology refers to the subject matter of methodology used in the original sense. 2. The definition of methodology emerging from the work of German post-Kantian philosophers exercised considerable influence on contemporary usage through M. Weber, A. von Schelting, and T. Parsons. Methodology is seen as a separate discipline studying the different methods of gaining scientific knowledge. It differs, however, from other approaches to the study of science in that it does not concern itself with the actual processes involved in scientific research, as the psychology of cognition or the sociology of knowledge might do. Instead the methodologist examines systematically and logically the aptness of all research tools, varying from basic assumptions to special research techniques, for the scientific purpose. Methodology is in this sense a normative discipline. Yet it does not impose values on empirical science from without but discovers its inherent norm. F. Kaufmann (Methodology of the Social Sciences, London: Oxford University Press, 1944, p. 240) expresses this point in modern terms: 'Methodology does not speak "about" empirical science in the same sense as empirical science speaks about the world; it rather clarifies the meaning of "empirical science" '. 3. Within this concept of methodology some writers emphasize strongly the general, more philosophical pole, others the pole of special problems of actual investigation. T. Parsons tends toward the philosophical pole when he says that methodology does not refer 'primarily to "methods" of empirical research such as statistics, case study, interview, and the like. These latter it is preferable to call research techniques. Methodology is the consideration of the general grounds for the validity of scientific procedures and systems of them. It is as such neither a strictly scientific nor a strictly philosophical discipline' (The Structure of Social Action, New York: McGraw-Hill, 1937, pp. 23-4). A similar view is held by J. C. McKinney who states: 'The methodologist makes certain necessary assumptions about the world and then proceeds to structure the inquiry concerning it. On the other hand, the philosopher, the logician, and the epistemologist focus upon and wrestle with the assumptions themselves' ('Methodology, Procedures, and Techniques in Sociology', in H. P. Becker & A. Boskoff (eds.), Modern Sociological Theory in Continuity and Change, New York: Dryden Press,

1957, p. 187). McKinney seems to include in the concept methodology what R. K. Merton (Social Theory and Social Structure, Glencoe, 111.: The Free Press, 1957, pp. 87-9) excludes as 'general sociological orientations', i.e. broad postulates which are for Merton the beginning of a substantive theory. The difference is, however, more apparent than real. Basic postulates have of course both theoretical and methodological consequences. Compared to the usage of methodology in the writings of Parsons, McKinney, Merton and especially F. Znaniecki {The Method of Sociology, New York: Farrar & Rinehart, 1934), there is a different emphasis in, for example, Lazarsfeld's and Rosenberg's work, '... the methodologist codifies ongoing research practices to bring out what is consistent about them and deserves to be taken into account the next time' (The Language of Social Research, p. 4). Clearly, they use the same overall definition of methodology as, for example, Weber and von Schelting. Yet within this definition they place more emphasis on the analysis of concrete research procedures and techniques than, for example, Parsons, who focuses more on the basic, or general methodological problems. Burkart Holzner

Science (p.620-2) A. In modern social science usage, the term science denotes the systematic, objective study of empirical phenomena and the resultant bodies of knowledge. It is believed by social scientists that their disciplines are themselves sciences in this sense, and that science as a human activity is itself an object of social science investigation. B. While most contemporary social scientists would tentatively agree with the definition of science given above, difficulties arise in relation to each of the qualifying adjectives: systematic, objective, and empirical. 1. Historically in the social sciences, there has been a gulf between those who believe that the systematic quality of science applies primarily to the body of interrelated propositions of empirical reference that constitute the theory of a science and those who believe that it applies primarily to the realm of methods of investigation. Even today, there is a hiatus between the research done by those stressing theory and by those stressing methods of research. In some disciplines, economics, for example, the stress still seems to be placed primarily on theoretical models. In others, such as sociology, there is a great body of research carried out according to the rules of careful quantitative research that still does not articulate with the most systematic theory. The tone of debate in this area is not as shrill as it once was and there are efforts on the one side to make theory researchable in a quantitative manner if possible, and on the other side to construct theoretical methods—although, because these are frequently quantitative in a highly technical sense, they still do not articulate with older systematic theory. In part this controversy has rested on the meaning of the term measurement—the act or process of ascertaining the extent, dimensions, quantity, degree, or capacity of a thing, and the argument of those oriented towards method that measurement is the very core of science. This controversy too has diminished with the recognition of systematic theorists that measurement is indeed central and of those interested primarily in method that qualitative phenomena can in a sense be measured as attributes which are present or absent. There has also been controversy over method itself. Those interested primarily in systematic theory have developed methods of research, but it remains true that these methods have not for the most part been codified, and they are still seriously challenged as to the level of reliability and validity which

