Laws On Bouncing Checks.docx

LAWS ON BOUNCING CHECKS 1. ESTAFA THRU ISSUANCE OF BOUNCING CHECK

[Art. 315, Revised Penal Code, as amended by Rep. Act 4885]

People v. Holzer 336 SCRA 319 (2000) In view of the amendment of Art. 315(2)(d) of RPC by R.A. 4885, the following are no longer elements of estafa through the issuance of a check:

a. Coverage - When drawer is notified by the payee, holder or drawee bank, of the dishonor of the check drawn by him for insufficiency of funds, his failure to make good the check within 3 days from such notice will constitute prima facie estafa. (Art. 315, RPC)

(a) knowledge of drawer that he has no funds in the bank or that funds deposited by him are not sufficient;

b. Defects in the Provision - There are two "defects" in the RPC provisions which make conviction for estafa difficult for issuance of bouncing check:

c. Elements of Estafa by Issuing a Check - The crime of estafa under Art. 315(2)(d) of RPC has the following elements:

(1) Article 315 provides that there can be no estafa without deceit:

(a) Postdating or issuance of a check in payment of an obligation contracted at the time the check was issued;

ILLUSTRATION:

(b) Insufficiency of funds to cover the check; and

(i) A shops at supermarket, buys groceries worth f*1,000.00, and pays with an unfunded check and goes home with the groceries. The check is dishonored for lack of funds. Is there estafa? YES, when A received the goods, there was deceit (pretending that check was good) in order to obtain the goods and thus cause damage to the supermarket. (ii) On the other hand, if grocer, knowing A, allows him to pay on a later date, granting then only credit on the goods, and after a few days A pays with a check that eventually bounces, A is not liable for estafa, as the check was issued in payment for a pre-existing debt. To constitute deceit, the taking of the goods must be simultaneous with the payment through a rubber check. People v. Sabio 86 SCRA 568 (1978) (a) Payment of a pre-existing debt with a bouncing check is not a crime under Revised Penal Code.

(b) failure to inform the payee of such circumstance.

(c) Damage to the payee thereof.'

(1) Element of Postdating or Issuance of Check: People v. Chua 315 SCRA 326 (1999) Postdating of checks simply means that on the date indicated the checks would be properly funded, not that the checks should be deemed as issued only then, and therefore such argument cannot be taken to mean that the checks were deemed "issued" in payment of a preexisting obligation.

People v. Hernando 317 SCRA 617 (1999)

b) Issuance of the bouncing check simultaneously with the incurring of debt is when estafa is committed, because the deceit was used to obtain credit.

Settled is the rule that, to constitute estafa, the act of postdating or issuing a check is payment of an obligation must be the efficient cause of defraudation and, as such, it should be either prior to or simultaneous with the act of fraud.

People v. Reyes 228 SCRA 13 (1993)

People v. Reyes 454 SCRA 635 (2005)

To constitute estafa under Art. 315(2) of RPC, the act of postdating or issuing a check in payment of an obligation must be the efficient cause of the defraudation - it should be either prior to or simultaneous with the act of fraud. (2) Assuming there is evidence of deceit, R.A. 4885 provides for "prima facie" estafa, whereas Its penal counterpart, Art. 315 requires proof of guilt beyond reasonable doubt:

Check Need Not Be Negotiable Instrument - It is not essential that the check by which estafa was committed has to be a negotiable instruments under NIL: "Negotiability is not the gravamen of the crime of estafa through bouncing checks - it is the fraud or deceit employed by the accused in issuing a worthless check that is penalized."

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(2) Elements of Damage and Deceit (Defenses): Chua v. People 484 SCRA 161 (2006) Accused's defense is that she issued the unfunded checks as collateral for the goods she got is not worthy of credence. Seller would not have parted with her goods in exchange for bum checks. It was likewise contrary to ordinary human experience and to sound business practice for the accused to issue so many unfunded checks as "collateral" or "by way of accommodation." As an experience business-woman, accused could not have been so naive as not to know that she could be held criminally liable for issuing unfunded checks.

People v. Juliano 448 SCRA 370 (2005) Damage and deceit are essential elements of the offense of estafa and must be established with satisfactory proof to warrant conviction, while the false pretense or fraudulent act must be committed prior to, or simultaneous with, the issuance of the bad check. The fact that the accused no longer deposited the amount necessary to cover the first check within the required period cannot be considered prima facie evidence of deceit against her, for complainant's own act of accepting the replacement checks and surrendering the first check to the accused meant that complainant was no longer holding the accused liable for the payment under the said first check.

People v. Panganlban 335 SCRA 354 (2000) As with all other forms of estafa, element of fraud or bad faith is indispensable. The fraudulent intentions of accused must be shown to exist at the time of the issuance and postdating of check or prior thereto. Where such fact of fraud is not ably proven, and the inability to make good on the check may have been occasioned by unforeseen business reverses after the obligation had been taken out, there can only be civil liability but no conviction for estafa.

Pacheco v. Court of Appeals 319 SCRA 595 (1999) In the absence of the essential element of deceit, no estafa is committed. Where complainant knew that drawer did not have sufficient funds in the bank at the time the check was issued to him, there is no estafa through bouncing checks. Awareness by complainant of

the fictitious nature of the pretense cannot give rise to estafa by means of deceit. (3) Element of Insufficient Funds: Dy v. People 571 SCRA 59 (2008) Uncollected deposits are not the same as insufficient funds—the prima facie presumption of deceit arises only when a check has been dishonored for lack or insufficiency of funds. Clearly, the estafa punished under Art. 315(2)(d) of RPC is committed when a check is dishonored for being drawn against insufficient funds or closed account, and not against uncollected deposit. d. Principal by Indispensable Cooperation People v. Gulion 349 SCRA 610 (2001) An accused could still be held liable for estafa under Art. 315(2)(d) even if he is not the owner of the checking account in question if it is shown that he conspired with the other accused by knowingly signing the latter's checks to ensure the payee's inability to encash said checks. Good faith is a defense to a charge of estafa by postdating a check. 2

Ladonga v. People 451 SCRA 673 (2005) To be held guilty as a co-princjpal by reason of conspiracy, accused must be shown to have performed an overt act in pursuance or furtherance of the complicity. Mere presence when the check was issued does not necessarily lead to an inference of complicity. Even knowledge, acquiescence in or agreement to cooperate, is not enough to constitute one party to a conspiracy, absent any active participation in the commission of the crime with a view to furtherance of the common design and purpose. e. Estafa and Bouncing Checks Are Separate Offenses People v. Reyes 228 SCRA 13 (1993) A single act can give rise to several offenses, such as estafa and violation of B.P. 22.

