Landti - Last Exam - Reviewer.docx

1 1. Balbin v. Register of Deeds of Ilocos Sur Facts: Petitioners Aurelio and Francis Balbin presented to the Ilocos Sur register of deeds a duplicate copy of the registered owner’s certificate of title and a deed of donation inter-vivos, requesting that the latter be annotated on the title. The registered owner Cornelio Balbin appears to have donated inter-vivos 2/3 portion of the land. The register of deeds denied the requested annotation for being “legally defective or otherwise not sufficient in law.” It appears that previously annotated in the memorandum of encumbrances on the OCT are three separate sales earlier executed by Cornelio Balbin in favor of Florentino Gabayan, Roberto Bravo and Juana Gabayan, who each received their co-owner’s duplicate CTs. Mainly because these 3 co-owner’s copies of CTs had not been presented by petitioners, the register of deeds refused to make the requested annotation. Petitioners referred the matter to the Commissioner of Land Registration, who upheld the action of the Register of Deeds in a resolution.

12, 1945, as required by Section 14 of the Property Registration Decree, since prior to 1980, the land was not alienable or disposable. The OSG suggested an interpretation that all lands of the public domain which were not declared alienable or disposable before June 12, 1945 would not be susceptible to original registration, no matter the length of unchallenged possession by the occupant. Ruling: Land Titles; Land Registration; Requisites for the filing of an application for registration of title under Section 14 (1) - There are three obvious requisites for the filing of an application for registration of title under Section 14(1) that the property in question is alienable and disposable land of the public domain; that the applicants by themselves or through their predecessors-in-interest have been in open, continuous, exclusive and notorious possession and occupation, and; that such possession is under a bona fide claim of ownership since June 12, 1945 or earlier.

Ruling: 2. Republic v. CA and Naguit Facts: On January 5, 1993, Naguit filed a petition for registration of title of a parcel of land. The application sought a judicial confirmation of imperfect title over the land. The public prosecutor, appearing for the government, and Angeles opposed the petition. The court issued an order of general default against the whole world except as to Angeles and the government. The evidence revealed that the subject parcel of land was originally declared for taxation purposes in the name of Urbano in 1945. Urbano executed a Deed of Quitclaim in favor of the heirs of Maming, wherein he renounced all his rights to the subject property and confirmed the sale made by his father to Maming sometime in 1955 or 1956. Subsequently, the heirs of Maming executed a deed of absolute sale in favor of respondent Naguit who thereupon started occupying the same. Naguit constituted Blanco, Jr. as her attorney-in-fact and administrator. The administrator introduced improvements, planted trees in addition to existing coconut trees which were then 50 to 60 years old, and paid the corresponding taxes due on the subject land. Naguit and her predecessors-in-interest had occupied the land openly and in the concept of owner without any objection from any private person or even the government until she filed her application for registration. The OSG argued that the property which is in open, continuous and exclusive possession must first be alienable. Since the subject land was declared alienable only on October 15, 1980, Naguit could not have maintained a bona fide claim of ownership since June

Same; Same; Absent a legislative amendment the rule would be, adopting the OSG’s view, that all lands of the public domain which are not declared alienable or disposable before June 12, 1945 would not be susceptible to original registration, no matter the length of unchallenged possession by the occupant - we are mindful of the absurdity that would result if we adopt petitioners position. Absent a legislative amendment, the rule would be, adopting the OSGs view, that all lands of the public domain which were not declared alienable or disposable before June 12, 1945 would not be susceptible to original registration, no matter the length of unchallenged possession by the occupant. Such interpretation renders paragraph (1) of Section 14 virtually inoperative and even precludes the government from giving it effect even as it decides to reclassify public agricultural lands as alienable and disposable. The unreasonableness of the situation would even be aggravated considering that before June 12, 1945, the Philippines was not yet even considered an independent state. Same; Same; The more reasonable interpretation of Section 14 (1) is that it merely requires the property sought to be registered as already alienable and disposable at the time the application for registration of title is filed - the more reasonable interpretation of Section 14(1) is that it merely requires the property sought to be registered as already alienable and disposable at the time the application for registration of title is filed. If the State, at the time the application is made, has not yet deemed it proper to release the property for alienation or disposition, the presumption is that the government is still reserving the right to utilize the property; hence, the need to preserve its ownership in the State irrespective of the length of adverse possession even if in good faith. However, if the property has already been classified as alienable and disposable, as it is in this case, then there is already an intention on

the part of the State to abdicate its exclusive prerogative over the property. Same; Same; There are no material differences between Section 14 (1) of the Property Registration Decree and Section 48 (b) of the Public of Land and Section 14 (1) of Property Registration Decree are of the same type - there are no material differences between Section 14(1) of the Property Registration Decree and Section 48(b) of the Public Land Act, as amended. True, the Public Land Act does refer to agricultural lands of the public domain, while the Property Registration Decree uses the term alienable and disposable lands of the public domain. It must be noted though that the Constitution declares that alienable lands of the public domain shall be limited to agricultural lands.[24] Clearly, the subject lands under Section 48(b) of the Public Land Act and Section 14(1) of the Property Registration Decree are of the same type. Same; Same; Even if possession of the alienable public land concerned on a date later than June 12, 1945 and such possession being open, continuous and exclusive, then the possessor may have the right to register the land by virtue of Section 14 (2) of the Property Registration Decree - Prescription is one of the modes of acquiring ownership under the Civil Code.[25] There is a consistent jurisprudential rule that properties classified as alienable public land may be converted into private property by reason of open, continuous and exclusive possession of at least thirty (30) years.[26] With such conversion, such property may now fall within the contemplation of private lands under Section 14(2), and thus susceptible to registration by those who have acquired ownership through prescription. Thus, even if possession of the alienable public land commenced on a date later than June 12, 1945, and such possession being been open, continuous and exclusive, then the possessor may have the right to register the land by virtue of Section 14(2) of the Property Registration Decree. 3. Kidlapos v. Baguio Gold Mining Company Facts: On August 31, 1954, herein petitioners sued the Baguio Gold Mining Company and the Director of Mines, to annul the declarations of location of certain mineral claims of the Baguio Gold Mining Company, overlapping the parcels claimed by plaintiffs. The complaint also sought to enjoin the Director of Mines from proceeding with the lode patent applications of The Mining Company. After due trial, CFI found that the plaintiffs had failed to substantiate their claims. Upon appeal the CA finding that the land lay within the Cordillera Forest Reservation proclaimed by Governor General Stimson, and that it formed part of the Public domain, the Court of Appeals affirmed the dismissal of the actions by the Court of First Instance. Plaintiffs had filed in Court the present registration cases. Baguio Gold opposed the registration, and moved to dismiss the applications.