they can achieve. Theorists, on the other hand, have accused those who have worked out the more systematic methods of sacrificing knowledge of the phenomena being studied to the requirements of respectable method. Here too there seems an increasing possibility of reconciliation as the theoretically oriented attempt to codify their methods and to make them more precise, and as those interested in method recognize increasingly the truth that in scientific research there is something to be said for a 'no holds barred' approach to the problem of grappling with significant data. Finally, there is an argument in this area as to whether or not systematic necessarily means generalization. There are those who have claimed that science is always nomothetic in the sense of attempting to build systematic bodies of generalizing propositions. But there is present in social science today, as an historical survival from the German idealist emphasis on the Geisteswissenschaften, the view that so long as what is studied is empirical and there is the recognition that general concepts are relevant to the phenomena, the stress can be placed for some purposes on the comprehension of the unique historical event. There is still a difference here between those who believe the social sciences should be primarily historical or biographical and those who believe that the fundamental task is the building of a generalizing discipline, but it is fundamentally a difference in emphasis today, not a difference as to what can be done scientifically (see, for example, C. W. Mills, The Sociological Imagination, New York: Oxford University Press, 1959). 2. Objectivity—the capacity of a scientific observer to see the empirical world as it 'actually' is, and the resultant quality of the body of knowledge—in the social sciences has been the object of controversy primarily with respect to the ultimate value commitments of the scientist, although radical doubt about objectivity with respect to economic interests, and other social and psychological forces, has been raised by some of the more extreme forms of the sociology of knowledge. The most famous statement on the issue of the relation between values and social science knowledge is that of Weber ('The Meaning of "Ethical Neutrality" in Sociology and Economics' (1917), in Max Weber on the Methodology of the Social Sciences, trans, and ed. by E. A. Shils & H. A. Finch, Glencoe, 111.: The Free Press, 1949, pp. 1-47). Because of the ambiguities of this piece, Weber has been quoted on both sides of the argument. There is no doubt that Weber opposed the claiming of scientific validity for ethical value judgments or the mixing of such judgments with teaching. There is greater doubt in light of his conception of the relevance of values for the selection of problems, of non-empirical normatively valid truths as a basis of empirical science, and finally, of the ultimate decisions by which a man chooses his fate, that there can, in his view, be the complete separation between such ultimate decisions, the non-empirical assumptions, and the value-relevance of problems on the one hand and the theoretical models within which factual data are interpreted on the other hand as is claimed by the strongest advocates of the value-freedom of science today. Thus T. Parsons (The Structure of Social Action, New York: McGraw-Hill, 1937, p. 593) points out, while disagreeing, that for Weber the process of analysis which leads to the building up of general concepts 'will not issue in one ultimately uniform system of general concepts but in as many systems as there are value points of view or others significant to knowledge. There can be no one universally valid system of general theory in the social sciences'. Parsons (ibid., pp. 594-7) believes that the logical disjunction between fact and value, the dependence of the demonstration of causal relations on a formal schema of proof that is independent of any value system except that of scientific truth, and the tendency of theoretical structures of science to close will permit the development of a single objective social science. G. Myrdal, however, believes that despite the presence of the elements of which Parsons speaks —which he believes will permit the growth of an increasing area of scientific consensus—scientific investigation in the social sciences must be related to the value systems of the people concerned (Value in Social Theory, New York: Harper & Bros., 1958). While in a somewhat different vein, W. L. Kolb argues that the theoretical models of social science are more closely related to the ultimate commitments of the scientist and of the society of

which he is a part than most social scientists think, even though the elements of which Parsons speaks are present and the only legitimate test of a model is its scientific fruitfulness ('Images of Man and the Sociology of Religion', Journal for the Scientific Study of Religion, vol. I, 1961-2, pp. 1-29). 3. There is general agreement among social scientists that empirical phenomena are phenomena that can be observed by trained scientific observers. There has been, historically, however, a continual disagreement about whether or not it is necessary to deal with phenomena that cannot be directly so observed but can be inferred from a set of observations and then checked against a different set of predicted observations. This has taken different forms. There have been those who have argued that only phenomena that can be directly observed should be conceptualized in the social sciences. Thus F. Adler has argued that the concept of value is unnecessary and undesirable in sociology (The Value Concept in Sociology', American Journal of Sociology, vol. LXII, 1956-7, pp. 272-9). There have been others who have argued that conceptualization of intervening variables can occur, but that no reality should be attributed to them. Against this has been placed the tradition that the central variables of the social sciences are frequently 'subjective' variables such as value and motive. In recent years this controversy has tended to die down as those stressing 'subjective' variables have come to recognize that they must always be inferred from and checked against 'objective' variables, and that indices of such variables are always needed; and as those stressing 'objective' variables have come to realize that they have been forced to deal with the same complexes of problems as those dealing with 'subjective' variables. Another controversy with respect to the empirical social world has had to do with the question of the social scientist's relationship to it. > There have been those who have simply stressed ■ the purpose of science as being the prediction I; and control of the empirical phenomena concerned. Others have insisted that this position combined with an absolute stress on freedom from values leads in the direction of manipulation and the sale of social science to the highest bidder. They have insisted that social science must at least in part serve as critic of society and as an instrument of human emancipation. C. As indicated in the section on definition, science is an object of social science investigation as well as a conception of what social science should be. The sociology of science is basically a - part of the sociology of knowledge (q.v.). In general there has not been as much stress on the rooting of social science in and distortion of it by the social location of the social scientists, as there has been in the case of modes of knowledge not directed towards the empirical world. It has been felt, however, that the social sciences are more subject to this rootage and distortion than the natural and physical sciences, and, in a few extreme cases, this determination is almost complete. In general the sociology of science has directed itself to the study of science as a social enterprise. Thus R. K. Merton's studies of the relation of Protestantism and science and of priorities in discovery have been more typica1 of the field than studies like Mills's 'The Professional Ideology of Social Pathologists (R. K. Merton, 'Puritanism, Pietism and Science', in his Social Theory and Social Structure, Glencoe, 111.: The Free Press, 1957, pp. 574-606; R. K. Merton, 'Priorities in Scientific Discovery', American Sociological Review, vol. 22, 1957, pp. 635-59; C. W. Mills, 'The Professional Ideology of Social Pathologists', American Journal of Sociology, vol. XLIX, 1943-4, pp. 164-80). William L. Kolb