Ltd Casebites _ Midterms V1.docx

LTD| NEL NOTES | UMAK LAW | A.Y. 2018-2019 Second Semester | Atty. ANCHOGRA CASEBITES

CASE

DIRECTOR OF LAND v. IAC

DIRECTOR OF LAND VS. MERALCO

DE OCSIO VS. RELIGIOUS OF THE VIRGIN MARY

REPUBLIC VS. ROMAN CATHOLIC

FACTS ACME, a domestic corporation, acquired subject land from the Infeils, members of the Dumagat tribe. The possession of the Infeils over the SM was time immemorial.

ISSUE

RULING Alienable public land held by a possessor, personally or through his predecessors-in-interest, openly, continuously and exclusively for the prescribed statutory period (30 years under The Public Land Act, as amended) is converted to private property by the mere lapse or completion of said period, ipso jure. Following that rule and on the basis of the undisputed facts, the land subject of this appeal was already private property at the time it was acquired from the Infiels by Acme. Acme thereby acquired a registrable title, there being at the time no prohibition against said corporation's holding or owning private land. A corporation may apply for registration of titles to public land. Doctrine that open, exclusive and undisputed possession of alienable public land for the period prescribed by law creates the legal fiction whereby the land ceases to be public land and becomes private property. If the land was already private at the time Meralco bought it from the seller, then the prohibition in the 1973 Constitution against corporations holding alienable lands of the public domain except by lease does not apply. Open, continuous and exclusive possession of alienable lands for at least 30 years ipso jure converts the land to private property and a juridical person who thereafter acquires the same may have title thereto confirmed in his name. The prohibition against acquisition or registration of lands by private corporations does not apply to public lands which have been converted to private ownership by natural persons under the Public Land Act. A corporation sole is a special form of corporation usually associated with the clergy. Conceived and introduced into the common law by sheer necessity, this legal creation which was referred to as "that unhappy freak of English Law" was designed to facilitate the exercise of the functions of ownership carried on by the clerics for and on behalf of the church which was regarded as the property owner (See 1 Bouvier's Law Dictionary, p. 682-683). A corporation sole consists of one person only, and his successors (who will always be one at a time), in some particular station, who are incorporated by law in order to give them some legal capacities and advantages, particulary that of perpetuity, which in their natural persons they could not have had. In this sense, the King is a sole corporation; so is a bishop, or deans distinct from their several chapters .

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There is no doubt that a corporation sole by the nature of its Incorporation is vested with the right to purchase and hold real estate and personal property. It need not therefore be treated as an ordinary private corporation because whether or not it be so treated as such, the Constitutional provision involved will, nevertheless, be not applicable.

OSG contend that the land must be alienable and disposable since June 12, 1945 in order to be entitled for registration under sec. 14(1).

REPUBLIC VS. NAGUIT

In the light of the facts obtaining in this case and the ruling of this Court in Director of Lands vs. IAC, (supra, 513), the lands subject of this petition were already private property at the time the application for confirmation of title was filed in 1979. There is therefore no cogent reason to disturb the findings of the appellate court. Even if possession of the alienable public land commenced on a date later than June 12, 1945, and such possession being open, continuous and exclusive, then the possessor may have the right to register the land by virtue of Section 14(2) of the Property Registration Decree.-Prescription is one of the modes of acquiring ownership under the Civil Code. There is a consistent jurisprudential rule that properties classified as alienable public land may be converted into private property by reason of open, continuous and exclusive possession of at least thirty (30) years. With such conversion, such property may now fall within the contemplation of “private lands” under Section 14(2), and thus susceptible to registration by those who have acquired ownership through prescription. Thus, even if possession of the alienable public land commenced on a date later than June 12, 1945, and such possession being open, continu-ous and exclusive, then the possessor may have the right to register the land by virtue of Section 14(2) of the Property Registration Decree. The more reasonable interpretation of Section 14(1) is that it merely requires the property sought to be registered as already alienable and disposable at the time the application for registration of title is filed. We are mindful of the absurdity that would result if we adopt petitioner’s position. Absent a legislative amendment, the rule would be, adopting the OSG’s view, that all lands of the public domain which were not declared alienable or disposable before June 12, 1945 would not be susceptible to original registration, no matter the length of unchallenged possession by the occupant. Such interpretation renders paragraph (1) of Section 14 virtually inoperative and even precludes the government from giving it effect even as it decides to reclassify public agricultural lands as alienable and disposable. The unreasonableness of the situation would even be aggravated considering that before June 12, 1945, the Philippines was not yet even considered an independent state. P a g e 2 | 10

