Katrine Thesis For Review - July 2004

The Art of Manoeuvring in Changing Rules of Traffic

CONTENTS 1

INTRODUCTION ........................................................................................................5

1.1

The new Vietnamese NGOs................................................................................................6

1.2

Research question................................................................................................................7

1.3

Reader’s guide – structure of the report ..............................................................................8

2

METHODOLOGY.....................................................................................................10

2.1

Research design.................................................................................................................10

2.2

Analytical approach...........................................................................................................10

2.3 The empirical research process .........................................................................................13 2.3.1 Primary qualitative data collection – interviews and case-studies ............................14 2.3.2

Primary quantitative data collection – the questionnaire survey...............................16

2.3.3

Secondary data collection..........................................................................................16

3

CONTEMPORARY CONCEPTUALISATIONS OF CIVIL SOCIETY AND NGOS .17

3.1

Background for the current debate and delineation of my position ..................................17

3.2

Defining civil society ........................................................................................................19

3.3

Civil society organisations and NGOs ..............................................................................21

3.4

Development abilities associated with civil society and NGOs........................................22

3.5

Wrapping up contemporary conceptualisations of civil society and NGOs .....................24

4

INSTITUTIONAL AND STRATEGIC THEORY .......................................................25

4.1 Defining institutions..........................................................................................................25 4.1.1 Regulative institutions...............................................................................................26 4.1.2

Normative institutions ...............................................................................................26

4.1.3

Cognitive institutions ................................................................................................27

4.1.4

Combining the three institutional elements...............................................................28

4.1.5

Activities and resources ............................................................................................29

4.2 Explaining institutional change.........................................................................................29 4.2.1 Institutions as process................................................................................................30 4.2.2

Co-existing institutions .............................................................................................30

4.2.3

Interrelating institutional elements............................................................................31 1

The Art of Manoeuvring in Changing Rules of Traffic 4.3

Survival and Legitimacy ...................................................................................................31

4.4

Strategic responses to institutional processes....................................................................33

4.5

Wrapping up institutional and strategic theory .................................................................36

5

THE VIETNAMESE SOCIO-POLITICAL CONTEXT ..............................................37

5.1

The party-state and the role of the communist party.........................................................37

5.2 The reform policy of doi moi and the reform process.......................................................39 5.2.1 The reform policy of doi moi ....................................................................................39 5.2.2

The dynamics of the reform process .........................................................................40

5.2.3

The nature of state-society relations and the concept of fence-breaking ..................41

5.3 Characteristics of and conditions for contemporary civic activity....................................43 5.3.1 Characteristics of the civic sector..............................................................................43 5.3.2

The legal framework for civic activity......................................................................44

5.3.3

Human and financial resources .................................................................................46

5.4 6

Summing up – the Vietnamese socio-political context.....................................................47 THE VIETNAMESE NGOS ......................................................................................49

6.1 Overview of the Vietnamese NGOs..................................................................................49 6.1.1 Time of establishment ...............................................................................................49 6.1.2

Legal basis and registration.......................................................................................49

6.1.3

Background of founders and directors ......................................................................50

6.1.4

Organisational structure and staffing ........................................................................51

6.1.5

Organisational identity ..............................................................................................52

6.1.6

Activities and funding ...............................................................................................53

6.1.7

Networking with other Vietnamese NGOs ...............................................................54

6.2 Introduction to the case-organisations...............................................................................54 6.2.1 Vietnamese NGO X - VNGO-X ...............................................................................55 6.2.2

Vietnamese NGO Y - VNGO-Y ...............................................................................55

6.2.3

Vietnamese NGO Z - VNGO-Z ................................................................................56

7 HOW DO THE VIETNAMESE NGOS MANOEUVRE IN RELATION TO INTEREST GROUPS IN THEIR IMMEDIATE ENVIRONMENT? .....................................................58 7.1 Relations to the party-state................................................................................................58 7.1.1 Vietnamese NGO X - VNGO-X ...............................................................................59 2

The Art of Manoeuvring in Changing Rules of Traffic 7.1.2

Vietnamese NGO Y - VNGO-Y ...............................................................................60

7.1.3

Vietnamese NGO Z - VNGO-Z ................................................................................61

7.1.4

Discussion of findings - how the Vietnamese NGOs manoeuvre in relation to the

party-state ..................................................................................................................................63 7.2 Relations to international aid agencies..............................................................................66 7.2.1 Vietnamese NGO X - VNGO-X ...............................................................................67 7.2.2

Vietnamese NGO Y -VNGO-Y ................................................................................67

7.2.3

Vietnamese NGO Z - VNGO-Z ................................................................................68

7.2.4

Discussion of findings – strategic use of relations with international aid agencies ..69

7.3 Relations to other Vietnamese NGOs ...............................................................................70 7.3.1 Vietnamese NGO X - VNGO-X ...............................................................................71 7.3.2

Vietnamese NGO Y - VNGO-Y ...............................................................................71

7.3.3

Vietnamese NGO Z - VNGO-Z ................................................................................72

7.3.4

Discussion of findings – strategic use of relations with other Vietnamese NGOs ...72

7.4 Discussion - how do the Vietnamese NGOs manoeuvre in relation to interest groups in their immediate environment?.......................................................................................................73 8 TO WHICH DEGREE DO THE VIETNAMESE NGOS GAIN RECOGNITION AS INDEPENDENT CIVIC ACTORS?..................................................................................78 8.1 Institutional change, legitimacy and institutionalisation of the Vietnamese NGOs .........79 8.1.1 The legal basis of the Vietnamese NGOs - and regulative institutions.....................79 8.1.2

Roles and functions of the Vietnamese NGOs - and normative institutions.............81

8.1.3

The concept of NGO - and cultural cognitive institutions ........................................83

8.2 Summing up – to which degree do the Vietnamese NGOs gain recognition as independent civic actors? ..............................................................................................................86 9 WHAT ARE THE CHARACTERISTICS AND DEVELOPMENT ABILITIES OF THE VIETNAMESE NGOS? ...................................................................................................88 9.1 What are the characteristics of the Vietnamese NGOs? ...................................................89 9.1.1 The question of independence from the state............................................................89 9.1.2

The question of separation from the market..............................................................90

9.1.3

The question of being directly representative of the poor.........................................91

9.2 What are the development abilities of the Vietnamese NGOs? ........................................92 9.2.1 The ability to innovate...............................................................................................92 9.2.2

The ability to reach the poor .....................................................................................93 3

The Art of Manoeuvring in Changing Rules of Traffic 9.2.3

The ability to empower the poor ...............................................................................94

9.3 Summing up – what are the characteristics and development abilities of the Vietnamese NGOs?…………………………………………………………………………………………...95 10 CONCLUSION .........................................................................................................97

4

The Art of Manoeuvring in Changing Rules of Traffic

1 Introduction The topic of this thesis is inspired by two broad themes, namely, the increasing focus on civil society and NGOs in the international development debate in the 1990s and the reform process of doi moi in Vietnam.1 In the past decade, civil society and NGOs have increasingly attracted the interest of development scholars and practitioners around the world. Aside from reflecting disappointment with previously applied development strategies, the new focus reflects a change in the consensus about what development actually is and how it can be achieved. This is aptly captured in the quote by UN Secretary General Kofi Annan: “The United Nations once dealt only with Governments. By now we know that peace and prosperity cannot be achieved without partnerships involving

Governments,

international

organisations,

the

business

community and civil society. In today’s world we depend on each other” (UNDP 2000). Civil society is thus ascribed an increasingly important role in the development process and hoping to further a process of development in the third world, aid agencies around the globe are developing strategies to support local civil society. In Vietnam, society is organised within the structures of an all-encompassing party-state with the Communist Party of Vietnam (CPV) at the core controlling a large and bureaucratic state administration and an elaborate structure of mass-organisations.2 Following the line of Marxist thinking, this comprehensive system, which reaches from central level to the local levels, is supposed to embody and mediate between different interest groups in society. According to the official conviction, the mass-organisations and other official interest groups organised under the umbrella of the Vietnam Fatherland Front (VFF) constitute the only imaginable and acceptable structure for organised civic activity in Vietnam. 1

I am aware of the confusion relating to the definition of the concepts of “civil society” and “NGO” and that NGOs are often - mistakenly - perceived to constitute civil society although they are only part of civil society. I shall come back to this in more detail in chapter 3 on contemporary conceptualisations of civil society and its organisations. 2 Mass-organisations is the term used to connote the officially mandated popular organisations such as for example Women’s Union, Farmers’ Union, The Labour Union etc. See chapter 5 for more about the mass-organisations.

5

The Art of Manoeuvring in Changing Rules of Traffic

Thus, when years of isolation from the non-communist world came to an end in the early 1990s and international donors and international NGOs (INGOs) entered the stage, the Vietnamese authorities ascribed the mass-organisations the role as “Vietnamese NGOs”. Due to the restrictive official Vietnamese policies, international donors and INGOs working at the local levels must work through the existing structures of mass-organisations and local authorities. While the reform process of doi moi (literally meaning “renovation”) officially introduced in 1986 has led to a loosening of CPV control over society, the issue of independent civic activity and local NGOs continues to be a politically sensitive one.

1.1 The new Vietnamese NGOs During a brief visit to Vietnam in the fall of 2000, I was therefore surprised to find that a discernible group of organisations - engaging in development activities with funding from international aid agencies, claiming to be independent and referring to themselves as NGOs - had emerged in Hanoi. When I worked in Hanoi in 1997-98 there was a large number of international NGOs and a couple of local charity organisations, but I never heard any talk of Vietnamese NGOs – aside from the existing mass-organisations mentioned above. So the formal existence of Vietnamese NGOs engaging in officially sanctioned development activities - although established and run outside the official structures - sounded like a contradiction in terms in my ears, I simply did not think it was possible. However, re-visiting Hanoi regularly since I left in 1998 I have observed how the reform process continuously stimulates visible and significant changes in Vietnamese society. People’s creativity and entrepreneurial spirit is great and although the leadership retains the right to clamp down on any kind of dubious activity there is great scope for experimentation. I also found that the new international consensus referred to earlier had reached international aid agencies operating in Vietnam and I noted a much increased interest among the international organisations to work with more independent local organisations including the new Vietnamese NGOs. I found that the knowledge about the new Vietnamese NGOs was limited although opinions were many. While some observers considered them first signs of an emerging civil society others were sceptical about the purpose as well as the real autonomy of the Vietnamese NGOs. In my initial talks with Vietnamese and foreign observers, a number of questions relating 6

The Art of Manoeuvring in Changing Rules of Traffic to the new Vietnamese NGOs were raised. “Why and how have they emerged? Are they really not-for profit? What are their characteristics? Are they really independent? How can they emerge and operate in an environment, which does not officially permit NGOs? Will they gain official recognition? If so, how? And what role will they be expected to play in the development process? Are they a sign of an emerging civil society? If so, what is their civic potential and how may they be included in international development co-operation as part of a civil society support strategy?”

1.2 Research question Thus inspired I set out to explore the following research question: How does the reform process of doi moi create space for the emergence of Vietnamese NGOs and can the Vietnamese NGOs be seen as a sign of an emerging civil society? Based on my pre-understanding of Vietnamese society and the dynamic nature of the reform process, I feel inclined to seek the answer to the first part of the question by examining how the Vietnamese NGOs manoeuvre in relation to their environment and contemplate whether their manoeuvres in turn create space for independent civic activity. To guide this examination I propose the following two working questions: 1.a How do the Vietnamese NGOs manoeuvre in relation to interest groups in their immediate environment? 1.b To which degree do the Vietnamese NGOs gain recognition as independent civic actors? In order to answer the second part of the research question I propose a reflective discussion of the following question: 2. What are the characteristics and development abilities of the Vietnamese NGOs? The research question and the related working questions are based on two fundamental views or assumptions:

7

The Art of Manoeuvring in Changing Rules of Traffic Overall I view the Vietnamese NGOs as part of “the civic sector” as opposed to for example “the public sector” or “the market sector”. I assume that the Vietnamese NGOs are influenced by but not passive products of their environment. According to this view the Vietnamese NGOs have the ability to - more or less consciously – respond to and shape their environmental conditions. The reform process in Vietnam and the notions of civil society and NGOs provide the thematic background for the study. The thesis is of an explorative character seeking to throw light on the dynamics of the reform process generally and to develop our specific understanding of the new social phenomenon - the Vietnamese NGOs - emerging in the course of the reform process. With this brief introduction to the research questions and the underlying assumptions, I shall now move on to outline the structure of the report.

1.3 Reader’s guide – structure of the report After this initial introduction of the issues treated in the report, I will continue by explaining the methodology used for the report in chapter 2. This chapter describes the research design and the analytical approach. This includes an introduction to the key concepts and ideas from the theoretical framework, which is also made operational for the analysis. It also accounts for the data collection methods used during my fieldwork. Chapter 3 provides an introduction to the concepts of civil society and NGOs. This includes an introduction to the key characteristics and development abilities commonly associated with civil society and NGOs in the contemporary literature. Chapter 4 outlines the overall theoretical framework of the thesis. This includes an account of the two theoretical approaches combined in the thesis: neo-institutional theory and strategic theory. An introduction to the Vietnamese socio-political context; the dynamics of the reform process and the characteristics of and conditions for civic activity in Vietnam follows in chapter 5.

8

The Art of Manoeuvring in Changing Rules of Traffic Having introduced the context in which the VNGOs emerge, chapter 6 follows with an overview of the VNGOs and their characteristics. Here I also introduce the three VNGOs which are used as case-studies and which constitute the empirical core of the thesis. Chapter 7 contains the core of the analysis where I examine and analyse how the VNGOs manoeuvre in relation to interest groups in their immediate environment - answering working question 1a. This provides a background for the discussion of the degree to which the VNGOs gain recognition as independent civic actors that follows in chapter 8, which answers working question 1b. In the second part of the analysis presented in chapter 9 I discuss the characteristics and development abilities of the VNGOs - answering working question 2. Chapter 10 presents the final conclusion - summing up the three working questions and answering the overall research question. Finally in chapter 11 I reflect upon further academic and practical concerns this study has raised.

9

The Art of Manoeuvring in Changing Rules of Traffic

2 Methodology[krp1] Having introduced what I look at in this study I shall now seek to clarify how I do it. I initially introduce the research design chosen for this study. Then I account for the analytical approach and make the theoretical frame operational for analysis. I go on to account for the empirical research process.

2.1 Research design The overall purpose of this thesis is to explore how the dynamics of the reform process in Vietnam is creating space for the emergence of the Vietnamese NGOs (VNGOs) and to contemplate whether the VNGOs can be understood as a sign of an emerging civil society. The character of Vietnamese civil society generally and the VNGOs specifically are little researched topics and the knowledge among international as well as Vietnamese observers about the VNGOs is somewhat anecdotal and opinionated. The purpose of this study is therefore to develop a less opinionated and more explicitly theoretically informed understanding of the VNGO-phenomenon. Based on the limited pre-existing knowledge about of the VNGOs, I have chosen an explorative research design seeking to describe and develop an understanding of a new social phenomenon that has emerged in the reform era, namely the VNGOs. I apply theory in an eclectic and explorative way which indirectly serves as a way of expanding our frame of reference for understanding the VNGOs. At the core of this study are in-depth-studies of three VNGOs, through which I seek to provide an in-depth understanding of the new social phenomenon. However, aware of the critique commonly raised against the case-study that it lacks generalisability and validity, I have made an informed selection of the case-organisations and I support the case-studies with a broader sample of qualitative and quantitative data (see section 2.3), which adds breadth to the study.

2.2 Analytical approach Based on the overall question about the emergence of the Vietnamese NGOs and civil society contemporary literature on civil society and NGOs is included to provide the overall thematic background of the study. However, in relation to the questions of how the VNGOs emerge and 10

The Art of Manoeuvring in Changing Rules of Traffic gain recognition, I do not find that the literature on civil society and NGOs helps us develop an understanding of the dynamics of the reform process in contemporary Vietnam, so for this purpose I combine institutional and strategic theory. In the following sections I will outline the analytical approach applied in the first part of the analysis, which includes working questions 1a and 1b and then move on to describe the second part of the analysis, which includes working question 2. Working question 1a and 1b: A combined institutional and strategic analytic frame While institutional theory draws our attention to the importance of the context in which organisations emerge and operate, it has a strong structural bias and its major weakness is the rather deterministic view it offers with regard to the ability of organisations to act strategically in relation to their environment. However, by focusing on institutional change and acknowledging the existence of co-existing and interrelating institutions I adopt a more dynamic approach. To make the dynamic approach operational, I combine institutional theory with strategic theory. Where institutional theorists stress conformity, strategic theorists stress the organisational necessity of adapting to environmental uncertainty by use of active strategic management of interdependencies and resources (Oliver 1991, p. 148).3 The strategic theory thus makes us aware of a range of strategic responses that organisations may employ in response to the institutional processes that affect them (Oliver 1991, p. 145). Furthermore, institutional and strategic theory provides us with the ideas of legitimacy and a collective audience which help us focus on important institutional actors – which may be referred to as interest groups in the immediate environment of the VNGOs. It provides us with a more concrete understanding of how institutional pressures are exerted, namely through relations with interest groups in the immediate environment of the VNGOs.

3

The specific strand of strategic theory applied for the purpose of this study is resource dependence theory. However, for simplicity I refer to it simply as strategic theory.

11

The Art of Manoeuvring in Changing Rules of Traffic The primary relation examined is that between the VNGOs and the official system also referred to as The party-

the party-state. I view the character of this relation as one in which; the VNGOs are influenced by

state

institutional pressures emanating more or less explicitly from institutional actors within the party-

International aid agencies

Institutional pressures

Strategic responses

state; the VNGOs respond to these pressures by use of different strategic responses or manoeuvring tactics. In addition to the primary relation, I examine two secondary relations in order to determine if and how the VNGOs engage in strategic relations with other interest groups to gain leverage in relation to the party-state. Secondary relations examined are: Vietnamese NGOs

the relation to international aid agencies and the relation between the Vietnamese NGOs themselves.4 Looking at the reform process in Vietnam it is clear that the environmental context in which Vietnamese

Constituents

organisational Vietnamese

life society

evolves is

is

changing

undergoing

as

extensive

transition. Developing a theoretically informed understanding of the characteristics and functions of the socio-political context and the dynamics of the reform process, helps us understand the strategic options available to the VNGOs and throw light on working question 1a. Three case-studies constitute the empirical core of the analysis of the manoeuvres applied by the VNGOs, supplemented with other VNGO interviews, providing us with insights into the subjectively experienced life-world of the VNGOs and adding depth to the analysis. The analysis of working question 1.a constitutes the core of the analysis which provides the back-ground for the subsequent more broad sweeping and contemplating analysis of question 1.b and 2. Working question 2: Concepts of Civil society and NGOs as a backdrop for discussion 4

Jeg kigger paa relationen til constitutents ved at diskutere reprepsentativeness – chapter 9

12

The Art of Manoeuvring in Changing Rules of Traffic Turning to working question 1b and the question of recognition, the idea of legitimacy helps us understand the institutional effects of the strategic responses applied by the VNGOs. The analysis does not attempt to verify whether the VNGOs gain legitimacy with their “collective audiences”, but contemplates the degree to which the VNGOs - based on their manoeuvres - gain legitimacy as independent civic actors and/or instil institutional changes which in turn may provide institutional support for independent civic activity. In this part of the analysis interviews with and a questionnaire survey of a broader sample of VNGOs supplement the qualitative empirical base and gives us an idea about the occurrence of different strategic responses, thus providing breadth to the analysis. The second part of the analysis (working question 2) relates to the overall concern with the emergence of civil society in Vietnam. Here I contemplate whether we may understand the VNGOs as a sign of an emerging civil society based on a discussion of the characteristics and development abilities of the VNGOs. The discussion is based on the understanding of the VNGOs and the context in which they emerge developed in the first part of the analysis. In this part of the analysis I include my findings based on interviews with and the questionnaire survey made of the VNGOs as well as interviews with foreign and Vietnamese representatives of international aid agencies which serve as “consultations with experts” (see chapter 2.3). While the literature on civil society and NGOs guides the discussion it does not control it. Based on the reflective character of the discussion, I indirectly question the appropriateness of applying a western/liberal conceptualisation of civil society and NGOs to the Vietnamese context and thereby seek to expand our frame of understanding (ref. section 2.1 and Andersen 1990).

2.3 The empirical research process My field-work took place in Hanoi over a period of ten weeks from June to August 2001. It was hosted by the Institute of Sociology (IoS) at the National Centre for Social Sciences and Humanities in Hanoi. Throughout the field work and later during the data processing I have worked with a rough distinction of my informants, placing them in three broad groups: the Vietnamese NGOs (VNGOs), the Vietnamese official organisations (VOs), and international aid agencies (IAAs). 13

The Art of Manoeuvring in Changing Rules of Traffic Below is an overview of the types and number of organisations covered through interviews, questionnaire survey and in-depth studies.

