Keioc P 2 Proof Of Evidence (transport)_doc

Public Inquiry into application for: mixed-use development including a new football stadium, retail, residential and leisure uses on land in Kirkby

Proof of Evidence of KEIOC Campaign (Transport)

Reference: KEIOC/P/2 Planning Inspectorate Reference: APP/V4305/V/08/1203375

December 2008

Contents Page 1.0

General Observations

3

2.0

Requirement of buses for Park & Ride & Local Match Day Services

4

3.0

Train travel

6

4.0

Park and Walk

8

5.0

Taxis

9

6.0

Post Match Congestion

9

7.0

Other Notes

11

8.0

Factors affecting local residents

11

Appendices

2

1.0

General observations

1.1

The basis for assumptions as to supporter travel to games at Goodison Park is a travel survey conducted in regard to Everton v Birmingham City, which took place on Saturday 3rd November 2007. The survey was emailed to supporters on Everton’s database of season ticket holders and individual match ticket purchasers.

1.2

The attendance at this game was 35,155. The survey determined that 72.4% of supporters (25,452) travelled by car, 8.2% (2,882) by bus and coach, and although only 5.8% are listed as travelling by train, it is reasonable to add the further 2.8% arriving by Soccerbus from Sandhills station, making a total of 8.6% (3,023) by train.

1.3

If the same percentages were applied to the projected number of Everton supporters at Kirkby (47,500), this would equate to 34,390 by car, 4,085 by train and 3,895 by us and coach.

1.4

At point 2.3 in TA, Vol 3, the point is made that this survey is unlikely to accurately reflect future spectator travel to a new stadium at Kirkby, due to ‘significant differences between the location of the existing stadium at Goodison and the proposed new stadium in Kirkby’.

1.5

Much of the Transport Assessment is based around Saturday afternoon kick off’s, and the same demographic is used for weekday evening, and Sunday afternoon matches. However, supporters attending these games will create an entirely different dynamic which should have been considered.

1.6

Mr Ellis, in his Proof of Evidence, states that a new stadium for Everton at Kirkby will be as accessible as that at Goodison Park. This is somewhat lower in expectation than the ballot document sent to Everton supporters, which promised ‘the best transport links of any stadium in the North West, perhaps even the country’. I will now consider aspects of the respective modes of transport.

1.7

The figures used by SDG assume that 85% of spectators will wish to leave within the first hour after kick off. Why this figure has been used is not explained, but the effect of it has been used consistently across all modes of transport.

1.8

It is mentioned that Corporate spectators will be encouraged or may wish to remain in the stadium until traffic clears. It is reasonable to assume these form part of the 15% remaining, but they will mostly have travelled by car and will be corporate spectators should have been excluded from the calculations for public transport and Park and Ride/Walk. This would take the ‘first hour’ figure for these modes closer to 92%, and place a further burden upon a system that cannot cope at 85%.

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2.0

Requirement of buses for Park & Ride and ‘Local Match Day Services’

2.1

A total of 18,550 spectators are forecast to use the Park and Ride and new Local Matchday services. Using the 85% in the first hour figure, this means that 8,500 Park & Ride and 7,267 using local bus services.

2.2

In the Proposed New Matchday Services indicated at Table 9.5 in the Transport Assessment, using a load factor of 60 passengers per bus, the projected number of journeys in the first hour – 87 – would only allow 5,220 passengers to depart. This number of journeys includes buses on local routes within Kirkby to make three journeys per hour, which would appear to be optimistic given that Valley Road and Whitefield Road will be closed for significant periods in the post match hour, resulting in congestion and limited access to the bus station. Even assuming the buses can make the expected number of journeys, there will still be 2,047 remaining, plus the remaining 15% who for some reason wish to remain in the area, making a total of 3,330 still waiting to catch buses over an hour later – a requirement of a further 56 bus journeys taking a further 40 minutes to clear.

2.3

The volume of buses assigned to the ‘Blue’ routes – 9 buses making 3 journeys each taking 20% of local bus service users does not seem proportionate to the number of season ticket holders in the zones covered by those routes (see below).