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Republic argued that any period of possession prior the date when the lot was classified as alienable and disposable should be excluded in the computation of the period of possession because the lot remained to be of the public dominion and incapable of private appropriation. REPUBLIC VS. IGLESIA NI CRISTO

DIRECTOR OF FORESTRY VS VILLAREAL

It is well-settled that no public land can be acquired by private persons without any grant, express or implied, from the government and it is indispensable that the persons claiming title to a public land should show that their title was acquired from the State or any other mode of acquisition recognized by law. Herbieto essentially ruled that reckoning of the possession of an applicant for judicial confirmation of imperfect title is counted from the date when the lot was classified as alienable and disposable, and possession before such date is inconsequential and must be excluded in the computation of the period of possession; In Naguit, the reckoning for the period of possession is the actual possession of the property and it is sufficient for the property sought to be registered to be already alienable and disposable at the time of the application for registration of title is filed. In declaring that the correct interpretation of Sec. 14(1) of PD 1529 is that which was adopted in Naguit, the Court ruled that “the more reasonable interpretation of Sec. 14(1) of PD 1529 is that it merely requires the property sought to be registered as already alienable and disposable at the time the application for registration of title is filed.” Mangrove swamps are classified as forest lands but said classification is descriptive only of its legal nature and status and does not have to be descriptive of what the land actually looks like.Mangrove swamps or manglares should be understood as comprised within the public forests of the Philippines as defined in the aforecited Section 1820 of the Administrative Code of 1917. The legislature having so determined, we have no authority to ignore or modify its decision, and in effect veto it, in the exercise of our own discretion. The statutory definition remains unchanged to date and, no less noteworthy, is accepted and invoked by the executive department. More importantly, the said provision has not been challenged as arbitrary or unrealistic or unconstitutional, assuming the requisite conditions, to justify our judicial intervention and scrutiny. The law is thus presumed valid and so must be respected. We repeat our statement in the Amunategui case that the classification of mangrove swamps as forest lands is descriptive of its legal nature or status and does not have to be descriptive of what the land actually looks like. That determination having been made and no cogent argument having been raised to annul it, we have no duty as judges but to apply it. And so we shall. Our previous description of the term in question as pertaining to our agricultural lands should be understood as covering only those lands over which ownership had already vested before the Administrative Code of 1917 became effective. Such lands could not be retroactively legislated as forest lands because this would P a g e 3 | 10

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be violative of a duly acquired property right protected by the due process clause. So we ruled again only two months ago in Republic of the Philippines vs. Court of Appeals, where the possession of the land in dispute commenced as early as 1909, before it was much later classified as timberland. Mangrove swamps form part of the public forests and are not alienable under the Constitution.It is reiterated for emphasis that, conformably to the legislative definition embodied in Section 1820 of the Revised Administrative Code of 1917, which remains unamended up to now, mangrove swamps or manglares form part of the public forests of the Philippines. As such, they are not alienable under the Constitution and may not be the subject of private ownership until and unless they are first released as forest land and classified as alienable agricultural land. Mangrove swamps form part of the public forest and are not alienable. 1. Later reserved for Provincial Park are not alienable and disposable, and possession thereof no matter how long, will never ripen to private ownership. Thus, the principle of tacking the possession does not apply.

PALOMO VS. REPUBLIC

2. The adverse possession which may the basis of a grant of title in confirmation of imperfect title cases applies to alienable lands of the public domain. 3. The Gov’t is not estopped in questioning the titles obtained by private person covering alienable lands even if the Gov’t did not interpose opposition to the application..

REPUBLIC VS. DOLDOL

4. Improvements introduced to the land by the person in bad faith (knowing that the land is covered by reservation area) will be forfeited. Thus, in the aforecited Republic vs. CA case, we stated that the Public Land Act requires that the applicant must prove (a) that the land is alienable public land and (b) that his open, continuous, exclusive and notorious possession and occupation of the same must either be since time immemorial or for the period prescribed in the Public Land Act. When the conditions set by law are complied with, the possessor of the land, by operation of law, acquires a right to a grant, a government grant, without the necessity of a certificate of title being issued. The law, as presently phrased, requires that possession of lands of the public domain must be from June 12, 1945 or earlier, for the same to be acquired through judicial confirmation of imperfect title.