IAAs

VOs

VNGOs

Types of organisations/networks - Interviews

No. of organisations interviewed

Vietnamese NGOs

15

Vietnamese NGO networks

25

Government agencies

4

Mass-organisations

3

International NGOs

8

Bilateral donor agencies

4

Multilateral donor agencies

4

INGO network (The VUFO-NGO Resource Centre)

1

Donor-NGO working group on civil society (CSWG)

16

Questionnaire survey

No. of organisations surveyed

Vietnamese NGOs

26

In-depth studies

No. of organisations Examined

Vietnamese NGOs

3

The fieldwork was organised in three phases. The first phase focused on interviews with the VNGOs and the IAAs. The second phase focused on the questionnaire survey and the third phase focused on the VNGO case-studies and interviews with VOs.

2.3.1

Primary qualitative data collection – interviews and case-studies

In the following section I will explain how my informants were selected. The Vietnamese NGOs - VNGOs A list of VNGOs was compiled based on information from existing studies, the international donor community and researchers at IoS.7 In order to be able to throw light on relations with international aid agencies and VNGO-networking I reduced the list to include approximately 30 VNGOs, which according to my information seemed to do some work with international aid agencies and/or seemed to be involved in some kind of VNGO-networking. In addition, I aimed

5

The VNGO networks were covered through regular VNGO interviews. The Donor-INGO Working Group on Civil Society or the Civil Society Working Group (CSWG) was covered through one INGO, one bilateral donor and one multilateral donor interview. 7 The researchers at IoS had recently co-conducted an extensive study of “civic organisations” in Hanoi and Ho Chi Minh with a German professor (Wischermann 2001 and Wischermann and Quang 2001). 6

14

The Art of Manoeuvring in Changing Rules of Traffic to include organisations working in different sectors. Otherwise the selection was random, based on the availability and willingness of the VNGOs to meet for an interview.89 Case-studies The case organisations were selected among the VNGOs interviewed during the first phase on the basis of an assessment of the variation they represented, so as to bring attention to the range of strategic responses to institutional processes applied by the VNGOs. In my choice of caseorganisations I cover organisations that differ on the following parameters:10 established at different times of the reform process directors have different backgrounds different legal basis/registration different sectoral focus The Vietnamese official organisations - VOs The VOs interviewed were mainly selected based on my findings from interviews with the VNGOs and IAAs. Seeking to cover different types of organs within the party-state I tried to get access to government agencies involved in the overall policy-making in relation to NGOs in Vietnam; the official organs and government agencies with whom the VNGOs register; and the mass-organisations and umbrella-organisations.11 The international aid agencies - IAAs The interviews with the IAAs mainly function as “consultations with experts” and as a qualitative supplement to the limited secondary data available about the VNGOs. The selection of IAAs was based on an interest to select “well-informed IAAs” who could be expected to have insights into and experience with civil society development in the Vietnamese context and who could be expected to have some working experience with some of the VNGOs.12

8

See annex xx list of VNGOs included in this study See annex xx for question guide 10 See annex xx for question guide 11 See annex xx for question guide 12 See annex xx for question guide 9

15

The Art of Manoeuvring in Changing Rules of Traffic 2.3.2

Primary quantitative data collection – the questionnaire survey

In order to establish a better overview of and be able to make some more substantiated generalisations about the VNGOs I decided to make a questionnaire survey of the VNGOs identified. Based on the information I had gathered during the first phase of my field work I made a questionnaire covering information about the background of the VNGOs, their organisational set-up and activities, their funding and relations to key-interest groups in the field.13

2.3.3

Secondary data collection14

The availability of specialised English language literature on civil society and Vietnamese NGOs outside Vietnam is extremely limited15 and often only available within networks of Vietnam scholars.16 In Vietnam a few studies and surveys made by individual researchers and/or international aid agencies can be found, but identifying and locating documentation in Vietnam often requires a lot of asking around and spending long hours in the libraries of the UNDP and the VUFO-NGO Resource Centre. English-language literature from Vietnamese sources is extremely scarce. However, during my field-work I was presented with a number of reports and documents in Vietnamese produced by government agencies, scholars etc. in connection with a series of workshops held on civil society and NGOs (which indicates that an internal debate is taking place!). Unfortunately, I have not been able to make use of them because they have been published in Vietnamese only.

13

See annex xx for questionnaire In this section focus is narrowly on literature on the NGOs and civil society in Vietnam. Background literature on the Vietnamese socio-political context is introduced with chapter 5. 15 This apparent gap is now in the process of being filled through the establishment of a webpage with “civil society readings” by the UNDP in Vietnam (UNDP 2002). 16 Such groups include the “The Vietnam Update Conference” organised by Vietnam scholars associated with the Australian National University and the National University of Singapore. 14

16

The Art of Manoeuvring in Changing Rules of Traffic

3 Contemporary conceptualisations of civil society and NGOs As explained in the introduction, I view the focal organisations of this study, the Vietnamese NGOs (VNGOs), as part of a loosely defined sector which may be termed “the civic sector” as opposed to for example the state sector or the business sector. In anticipation of the examination of the VNGOs, the purpose of this chapter is to introduce the reader to contemporary conceptualisations of civil society and NGOs. 17 Thus, the chapter serves as a thematic backdrop for the present study of the VNGOs and it provides us with topics around which the discussion in chapter 9 about the characteristics and development abilities of the VNGOs can be structured. In this way the chapter serves as an elaboration of the analytic frame introduced in chapter 2.2. Initially, I introduce the reader to the background for the current interest in civil society and NGOs in the development literature and delineate my own position in relation to the debate. I then introduce the reader to the concept of civil society and some of the key features associated with it. Then, seeking to illustrate the variety of organisations and organisational characteristics which can be found within the civic sector, I provide an overview of different types of civic organisations and some of the organisational characteristics commonly associated with civic organisations. Finally, seeking to synthesise the debate and point to some common qualities of the sector and its organisations, I identify a set of development abilities commonly associated with civil society and NGOs.

3.1 Background for the current debate and delineation of my position The evolution of the concept of civil society is mainly related to political philosophy and can be traced back to the period when capitalism and modern ideas of democracy were beginning to take root in Europe in the 18th century.18 It is only from the late 1980s, however, that NGOs and civil society have found their way into the development debate. A number of interrelated factors may explain the reason for the shift in donor policies placing NGOs and civil society on the development agenda. 17

This chapter is based on a relatively large and diverse literature. For the ease of reading I have placed more extensive references in the footnotes. 18 The notion of civil society dates back to the Romans (15th century), but contemporary conceptualisations of civil society have their roots in the Scottish Enlightenment in the 18th century. Especially the writings of Paine, Hegel and Tocqueville have informed the current understanding of civil society and it was with these writers that a line between civil society and the state, which had not existed before, was drawn. See for example Hydén 1997 and Rooy 1998, pp. 6-30 for an elaboration of the historical roots of contemporary conceptualisations of civil society.

17

The Art of Manoeuvring in Changing Rules of Traffic

As disappointment with the previously applied development strategies focusing on either the state or the market spread during the 1980s, donors began to look to for alternative approaches to development. This trend has been supported by a changing consensus about what development actually is. Moving from a somewhat narrowly defined “economic development perspective” focusing on economic growth, development is increasingly defined according to a broader based “human development perspective” focusing more on social welfare.19 Furthermore, the fall of authoritarian political regimes in the former communist countries in the late 1980s in which civil society organisations played a crucial role, coupled with the demise of a number of authoritarian regimes in Africa, has brought new life to the political science debate and instilled hope, that civil society can bring about democratic development in authoritarian political regimes.20 As a result of this shift, an abundance of literature has been published over the past decade seeking to define civil society, its organisations and their role as vehicles of development. Boussard proposes that a rough distinction can be made between the academic literature on the one hand and the policy literature (emanating from various donor agencies) on the other hand (Boussard 2001). 21 There has been a tendency especially within the policy literature, to focus on NGOs and to equate civil society with and reduce it to NGOs.22 The academic literature - and especially the more recent literature - proposes a broader and more critical view of the conceptualisation of civil society and its organisations (including the NGOs) as well as the way they are applied in the context of development aid.23 Based on a review of the literature, I find that the debate on civil society and NGOs is vibrant and very exiting, but it is also characterised by contradictions and ambiguity. The concepts provided by the literature are too contradictory and too normative to provide an analytical frame for understanding how the VNGOs emerge and operate. However, it is clear that the 19

Marking this shift the first Human Development Report was published by the UNDP in 1990. See for example Hulme and Edwards 1997, p. 276; Fowler 2000b p. 639-641; Howell 2000 p. 4-6; Robinson 1995, p. 70; Stiles 1998; Tvedt 1994, p. 141 21 Academic literature consulted for this study includes: Diamond 1994; Hulme and Edwards 1992; Hulme and Edwards 1997; Robinson 1995; Rooy 1998; Stewart 1997; White 1994; Clayton 1996. Policy literature consulted include Fowler 2000a; Holloway 1996; Danida 2000b; UNDP 2001 and the World Bank 2001. In addition to the two above categories one might add empirical literature seeking to define civil society based on extensive empirical research including Salamon and Anheier 1996; Manor 1999; and CIVICUS 2000. 22 Howell observes: “For many donors, especially in the early 1990s, the concept of civil society was equated with and so reduced to NGOs” (Howell 2000, p. 5) and Powell and Seddon notes “Indeed for many, NGOs become equated with civil society, and civil society with NGOs …” (Powell and Seddon 1997, p. 9). An example of this equation can also be found in World Bank 2000, where civil society and its organisations in a definitional note is reduced to “NGOs”. 23 See for example: Howell 2000; Hulme and Edwards 1997; Rooy 1998; Sampson 1996; and Jørgensen 1996. 20

18

The Art of Manoeuvring in Changing Rules of Traffic contemporary debate on civil society and NGOs is strongly influencing the current donor interest in the VNGOs. Therefore I find that this - empirically founded - study must be informed by the contemporary literature in order to be of value to the current debate.

3.2 Defining civil society A definition capturing the most important characteristics of civil society has been proposed by White, who suggests that civil society is: “… an intermediate associational realm between state and family, populated by organisations which are separate from the state, enjoy autonomy in relation to the state and are formed voluntarily by members of society to protect or extend their interests or values” (White 1994, p. 379). 24 Although I can adhere to this definition I also agree with White and others who suggest that civil society is “much more”. Such as for example “a discursive field” and “a structure of resources” (Sampson 1996, p. 142); “a normative idea” and “a politically laden slogan” (Boussard 2001, p. 4); “… a term used as a code for a set of ideas related to participation, good governance, human rights, privatisation and public sector reform.” (Bebbington and Ridell 1995, p. 880). In White’s own words: “… the precise meaning of civil society remains elusive. It is used in a variety of ways for a variety of purposes, functioning as a pragmatic rather than a theoretical concept” (White 1994, p. 377). We will see how some of these “functions” work as we move along. Going back to the more “narrow” definition of civil society, it follows from this definition that civil society is an abstract concept connoting the space in which civic activity is evolving. Civil society is found in the public realm and thus does not include family and personal networks, which are perceived to belong to the private realm.25 While for example Manor points out that some kinship organisations above the nuclear or extended family, such as lineages and clans, may be important elements of civil society (Manor 1999, p. 4), most definitions do not include them.

24

A variant of White’s definition is for example found in Manor 1999. Another much cited definition is proposed by Diamond proposing that civil society is “… the realm of organized social life that is voluntary, self-generating, (largely) self-supporting, autonomous from the state, and bound by a legal order or set of shared rules. It is distinct from “society” in general in that it involves citizens acting collectively in a public sphere …” (Diamond 1994, p. 5). 25 Manor 1999, p. 4; Diamond 1994, p. 5; Jørgensen 1996, p. 36; and Danida 2000b, p. 8.

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The Art of Manoeuvring in Changing Rules of Traffic The relationship between civil society and the state and especially the autonomy of civil society in relation to the state are key points in most contemporary conceptualisations, although the nature of the relationship as well as the degree of (desired) autonomy is being debated (the civic sector is sometimes seen referred to as “the NGO-sector” indicating that it is everything which is “non-state” or “non-governmental”). Most liberal observers agree that civil society must exist and operate autonomously in relation to the state, but it is also recognised that civil society should not operate in complete isolation from the state if it is to contribute positively to the democratic development of society (see also section 3.4).26 The distinction from the market sector is also important. Some definitions explicitly refer to civil society as “the non-profit sector” emphasising that civil society organisations are not governed by profit seeking motives27 and most contemporary conceptualisations more or less explicitly imply that civil society is governed by a shared set of values of voluntarism and solidarity.28 It follows, that civil society is conceptualised as a societal realm above the family. It is separate but interrelated with the state and the market, and can be visualised in the following way:

State

Market Civil society

Figure 4.1 Civil society in relation to other sectors in society.29

However, as the overlapping circles indicate, boundaries are blurred and the realms intertwined making empirical delineation of civil society difficult. Furthermore, as pointed out earlier 26 For an elaboration of these questions see for example White 1994; Diamond 1994, p. 7-11; Clark 1997; Fowler 2000a, p. 32-35; Stewart 1997; also Atack 1999, p. 863 touches upon this issue. 27 See for example World Bank 2001 and Salamon and Anheier 1996, p. 21-22. See also Salamon and Anheier 1996, pp. 2-3 for an enlightening discussion of the “NGO” vs. the “non-profit” terms. 28 See for example White 1994; Holloway 1996, p. 20; Diamond 1994, p. 5-7; World Bank 2001; UNDP 2001; Danida 2000b. Specifically for the values of voluntarism and solidarity see Robinson 1997, p. 59 and Atack 1999, p. 859. 29 The illustration is for example found in Martinussen 1997; Holloway 1996; Jørgensen 1996 and Fowler 1997.

20

The Art of Manoeuvring in Changing Rules of Traffic empirical reality is often confused with normative perceptions of what it ought to be which adds to the confusion. Even so I find that the model provides a useful backdrop for the study as it illustrates the general western/liberal conceptualisation of civil society in relation to other spheres. As I progress, it will become clear that this perception does not necessarily fit well with the Vietnamese reality or with views prevailing in Vietnam on how society should be organised.

3.3 Civil society organisations and NGOs Just as there seems to be a fondness for proposing new definitions of civil society there also seems to be a fondness for proposing differing typologies of civil society organisations depending on the theoretical outlook and the purpose of the typology. Risking falling into the same trap, I attempt to synthesise the varying and at times contradictory definitions found in the contemporary literature into five broad categories of civil society organisations: 30 1. Professional organisations (business and professional associations, trade unions, farmers’ organisations etc.) 2. Cultural, recreational and religious organisations (sports associations, women’s associations, religious groups etc.) 3. Academic/research, educational and informational organisations (universities, research institutions, think tanks, media etc.) 4. Grassroots organisations or community-based organisations (local village networks, neighbourhood networks etc.) 5. Development-oriented organisations and NGOs (organisations which seek to help others based on humanitarian principles) Some authors lump together more groups into one category while others propose more subdivisions or alternative dividing lines.31 A dividing line is often made between grassroots organisations and community-based organisations (ref. category 4) and development-oriented organisations and NGOs (ref. category 5). Organisations belonging to the former group are commonly conceptualised as more or less formalised local organisations with a membershipbase among the people they aim to serve. Organisations belonging to the latter group are commonly conceptualised as more formalised national organisations, which do not necessarily 30

The synthesis is based on Diamond 1994, p. 6; Danida 2000b, p. 10; Manor 1999, p. 15; Holloway 1996, p. 22-30; Salamon and Anheier 1996, p. 20; Jørgensen 1996, p. 38; and UNDP 1998, p. 2. 31 See Annex 9. for some of the variables along which distinctions are commonly made

21

The Art of Manoeuvring in Changing Rules of Traffic have a membership-base among the people they aim to serve. Based on this distinction, the grassroots organisations and community based organisations are more or less explicitly considered directly representative of the people and therefore “closer” to the “real” civil society than the development-oriented organisations and NGOs. The development-oriented organisations and NGOs on the other hand have been found to be suitable as implementers of development projects (Rooy 1998 and Stewart 1997) apparently because they are more formally organised and familiar with the concepts and working methods relating to international development aid. As a result of the increasing interest in civil society and NGOs and the tendency to equate civil society with NGOs noted in section 3.1, the NGO term is used by all kinds of “NGO-pretenders” seeking to attract donor funds (ref. for example the observation made by Sampson 1996, that civil society is “a structure of resources” mentioned in section 3.1).32 Another distinction sometimes made is that between service providing organisations whose primary purpose is to deliver social services and/or development-related projects and policyoriented organisations who seek to promote a specific cause and influence the policymakers. 33 These different functions are also reflected in the development abilities commonly associated with civil society which I deal with in the following section.

3.4 Development abilities associated with civil society and NGOs As mentioned earlier, civil society and NGOs have been ascribed a number of development abilities or “comparative advantages”.34 Instead of making an elaborate list, I suggest a synthesis of the most commonly proposed abilities, which is more manageable in relation to the discussion about the VNGOs in chapter 9. In the following, I briefly introduce three core abilities identified, namely, the ability to innovate; the ability to reach the poor; and the ability to empower the poor:35

32 For an elaboration of the term “NGO-pretenders” see Annex 10, from Fowler 1997, p. 32, listing various types of organisations, which call themselves NGOs for various reasons - for example to attract donor funds. 33 See for example the World Bank 2001; White, 1994 p. 379; Manor 1999, p. 15; and Holloway 1996, p. 22. 34 The “comparative advantages” term has been commonly used to connote the special development abilities of NGOs. See Stewart 1997, p. 12 for a thought-provoking critique of the term. See also Stewart 1997, p.12 for an elaboration of what he calls “the pro-NGO perspective” or “NGOs do it cheaper, better, faster” perspective. 35 A large part of the “comparative advantage literature” has been concerned with what is often referred to as international NGOs (INGOs) or Northern NGOs (NNGOs), i.e. internationally operating NGOs with a basis in the donor countries. While donors are increasingly looking to direct funding of what is referred to as Southern NGOs (SNGOs), i.e. NGOs with their basis in the recipient countries, the SNGOs are often assumed to have similar advantages as those ascribed to the NNGOs (see for example Fowler 2000b, p. 640)

22

The Art of Manoeuvring in Changing Rules of Traffic The ability innovate: Civil society organisations and NGOs are believed to be able to develop new approaches and solutions to development projects through innovation, experimentation and adaptation. Due to their special characteristics, civil society organisations are considered more flexible and cost-efficient than for example the state and/or official aid agencies for small scale interventions, which might serve as demonstration projects for large scale replication. Local civil society organisations are often cited as having indigenous knowledge which foreign aid organisations lack. They are therefore considered to be more culturally sensitive and better able to adapt project interventions to suit the local context.36 The ability to reach the poor: Civil society organisations and NGOs are believed to be able to reach the poor through social welfare provision. As a remnant of the development strategies of the 1980s (promoting a roll-back of the state) most contemporary policy recommendations encourage that private organisations take over some of the social service obligations from the state. In this connection civil society and its organisations are believed to contribute with additional resources (Clark 1997, p. 46) and to be able to cost-effectively expand access to for example health and educational services (Fowler 2000a p. 12). Especially NGOs have been conceived, as Howell puts it: “… as ‘alternative’ deliverers of social services and welfare, thus providing a solution to the incapacities of the state as well as the inequities of capitalist development” (Howell 2000, p. 5).37 The ability to empower the poor: Civil society organisations and NGOs are believed to be able to further a process of democratic development which helps empower the poor. This ability rests on the premise of autonomy of civil society organisations from the state, the assumption that civil society organisations represent the poor and disadvantaged, and the assumed civilised behaviour of civil society (Atack 1999, p. 861). Based on its characteristics and its relation to the state and other societal actors civil society is expected to: “… push for policy reforms, exact[ing] civic compliance on government and business behaviour and foster[ing] ‘good governance’” (Fowler 2000, p. 12).38 It follows that policymaking and advocacy activity is associated with this ability.

36

See for example Clark 1997, p. 46; Stewart 1997, p. 12; and Fowler 2000b pp. 647-649. For more references see: Howell 2000, p. 5; Fowler 2000a, p. 12; Clark 1997, p. 46; Stewart 1997, p. 12; Atack 1999 p. 861; Robinson 1997, p. 61; Holloway 1996, pp. 72-74; and Hydén 1997, p. 10. 38 For more references see Atack 1999, p. 861; Fowler 2000a, p. 12; Danida 2000b, p.12; Diamond 1994, pp. 7-11; and Clark 1997, p. 46. 37

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The Art of Manoeuvring in Changing Rules of Traffic

3.5 Wrapping up contemporary conceptualisations of civil society and NGOs On the basis of the presentation of the concepts of civil society, its organisations, and the developmental abilities associated with civil society and NGOs it is clear that the debate is complex and many concepts and definitions are flawed when faced with empirical realities. We have seen that the concepts of “civil society” and “NGO” are associated not only with a theoretical understanding of society, but indeed also with normative ideas about how society should be organised and what development is. They are also associated with certain activities and resources which relate to development aid. Even so, I have found the literature on civil society useful to inspire my examination of the VNGOs and as a backdrop for the discussion about the characteristics and development abilities of the VNGOs in chapter 9 (ref. chapter 2.2). In relation to the question of how the VNGOs have emerged, however, I do not find that the literature on civil society and NGOs helps us develop an understanding of the societal dynamics in contemporary Vietnam, for this purpose I shall now turn to institutional and strategic theory.