2 Ruling: Judgments; Res Judicata; Difference in forms of action does not prevent operation of rule difference in forms of action are irrelevant for the purposes of res judicata. It is a firmly established rule that a different remedy sought or a diverse form of action does not prevent the estoppel of the former adjudication. Same; Same; A matter of defense and not jurisdiction - res judicata is a matter of defense and does not deprive the trial court of jurisdiction to act on a second suit between the parties on the same subject matter. Same; Same; Scope of former judgment - if the record of the former trial shows that the judgment could not have been rendered without deciding the particular matter, it will be considered as having settled that matter as to all future actions between the parties, and if a judgment necessarily presupposes certain premises, they are as conclusive as the judgment itself. 4. Benin v. Tuason Facts: On May 19, 1955 three sets of plaintiffs filed three separate complaints containing substantiallythe same allegations. In Civil Case No. 3621, the plaintiffs alleged that they were the owners andpossessors of the three parcels of agricultural lands, described in paragraph V of the complaint,located in the barrio of La Loma (now barrio of San Jose) in the municipality (now city) of Caloocan, province of Rizal andthat they inherited said parcels of land from their ancestor Sixto Benin; In Civil Case No. 3622the plaintiffs alleged that they were the owners and possessors of two parcels of agricultural land,described in paragraph V of the complaint, and that these parcels of land were inherited by themfrom their deceased father Bonoso Alcantara. In Civil Case No. 3623, plaintiffs alleged that they are the owners and possessors of a parcel ofagricultural land located in the Barrio of La Loma (now San Jose), municipality of Caloocan,province of Rizal, having an area of approximately 62,481 square meters; that this parcel of landwas inherited by plaintiffs from their ancestor Candido Pili who in turn inherited the same fromhis parents; and they and their predecessors in interest had been in open, adverse and continuouspossession of the same; had said lands declared for taxation purposes. The plaintiffs in these three civil cases uniformly alleged, in their respective complaint, thatsometime in the year 1951 while they were enjoying the peaceful possession of their lands, thedefendants, particularly the defendant J.M. Tuason and Co. Inc., through their agents andrepresentatives, with the aid of armed men, by force and intimidation, using bulldozers and otherdemolishing equipment, illegally entered and started defacing, demolishing and destroying thedwellings and constructions of plaintiffs' lessees, as well as the improvements. They madeinquiries regarding the probable claim of defendants, and in 1953 they

discovered for the firsttime that their lands, as described in their respective complaint, had either been fraudulently or rroneously included, by direct or constructive fraud, in what appears as Parcel No. 1 (known asSanta Mesa Estate) in Original Certificate of Title No. 735 of the Land Records of the provinceof Rizal in the names of the original applicants for registration, now defendants, Mariano SeveroTuason y de la Paz, Teresa Eriberta Tuason y de la Paz, Juan Jose Tuason y de la Paz, DemetrioAsuncion Tuason y de la Paz, and Augusto Huberto Tuason y de la Paz. The plaintiffs in each of the three complaints also alleged that the registered owners had appliedfor the registration of two parcels of land (known as the Santa Mesa Estate and the DilimanEstate; that the registration proceedings were docketed as LRC No. 7681 of the Court of LandRegistration; They allege that the application for registration in LRC No. 7681, containing theboundaries, technical descriptions and areas of parcel No. 1 (Santa Mesa Estate) and parcel No. 2(Diliman Estate) was published in the Official Gazette; that before the decision was handeddown in LRC No. 7681, the area, boundaries and technical descriptions of parcel No. 1 werealtered and amended; that the area of parcel No. 1 as mentioned in Decree No. 17431 is biggerthan the area of parcel No. 1 appearing in the application for registration as published in theOfficial Gazette; that the amendments and alterations, which were made after the publication ofthe original application, were never published; that on March 7, 1914 a decision was rendered inLRC No. 7681 based on the amended plan; that pursuant to the decision of March 7, 1914 adecree of registration was issued on July 6, 1914, known as Decree No. 17431, decreeing theregistration in the names of the applicants of the two parcels of land (Santa Mesa Estate andDiliman Estate). They contend that the decision dated March 7, 1914 in LRC No. 7681 is nulland void because the Land Registration Court had no jurisdiction to render the decision for lackof publication; that Decree No. 17431 issued pursuant to the decision of March 7, 1914 in LRCNo. 7681 is likewise null and void from the beginning, because it was issued pursuant to a voiddecision and that Original Certificate of Title No. 735, referring to parcel 1 (Santa Mesa Estate),is also null and void from the beginning because it was issued pursuant to a void decree ofregistration. The lower court rendered a decision in favor of the plaintiffs. A motion for new trialwas filed by defendant J.M. Tuason & Co., Inc. on January 30, 1965. However, before themotion for new trial was resolved by the court, said defendant, on February 11, 1965, filed a notice of appeal to this Court and an appeal bond, and on February 12, 1965 he filed the recordon appeal.The record on appeal, after it had been corrected and amended, as ordered and/or authorized bythe trial court, was approved on September 29, 1965. Ruling: Land Registration; Amendment to application for registration need not be published anew if the amendment merely excludes portions

covered by the original application - Under Section 23 of Act 496, the registration court may allow, or order, an amendment of the application for registration when it appears to the court that the amendment is necessary and proper. Under Section 24 of the same act the court may at any time order an application to be amended by striking out one or more parcels or by severance of the application. The amendment may be made in the application or in the survey plan, or in both, since the application and the survey plan go together. If the amendment consists in the inclusion in the application for registration of an area or parcel of land not previously included in the original application, as published, a new publication of the amended application must be made. The purpose of the new publication is to give notice to all persons concerned regarding the amended application. Without a new publication the registration court can not acquire jurisdiction over the area or parcel of land that is added to the area covered by the original application, and the decision of the registration court would be a nullity insofar as the decision concerns the newly included land.11 The reason is because without a new publication, the law is infringed with respect to the publicity that is required in registration proceedings, and third parties who have not had the opportunity to present their claim might be prejudiced in their rights because of failure of notice.12 But if the amendment consists in the exclusion of a portion of the area covered by the original application and the original plan as previously published, a new publication is not necessary. 13 In the latter case, the jurisdiction of the court over the remaining area is not affected by the failure of a new publication. Same; Slight increase in area registered over the area contained in the application is not fatal to the decree of registration - We believe that this very slight increase of 27.10 square meters would not justify the conclusion of the lower court that "the amended plan ... included additional lands which were not originally included in Parcel 1 as published in the Official Gazette." It being undisputed that Parcel 1 has an area of more than 8,798,600 square meters (or 879.86 hectares), We believe that this difference of 27.10 square meters, between the computation of the area when the original plan was made and the computation of the area when the amended plan was prepared, cannot be considered substantial as would affect the identity of Parcel 1. Same; Registration Court has no jurisdiction only insofar as areas not covered by original application are added - The settled rule, further, is that once the registration court had acquired jurisdiction over a certain parcel, or parcels, of land in the registration proceedings in virtue of the publication of the application, that jurisdiction attaches to the land or lands mentioned and described in the application. If it is later shown that the decree of registration had included land or lands not included in the original application as published, then the registration proceedings and the decree of registration must be declared null and void in so far — but only in so