Uy v. Court of Appeals 276 SCRA 367 (1997) Estafa and violation of B.P. 22 are two different offenses having different elements and, necessarily, for a court to acquire jurisdiction each of the essential ingredients of each crime has to be satisfied. In estafa, deceit and damage are essential elements of the offense and have 2

to be established with satisfactory proof to warrant conviction; on the other hand, the elements of deceit and damage are neither essential nor required for violation of the B.P. 22. 3

Lim v. People 340 SCRA 497 (2000) Unlike in estafa, under B.P. 22 one need not prove that the check was issued in payment of an obligation, or that there was damage; the damage done is to the banking system.

barred from subsequently resorting to an action for foreclosure.

(2) Standing to Sue on a Bounced Check: Tarn Wing Tak v. Makaslar 350 SCRA 475 (2001) A person who is neither a payee nor a holder of a bad check has no personality to sue or a cause of action against the drawer. 2. BOUNCING CHECKS LAW [Batas Pambansa Big. 22]

Ong v. People 56S SCRA 253 (2008)

Violago v. Hon. Pano 146 SCRA 323 (1986)

Although paragraphs 2(a) and 2(d) of Art. 315 of RPC have a common element - false pretenses or fraudulent acts - the law treats estafa under par. 2(d) by postdating a check or issuing a bouncing check differently. Under par. 2(d), if there is no proof of notice of dishonor, knowledge of insufficiency of funds cannot be presumed, and unless there is a priori intent, which is hard to determine and may not be inferred from mere failure to comply with a promise, no estafa can be deemed to exist.

Bouncing Checks Law (B.P. 22) is constitutional as a valid exercise of police power.

(1) But Only One Civil Liability Arising:

Lozano v. Martinez. Recuerdo v. People 395 SCRA 638 (2003) Punishment under B.P. 22 does not amount to imprisonment for non-payment of debt, for what is being punished is the issuance of a bouncing check, and all issues on constitutionality of the law have long been settled. 4

Rodriguez v. Ponferrada 464 SCRA 338 (2005) While the single act of issuing a bouncing check may give rise to estafa and violation of B.P. 22, the same involves only one civil liability for the offended party since he sustained only a single injury.

Rodriguez v. Ponferrada 464 SCRA 338 (2005) The possible single liability arising from the act of issuing a bouncing check can be the subject of both civil actions deemed instituted with the estafa case and the B.P 22 prosecution, and both remedies are simultaneously available to such party, there can be no forum shopping. The Rules do not require the necessary inclusion of a civil action in a criminal case for violation of B.P. 22 precludes the institution in an estafa case of the corresponding civil action, even if both offenses relate to the issuance of the same check. But a recovery under one remedy bars that under the other - obviously stemming from the fundamental rule against unjust enrichment. Chieng v. Santos 531 SCRA 730 (2007) When mortgage-creditor files a criminal case for violation of B.P. 22 against the mortgage-debtor, he is deemed to have already availed himself of the remedy of collection suit, and following the rule on alternative remedies, he is

Recuerdo v. People 395 SCRA 638 (2003) The contention that B.P. 22 is a bill of attainder, one which inflicts punishment without trial and the essence of which is, the substitution of a legislative for a judicial determination of guilt, fails, for under the law every element of the crime is still to be proven before the trial court to warrant a conviction. a. Purpose of Bouncing Checks Law - Bouncing Checks Law was devised to safeguard the interest of the banking system and the legitimate public checking account user.

Griffith v. Court of Appeals 379 SCRA 94 (2002) B.P. 22 was devised to safeguard the interest of the banking system and the legitimate public checking account user. It was not designed to favor or encourage those who seek to enrich themselves through manipulation and circumvention of the purpose of the law. 5

Cueme v. People 335 SCRA 795 (2000) B.P. 22 was purposely enacted to prevent the proliferation of worthless checks in the mainstream of 3

daily business and to avert not only the undermining of the banking system of the country but also the infliction of damage and injury upon trade and commerce occasioned by the indiscriminate issuances of such checks. Mitra v. People 623 SCRA 673 (2010) The purpose of B.P. 22 in declaring the mere issuance of a bouncing check as malum prohibitum is to punish the offender in order to deter him and others from committing the offense, to isolate him from society, to reform and rehabilitate him, and to maintain social order.

Rosario v. Co 563 SCRA 239 (2008) The gravamen of the offense punished by B.P. 22 is the act of making and issuing a worthless check; that is, a check that is dishonored upon its presentation for payment. It is designed to prevent damage to trade, commerce, and banking caused by worthless checks. The law is not intended or designed to coerce a debtor to pay his debt. The thrust of the law is to prohibit, under, under pain of penal sanctions, the making and circulation of worthless checks. Because of its deletious effects on the public interest, the practice is proscribed by the law. The law punishes the act not as an offense against property, but an offense against public order. The prime purpose of the criminal action is to punish the offender in order to deter him and others from committing the same or similar offense, to isolate himfrom society, to reform and rehabilitate him or, in general, to maintain social order. Hence, the criminal prosecution is designed to promote the public welfare by punishing offenders and deterring others.

Meriz v. People 368 SCRA 524 (2001) B.P. 22 does not concern itself with what might actually be envisioned by the parties, its primordial intention being to instead ensure the stability and commercial value of checks as being virtual substitutes for currency. It is a policy that can easily be eroded if one has yet to determine the reasons for which checks are issued, or the terms and conditions for their issuance, before an appropriate application of the legislative enactment can be made. Lim v. People 390 SCRA 194 (2002) The increase in penalty in P.D. 818 is to effectuate the repression of an evil that undermines the country's commercial and economic growth, and to serve as a necessary precaution to deter people from issuing bouncing checks.

b. Nature of Offense Ambito v. People 579 SCRA 69 (2009) The gravamen of B.P. 22 offense is the act of making or issuing a worthless check (a check that is dishonored upon its presentation for payment). It is not the nonpayment of an obligation which the law punishes. The mere act of issuing a worthless check - whether as a deposit, as a guarantee or even as evidence of preexisting debt - is malum prohibitum. 7

Lunaria v. People 570 SCRA 572 (2008) The lack of criminal intent on the part of the accused is irrelevant. The law has made the mere act of issuing a worthless check a malum prohibitum. The gravamen of the offense under this law is the act of issuing a worthless check or a check that is dishonored upon its presentment for payment, not the non-payment of the obligation. 8

Ong v. People 346 SCRA 117 (2000) What B.P. 22 punishes is the issuance of a bouncing check and not the purpose for which the check was issued; it is not the non-payment of an obligation which the law punishes, nor the terms and conditions of its issuance. Thus, the contention that the checks were issued merely to guarantee payment of obligation is hardly a defense, since the mere act of issuing a worthless check is malum prohibitum and is punishable under B.P. 22, provided the other elements of the offense are properly proved. 9