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The Art of Manoeuvring in Changing Rules of Traffic

4 Institutional and strategic theory To develop our understanding of the changing environmental conditions in Vietnam and the interaction between the socio-political environment and the Vietnamese NGOs (VNGOs), I have chosen a theoretical approach combining neo-institutional theory and strategic theory. In the following sub-sections I seek to unpack the concept of institutions and institutional change. Then, building a bridge between institutional theory and strategic theory I introduce the concepts of legitimacy before I move on to strategic theory. In this way the chapter serves as an elaboration of the concepts introduced in relation to the analytic frame which was presented in chapter 2.2.

4.1 Defining institutions My presentation of institutional theory is mainly based on Scott’s synthesis of different strands of institutional theory proposed in “Institutional Theory and Organization” (Scott 1995) and in one of his more recent works “Institutions and Organisations” (Scott 2001). Acknowledging the complexity of institutions and accounting for different strands of institutional theory, Scott has developed an elaborate conception of institutions (Scott 2001, p. 48), from which the following, somewhat briefer, definition of institutions can be adapted and applied for the purpose of this study: “Institutions are social structures consisting of regulative, normative and culture-cognitive elements, that together with associated activities and resources, provide stability and meaning to social life.” 39 Scott distinguishes between three different approaches: the regulative, the normative and the cultural-cognitive approach, each highlighting different institutional elements. Merging the three approaches Scott proposes a comprehensive approach including regulative, normative and cultural-cognitive institutions also referred to as “elements” or “pillars” (Scott 2001). In the following sections I briefly describe each of the elements and how they “provide stability and meaning to social life”.

39

In his definition of institutions Scott also works with what he refers to as “carriers”, which can be understood as “repositories” or and “transmitters” of institutional elements. I recognise the idea of carriers, but I do not apply Scott’s elaborate typology of carriers, which includes “symbolic systems”; “relational systems”; “routines”; and “artefacts” in this study (see Scott 2001, p. 77-83).

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The Art of Manoeuvring in Changing Rules of Traffic

4.1.1

Regulative institutions

Regulative institutions consist of formal and informal rules regulating behaviour Rules, laws and sanctions are indications that regulative institutions exist and regulate human behaviour. These rules, laws and sanctions may work in formal ways as written rules and laws or in informal ways as unwritten codes of conduct. Much in the same way as the concern with police control and the prospects of getting a fine keep drivers from breaking the speed limits, the primary mechanism ensuring compliance is coercion and expedience and fear of sanctions. It follows that legitimate behaviour according to regulative institutions is legally sanctioned behaviour (Scott 2001, p. 52).40 In relation to the present study, the regulative perspective make us aware of the influence formal as well as informal rules, laws, and sanctions may have on state-society relations generally and on the environmental conditions and strategic responses of the VNGOs specifically.

4.1.2

Normative institutions

Normative institutions are made up of conceptions of the preferred or the desirable (values) and specifications of how things should be done (norms) Norms and values are key elements of normative institutions and when they are applied to selected types of actors, they give rise to roles. According to Scott “Values are conceptions of the preferred or the desirable, together with the construction of standards to which existing structures or behaviour can be compared and assessed. Norms specify how things should be done; they define legitimate means to pursue valued ends” (Scott 2001, p. 54-55, author’s emphasis). It is the awareness of one’s role in a social situation and a concern to behave appropriately in accordance with others’ expectations, that guides human behaviour (Scott 1995, p. xv). Much like a student obeys the teacher because he/she is aware that as a student he/she is

40

Examples of scholars favouring the regulative perspective on institutions are neo-institutional economists such as Williamson, but adherents of the regulative perspective are also found among political scientists and political sociologists like Krasner examining international regimes (Scott 1995, p. xiv-xv).

26

The Art of Manoeuvring in Changing Rules of Traffic expected to do so, social obligation and the desire to receive approval and recognition regulates our actions. It follows that morally governed behaviour is considered legitimate behaviour according to normative institutions.41 In this way the normative perspective brings attention to the norms and values prevailing in Vietnamese society about how state-society relations ought to be. It indicates that we must understand these norms and values in order to understand how the environment influences and interacts with the VNGOs.

4.1.3

Cognitive institutions

Cultural-cognitive institutions rest on actors’ perceptions and interpretations of social reality that brings about compliance because alternative behaviour is unthinkable According to the cultural-cognitive perspective: “cognitive systems control behaviour by controlling our conception of what the world is and what kinds of action can be taken by what types of actors” (Scott 1995, p. xviii). Analysts examining cultural-cognitive institutions “… give particular emphasis to the ‘constitutive rules’ that are part of the cultural system” (Scott 1995, p. xvii). These rules are employed to construct actors and actions, like the set of rules and definitions that creates actors and actions in a game of baseball (Scott 1995, p. xvii-xviii).42 In the cultural-cognitive view the logic guiding action is based on convention,43 in other words: “compliance occurs … because other types of behaviour are inconceivable; routines are followed because they are taken for granted as ‘the way we do things’” (Scott 2001, p. 57). It follows that legitimate behaviour according to the cultural-cognitive perspective must be comprehensible, recognisable, and culturally supported (Scott 2001, p. 52).44

41 Examples of scholars favouring the normative perspective on institutions are the early sociologists such as Durkheim and Weber and later also Parsons and Selznick, but also political scientists have given priority to a normative conception of institutions in their analysis of political structures. (Scott 1995, p. xvi and Scott 2001, p. 55). 42 In the same way entities like schools and hospitals are created based on models provided by cultural systems (cultural templates). From this follows that entities which conform to the cultural templates are assumed to have characteristics and capacities associated with the template (Scott 1995, p. xviii). 43 Scott uses the term “orthodoxy”. 44 Examples of scholars who have favouring the regulative perspective on institutions are mainly neo-institutional sociologists examining organisations at various levels including Scott himself, Meyer, Rowan, DiMaggio, Powell and Zucker (Scott 1995, pp. xvii-xviii and Scott 2001, pp. 57-58).

27

The Art of Manoeuvring in Changing Rules of Traffic In this way the cultural-cognitive approach highlights culturally rooted regulating mechanisms which may be significant when attempting to explain institutional processes at work in relation to the emergence and survival of the VNGOs.

4.1.4

Combining the three institutional elements

Briefly summing up the three institutional elements which are brought together from three different institutional perspectives, it is clear that they rest on different philosophical and ontological assumptions. Analysts viewing institutions as regulatory systems are generally social realists which mean that “… the social world is believed to exist independently of an individual’s appreciation of it.” (Scott 1995, p. xiv). At the core of the regulative perspective is an individual conception of human nature and individuals are perceived to pursue interests in an (intended) rational manner based on an instrumental logic (Scott 1995, pp. xiv). The regulative perspective gives prominence to regulative processes and assumes that the individual is acting independently based on self-interest, disregarding the influence the social and cultural context may exert on an individual’s behaviour. It also assumes that the individual is always evaluating the institutions he/she is facing (Engberg-Pedersen 1997, p.71). Also adherents of the normative perspective tend to be social realists, but at the core of the normative perspective is a collectivist conception of human nature as opposed to the individualist conception favoured by the regulatory analysts (Scott 1995 p. xvi). In this way the normative approach broadens the view by emphasising the importance of appropriateness and social obligation as opposed to instrumentality and expedience, but it still assumes that the individual evaluates the institutions he/she is facing. The cultural-cognitive perspective represents a social constructionist view. “In this view people don’t discover reality; they create it.” (Scott 1995, p. xvii). The cultural-cognitive perspective broadens the view further by calling attention to the internalisation of external cultural frameworks, i.e. the unconscious level. While cultural-cognitive institutions are very difficult to work with because of their elusive character, this approach attracts our attention to the deeper layers of the socio-cultural context which prescribes certain kinds of behaviour, not because other behaviour patterns are considered unlawful or immoral, but simply because they are unthinkable.

28

The Art of Manoeuvring in Changing Rules of Traffic Thus, if we accept that there might in fact be different ways of understanding the nature of social reality none of which is necessarily more correct than the other, it becomes apparent that the different institutional perspectives complement each other and that different institutional elements might indeed co-exist and interrelate (I will come back to the issue of co-existing and interrelating institutions in section 4.2 below). It follows from this recognition that a broad based approach combining the perspectives can produce a more holistic analytical approach.

4.1.5

Activities and resources

Scott doesn’t elaborate much on associated activities and resources in his theoretical overview. However, he does emphasise that “although an institutional perspective gives heightened attention to the symbolic aspects of social life we must also attend to the activities that produce and reproduce them” (Scott 2001, p. 49 - my emphasis). Also material resources must be taken into consideration. Scott points out that institutions must be supported by resources to be viable and that flows of resources must be supported by institutions to persist (Scott 2001, p. 50). In relation to the analysis we are made aware that it may be fruitful to pay attention to activities and resource flows related to the field in which the VNGOs are situated, in order to understand the institutional processes taking place. It also follows that activities and resources may play a significant role in relation to institutional change, which I shall turn to in the following section.

4.2 Explaining institutional change Having elaborated on the key concepts introduced in the definition of institutions and having illustrated how they “provide stability and meaning to social life”, I shall seek to counter one of the most important criticisms of institutional theory, namely its emphasis on stability and inability to explain change. I find it important to counter this criticism because institutional change is at the core of this study and to critics institutional theory may therefore seem to be an odd choice. In the following sub-sections I first introduce “a way of looking at institutions” suggested by Scott, namely as processes rather than properties, then I turn to the issue of coexisting institutions, and finally I look at interrelating institutional elements. Paying attention to these issues will help us develop an understanding of the dynamics of the reform process and the manoeuvres available to the VNGOs.

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The Art of Manoeuvring in Changing Rules of Traffic 4.2.1

Institutions as process

Critics of institutional theory claim that by focusing on the stabilising effects of institutions and disregarding power and interests, institutional theory fails to explain institutional change. However, what according to Scott is sometimes overlooked by critics, is that while by definition institutions connote stability they are subject to change processes. According to this dual perspective “… our subject must include not only institutions as a property or state of an existing social order, but also institutions as process, including the processes of institutionalisation and de-institutionalisation” (Scott 2001, p. 50, my emphasis). According to Scott examples of deinstitutionalisation of regulative systems are weakened laws, diluted sanctions, and increasing non-compliance. De-institutionalisation of normative systems diminishes the force of obligatory expectations and de-institutionalisation of cultural-cognitive systems is increased questioning of what was once taken for granted (Scott 2001, p. 182). Such processes allows for changing regulative systems, changing norms and values and the emergence of alternative ways of doing things. Thus viewing institutions as process provides us with a frame of understanding of the dynamics of institutional change. The concept of co-existing institutions may elaborate this understanding.

4.2.2

Co-existing institutions

As proposed by institutional theorists seeking to explain institutional change, divergent institutions may co-exist. For example differing regulations may overlap and in fact compete to regulate the same field of activity. Inconsistent moral concerns may influence our behaviour in certain situations. Or we may be presented with a different “way of doing things”, which challenges the usual “way of doing things”. In this way co-existing institutions create a basis for contradictions and the existence of different opinions, which social actors can draw on (Lars Engberg-Pedersen 1997, p. 78). Especially in a process of reform as the one currently taking place in Vietnam it can be expected that a multitude of new and old, formal and informal, (inter)national and local institutions co-exist. While some institutions are weakening others are strengthening and in the process new institutions or adaptations of existing institutions emerge. In addition to the idea of co-existing institutions, the notion of interrelating institutional elements can develop our understanding of the dynamics of institutional change further.

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The Art of Manoeuvring in Changing Rules of Traffic 4.2.3

Interrelating institutional elements

Scott points out that “… many laws are sufficiently controversial or ambiguous that they do not provide clear prescriptions for conduct” (Scott 2001, p. 54). With an ambiguous or even weakened regulative mechanism compliance to and enforcement of the law may depend on normative and/or cultural-cognitive elements, which define prescriptions for conduct (see Scott 2001, p. 54). Following this line of thought, it is also possible to imagine that regulative mechanisms can be undermined by normative and/or cultural-cognitive elements and vice versa. An example from daily life in Vietnam is the traffic rules stipulating right-side driving. Everybody knows this general traffic rule, but when turning left drivers consistently keep to the left – even in front of the police. Keeping to the left although the rules stipulate the opposite is clearly not considered morally wrong and everyone (including the police!) does it. It is thus clear that institutional elements may interrelate in different ways to support or undermine each other. Thus, by viewing institutions as processes and acknowledging the existence of co-existing institutions and interrelating institutional elements, we have developed a way of looking at institutions which although connoting stability allows considerable scope for active manoeuvring by social actors. Strategic theory has been included and incorporated in the analytical frame used for this study to specify the strategies available to the VNGOs, but before turning to strategic theory, I take a look at the concept of legitimacy which helps link institutional theory with strategic theory.

4.3 Survival and Legitimacy According to a combined institutional and strategic perspective an organisation’s survival depends on its ability to gain legitimacy and attract resources.45 According to Suchman (Suchman 1995, p. 574): “Legitimacy is a generalised perception or assumption that the actions of an entity are desirable, proper, or appropriate within some socially constructed system of norms, values, beliefs and definitions.” 46

45

I have already touched upon the question of resources and while I return to the issue of resources in the analysis, it is subordinated the question of legitimacy and institutionalisation. 46 The “socially constructed system” mentioned by Suchman equals the institutional framework

31

The Art of Manoeuvring in Changing Rules of Traffic In this conception legitimacy is a social construction dependent on a collective audience. According to Suchman legitimacy is based on evaluative dimensions which have to do with the (perceived) desirability of an organisation as well as cognitive dimensions, which has to do with the (perceived) understandability of an organisation and its activities (Suchman 1995, p. 574). While Suchman does not operate with a regulative dimension, this could, inspired by Scott, be included and would then have to do with the (perceived) legality of an organisation. Inspired by Meyer and Scott, I propose that a completely legitimate organisation would be one about which no regulatively, normatively or cultural-cognitively based question could be raised (see Meyer and Scott 1992, p. 201). It follows that a completely illegitimate organisation is one about which many such questions could be raised. In this conception complete legitimacy and complete illegitimacy represents extremes in a continuum, where an organisation may enjoy more or less legitimacy. Operating with three institutional dimensions, namely, the regulative, the normative, and the cultural-cognitive institutional dimension this conception can be illustrated in a three-dimensional figure, where an organisation can enjoy different degrees of legitimacy depending on the institutional dimension. Complete cultural-

Complete

cognitive

normative

legitimacy

illegitimacy

Complete

Complete

regulative

regulative

illegitimacy

legitimacy

Complete

Complete

normative

cultural-

illegitimacy

cognitive illegitimacy

Figure 4.1 Dimensions and degrees of legitimacy

It is thus possible to imagine that an organisation for example enjoy a low degree of regulative legitimacy, combined with a high degree of cultural-cognitive legitimacy and a medium degree 32

The Art of Manoeuvring in Changing Rules of Traffic of normative legitimacy, which combined makes the organisation partly legitimate according to the prevailing institutions. It is also worth reminding ourselves of what we have seen earlier, that institutions may co-exist. While some institutions may support one type of behaviour other co-existing institutions may support alternative types of behaviour. In such situations social actors may (more or less consciously) choose between institutions to which they seek to comply. I have also noted that divergent institutional elements may interrelate to support or undermine each other. This implies that for example behaviour which is considered morally right (normatively legitimate) is not necessarily considered legal (regulatively legitimate) and for example behaviour which is conceivable (cultural-cognitively legitimate) is not necessarily considered morally right (normatively legitimate). It is thus possible to imagine that the VNGOs may gain partial legitimacy by varying degrees of compliance to different types of institutions and by choosing between co-existing institutions. It is also possible to imagine that the institutional context is characterised by divergent institutional elements and that behaviour which is for example not supported by regulative institutions is supported by normative and cultural-cognitive institutions and thereby made - at least partly – legitimate. In addition, strategic theorists suggest that social actors may gain legitimacy not only through strict compliance, but also through application of various manoeuvring strategies. Let us therefore turn to look at how strategic theory can inform our examination of the manoeuvres applied by the VNGOs.

4.4 Strategic responses to institutional processes A strategic perspective proposes that social actors can choose different legitimating strategies. Having observed that institutional elements inter-relate and institutions co-exist, it can be assumed that there is considerable scope for organisations to manoeuvre strategically within their cultural environment.

33

The Art of Manoeuvring in Changing Rules of Traffic Combining institutional and strategic theory both Oliver and Suchman propose different sets of theoretically inspired typologies for strategies, which may be adopted by organisations in response to institutional processes (Oliver 1991) and in order to gain legitimacy (Suchman 1995). Suchman suggests that what he refers to as “legitimacy-building strategies” fall into three clusters of: strategies efforts to conform, select, and/or manipulate (Suchman 1995, p. 587). Oliver suggests a slightly more elaborate typology of what she refers to as “strategic responses to institutional processes” including acquiescence, compromise, avoidance, defiance, and manipulation (Oliver 1991, p. 152). Although the wording and the categories are slightly different Suchman’s categories all seem included in Oliver’s more elaborate typology. The following presentation of strategic responses available to social actors therefore takes it starting point in Oliver’s typology and I will add with observations from Suchman’s typology where it serves as an elaboration. In the following I briefly introduce the proposed strategies and subsequently recap how I intend to use them in my analysis of the VNGOs (for an elaboration of the analytic frame ref. chapter 2.2). Acquiescence or conformance - or compliance as I prefer to call this strategy. Organisations which adopt this strategy follow invisible and taken-for granted norms, they mimic institutional models and obey rules and accept norms. This is most commonly seen when institutional norms have attained the persisting status of a social fact and taken for granted as “the way we do things” (Oliver 1991, p. 152). Oliver’s category acquiescence roughly equals Suchman’s category conform. Suchman notes that conforming is often the easiest strategy a manager can chose as this strategy signals allegiance to the cultural order and pose few challenges to established institutional logics (Suchman 1995, p. 587). Compromise and selection - if confronted with conflicting institutional demands or inconsistency between internal interests and external pressures, an organisation may seek to balance the expectations of multiple constituents, placate and accommodate institutional elements (by for example adhering to minimum standards) and negotiate with institutional stakeholders (for example to obtain concessions) (Oliver 1991, pp. 152 and 154). Oliver’s category compromise includes elements of Suchman’s selection. This strategy rests on the 34

The Art of Manoeuvring in Changing Rules of Traffic assumption introduced in section 4.2.2 about co-existing institutions which creates gaps in which actors can select among pre-existing logics. This provides an opportunity for organisations to select more “friendly” environments to lean themselves against and it is the simplest way for managers to avoid that their organisation is re-made in the image of the environment (Suchman, 1995, p. 589); Avoidance – the organisation attempts to preclude the necessity of conformity. It achieves this by concealing non-conformity (“window-dressing”), buffering itself from institutional pressures (by for example minimising external interventions), or escaping institutional rules or expectations, by exiting the domain within which pressure is exerted (Oliver 1991, p. 154); Defiance – is an active form of resistance to institutional processes in which the organisation ignores explicit norms and values, contests rules and requirements, and assaults the sources of institutional pressure. It used for example when organisations believe they can demonstrate rationality or righteousness of their own alternative convictions and conduct (Oliver 1991, pp. 152 and 157); Manipulation – is the most active response in which the organisation may co-opt influential constituents (for example by persuading institutional constituents to join the board), influence (for example through lobbying) values and criteria and seek domination over institutional constituents and processes (Oliver 1991, pp. 152 and 154).

This category

roughly equals Suchman’s category of the same name. Suchman notes that in cases where innovators depart substantially from prior practice selecting among environments is not necessarily enough. Instead the innovators must engage in proactive cultural manipulation in order to develop bases of support and promulgate new explanations of social reality. He further notes that concerted action might be the key to successful manipulation (Suchman, 1995, p. 591). On the basis of the strategic responses proposed Oliver develops a number of hypotheses about when and how different strategies are adopted. Likewise Suchman develops an elaborate theoretical framework about processes of gaining, maintaining and re-gaining legitimacy. However, the purpose of this study is not to test or clarify the frameworks proposed by Oliver and Suchman. The purpose of this study is to make a theoretically informed but an empirically 35

The Art of Manoeuvring in Changing Rules of Traffic rooted examination of how the VNGOs manoeuvre in relation to institutional pressures. I therefore delimit my use of strategic theory to make us aware that a range of different responses may be applied by the VNGOs in response to institutional pressures. In this way I develop an understanding of the specific Vietnamese context in which the VNGOs emerge.