3 far — as the land not included in the publication is concerned. Same; Error in the plans does not nullify the decree of registration - We may further observe that underlying the contention of the plaintiffs is the idea that errors in the plans nullify the decrees of registration. This is erroneous. It is the land and not the plan which is registered. Prior to the enactment of Act No. 1875, practically all plans for land registration were defective especially in regard to errors of closures and areas, but so far no such errors have been permitted to affect the validity of the decrees. If the boundaries of the land registered can be determined, the technical description in the certificate of title may be corrected without cancelling the decree. Such corrections have been made in this case by approved surveys which embrace all of the land here in question. To nullify and cancel final decrees merely by reason of faulty technical descriptions would lead to chaos. Same; Full transcription of the decree of registration in the Registration Book though made in a disorderly manner is valid - There is no showing that the manner of transcribing the decree, as it appears on that photostat, was done for a fraudulent purpose, or was done in order to mislead. Considering that the decree of registration is fully transcribed in the Registration Book, and also as copied in Original Certificate of Title No. 735, the circumstance that the beginning of the technical descriptions is not found on the face, or on the first page, of Original Certificate of Title No. 735 is not a ground to nullify the said certificate of title. Same; Purposes of the land Registration Law stated - the purpose of the Land Registration Law (Act 496), which generally are to ascertain once and for all the absolute title over a given landed property31; to make, so far as it is possible, a certificate of title issued by the court to the owner of the land absolute proof of such title32; to quiet title to land and to put a stop forever to any question of legality of title33; and to decree that land title shall be final, irrevocable and indisputable. Same; Remedies of party unlawfully deprived of property through fraudulent registration - It is the settled rule that a party seeking the reconveyance to him of his land that he claims had been wrongly registered in the name of another person must recognize the validity of the certificate of title of the latter. It is also the rule that a reconveyance may only take place if the land that is claimed to be wrongly registered is still registered in the name of the person who procured the wrongful registration. No action for reconveyance can take place as against a third party who had acquired title over the registered property in good faith and for value. And if no reconveyance can be made, the value of the property registered may be demanded only from the person (or persons) who procured the wrongful registration in his name.

Same; Effects of in rem proceedings in land registrations - The proceedings in LRC 7681 being in rem, the decree of registration issued pursuant to the decision rendered in said registration case bound the lands covered by the decree and quieted title thereto, and is conclusive upon and against all persons, including the government and all the branches thereof, whether mentioned by name in the application, notice or citation, or included in the general inscription "To whom it may concern", and such decree will not be opened by reason of the absence, infancy, or other disability of any person affected thereby, nor by any proceedings in any court for reversing judgment or decree. Such decree may only be reopened if any person deprived of land or of any estate or interest therein by decree of registration obtained by fraud would file in the competent court of first instance a petition for review within one year after entry of the decree, provided no innocent purchaser for value had acquired an interest on the land, and upon the expiration of said period of one year, the decree, or the certificate of title issued pursuant to the decree, is incontrovertible (See. 38, Act 496). Same; Mere possession cannot defeat title issued under the Land Registration Act - the possession by the appellees, either by themselves or through their predecessors in interest, if there was such possession at all, would be unavailing against title holder of a Torrens certificate of title covering the parcels Of lands now in question. From July 8, 1914 when Certificate of Title No. 735 was issued, no possession by any person of any portion of the lands covered by said original certificate of title, or covered by a subsequent transfer certificate of title derived from said original certificate of title, could defeat the title of the registered owner of the lands covered by the certificate of title. Same; Titles of purchasers in good faith for value cannot be annulled without due hearing - The buyers of the lots relied upon the certificate of title in the name of J. M. Tuason & Co., Inc. and because they paid for the lots they certainly are purchasers in good faith and for value. The purchasers of these lots have built thereon residential houses, office buildings, shops, hospital, even churches. But the lower court, disregarding these circumstances, declared null and void all transfer certificates of title that emanated, or that were derived, from Original Certificate of Title No. 735. This is a grave error committed by the lower court. And the error is compounded when the lower court ordered appellant J. M. Tuason & Co., Inc. and all those claiming under said appellant, to vacate and restore to the appellees the possession of the parcels of lands that are claimed by them in the present cases. The possessors of the lots comprised within the six parcels of land in question, and who hold certificates of title covering the lots that they bought, are not parties in the present cases, and yet the decision of the lower court would annul their titles and compel them to give up the possession of their properties. To give effect to the decision of the lower court is to deprive persons of their property without due

process of law.44 The decision of the lower court would set at naught the settled doctrine that the holder of a certificate of title who acquired the property covered by the title in good faith and for value can rest assured that his title is perfect and incontrovertible. Judgment; Res Judicata; Elements of Res Judicata In order that the rule of res judicata may apply, the following requisites must be present: (a) the former judgment must be final; (b) it must have been rendered by a court having jurisdiction of the subject-matter and of the parties; (c) it must be a judgment on the merits; and (d) there must be, between the first and the second actions, identity of parties, of subject-matter, and of cause of action (San Diego vs. Cardona, 70 Phil. 281283). Same; Same; Instance where parties though not privies to the prior action are affected by the judgment therein - But granting that the plaintiffsappellants herein are not privies of the defendants Santiago in the former litigation over this same property (S.C.G.R. No. L-5079), still the pronouncement of this Court, made in the former case, to the effect that the Spanish document (Annex A) issued in favor of Ynocencio Santiago (ancestor of appellants herein) was neither a titulo de informacion posesoria nor a title by composicion con el estado, and, therefore, vested no ownership over the land therein described in favor of Ynocencio Santiago, holds and applies to herein appellants, since the quality or the legal effect of the document does not depend upon the person who invoke it. 5. Director of Lands v. IAC Facts: 6. Director of Lands v. IAC and Acme Facts: The Director of Lands has brought this appeal by certiorari from a judgment of the Intermediate Appellate Court affirming a decision of the Court of First Instance of Isabela, which ordered registration in favor of Acme Plywood & Veneer Co., Inc. of five parcels of land measuring 481, 390 square meters, more or less, acquired by it from Mariano and Acer Infiel, members of the Dumagat tribe. The land subjects of the Land Registration proceedings was ancestrally acquired by Acme Plywood & Veneer Co., Inc., on October 29, 1962, from Mariano Infiel and Acer Infiel, both members of the Dumagat tribe and as such are cultural minorities. Ruling: Land Registration; A juridical confirmation proceeding should at most be limited to ascertaining whether the possession claimed is of the required character and length of time as it is not so much one to confer title as it is to recognize a title already vested - Nothing can more clearly demonstrate the logical inevitability of considering possession of public