Dico, Jr. v. Court of Appeals 305 SCRA 637 (1999) Although a check is issued as an evidence of debt and not intended for encashment, it would have the same effect like any other check when it bounces under B.P. 22, since the mere act of issuing an unfunded check is a malum prohibitum, the mischief of circulating unfunded checks is injurious not only to the payee or holder of such checks but to society in general, and the business community, in particular. Ibasco v. Court of Appeals 261 SCRA 449 (1996) Offense Transitory or Continuing - The offense under B.P. 22 is a continuing offense and may therefore be prosecuted within the territory where any of the elements have been committed, i.e., where the check was made, drawn or issued. 10

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Lim v. People 368 SCRA 436 (2001) Criminal Offense for Each Issuance of Bounced Check Each act of drawing and issuing of a bounced check constitutes a violation of B.P. 22. The rule that there is only one offense when the offender is moved by one criminal intent cannot apply because the offense if malum prohibitum where malice or criminal intent is immaterial. c. Two Types of Offenses Covered by Law Bautlsta v. Court of Appeals 360 SCRA 618 (2001) An analysis of Sec. 1 shows that B.P. 22 penalizes two distinct acts: (a) Making or drawing and issuing any check to apply on account or for value, knowing at the time of issue that the drawer does not have sufficient funds in or credit with the drawee bank; and (b) Having sufficient funds in or credit with the drawee bank shall fail to keep sufficient funds or to maintain a credit to cover the full amount of the check if presented within a period of 90 days from the date appearing thereon, for which reason it is dishonoured by the drawee bank. In first offense, drawer knows that he does not have sufficient funds to cover the check at time of its issuance. While in second offense, drawer has sufficient funds at the time of issuance but fails to keep sufficient funds or maintain credit within 90 days from the date appearing on the check. In both instances, offense is consummated by the dishonor of the check for insufficiency of funds or credit. The check involved in first offense is worthless at the time of issuance since the drawer had neither sufficient funds in nor credit with the drawee bank at the time. While that involved in second offense is good when issued as drawer had sufficient funds in or credit with drawee bank when issued. Under first offense, the 90day presentment period is not expressly provided, while such period is an express element of the second offense. 11

(1) When Endorser Liable under B.P. 22: Bautista v. Court of Appeals 360 SCRA 618(2001) Endorser who passes a bad check may be held liable under B.P. 22, even though the presumption of knowledge does not apply to him, if there is evidence that at the time of endorsement, he was aware of the insufficiency of funds. It is evident from the foregoing deliberations that the presumption in Sec. 2 was

intended to facilitate proof of knowledge and not to foreclose admissibility of other evidence that may also prove such knowledge. Thus, the only consequence of failure to present check for payment within 90 days from the date started is that there arises no prima facie presumption of knowledge of insufficiency of funds. But the prosecution may still prove such knowledge through other evidence. (2) When Foreign Checks Covered by Law: De Villa v. Court of Appeals 195 SCRA 722 (1991) Foreign checks, provided they are either drawn or issued in the Philippines though payable outside the Philippines, are covered by B.P. 22. In addition, the determinative factor in determining venue is place of issuance of check. d. Elements of Offense Navarro v. Court of Appeals 234 SCRA 639 (1994) Under the provisions of B.P. 22, an offense is committed when the following elements are present: (a) Making, drawing and issuance of any check to apply for account or for value; (b) Knowledge of the maker, drawer, or issuer that at the time of issue he does not have sufficient funds in or credit with the drawee bank for the payment of such check in full upon its presentment; and (c) Subsequent dishonor of the check by the drawee bank for insufficiency of funds or credit or dishonorfor the same reason had not the drawer, without any valid cause, ordered the bank to stop payment." Dy v. People 571 SCRA 59 (2008) \Element of "Issuance" - Sec. 191 of NIL defines "issuance" as the first delivery of an instrument, complete in form, to a person who takes it as a holder. Delivery denotes physical transfer of the instrument by the maker or drawer coupled with an intention to convey title to the payee and recognize him as a holder. Therefore, for purposes of the B.P. 22, even if the checks were given to the payee in blank, this alone did not make their issuance invalid.

Ambfto v. People 579 SCRA 69 ( 2009 )

Element of "Notice' - Under B.P. 22, the prosecution must prove not only that the accused issued a chock that was subsequently dishonored - it must also 5

establish that the accused was actually notified that the check was dishonored, and that he or she failed, within 5 banking days from receipt of the notice, to pay the holder of the check the amount due thereon or to make arrangement for its payment Procedural due process dearly enjoins that a notice of dishonor be actually sent to and received by the accused. The notice of dishonor of a check, which must in writing, may be sent to the drawer or maker by the drawee bank, the holder of the check, or the offended party either by personal delivery or by registered mail.

Azarcon v. People 622 SCRA 341 (2010) A notice of dishonor received by the maker or drawer of the check is thus indispensable before a conviction can ensure. The notice of dishonor may be sent by the offended party or the drawee bank. The notice must be in writing. A mere oral notice to pay a dishonored check will not suffice. The lack of a written notice is fatal for the prosecution.

Dy v. People 571 SCRA 59 (2008) Element of 'Insufficient Fund" - Uncollected deposits are not the same as insufficient funds - the prima fade presumption of deceit arises only when a check has been dishonored for lack or insufficiency of funds. To be liable under Sec. 1 of B.P. 22, the check must be dishonored by the drawee bank for insufficiency of funds or credit or dishonored for the same reason had not the drawer, withouty any valid cause, ordered the bank to stop payment Like Art 315 of RPC. B.P. 22 also speaks only of insufficiency of funds and does not treat of uncollected deposits.

(1) Making, Drawing, Issuance of Check: Lim v. Rodrigo 167 SCRA 487 (1988) "Dei/very" contemplated must be to the person who takes the bad check as a holder, which covers either payee or indorsee of a bill or note, who is in possession thereof, or bearer thereof. Venue of the offense lies at the place whether the check was executed and delivered to the payee, and the final act essential to its consummation as an obligation is delivery thereof to payee. Dico v. Court of Appeals 452 SCRA 441 (2005) A postdated check cannot be dishonored if presented for payment before its due date.

Ngo v. People 434 SCRA 522 (2004) Law does not require that payee of a check be the same as the obligee of the obligation in consideration for which the check has been issued. Alonto v. People 445 SCRA 624 (2004) Since identity of check enters into first essential element of offense, that is, that a person makes, draws or issues a check on account or for value, and date thereof involves its second element, namely, that at the time of issue that maker, drawer or issuer knew that he or she did not have sufficient funds to cover the same, there is a violation of the accused's constitutional right to be informed of the nature of the offense charged where there is a variance between the dates of the check as alleged in the Information (14 May 1992) and as indicated in the documentary evidence presented and marked as exhibit (5 April 1992). Josef v. People 476 SCRA 417 (2005) By admitting that the originals were in his possession and even producing them in open court, petitioner cured whatever flaw might have existed in the prosecution's evidence.