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The privilege of occupying public lands with a view of preemption confers no contractual or vested right in the lands occupied and the authority of the President to withdraw such lands for sale or acquisition by the public, or to reserve them for public use, prior to the divesting by the government of title thereof stands, even though this may defeat the imperfect right of a settler. It is doctrinal that all lands not appearing to be clearly of private dominion presumptively belong to the State. Public lands not shown to have been reclassified or released as alienable agricultural land or alienated to a private person by the State remain part of the inalienable public domain. Unless public land is shown to have been reclassified or alienated to a private person by the State, it remains part of the inalienable public domain. The onus to overturn, by incontrovertible evidence, the presumption that the land subject of an application for registration is alienable or disposable rests with the applicant. REPUBLIC VS. ESPINOSA

REPUBLIC VS. ABRIL

To prove that the land subject of an application for registration is alienable, an applicant must establish the existence of a positive act of the government such as a presidential proclamation or an executive order, an administrative action, investigation reports of Bureau of Lands investigators, and a legislative act or statute. The applicant may also secure a certification from the Government that the lands applied for are alienable and disposable. In the case at bar, while the Advance Plan bearing the notation was certified by the Lands Management Services of the DENR, the certification refers only to the technical correctness of the survey plotted in the said plan and has nothing to do whatsoever with the nature and character of the property surveyed. Respondents failed to submit a certification from the proper government agency to prove that the lands subject for registration are indeed alienable and disposable. Requisites for Land Registration.—The pertinent provision of Section 14 of the Property Registration Decree sets forth the requirements for registration of title, viz.: SECTION 14. Who may apply.—The following persons may file in the proper Court of First Instance an application for registration of title to land, whether personally or through their duly authorized representatives: (1) Those who by themselves or through their predecessors-in-interest have been in open, continuous, exclusive and notorious possession and occupation of alienable and disposable lands of the public domain under a bona fide claim of ownership since June 12, 1945, or earlier. x x x x (Emphasis and underscoring supplied) Under said provision of law, three requisites must thus be satisfied: (1) open, exclusive, and notorious possession and occupation of the land since June 12, 1945 or earlier; (2) alienable and disposable character of the land of the public domain, and (3) a bona fide claim of ownership.

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The applicant has not shown that he and his predecessors-in-interest have been in continuous, exclusive and notorious possession of the subject property. The petition did not state in what manner the applicant or his predecessors-in-interest came into possession of the property, either by possession as owner for more than thirty (30) years or possession since time immemorial. The testimony of Emilia Baldevieso who is only 33 years old to the effect that her father, Aurelio Manlaban [sic], Sr., and before him, her grandfather, Martin Manlabao, were the prior owners of this property, are more conclusion of law which requires factual support and substantiation. Of course, the Court noted that the applicant tried to cure this deficiency by presenting tax declarations as early as 1953 in the name of Martin Manlabao but tax declarations are not sufficient to prove ownership. x Failure to prove possession and occupation for the length of time required by law, an applicant can still file another application involving the same land even if his first application was already denied. If respondent’s argument stems from the Court of Appeals’ ruling that petitioner cannot acquire title to the property because of Section 3, Article XII of the Constitution, which prohibits private corporations from acquiring public land, respondent is, again, mistaken. The prohibition in Section 3, Article XII of the Constitution applies only to private corporations. Petitioner is a government corporation organized under Presidential Decree No. 361, as amended by Presidential Decree No. 1656

AFP RETIREMENT VS. REPUBLIC

The requirements for the application for original registration of land based on a claim of open and continuous possession of alienable and disposable lands of public domain are provided in Section 14(1) of Presidential Decree No. 1529 or the Property Registration Decree. It provides: Section 14. Who may apply.—The following persons may file in the proper Court of First Instance an application for registration of title to land, whether personally or through their duly authorized representatives. An applicant for original registration based on a claim of exclusive and continuous possession or occupation must show the existence of the following: 1) Open, continuous, exclusive, and notorious possession, by themselves or through their predecessors-in-interest, of land; 2) The land possessed or occupied must have been declared alienable and disposable agricultural land of public domain; 3) The possession or occupation was under a bona fide claim of ownership; 4) Possession dates back to June 12, 1945 or earlier.