4 land which is of the character and duration prescribed by statute as the equivalent of an express grant from the State than the dictum of the statute itself 13 that the possessor(s) "... shall be conclusively presumed to have performed all the conditions essential to a Government grant and shall be entitled to a certificate of title .... " No proof being admissible to overcome a conclusive presumption, confirmation proceedings would, in truth be little more than a formality, at the most limited to ascertaining whether the possession claimed is of the required character and length of time; and registration thereunder would not confer title, but simply recognize a title already vested. The proceedings would not originally convert the land from public to private land, but only confirm such a conversion already affected by operation of law from the moment the required period of possession became complete. As was so well put in Carino, "... (T)here are indications that registration was expected from all, but none sufficient to show that, for want of it, ownership actually gained would be lost. The effect of the proof, wherever made, was not to confer title, but simply to establish it, as already conferred by the decree, if not by earlier law." Same; Constitutional Law; The 1973 Constitution cannot impair vested rights, thus where land was acquired in 1962 when corporations were allowed to acquire lands not beyond 1,024 hectares, the same may be registered in 1982 although under 1973 Constitution corporations cannot acquire lands of the public domain - Even on the proposition that the land remained technically "public" land, despite immemorial possession of the Infiels and their ancestors, until title in their favor was actually confirmed in appropriate proceedings under the Public Land Act, there can be no serious question of Acmes right to acquire the land at the time it did, there also being nothing in the 1935 Constitution that might be construed to prohibit corporations from purchasing or acquiring interests in public land to which the vendor had already acquired that type of so-called "incomplete" or "imperfect" title. The only limitation then extant was that corporations could not acquire, hold or lease public agricultural lands in excess of 1,024 hectares. The purely accidental circumstance that confirmation proceedings were brought under the aegis of the 1973 Constitution which forbids corporations from owning lands of the public domain cannot defeat a right already vested before that law came into effect, or invalidate transactions then perfectly valid and proper. This Court has already held, in analogous circumstances, that the Constitution cannot impair vested rights. Same; Same; Same; - The fact, therefore, that the confirmation proceedings were instituted by Acme in its own name must be regarded as simply another accidental circumstance, productive of a defect hardly more than procedural and in nowise affecting the substance and merits of the right of ownership sought to be confirmed in said proceedings, there being no doubt of Acme's entitlement to the land. As it is unquestionable

that in the light of the undisputed facts, the Infiels, under either the 1935 or the 1973 Constitution, could have had title in themselves confirmed and registered, only a rigid subservience to the letter of the law would deny the same benefit to their lawful successor-in-interest by valid conveyance which violates no constitutional mandate. Same; Same; The ruling in Meralco v. CastroBartolome (114 Scra 799) that public land ceases to be so only upon issuance of a certificate of title, is hereby reconsidered and abandoned. Correct rule is that Susi v. Razon 48 Phil 424 - The Court, in the light of the foregoing, is of the view, and so holds, that the majority ruling in Meralco must be reconsidered and no longer deemed to be binding precedent. The correct rule, as enunciated in the line of cases already referred to, is that alienable public land held by a possessor, personally or through his predecessors-in-interest, openly, continuously and exclusively for the prescribed statutory period (30 years under The Public Land Act, as amended) is converted to private property by the mere lapse or completion of said period, ipso jure. Following that rule and on the basis of the undisputed facts, the land subject of this appeal was already private property at the time it was acquired from the Infiels by Acme. Acme thereby acquired a registrable title, there being at the time no prohibition against said corporation's holding or owning private land. The objection that, as a juridical person, Acme is not qualified to apply for judicial confirmation of title under section 48(b) of the Public Land Act is technical, rather than substantial and, again, finds its answer in the dissent in Meralco. Same; Same; Same; Same; - While this opinion seemingly reverses an earlier ruling of comparatively recent vintage, in a real sense, it breaks no precedent, but only reaffirms and re-established, as it were, doctrines the soundness of which has passed the test of searching examination and inquiry in many past cases. Indeed, it is worth noting that the majority opinion, as well as the concurring opinions of Chief Justice Fernando and Justice Abad Santos, in Meralco rested chiefly on the proposition that the petitioner therein, a juridical person, was disqualified from applying for confirmation of an imperfect title to public land under Section 48(b) of the Public Land Act. Reference to the 1973 Constitution and its Article XIV, Section 11, was only tangential limited to a brief paragraph in the main opinion, and may, in that context, be considered as essentially obiter. Meralco, in short, decided no constitutional question. 7. Mindanao v. Director of Lands Facts: Appelllants, heirs of Pelagio Zara filed an application for registration of a parcel of land on August 4, 1960. Their grounds were on the basis on provisions of Act 496 that their grandfather has been granted a Spanish Title and CA 141 Chap 8 Sec. 48, that their predecessor--‐in--‐interest had been in continuous and adverse possession of the

land in the concept of an owner for more than 30 years. Their application was opposed by the Director of Lands and Vicente V. de Villa on the ground that parcel of land had been included in the parcel of land applied for in registration by Vicente de Villa in Civil Case No. 26, L.R. Case No. 601 was adjudicated on September 30, 1949. Ruling: Public Lands; Torrens System; Judgments; Res Judicata; Judicial confirmation of title - should the provisions of the Land Registration Act be not applicable, applicants invoke the benefits of the provisions of Chapter VIII, Section 48, subsection (b) of C.A. 141 as amended, on the ground that they and their predecessor-in-interest had been in continuous and adverse possession of the land in concept of owner for more than 30 years immediately preceding the application. Same; Basis of decree of judicial confirmation of title - The basis of the decree of judicial confirmation authorized therein is not that the land is already privately owned and hence no longer part of the public domain, but rather that by reason of the claimant's possession for thirty years he is conclusively presumed to have performed all the conditions essential to a Government grant. Same; Personality of oppositor – Persons, who claim to be in possession of a tract of public land and who have applied to the Bureau of Lands for its purchase, may oppose its registration under section 48 of the Public Land Law. 8. De Castro v. Marcos Facts: Ruling: Cadastral Law; Cadastral Proceedings; Procedure for re-opening; Publication not required; Inclusion of additional territory in a plan; Effect of absence of new publication upon jurisdiction of cadastral court - The foregoing provision establishes the procedure for reopening cadastral proceedings. Such procedure does not include publication. Neither is publication mentioned in any of the other provisions of Republic Act 931. Section 1 above-quoted merely states that "the competent Court of First Instance, upon receiving such petition, shall notify the Government, through the Solicitor General." About two years back, we held in a case, 5 that under Republic Act 931, it is unnecessary to furnish the Director of Forestry a copy of the reopening petition "inasmuch as said Act [931] only required service thereof to the Solicitor General." Jurisprudence informs us that "[a]n order of court in a cadastral case amending the official plan so as to make it include land not previously included therein is a nullity unless new publication is made as a preliminary to such step" and that "additional territory cannot be included by amendment of the plan without new publication." 6 Upon