(2) Presumption as to Value In Issuance of Check: Ongson v. People 466 SCRA 656 (2005) Upon issuance of a check, in the absence of evidence to the contrary, it is presumed that the same was issued for valuable consideration, which may consist either in some right, interest, profit or benefit accruing to the party who makes the contract, or some forbearance, detriment, loss or some responsibility, to act, or labor, or service given, suffered or undertaken.

(3) Knowledge of Insufficiency of Funds: Vergara v. People 450 SCRA 495 (2005) To be liable under B.P. 22, it is not enough that the check was subsequently dishonored for insufficiency of funds; it must be shown also beyond reasonable doubt that the accused knew of the insufficiency of funds at the time the check was issued. 4

Lee v. Court of Appeals 448 SCRA 455 (2005) If the knowledge of insufficiency of funds is proven to be 6

Bautista v. Court of Appeals 360 SCRA 618 (2001)

actually absent or inexistent, the accused should not be held liable for the offense defined under Sec. 1 of B.P. 22. Uy v. Court of Appeals 276 SCRA 367 (1997) Although violation of B.P. 22 is a transitory or continuing offense and such being the case, the person indicted may be validly tried in any jurisdiction where the offense was in part committed, nevertheless, the element of knowledge by the maker or drawer of the fact that he has no sufficient funds to cover the check or of having sufficient funds must be simultaneous to the issuance of the instrument. Caram Resources Corp. v. Contreras 237 SCRA 724 (1994) Although malice and intent in issuing a worthless check are immaterial; nevertheless, knowledge is an essential element of the offense of B.P. 22. Absence of knowledge by the drawer of the issuance of the check and the fact of its dishonor would entitle the accused to acquittal.

The 90-day period is not among the elements to constitute the offense of bouncing check. Sec. 2 of B.P. 22 is clear that a dishonoured check presented within the 90-day period creates a prima facie presumption of knowledge of insufficiency of funds, which is an essential element of the offense. Since knowledge involves a state of mind difficult to establish, the statute creates a prima facie presumption of the existence of this element from the fact of drawing, issuing or making a check that subsequently bounces. Prima facie evidence denotes evidence which, if unexplained or uncontradicted, is sufficient to sustain the proposition it supports or to establish the facts, or to counterbalance the presumption of innocence to warrant a conviction.

Wong v. Court of Appeals 351 SCRA 100 (2001) That the check must be deposited within 90 days is simply one of the conditions for the prima facie presumption of knowledge of lack of funds to arise.

(4) Presumption of Knowledge: Lim v. People 340 SCRA 497 (2000)

Yu Oh v. Court of Appeals 403 SCRA 300 (2003) Presumption that issuer had knowledge of insufficiency of funds is brought into existence only after it is proved that issuer had received a notice of dishonor and that within 5 days from receipt thereof, he failed to pay amount of check or make arrangement for its payment. Failure of prosecution to prove that issuer was given the requisite notice of dishonor is a clear ground for her acquittal." Ongson v. People 466 SCRA 656 (2005) Presumption or prima facie evidence cannot arise, if such notice of nonpayment by drawee bank is not sent to maker or drawer, of if there is no proof as to when such notice was received by drawer since there would simply be no way of reckoning the crucial 5-day period.

Sec. 2 of B.P. 22 creates a presumption juris tantum that the second element prima facie exists when the first and third elements of the offense are present; if not rebutted, it suffices to sustain a conviction. (5) Necessity of Notice of Dishonor: Cabrera v. People 407 SCRA 247 (2003) Since payment within 5 days from notice of dishonor is a complete defense regardless of the strength of the evidence of the prosecution, it must be presupposed, then, that the issuer received a notice of dishonor and that, within five days from receipt thereof, he failed to pay the amount of the check or to make arrangement for its payment.' 9

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Marigomen v. People 459 SCRA 169 (2005) Procedural due process clearly enjoins that a notice of dishonor of a check be given the signatory - the absence of a notice of dishonor necessarily deprives an accused an opportunity to prelude a criminal prosecution. If drawer or maker is an officer of a corporation, the notice of dishonor to the said corporation is not notice to the employee or officer who drew or issued the check for and in its behalf.

Rigor v. People 442 SCRA 450 (2004) Notice of dishonor of a check may be sent to drawer or maker by drawee bank, holder of the check, or offended party either by personal delivery or by registered mail the notice of dishonor to maker of a check must be in writing. 20

Meriz v. People . 368 SCRA 524 (2001) Inaccuracy of description of dishonored checks in the written notice of dishonor is not a fatal defect, especially 7

when accused acknowledged non-payment upon receipt of the notice, since there is nothing in the law, that prescribed the contents of a notice of dishonor except that the same be in writing as opposed to a mere oral notice. Caras v. Court of Appeals 366 SCRA 371 (2001) Presentation of lawyer's demand letter to issuer of the notice of dishonor of the check without presentation of evidence that would establish actual receipt does not establish the required notice of dishonor and would be fatal to the cause. Absence of any notice of dishonor personally sent to and received by the accused is a violation of due process. Ting v. Court of Appeals 344 SCRA 551 (2000) For B.P. 22 cases, there should be clear proof of notice. It is a general rule that, when service of a notice is sought to be made by mail, it should appear that the conditions on which the validity of such service depends had existence, otherwise the evidence is insufficient to establish the fact of service. To illustrate, receipts for registered letters and return receipts do not prove themselves; they must be properly authenticated in order to serve as proof of receipt of the letters. 21

(6) On Post-dated Checks:

(7) Payment Within Five-Day Period: Ting v. Court of Appeals 344 SCRA 551 (2000) For liability to attach under B.P. 22, it is not enough that the prosecution establish that a check was issued and that the same was subsequently dishonored, but must also prove that issuer, at the time of check's issuance, had knowledge that he did not have enough funds or credit in the bank for payment thereof upon its presentment. The presumption that the issuer had knowledge of the insufficiency of funds is brought into" existence only after it is proved that issuer had received notice of dishonor and that, within five days from receipt thereof, he failed to pay the amount of the check or to make arrangement for its payment. The full payment of the amount appearing in the check within five (5) banking days from notice of dishonor is a "complete defense."

Tan v. Philippines Commercial International Bank 552 SCRA 532 (2008) Payment is a complete defense that would lie regardless of the strength of the evidence presented by the prosecution. However, only a full payment at the time of its presentment or during the 5-day grace period could exonerate one from criminal liability under B.P. 22 and that subsequent payments can only affect the civil, but not the criminal liability.