4.5 Wrapping up institutional and strategic theory In this chapter I have elaborated on the concepts introduced in chapter 2.2 where the analytic frame was presented. We have seen how institutional theory may help us develop an understanding of the dynamics of the environment in which the VNGOs emerge. We have also seen how the concept of legitimacy brings attention to the interrelation between the VNGOs and their environment. Finally, strategic theory has brought to our attention the range of strategic responses available to the VNGOs. On this basis I now move on to the socio-political context – or the institutional environment - in which the VNGOs emerge.

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5 The Vietnamese socio-political context In the following I will seek to develop an understanding of the Vietnamese socio-political context in which the Vietnamese NGOs (VNGOs) emerge and operate. After an introduction to the political system and the role of the Communist Party of Vietnam (CPV) I look at the reform policy of doi moi and the dynamics of the reform process. I also introduce the phenomenon of “fence-breaking” which helps us understand the nature of state-society relations in Vietnam. Finally I provide an overview of the characteristics and conditions of the civic sector in Vietnam. This chapter thus serves to help us develop an understanding of the socio-political environment or to use the terms from the theoretical frame the institutional environment - in which the VNGOs emerge. 47

5.1 The party-state and the role of the communist party The dominating role and unique legitimacy of the Communist Party of Vietnam (CPV) is based on the long and ultimately successful struggle for liberation from foreign domination.48 The party is ascribed the leading role in a system which is referred to as democratic, but in reality a one-party system that fundamentally does not tolerate pluralism. Domination by the party is exercised through the state apparatus and an encompassing network of organisations forming part of the party-structure.49 For the same reason the Vietnamese state is commonly referred to as the party-state. The three key components making up the party-state: the communist party, the state apparatus and the mass-organisations, are closely interconnected and organised in a parallel structure reaching from the central level, to province/city level, district/ward level, commune/sub-ward level and sometime village levels (Porter 1993, p. 69). The organisations of the party-state are hierarchically linked and are supposed to function according to the principle of “democratic centralism”, according to which decisions made by the

47

This chapter is based on a number of different authors representing different perspectives on the Vietnamese socio-political context (see Annex 11 for an introduction to the different perspectives). For those interested in the discussion about the different perspectives I have chosen to indicate all the references I have found making similar observations. For the reading ease I have chosen to put such extensive references in the footnotes, so those not interested in the above discussion may read the chapter without too many interruptions. 48 See for example Brown 1996, p. 76 and Turley 1993b, pp. 328-29. 49 Turley 1993a; Thayer 1998

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The Art of Manoeuvring in Changing Rules of Traffic majority of the leadership at the central level, must be obeyed by the minority and must be implemented by organs of the party-state at lower levels. In this system the role of the communist party with the Polit Buro at the top is to provide the overall policy guidelines for the country, which are supposed to be implemented by the state apparatus assisted by the mass-organisations organised under the umbrella of the Vietnam Fatherland Front (VFF). The highest state organ is the National Assembly, which is also the only legislative power. However, the first National Assembly elected in 1946 was left ineffectual after the war and the country has effectively been ruled by the party (Porter 1993, p. 73). In addition, nomination of candidates for the National Assembly has been controlled by the CPV50 and many government officials are simultaneously party officials (Marr 1994a, p. 8).51 This has created institutional and personal overlap and in practice left the administration of the state under the control of the CPV. Furthermore, a number of standing departments under the CPV52 creates a parallel structure and those departments whose area of responsibility coincided with those of the government ministries have traditionally exercised considerable influence over those ministries (Porter 1993, p. 67). Also at the local levels party control has been exercised through party domination in the People’s Committees - the executive bodies of the popularly elected People’s councils (Turley 1993b, p. 332). The third component of the Vietnamese party-state; the mass-organisations, include Women’s Union, Youth Union, Farmers’ Union and the Confederation of Vietnamese Labour Unions. Together with special interest groups (for artists, journalists, intellectuals and various religions) the mass-organisations are placed under the umbrella of the VFF, which in turn is controlled by the CPV.53 The function of the mass-organisations is to link major socio-economic sectors and interest groups in society with the party in a dual fashion: by rallying support for and organise implementation of CPV policies at all levels, and by assisting the CPV in assessing the attitudes

50 In the past only candidates from the Vietnam Fatherland Front, which is controlled by the party, have been allowed to run for elections. With the introduction of reforms non-party members may now run for election, but only around 10% of the present legislature (2002-) are taken by non-party members (Voice of Vietnam 2002). 51 Although Marr notes that: “.. this practice may be less common now than in previous decades” (Marr 1994a, p. 8). 52 At the inner core of the Communist party is the Political Bureau, which consists of a small group of senior officials dealing with long term and ideological issues and giving direction to the party in between the plenums of the Central Committee. The Central Committee is the supreme leading organ of the party determining policies in between the National party Congress, which convenes every five years. Organisation of policy implementation is the responsibility of the Secretariat and a number of standing departments of the Central Committee (Porter 1993, pp. 65-66). 53 Thayer 1998, p. 449 and Porter 1993, p. 87

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The Art of Manoeuvring in Changing Rules of Traffic among these groups.54 While the mass-organisations are supposed to “constitute the political base of people’s power” (The Constitution of 1992, article 9) they are tightly controlled by the CPV by means of party members in leadership posts at all levels (Porter 1993, p. 88). It is thus clear that the party penetrates the whole system and has exercised its control over the state and the mass-organisations to the extent that it is difficult to draw clear boundaries between the various components of the party-state. This was in fact one of the criticisms raised by party officials in the 1980’s which, together with deep economic crisis, led to the introduction of the reform policy of doi moi to which I now turn.

5.2 The reform policy of doi moi and the reform process 5.2.1

The reform policy of doi moi

While the aim in 1976 was to build socialism in the South the way it had been built in the North, deep economic crisis - caused by natural disasters, economic mismanagement and the economic and political costs of engaging in a war with Cambodia - led to cautious experimentation with liberal economic reforms in 1979.55 Also calls for political reform were voiced, by prominent party officials.56 Especially the overlap between party and state organisations was criticised (Turley 1993b, p. 329). At the CPV’s sixth national congress, held in 1986, it was decided to embark on a process of reform termed doi moi (renovation), which included economic and political renovation. Economic reform initiatives introduced include a shift from collective to family-based farming; liberalisation of prices; rationalisation of the state-owned sector; liberalisation of external trade; and encouragement of foreign direct investment also referred to as “the open door policy” (UNDP 1999, p. 8). The reform process has led to a roll back of the state and according to Sidel the Vietnamese state is no longer the dominant provider of education, health and social services (Sidel 1995, p. 294). Even so there is reluctance among Vietnamese officials and even to intellectuals critical of the regime to support the idea that “… the state should limit its operations to what it can do best or what others in society refuse to do (Marr 1994a, p. 9).

54

Porter 1993, p. 87; and Beresford 1988, p. 120 Thayer 1998, p. 451; Marr 1994b, p. 5; Ljunggren 1997; pp. 480-81; and Turley 1993b, p. 328. 56 Many observers refer to Nguyen Khach Vien’s open letter to members of the National Assembly calling for a number of reforms in party-state relations. See Thayer 1998, p. 452; Marr 1994a, pp. 3 and 11; and Turley 1993b, p. 338. 55

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Political reforms introduced included renovation of the party-organisation, revitalisation of the mass organisations; introduction of less bureaucratic procedures in the state-apparatus; strengthening of the National Assembly and “the rule of law”; and increased independence of the media (Thayer 1992, p. 113).57 Although the reform measures created an atmosphere of liberalisation the extent of political reform had certain limitations. Marr points out that while people were encouraged to voice grievances openly they were only encouraged to do so via existing institutional channels (my emphasis), “… not by forming new organisations to push for change on their own initiative” (Marr 1994b, p. 5-6). Even so, by the late 1980s the Vietnamese leadership became worried that too harsh criticism would lead to a loss of public confidence in the party (Thayer 1992, p. 117). Also worried by the collapse of socialism in Eastern Europe and the Soviet Union as well as the events in China (the student demonstrations at Tiananmen Square) political liberalisation was cut short and party control was reasserted.58 Political reform measures introduced in the 1990s have been cautious and mainly oriented towards public administrative reform (UNDP 2001).

5.2.2

The dynamics of the reform process

The reform policy of doi moi was embarked upon more out of necessity than out of choice and it has never been the intention of the Vietnamese leadership to let go of the political power like it has happened for example in Eastern Europe. Despite the controlled manner the Vietnamese leadership seeks to apply to the reform process some observers suggest that the process of economic reform into which Vietnam has thrown itself, has its own dynamics, which will have significant political consequences (Ljunggren 1997, p. 477). Thayer, quoting Wain, suggests that the mono-organisational grip on society is slipping: “… not because the party is being directly challenged but because the whole system is being loosened by a multitude of developments” (Thayer 1992, p. 129).59 While officially the ideological basis of the regime is Marxist ideology, Ljunggren claims that “the undeniable incentive effects of the reforms on production created a

57

Thayer notes that possibly the most important factor in the liberalisation of press activity was not political but economic. As state subsidies were phased out the press began to explore popular topics, the number of publications – including those published without formal approval – increased rapidly (Thayer 1992, p. 117). 58 Thayer 1998, p. 456; Marr 1994b, pp. 5-6; Ljunggren 1997, p. 489; Turley 1993b, pp. 333-34; Porter 1993, p. 65. Examples include the co-optation of the Vietnam War Veterans Association from Ho Chi Minh City (Thayer 1991, p. 29) and tighter controls on the media and National Assembly deputies (Thayer 1992, pp. 123-24). Other developments commonly referred to is the voluntary dissolving of two political parties in 1988, which had operated legally in North Vietnam since 1954 (Thayer 1998, p. 453). 59 According to Ljunggren a new realm of social and cultural space for social organisations, discourse and advocacy is emerging, affecting the inner dynamics of political life in Vietnam (Ljunggren 1997, p. 491).

40

The Art of Manoeuvring in Changing Rules of Traffic dynamic process that “ditched” Marxist ideology” (Ljunggren 1997, p. 482). This in turn means, as Turley points out, that there is no longer a model for the Vietnamese leadership to follow and that experimentation is the way ahead (Turley 1993b, pp. 342-45). Making the same observation Fforde and Porter refers to: “the end of ideological certainty”. Which implies that: “… the party is simply not sure any longer what the correct institutional form or content should be in any particular instance” (Fforde and Porter 1994, p. 16). Ljunggren observes that: “… a new realm of free social and cultural space for social organizations, discourse, and advocacy is emerging … affecting the Vietnamese model and, gradually, the inner dynamics of political life in Vietnam” (Ljunggren 1997, p. 491). Marr also notes that the channels for voicing concerns have increased with doi moi but that formalised lobbying as understood in the western sense (discussing alternative draft laws, using the media, lobbying officials) is not possible (Marr 1994a, p. 14) Briefly drawing a line back to institutional theory it is thus clear that Vietnamese society is undergoing extensive institutional change and that old models and ways of doing things are being challenged through an experimental process which is no longer within the full control of the party. Within this context existing civic organisations are seeking to maintain their foothold and new civic initiatives including the Vietnamese NGOs are emerging. But before moving on to the civic sector in Vietnam let us take a look at the phenomenon of fence-breaking or fence jumping (vuot rao), which may help further our understanding of the nature of state-society relations and the dynamics of the environment in which new civic initiatives are emerging.

5.2.3

The nature of state-society relations and the concept of fence-breaking

The term fence-breaking, which was originally introduced in the Vietnamese economic literature, has had a major effect upon the Western discussion of Vietnamese society before and after doi moi (Fforde and Porter 1994, p. 13). It is a useful concept when trying to understand the nature of state-society relations in Vietnam. Marr notes that in post-war Vietnam “politics” was the domain of the CPV and “state affairs” was left to party officials, while everyone else concentrated on day-to-day survival in increasingly difficult conditions (Marr 1994a, p. 3). As a result there was a growing gap between 41

The Art of Manoeuvring in Changing Rules of Traffic politics and daily reality and Marr observes that it spurred the practice of fence breaking, “… wherein millions of Vietnamese found ways to evade or ignore rules and regulations which the party and state had promulgated on almost every subject imaginable” (Marr 1994a, p. 3). Marr notes that within the official system it has been a common practice for lower level organs to agree with a particular central formula and then proceed to apply it selectively (Marr 1994b, p. 7).60 Examining state-society relations Kerkvliet notes that “having ‘connections’ makes it possible, at least in some cases, for a citizen to get a favourable decision from a government office even if otherwise not merited or have that office ignore an infraction that the person has committed” (Kerkvliet 2000, p. 15). Citing research made on housing practices, he notes that limited resources for state law enforcement and local officials turning a blind eye allowed residents to avoid fines and other punishments even though they frequently did as they wanted. Kerkvliet notes that widespread violations compelled national authorities to make new laws that were more in line with what people were actually doing. More organised action cited by Kerkvliet includes workers strikes, (peaceful!) public demonstrations, the emergence of independent “NGOs”, and the resistance of the Buddhist Church of Vietnam to submit to the control of the authorities, examples which according to Kerkvliet are evidence of organised activity voicing citizen’s concerns at odds with those of the authorities or aimed at trying to influence policy. Examples of “fence-breaking” and more or less organised independent civic action shows us that it is in fact possible for people to ignore the state’s rules in some matters and to go beyond official channels to raise concerns. It also indicates that society beyond the state exists and activities in it from time to time influence policy debates and what authorities decide (Kerkvliet 2000, p. 41; Nørlund 1996, p. 82). Having examined the overall socio-political context and the dynamics of the reform process let us now turn to look at the characteristics of and conditions for civic activity in contemporary Vietnam.

60

Marr adds that it helps if the locality has someone at the centre who can advise on tactics and provide cover if necessary.

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5.3 Characteristics of and conditions for contemporary civic activity Officially, civic activity is the domain of the mass-organisations, but political liberalisation and socio-economic developments are opening up space to substantial private sector and informal sector activity. Combined, existing and new organisations make up a dynamic sector, which by some observers is termed “an emerging civic sector”.

5.3.1

Characteristics of the civic sector

In his article “The Emergence of a Nonprofit Sector and Philanthropy in The Socialist Republic of Vietnam”, Sidel proposes an elaborate typology of the organisations inhabiting the Vietnamese civic sector. He distinguishes between: newer, more independent policy research and teaching groups (mainly in the North); Ho Chi Minh City and other southern social activism and social services network; quasi-public/quasi-private and private universities and other educational institutions; senior leader-supported patronage groups supporting training and research projects; professional and business associations; peasant associations and collectives; religious groups, temples and churches; mass-organisations and trade unions; and political activism groups (Sidel 1995).61 Organisations originally established under the VFF structure include a number of the professional associations, some peasant collectives established before 1986 and the massorganisations and trade unions, who are trying to re-define their role according to the new situation. Many of these organisations date back to the revolution in the 1930s and the introduction of socialism in North Vietnam after 1954. Combined, the socio-political organisations under the VFF constitute an elaborate structure of membership-based organisations reaching from central level to the local levels. With the economic developments new more or less independent business associations are emerging, especially – it seems – in the South where the economic developments have been most extensive (Wischermann 2001). Also new peasant associations and community groups operating locally are being established on a voluntary basis. Together with the new more or less private educational initiatives these

61

See Annex 12 for a fuller description of Sidel’s typology.

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The Art of Manoeuvring in Changing Rules of Traffic relatively new initiatives seem mainly motivated by socio-economic objectives and many operate on a local basis. While organised political activity seems non-existent religious groups and individuals are often associated with a position critical of the regime and prominent religious leaders are kept under close watch by the authorities. Aside from the political aspect, religious groups often function on a local basis as a social network for followers and beneficiaries of charity work. Finally, the senior leader-supported patronage groups, the social services networks in the South and the policy research and training groups in the North include newer more or less independent initiatives. These groups are based in the urban centres of Hanoi and Ho Chi Minh and engage in a variety of activities locally as well as central level policy research. It is within this group the Vietnamese NGOs examined in this thesis are found. Other groupings or networks, which may be termed “civic”, but which are more informal in character, and therefore difficult to discern, include informal village networks and personal relations with party and/or government officials, based on for example common geographic origin, educational and/or military background.62 It is thus clear that although civil society as conceptualised in the contemporary literature on civil society and NGOs reviewed in chapter 3 does not seem to exist in Vietnam a range of different organisations neither belonging strictly to the state nor to the market sector can be identified. So some kind of civil society seems to exist and new initiatives within this sector emerge. With the concept of fence-breaking we have seen that there is space for informal and independent civic activity, but how about more formalised and independent civic activity? Considering the general position of the party-state towards independent civic activity how is it possible at all for organisations in the civic sector to establish and gain a legal basis?

5.3.2

The legal framework for civic activity

The Constitution from 1992 provides for socially oriented organisations by guaranteeing citizens’ rights to become involved in organisations that benefit society and the Civil Code from

62

See Kerkvliet 2000, p. 14 for examples of how such relations may work.

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The Art of Manoeuvring in Changing Rules of Traffic 1995 underscores the right to establish not-for profit organisations (ICNL 1996, p. 2). In addition legislation relating to civic activity includes:63 Decree No. 001 of 1957 by the President* Decree No. 258 of 1957 by the Prime Minister provide the basic framework for NGOs Instruction No. 001 of 1989 by the Prime Minister referring to the organisation of operation of the NGOs Decree 35/CP-1992 on Science and Technology Organisations Decree no. 177/1999/ND-CP of December 22, 1999 Promulgating the Regulation on Organization and Operation of the Social Funds and Charity Funds* Law on Science and Technology No. 21/2000/QH10 of June 9, 2000* The decrees from 1957 are generally considered outdated by Vietnamese observers. The instruction from 1989 seems to relate to the implementation of the 1957 decrees. The decree from 1992 allows the establishment of not-for profit science and technology organisations. The decree from 1999 which by observers has been referred to as “the secret NGO-law” has a rather restrictive character, leaving ample scope for the authorities to interfere in the operation of organisations establishing under this decree. The law on science and technology from 2000 updates and replaces the decree from 1992. In addition the government has been drafting a law on associations since 1993, but as of yet it has not been presented to the National Assembly and according to most observers in Vietnam it is not expected to be on the legislation agenda in near future. Although, a number of new laws thus exist to govern the area of civic activity, overall the legal framework regulating civic activity is restrictive, complex and fragmented (ICNL 1996) and implementation is inconsistent.64

63 The list is compiled based on information from interviews with representatives of the Civil Society Working Group in Hanoi and from ICNL’s homepage (see references). I have been able to obtain English language copies of those legal documents marked with * during my field trip. There is some inconsistency in the information given by my sources, which might stem from confusion between decrees and laws outlining the overall regulations and instructions or regulations specifying the administration of the decrees and laws. This is not only a problem in relation to doing research on the topic, it is also a problem in relation to the implementation of the laws because the capacity with the local authorities and the awareness of legal developments in different sectors is limited. 64 Generally Vietnamese legal documents emphasise loyalty to the Vietnamese socialist institutions and political culture. Some examples from The Constitution of 1992 give an idea about the character of the legal documents. Here the role of the VFF and its member-organisations as “… the political base of people’s power” (Article 9) is underscored. It emphasises the duties of the citizens: “The citizens’ rights are inseparable from his duties” (Article

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While the mass-organisations are officially sanctioned the legal basis of the new organisations is rather tedious (Sidel 1995). In an extensive study of “civic organisations” in Vietnam Wischermann notes that the process of getting the required permissions to set up and run a civic organisation is intransparent and often fraught with obstacles along the way (Wischermann 2001).65 The permission of at least one or two societal organisations is required to establish a new “civic organization”. This may be a professional association (for example the Association for Psychology and Pedagogy); and/or a socio-political organisation (for example Women’s Union, Farmers Union or the Vietnamese Union of Science and Technology Associations); and/or a political-administrative institution (for example a sub-unit of a Ministry or a local People’s Committee) (Wischermann 2001, p. 10). It is thus clear that while it is in fact possible to gain a legal basis for a civic organisation it is not necessarily easy. But how then, once established, do the civic organisations attract human and financial resources necessary to carry out their activities? Again the mass-organisations being at least partly - officially sponsored and membership-based can draw on substantial financial and human resources, but how about the new more independent organisations, which are not membership-based and who are not entitled to government financing?

5.3.3

Human and financial resources

Whereas independent organisations in other countries, like for example the Philippines have been able to raise funds from a wealthy business class, the socialist legacy does not allow independent organisations in Vietnam this opportunity.66 Many Vietnamese (at least in the cities) have two or three jobs to be able to pay for health care services, their children’s education, etc. and very few individuals of working age feel inclined to engage in organised philanthropic work. New independent organisations thus rely mainly on retired government officials and professional 51) while the state guarantees the rights of the citizen; the citizen must fulfil his duties to the State and society.” (Article 51). Respect of elders (Article 64), loyalty to the motherland (Article 75), and safeguarding of social order (Article 79) are also recurrent themes. 65 Wischermann makes a rough distinction between the mass-organisations; professional associations; organizations of business men/women (only in Ho Chi Minh City); and issue-oriented organisations (which more or less seems to correspond with the newer and more or less independent activities, which again more or less corresponds with the VNGOs examined in this study) (Wischermann 2001). 66 In fact with a GDP per capita of around 350 USD Vietnam ranges as one of the poorest countries in the world (UNDP 1999).