5 the other hand, the jurisdiction of a court to issue orders providing for exclusion of land included in the original plan is not affected by failure to order a new publication. Same; Notice to the government of a re-opening petition suffices; Reason; When petition for reopening of cadastral proceeding can successfully be blocked - If a prospective intervenor claims a piece of land by an alleged right that has accrued prior to the institution of the original cadastral case, a proceeding in rem, he is, of course, to be deemed to have received notice thru the publication therein made. If his rights are derived from the government after the land has been declared part of the public domain by the cadastral court, then notice to the government of a reopening petition as provided by law, should suffice. For the government is supposed to take up the cudgels for a public land grantee, or at the very least, notify the latter. It must be remembered that a petition for reopening under Republic Act 931 can successfully be blocked if it is shown that the land involved therein has already "been alienated, reserved, leased, granted or otherwise provisionally or permanently disposed of by the Government. Same; Basis of re-opening of cadastral proceeding in Director of Lands v. Benitez; Explained; Off- shore land could not be the subject of cadastral survey True, Director of Lands vs. Benitez, L-21368, March 31, 1966, ruled that the petition to reopen filed in that case under Republic Act 931, must be published as required in Section I of the Cadastral Act (Act 2259) because such case is still governed by the procedure laid down by the latter law. The Benitez case, however, must be read in its factual context. There, the petition of the Benitez spouses for reopening the cadastral proceedings covering the entire city of Tacloban, was based on the claim that "through oversight, inadvertence and excusable neglect a portion of" 1,805 square meters of Lot 2157 of the land originally registered in the name of petitioners therein "has not been included in the original survey." They prayed that after appropriate proceedings, said portion (designated as Lot No. 1 of the subdivision plan) be adjudicated to them pursuant to Republic Act 931. In fact, back of the Benitez declaration that publication is necessary is jurisprudence heretofore stated, 11 that such publication is required when additional territory is sought to be included in the original plan. Indeed, the record of Benitez in this Court shows that the opposition to the reopening petition is predicated on the averment that the cadastral court did not include the lots in controversy because those lots were "part of the offshore land" and hence, of the public domain which could not be the subject of cadastral survey or of the cadastral case. Same; Legal standing or personality to sue in land registration or cadastral proceedings; Case at bar In an early case, 13 this Court declared that mere citizens could have no interest in public land. At about the same time, this Court also held that to give a party standing in a court of land registration, he must make

some claim to the property. 14Then, in Archbishop of Manila vs. Barrio of Sto. Cristo, 15 this Court pronounced that although an opponent in a land registration proceeding could not show title in himself, he was not discapacitated from opposing the registration sought by another. Plain was the statement there that "[a]ll that is necessary to enable anyone to exert the faculty of opposition is that he should appear to have an interest in the property." And, so this Court added, "it is immaterial whether this interest is in the character of legal owner or is of a purely equitable nature as where he is the beneficiary in a trust." Later, this Court described a homesteader who had not yet been issued his title but who had fulfilled all the conditions required by law, as a person who should be regarded as an equitable owner of the land. 16 Similarly, a purchaser of friar land has an equitable title to the land before the issuance of the patent.17 Pitargue vs. Sorilla,18 laid down the principle that a bona fide applicant of public land may protect his right of possession and sue for forcible entry or unlawful detainer or pursue any suitable remedy provided by law. Indeed, an awardee in a sales application is authorized to take possession of the land to enable him to comply with the requirements of the award before title can be issued. 19 We held in still another case, 20 that a homestead entry segregates the homestead from the public domain and divests the Director of Lands of control and possession thereof except if the homestead application is finally disapproved and the entry annulled or revoked. Recently, we declared that persons who claim to be in possession of a tract of public land and have applied with the Bureau of Lands for its purchase have the necessary personality to oppose registration. 21 We have held, too, that an award under a sales application has "the effect of withdrawing the lands of the public domain that were 'disposable' by the Director of Lands." 22 Under Republic Act 931, the petition for reopening is narrowed down by the specific conditions therein set forth. It bears repetition to say that said petition is possible "only with respect to such of said parcels of land as have not been alienated, reserved, leased, granted or otherwise provisionally or permanently disposed of by the Government." 23 The statute made it abundantly clear that judicial proceedings shall be reopened only, if the cadastral court "shall find that all conditions herein established have been complied with." Thus it is, that the alienation, reservation, lease, grant or any provisional or permanent disposition by the government of the land claimed should suffice to bar reopening. Petitioner Virginia de Castro here, it must be recalled, is an awardee in the public bidding held upon her own township sales application. Of course, the award up to now has not been fully implemented because she has not yet complied with one condition imposed on her. But, if the award is not a permanent disposition, it is at least a provisional one, enough to prevent reopening by respondent Akia as to the land disputed.

Special Civil Action; Certiorari; When courts ordinarily do not deny writ of certiorari - Well it is to remember that "[c]ourts ordinarily do not deny the writ [of certiorari] if the result would be to deprive a party of his substantial rights and leave him without remedy." 9. Valisno v. Plan Facts: Petitioners Flordeliza and Honorio purchased from the legal heirs of Agapita Blanco (Guillermo, Guillermo,Jr., Manuel and Rosario) 2 parcels of land. These lands were located at Sitio Sisim, Brgy. Cabaruan, Isabela. They declared the parcels of land in their name for taxation purposes and exercised exclusive possession in the conceptof owners. They hired Fermin Lozano as caretaker who had his house built thereon. Private respondent Cayaba ousted Lozano from the land and built an apartment thereon. He claimed that he is the owner of the land in question by virtue of a deed of sale executed in his and Bienvenido G. Noriega's favor by the heirs of Dr. Epifanio Q. Verano. Petitioners filed a complaint against private respondent for recovery of possession of the subject lands before the then CFI. The court decided in favor of petitioners who were declared owners thereof. On appeal, the CA reversed the decision of the lower court and dismissed the complaint of petitioners. It ruled that the subject lands is different is different from the land appearing in the Subdivision Plan of the petitioners. The land occupied by the petitioners has not been successfully identified with that described in the complaint, the instant action should have been dismissed outright. Also, it is undisputed that the private respondent is the present occupant of the land since he purchased it from Tomasita F. Verano and that he is the actual possessor of the property, thus he possesses it with a just title and he need not show or prove why he possesses the same. Finally, contrasting the evidence of the respondent and petitioner, the court choose the respondent’s evidence as they were able to provide a vicinity plan that shows the land position in relation to the adjoining properties with known boundaries and landmarks. Petitioner merely presented a sketch prepared by Dr. Blanco constituting as mere guess works. Subsequently, the respondent filed a petition for registration of the property before the CFI which was opposed by the petitioner. Respondent moved for the dismissal of the opposition that the same is barred by a prior judgment of the court. The CFI dismissed the opposition on ground of res judicata thus this appeal before the SC. With the petition given due course by the SC, it orders both parties to submit their briefs. Only the petitioner submitted their own brief within the given period thus the SC considered the case submitted for decision with the