Sycip, Jr. v. Court of Appeals 328 SCRA 447 (2000)

King v. People 319 SCRA 654 (1999)

When postdated checks had been issued, they are deemed issued under B.P. 22 not on the date therein but on the date actually issued; and when the presumption of knowledge under the law has been rebutted, and there is no evidence presented to show that at the time of actual issuance, the drawer had knowledge that his deposit or credit in the bank would be insufficient to cover them when the check is presented for encashment.

B.P. 22 provides that the presumption does not arise when the issuer pays the amount of the check or makes arrangement for its payment "within five banking days after receiving notice that such check has not been paid by the drawee." Verily, B.P. 22 gives the accused an opportunity to satisfy the amount indicated in the check and thus avert prosecution. Thus, in order to create the prima facie presumption that the issuer knew of the insufficiency of funds, it must be shown that he or she received a notice of dishonor and within five banking days thereafter, failed to satisfy the amount of the check or make arrangement for its payment.

People v. Dizon 336 SCRA 54 (2000) Situation of Co-Accused - A co-accused cannot be presumed to have knowledge of the non-existence or insufficiency of funds in bank account of her co-accused at the time the latter issued postdated checks. Such legal presumption applies only to drawer or issuer. Without evidence showing how such co-accused participated in the defraudation of another by the issuance of unfunded checks in payment of an obligation, conspiracy cannot be appreciated against her.

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People v. Reyes 228 SCRA 13 (1993) Accused's failure to take advantage of 5-day grace period offered by B.P. 22 will raise prima facie inference of deceit consisting of false pretense or fraudulent act.

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(8) Subsequent Dishonor of Check: Ongson v. People 466 SCRA 656 (2005) The reason for dishonor as stamped in the dorsal portion of the checks is prima facie presumptions of such dishonor and the reasons therefor. It is not required, much less indispensable, for the prosecution to present the bank's representative to testify on the dishonor of the checks."

Gutierrez v. Palattao 292 SCRA 28 (1998) To establish a person's culpability under B.P. 22, it is indispensable that the checks he or she issued for which he or she was subsequently charged, be offered in evidence because the gravamen of the offense charged is the act of knowingly issuing a check with insufficient funds. (10) Complainant's Testimony Alone Would Suffice:

Wong v. Court of Appeals 351 SCRA 100 (2001)

Tadeo v. People 300 SCRA 744 (1998)

To mitigate the harshness of the law in its application, i.e., presumption of knowledge on the part of the maker or drawer of the insufficiency of his funds, the statutes provide that such presumption shall not arise if within 5 banking days from receipt of the notice of dishonor, the maker or drawer makes arrangements for payment of the check by the bank or pays the holder the amount of the check. However, nowhere in said provision does the law require a maker to maintain funds in his bank account for only 90 days; that the check must be deposited within 90 days is simply one of the conditions for the prima facie presumption of knowledge of lack of fund to arise; it is not an element of the offense; and neither does it discharge the drawer from his duty to maintain sufficient funds in the account within a reasonable period pursuant to Sec. 186 of NIL, which under current practice is 6 months or 180 days.

Prosecution under B.P. 22 may present only the complainant as a witness to prove all the elements of the offense charged, and such sole testimony to identify the dishonored checks and unless rebutted, the prosecution may rely on such presumption to establish that element of the offense charged. It is for the accused to rebut the presumption provided for under the law, disputable as it is.

People v. Gullon 349 SCRA 610(2001) Where what was stamped on the check is "DAUD" meaning drawn against uncollected deposits, the bank may still honor the check at its discretion in favor of favored clients, in which case there would be no violation of B.P. 22. Domagsang v. Court of Appeals 347 SCRA 75 (2000)

. Rejected Defenses under B.P. 22 (1) Surrounding Circumstances: Dreamwork Construction, Inc. v. Janiola 591 SCRA 466 (2009) The agreement surrounding the issuance of dishonoured checks is irrelevant to the prosecution for violation of B.P. 22. (2) Lack of Consideration: Dreamwork Construction, Inc. v. Janiola 591 SCRA 466 (2009) The issue of lack of valuable consideration for the issuance of checks which were later on dishonored for insufficient funds is immaterial to the success of a prosecution under B.P. 22. ( 3 ) Underlying Transaction Did Not Materialize:

There is deemed to be prima facie evidence of knowledge on the part of maker, drawer, or issuer of insufficiency of funds in or credit with drawee bank of the check issued, if the dishonoured check and the maker or drawer fails to pay thereon or to make arrangement with the drawee bank for that purpose. The statute has created the prima facie presumption evidently because "knowledge" which involves a state of mind, would be difficult to establish. The presumption does not hold, however, when maker, drawer or issuer of the check pays the holder the amount due thereon or makes arrangement for payment in full by the drawee bank within 5 banking days after receiver noticed that such check has not been paid by the drawee bank.

Facts: Accused issued seven bounced checks to cover orders made from complainant. Accused's defense was that he ordered stop-payments because the goods delivered were not those specified, and that there was sufficient funds to pay the checks. He also alleged that RTC Malabon had no jurisdiction since the checks were issued, received by the collectors, and dishonoured by drawee bank in Kalookan City. Furthermore, no evidence was given to support the proposition that they knew that their checks were insufficiently funded.

(9) Need to Present Original Checks in Evidence:

Held: Positions have no merits. Gravamen of the offense

Lim v. Court of Appeals 251 SCRA 408 (1995)

9

is knowingly issuing a worthless check. Thus, a fundamental element is knowledge on the part of the drawer of the insufficiency of his funds in or credit with the drawee bank for the payment of such checks in full upon presentment. Another essential element is subsequent dishonor of the check by the drawee bank for insufficiency of funds or credit or would have been dishonoured for the same reason had not the drawer without any valid reason ordered the bank to stop payment. Although checks were delivered to collector in Kalookan City, nevertheless they are deemed to have been issued and received by the private complainant in Navotas because collector was not the person who could take the checks as a holder, i.e., as payee or indorsee thereof, with the intent to transfer title thereto. Under Sac. 191 of NIL the term "issue" means the first delivery of the instrument complete in form to a person who takes it as a holder. On the other hand, the term "holder" refers to the payee orindorsee of a bill or note who is in possession of it or the bearer thereof.