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What is important in computing the period of possession is that the land has already been declared alienable and disposable at the time of the application for registration. Although adverse, open, continuous, and notorious possession in the concept of an owner is a conclusion of law to be determined by courts, it has more to do with a person’s belief in good faith that he or she has just title to the property that he or she is occupying. It is unrelated to the declaration that land is alienable or disposable. A possessor or occupant of property may, therefore, be a possessor in the concept of an owner prior to the determination that the property is alienable and disposable agricultural land. His or her rights, however, are still to be determined under the law. Petitioner’s right to the original registration of title over the property is, therefore, dependent on the existence of: a) a declaration that the land is alienable and disposable at the time of the application for registration and b) open and continuous possession in the concept of an owner through itself or through its predecessors-in-interest since June 12, 1945 or earlier.

REPUBLIC VS. ROASA

REPUBLIC VS. CENIZA

The period and possession before the declaration that the land is alienable and disposable agricultural land should be included in determining the required period of possession under sec. 14(1) Although adverse, open, continuous, and notorious possession in the concept of an owner is a conclusion of law to be determined by courts, it has more to do with a person’s belief in good faith that he or she has just title to the property that he or she is occupying. It is unrelated to the declaration that land is alienable or disposable. A possessor or occupant of property may, therefore, be a possessor in the concept of an owner prior to the determination that the property is alienable and disposable agricultural land. An applicant for original registration of title based on a claim of exclusive and continuous possession or occupation must show the existence of the following: 1. Open, continuous, exclusive and notorious possession, by themselves or through their predecessors-in-interest, of land; 2. The land possessed or occupied must have been declared alienable and disposable agricultural land of public domain; 3. The possession or occupation was under a bona fide claim of ownership; 4. Possession dates back to June 12, 1945 or earlier. Indeed, before one can be granted a confirmation of title to lands of the public domain, the Public Land Act “requires that the applicant must prove (a) that the land is alienable public land and (b) that his open, continuous, exclusive and notorious possession and occupation of the same must either be since time P a g e 7 | 10

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immemorial or for the period prescribed in the Public Land Act.” Only when these conditions are met may the possessor of the land acquire, by operation of law, “a right to a grant, a government grant, without the necessity of a certificate of title being issued.” Conclusively, the Court of Appeals erred when it held that mere adverse possession in accordance with law for a period likewise provided for by law would automatically entitle the possessor to the right to register public land in his name. The applicant has to establish first the disposable and alienable character of the public land. Otherwise, all public lands, regardless of their classification, can be subject of registration of private titles, as long as the applicant shows that he meets the required years of possession.

REPUBLIC VS CORTEZ

OFFICE OF THE CITY MAYOR VS. EBIO

To prove that the land subject of an application for registration is alienable, an applicant must establish the existence of a positive act of the government such as a presidential proclamation or an executive order, an administrative action, investigation reports of the Bureau of Lands investigators, and a legislative act or a statute; A certification issued by a Community Environment and Natural Resources Officer in the Department of Environment and Natural Resources stating that the lots involved were found to be within the alienable and disposable area is sufficient to show the real character of the land. Applicants for original registration of title to land must establish compliance with the provisions of Section 14 of P.D. No. 1529. Alluvial deposits along the banks of a creek do not form part of the public domain as the alluvial property automatically belongs to the owner of the estate to which it may have been added.—It is an uncontested fact that the subject land was formed from the alluvial deposits that have gradually settled along the banks of Cut-cut creek. This being the case, the law that governs ownership over the accreted portion is Article 84 of the Spanish Law of Waters of 1866, which remains in effect, in relation to Article 457 of the Civil Code. Article 84 of the Spanish Law of Waters of 1866 specifically covers ownership over alluvial deposits along the banks of a creek. It reads: ART. 84. Accretions deposited gradually upon lands contiguous to creeks, streams, rivers, and lakes, by accessions or sediments from the waters thereof, belong to the owners of such lands. Interestingly, Article 457 of the Civil Code states: Art. 457. To the owners of lands adjoining the banks of rivers belong the accretion which they gradually receive from the effects of the current of the waters. It is therefore explicit from the foregoing provisions that alluvial deposits along the banks of a creek do not form part of the public domain as the alluvial property automatically belongs to the owner of the estate to which it may have been added. The only restriction provided for by law is that the owner of the adjoining property must register the same under the Torrens system; otherwise, P a g e 8 | 10

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the alluvial property may be subject to acquisition through prescription by third persons.