6 brief of the respondent. The petitioner filed a motion to amend the application to include Bienvenido Noriega as a co-applicant to the petition. Ruling: Land Registration; Actions; Practice and Pleadings; In land registration cases, an opposition partakes of the nature of an answer with counterclaim and a motion to dismiss the opposition is not unauthorized as Rules of Court are merely suppletory to such proceedings - Verily, the Land Registration Act [Act 496] does not provide for a pleading similar or corresponding to a motion to dismiss. Rule 132 of the Rules of Court, however, allows the application of the rules contained therein in land registration proceedings in a suppletory character or whenever practicable and convenient. Thus, for the expeditious termination of the land registration case, this Court in Duran v. Oliva, 3 SCRA 154, sustained the dismissal of the application for registration of therein appellants upon a motion to dismiss filed by five [5] oppositors, it having been indubitably shown that the court a quo did not have jurisdiction over the res as the lands sought to be registered in appellants' name had previously been registered in the names of the oppositors. To have allowed the registration proceeding to run its usual course would have been a mere exercise in futility. The same consideration applies to the case at bar. Same; Same; Same; Same - It must be noted that the opposition partakes of the nature of an answer with a counterclaim. In ordinary civil cases, the counterclaim would be considered a complaint, this time with the original defendant becoming the plaintiff. The original plaintiff, who becomes defendant in the counterclaim may either then answer the counterclaim or be declared in default, or may file a motion to dismiss the same. The latter choice was what respondent Cayaba opted for. Although as We have earlier said, such situation rarely, if ever, happens in land registration cases, the irregularity that petitioners complain of stems basically from the infrequent use of a motion to dismiss in land registration cases, and not from it being unauthorized. Same; Same; Judgments; The Doctrine in Abellara v. Farol 74 Phil 284 needs re-evaluation. A final judgment in an ordinary civil case determining ownership of a certain land is res judicata in the land registration case where the parties and the property are identical, including the addition of a party in the registration case where he claims co-ownership There is no doubt that the principle of res judicata operates in the case at bar. For said principle to apply: [a] the former judgment must be final, [b] it must have been' rendered by a court having jurisdiction of the subject matter and of the parties, [c] it must be a judgment on the merits and [d] there must be between the first and second actions identity of parties, of subject matter and of cause of action. [Carandang v. Venturanza, 133 SCRA 344] The decision in CA-G. R. No. 60142-R is a final judgment on the merits rendered by a court which had jurisdiction over the subject matter

and the parties. There is, between the registration case under consideration and the previous civil action for recovery of property, identity of parties, subject matter and cause of action. The inclusion of private respondent Cayaba's co-owner, Bienvenido Noriega, Sr., in the application for registration does not result in a difference in parties between the two cases. One right of a coowner is to defend in court the interests of the coownership. [Paras, Civil Code of the Philippines, Annotated, Vol. II, 7th Edition, p. 258] Thus, when private respondent Cayaba defended his ownership over the land in question, he was doing so in behalf of the coownership. This is evident from the fact that one of the evidence he presented to prove ownership was the deed of sale executed by the heirs of Dr. Epifanio Q. Verano is his and Bienvenido Noriega's favor. 10. Director of Lands v. CA and Valeriano Facts: In their application for registration filed on May 10, 1976, private respondents (Applicants, for brevity) claimed that they are the co-owners in fee simple of the land applied for partly through inheritance in 1918 and partly by purchase on May 2, 1958; that it is not within any forest zone or military reservation; and that the same is assessed for taxation purposes in their names. The Republic of the Philippines, represented by the Director of the Bureau of Forest Development opposed the application on the principal ground that the land applied for is within the unclassified region of Obando, Bulacan, per BF Map LC No. 637 dated March 1, 1927; and that areas within the unclassified region are denominated as forest lands and do not form part of the disposable and alienable portion of the public domain. After hearing, the Trial Court ordered registration of the subject land in favor of the Applicants. This was affirmed on appeal by respondent Appellate Court. Ruling: Civil Law; Land Registration; Regalian Doctrine; Classification of Public Lands, an exclusive prerogative of the Executive Department, not the courts; Absence of classification of land renders the land as unclassified in consonance with the Regalian Doctrine - In effect, what the Courts a quo have done is to release the subject property from the unclassified category, which is beyond their competence and jurisdiction. The classification of public lands is an exclusive prerogative of the Executive Department of the Government and not of the Courts. In the absence of such classification, the land remains as unclassified land until it is released therefrom and rendered open to disposition. 3 This should be so under time-honored Constitutional precepts. This is also in consonance with the Regalian doctrine that all lands of the public domain belong to the State, 4 and that the State is the source of any asserted right to ownership in land and charged with the conservation of such patrimony. Same; Same; Estoppel by State; Non- Presentation of evidence that property within the unclassified

region, will not operate against the State under the rule that the State cannot be estopped by omission, mistake or error of its officials or agents - The recommendation of the District Forester for release of subject property from the unclassified region is not the ultimate word on the matter. And the fact that BF Map LC No. 637 dated March 1, 1927 showing subject property to be within the unclassified region was not presented in evidence will not operate against the State considering the stipulation between the parties and under the wellsettled rule that the State cannot be estopped by the omission, mistake or error of its officials or agents, 6 if omission there was, in fact. Same; Same; Jurisdiction; Torrens System; Land within the jurisdiction of the Bureau of Forest Development is beyond the jurisdiction of the cadastral court to register under the Torrens System - While it may be that the Municipality of Obando has been cadastrally surveyed in 1961, it does not follow that an lands comprised therein are automatically released as alienable. A survey made in a cadastral proceeding merely Identifies each lot preparatory to a judicial proceeding for adjudication of title to any of the lands upon claim of interested parties. Besides, if land is within the jurisdiction of the Bureau of Forest Development, it would be beyond the jurisdiction of the Cadastral Court to register it under the Torrens System. Same; Same; Where the property is still unclassified, possession of applicants, however long, cannot ripen into private ownership - Since the subject property is still unclassified, whatever possession Applicants may have had, and, however long, cannot ripen into private ownership. Same; Same; Conversion of property into fishpond or titling of properties around it, does not automatically render the property as alienable and disposable; Remedy is the release of the property from its being unclassified - The conversion of subject property into a fishpond by Applicants, or the alleged titling of properties around it, does not automatically render the property as alienable and disposable. Applicants' remedy lies in the release of the property from its present classification. In fairness to Applicants, and it appearing that there are titled lands around the subject property, petitioners-officials should give serious consideration to the matter of classification of the land in question. 11. Sunbeam Convenience Foods, Inc. v. CA Facts: On April 29, 1963, the Director of Lands caused the issuance of a Sales Patent in favor of Sunbeam Convenience Foods, Inc., over 2 parcels of land namely Lot 1-Sgs-2409 and Lot 2-Sgs-2409. On May 3, 1963, the aforesaid Sales Patent was registered with the Register of Deeds who in turn issued Original Certificate of Title No. Sp-24 in favor of Sunbeam Convenience Foods, Inc., for the two parcels

7 of land. Subsequently, Original Sp-24 was cancelled and in Certificate of Titles were issued favor of defendant Coral Corporation.