Abarquez v. Court of Appeals 408 SCRA 500 (2003) The averment that one issued the checks as advance payment but only on the condition that there be proper reconciliation of the books of account is not a valid defense against B.P. 22 conviction. (4) No Bad Faith nor Malice on Part of Issuer, Maker, Drawer: Josef v. People 476 SCRA 417 (2005) Gravamen of B.P. 22 offense is the act of making and issuing a worthless check; that is, a check that is dishonored upon its presentation for payment. The mere act of issuing a worthless check is malum prohibitum. The law does not make any distinction between checks issued in payment of an obligation and those merely to guarantee that obligation; nor does the law consider important whether or not malice and intent attended the issuance of the check. 24

(5) Afo Checking Account; or Account Has Been Closed: Ruiz v. People 476 SCRA 476 (2005) Gravamen of the offense is the act of making and issuing a worthless check or any check that is dishonored upon its presentment for payment and putting them in circulation. The law includes all checks drawn against banks. The law includes the making and issuing of a check by one who has no account with a

bank, or where such account was already closed when the check was presented for payment. There is every reason to penalize a person who indulges in the making and issuing of a check on an account belonging to another with the latter's consent which account has been closed or has no funds or credit with the drawee bank.

(6) Check Issued Merely as Guarantee: Que v. People 154 SCRA 160 (1987) Allegation that issuance of a check was a mere guarantee is not a valid defense under B.P. 22, which applies whether the check is issued as deposit or guaranty and not as payment. 25

Cruz v. Court of Appeals 233 SCRA 301 (1994) Even when check is issued as a mere evidence of debt, though not intended to be presented for payment has the same effect of an ordinary check, and if it is deposited and it bounces, it would be a violation of B.P. 22, since the mere issuing of a worthless check is malum prohibitum. Cross checks or restricted checks are negotiable instruments within the coverage of B.P. 22.*'

(7) Usurious Interest Rates Being Charged: Land Bank of the Philippines v. Jacinto 626 SCRA 315 (2010) The invalidity of the interest rate is not determinative of the guilt of respondents in criminal cases under B.P. 22. The Court has consistently declared that the cause or reason for the issuance of a check is inconsequential in determining criminal culpability under B.P. In several instances, we have held that what the law punishes is the issuance of a bouncing check and not the purpose for which it was issued or terms and conditions relating to its issuance; and that the mere act of issuing a worthless check is malum prohibitum provided the other elements of the offense are property proved. (8) Prior Knowledge of Payee of Insuffiency of Funds: Lee v. Court of Appeals 448 SCRA 455 (2005) Knowledge of payee that drawer did not have sufficient funds with the drawee bank at the time of the check was issued is immaterial as deceit is not an essential element of the offense under B.P. 22." CONTRA: Lee refers to the ruling in Yu Oh v. Court of Appeals, 403 SCRA 300 (2003), that there is no violation of B.P. 22 if the complainant was actually told by the 10

drawer that he has no sufficient funds in the bank at the time of the issuance of the check. The Yu Oh obiter is wrong since it was based on a supposed ruling in Eastern Assurance v. Court of Appeals, 322 SCRA 73, 79 (2000), and reading of which contains no such ruling nor anything about bouncing checks.

Lee v. Court of Appeals 448 SCRA 455 (2005) Doctrine Not Applicable to Personal Checks - The doctrine that a mere employee tasked to sign checks in blanks may not be deemed to have knowledge of the insufficiency of funds applies only to corporate checks and not to personal checks even when issued for a sole proprietorship business.

(9) Signatory Mere Corporate Officer: Llamado v. Court of Appeals 270 SCRA 423 (1997) Corporate officer who signs the check that bounced is liable under B.P. 22, even when such officer was not involved in the negotiation for the transaction resulting in the issuance of the check. Lao v. Court of Appeals 274 SCRA 572 (1997) An employee who, as part of her regular duties, signs blank corporate checks - with the name of the payee and amount drawn to be filled later by another signatory and, therefore, does so without actual knowledge of whether such checks are funded, may not be held liable for violation of Bouncing Checks Law, when checks so signed are dishonored due to insuffiency of funds. Under B.P. 22, a notice of dishonor sent to the main office of the corporation cannot constitute a valid notice to the corporate signatory who signed the check in blank and who holds office in a separate branch and who had no actual knowledge thereof. Vaca v. Court of Appeals 298 SCRA 656 (1998) Officers and owners of a company cannot escape criminal liability under B.P. 22 on the ground that preparation of company checks is responsibility of company accountant and all they do is sign the checks, and they merely rely on the word of accountant that there are sufficient funds in the bank to pay for the checks. They cannot feign ignorance of insufficiency of funds; while it may be true that it was the company's accountant who actually prepared the rubber check, the fact remains that they are the owners and officers of the company and under Sec. 1, "Where the check is drawn by a corporation, company or entity, the person or persons who actually signed the check in behalf of such drawer shall be liable under this Act." The situation is not the same as in the case of Lao v. Court of Appeals, 274 SCRA 572 (1997), where the accused was a mere employee who merely countersigned checks in blank for the company, and she did not have anything to do with the issuance of checks and who in fact did not know to whom the checks would be issued.

(10) Novation of Incipient Criminal Liability: Salazar v. J.Y. Brothers Marketing Corp. 634 SCRA 95 (2010) Novation is never presumed, there must be an express intention to novate. The creditor's acceptance of another check, which replaced an earlier dishonored check, does not result in novation where there was no express agreement to establish that the debtor was already discharged from his liability. Seares v. Salazar 345 SCRA 308 (2000) Pendency of an amicable settlement is not a valid excuse in not deciding a case within the reglementary period because it is a settled rule that a criminal case once filed in court cannot be amicably settled. The payment of the civil liability does not extinguish the criminal actions since what is being punished is not the accused's failure to pay his obligation but the issuance per se of the checks which subsequently bounced or were dishonored for insufficiency or lack of funds. Llamado v. Court of Appeals 270 SCRA 423 (1997) The "novation theory" under which an incipient criminal offense is converted into an ordinary civil obligation cannot apply where the offer to pay by the debtor, though accepted by the creditor, was actually an empty promise meant only to delay the filing of the criminal case for issuance of bouncing check. [CLV: Ergo valid if agreement is sincere.]

(11) Stay Order in Corporate Rehabilitation Proceeding Prevent the Payment of the Corporate Check: Rosario v. Co 563 SCRA 239 (2008) The filing of a case under B.P. 22 is not a "claim" that can be enjoined within the purview of P.D. 902-A on stay order. True, although the conviction of the accused for the alleged crime could result in the restitution, reparaton or indemnification of the private offended party for the damage or injury he sustained by reason of the felonious 11

act of the accused, nevertheless, prosecution for violation of B.P. 22 is a criminal action, the purpose of which is to punish the mere issuance of a bad check, rather for its nonpayment.

