Law-of-property Project..docx

DR. RAM MANOHAR LOHIYA NATIONAL LAW UNIVERSITY

PROPERTY LAW-I PROJECT ON

“DUTY OF THE SELLER TO ANSWER TO THE BEST OF HIS INFORMATION ALL RELEVANT QUESTIONS PUT TO HIM BY THE BUYER IN RESPECT TO THE PROPERTY OR THE TITLE”

UNDER THE SUPERVISION OF:

DR. MANISH SINGH

SUBMITTED BY:

NAYANIKA RAWAT

ASSOCIATE PROFESSOR (LAW)

ENROLLMENT NO. 150101085

DR. RMLNLU, LUCKNOW

SECTION- ‘B’, ROLL NO- 89

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TABLE OF CONTENTS

I.

objective of the project.................................................................................................................... 3

II.

HYPOTHESIS ................................................................................................................................ 3

III.

INTRODUCTION ...................................................................................................................... 4

IV.

SELLER’S DUTY TO ANSWER ALL RELEVANT QUESTIONS ........................................ 5

ENGLISH POSITION .................................................................................................................................. 5 INDIAN POSITION ..................................................................................................................................... 5 V.

ANALYSIS OF LEADING CASE LAWS ON POINT ................................................................. 9

1.

PREMCHAND V RAM SAHAI AND ANOTHER .................................................................................... 9

2.

JITENDRA NATH ROY V SM. MAHESWARI BOSE ........................................................................... 10

3.

A K LAKSHMIPATHY V RAI SAHEB PANNALAL H LAHOTI CHARITABLE TRUST ......................... 11

4.

HEYWOOD V MALLALIEU ............................................................................................................. 14

5.

JOGENDRA NATH GOSWAMI V CHANDRA KUMAR MOZUMDAR .................................................. 14

VI.

CONCLUSION ......................................................................................................................... 16

VIII.

OUTCOME OF THE HYPOTHESIS....................................................................................... 17

VIII.

BIBLIOGRAPHY ..................................................................................................................... 17

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I. OBJECTIVE OF THE PROJECT The main objective of the project is to discuss and analyse the duty of the seller to answer to the best of his information all relevant questions put to him by the buyer in respect to the property or the title thereto as envisaged in Section 55(1)(c) of the Transfer of Property Act, 1882. All the required acts, cases and materials have been taken into consideration.

II. HYPOTHESIS Section 55(1)(c) of the Transfer of Property Act, 1882, means that if the seller is being asked about something in relation or connection with the immovable property that is to be sold, then he must answer all the relevant questions put to him with the best knowledge he has. In other words, if asked by the buyer, he must answers all the questions which are relevant to the sell.

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III.

INTRODUCTION

Section 55(1)(c) sets forth the rights and liabilities of the buyer and seller before and after completion of sale in case immovable property. In the absence of a contract to the contrary, the buyer and the seller of immovable property respectively are subject to the liabilities, and have the rights, mentioned in the rules or such of them as are applicable to the property sold as stated in the section.

DUTIES AND LIABILITIES OF THE SELLER The primary aim of laying down the rights and duties of the seller and buyer in case of sale is to ensure fair dealings, and as far as possible, to minimize fraud and wastage of the property. Law imposes seven duties on the seller, six prior to the passing of ownership, and one after the title has passed in favour of the buyer. They are stated as follows: 1. Disclosure of material defects relating to property [S. 55(1)(a)]; 2. Allowing the buyer to examine documents relating to property on request [S. 55(1)(b)]; 3. To answer the related queries or questions of the buyer [S. 55(1)(c)]; 4. Execute a proper conveyance in favour of the buyer [S. 55(1)(d)]; 5. To take care of property and related documents in between the date of contract to sell and actual execution of the sale deed [S. 55(1)(e)]; 6. To give possession to the buyer [S. 55(1)(f)]; 7. To pay rent or public charges due on the property till the date of sale [S. 55(1)(g)]. The rights and liabilities before completion are all contractual with the exception of the seller’s right to take the rents and profits under section 55(4)(a), which is a right the seller has because he continues to be the owner after the contract. The seller’s liabilities- to produce title deeds under section 55(1)(b); to answer question as to title under section 55(1)(c); to execute a conveyance under section 55(1)(d); and to disclose defects under section 55(1)(a); and the buyer’s liability to disclose facts materially increasing the value under section 55(5)(a) merge in the conveyance. There is no remedy on them after the conveyance except on the ground of fraud, but the omission of disclosure is expressly declared to be fraudulent. The seller’s liability to take care of the property under section 55(1)(e) and to pay outgoings

