Love And Economics

Mate Value Love (and economics)

• Attraction mechanisms based on theoretically important traits do not necessarily provide insight on how real-world relationships form • Even if we know what male and female mate preferences look like in general, we need a model for how the two might intersect to produce relationships – Not everyone possesses qualities desired by members of the opposite sex in equal measure – Those who have more of the qualities desired by the opposite sex are expected to be more in demand, and therefore might be able to be choosier in their own mate selection • Need some way to quantify this – called mate value

Mate Value

Subjective Assessments of Mate Value

• Mate value predicted to be a function of qualities desired by members of the opposite sex, all weighted in some way

• These qualities should be consistently valued in mates, but the degree to which each one is important may be different depending on who is doing the evaluation • MV is summed total of ‘scores’ on these dimensions, weighted by how critical each dimension is to the evaluator

– In females, expect MV to be a function of: • • • •

Physical attractiveness (index of fertility) Age Parity status Non-physical qualities (kindness, intelligence, etc)

– In males, expect MV to be a function of: • Physical attractiveness (index of genetic quality/indirect benefits) • Ability to command/deliver resources (direct benefits) • Non-physical qualities (kindness, intelligence, etc)

Mate Value • Obviously, many factors would go in to calculating an exact (or absolute) MV – No formula yet proposed seems able to estimate this value (if it is even possible to do) – MV discussions therefore tend to center on relative magnitudes; how one person compares to another

– Therefore, MV for a given person actually differs for each potential mate that evaluates him/her – Call this idiosyncratic value ‘subjective value’ – Distribution of ‘subjective values’ should cluster around some average (assuming reasonably similar weightings used by different evaluators)

Estimating Mate Value • Not just discussions of MV that require relative comparisons – brain mechanisms that calculate MV (attraction) need ways to compare – Bad design to hold out for person of a certain MV if no one in possible relationship pool meets threshold – Need to sample the local environment to get a feel for distribution of MVs that available partners have – Once this sampling done, can then compute internal representation of distribution (either for MVs generally, or for particular dimensions) – Then don’t need to directly compare people – can evaluate a particular person and estimate where they fall on distributions

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Estimating Mate Value By estimating where the individual falls on the curve, can get a sense of how they would compare to other available choices

MV

Potential mate

Construction of these curves might be where ‘the media’ really *does* have (potentially negative) impact on mating psychology

Allows for evaluation of how likely finding someone better Probably way to think about it not in finding someone better, but likelihood that *next* person would be better/worse (odds ratio)

Matching Mate Value • When should we predict a ‘match’ is made? – When search costs beyond currently evaluated partner outweigh potential benefits that might be returned by finding someone of higher subjective value – Essentially, when: benefits of current partner >

benefits of better partner – costs of continuing to search

Mate Value • If MV provides an index for how sought after a particular person is, then also provides insight into how much leverage they have in choosing a mate – Think of relationship formation like bargaining; want to create a match where both parties are (approximately) equally valued by the other • If one has more value than the other, that person could reasonably expect to be able to find better partner (one with higher MV) • Ideally, looking for someone just higher in MV than self; represents best can realistically do, but not so much better that it is worth if for him/her to leave • Other person has exactly the same payoffs & motives

Matching Mate Value • This person is not the absolute best person available – By definition, there is always someone better in a continuous distribution – Might not necessarily be the case in small populations

• Need some way to stop search process and stay with the current partner – Need to stop *own* brain mechanisms from continued partner evaluation/switching (inefficient, due to costs/benefits) – Need to assure *other person* that you are not likely to leave them, allowing them to invest in relationship

• This dilemma called the commitment problem

Commitment Problem

Commitment Problem

• Your absolute best option is not your current partner, so how do you get that partner to commit given that they *know* that you could find someone better

• One way to overcome this problem is with some reliable system of assurances that both parties can count on

– Situation is exactly the same for your partner, you aren’t the best they can do, etc

• Need to find mechanism that allows you to mutually commit resources to relationship, or it would be in (both) your best interest(s) to withhold them – e.g., men can signal that they are interested in long-term relationships, acquire sex, then take off – True also of women and securing large male investment

– Public commitment of relationship involvement that can bring social or legal pressure to bear on relationship maintenance • Violation of this public commitment bring sanction or penalty to the offender

– If the costs of these penalties are sufficient and the benefits of relationship non-trivial, they can provide an appropriate cost/benefit structure to promote relationship stability

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Commitment Problem • Many types of these commitments are possible, of varying levels of strength – – – –

Appear in public as a couple Dating exclusivity Engagement Marriage

• With stronger assurances, expect more investment in the relationship – Could potentially lead to positive-feedback process where relationships with more investment are: • Harder to walk away from because of the investment you put in that would be lost • Harder to walk away from because the payoffs are so high, due to investment by the other partner

Commitment Problem • These publicly enforced solutions have the potential to solve some incarnations of commitment problem, but in many situations would be insufficient – Require legal codes, methods of social regulation, etc – Still need to have enduring relationships in these situations (perhaps especially so) if things such as mutual investment in offspring are critical to success – Need some other solution to commitment problem that is less subject to external factors…

Love • Idealization of partner – Represent partner as having positive or valued traits in excess of those they actually possess • Not conscious of this inaccuracy (or would not serve function); need to believe it to be true • Not particularly receptive to reevaluation of these traits even in the face of new data

– Need to demonstrate that this effect is specific; not just general appraisal of others • Subjective perceptions of mate’s qualities exceed those of others • Might need this to happen/not in particular circumstances for it to remain credible

Commitment Problem • Penalties for breaking commitment: – Usually costs associated with divorce • Modern/western environments, these are primarily imposed by legal system – Division of resources, custody, coalition partners – Asymmetries in how these penalties are realized between sexes; is marriage a stronger regulator in males than in females?