Payment as Valid Defense under B.P. 22 (1) Valid Defense When Done within 5-day Period After Notice of Dishonor: Abarquez v. Court of Appeals 408 SCRA 500 (2003) Prima facie presumption that drawer has knowledge of the insufficiency of funds or credit at the time of the issuance or on the presentment for payment, of the check may be rebutted by payment of the value of the check either by the drawer or by the drawee-bank within five banking days from notice of the dishonour given to the drawer. The payment thus becomes a complete defence regardless of the strength of the evidence offered by the prosecution. Payment of the value of the check either by the drawer or by the drawee bank within 5 banking days from notice of dishonor given to the drawer is a complete defense. 28

(2) After 5-Day Period: Receipt of Payment and Delay in Prosecution: Griffith v. Court of Appeals 379 SCRA 94 (2002) When two criminal cases are filed based on two bounced checks, which were corporate checks that the corporation failed to fund for a valid reason duly communicated to the payee, and that the value of the checks were fully recovered by the payee more than two years prior to the filing of the criminal cases, then the conviction and sentencing of the accused cannot be upheld without running afoul of basic principles of fairness and justice. While we agree with the private respondent-payee that the gravamen of violation of B.P. 22 is the issuance of worthless checks that are dishonored upon their presentment for payment, we should not apply penal laws mechanically. We must find if the application of the law is consistent with the purpose of and reason for the law Ratione cessat lex, et cessat lex. The creditor having collected already more than a sufficient amount to cover the value of the checks for payment of rentals, via auction sale, we find that holding the debtor's president to answer for a criminal offense under B.P. 22 two years after said collection, is no longer tenable nor justified by law or equitable considerations.

(3) Payment of Check Should Properly Be Pleaded as Defense; Principles, Compensation and Set-off: Tan v. Mendez, Jr. 383 SCRA 202 (2002) The law has made the mere act of issuing a bum check a malum prohibitum, an act proscribed by legislature for being deemed pernicious and inimical to public welfare. The gravamen of the offense under this law is the act of issuing a worthless check or a check that is dishonored upon its presentment for payment. Thus, even if there had been payment, through compensation or some other means, there could still be prosecution for violation of B.P. 22. We find that no reversible error was committed by the courts a quo in finding petitioners guilty of violation of B.P. 22. In their defense, petitioners principally rely on the principle of compensation or offset under the civil law to avoid criminal prosecution. Essentially, they argue that they could not be held liable for violation of B.P. 22 because the amount covered by the subject check issued by respondent as remittances of ticket sales for petitioners' bus company. As found by the trial court, petitioners' defense of compensation is unavailing because petitioners did not clearly specify in the memorandum dated June 10, 1991 which dishonored check is being offset. Applying Art. 1289 in relation to Art. 1254 of the Civil Code, the unencashed checks amounting to P66.839.25 should have been applied to eadier dishonored check amounting to P235.387.33 what is more onerous than the subject check amounting to only P58.237.75. Interestingly, the accused never alleged compensation when they received the demand letter, during the preliminary investigation, on or before trial by filing a motion to dismiss. Moreover, if indeed there was payment by compensation, accused should have redeemed or taken the checks back in the ordinary course of business. There is no evidence on record that they did so. [CLV: Ergo, if compensation and set-off valid, they prevent the arising of criminal liability under BP 22.] g. Other Successful Defenses

(1) Varying of Critical Dates: Ongson v. People 466 SCRA 656 (2005) Where the date of the check and the amount thereof as stated in the information vary from the exhibits submitted by the prosecution, the accused should be acquitted, because such inconsistencies violate his constitutional 12

right to be informed and violation of the requirement of due process.

no knowledge that his funds or credit would be insufficient when the checks would be presented for encashment.

(2) Denial of Issuance of Checks: 6) No Authority to Receive Check:

Chiang Hla Min v. Court of Appeals 355 SCRA 608 (2001) A person who denies issuing certain checks puts into question ne genuineness and authenticity of the signatures appearing thereon, and it is he who has the burden of proving that those signatures were forgeries. (3) Complainant Took Commission of Wrong:

Check

as

Part

of

the

Magro v. Court of Appeals 210 SCRA 471 (1992)

Carino v. De Castro 553 SCRA 688 (2008) Checks issued to a person who was not authorized to collect and receive the same are without valuable consideration and are also considered issued for a nonexisting account.

h. Conviction for Issuance of Bouncing Check (1) Effected on the Accused:

There is no violation of B.P. 22 where the drawer issues the check to cover the required warranty deposit given by the complainant herself to enable the drawer to import equipment in case where such drawer never took out the warranty deposit; where the payee turned out to be the financier herself who was the wrongdoer; and the complainant was told by the drawer from the beginning that he does not have sufficient funds in the bank. (4) When Stop-Payment Was to Protect Against Complainant's Wrongful Act: Sycip, Jr. v. Court of Appeals 328 SCRA 447 (2000) When drawer who has previously issued postdated checks for amortization on purchase price of a townhouse, and developer/ seller has defaulted on his obligations to complete the project, then when drawer closed his account to avoid having to issued a "stoppayment order" to prevent the developer/seller for encashing the checks, this would not be a violation of B.P. 22, since action was made in compliance with Sec. 23 of P.D. 957 to suspend payment until such time as the owner or developer had fulfilled its obligation to the buyer. This exercise of a statutory right to suspend installment payments is a valid defense against a purported violation of B.P. 22. (5) Closing of Account Upon Advise of Bank: Sycip, Jr. v. Court of Appeals 328 SCRA 447 (2000) When the closing of account is shown to be for insufficiency of funds, but was shown to have been made upon advice of drawee bank, to avoid payment of hefty bank charges each time drawer issued a "stop payment" order to prevent encashment of postdated checks, said evidence would contradict the prima facie evidence of knowledge of insufficiency of funds, but establishes the drawer's state of mind at the time of the issuance of the postdated checks that he definitely had

Villaber v. COMELEC 369 SCRA 126 (2001) Conviction under B.P. 22 "imports deceit ... [and] certainly relates to and affects the good moral character of a person" – a drawee who issues an unfounded check deliberately reneges on his private duties he owes his fellow men or society in a manner contrary to accepted and customary rule of right and duty, justice, honesty or good morals. Ctearty, in People v. Tuanda, 181 SCRA 692 (1990), We did not make a distinction whether the offender is a lawyer or a non-lawyer nor did it declare that such offense constitutes moral turpitude when cornrriitted by a member of the Bar but not so when committed by a non-member. We made no pronouncement in Rosa] Urn v. People, 340 SCRA 497 (2000). which reiterated the ruling in Vaca v. Court of Appeals, 298 SCRA 656 (1998), that with the deletion of the prison sentence for violation of B.P. 22. the offense no longer involves moral turpitude.