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under section 55(1)(g) are obligations collateral to the contract, which do not merge in the conveyance and can be enforced after completion. The liability to give possession under section 55(1)(f), and to guarantee title as per section 55(2) are contractual liabilities implied in the conveyance.

IV.

SELLER’S DUTY TO ANSWER ALL RELEVANT QUESTIONS

ENGLISH POSITION In England, the usual practice, in an open contract of sale, i.e., a contract in which nothing is said about the method in which the seller is to prove his title but which merely fixes the price for the land contracted to be sold, is for the seller to deliver to the buyer an abstract of title which gives a summary of the effect of all the documents by which any dispositions of the property have been made during the period for which title has to be shown, and of all the facts affecting the devolution of the title during the same period. On receipt of the abstract the buyer examines it with the original document, and if he considers it necessary makes requisitions and inquiries which are to be answered by the seller. Usually the conditions of sale will fix a time within which such requisitions or inquiries should be made, after the expiry of which the buyer would have deemed to have accepted the title. If there is no stipulation as to time, the buyer must make his objections within a reasonable time after the delivery of the abstract. In the event of unreasonable delay the seller can, by notice, limit a reasonable time for sending in objections and, upon the buyer’s default, rescind the contract; or the purchaser will be assumed to have accepted the title.1

INDIAN POSITION

Requisitions Halsbury’s , Laws of England, Vol. XXV pp. 342, 355, 323, 324; (1852) 51 ER 770, Pegg v. Wisden. (Abstract retained for five months without an objection- Buyer must be deemed to have accepted the title.) [AIR 1953 Punj 231 (DB). (Agreement to sale made on 24-1-1947 providing for completion of sale on or before 23-5-1947 and no request was made by the buyer for examination of title deeds till 16-5-1947-Buyer held must be taken to have accepted the title of seller before he made request- (18520 51 ER 770, Pegg v. Wisden relied upon.] 1

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When the documents of title are produced under the last sub-section the buyer examines them and if he is not satisfied, he makes requisitions or objections. These are (1) requisitions on title; (2) requisitions as to matters relating to conveyance; and (3) merely inquiries. Requisitions on title are objections purporting that the documents do not show the agreed title or that the documents are not efficacious, i.e., not duly attested or not executed by parties having the capacity to convey, or that the identity of the property is not established, or that further evidence is necessary. Examples of such requisitions will be found in the cases mentioned in the footnote herewith.2 Requisitions as to matters relating to conveyance refer to such matters as the joinder or concurrence of parties to the conveyance. Inquiries are for the protection of the buyer, and call attention to possible omissions of disclosure by the seller, and seek information on such points as easements, party walls and insurance. The conditions of sale usually contain a stipulation requiring requisitions to be made within a certain time of the delivery of the abstract. This stipulation is construed as referring to the delivery of a perfect abstract, i.e., an abstract which shows all the documents, and gives all the facts upon which the vendor’s title is based.3 Answers to requisitions The seller is bound to answer all requisitions which are relevant to the title and which are specific. He is not bound to answer a general inquiry as to whether there was within the knowledge of the seller or his solicitor any settlement, deed, fact, omission or encumbrance affecting the property, and not disclosed by the abstract. 4 He is bound to answer to the best of his information questions regarding the income or rental of the property. 5 The contract may give the vendor an express power of recission if the requisitions are made which he is unwilling to comply with. But even so, the vendor is not relieved of his duty to make out his title.6

2

Shrinivasdas v Meherbai (1917) ILR Bom 300 ; Hirachand v Jayagopal AIR 1925 Bom 69.