• In hunter-gatherer environments, imposed by other members of community – Threats of violence, ostracism, retaliation against other family members – Likely to be asymmetrical as well, but not necessarily between sexes; partner with weaker standing in community more likely to be punished/more severely punished

– Also costs for dissolving weaker bonds • Reputational damage • Possibility of retribution from friends

Love • Frank (1998): Argues emotion of love could serve this function – If desire to be with other person is based on “love” for and idealization of that specific partner vs. rational calculation of costs and benefits of relationship, then people will be less tempted to leave if someone with better cost/benefit package comes along – “Love” provides insurance against abandonment (or cuckoldry) that allows mutually beneficial partnership for producing offspring to take place

Love • Demonstration of ‘love’ then implies a lack of strict rationality when considering relationship – Even though better matches are possible (and there is always someone better), suggestive that other possibilities are not being considered – Essentially, artificially simulates that partner is the absolute best mate available, so other options do not matter – Crucial that this is not just a signal, but rather a real representation in the mind of relationship partners

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Implementation Problem • Implementation problem: even if stable long-term relationships are ultimately good (in terms of reproductive success), this is a benefit realized only over long timescale – Assume that fidelity is in long-term interests to maintain mutually beneficial relationship – Problem with behaving consistent with that interest is that pleasure of infidelity occurs now and costs are only probabilistic and in the future

Signaling Love • How is love communicated to other parties? – Words are cheap and easy to fake; need other mechanism – Involuntary vs. voluntary smiling – Physiological/psychological states (e.g., euphoria) – Irrationality of desire/attraction • Suggests person is irreplaceable, even by someone with higher MV • Logical and rational evaluation of other potential partners is preempted

Signaling Love • Why is love difficult to fake? – Social costs of the signals • Love can make you look foolish/do stupid things • Love signals similar to submission signals in many respects – may signal low dominance/attractiveness – What happens to attractiveness of someone who signals “in love” too soon? – Courtship may generally be two-step process: » (1) signal attractiveness, mate value, dominance, better than others » (2) signal commitment to specific individual second

Implementation Problem • Love also acts to solve implementation problem – If love produces guilt at thought of hurting partner, though, feelings of guilt in effect transfer future costs of infidelity to the present to be weighed against the benefits of the infidelity • Does assume feelings of ‘guilt’ are unpleasant (neurons fire in patterns that reduce probability that the behavior that cased them is repeated)

Signaling Love • Why is love difficult to fake? – Why couldn’t a cheating strategy evolve that mimicked euphoria, involuntary smiling/laughing, physiological arousal, etc. in order to fool others into providing benefits but then abandon them? • Physiological costs of the signals? – States such as euphoria difficult to simulate; hard to interact with environment in non-optimal way

• Behavioral confirmation – Time spent on relationship cannot be taken back/used for other purposes – Investment made in relationship/on gifts to partner represent resources that cannot be used for other purposes » Dinner » Flowers » Engagement rings

Sex Differences in the Timing of Love • Given that commitment problem, specifically in relation to sexual involvement, might by asymmetric with respect to females and males – PI theory; females should demand more signals of commitment before sex compared to men – If signals of commitment required, and those are hard to fake, one line of argument is that men should fall in love more quickly than women – Expect differences in when ‘love’ happens since costs to being deceived are not equal • Men falling in love more quickly increases likelihood of relationship commitment prior to or concurrent with sexual contact • Females might take longer to fall in love, as they require more time to evaluate qualities of potential mate

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Humor

Humor

• Humor in general may have similar commitmentsignaling role • Both sexes rate sense of humor as highly desirable in potential mate – What is evolutionary function of humor? – Humor signals intelligence/good genes

• Humor as signal of interest: – Involuntary vs. voluntary laughter/smiling • Involuntary laughter may send hard to fake signal that parties like each other

– Men may float humor as test of how much women like them • If respond with involuntary laughter, likely that woman is attracted to/interested in man

• Problems with that: • Most jokes aren’t funny • Everyone thinks their partner has a good sense of humor • Dumb people are “funny”

– If humor does act a signal, preferences for “sense of humor” in a mate extremely unsurprising • This really says that people want mates who like them (not shocking)

Cognitive Description of Love? Physical features, behaviors, personality traits Match with self (slightly more attractive?) Cues of interest in you Brain structures

Behavioral output

Idealization of partner Involuntary smiling/physiology Rumination/obsessive thoughts

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