Moreno v. Araneta 457 SCRA 329 (2005) The act of issuing a check knowing at the time of the issuance that he or she does not have sufficient funds in, or credit with, the drawee bank for the payment of the check in full upon its presentment is a manifestation of moral turpitude.*

(2) Fine Adjudged Instead of Imprisonment - In line with such philosophy, the Supreme Court issued Administrative Circular No. 12-2000 giving notice to all courts and judges "to henceforth take note of the foregoing policy for violation of B P 22" to impose instead of imprisonment, the penalty of fine of double the amount of the check. However, the Court subsequently issued in February 2001, an amendment Administrative 13

Circular 13-2001, notifying judges that they may still impose jail terms to offenders of B.P. 22:

Lunaria v. People 570 SCRA 572 (2008)

The judges concerned may, in the exercise of sound discretion, and taking into consideration the peculiar circumstances of each case ... impose imprisonment [which otherwise] would depreciate the seriousness of the offense, work violence on the social order, or otherwise be contrary to the imperative of justice. The "peculiar circumstances" would include bad faith on the part of the issuer and whether he had previously issued bounced checks.

Issuance of worthless checks manifest a lawyer's low regard to her commitment to the oath she has taken when she joined her peers, seriously and irreparably tarnishing the image of the profession she should hold in high esteem.

Yap v. First e-Bank Corp. 601 SCRA 250 (2009) Yap obtained a loan from the Bank secured by a thirdparty real estate mortgage, plus the issuance of six postdated checks. When the checks were deposited on due dates, they all bounced and for which the Bank brought a criminal case for violation of B.P. 22. During the pendency of the criminal case, the Bank commenced extrajudicial foreclosure of the real estate mortgage. Yap seeks to suspend the extrajudicial foreclosure proceedings on the ground that under SC Administrative Circular 57-97 foreclsoure remedy was deemed waived with the filing of the criminal case for bouncing checks. Held: Adm. Circular 57-97 provides for the rules and guidelines in the filing and prosecution of criminal cases under B.P. 22 which provides: "1. The criminal action for violation of [BP] 22 shall be deemed to necessarily include the corresponding civil action, and no reservation to file such civil action separately shall be allowed or recognized," which has been institutionalized as Sec. 1(b), Rule 111 of the Rules of Court. The alternative remedies of foreclosure of mortgage and collection suit are not barred even if a suit for B.P. 22 is filed earlier, unless a judgment of conviction had already been rendered in the B.P. 22 case finding the accused debtor criminally liable and ordering him to pay the amount of the checks. In this case, no judgment of conviction (which could have declared the criminal and civil liability of the accused) was rendered because the accused move for the provisional dismissal of the case. Hence, the private complainant could have still foreclosed on the mortgaged or filed a collection suit. Lunaria v. People 570 SCRA 572 (2008) Administrative Circular No. 12-2000, authorized the nonimposition of the penalty of imprisonment in B.P. 22 cases. The Court has not decriminalized B.P. 22 violations, nor have removed imprisonment as an alternative penalty. The lack of criminal intent on the part of the accused is irrelevant:

Josef v. People 476 SCRA 417 (2005) The imposition of either a fine or imprisonment remains entirely within the sound discretion of the judge trying the case, based on his assessment of the offender and the facts. Ongson v. People 466 SCRA 428 (2005) Courts are vested the discretion to determine, taking into consideration the peculiar circumstance of each case, whether the imposition of fine would serve the interest of justice, or whether forbearing to impose imprisonment would depreciate the seriousness of the offense, work violence on the social order, or otherwise contrary to the imperatives of justice. Whether there is neither proof nor allegation that the accused is not a first time offender, imposition of the penalty of fine instead of imprisonment is proper. Tan v. Mendez, Jr. 383 SCRA 202 (2002) We note that accused had exerted efforts to settle their obligations. The fact of returning the un-encashed checks to respondent indicates good faith on the part of accused. Absent any showing that accused acted in bad faith, the deletion of the penalty of imprisonment in this case is proper. Negrampa v. People 386 SCRA 412 (2002) Accused cannot avail himself of benefits under Adm. Circular 2-2000 where he manifested utter lack of good faith or wanton bad faith, such as when he issued the postdated checks even though he had no more account with the drawee bank, having closed it more than four years before. Ong v. People 346 SCRA 117 (2000) In the light of the ruling in the recent cases of Vaca v. Court of Appeals and Rosa Lim v. People, We deemed it best in the instant case, to limit the penalty for violation of B.P. 22 to payment of a fine. Following our rationale in the aforesaid cases, We believed that it would best serve the ends of criminal justice, if in fixing the penalty within the range of discretion allowed by Sec. 1(1), the same philosophy underlying the Indeterminate Sentence Law is observed, namely, that of redeeming valuable human material and preventing unnecessary 14

deprivation of personal liberty and economic usefulness with due regard to the protection of the social order.

i. Civil Aspect Deemed Included in Filing of Criminal Action for Bouncing Checks Ricaforte v. Jurado 532 SCRA 317 (2007) The fine that may be imposed by the court is not awarded to the private complainant - it is imposed as a penalty and not as a payment for a specific loss or injury. Bax v. People 532 SCRA 284 (2007) The civil liability is not extinguished by acquittal where such acquittal is based on lack of proof beyond reasonable doubt, since only preponderance of evidence is required in civil cases.

indistinct. The confusion is traceable to the singularity of the amount of each. There are two prevailing concerns should civil recovery against the corporation be pursued even as the B.P. 22 case against the signatory remains extant. First, the possibility that the plaintiff might be awarded the amount of the check in both the B.P. 22 case and in the civil action against the corporation. For obvious reasons, that should not be permitted. As a matter of equity, petitioner should be exempted from paying filing fees in an action versus the corporation. The period of prescription to file such action should run from the finality of the decision.

Cheng v. Sy 592 SCRA 155 (2009) The criminal action under B.P. 22 includes the corresponding civil action to recover the amount of the checks. The rule is that upon the filing of the estafa and B.P. 22 cases against the respondents, where the petitioner has not made any waiver, express reservation to litigate separately, or has not instituted the corresponding civil action to collect the amount and damages prior to the criminal action, the civil action is deemed instituted with the criminal cases. Hyatt Industrial Manufacturing v. Asia Dynamic Electric 465 SCRA 454 (2005) Under the revised Rules, the criminal action for violation of B.P. 22 shall be deemed to include the corresponding civil action, which is expected to significantly lower the number of cases filed before the courts for collection based on dishonored checks. The pendency of the civil action before the court trying the criminal case bars the filing of another civil action in another court on the ground of litis pendentia. 33

Gosiaco v. Ching 585 SCRA 471 (2009) B.P. 22 imposes a distinct civil liability on the signatory of the check which is distinct from the civil liability of the corporation for the amount represented from the check. The civil liability attaching to the signatory arises from the wrongful act of signing the check despite the insufficiency of funds in the account, while the civil liability attaching to the corporation is itself the very obligation covered by the check or the consideration for its execution. Yet these civil liabilities are mistaken to be 15