3

Nilmani Addy v Dinendranath Das AIR 1930 Cal 428. Taylor v London and County Banking Co (1901) 2 Ch 231. 5 Premchand v Ram Sahai AIR 1932 Nag 148. 6 Lakhmidas and Co v DJ Tata AIR 1927 Bom 195. 4

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Where the vendor has failed to answer requisitions, the purchaser is entitled to rescind the contract; he need not formally demand answers or make time the essence.7 The duty to answer requisitions is altogether distinct from the duty of disclosure under s. 55(1)(a), for the omission of the buyer to make a requisition will not absolve the seller if he has not made a full disclosure.8 Where a vendor sells land under an open contract, he cannot compel the purchaser to accept a statutory declaration as sufficient declaration as sufficient evidence to contradict statements appearing in the documents of title, such as the consideration stated in a deed which shows prima facie that the deed is insufficiently stamped.9 With or even without inspection of the documents relating to the property, if the buyer raises reasonable questions with respect to the property, the title of the seller or the encumbrances over the property, the seller is bound to answer the same. In fact he must answer to the best of his information all relevant questions10 put to him by the buyer in respect to the property and the title thereto.11 If the seller fails to do so, it entitles the buyer to rescind the contract. Where the seller has failed to answer requisitions, the buyer is entitled to rescind the contract; he need not formally demand answers or make time the essence. Any information regarding the income or the rental of the property to be sold is a relevant question within the purview of Section 55(1) (c) and it is the duty of the seller to answer such a question to the best of his information. If he gives an answer which he knows is false, he is guilty of breach of duty and misrepresentation. Further, if he volunteers any information about the income, he is certainly bound to give true information. Nature of requisitions Where a requisition is made by the buyer, the seller must have reasonable time to comply with it, the buyer cannot put an end to the contract before such time.12 The requisition must be specific. A general inquiry such as, whether to the knowledge of the seller, there are Re Stone and Saville’s Contract (1963) 1 WLR 163. Heywood v Mallalieu (1883) 25 Ch D 357. 9 Re Spollon and Long’s Contract (1936) 1 Ch 713. 10 Prem Chand v Ram Sahai AIR 1932 Nag 148. 11 Section 55(1)(c), The Transfer of Property Act, 1882 12 Micholls v Corbett (1865) 55 ER 680. 7 8

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encumbrances affecting the property need not be answered by the seller. 13 The seller must answer the requisitions made to the best of his information and then it would be open to the buyer to say whether he would accept the title as made out.14 Waiver of requisitions The buyer may waive requisitions. Waiver may be express, or may be implied from conduct as when a buyer does not press a requisition that has been made, or ask for time to pay the price;15 or when he enters into possession or pays the whole or part of the price.16 Such conduct constitutes waiver as it shows an acceptance of title. However, the question is one of fact to be decided on all the circumstances of the case, and payment of price and entry into possession will not have this effect if the contract provides that this may be done before completion.17 Such implied waiver only refers to the title shown in the abstract or the documents produced, but not to an extraneous defect subsequently discovered,18 or to an encumbrance removable by the seller.19 Existence of a contract to the contrary Even where the seller has, under the contract, an express power of recission, if requisitions are made, which he is unwilling to comply with; it has been held that the power does not enable him to override reasonable requisitions.20

13

Taylor v London and Country Banking Co. (1901) 2 Ch 231. Turpin v Chambers (1861) 54 ER 566. 15 Burroughs v Oakley (1819) 3 Swans 159. 16 Fludyer v Cocker (1806) 12 Ves 25. 17 Bolton v London School Board (1878) 7 Ch D 766. 18 Blacklow v Laws (1842) 2 Hare 40. 19 Re Gloag and Miller’s Contract (1883) 23 Ch D 320. 20 AIR 1956 Bom 175 (DB). 14