46

The Art of Manoeuvring in Changing Rules of Traffic (salaried) staff and for a substantial part of the funding they seem to rely on external sources such as overseas foundations and foreign development agencies in Vietnam (Gray 1999, Sidel 1995). It thus seems that foreign funding is one of the prerequisites for the emergence of new civic organisations in contemporary Vietnam. Before turning to look more closely at the VNGOs let us therefore take a brief look at the development co-operation in Vietnam: More than 45 donor agencies have development co-operation with Vietnam and around 350 International NGOs (INGOs), of which 100 have staffed offices in Vietnam, are active in the country. Official development assistance pledges reach around 2.2 billion USD annually and assistance provided via INGOs at 83 million USD (UNDP and MPI 2001). Because of the political sensitivity relating to civic activity, donors and INGOs working locally have traditionally worked with local authorities and local branches of the mass-organisations. However, the interest of the international donors and INGOs to work with emerging local NGOs and civil society issues is increasing and considering the amount of aid money flowing into the country there seems to be ample financial resources available for independent civic organisations looking for foreign funding.67

5.4 Summing up – the Vietnamese socio-political context Based on the above introduction to the Vietnamese socio-political context it is clear that the environment in which the VNGOs are emerging is characterised by institutions which do not seem to support the emergence of independent civic activity. Political power is highly centralised within the hierarchical structures of the party-state and the management of society takes place according to the principle of “democratic centralism” in a top-down manner. At the same time however, it is clear that the reform process of doi moi is characterised by liberalisation and experimentation, which creates scope for de-institutionalisation and new ways of doing things. With the phenomenon of “fence-breaking” we have seen that formal policies can be influenced by informal and even illegal behaviour, which is formalised and legalised a posteriori. Even so it is clear that any activity which may be regarded political in character 67

This interest is for example reflected in the emergence of INGO- and donor-working groups on issues relating to civil society and NGOs (including the NGO-donor Civil Society Working Group and the VUFO-NGO Resource Centre Poverty Policy Learning Group) in the latter part of the 1990s.

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The Art of Manoeuvring in Changing Rules of Traffic and/or thought to constitute a challenge to the political regime will not be tolerated if it comes to the attention of the authorities. It is clear that although the official institutions do not allow much space for the emergence of independent civic activity, co-existing institutions exist. This is perhaps most clearly discernible when looking at the legal framework – or the regulative institutions – for civic activity. Also the ability of the authorities to monitor and control the reform process new initiatives emerging is decreasing as the reform process evolves. This seems to provide at least initial space needed for independent civic organisations to emerge. Finally, the presence of a large number of international donors and NGO and with them development projects, which brings not only flows of resources and activities, but also new ideas may be of significance when trying to understand the emergence of the VNGOs. On this basis, let us now turn to look more closely at the VNGOs and how they interrelate with their environment.

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6 The Vietnamese NGOs In the following I introduce the Vietnamese NGOs (VNGOs). Initially I will present synthesised data about the whole VNGO population surveyed to give an idea about the key-characteristics of the VNGOs. While the overview is rather “facts-based” and provides a somewhat static picture of the VNGO population the subsequent introduction to the case-organisations and analysis will give a more dynamic picture of the VNGOs and how they interrelate with their environment.

6.1 Overview of the Vietnamese NGOs In the following I seek to establish an overview of the VNGO population and their keycharacteristics. Aside from serving as a background for the introduction to the case-organisations the overview also supports the analyses in chapter 8 and 9.

6.1.1

Time of establishment

The VNGOs surveyed were established between 1985 and 2001. However, only one VNGO was established before the introduction of doi moi in 1986 and more than two thirds of the VNGOs emerged during the period 1993-1997.

8 6 4 2 0 19 85 19 89 19 90 19 92 19 93 19 94 19 95 19 96 19 97 19 98 19 99 20 00 20 01

Number of VNGOs

Time of establishment

n=26

6.1.2

Legal basis and registration

A rough distinction can be made between the VNGOs established upon the initiative of the government and those established upon private initiative. Some VNGOs are hard to place because they all stress their “independence from the government”, but it seems that six out of twenty-six questionnaire respondents, mainly established in the early years of the reform 49

The Art of Manoeuvring in Changing Rules of Traffic process, belong to the first group, which makes them a kind of “government-NGOs (G-VNGOs). These organisations are usually set up under the auspices of a ministry, an existing association, or an academic institution. The remaining VNGOs seem to have their legal basis in the decree on science and technology organisations from 1992, which is administered on the central level by the Ministry of Science and Technology and Environment (MoSTE) and the city level Department of Science and Technology and Environment (DoSTE).

Legal basis/registration Private/ registered under the Law on Science and Technology from 1992

23%

77%

G-VNGO / established under an official organ

n=26

Out of the VNGOs registered under the decree on science and technology organisations from 1992 around two thirds have co-registered with the Vietnamese Union for Science and Technology Associations (VUSTA) or a professional association. The remaining VNGOs have not co-registered.

Registration and co-registration Only registered w ith MoSTE or DoSTE

35%

40%

25%

Co-registered w ith VUSTA Co-registered w ith a professional association

n=20

6.1.3

Background of founders and directors

Some of the VNGOs are founded by a single individual, but most of them are founded by two or more individuals and in one case up to 19 individuals have founded the organisation.

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The Art of Manoeuvring in Changing Rules of Traffic

Number of VNGOs

Number of founders 6 5 4 3 2 1 0 1

3

5

7

9

11

13

15

17

19

n=24

The key founder, who is often also the director, is usually a senior and charismatic individual who personifies the organisation. All of the key founders have a university degree, most of them a master’s degree or a PhD, in human or natural sciences. Except from the G-VNGOs, which are usually headed by senior government officials, the founders/directors of the VNGOs are almost all retired government or party-officials or academia. Although officially retired some of the founders/directors still hold positions with the official system.

6.1.4

Organisational structure and staffing

While the G-VNGOs often form part of a more extensive organisational structure most of the remaining VNGOs are only represented in Hanoi. With a couple of exceptions among the GVNGOs, none of the VNGOs are membership-based. Instead they are staffed with professional staff. Around two thirds of the VNGOs have 20 employees or less.

Number of VNGOs

Total number of staff 8 6 4 2 0 5 1-

10 6-

5 -1 11

0 -2 16

5 -2 21

0 -3 26

0 >3

n=26

Around 25% of the VNGOs are staffed only with full time staff and the remaining share is staffed with a combination of full time and part time staff. Full time staff is usually composed by young graduates while part time positions are often held by individuals who simultaneously hold 51

The Art of Manoeuvring in Changing Rules of Traffic full time senior positions within the official system. In addition there is an extensive use of “collaborators”, which appears to be more loosely associated senior officials. In addition almost four out of ten VNGOs have an international volunteer, funded by international organisations.

6.1.5

Organisational identity

Almost eight out of ten prefer to refer to their organisation as “NGO” while four out of ten like to refer to their organisation as “centre”. With seven respondents simultaneously referring to their organisation as “NGO” and “centre” and one respondent simultaneously referring to their organisation as “NGO” and “institute” there is extensive overlap or what could be termed “dual organisational labelling” among the VNGOs.

O NG

Ce nt re

itu te In st

tio n As so c ia

ny

25 20 15 10 5 0 Co m pa

Number of VNGOs

Organisational identity

n=26

According to the VNGOs interviewed, the main criteria defining “NGO” can be synthesised in the following way:68 An NGO is an organisation, which: … does not get staff salary from the government … works not-for-profit … is voluntary and not established upon the initiative of a government agency69 … works for the people/the country

68

The wording I have chosen is as close as possible to the wording proposed by the VNGOs themselves. The first defining parameter was mentioned first by virtually all the interviewees and the second and third was mentioned interchangeably as the second or the third defining parameter. While the fourth and fifth parameter was mentioned by virtually all interviewees as characteristics of their organisation not everyone mentioned those parameters as distinct characteristics for an NGO. 69 The term “voluntary” seems to refer to the term: ”not established upon the initiative of a government agency”

52

The Art of Manoeuvring in Changing Rules of Traffic … works according to government policies and laws Although most of the organisations interviewed stress their financial and managerial independence from the government I found that all interviewees made a point of emphasising that they work in accordance with government policies.

6.1.6

Activities and funding

According to the questionnaire survey at least half of the funding is from international aid agencies. Out of this share almost two thirds comes from international NGOs and the remaining share is almost evenly shared between multilateral and bilateral donors.

Sources of funding Commercial services

12%

19%

Government funded projects

17% 52%

International aid agencies funding Other

n=24

Based on interviews, I estimate that the share of funding coming from international aid agencies in the form of grants or payment for consulting services is closer to 70%. The remaining share comes mainly from government-funded projects and one G-VNGO notes that they raise a membership fee. There is a clear orientation towards the international aid agencies and projectbased work among the VNGOs, apparently as a result of the funding structure - in fact it seems that the main motivation for co-operating with the international aid agencies is to obtain funding. While budgets are not willingly disclosed I estimate, based on the sketchy information I was able to obtain, that the VNGOs operate with budgets from some few ten thousand to a few hundred thousand USD per year. Although some VNGOs claim to undertake advocacy or policy advice, the core activities aside from project implementation are training and research.

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The Art of Manoeuvring in Changing Rules of Traffic

th er O

R

es ea rc h

Tr ai ni ng

Pr oj ec ts

30 25 20 15 10 5 0 Ad vo ca cy Po l ic y ad vi ce

Number of VNGOs

Activities

n=26

All of the VNGOs seem to be oriented towards socio-economic development in rural areas and they cover a broad range of sectors including environment, education and health. Although the VNGOs are based in Hanoi, most of them claim to work nationwide, although they seem to concentrate their activities to the central and northern regions of the country. The level of intervention seems to be concentrated around the province, district and commune level.

6.1.7

Networking with other Vietnamese NGOs

Despite limited VNGO-co-operation some networking seems to be going on among the VNGOs and two networking structures can be identified. While both networking structures are informal, one of the networking structures – making reference to a secretariat, mission statement and internal regulations for the network – seems to have a relatively formalised set-up. The other networking structure is very informal and most of the interviewees preferred to refer to it as a merely series of meetings and not actually a “network”.70 Having established a “facts-based” overview of some of the key-characteristics of the VNGO population I will introduce the three case-organisations.

6.2 Introduction to the case-organisations[krp2] The three case-studies constitute the main empirical basis for the analysis presented in chapter 7, where I examine how the VNGOs manoeuvre in relation to key-interest groups in their environment. The three case-organisations are: 70

All of the VNGOs covered in this study participate in one or both of the VNGO networking structures.

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The Art of Manoeuvring in Changing Rules of Traffic

“Vietnamese NGO X” (VNGO-X), founded in the early 1990s by a group of academic scholars, headed by Professor X1; “Vietnamese NGO Y” (VNGO-Y), established in the early 1990s by Mr./Mrs. Y1, a retired government official; and “Vietnamese NGO Z” (VNGO-Z) founded in the mid-1990s by Mr./Mrs. Z1, who has previously worked with the government as well as with the international aid community.

6.2.1

Vietnamese NGO X - VNGO-X

“Vietnamese NGO X” (VNGO-X) was founded in the early 1990s by a group of academic scholars. The key founder and director Professor X1 was retired at the time of foundation. VNGO-X was granted legal status by the National Scientific and Technique Committee (later the Ministry of Science, Technology and Environment (MoSTE)) and is registered with VUSTA. The organisation has a core group of 11-15 - mainly full-time - staff and a number of “collaborators”. The representative office in Hanoi forms part of a larger network, with offices in Ho Chi Minh City and other parts of the country. The management interviewees perceive VNGO-X as an “institute” and an “NGO”, which they define as a not-for profit organisation doing research in the field of development. They explain that they are different from for example an association, which in their mind assembles people and works for profit. The management staff stress that VNGO-X is “the unique Vietnamese NGO”. Unfortunately I was not able to get a definition of this particular term, but the management staff stress that VNGO-X is based on voluntary work, which seems to be defined as unpaid work. Approximately 30% of VNGO-X’s funding comes from carrying out government-funded projects and 70% is based on funding from international aid agencies (IAAs).

6.2.2

Vietnamese NGO Y - VNGO-Y

When Mr./Mrs. Y1, who holds a university degree, retired from a leading position with the government, he/she set up “Vietnamese NGO Y” (VNGO-Y). He/she was contemplating either to set up a small business in Hanoi, which he/she notes, would be in his/her own self-interest, or

55

The Art of Manoeuvring in Changing Rules of Traffic he/she could work in the rural areas, which he/she thought would serve a broader purpose and be “more significant”. VNGO-Y has its legal basis in the decree on science and technology organisations from 1992 and is registered with DoSTE. VNGO-Y is neither registered with any professional association nor with VUSTA. VNGO-Y has more than 25 full-time staff and awaits the arrival of one international volunteer. The organisation does not form part of a larger organisational set-up, but Mr./Mrs. Y1 also runs a small related for-profit business. Mr./Mrs. Y1 perceives his/her organisation as an “NGO”, by which is understood an organisation which: “works outside of the government, not-for profit in order to support the government”. The main activities seem to be project implementation and training activities. Approximately 30% of VNGO-Y’s funding comes from services offered on a commercial basis to other organisations/individuals, 10% is government funded projects and 60% is based on funding from IAAs.

6.2.3

Vietnamese NGO Z - VNGO-Z

“Vietnamese NGO Z” (VNGO-Z) was founded in the mid-1990s by Mr./Mrs. Z1. Mr./Mrs. Z1 holds a university degree and has worked with the government and subsequently with the international aid community until he/she decided to establish his/her own organisation. VNGO-Z has its legal basis in the decree on science and technology organisations from 1992 and is registered with DoSTE. VNGO-Z is not registered with any professional association nor with VUSTA. VNGO-Z has 16-20 full-time staff and one international volunteer. The organisation does not form part of a larger organisation. The organisation perceives itself as a “Centre” and a “support organisation”. VNGO-Z engages in local community development through training, research, and project activities. Approximately 30% of the funding comes from services offered on a commercial basis to other organisations/individuals, 10% is government funded projects and 60% is based on funding from 56

The Art of Manoeuvring in Changing Rules of Traffic IAAs. Aside from project based funding VNGO-Z also receives some organisational (i.e. continuous) funding from international partners

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The Art of Manoeuvring in Changing Rules of Traffic

7 How do the Vietnamese NGOs manoeuvre in relation to interest groups in their immediate environment? In this part of the analysis I seek to throw light on the first working question about how the Vietnamese NGOs (VNGOs) manoeuvre in relation to interest groups in their environment. In theoretical terms, I examine how the VNGOs respond strategically to institutional pressures in their environment (ref. chapter 2 and 4). Before I move on let me briefly recap what Oliver (1991) and Suchman (1995), had to say about strategic responses (ref. chapter 2 and 4). According to Oliver and Suchman, organisations may respond strategically in various ways to institutional pressures. Responses can be more or less consciously guided and more or less active in character and range from compliance; compromise and selection; avoidance; defiance; to manipulation. While I will not stick strictly to this typology it underlies my examination of the VNGOs strategic responses to institutional pressures. Institutional pressures are facilitated by interest groups in the immediate environment of the VNGOs. In chapter 2 the party-state is identified as the most important interest group facilitating institutional pressures to which the VNGOs respond. The primary relation examined in section 7.1 is therefore that between the VNGOs and the party-state. Secondary relations assumed to exercise influence on the primary relation, are the relation to the international aid agencies examined in section 7.2 and the relation to other VNGOs examined in section 7.3. Finally, in section 7.4 I sum up the analysis in a discussion, which also serves as an answer to the first working question.

7.1 Relations to the party-state In my examination of the VNGOs’ manoeuvres in relation to the party state I examine how they interrelate with the party-state in relation to the process of establishing and registration and in day-to-day interaction. In my examination of the day-to-day interaction I focus on relations to the central authorities in relation to policy-making processes and on relations to local authorities in relation to project implementation.

58

The Art of Manoeuvring in Changing Rules of Traffic In the following I examine the three case organisations one by one and then in section 7.1.4, I synthesise my observations in a discussion about the strategic responses identified.

7.1.1

Vietnamese NGO X - VNGO-X

Noting the developmental problems in his field of expertise the director, Mr./Mrs. X1, together with the group of founding members decided to set up an organisation to address these issues. Stressing that VNGO-X is the “the unique Vietnamese NGO”, the management staff explains that when the organisation was established in the early 1990s the legal basis for NGOs in Vietnam was weak. They tell me that the director Mr./Mrs. X1 enjoys high recognition by the highest-ranking party and Government officials and that he/she explained the idea to former Prime Minister Vo Van Kiet. That way VNGO-X was granted legal status by the National Scientific and Technique Committee (later MoSTE). Initially VNGO-X only registered with the National Scientific and Technique Committee, but later registered with the Vietnamese Union for Science and Technology Associations (VUSTA). Seemingly seeking to emphasise their independent status, the management staff of VNGO-X did not elaborate much on their relations to the party-state in the interviews conducted. Aside from getting confirmed that VNGO-X is registered with MoSTE and with VUSTA I was not able to find out more about their working relationship with these bodies. VNGO-X’s core activities are project implementation, research and publication and the organisation does not seek to engage directly in policy advice or advocacy activities. However, based on their status as academics with the official system and their good relations with central level authorities, the director and management staff are regularly invited to participate in various policy-consultations at central level. I found that one of the management staff, Mr./Mrs. X2, regularly participates in high level donor-government meetings, where the Vietnamese NGOs included in this study are not invited. A little surprised I asked if he/she was there as a representative of VNGO-X and it turned out that he/she did not participate as a representative of VNGO-X, but as a representative of an official government institute, to which he/she is also associated. It generally seems that VNGO-X enjoys good working relations with the party-state. During project implementation VNGO-X works closely with district and commune authorities and massorganisations and they do not seem to find this set-up cumbersome or in any way problematic. In 59

The Art of Manoeuvring in Changing Rules of Traffic fact Mr./Mrs. X2 emphasises that they prefer to work with the existing structures of the local authorities and mass-organisations at the local level instead of establishing project-user-groups, as the international NGOs commonly do. In his/her mind project user groups disrupts “the order” at the local level and Mr./Mrs. X2 explains that: “... we don’t want to have something against the government”.

7.1.2

Vietnamese NGO Y - VNGO-Y

Even though Mr./Mrs. Y1 also has a high status within the official system, he/she relates quite differently to the party-state. Where VNGO-X seems to use the status of the management staff to link with the party-state Mr./Mrs. Y1 seems to use his/her status to avoid interacting too much with the party-state. Mr./Mrs. Y1 tells me that when he/she retired from a position with the government he/she wanted to stay active after retirement and maintain contact with people. Based on his/her previous experience he/she found that there were many problems in her field of expertise. Mr./Mrs. Y1 explains that when he/she retired he/she “… had no concept of NGO” and initially set up an organisation, which he/she registered under the umbrella structure of VVF and the mass-organisations. However, he/she found that they were “… too difficult to work with” and when the decree on science and technology organisations was issued in 1992, he/she decided to set up his/her own independent centre and subsequently established VNGO-Y. Mr./Mrs. Y1 has consciously decided to minimise the registration of VNGO-Y to the Department of Science, Technology and Environment (DoSTE). When I ask him/her why he/she has not registered VNGO-Y with an umbrella organisation - for example VUSTA - he/she explains that the advantage for VNGOs under the city authorities is that they are more independent from government than if they were under VUSTA. However, he/she points out that VNGOs registering with VUSTA “… have more power with the people because of bigger stamp”, while VNGOs registering with DoSTE “… have less power with the people because of smaller stamp”. The core activities of VNGO-Y are project implementation and research. According to the questionnaire survey VNGO-Y also engages in “advocacy” and Mr./Mrs. Y1 explains that he/she is often invited to consult various government bodies, based on VNGO-Y’s work. However, he/she mentions that while he/she finds the contact easy he/she prefers “… not to work too much 60

The Art of Manoeuvring in Changing Rules of Traffic with the government”, because: “… they have another way of working”. It is clear that Mr./Mrs. Y1 is seeking maximum independence and despite enjoying a high status and obviously having good contacts within the system71, he/she seems to avoid having too much formal contact with the official organs at central level. It seems that he/she only involves him/herself to the extent that he/she thinks it is necessary in order not to upset anyone. For example he/she mentions that although he/she finds that the mass-organisations at central level are rather unimportant he/she sometimes attends meetings hosted by them because they may indirectly influence the government’s attitude to the VNGOs. In relation to project implementation VNGO-Y, like VNGO-X, works through the existing structures of local authorities and mass-organisations, but Mr./Mrs. Y1 emphasises that the objective is not to help the local authorities and/or mass-organisations, but to work through them to help the people.