2.4

The proposed Westvale bus park has 30 loading bays. 15 will need to be allocated to the 15 local bus routes, leaving 15 to service the Park and Ride sites, which will also need to be allocated by specific car parks for each bay. Using the same 10 minutes frequency (6 per hour) for departures (allowing for bus manoeuvring), this means that the handling capacity of these bays is: 15 bays x 6 per hour x 60 passengers = 5,400 per hour If the frequency could be increased to 8 minutes, the calculation would be: 15 x 7.5 x 60 = 6750 per hour

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2.5

With 8,500 passengers projected to want to use the Park and Ride in the first hour, this means that at a 10 minute frequency, there would be 3,100 still waiting at the end of the first hour, with a further 1,500 (the 15% hanging around) to join them. At the same frequency, it would take a further 50 minutes to clear them: 3,100 + 1,500 = 4,600 / 60 = 77 journeys /15 bays = 5 per bay @ 10 minutes = 50 min At eight minute frequency, it would be 4,600 / 60 = 77 /15 = 5 * 8 = 40 minutes

2.5

It is simply unrealistic to project continuing full attendances if people are expected to wait over 90 minutes after the first buses leave (NOTE: not 90 minutes after final whistle) before even beginning the journey home.

2.6

The ability of the local bus companies to provide buses to meet the Park and Ride and Matchday bus services requires further examination. I am aware that letters from Arriva and Stagecoach are appended to Mr Ellis’s evidence, which state they are able to fulfil matchday operations. However, the prematch requirement for evening kick-off’s requires further clarification.

The Addendum to Document 9.1:Volume 3, at point 10.23 concludes: “There are sufficient buses available for weekday evening and Saturday afternoon matches. However, these uses will only become available after the end of the evening peak. The buses required for prematch weekday evening matches and pre-match Saturday afternoons will need to be carefully managed around the commuter and weekend peaks” 2.6

Data tables show the size of respective bus fleets, and assumptions are made with regard to the number of available buses from the total fleet. I wrote to both Arriva and Stagecoach to ask what percentage of their available bus fleet would be available in the crucial time bands pre-match.

2.7

Stagecoach confirmed that 98% of their available fleet are in use during the period 6pm to 6.30pm, with 80% available between 6.30 and 7pm. Arriva also confirmed the 98% figure in the first period, with 95% still in use after 6.30pm. *** I have written to both Arriva and Stagecoach again to clarify the letters appended to Joe Ellis’s evidence and I await their replies ***

5

Available

2.8

18:30

Operator

Total Fleet

Fleet

18:00 to 18:30

19:00

Arriva

673

639

13

32

Stagecoach

172

155

3

32

Total

845

794

16

64

to

Another consideration is that 20% of the post match matchday service buses in the first hour are allocated to Blue Routes i.e. 3 routes, with a post match frequency of 6 minutes, using 9 buses each making 3 trips: 3 routes x 6 per hour = 18 journeys @ 60 passengers = 1080 Total first hour passengers all routes = 5220 1080 /5220% = 20.7%

2.9

A glance at the season ticket holder (STH) map in Fig 9.11 of the Transport Assessment shows clearly that the areas covered by the Blue Routes do not constitute anywhere near 20% of the STH’s. Consequently, there will be buses departing frequently, but not full, whilst others are waiting for up to 1 hour 45 minutes.

3.0

Train travel

3.1

In his Proof of Evidence, Mr Ellis states that ‘the good train service from Liverpool Central to Kirkby will be a very attractive means of transport for supporters’

3.2

Whether a service which can operate to a maximum of 4 trains per hour, due the restriction of a single track for both directions into and out of Kirkby station, could be considered a ‘good’ service is debatable.

3.3

I have already mentioned above that the figures for the matchday travel survey for Goodison, conducted in 2007, when applied to the projected attendance for Kirkby would see NO increase in rail travel, despite Mr Ellis’s assertion that ‘the new stadium provides an opportunity to provide new public transport facilities from the outset to encourage a shift away from the private car and towards more sustainable modes’.

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3.4

It is inconceivable that car usage would fall from 72% to 55%, yet train usage would not increase at all. Of course, the problem that any significant increase in rail travel would highlight is the lack of capacity on the line. Only 4,000 passengers per hour can be accommodated, and if Kirkby residents and current users of the line are included in the figures, then those wanting to travel by train might be waiting up to 90 minutes after the final whistle to board.