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V. ANALYSIS OF LEADING CASE LAWS ON POINT 1. PREMCHAND V RAM SAHAI AND ANOTHER21 Facts of the case The appellant through his best friend Ballulal purchased an eight-anna share in Mauza Sohagi from the respondent Ramsahai for Rs. 7,500 on 25th February 1926. Briefly, the allegation that he makes is that it was represented to Ballulal, who made the contract by Ramsahai that the gross income of the village was Rs. 749-8-0 and that the price of Rs. 7,500 was fixed accordingly; subsequently however Ballulal discovered that the income was less and that the area of the khudkast land was also less. He therefore claims that there was a misrepresentation on the part of Ramsahai and that the contract was induced by that misrepresentation. Analysis of the judgment The Court was of opinion that any information regarding the income or rental of the property would be a relevant question and that therefore it was the duty of the seller to answer such a question to the best of his information. If therefore he gave an answer that he knew to be false, he was guilty of a breach of duty and misrepresentation. Further, even if it was not the duty of the seller to give information regarding the income of the property if no question regarding the income was put, still, if he volunteered any information about the income, he was certainly bound to give true information; that is, he may not have been bound to give any information at all, but if he went out of his way to give any information he was bound to give true information and not false. The fact, then, that he gave information which has been found to be false must be held to be deliberate misrepresentation. In the present case I am of opinion that Ballulal had the means of discovering the truth with ordinary diligence. As noted above, Ex. P-2 is obviously not a complete copy of the revenue papers nor is it a certified copy. Ballulal must have been aware that it was only a private note, or memorandum and he could have verified its truth or otherwise by a reference to the revenue papers. Ballulal lives in Jubbulpore himself, and the Patwari Babulal also lives in Jubbulpore. He further admitted on cross-examination that he has been patwari for the last 23 or 24 years and that he has known

21

AIR 1932 Nag 148.

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Babulal apparently daring that period. The contract was entered into in Jubbulpore according to the evidence of both parties, and it would have been easy for Ballulal to have gone to the Deputy Commissioner's office and to have obtained copies of revenue papers. It is also important to note that Mihilal, who acted as a go between in negotiating the agreement, roust almost certainly have known the true state of affairs, and he has known Ballulal for the last five or six years. He has further admitted on cross-examination that Ballulal has purchased a share in Mauza Chatti, where he resides, through him. It would seem therefore that, if Ballulal had questioned him, he could have told him the true state of affairs regarding the village share purchased from Ramsahai. It is the opinion of the researcher that then Ballulal had the means of discovering the truth with ordinary diligence and that the exception to Section 19, Contract Act, applies. It was therefore decided to set aside the decree of the lower appellate Court and instead restore the decree of the trial Court dismissing the suit of the plaintiff-appellant. Costs of the appeal in both Courts and of the cross-objections would have to be borne by the appellant, who will also bear the costs of the suit.

2. JITENDRA NATH ROY V SM. MAHESWARI BOSE22

Facts of the case The negotiation for the property i.e,. premises Nos. 34A and 34B, Amherst Street were carried on between two solicitors namely Mr. Anil Kumar Ghose for the purchaser and Mr. Anil Kumar Dutta for the vendor commencing in the first week of December 1954, The vendor was one Maheswari Bose a Hindu widow, who wanted to sell the property for legal necessity. (After dealing with the correspondence between the solicitors the judgment proceeded to deal with the relevant terms of the draft agreement dated 13-12-1954) The terms of the agreement relevant are as follows:-(1) The vendor agrees to sell as a Hindu widow the said two properties free from all incumbrances at Rs. 32,000/- out of which Rs. 501/- has been paid by way of earnest and in part payment. (2) The purchase is to be subject to the approval of the vendor's title by the purchaser's attorney Mr. Anil Ghosh provided that the disapproval of the title should not be unreasonable

22

AIR 1965 Cal 45.

