Mciis Dni Osint Challenge -- Winning Entry

Al Qaeda Highly Unlikely A Cohesive Organization With Strong And Centralized Control, Intent And Direction; Command Likely To Continue To Degrade Over The Next 6-12 Months Executive Summary: Al Qaeda is now best seen as a “Movement” and is currently highly unlikely to be anything more than a loose coalition of terrorist groups. Lacking central operating authority, a diffuse mission and ideology combined with an inconsistency in strategic plans, the original Al Qaeda leadership has lost control over the agenda that drives the Movement as a whole. As each sub-group in the Movement pursues its own plans, rifts in the Movement have begun to show. Analytical Confidence: High From Single Group to Movement Al Qaeda has undergone a drastic transformation since 9/11. Though initially weakened after losing its safe haven in Afghanistan, Al Qaeda inspired existing terrorist groups and new self-generating cells to rally under bin Laden’s symbolic banner. Al Qaeda has now become a franchise in which disparate groups take upon themselves its ‘global jihadist’ mantle.1∗ Lack of Central Operational Authority Though the original Al Qaeda ‘Proper’ (AQP) continues to attempt to reconstitute itself,2 it has lost centralized operating authority over the Al Qaeda ‘Movement’ as a whole. Many emerging groups cannot receive direct orders from AQP because they have very few or no direct ties to it.3 •

A video presentation on the Origins of the Al Qaeda Movement can be accessed on the electronic version of this document by clicking here.

Example: Though AQP’s Al-Zawahiri attempted to take credit for the inspiration of the London underground bombings,4 leaked reporting from investigations of the incident by the British government indicates that the attackers conceived and conducted the operation completely independently from AQP leadership.5

Even in cases where direct ties remain between AQP and other groups in the Movement, AQP does not dictate attack targets and methods to the other factions. Thus, while the other factions may consult or receive support from AQP leadership, each group carries out its attacks independently. •

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Examples: Jemaah Islamiyah (JI) likely continues6 to enjoy a relationship of mutual benefit with AQP, but it has likely never been subservient to it and has chosen its own targets.7 Though the East Turkestan Islamic Movement has loose ties to AQP and has attempted a global jihadist-type attack in Kyrgyzstan, it functions beyond AQP’s control.8

Footnotes are embedded with a direct hyperlink to each information source. Thus, these footnotes can be accessed using the electronic version of this document or accessed and printed at http://mciisodnichallenge.blogspot.com/2008/09/reference.html. Intext hyperlinks lead to additional data visualizations or articles that explain concepts with which the reader may not be familiar.

2 Although jihadists have immortalized many of Al Qaeda’s operational techniques online,9 their interpretation and execution are not universally consistent or controlled. For example, jihadist groups operating in Iraq and Central Asia utilize tactics that differ starkly from those of AQP. 10

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Examples: While AQP tries to avoid killing Muslim civilians, Al Qaeda in Iraq (AQI) has done so regularly and with exceptional violence.11 While AQP tries to cooperate with other jihadis, the Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan has been difficult or hostile to other terrorist groups, even at times targeting them for murder.12

Attacks conducted under the direct command of AQP leadership account for only 29% of all the Movement’s major attacks.

Inconsistency of Strategic Plans The Movement follows no single road map to achieve its diverse goals. Instead, though groups may swear allegiance to AQP, in practical terms they each interpret its directives differently13 and pursue their own agendas, as evidenced by the pattern of their attacks. • •

Examples: Even since swearing its allegiance to Al Qaeda, Al Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb almost exclusively targeted installations of the Algerian government, 14 which the group seeks to overthrow.15 The 2004 Madrid train bombings were not a part of any strategic vision from AQP leadership. Instead, the attacks were a result of that cell’s assumption that influencing a local election to sway against US policy in Iraq would benefit the global jihadist cause.16

The lack of a common strategic plan is also evidenced by the conflicts between factions in the Movement. AQP strongly disapproved of AQI’s tactics, as evidenced by al-Zawahiri’s letter to alZarqawi which was recovered after the latter’s death.17 Clashes over affiliation with the Movement have also arisen within individual groups, such as the tension in recent years that has: • • •

Divided members of JI,18 Caused splits in Al Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb,19 and Inspired splinter20 or other rival groups that sometimes fight in outright opposition to AQI.21

Diffuse Mission & Ideology Though it is bound together by devotion to general ideals of global jihad, there is no single intent driving the Al Qaeda Movement. First, no central authority in the Movement manages the content and flow of global jihadist propaganda. Instead, each group has adopted and adapted the Al Qaeda Propaganda Model for its own purposes.22 Even among individual factions, there is increasingly little unity in the dissemination of ideology.

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Example: Within AQI there are dozens of subgroups each of which independently manages their media operations and tailors its message to meet specific needs.23

The loss of ideological control has also affected how new terrorists are recruited into the Al Qaeda Movement. To enter the Movement now, candidates increasingly self-radicalize via the internet or through social activities such as sports clubs.24 The Diversity of Producers Using the Al Qaeda Propaganda Model for their own purposes.

Accordingly, as each faction and its subgroups adapt the AQP message to fit their needs, AQP’s core religious message has been diluted. Using religion as a medium to transmit its increasingly diffuse message,25 the Movement is now tied to nebulous ideals revolving around social rebellion.26 A Trend of Continuing Command Disintegration The centrality of the Movement is likely to continue to deteriorate over the next 6-12 months. Analysis of the Movement’s attacks shows that the number of major attacks conducted under the direct leadership of AQP continues to decrease each year. Also, the inter-group conflicts, combined with the increasing diffusion of the global jihadist message, and the tarnishing of Al Qaeda’s reputation,27 indicate that the Movement is unlikely to develop or maintain a cohesive strategic plan or ideology in the near term.

While AQP conducted the most attacks prior to 9/11, other groups have gradually come to dominate the global jihad.

Notes on Tools & Techniques: To produce this analysis, the team utilized several interesting tools and techniques to gather and process data. Most of the tools used are available for free online. •

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To utilize the concept of the ‘Web 2.0’ as an interactive environment, the team used ‘crowdsourcing’ for collection, utilizing mass email and blogging to produce open calls for resources, the team broadened its take of high-quality sources. Responses came from Terrorism.com, the International Relations and Security Network in Zurich, King’s College in London, and MCIIS students and alumni, and other sources. The team also used Deep Web search engines such as Turbo 10 and Kartoo. A project collection blog allowed analysts to upload, catalog, and retrieve data at any time. Palo Alto Research Center’s Analysis of Competing Hypothesis software helped structure the team’s findings. To visualize the analyzed data, the team used several conceptual modeling and visualization programs, including i2 Analyst Notebook, and bubbl.us. A video was also produced using online media from YouTube and Google Images and video production software.