7.1.3

Vietnamese NGO Z - VNGO-Z

The background of VNGO-Z and its founder is quite different from VNGO-X and VNGO-Y in that the founder of VNGO-Z Mr./Mrs. Z1 does not come from a high position with the government. This seems to influence the way VNGO-Z is manoeuvring in relation to the state, where Mr./Mrs. Z1 consciously tries to avoid the attention of the authorities. By the mid-1990s, when Mr./Mrs. Z1 established VNGO-Z, international aid agencies had arrived in large numbers and were initiating their development programmes in co-operation with the Vietnamese authorities. Mr./Mrs. Z1, tells me how, based on his/her experience working with international aid agencies, he/she observed that they: “… lack local knowledge”. He/she had also observed that as part of the reform process the state was resigning from certain tasks it took care of before and generally found that the state is not suited to reach the poorest and the ethnic minorities. Thus inspired and based on a belief that an independent local organisation could “do it better and cheaper” he/she set up VNGO-Z. Recognising that he/she was doing something new that could potentially be looked upon with disapproval by the authorities he/she started out on a “trial basis” in a small rented office. He/she did not expect any support from the government because, as he/she says “… the government had no experience in supporting private sector initiatives” nor did he/she expect to get support from international aid agencies because

71

his/her wife/husband was also a high-ranking government official.

61

The Art of Manoeuvring in Changing Rules of Traffic he/she finds that they prefer to go for “strong partners”. While VNGO-Z got some financial support from some international aid agencies for computer and office equipment, activities carried out during the first year were self-financed. Wanting to test if it was possible to minimise the registration Mr./Mrs. Z1 registered VNGO-Z DoSTE and did not pursue any additional registration. He/she says that registering with an umbrella organisation: “… is only for those formerly high-ranking officials who have contacts”, which he/she adds, he/she does not have. About the relations to DoSTE Mr./Mrs. Z1 explains that they visited VNGO-Z regularly the first two years to review the activities of the organisation, but that now VNGO-Z just has to send a report to DoSTE every year. Mr./Mrs. Z1 tells me that VNGO-Z “… does not have relation with national government because it is unclear about the attitude of the national government to local developmental organisations, so it is better to stay a little far from the national government.” The core activities of VNGO-Z are project implementation, training and research and VNGO-Z does not attempt to engage directly in advocacy or policy-making at central level. Mr./Mrs. Z1 explains that: “concerning the voice of the people VNGO-Z is serving he/she believes that at this stage it is better to make them known to the local government …”. Another channel proposed is to: “… develop a strong association with other social development organisations who can talk with the Government.” Finally, another “indirect” way suggested is to participate in national workshops and conferences. In relation to project implementation VNGO-Z works through the existing structure of local authorities and mass-organisations and Mr./Mrs. Z1 explains that he/she finds it more important to establish good relations locally than at the central level. He/she explains: “… if you disturb their community you will be out”. Even so, VNGO-Z also seems to apply the working methods used by many international aid agencies, establishing local user groups as part of the project implementation, and although Mr./Mrs. Z1 expresses concern with their sustainability after the termination of the project he, unlike Mr./Mrs. X2 from VNGO-X, does not seem to find that they constitute a problem in relation to “the order” at the local level.

62

The Art of Manoeuvring in Changing Rules of Traffic 7.1.4

Discussion of findings - how the Vietnamese NGOs manoeuvre in relation to the party-state

In chapter 2 and 4 on institutional and strategic theory I noted that although institutions connote stability they are also subject to change processes and given the assumed existence of interrelating and co-existing institutions there is considerable latitude for organisations to manoeuvre strategically in their cultural environment. A number of more or less consciously guided and more or less proactive responses were identified ranging from compliance; compromise and selection; avoidance; defiance; to manipulation. Having observed how the VNGOs manoeuvre in the process of setting up and in their day-to-day operations it is clear that there is significant diversity in the strategies applied by the VNGOs in relation to the party-state and official institutional pressures. When the first VNGOs were established there were no evident role models to imitate, i.e. no cultural-cognitive institutional support; there was no officially sanctioned role for local NGOs, i.e. no normative institutional support; and there was no official legal basis for NGO activity, i.e. no regulative support. It is therefore not surprising to find that the process of establishing the VNGOs has been characterised by experimentation and processes of trial-and-error. Thus, Mr./Mrs. Y1 was not aware of the concept of NGO and given the lack of alternative models he/she initially registered his/her organisation, in what could be termed “the conventional way”, i.e. under the umbrella of a mass-organisation. He/she later decided to re-organise because the initial set-up with the mass-organisation was not workable. Mr./Mrs. Z1 from VNGO-Z set out on a trial basis and other interviewees tell similar stories about how they started out on a kind of trial period during which time they had to prove their work to the Government, to obtain a legal basis, or how different tedious set-ups were tried out before the present workable set-up was found. Not enjoying any institutional support, the VNGOs have had to “create a rationale” for their behaviour and actively manipulate institutional pressures or negotiate existing institutions in order to gain a foothold. This was the case for the founders of VNGO-X who had to explain their purpose to the highest ranking government officials and negotiate their legal status on an individual basis with the National Scientific Technique Committee in order to be able to set up VNGO-X. It seems that the group of founders of VNGO-X have used their combined and certainly Mr./Mrs. X1’s personal status within the party-state to negotiate for a license to set up their institute. It is doubtful that the founders or the government had much of an idea of the 63

The Art of Manoeuvring in Changing Rules of Traffic concept of NGO when VNGO-X was set up, but it is clear that the initiative was deviating sufficiently from the usual practice to require special permission and strategic use of personal relations to high-ranking officials in order to obtain formal sanctioning. Other interviewees also explain how the background and status of the founders with the official system was useful in the initial phase dealing with administrative procedures and explaining the idea to the authorities. It is my impression from interviews with the VNGOs that many feel that the process of setting up has not been easy. Some interviewees observe that it is easier to establish an NGO today than it was earlier, and it seems that the decree on science and technology organisations from 1992 has been instrumental in allowing an organisation like VNGO-Y to develop from an organisation operating directly under the wings of the official structure to a more independently operating organisation solely registered with the city authorities. It also seems that it has been instrumental in allowing a person like Mr./Mrs. Z1 with no status within the official system to set up VNGOZ. The context in which VNGO-Z emerged in the mid 1990s was already quite different from the context in which VNGO-X and VNGO-Y emerged in the early 1990s. International NGOs had arrived in large numbers and the Vietnamese authorities had been exposed to the concept of NGOs. Thus, although the idea of local NGOs was not normatively or regulatively supported, the idea of NGOs had entered into the Vietnamese vocabulary and was being established as a cognitively imaginable category. In addition the decree on science and technology organisations was introduced in 1992 and it seems that through creative interpretation of this decree it has become possible, even for individuals coming from a weak position, to gain a legal basis, i.e. regulative support, for the establishment of a VNGO. While both VNGO-Z and VNGO-Y seek maximum independence from the party-state by minimising the registration to the city authorities (DoSTE), VNGO-X co-registers with central level authorities (MoSTE) and a central level umbrella organisation (VUSTA), thus linking itself more closely to the official system. It seems that different time of establishment (which causes different institutional pressures), different backgrounds and differently felt needs of independence influences the different manoeuvring tactics adopted by the VNGOs in relation to the party-state in the process of setting up. But before I attempt to sum up the different responses identified, I would like to discuss how the VNGOs interact with the central and local levels of the party-state in the course of carrying out day-to-day activities.

64

The Art of Manoeuvring in Changing Rules of Traffic Political matters are traditionally the domain of the party-state and engaging in policy making and advocacy activities in the western sense of the term is considered controversial. Although VNGO-X management staffs participate in various meetings and conferences, they are not explicitly concerned with policy making or advocacy and thus seem to comply with the institutional pressures of leaving politics to the party-state. However, a foreign observer notes that VNGO-X has “… their own way of speaking with the government”. An IAA working closely with VNGO-X notes that Mr./Mrs. X2 is not “… holding him/herself back to get up and make pretty political statements” – as a representative of an NGO. This seems to imply that VNGO-X makes use of informal channels to raise their concerns. Although VNGO-Z claims not to engage in policy making or advocacy activities, VNGO-Z does express concern with “the voice of the people VNGO-Z is serving”, but finds that it is better to raise these concerns indirectly through local level government; other social development organisations; and participation in workshops and national conferences. In this way VNGO-Z avoids direct contact with the central level authorities and creates a “buffer” to protect it from the (potentially negative) attention of the authorities. VNGO-Y, apparently not afraid of challenging institutional pressures, claims to engage in advocacy. How this advocacy activity takes place is uncertain, but according to a foreign observer Mr./Mrs. Y1, is one of the few VNGO directors who “speaks directly with government”. Based on my talks with Mr./Mrs. Y1 and Vietnamese and foreign observers, it seems to me that he/she is not afraid of defying existing norms and practices – as long as it takes place within the overall framework of “loyalty to the government”. In relation to project implementation all the case-organisations work with the local authorities and the mass-organisations. While VNGO-X clearly thinks that this constitutes the most appropriate way of doing things and denounces alternative ways of doing things, VNGO-Y emphasises that the co-operation is only instrumental, i.e. a means to help the people. Both VNGO-X and VNGO-Y thus comply with institutional pressures to work with the existing structures at the local level, although for different reasons it seems. While VNGO-X seems to find that it is the only morally right way to work, VNGO-Y seems to view it as the most efficient way to work. VNGO-Z on the other hand strikes a compromise between the “conventional way of doing things” and the “new way of doing things” introduced by the IAAs by establishing project-user groups while also working with the existing structure. In sum, it seems that VNGO-X use the status of key personnel to maintain relations with the party-state in order to gain recognition and protection. VNGO-Y on the other hand uses 65

The Art of Manoeuvring in Changing Rules of Traffic Mr./Mrs. Y1’s position to gain independence from the party-state and in this way create more room for manoeuvring. VNGO-Z differs from the previous two organisations in that Mr./Mrs. Z1 does not enjoy high status within the official system. Aware of the weakness this constitutes Mr./Mrs. Z1 consciously applies a strategy of avoidance in relation to the party-state. Thus, while VNGO-Y and VNGO-Z can be said to relate in similar ways to the party-state their reasons for doing so are different. Having examined how the case-organisations manoeuvre directly in relation to the party-state, i.e. how they respond to institutional pressures, I now turn to look at how they relate to foreign donors and examine if and how their relations with international donors is used as a way of manoeuvring in relation to the party-state.

7.2 Relations to international aid agencies Previous studies suggest that the availability of foreign funding helps the VNGOs establish themselves as independent players in relation to the party-state (Gray 1999 and Sidel 1995) and my findings (ref. chapter 6) that around two thirds if not a larger share of the VNGOs’ funding derives from international aid agencies seems to support this observation. Based on my talks with international aid agencies it is clear that many international aid agencies are eager to support the VNGOs directly through financial support for project activities. Many international aid agencies are also concerned with the broader issues relating to the development of civil society in Vietnam and a number of international aid agencies engage in work to support an “enabling environment” for local NGO activity for example by supporting the process of developing a legal framework for local NGOs. Establishing relations with the foreign donor community constitutes an opportunity for the VNGOs to gain financial independence from the government. In addition, engaging in strategic relations with foreign donors to gain recognition with this interest group can be used as part of a strategy to gain leverage vis-à-vis the party-state. Due to the relative financial dependence of the Vietnamese government on foreign aid, the foreign donor community is in a position to exert some influence on overall government policies - including those relating to local NGO activity. If the VNGOs gain recognition from this alternative “collective audience”, to use Suchman’s terminology, the VNGOs have an “ally”, who – on behalf of the VNGOs - may work to improve the conditions for the VNGOs. 66

The Art of Manoeuvring in Changing Rules of Traffic

In my examination of the relationship between the case-organisations and the international aid agencies, I try to throw light on the motivation of the VNGOs to engage into relations with the international donor community. In this way I seek to identify if and how the VNGOs strategically engage in relations with international aid agencies in order to strengthen their position vis-à-vis the party-state.

7.2.1

Vietnamese NGO X - VNGO-X

VNGO-X was set up in the early 1990s before the influx of international aid agencies, took off. I have not been able to track any activity until a couple of years after establishment, when the first project was carried out with funding from the government. Later foreign funding has become the primary source of funding for VNGO-X. The organisation actively engages in the networking activities with the international aid agencies, but even though the organisation is well-known among the international aid agencies from various forums, VNGO-X does not seem to engage in networking activities with foreign donors in order to gain recognition which may be used to strengthen its position vis-à-vis the party-state. Based on my talks with VNGO-X and with foreign observers it is my impression that the management of VNGO-X is rather critical towards the International NGOs and their working methods and when VNGO-X engages into relations with the International NGO community it seems to be in order to gain more influence within those circles and strengthen their position vis-à-vis the INGOs. Mr./Mrs. X2 actually expresses his/her discontent with the INGOs when I ask if they may be able to influence the government’s position on Vietnamese NGOs. In fact he/she gets very agitated and says that “… the government does not want to hear about Vietnamese NGO from International NGOs”. He/she also complains that the international aid agencies are saying that they want to support Vietnamese NGOs, when in reality they don’t. When I ask for an elaboration he/she explains that for example one of the IAAs say they want to support Vietnamese NGOs, but when VNGO-X apply for funds from them they are not granted any funds. Considering that “support” is closely related with funding in Mr./Mrs. X2’s mind it seems that the main objective of networking with foreign donors is to obtain funding.

7.2.2

Vietnamese NGO Y -VNGO-Y

When Mr./Mrs. Y1 initially established his/her organisation in the early 1990s foreign funding was limited, but he/she explains that the current organisational set-up was established later with 67

The Art of Manoeuvring in Changing Rules of Traffic assistance from a couple of IAAs. The impression I get - from interviews with VNGO-Y and foreign organisations, which are familiar with VNGO-Y - is that the main reason for cooperating with donors is to obtain funding. Even so, Mr./Mrs. Y1 acknowledges the influence the international donor community may have in relation to strengthening of the VNGO sector generally. In fact he/she finds that some of the IAAs actively promoting the development of a local NGO sector may sometimes be “… more powerful than the government”. However, he/she finds that the working relationship between the international aid agencies and the VNGOs is difficult because they are not equal and the foreign agencies do not recognise the qualifications of the local organisations. As with VNGO-X it is my impression that VNGO-Y mainly works with the foreign donors out of financial necessity and not based on a strategic concern to gain recognition and gain leverage vis-à-vis the party-state.

7.2.3

Vietnamese NGO Z - VNGO-Z

When VNGO-Z was established foreign funding had been around for some time and Mr./Mrs. Z1 established VNGO-Z based on an expectation of being able to raise foreign funds.72 Based on the organisational funding from one IAA, VNGO-Z benefits from a more constant flow of funding than VNGO-Y and VNGO-X. This arrangement means that VNGO-Z does not work under the same pressure to constantly develop new projects and approach potential funders as VNGO-Y and VNGO-X and most of the other VNGOs interviewed do. Based on my talks with Mr./Mrs. Z1 as well as foreign donors it is my impression that Mr./Mrs. Z1 views the foreign organisations as partners with whom he/she engages, not so much to obtain funding, but more so to get advice and support, co-ordinate activities and engage into dialogue about the conditions for local NGO development. Mr./Mrs. Z1 clearly thinks that the international donor community can influence government policy on Vietnamese NGOs and he/she seems to consciously manage the working relations between VNGO-Z and the international aid agencies to ensure the support of and gain recognition from the foreign organisations. Mr./Mrs. Z1 also seems to relate strategically to the foreign donors in connection with the assignments VNGO-Z undertakes. VNGO-Z has for example been involved in capacity assessments of local NGOs and some work on the inter-relationship between the donor community, Vietnamese NGOs and the government 72

Even so he/she does not seem to have established VNGO-Z for his/her own personal benefit. Based on my talks with the VNGOs (including the staff) and other Vietnamese observers, I found that in contemporary Vietnam welleducated people mainly seek stable and/or well-paid jobs. The government is still considered a stable employer although the salary is low. Foreign organisations are considered attractive employers and it is a well-known fact that they pay substantially more than any local employer. Considering that Mr./Mrs. Z1 quit working for foreign aid agenices to establish an organisation, for which there was little institutional support, it seems unlikely that he/she established VNGO-Z for his/her own personal benefit.

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The Art of Manoeuvring in Changing Rules of Traffic and also regularly engages in discussions relating to development aid and the VNGO sector. While most other VNGOs seem willing to engage in anything which releases foreign funding, Mr./Mrs. Z1 seems to consciously build up a portfolio of assignments and engages in activities, which places VNGO-Z in a strategic position between the local NGO sector and the international donor community.

7.2.4

Discussion of findings – strategic use of relations with international aid agencies

It is clear that the three case-organisations have rather different approaches to the international organisations. While VNGO-X and VNGO-Y were not initially motivated by the availability of foreign funding, this was the case for VNGO-Z. Interestingly, the impression one gets examining the organisations today is the reverse. Interviews clearly left me with the impression that VNGOX and VNGO-Y mainly work with foreign organisations to obtain funding, and while VNGO-Z is highly dependent on foreign funding, the availability of continuous funding allows Mr./Mrs. Z1 to act more strategically and to establish him/herself among the international donors and INGOs as a sort of intermediary between the foreign agencies and the local NGO sector. Looking more broadly at the whole VNGO population, most of the VNGOs interviewed and surveyed clearly seem to engage into relations with the foreign donors motivated by the funding opportunities73 and while a number of VNGO interviewees point out that they find the lack of continuous funding to be a big challenge foreign donors on the other hand note that the VNGOs have “no focus” and “… if donors have funds they just run”. Another important motivating factor pointed out by many VNGOs is the opportunity to “learn new working methods”,74 although it is clear that the VNGOs are not happy with all the working methods proposed by the foreign donors. Aside from the critique raised by VNGO-X in relation to project implementation, a number of VNGOs point out that: there is “… difference about thinking and working methods between Vietnamese and some foreign experts”, “… report procedure is too strict and difficult to carry out”, and “the process of approval and disbursement is often too slow”. In fact, some interviewees left me with the impression that they would prefer to simply receive the funds for the proposed activities without having to engage in meetings, writing of reports etc. Some IAA interviewees note that the VNGOs “… prefer to do action rather than just talk and share information” and that “… the VNGOs take no time to share information and co-ordinate”. On 73

In the questionnaire survey 22 out of 26 indicate “obtain funding” as a reason to co-operate with foreign donors and NGOs. 74 In the questionnaire survey 15 out of 26 indicate “learn new working methods” as a reason to co-operate with foreign donors and NGOs in addition a number of respondents point to “new techniques” and “new working methods” as benefits derived from co-operating with international aid agencies.

69

The Art of Manoeuvring in Changing Rules of Traffic this basis it seems that Mr./Mrs. Z1 is “the exception that proves the rule”, which is that the VNGOs do not engage into strategic relations with foreign donors to gain recognition with this interest group as part of a strategy to gain leverage vis-à-vis the party-state. They primarily see the international aid agencies as providers of funding and secondarily as facilitators of new techniques and working methods. The difference between VNGO-Z and the other VNGOs seems to stem from the background of the founders. Coming from strong positions within the official system, VNGO-Y’s and VNGO-X’s networking activities with foreign donors and INGOs does not seem to be motivated by a concern with gaining recognition from “alternative collective audiences”, but purely to obtain funding. VNGO-Z on the other hand - coming from a relatively weak position in relation to the official system, but with closer relations to the international donor community - seems to make up for the weakness in relation to the party-state by nurturing the relations with the international aid agencies.

7.3 Relations to other Vietnamese NGOs As we saw in chapter 5 the VNGOs are emerging and operating in a context which does not support independent civic activity and in section 7.1 we have seen indications that they face similar challenges and share similar concerns in relation to setting up and operating independently from the state. Considering the propensity with which business associations seem to emerge during doi moi75 one could imagine that the VNGOs would also engage in VNGOnetworking activities in order to address common concerns - or to use Suchman’s terms that the VNGOs would engage in collective action to manipulate institutional pressures (ref. chapter 4). However, like Mulla and Boothroyd observed in 1994 (Mulla and Boothroyd 1994) I found that in 2001 - almost ten years later - there is still very little networking between the VNGOs. Although there is a movement towards increased networking, the tendency is not clear and contradictions prevail. In the following sections I look at how the case-organisations perceive and relate to other VNGOs and whether the case-organisations relate strategically to other VNGOs as part of a strategic manoeuvre in relation to the party-state.