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or arbitrary. The purchaser's attorney shall intimate to the vendor's attorney in writing by January 24, 1955 his approval of the vendor's title and power to sell the said laud and premises. In default the vendor will be entitled to cancel the agreement and refund only the earnest money without interest or costs. (3) The balance of the price shall be paid and the purchase shall be completed by February 15, 1955. The vendor shall forthwith deliver the title deeds which are in the possession of the vendor to the purchasers' attorney on his accountable receipt for his inspection. The word 'purchaser' in the document shall mean, and include himself, his heirs, executors and assigns and nominee or nominees.(After dealing further with the correspondence, the judgment proceeded) Analysis of the judgment The duty of the seller to produce documents of title under this clause can arise only on the request of the buyer and not if there is no such request. Held, there was no dispute that benefit of contract of type before could be transferred and agreement for sale expressly provided that word, purchaser could include his assignee or nominee. Further, if it was showed that assignment of contract was entered and assignee was person who could have put up Rs. 32,000/- when called upon term, as to readiness and willingness to pay consideration. Thus, the plaintiff never had the means to complete the purchase. Moreover, the document of assignment was not in existence before the institution of the suit. It was established that inactivity of plaintiff and his solicitor after the date of agreement for sale, absence of any entry regarded that the payment was long due after the institution of suit only fits in with assignment being posterior to data of suit. Therefore, readiness and willingness on part of plaintiff to enable him to claim specific performance of contract could be answered against him which is why the appeal was dismissed.

3. A K LAKSHMIPATHY V RAI SAHEB PANNALAL H LAHOTI CHARITABLE TRUST23 Facts of the case

23

AIR 2010 SC 377.

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The dispute in this appeal involves a property marked no. 1-11- 251 in Begumpet, Hyderabad (hereinafter referred to as the `property in question') which was owned by one Rai Bahadur Saheb Pannalal Lahoti. By a Will, he bequeathed all his properties including the property in question and appointed Respondent no. 2 B.M. Bhandari and one Bhima Bai as joint executors of his Will. According to the Will of Rai Bahadur Saheb Pannalal Lahoti, onefourth of the fund of his estate was to be used for hospitals and educational institutions in equal shares as the executors would deem fit. After the death of Bhima Bai, who was one of the joint executors of the Will, her heirs Govind Bai Vinani and Suresh Chandra Lahoti (Respondents no. 2 and 5 respectively) came into the picture. By a trust deed as per the wishes of the Late Rai Bahadur Saheb Pannalal Hiralal Lahoti, a Charitable Trust by the same name was set up. The trust owned properties in Hyderabad, Andhra Pradesh and Hingoli in Maharashtra. The registered office was in Kolkata, West Bengal. Respondent no. 2 on behalf of the trust entered into a written contract for sale with appellant no. 1 on 6th of December 1978 agreeing to sell the property in question measuring 9400 sq. yards along with constructions thereon. The contract contained certain terms and conditions. The first of such condition was that Appellant no. 1 would advance a sum of Rsection1 lakh and the rest of the balance amount, i.e., Rs 5 lakhs would be paid by the appellants on or before 5th of June 1979. Under the contract, the appellants also agreed to obtain the necessary permission or exemption from the competent authorities under the Urban Land (Ceiling and Regulation) Act, 1976 (hereinafter referred to as "the ULC Act"). It was also alleged that the respondents shall cooperate with the appellants in getting all such necessary permissions from the competent authority under the ULC Act. Clause 10 of the Contract emphatically mentioned that time was the essence of the contract. It reads as under: "Time will be of essence of the contract." The said contract also mentioned that in case of failure of the appellants to pay the balance amount within the stipulated time, the respondents would forfeit the balance amount. Thereafter, the competent authority under the ULC Act informed the appellants of being granted exemption provided that the land was continued to be used for the purposes of the trust. Due to such intimation, the Appellants sought clarifications from Respondent no. 2 regarding procurement of permissions from the Endowment Department in a telegraphic notice on 29th of May 1979. This was followed by a registered notice on 31st of May 1979. Respondent no.2 sent a reply to the appellants on 4th of June 1979 without clarifying the