Civil Interruptions

HEIRS OF TANYAG VS. GABRIEL

Accretion to a titled land does not make the accreted portion a titled land and so it could be a subject to prescription. In the case of accretion, prescription states to run from the time the adverse possession and occupation under the law set in. It does not require that the land be first declared patrimonial land. Registration of a piece of land under the Torrens System does not create or vest title, because it is not a mode of acquiring ownership. A certificate of title is merely an evidence of ownership or title over the particular property described therein. Thus, notwithstanding the indefeasibility of the Torrens title, the registered owner may still be compelled to reconvey the registered property to its true owners. The rationale for the rule is that reconveyance does not set aside or re-subject to review the findings of fact of the Bureau of Lands. In an action for reconveyance, the decree of registration is respected as incontrovertible. What is sought instead is the transfer of the property or its title which has been wrongfully or erroneously registered in another person’s name, to its rightful or legal owner, or to the one with a better right. In the case of Heirs of Marcelina Azardon-Crisologo v. Rañon, 532 SCRA 391 (2007), this Court citing Article 1123 of the Civil Code held that civil interruption takes place with the service of judicial summons to the possessor and not by filing of a mere Notice of Adverse Claim. Thus: Article 1123 of the Civil Code is categorical. Civil interruption is produced by judicial summons to the possessor. Moreover, even with the presence of judicial summons, Article 1124 sets limitations as to when such summons shall not be deemed to have been issued and shall not give rise to interruption, to wit: 1) if it should be void for lack of legal solemnities; 2) if the plaintiff should desist from the complaint or should allow the proceedings to lapse; or 3) if the possessor should be absolved from the complaint. Both Article 1123 and Article 1124 of the Civil Code underscore the judicial character of civil interruption. For civil interruption to take place, the possessor must have received judicial summons. None appears in the case at bar. The Notice of Adverse Claim which was filed by petitioners in 1977 is nothing more than a notice of claim which did not effectively interrupt respondents’ possession. Such a notice could not have produced civil interruption. We agree in the conclusion of the RTC, which was affirmed by the Court of Appeals, that the execution of the Notice of Adverse Claim in 1977 did not toll or interrupt the running of the prescriptive period because there remains, as yet, a necessity for a judicial determination of its judicial validity. What existed was merely a notice. There was no compliance with Article 1123 of the Civil Code. What is striking is that no action was, in fact, filed by petitioners against P a g e 9 | 10

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respondents. As a consequence, no judicial summons was received by respondents. As aptly held by the Court of Appeals in its affirmance of the RTC’s ruling, the Notice of Adverse Claim cannot take the place of judicial summons which produces the civil interruption provided for under the law. In the instant case, petitioners were not able to interrupt respondents’ adverse possession since 1962. The period of acquisitive prescription from 1962 continued to run in respondents’ favor despite the Notice of Adverse Claim. Acquisitive prescription is a mode of acquiring ownership by a possessor through the requisite lapse of time. In order to ripen into ownership, possession must be in the concept of an owner, public, peaceful and uninterrupted. Possession is open when it is patent, visible, apparent, notorious and not clandestine. It is continuous when uninterrupted, unbroken and not intermittent or occasional; exclusive when the adverse possessor can show exclusive dominion over the land and an appropriation of it to his own use and benefit; and notorious when it is so conspicuous that it is generally known and talked of by the public or the people in the neighborhood. The party who asserts ownership by adverse possession must prove the presence of the essential elements of acquisitive prescription. Land formed by the action of the sea is property of the state; Francisco vs. Government of the P.I., 28 Phil., 505, involving a land claimed by a private person and subject to the ebb and flow of the tides of the Manila Bay. IGNACIO VS. DIRECTOR OF LAND

Until a formal declaration on the part of the Government, through the executive department or the legislature, to the effect that land is no longer needed for coast guard service, for public use or for special industries, they continue to be part of the public domain; not available for private appropriation or ownership. Alluvial formation along seashore is a part of the public domain and therefore not subject to adverse possession. Land added to the shore by accretion caused by the action of the sea form part of the public domain. NOTHING FOLLOWS ONLY FAITH THAT THIS MATERIAL COVERS THE QUESTIONS FOR MIDTERMS!!! UMAK-Law 2019

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