3.5

For evening kick-off’s, with the last train leaving at 11.18pm, it may not be possible to load all the passengers in time to meet the last train. Assuming the first 1,000 passengers arrive at the station some 20 minutes after the final whistle (unless they leave early, a la Emirates), they might just be in time to catch the 10.18 if they hurry. If not, there would be more spectators than available train capacity. In any event, there is little margin for error – if 5,500 people decided to travel by train, some wouldn’t get home from an evening kick off by the same mode.

3.6

Mr. Ellis makes reference to current train use at Goodison Park, and mentions that spectators make use of Kirkdale and Sandhills stations. He has omitted to mention Bankhall station, providing a third option. This big difference with these stations when compared to Kirkby is that they have trains moving in both directions, and on multiple services, thus enabling rapid dispersal of passengers. Trains per hour Kirkby 4 Bankhall 8 Kirkdale 16 Sandhills 24

3.7

As a consequence, there is no requirement for rail users to queue in car parks for over an hour, no need for police controlled crowd marshalling. Perhaps, instead of showing pictures of rail users at Sunderland and Aintree racecourse, as an excellent illustration of how spectators are well served by rail use, Mr. Ellis could have shown pictures of train users who have attended a game at Goodison Park, and any suggestion that Kirkby is in anyway comparable are ludicrous.

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4.0

Park and Walk

4.1

As the Transport Assessment has evolved, the percentage of mode share has been amended, most notably the huge increase in perceived use of ‘Park and Walk’ by introducing additional Parking at Kirkby Industrial Estate, up from 1,700 vehicles to 3,700 vehicles. The premise for this assumption is that PPG13 quotes that people are willing to walk up to 2 miles (40 minutes) and that people will choose to walk to their cars rather than queue for buses to Park and Ride sites. I can find no mention in PPG13 that people are willing to walk up to 2 miles, although there is a passage as follows:

“75. Walking is the most important mode of travel at the local level and offers the greatest potential to replace short car trips, particularly under 2 kilometres. Walking also forms an often forgotten part of all longer journeys by public transport and car.” 4.2

In 2006, the National Travel Survey found that the average distance walked when part of a bus or car journey was just 0.2 miles, or 0.4 miles when part of a rail journey. Of journeys, which were entirely walking, the average was 0.6 miles, and only 4% were over 2 miles. 25% of respondents NEVER walk more than 20 minutes in a whole year.

4.3

It therefore questions the assumption that a very significant number ofspectators would be willing to walk up to 40 minutes each way to their car.

4.4

The assumption that car usage will drop to 55% appears to be arbitrary, and based upon the fact that a combination of the rigidly enforced CPZ, and lessconvenient Park and Walk and Park and Ride schemes will discourage drivers and divert them to public transport. This would be a convincing theory if public transport provision was being enhanced to be fast and convenient.

4.5

Unfortunately, the proposed arrangements will be neither fast, nor convenient. The likely effect of this is not to force car-driving spectators on to public transport, but to discourage them from attending at all.

4.6

No studies or surveys appear to have been carried out to canvass opinion from supporters as to whether the assumptions, which have been made for Kirkby, are realistic.

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5.0

Taxis

5.1

It should be noted that whilst spectators travelling to the stadium pre match will be able to use the large fleet of Liverpool licensed taxis, these will not be available in the post-match period, as Liverpool taxis are only allowed to pick up within the City area.

6.0

Post Match Congestion

6.1

In his evidence, Mr Ellis comments, at 2.18, that ‘.there is some congestion at peak times at a

number of junctions. However, this congestion is limited in both coverage and duration.’ 6.2

At 2.42 he states that ‘during the closure of Valley Road, and indeed for the hour before and

after a major event at the stadium, there will be some inconvenience, but this will be of a short duration…’. 6.3

In Document 9.1 Vol 8 Transport - Other Matters it is stated that:

‘Although it is probably correct to say that those spectators using trains, buses, walking and cycling will be away from Kirkby in an hour, and that most car borne spectators will also be in their cars and on their way from Kirkby, it is somewhat imprecise to assume 85% of car borne spectators will be on the strategic network within one hour after the final whistle’ 6.4

Tables are shown to indicate post match vehicle departure at junctions 4 and 6 of the M57 motorway.