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doubts raised on procurement of permission from the Endowment Department. In response, the appellants sent a detailed communication to the respondent enquiring about the state of affairs on 5th of June 1979. The respondent no. 2 sent a reply on 6th of June 1979 informing the appellants that there was no requirement of obtaining permission from the Endowment Department as the laws of West Bengal, which were applicable in this case, did not require any particular procedure for alienation of the trust property. Thereafter, the appellants sent a communication enclosing a Photostat copy of a cheque of Rs 5 lakhs, certified by the banker as "good for payment", thus showing their readiness and willingness to complete the contract with the balance consideration but with the condition that the respondent had to obtain a certificate from, the Endowment Department. In reply, on 7th of June 1979 the respondents sent a Photostat copy of a cheque of Rs 1 lakh towards return of the advance amount simply terminating the agreement and threatening to forfeit the advance amount. The written communication mentioned that Respondent no. 2 was kind enough to offer the earnest amount back to the appellants on the condition that the latter would not agitate the matter further. The appellants were directed to collect the amount within three days of the receipt of the letter; otherwise the earnest money would be forfeited. The said letter mentioned that by this communication the respondents would not be waiving any of their rights to pursue the matter further. Analysis of the Judgment So far as the present case is concerned, the condition regarding the clearance or exemption from the Endowment Department is not a document of title relating to the property which would benefit the buyer for examination for the purpose of completing the agreement for sale. Sub-section (c) of Section 55(1) of the Transfer of Property Act also equally cannot be applicable in the facts and circumstances of the present case. That apart, it is evident from a plain reading of Section 55 that this section becomes applicable only in the absence of the contract to the contrary. In this case, there is admittedly a contract for sale which clearly lays down the terms and conditions to govern the sale transaction.

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4. HEYWOOD V MALLALIEU 24

Facts of the case A house was sold at auction by a mortgagee ‘subject to any easementsection’ It turned out to be subject to an easement in favour of a neighbour entitling her to come and wash her clothes in the kitchen. The vendor’s solicitor had been told that the neighbour claimed such a right but made no inquiries because he ‘was not going to put other people on their guard about mere claimsection Analysis of the Judgment The duty to answer requisitions under Section 55(1)(c) is altogether distinct from the duty of disclosure under Section 55(1)(a), because the omission by the buyer to make a requisition will not absolve the seller if he has not made a full disclosure. The vendor’s solicitor had been put on inquiry and had a duty to investigate the claim further. The court dismissed the vendor’s action for specific performance, and ordered the return of the deposit.

5. JOGENDRA NATH GOSWAMI V CHANDRA KUMAR MOZUMDAR25 Facts of the case This second appeal arises out of a suit brought by the plaintiff for rescission of a contract and for return of half-notes to the value of 1,400 rupees; in the alternative if it be found by the Court that the defendant had transferable chukani right in the land in suit and if it be held that the plaintiff is bound according to law to purchase the said land from the defendant, then the defendant may be directed to execute a conveyance in respect of the said land containing lawful and proper terms. The question whether the plaintiff was deceived is one which largely rests upon the question of the chukani right. This the Subordinate Judge in the first Court has clearly decided erroneously. He says chukani right is not equivalent to occupancy right nor to mokarari istemrari, it always denotes a temporary right. The defendant continued to hold it after the expiration of the lease and no new lease was ever granted. The plaintiff appears to have held this laud or a portion of it on a sub-lease for 9 years.

24 25

(1883) 25 Ch D 357. AIR 1914 Cal 661.