75

See for example Wischermann 2001

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The Art of Manoeuvring in Changing Rules of Traffic 7.3.1

Vietnamese NGO X - VNGO-X

The management interviewees at VNGO-X repeatedly stressed that VNGO-X is the “the unique Vietnamese NGO” and strongly indicated that a number of other so-called NGOs are not “real” NGOs. When asked if they have any co-operation or networking with other VNGOs they explain that they work with a few VNGOs, but that they mainly just meet them at meetings and workshops organised by IAAs or the government. They explain that the local NGO community is not very strong and point out that there is no legal framework for VNGO co-operation - they clearly find that VNGO co-operation is problematic as long as it is not officially sanctioned. What especially struck me in my talks with VNGO-X, however, was the strong indications I got that they do not want to be associated with the other VNGOs mentioned in our talks. It is clear that the management interviewees at VNGO-X think that they are in a relatively strong position compared to some of the other VNGOs and that they fear that this position may be hampered if they associate themselves with other VNGOs and the unsanctioned VNGO networks.

7.3.2

Vietnamese NGO Y - VNGO-Y

While it seems clear that VNGO-Y has been instrumental in bringing together and organising meetings in on of the VNGO networks, the motive remains unclear. Mr./Mrs. Y1 did not want to relay much about his/her role in relation to the network, but it does not seem to me that VNGOY engages in the network as a way of strengthening the organisation’s position in relation to the government. It is clear from my talks with Mr./Mrs. Y1 and his/her staff that they consider VNGO-Y to be in a strong position compared with other VNGOs and Mr./Mrs. Y1 indicates that VNGO networking might help the small VNGOs to get access to funding. According to other VNGO directors and foreign observers Mr./Mrs. Y1 enjoys tremendous respect within government circles and he/she is one of the few VNGO directors who is in a position to “speak directly to government” (ref. section 7.1.4). Other VNGO interviewees explain that Mr./Mrs. Y1 is “ … important for the local NGOs because he/she is totally non-state, he/she enjoys high status, he/she is well-known, experienced and retired”. It seems on this basis that Mr./Mrs. Y1 may be one of the few VNGO directors who might be able to convince the authorities that they should tolerate and listen to a network of VNGOs. In relation to the government it thus seems that VNGO-Y is of more use for the network than vice versa. But why then does Mr./Mrs. Y1 engage in the VNGO-network? Based on talks with Mr./Mrs. Y1 and other observers it seems that he/she is driven by funding opportunities and perhaps an interest to establish VNGO-Y in a

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The Art of Manoeuvring in Changing Rules of Traffic leading position in relation to other VNGOs. A number of observers indicated that Mr./Mrs. Y1’s main interest is to build a strong organisation.

7.3.3

Vietnamese NGO Z - VNGO-Z

VNGO-Z has engaged in networking activities with what started as a small group of VNGOs since the late 1990s. The initiative came about helped along by assistance from an international partner. Despite the fact that this networking structure has emerged with foreign funding, it is my impression, that VNGO-Z and the founding VNGOs have defined the purpose of the network based on a commonly felt need to exchange information and jointly build the capacity of their organisations. Mr./Mrs. Z1 thus explains that: “… the co-operation is seen as an opportunity to maintain VNGO-Z’s training capacity and deliver training services”. Mr./Mrs. Z1 notes that VNGO-Z’s services are in demand, but that a number of requests from international aid agencies have to be turned down because VNGO-Z suffers from a bottleneck problem, because VNGO-Z does not have enough senior consultants. Thus VNGO-Z engages in VNGO-networking for information sharing and in order to extend its own capacity. In relation to the government, I observed (in section 7.1) that VNGO-Z views affiliation with other social development organisations as an indirect way through which they can let the concerns of the people become known to government without having to engage in direct dialogue with the central authorities. Thus, VNGO-Z also engages in VNGO-networking in order to avoid direct interaction with government authorities. I have previously noted that Mr./Mrs. Z1 consciously seeks to avoid the attention of the government authorities because of his/her relatively weak position in relation to the government and it appears that the network works as a sort of buffer against potentially negative attention of the national authorities.

7.3.4

Discussion of findings – strategic use of relations with other Vietnamese NGOs

It thus appears that different strategic concerns influence the way the case-organisations view and relate to other VNGOs. The only organisation which seems to engage in VNGO-networking as a strategic move in relation to the party-state is VNGO-Z. Coming from a relatively weak position VNGO-Z seems sincerely interested in building a strong VNGO sector partly to build its own capacity and partly to protect itself from potentially negative attention from the central level authorities. VNGO-Y’s objectives for engaging in VNGO-networking are not clear, but it seems that the opportunity for funding and the opportunity to develop a leading position among the VNGOs is a key factor pulling VNGO-Y into an active role in VNGO co-ordination. Thus, 72

The Art of Manoeuvring in Changing Rules of Traffic although their motives are different, VNGO-Z and VNGO-Y both actively engage in VNGO networking and differ from VNGO-X who seem to be reluctant to engage in VNGO networking because - coming from a strong position in relation to the party-state - they fear that association with organisations with dubious reputations might spoil their own. Not actively engaging in VNGO networking, but participating in meetings when invited, VNGO-X’s position seems to be more in line with the general position of the VNGOs towards VNGO networking. Like VNGO-X other VNGO interviewees also point to the lack of a legal basis for VNGO co-operation as a reason why they do not engage actively in VNGO networking and thus seem to comply with formal regulative institutions. Other VNGO interviewees explain that they co-operate with some VNGOs, but that it is difficult to co-operate because they “… don’t have much in common” and “… work in different fields”. The VNGOs do not find that they have much in common with VNGOs working in different sectors and seem to think of VNGO networking purely along sectoral lines. Seeking to explain the lack of networking among the VNGOs one VNGO interviewee notes that the VNGOs work in different fields and goes on, almost as thinking aloud: “… maybe we should organise something within our field”. He/she then breaks off and says something, which seems to be the real - but largely unarticulated reason - for the lack of VNGO networking: that there is “… too much competition” among the VNGOs working in the same field. When I ask him/her what kind of competition he/she says “for funding” and almost as if embarrassed to admit this he/she searches his/her mind for other examples of “competition” and finally says “… and they may overlap in their work”. The general impression is that the VNGOs view each other more as competitors competing for funds than as colleagues with common interests and concerns and there is little concerted action to manipulate institutional processes.

7.4 Discussion

- how do the Vietnamese NGOs manoeuvre in relation to

interest groups in their immediate environment? Through the examination of three VNGOs we have gained some insights into the institutional processes and the strategic responses which have allowed the VNGOs to emerge and survive. Seen from a regulative perspective there has not been a legal basis for independent civic activity. Similarly, seen from a normative perspective independent organisations engaging in social activity have not been considered “desirable” by the leadership of the country vigorously seeking to control all spheres of society in their effort to develop a socialist state and stay in power of. 73

The Art of Manoeuvring in Changing Rules of Traffic Finally, seen from a cultural-cognitive perspective the VNGOs seem an “impossible invention”. The Vietnamese socialist culture does not provide any script or pre-existing models for organised independent civic action. It is therefore not surprising that the VNGOs have had to manoeuvre their way around in order to establish their organisation and in order to perform their daily activities. So in relation to all of the institutional elements the VNGOs have had to respond strategically to be able to emerge and survive. Although the VNGO phenomenon itself defies the conventional ways of organising society, the VNGOs comply with the overall expectation of showing loyalty to the government and not challenging the political system. Although some VNGOs claim to engage in advocacy or policymaking activities, they do not seem pro-active in this area and activities seeking to bring the concerns of the VNGOs to the attention of the policy-makers take place in indirect and informal ways. Most of the VNGOs express loyalty to the government and stress that they work in accordance with government policies and the law (ref. chapter 6.1). We have seen from the case-studies the VNGOs emerge on what could be called an experimental basis seen both from the point of view of the VNGOs and the authorities. While the VNGOs experiment with different set-ups to find a workable solution, different official organs respond in more or less accommodating ways, with what could be termed “experimental sanctioning”. With VNGO-X we see an early example of how high official status and good personal relations is used to convince the authorities about an idea for which there was little institutional support. With a group of founding members, all of whom - being scientists - belong to the elite of the country and a director who has direct access to the highest ranking officials, VNGO-X can be said to use a kind of negotiation strategy - resembling what the strategic theory refers to as manipulation or compromise - in which they use the combined status of the director and the founding members to negotiate a legal basis and official recognition. Based on talks with other VNGOs this seems a common way of establishing an organisation: using the high status and personal relations of the director and/or founders within the official system to negotiate for a legal basis and official recognition. The legal set-up of the individual VNGO thus then depends more on the director and/or founders’ background(s) and contacts within the official system than on existing laws and regulations. Formal regulative institutions thus seem to have little influence on the behaviour of the VNGOs. With VNGO-X we see an example of an organisation, which, although claiming to be an NGO and working independently, 74

The Art of Manoeuvring in Changing Rules of Traffic leans heavily on the official system. First of all, the organisation is registered directly with the central level authority of MoSTE and VUSTA, which brings the organisation close to the attention of central level authorities - the centre of official power and authority (I will come back to local level vs. central level registration in chapter 8.1.1). In addition, the management staffs are clearly proud and appreciative of their good standing with the official system. Furthermore, most of the management staffs continue to hold positions within the party-state despite having passed the retirement age. Finally, they clearly approve and work according to the established working methods of the official system and - somewhat unconsciously it seems - comply with the prevailing institutions in their day-to-day operations. On this basis I find that VNGO-X defies prevailing institutional pressures by its mere existence as “the unique Vietnamese NGO”. On the other hand the organisation seems almost unconsciously guided - especially by normative institutions - to comply with the prevailing institutional pressures in their daily operations, which combined with a strategy of association or linking with the party-state makes up for the defiant behaviour of being an NGO. Clearly aware that the organisational configuration of VNGO-X defies the conventional way of organising society, VNGO-X uses high status and personal relations of the director and management staff with the official system to gain recognition from individuals within the party-state, who may protect the organisation from potential suspicion and/or sanctions. In addition, although VNGO-X clearly considers itself distinct from the official system and recognise the existence of other VNGOs the management staffs do not seem to perceive their organisation as part of a group of likeminded organisations with whom they wish to engage for collective action. This view combined with the relatively strong position of VNGO-X in relation to the party-state helps explain why VNGO-X does not engage strategically with VNGOs and/or foreign donors to gain leverage in relation to the party-state. Established under the decree on science and technology organisations from 1992, VNGO-Z is the only VNGO founded by an individual who does not come from a high position within the official system. This means that Mr./Mrs. Z1 is not as heavily influenced by the official norms and values and ways of doing things as other VNGO founders. It also means that he/she does not enjoy high status within the official system. While, one would think that the promulgation of the decree on science and technology organisations from 1992 would render high status and personal relations less important, Mr./Mrs. Z1 clearly finds that he/she is in a vulnerable position because he/she does not have a high status within the official system. This leads to what could be termed a strategy of avoidance not only in relation to setting up, but also in the way VNGO-Z relates to the state in its day-to-day operations. Having worked with IAAs Mr./Mrs. Z1 is more influenced 75

The Art of Manoeuvring in Changing Rules of Traffic by their values and norms and “ways of doing things” than other VNGO directors interviewed. Looking at the way the VNGOs relate to other interest groups in their immediate environment it is worth noting that VNGO-Z coming from a weak position in relation to the official system orients itself towards the donor community not only for financial support, but also for recognition. To use Suchman’s terminology, I would say that VNGO-Z selects a more “friendly environment” to lean itself against. It is very illustrative that where VNGO-X has a board of founding members found among the local elite of the country, Mr./Mrs. Z1 explains that he was looking to contacts with the international donor community for advise and managerial support when setting up VNGO-Z. Whereas VNGO-X, unconsciously it seems, emulates the official line in their organisation, working methods and rhetoric, VNGO-Y gives the impression of being a conscious rebellion within the overall expectation of loyalty to the party. Mr./Mrs. Y1 appears very strong and resolute, and although he/she is aware that as a VNGO VNGO-Y is not in a strong position in relation to the Government, he/she is not afraid of challenging existing perceptions of how things should be done. He/she dissolved the original organisation registered with one of the massorganisations and has consciously chosen not to co-register with an umbrella organisation in order to gain maximum independence and thus defies the institutional pressure to co-register. He/she doesn’t think that it is problematic that there doesn’t seem to be a legal basis for VNGOnetworking and actively works for more VNGO-networking at a time where a number of VNGOs, including VNGO-X, are still reluctant to participate in something for which there doesn’t seem to be any legal basis or formal regulative support. It is clear from talks with other observers that Mr./Mrs. Y1 is able to defy existing ways of doing things and distance his/her own organisation from the official system because of his/her special status within the system. So although he/she uses a strategy of de-linking and defiance it is based on a high status and informal links within the official system. It follows that the main objective of VNGO-Y in relation to the international donors is to obtain funding; in fact it is clear from talks with foreign observers that Mr./Mrs. Y1 not only wants to work independently of the official system, but also seeks maximum independence in relation to foreign donors. He/she simply “wants the money” and is reluctant to go into a closer relationship, which would cause the foreign organisation to have more influence on how he/she runs his/her organisation, how he/she administers the funds etc. So unlike Mr./Mrs. Z1 from VNGO-Z, Mr./Mrs. Y1 from VNGO-Y merely uses the discourse of “NGO” and the funding provided by international aid agencies to serve his/her purpose of building his/her organisation and does not orient his/her organisation towards an 76

The Art of Manoeuvring in Changing Rules of Traffic “alternative collective audience” in order to gain leverage in relation to the party-state. In relation to VNGO-networking it also appears that the main objective behind the active involvement is in fact to strengthen VNGO-Y’s position within the group of VNGOs and less so as a strategic alliance or concerted action to manipulate institutional pressures. Thus, within the framework of compliance with the overall – mainly normative - pressure of loyalty to the government different strategic responses to institutional pressures transmitted through the relation with the party-state have been identified. VNGO-X uses the status of the founders as a basis for a strategy of linking with the official system and complying with official institutions to ensure official approval and protection. It follows that VNGO-X does not seek association with other interest groups for the purpose of gaining recognition or legitimacy. The example of VNGO-Y shows that high status can also be used as a basis for a strategy of de-linking with the official system and defying official institutions to gain independence. It follows that relations with other interest groups are not strategically used for the purpose of gaining leverage in relation to the party-state. Coming from a relatively weak position Mr./Mrs. Z1 from VNGO-Z follows a strategy of avoidance combined with a strategy of association with other interest groups to gain leverage in relation to the party-state.

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8 To which degree do the Vietnamese NGOs gain recognition as independent civic actors? Having examined how the Vietnamese NGOs (VNGOs) respond strategically to institutional processes and pressures we have developed an understanding of how the VNGOs manage to emerge and survive. However, the long term survival of the VNGOs depends on the degree to which they are able to gain recognition – or to use the theoretical terms: the degree to which they are able to gain legitimacy and become institutionalised. Let us therefore briefly recap what institutional theorists have to say about legitimacy and institutionalisation. According to institutional theory a completely legitimate organisation is one about which no institutionally based questions can be raised. I.e. an organisation which is “completely in accordance with the rules” according to regulative institutions; “completely desirable” according to normative institutions; and “completely comprehensible” according to cultural-cognitive institutions. In the following I look at the degree to which the strategic responses applied by the VNGOs make them “in accordance with the rules”; “desirable”; and “comprehensible” according to the prevailing institutions and/or the degree to which they instil institutional changes, which in turn provides institutional support for independent civic activity and the VNGO phenomenon. In this part of the analysis the perspective changes from the “depth perspective” applied in the previous part of the analysis to a “breadth perspective” taking a broader view of the VNGOs as a group. Furthermore, this part of the analysis is more loosely based than the first part and does not intend to provide clear cut answers to whether or not the VNGOs gain legitimacy. Instead it aims to present some deliberations about the dynamics of the institutional processes evolving around the VNGOs and discuss the degree to which the VNGOs gain legitimacy. The discussion is loosely structured around three themes which relate to the three institutional elements. First I look at the legal basis of the VNGOs and regulative institutions. Then I look at the role and functions of the VNGOs and normative institutions. Finally, I look at the concept of NGO and cultural-cognitive institutions. I will draw other theoretically inspired themes, including the issue of flows of activities and resources, co-existing institutions and interrelating institutional elements from the theoretical framework into the discussion as I move along.

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8.1 Institutional change, legitimacy and institutionalisation of the Vietnamese NGOs It is clear from the general introduction to the VNGO population in chapter 6 and the specific case-studies that the VNGOs comply with the overall institutional requirement of showing loyalty to the government and not challenging the authority of the political regime. Some VNGOs interviewed explain that they have set up “… to implement government law” (VNGO-6) or that they work “… under the guidelines of the government and for the nation” (VNGO-12). By pledging their allegiance to the government, the VNGOs emphasise their compliance with normative institutions, which provide the basis for the existing political system. Within this overall compliance with institutional pressures, the manoeuvres of the VNGOs may spur a process of institutional change and institutionalisation of the VNGOs.

8.1.1

The legal basis of the Vietnamese NGOs - and regulative institutions

According to prevailing institutions in Vietnamese society organised civic activity must be setup within the framework of the mass-organisations and/or special interest groups under the VFF. The umbrella structure rests on mutually supporting interrelating institutional elements and could be called an institution in its own right. Firstly, the role and position in society of the VFF and the mass-organisations is officially endorsed in the constitution (The Constitution of 1992, Article 9) and thus enjoys the highest degree of regulative support. Secondly, the umbrella structure is normatively supported by the socialist norms and values promoting an all encompassing party-state. Thirdly, after decades of socialism this structure has been culturalcognitively institutionalised as the only imaginable way of organising society. This may also explain why Mr./Mrs. Y1 initially chose to set up under this structure when he/she initially set up his/her organisation in the early 1990s, he/she simply could not think of alternative “ways of doing it”. However, during the reform process characterised by the introduction of new ways of doing things, new norms and values and new rules and regulations, there is ample scope for experimentation. This has resulted in a range of different legal set-ups among the VNGOs. As observed in chapter 6.1.2, aside from a handful of VNGOs registered with a university, a ministry or other, all the VNGOs surveyed seem to be registered under the decree for science and technology organisations from 1992. Let us briefly recap the different set-ups identified: a little less than a third of those registered under the decree for science and technology organisations (including VNGO-Z and VNGO-Y) have just registered with the city authorities (the Department 79

The Art of Manoeuvring in Changing Rules of Traffic of Science, Technology and Environment - DoSTE) or the national authorities (the Ministry of Science, Technology and Environment - MoSTE). The remaining VNGOs registered under the decree for science and technology organisations have co-registered with the Vietnamese Union for Science and Technology Associations (VUSTA) (like VNGO-X) or with a professional association (under VUSTA). It seems that the VNGOs themselves find that more legitimacy is gained through co-registration with the state authorities (i.e. DoSTE or MoSTE) and the umbrella structure under the Vietnamese Fatherland Front (VFF) (i.e. VUSTA or a professional association). As Mr./Mrs. Y1 from VNGO-Y explains, those VNGOs co-registering with VUSTA have “more power among the people” because of a “bigger stamp”. In addition it is my impression from talks with Vietnamese and foreign observers that registration with central level organs and unions i.e. MoSTE and/or VUSTA provides an organisation with more official legitimacy. According to the principle of “democratic centralism” power is concentrated at the top and the closer an organisation is to the central level, the more status and official legitimacy it enjoys. Looking at the degree of co-registration, there is little indication that new organisations registering under the decree for science and technology organisations from 1992 or the law on science and technology from 2000 chose not to co-register with an umbrella-organisation, but there is a small tendency that organisations established from around 1995-1996 who chose to make a co-registration with an umbrella-organisation register with a professional association instead of VUSTA. This could indicate that the traditional umbrella structure is reproduced although a process of decentralisation from VUSTA to the professional associations is taking place. While the VNGOs registering with DoSTE avoid, compromise and/or defy the institutional pressure to register under the traditional umbrella structure it is not my impression that these VNGOs encounter more problems than VNGOs co-registering. In this way I would say that a “new way of doing things” as opposed to the umbrella structure - or a co-existing institution is emerging. In relation to the decree for science and technology organisations from 1992 more generally it is interesting to note that the decree has in fact been followed up in 2000 with the promulgation of a law on science and technology. According to an analysis provided by one of the VNGOs 80

The Art of Manoeuvring in Changing Rules of Traffic interviewed, the new law is: “… a positive and progressive regulation…”,”… it provides much needed support to NGOs currently in operation…”, and “…it may also lead to a substantial increase in the emergence of independent development organisations in the coming years.” Based on my observations and the above analysis of the new law, it seems likely that the law on science and technology - in the absence of an official legal framework for NGOs - is in the process of being institutionalised – at least informally - as “the NGO-law”.