6.5

The figures are represented in percentage form but no figures are given as to the actual number of vehicles expected to use the junctions. It would be useful to know how many vehicles are actually represented by the figure of 45% of Park & Walk still using junction 4 after 6pm.

6.6

The assessment of congestion at Hall Road/Cherryfield Drive/Vally Road/Kirkby Row, as described at 2.27 and the table 2.7, which shows that there would be a vehicle queue of 156 cars at Cherryfield Drive. At 2.28, Mr. Ellis states that ‘… Cherryfield Drive is likely to experience queuing during the post match hour…’ and ‘Over time, many of the corporate guests will be accustomed to the queuing and alter their departures accordingly’. Closer inspection of the results from the Arcady 6 program, which are appended to Volume 8 shows that the 156 vehicle queue actually occurs at 6.15 pm – around 1 hour 20 minutes post match, with 116 vehicles still in the queue at 6.30.

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6.7

Mr. Ellis states that the queue will actually begin in the multi-storey car park, and stretch all the way to the roundabout. To put this into perspective, this is a queue of almost 900 metres at 6.15pm and 667metres at 6.30pm. For an evening kick off, these times would be 11.15pm and 11.30pm.

6.8

We have already heard that very little, if any, study has been made into the likely take up of corporate facilities at the new stadium, and we know that EFC currently have capacity in 9 of 11 lounges at Goodison. If corporate guests at the new stadium are going to be inconvenienced to this extent, what are the implications for take up of these facilities? It’s one thing to have an option to stay after a game, and another to be effectively forced to do so by traffic conditions. For evening matches, it’s fair to assume the corporate guests will have work the following morning, and beginning their journey home at 11.30pm will not be a positive factor.

6.9

In conclusion: In the summary of his evidence, Mr Ellis states:

‘Based on the evidence it is my view that a new stadium for Everton Football Club at Kirkby will be as accessible as that at Goodison Park.’ 6.9

Quite which criteria have been used for the basis of this assertion is not clear, but there is no question that: 1. Rail travel is less convenient than Goodison 2. There is a need for a huge bus scheme for Kirkby, which is not required for Goodison 3. Journey times for most spectators will increase considerably 4. Congestion in the local area will be more severe, and last longer

6.10

Given that a central premise to the relocation of Everton Football Club is to increase revenue by increasing attendance, the Transport Plan will serve only to discourage spectators, rather than encourage increased attendance. Football is largely a winter sport, and people will not be inclined to walk long distances or queue for transport in the open in cold, inclement weather.

6.11

Much is made of improved sightlines, better stadium facilities such as toilets and catering. However, the matchday experience begins when leaving work and ends when arriving home. If a large part of that experience proves unpleasant, fans will not come back and the objectives of the stadium will not be met.

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7.0

Other Notes

7.1

With regard to PPS6, Mr Ellis, in his summary of the topic, states that

‘the development is in, and on the edge of, an existing town centre, accessible by a choice of means of transport, provides significant enhancements to the accessibility of the location, reduces the need to travel by car and significantly reduces the travel distance by car for Kirkby residents, all in accordance with Government policy set out in PPS6’ 7.2

Whether this is correct in terms of the retail aspects is open to argument, and is part of the criteria for the Inquiry. However, with stadium capacity set at a level higher then the entire population of Kirkby, it is clear this is an out of town development in regard to where the users of the stadium actually live.

7.3

At 8.15 he clarifies the standards for parking as defined by PPG13 – to promote sustainable transport choices, reduce the landtake of development, enable schemes to fit into central urban sites, promote linked-trips and access to development for those without use of a car. Contrast this to the comments in the Design Review Assessment by KMBC and submitted by LCC which pretty much contradict all of that. He states at 8.34 that in his view the proposal accords with PPG13 and he needs to be questioned about that.

8.0

Factors affecting local residents

8.1

Little consideration appears to have been given to the effect on local residents who may wish to use the transport facilities on match days. Car parking at Kirkby station will be unavailable, anyone wishing to use trains, buses or taxis in the post match hour will find them full, and the road will be congested or closed for periods. People wishing to attend evening visiting at Fazakerly hospital will be severely hampered, with all modes of transport presenting difficulties. Residents who work in Liverpool City Centre will find their journey home extremely uncomfortable when matches are taking place at the stadium.

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