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Analysis of the Judgment But on this finding it is clear that the tenancy is a precarious one, and that under the Transfer of Property Act the defendant and his vendee would be liable to be ejected on six months' notice at the end of any year of tenancy. This certainly is not a chukani right. It is urged that the defendant's own pottah describes it as chukani-right, and that the plaintiff cannot have been deceived, and with due diligence he could have discovered what the real right was. The question which really ari(sic)n this case is; did the defendant deceive the plain (sic) by holding out to him according to the words of his own written statement that he had a chukani right for sale, which he was willing to let the plaintiff purchase for the purpose of permanently settling his nephew on the land, when he had in reality nothing but a leasehold from year to year transferable only under the Transfer of Property Act. It is clear from the written statement that the defendant knew that the plaintiffs' intention was to permanently settle his nephew upon this land after the purchase; and it has always been hold as laid down in the case of Flight v. Barton (1832) 3 My. & K. 282. that if the vendor be informed by the purchaser of his object in buying and the lease contains covenants which will defeat that object, mere silence will in equity be equivalent to misrepresentation; in other words the defendant was bound to disclose to the plaintiff that the word chukani in his lease had no meaning or at any rate not the meaning which persons residing in the Rungpur district are entitled to attach to it. But this question can only be decided by a consideration of the various documents in the case which we are surprised to see the lower Courts do not appear to have taken any notice of with the exception of the defendant's pottah. But it is obvious that the question whether the defendant deceived the plaintiff cannot be decided without further reference to all these" matters. The case therefore must go back for consideration of this point. If it be found that the defendant had nothing but a leasehold right from year to year under the Transfer of Property Act, and if the kabala and the correspondence show that he purported to sell the chukani right and not merely the right he acquired from the Shahs, whatever that right might be, then the defendant must be held to be guilty of fraudulent concealment and the plaintiff is entitled to have his half-notes back and cancel the contract. If on the other hand it be held that the defendant has chukani right as defined by Dr. Field and as generally recognised in the Rungpur district, or that the plaintiff had full knowledge that what is described as chukani right in the pottah of the defendant was nothing more than a transferable yearly tenancy for non-agricultural purposes, then the plaint ill: cannot succeed. As regards the contention that

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the plaintiff had the means to discover the truth with ordinary diligence we may again point out that if the use of the word chukani in the defendant's title-deeds misled the plaintiff, or if as the plaintiff says, the defendant refused to show him his title-deeds, then the exception to Section 19 of the Contract Act does not apply.

VI.

CONCLUSION

Factual Example: ‘A’, a person has a house which he is willing to sell. ‘B’, a person interested in buying that immovable property comes and inspects the house. After inspecting the house, ‘B’ asks ‘A’ certain questions about the property. Suppose, the questions which were asked, are: i)

About the neighbourhood, i.e. how are the neighbours? Since he would live in that house along with his family (which includes his parents also and since they are old, they like peaceful surroundings)

ii)

What about the title of the property? Whether the seller is the sole owner of the property or is it under joint-ownership?

iii)

Is there any material defect in the walls, ceilings of the house?

In this factual example, the buyer, ‘B’ asks the seller, ‘A’ some questions pertaining to the property which he is about to buy. All the questions which he asked are the relevant questions related to the property. Here, the seller ‘A’ must answer all the questions with the best of his information to the buyer ‘B’. If the seller refused to answer any of the questions, the buyer can rescind the contract and can terminate his will to buy the property. The obligation laid down in Section 55(1)(c)- answering of all relevant questions asked by the buyer questions- are interned to ensure to the satisfaction of the buyer that the seller has done his utmost to perform his obligations, particularly the obligation under clause (a) to disclose defects in the property or title.

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VIII.

OUTCOME OF THE HYPOTHESIS

After analysing the meaning of the section and discussing the various case laws in which the relevant questions pertaining to a sell had been discussed, the outcome of the hypothesis is nearly true. The seller must answer all the relevant questions with the best of his information to the buyer if, he asked. Also, the seller just can’t take the benefit of this clause, means he must disclose all the material defect/s, if any in the property or sell. If any problem arises in interpreting the contents of the section then the whole section must be read as whole and must construed harmoniously taking into consideration all its effects.

VIII. 

BIBLIOGRAPHY

Books 1) Avtar Singh, A Textbook on the Transfer of Property Act ( 4th edn, Universal Law Publishing Company Pvt Ltd New Delhi 2010) 2) Poonam Pradhan Saxena, The Transfer of Property Act (2nd edn Lexis Nexis New Delhi 2015) 3) GP Tripathi, The Transfer of Property Act (18th edn, Central Law Publications 2014) 4) RK Sinha, The Transfer of Property Act (17th edn, Central Law Agency 2013)



Electronic Sources

1. www.manupatra.com. 2. www.lexis.com. 3. www.scconline.com.

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