Certificate of Title No. lieu thereof, Transfer over the 2 lots, both in Beach Development

On May 11, 1976, the Solicitor General instituted before the Court of First Instance of Bataan, an action for reversion. SUNBEAM and CORAL BEACH then filed a Motion to Dismiss which was granted by the Court of First Instance. The Solicitor General filed a petition for certiorari in the Court of Appeals. The former alleges that Court of First Instance committed grave abuse of discretion in dismissing the complaint and in not finding that Lots I and 2 are alienable and disposable lands of the public domain. Ruling: Civil Procedure; Petition for Review; Review not a matter of right but of sound judicial discretion; Premises for granting review - A review is not a matter of right but of sound judicial discretion, and is granted only when there are special and important reasons therefore. The following, while neither controlling nor fully measuring the Court's discretion, enumerates the premises for granting a review: (a) When the Court of Appeals has decided a question of substance, not theretofore determined by the Supreme Court or has decided it in a way probably not in accord with law or the applicable decisions of the Supreme Court; and (b) When the Court of Appeals has so far departed from the accepted and usual course of judicial proceedings or so far sanctioned such departure by a lower court as to call for supervision. Same; Motion to Dismiss; Admissions; Filing of a motion to dismiss on the ground of lack of cause of action, carries with it the admission of the material facts pleaded in the complaint - The filing of the Motion to Dismiss the complaint for reversion by SUNBEAM and CORAL BEACH on the ground of lack of cause of action, necessarily carried with it the admission, for purposes of the motion, of the truth of all material facts pleaded in the complaint instituted by the Republic. An important factual issue raised in the complaint was the classification of the lands as forest lands. This material allegation stated in the Republic's complaint' was never denied specifically 9 by the defendants (petitioners herein) SUNBEAM and CORAL BEACH. Same; Certiorari; Certiorari; available only when there is no appeal, speedy or adequate, remedy in the ordinary course of the law - Certiorari is one such remedy. Considered extraordinary, it is made available only when there is no appeal, nor any plain, speedy or adequate remedy in the ordinary course of the law. 15

The long line of decisions denying the petition for certiorari, either before appeal was availed of or specially in instances where the appeal period has lapsed, far outnumbers the instances when certiorari was given due course. The few significant exceptions were: when public welfare and the advancement of public policy dictate; or when the broader interests of justice so require, or when the writs issued are null, 16 or when the questioned order amounts to an oppressive exercise of judicial authority. Land Registration; Public Lands; Land remains unclassified land until it is released therefrom and rendered open to disposition - If it is true that the lands are forest lands, then all these proceedings become moot and academic. Land remains unclassified land until it is released therefrom and rendered open to disposition.10 Our adherence to the Regalian doctrine subjects all agricultural, timber, and mineral lands to the dominion of the State.11 Thus, before any land may be declassified from the forest group and converted into alienable or disposable land for agricultural or other purposes, there must be a positive act from the government. Even rules on the confirmation of imperfect titles do not apply unless and until the land classified as forest land is released in an official proclamation to that effect so that it may form part of the disposable agricultural lands of the public domain. 12. International Hardwood and Veneer Co. v. UP Doctrine: The Philippines relinquished and conveyed its rights over the area to UP. Thus, UP became the owner of the land, subject only to existing concession. Since there is an express proviso on existing concessions, this means that the right of Hardwood as a timber licensee must not be affected, impaired, or diminished; it must be respected BUT insofar as the Government is concerned, all its rights as grantor of the license were effectively assigned, ceded and conveyed to U.P. Having been effectively segregated and removed from the public domain or from a public forest and, in effect, converted into a registered private woodland, the authority and jurisdiction of the Bureau of Forestry over it were likewise terminated. BIR also lost authority to measure the timber cut from the subject area and to collect forestry charges and other fees thereon because of this full transfer. Facts: International Hardwood is engaged in the manufacture, processing, and exportation of plywood. It wasgranted by the Government an exclusive license for 25years expiring on Feb 1985 to cut, collect and remove timber from a timber land in the provinces of Quezon and Laguna. Sometime on 1961, during the effectivity of the License Agreement, the President issued Executive Proclamation No.791. Under this proclamation, certain parcels of land

of the public domain in Quezon and Laguna were withdrawn from sale or settlement and were reserved for the UP College of Agriculture as experiment station for the college. On 1964, still during the effectivity of the License Agreement, RA 3990 was enacted establishing a central experiment station for UP for the colleges of agriculture, veterinary medicine, arts and sciences. Under RA 3990 the land described in Proc. 791 was fully cede to UP, subject to any existing concessions, if any. On the strength of RA 3990, UP demanded from Hardwood: 1. Payment of forest charges due and demandable under the License Agreement to UP, instead of the BIR. 2. That the sale of any timber felled or cut by Hardwood within the land described in RA 3990 be performed by UP personnel. However, despite repeated demands, Hardwood refused to accede to UP’s demands. International Hardwood filed before the CFI a petition for declaratory relief seeking a declaration that UP does NO Thave the right to: 1. Supervise and regulate the cutting and removal of timber and other forest products, 2. Scale, measure and seal the timber cut and/or 3. Collect forest charges, reforestation royalties from Hardwood and/or

fees

and

4.Impose any other duty or burden upon the latter in that portion of its concession covered by a License Agreement, ceded in full ownership to UP by RA 3990. Hardwood also prayed for an injunction and P100,000in damages. UP filed its Answer: 1. Interposed affirmative defenses of improper venue and that the petition states no cause of action 2. Set up counterclaim for payment of forest charges on the forest products cut and felled within the area ceded to UP under RA 3990 CFI DECISION: of Hardwood:

CFI

rendered

judgment

in

favor

1.RA 3990 does not empower UP to scale, measure, and seal the timber cut by International Hardwood within the tract of land and collect the corresponding charges prescribed by NIRC

8 2. Dismissed UP’s counterclaim CA DECISION: Elevated the case to the SC as the case involves purely legal questions. Ruling: Civil Procedure; Declatory Relief - The stipulation of facts and the agreement as to the issues unquestionably satisfy the requisites for declaratory relief: (a) there must be a justiciable controversy; (b) the controversy must be between persons whose interests are adverse; (c) the party seeking declaratory relief must have a legal interest in the controversy; and (d) the issue invoked must be ripe for judicial determination. 7 There is a justiciable controversy where there is an actual controversy, or the ripening seeds of one exists between the parties, all of whom are sui juris and before the court, and that the declaration sought will help in ending the controversy. A doubt becomes a justiciable controversy when it is translated into a claim of right which is actually contested. Public Lands; Forest Lands; Transfer of Ownership; Effect on existing timber license agreements - When it ceded and transferred the property to UP, the Republic of the Philippines completely removed it from the public domain and, more specifically, in respect to the areas covered by the timber license of petitioner, removed and segregated it from a public forest; it divested itself of its rights and title thereto and relinquished and conveyed the same to the UP; and made the latter the absolute owner thereof, subject only to the existing concession. That the law intended a transfer of the absolute ownership is unequivocally evidenced by its use of the word "full" to describe it. Full means entire, complete, or possessing all particulars, or not wanting in any essential quality. 11 The proviso regarding existing concessions refers to the timber license of petitioner. All that it means, however, is that the right of petitioner as a timber licensee must not be affected, impaired or diminished; it must be respected. But, insofar as the Republic of the Philippines is concerned, all its rights as grantor of the license were effectively assigned, ceded and conveyed to UP as a consequence of the above transfer of full ownership. This is further borne out by Section 3 of R.A. No. 3990 which provides, inter alia, that "any incidental receipts or income therefrom shall pertain to the general fund of the University of the Philippines." Same; Same; Same; Jurisdiction of Bureau of Forestry - Having been effectively segregated and removed from the public domain or from a public forest and, in effect, converted into a registered private woodland, the authority and jurisdiction of the Bureau of Forestry over it were likewise terminated. This is obvious from the fact that the condition in Proclamation No. 971 to the effect that the disposition of timber shall be subject to forestry laws and regulations is not reproduced in R.A. No. 3990. The latter does not likewise provide that it is subject to the conditions set forth in the proclamation. An

owner has the right to enjoy and dispose of a thing without other limitations than those established by law.

domain, the rules on confirmation of imperfect title do not apply.

Same; Same; Same; Authority to collect forest charges - As provided for in Article 441 of the Civil Code, to the owner belongs the natural fruits, the industrial fruits and the civil fruits. There are, however, exceptions to this rules, as where the property is subject to a usufruct, in which case the usufructuary gets the fruits. 14 In the instant case, that exception is made for the petitioner as licensee or grantee of the concession, which has been given the license to cut, collect, and remove timber from the area ceded and transferred to UP until 1 February 1985. However, it has the correlative duty and obligation to pay the forest charges, or royalties, to the new owner, the UP, at the same rate as provided for in the Agreement. The charges should not be paid anymore to the Republic of the Philippines through the Bureau of Internal Revenue because of the very nature of the transfer as aforestated.

Same; Same; Same; Same; Positive act of the government needed to declassify land classified as forest - It bears emphasizing that a positive act of government is needed to declassify land which is classified as forest and to convert it into alienable or disposable land for agricultural or other purposes.

13. Republic v. CA Facts: Ruling: 14. Republic v. Bacus Facts: In 1981, Bacus filed an application for the registration of a 496-m2 parcel of land in the CFI of Misamis Occidental. The Republic through the Director of Lands opposed the application on the ground that said land was still a part of the public domain since the land is still part of a public forest. The CFI and CA ruled in favor of Bacus. The CA relied on the certification of City Development Coordinator of Ozamis City, who certified that the subject land was within the commercial-residential zone and the certification of the Register of Deeds of Ozamis City, who certified that the lots near and surrounding the subject land had already been registered in favor of private persons. Ruling: Public Land Law; Forest Lands; Forest Lands are not alienable as such can be the subject of private appropriation only when they are declassified and declared as alienable - There should be no more question at this time that forest lands are not alienable as such and can be the subject of private appropriation only when they are declassified and declared as alienable. As long as they remain forest lands, no court has jurisdiction to order their registration in the name of a private person. Same; Same; Same; Unless and until the land declassified the rules on confirmation of imperfect title do not apply - Unless and until the land classified as "forest" is released in an official proclamation to that effect so that it 'may form part of the disposable agricultural (or commercial/residential) lands of the public

Same; Same; Same; Same; Same; Rule that forest lands or forest reserves are not capable of private appropriation and possession thereof, however long, cannot convert them into private property settled - It is already a settled rule that forest lands or forest reserves are not capable of private appropriation and possession thereof, however long, cannot convert them into private property (Vano v. Government of Philippine Islands, 41 Phil. 11; Adorable v. Director of Forestry, 107 Phil. 401; Director of Forestry v. Muñ;oz, 23 SCRA 11 82; Republic v. De la Cruz, 67 SCRA 221; Director of Lands v. Reyes and Alinsunurin v. Director of Lands, 68 SCRA 177; Republic v. Court of Appeals, 89 SCRA 648; and Director of Lands v. Court of Appeals, 133 SCRA 701) unless such lands are reclassified and considered disposable and alienable by the Director of Forestry, but even then, possession of the land prior to the reclassification of the land as disposable and alienable cannot be credited as part of the thirty-year requirement under Section 48 (b) of the Public Land Act (Director of Lands v. Court of Appeals, supra). Same; Same; Same; Same; Same; The law is clear on who may declassify forest lands and declare them alienable and disposable - The law is equally clear on who may declassify forest lands and declare them alienable and disposable. Act No. 141 provides in no uncertain terms that: Sec. 6. The President, upon the recommendation of the Secretary of Agriculture and Natural Resources, shall from time to time classify the lands of the public domain into: (a)

Alienable or disposable, (b) Timber, and (c) Mineral lands,

and may at any time and in a like manner transfer such lands from one class to another, for the purposes of their administration and disposition. Sec. 7. For the purposes of the administration and disposition of alienable or disposable lands, the President, upon recommendation by the Secretary of Agriculture and Natural Resources, shall from time to time declare what lands are open to disposition or concession under this Act. Same; Same; Same; Same; Same; Same; No valid reason for respondent court to conclude that the subject land was no longer forest land and could be

9 the subject of private appropriation - The respondent court could not have been unaware of the above-quoted cases or of the cited laws which were in force at the time it rendered its decision. There was therefore no valid reason for it to conclude that the subject land was no longer forest land and could be the subject of private appropriation. This ruling had no firmer basis than the certifications made by minor functionaries who had no authority whatever in the classification of public lands. Curiously, they were not even connected with the Bureau of Forest Development. Constitutional Law; Separation of Powers; Under the doctrine of separation of powers, the Courts can only apply the law and have no authority to enact or execute them - Even with the best of motives, the courts of justice have no right to encroach on the prerogatives of the legislative and executive officials as long as it has not been shown that they have acted without or in excess of jurisdiction or with grave abuse of discretion. Judicial intervention, and much less usurpation, cannot be the panacea for every legal problem hopefully brought to us for resolution. Under the doctrine of separation of powers, the courts can only apply the law and have no authority to enact or execute them. The last two functions belong to the political departments of the government and cannot be arrogated by the judiciary.