8.1.2

Roles and functions of the Vietnamese NGOs - and normative institutions

Overall, socio-political activity is the domain of the party-state and the system is such that there is no officially sanctioned role for independent civic actors. Given this context, the question is to which degree the VNGOs gain legitimacy as independent civic actors and whether they spur any institutional changes, by which they may in turn gain legitimacy. According to the prevailing institutional set-up, policy-making takes place within the framework of the CPV, the party-state and the mass-organisations. I have noted earlier that formalised lobbying as understood in the western sense is not common. Even so almost four out of ten VNGOs claim to engage in either advocacy or policy advice. How can we understand this “discrepancy”? The impression I got from interviews with the VNGOs as well as foreign observers is that the VNGOs do not engage in formal advocacy or policy advice, but they present their results to government officials they know personally or if asked to do so.76 The VNGOs do not seem to push for access to the policy-making process, but participate in national meetings and conferences (co-)organised by the aid agencies with whom they work. They publish their results in books and journals, but leave it up to the government whether they will make use of it (see also Beaulieu 1994). The VNGO directors/founders and senior staff participate in policy consultations, apparently not based on their status as VNGO representatives, but based on their status as prominent senior scientists and/or government officials. This was the case for VNGO-X

76 It may be worth noting that there is no clear understanding of the terms “lobbying”, “policy-making” and “advocacy”. According to Marr, the Vietnamese word used for lobbying translates “mobilise”, a term used extensively since 1945 to signify organising support for party or State policies (Marr 1994a, p. 14). And in the course of my research I found that people were not familiar with the terms “policy-making” and “advocacy” and also had difficulty distinguishing between the two. In fact these terms spurred a long discussion between myself and my translator when translating the questionnaire from English into Vietnamese. In the end we put the Vietnamese terms in brackets to clarify the concepts – even so I am not sure if my understanding of these terms is the same as my respondents’.

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The Art of Manoeuvring in Changing Rules of Traffic and it is clear from my interviews with other Vietnamese and foreign observers that the VNGO directors have access to policy makers based on their status within the official system and not based on their status as VNGO directors. Like Mr./Mrs. X2, another VNGO interviewee, who aside from being the Vice-director of a VNGO is a lecturer at one of the universities in Hanoi participates in high-level consultations with the government and the donor community – not as a representative of his/her VNGO, but as a representative of the university. Thus, the VNGOs do not - officially - have a role as independent civic actors to be included in political processes, but their representatives do - informally - have access to policy makers. However, the access depends on the personal status of the VNGO directors/founders and senior staffs within the official system and policy-oriented activities are carried out based on the conditions set by the government. According to the prevailing institutional set-up, local authorities and mass-organisations are the main providers of social welfare services to people at local levels. All development projects must obtain permission from the local authorities and practical implementation is often carried out through the local mass-organisations. Most of the VNGOs engage in some kind of project implementation and service delivery at local levels. Although the VNGOs claim to work to help the people, they do not engage directly in activities with the people at local levels. Complying with the overall institutional set-up, the VNGOs mainly work through the local authorities and mass-organisations, and they generally find that, especially the local authorities and to some extent also the mass-organisations, are very important in relation to day-to-day project activities.77 Although the VNGOs thus do not seem to generate radical institutional changes their mere presence at the local level may instil some changes. In fact the VNGOs themselves can be seen as an “extra link” or a “parallel structure” between the centre, comprised by international aid agencies and national authorities in Hanoi, and the localities. The VNGOs undertake a facilitating role channelling activities, resources and ideas between the centre and the local levels. Mr./Mrs. X2 explains that the role of VNGO-X in relation to the local authorities is to “… bring ideas from the national level to the local level… and back” (he/she adds after a small pause) and Mr./Mrs. Y1 explains that when he/she is in the field he/she is sometimes approached by local authorities who ask him/her to help them formulate and submit project proposals to foreign donors in Hanoi. It thus seems that even though the VNGOs comply with the overall institutional pressures of working through the official organs at local levels, they may in fact

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According to the questionnaire survey the local authorities are the most important interest group in the short term and the local mass organisations are moderately important, ref. Annex 6.c

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The Art of Manoeuvring in Changing Rules of Traffic instil changes which relates directly to the way the official system functions, by constituting a new facilitating structure not only between central and local level authorities, but also between local authorities and the donor community. This, combined with other changes may add the ongoing process of liberalisation and decentralisation taking place in Vietnamese society.

8.1.3

The concept of NGO - and cultural cognitive institutions

Turning to the concept of “NGO”, I found it interesting to note that today – fifteen years after the establishment of the first VNGO - there is still no commonly accepted term to connote the VNGOs, and although the VNGOs seem eager to project an NGO identity several of my VNGO interviewees seemed to find it hard to define the term. I also detected much confusion among other Vietnamese as well as foreign observers and I found it very illustrative when a foreign observer in an exasperated voice exclaimed: “I am confused about the definition of NGO in this country”. Aside from the obvious, normatively based, negative connotations associated with activity outside the state in a communist culture I was made aware by one of the interviewed VNGO Directors that the Vietnamese word for NGO is problematic in translation into Vietnamese. The Vietnamese word for “non-governmental organisation” is “to chuc phi chinh phu” (“to chuc” being “organisation”; “phi” being “non”; and chinh phu” being “government”). What the VNGO Director pointed out to me was that the original (apparently Chinese) meaning of the word “phi” is “something against” or “outside the control of”, which is obviously not very “desirable” according to prevailing normative institutions. Double checking this information with other interviewees spurred interesting remarks ranging from complete refusal that the NGO term is linguistically problematic in the Vietnamese context to agreement, that the term bears negative connotations. Whether concerned with linguistics or not, the NGO term does not enjoy institutional support in the Vietnamese context. What is interesting to note is that seeking to strike a compromise between the prevailing institutional pressures and the expectations of the international donors, the VNGOs themselves create a barrier for a commonly accepted term. Let me clarify: We saw in chapter 6.1 that the VNGOs prefer to refer to themselves as NGOs and based on the analysis in chapter 7.2 it seems that an important reason for doing so is to attract foreign funding. By doing so, the VNGOs compromise and/or defy the official institutional pressures. However, 83

The Art of Manoeuvring in Changing Rules of Traffic seeking to make up for this they define the NGO term in a way which states their financial and managerial independence from the official system, while simultaneously stressing their compliance with the overall normative value of loyalty to the government. In addition they use “dual organisational labelling”, referring to themselves not only as NGOs but also as “centres”, which seems to be regulatively supported term for organisations establishing under the decree for science and technology organisations from 1992. While this creative manoeuvring seems to allow the VNGOs to survive it does not further their cultural-cognitive institutionalisation as VNGOs. And while defining the NGO term according to prevailing normative institutions of loyalty to the government may add “desirability” to the NGO-term according to prevailing institutional pressures it does not necessarily add “understandability” to the term, neither to foreigners nor to Vietnamese. In addition, the “dual organisational labelling” leads to an inconsistent use of terms, which adds to the confusion. Curious to know if the debate on NGOs had reached the local levels and contemplating – inspired by the concept of “fence-breaking” introduced in chapter 5 - that perhaps the VNGOs could gain institutional support for the NGO term at the local level in order to push for official recognition at the central level, I asked some of my interviewees how they introduce themselves at the local levels. Mr./Mrs. Y1 from VNGO-Y notes that he/she is not sure that people and official organisations at the local levels understand the concept of NGO, and he/she does not think they really care whether his/her organisation is an NGO or something else as long as they can see that they benefit. In a similar fashion another VNGO Director explains that “… what matters is the work and not the name”. Thus, it does not seem that the VNGOs promote the idea of non-governmental organisation at the local levels, rather it seems that the VNGOs enjoy legitimacy with the local official organs based on the directors’ previous or existing position within the official system. One VNGO explains that they enjoy good relations with the authorities at district level throughout the country because most of the leaders know one of the directors from his/her (current) job with the central government. Another VNGO interviewee explains that he/she enjoys good relations with the local branches of the mass-organisations all over the country due to his/her previous senior position within this structure. It is thus clear that the VNGOs do not gain any legitimacy “as NGOs” at the local level. Instead the initial legitimacy they enjoy at the local levels is based on directors’ status within the official system and the legitimacy they gain with time at the local level is based on their working

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The Art of Manoeuvring in Changing Rules of Traffic efficiency and their ability to channel resources from central level to local levels (ref. section 8.1.2). Furthermore, the lack of sense of shared identity and common interests and the resulting competition and lack of networking among the VNGOs does not work in favour of a culturalcognitive institutionalisation of the VNGOs as NGOs. If the VNGOs do not belong to a distinct group in their own minds and engage in “concerted action” (ref. Suchman), there is little basis for establishing themselves as a distinct group in the minds of key-interest groups in their immediate environment (and manipulate existing institutions). Seeking to assess the degree to which the VNGOs have managed to gain legitimacy as NGOs and become institutionalised it may be worth looking at how the authorities perceive and refer to the VNGOs. A VNGO interviewee tells me that a representative from the government who participated in a meeting with a group of VNGOs explained that “… “NGO” is just a word from foreign donors that is not suitable for Vietnam”. A Vietnamese observer from an IAA explained that the authorities prefer not to refer to the VNGOs as NGOs, but by using the broader term: “social development organisations”, which also includes the mass-organisations and other official organs or by referring to them individually by name (of the director or the organisation). In relation to the cultural-cognitive institutions these observations are extremely interesting. By refusing to accept the NGO term, which is adopted and adapted by the VNGOs, and by referring to the VNGOs broadly together with other types of organisations the authorities avoid having to recognise their formal existence as NGOs and their importance as a distinct group. By referring to them as individual organisations they create a basis for treating them on a “special case basis” - a sort of “divide and rule strategy”, which ensures the authorities more leeway in terms of setting the terms and conditions for the VNGOs on an individual basis. This in turn enforces the importance of the VNGO directors’ high status and personal relations within the system (ref. chapter 7). We thus come back to the issue of personal status and personal relations, which is clearly very important in the Vietnamese context. Before summing up on the legitimacy gained by and institutionalisation of the VNGOs, I would like to introduce a small observation I made in the course of my fieldwork, which helps illustrate the importance of personal relations as opposed to formal institutionalised structures in the Vietnamese culture. During my talks with Vietnamese and foreign interviewees I found that while foreigners identified the VNGOs by the name of the 85

The Art of Manoeuvring in Changing Rules of Traffic organisation, the Vietnamese identified the organisation by name of the director or leading staff members. Thus VNGO-Y was rarely referred to as VNGO-Y, but as “Mr./Mrs. Y1” or “Mr./Mrs. Y1’s organisation”, VNGO-Z was referred to as “Mr./Mrs. Z1” or “Mr./Mrs. Z1’s organisation” etc. The cognitive perception of the individual VNGO thus seems closely linked with the individuals heading the organisation. This illustrates that in the Vietnamese context “people matter” – sometimes more than institutions, which implies that the long term survival of the VNGOs may depend more on the ability of individual organisations to perform smooth generational (leader-)shifts than on the formal institutionalisation of the VNGOs as an organisational category.

8.2 Summing up – to which degree do the Vietnamese NGOs gain recognition as independent civic actors? I have now considered the degree to which the VNGOs gain legitimacy and become institutionalised as independent civic actors and the degree to which they instil institutional changes which with time may provide institutional support for the independent civic activity. It seems that the VNGOs, through creative interpretation of the decree on science and technology from 1992 have - at least informally - institutionalised the decree (now law) as the NGO-law. In this way they have actually established a co-existing institution which provides them with sufficient regulative legitimacy to establish and operate. There are also indications that, even though the umbrella system is reproduced by the VNGOs there is a tendency towards decentralisation from VUSTA to the professional associations. The VNGOs seem to enjoy little legitimacy and be little institutionalised in relation to the central level authorities. They are not recognised as NGOs by the authorities and their participation in the policy-making process is based on status and personal relations within the official system. Overall it is my impression that the VNGOs are not interested in generating radical institutional changes and their behaviour does not instil immediate radical changes – as a result their long term survival depends more on personal relations than on supporting institutions. We have also seen that although the VNGOs do not seem to enjoy legitimacy as NGOs at the local levels, they may indirectly influence the relationship between local and central level authorities by bringing new resources, activities and ideas to the local levels. This, combined with other developments may further a general process of decentralisation. 86

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Keeping in mind figure 4.1., illustrating dimensions and degrees of legitimacy I find that although the VNGOs have managed to gain a relatively high degree of regulative legitimacy through the establishment of a co-existing regulative institution, they enjoy a limited degree of legitimacy based on normative perceptions of their desirability and cognitive perceptions of their understandability as independent civic actors.

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9 What are the characteristics and development abilities of the Vietnamese NGOs? In this part of the analysis I bring together the overall issue of civil society development in Vietnam and the more specific concern to develop our understanding of the Vietnamese NGO (VNGO) phenomenon. I present some deliberations about how we may understand the VNGO phenomenon seen in relation to the contemporary international debate on civil society and NGOs. Like the previous chapter this chapter draws broadly on the whole surveyed VNGO population. In addition, observations made by representatives of international aid agencies about the VNGOs are included in the discussion. The discussion is structured around the following questions: What are the characteristics of the VNGOs compared with the characteristics commonly associated with civil society organisations? Considering the conditions and the characteristics of the VNGOs what are their development abilities compared with the development abilities commonly associated with civil society organisations? On this basis the present chapter provides the background for the answer to the second part of the research question as to whether the VNGOs can be seen as a sign of an emerging civil society. The purpose of this chapter is not to provide conclusive answers; but informed by the literature on civil society and NGOs and the examination of the VNGOs I present a reflective discussion of these questions. Thus, the purpose of this last part of the analysis is not to wrap up and close the discussion, but to open up and provide the starting point for an informed discussion about the VNGOs and civil society development in Vietnam. Before I move on, let me briefly recap what the literature says about civil society and its organisations. We saw in chapter 3 that the western conceptualisation of civil society stresses that it is independent from the state, it is not-for profit, and it is characterised by values such as voluntarism and solidarity. Usually, a distinction is made between organisations directly representative of the poor (often referred to as membership based and/or grass-root organisations) and those who not directly representative of the poor, but who work to help the poor and raise the concerns of the poor (often referred to as development-oriented organisations or NGOs). Finally, three developmental abilities ascribed civil society were identified, including: their ability to innovate, their ability to reach the poor, and their ability to empower the poor.

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9.1 What are the characteristics of the Vietnamese NGOs? In the following I will discuss the characteristics of the VNGOs compared to the characteristics commonly associated with civil society organisations. I specifically discuss the question of: independence from the state; separation from the market, not-for-profit and voluntarism and solidarity; and being directly representative of the poor.

9.1.1

The question of independence from the state

The contemporary literature on civil society and NGOs is much concerned with the independence of civil society from the state. The general idea is that in order to have an effect as a counterweight to the state and have a democratising function independence is required. But what exactly is meant by independence from the state? It is my impression that most of the VNGOs interviewed have emerged upon the initiative of individuals as opposed to the initiative of the party-state. However, with almost no exceptions all of the VNGOs are founded by individuals with a background from the party-state. We have also seen that to establish a VNGO registration with at least one or two official organs is required and although the VNGOs stress their independence from the state they must report at least annually to the authorities with whom they are registered. On this basis, can we say that the VNGOs are independent from the state or that they are not? With VNGO-X we have seen an example of a VNGO making use of high status and personal relations to link with the official system apparently to negotiate the terms for the organisation and to survive and gain legitimacy. Does that make VNGO-X dependent on the state, considering that it is financially and managerially independent? With VNGO-Y we have also seen an example of a VNGO making use of high status and personal relations to gain maximum independence from the official system. Does that make VNGO-Y more independent from the state? Finally, with VNGO-Z we have seen an organisation, which - coming from a relatively weak position in relation to the state – consciously avoids the attention of the national level authorities, to avoid potentially negative attention. Does that make VNGO-Z more or less independent? It seems that although the VNGOs are formally dependent on the sanctioning of the official system, once established they operate fairly independently from the party-state. While they can thus be said to operate relatively independently on a day-to-day basis, their survival and legitimacy is highly dependent on the position of the official system.78

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This observation is supported by the VNGOs themselves. In the questionnaire survey they rate the importance of “national government” in the short term as less important than fx. “local government” and “international donors and NGOs”, in the long term, however, “national government” is rated as the most important interest group.

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The Art of Manoeuvring in Changing Rules of Traffic 9.1.2

The question of separation from the market

Another concern raised in the literature on civil society and NGOs is the separation of civil society from the market, that it is not-for-profit and driven by values of voluntarism and solidarity. How about the VNGOs then? Are they separate from the market, are they not-for profit and are they driven by values of voluntarism and solidarity? The VNGOs are registered as not-for-profit organisations and claim to be not-for-profit. The VNGOs do not have any shareholders who reap a profit. So formally they work on a not-for-profit basis. However, considering the amount of aid-money pouring into Vietnam, international development cooperation in contemporary Vietnam can be considered a business sector in its own right, in which services are paid for at prices which are far more attractive than a government salary or pension. The staff members of the VNGOs are professionals and receive a salary, which is well above the average salary for a government official.79 Seen from this point of view the VNGOs seem driven by economic motives, but does this mean that they are not separate from the market, that they are not not-for-profit and that they are not driven by values of voluntarism and solidarity? Some foreign and Vietnamese observers are highly critical and one foreign observer referred to the VNGOs as “employment schemes for retired government officials”, others consider them as businesses in disguise as NGOs, and while this is rather difficult to determine based on my interviews indeed one of the VNGOs interviewed appears to be just that. In the interview they told me that they are an NGO, just a few days after having told a visiting consultant, whom I happen to know, that they had simply registered as an NGO for tax reasons! However, considering the VNGOs’ stated objectives, some of which are to: “… improve peoples’ life”; “… participate directly in hunger eradication and poverty alleviation”; “… to improve the living standard for the poor facing disaster”; “ … support poor rural areas … and improve the living standard” they certainly display the values of solidarity commonly associated with civil society organisations. The impression I got from my visits was that the directors as well as the staff members are truly committed to the development cause and driven by philanthropic motives. At the same time some founders, although most of them have reached the retirement age, are driven by professional motives to “… do his/her own research as he/she likes” outside the bureaucratic structures of the official system. The professional motives also seem to relate to an entrepreneurial spirit, which I found characterised many of my interviewees. Mr./Mrs. Y1

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According to the information I was able to obtain an average monthly salary for VNGO staff is around 100 USD. While this is well below what international NGOs may offer (usually +200 USD monthly), it is well above the salaries offered by the government, which is usually around 30-50 USD monthly. Other benefits follow from working with the government such as housing, contacts etc., but strictly measured in monetary terms it is more attractive to work for a VNGO.

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The Art of Manoeuvring in Changing Rules of Traffic from VNGO-Y mentions that he/she “wanted to do everything him/herself” and another VNGO Director (who was in fact offered a position as a vice director with an existing VNGO upon his/her retirement) explains that he/she “… preferred to set up his/her own”. Finally, a number of the VNGOs seem driven by personal motives, like Mr./Mrs. Y1 from VNGO-Y who wanted to stay active and maintain contact with people (ref. chapter 7.1.2). Overall, the VNGOs thus seem to be driven by a combination of philanthropic, professional, personal and economic motives, which makes them hard to categorise. It may therefore be more appropriate to place them “somewhere in between” in relation to the question of separation from the market, not-forprofit and values of voluntarism and solidarity.

9.1.3

The question of being directly representative of the poor

In the contemporary literature on civil society and NGOs a distinction is often made between organisations which are directly representative of the poor and those who are not. While it is rarely made explicit, there is a tendency to consider locally rooted organisations which directly represent the people at the local levels (often referred to as grass-root organisations or community-based organisations) as “closer” to the “real” civil society than those organisations, which are not based on the local communities and which are not directly representative. The VNGOs included in this study are not membership based although for example VNGO-X refers to their founders, staffs and external collaborators as “members”.80 Founders and staff are all well-educated and represent the elite of the country. With the exception of VNGO-Z all the founders/directors are either party-members or former high ranking officials or both. The VNGOs surveyed are city-based organisations and with few exceptions (like for example VNGO-X) they are not represented in other parts of the country. A foreign observer from IAA-9 calls the VNGOs “sophisticated research based organisations”, which are not locally based. A Vietnamese observer from an IAA notes that the VNGOs “lack direct presence” in the localities and Another Vietnamese IAA observer notes that “… till now the VNGOs has no structure at grassroots level” and finds that “… something is missing between the VNGOs and the poor people”. Thus, according to the perception of the international aid agencies, the VNGOs are not directly representative of the poor and disadvantaged although they aim to help these groups at the local levels. But does this mean that they do not understand and that they are not concerned with the interests of the poor? In the Vietnamese communist context, equality has been and 80

Only one of the surveyed VNGOs seems to represent a group of members. However, this VNGO was established upon the initiative of the official system, and partly funded by the official system and belongs to the group identified in chapter 6.1.2 referred to as government-VNGOs.

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The Art of Manoeuvring in Changing Rules of Traffic continues to be – at least officially – of great concern of the leadership and although income disparities are increasing, the government is dedicated to fight poverty. The VNGOs seem to embrace this position, and many VNGOs interviewed claim to target their efforts towards the remote and mountainous areas where the ethnic minorities traditionally live and where poverty is widespread. Whether the VNGOs truly understand and are concerned with the interests of the poor, however, is a very subjective question. According to the VNGOs themselves, they understand the local conditions better than the foreign organisations (ref. for example VNGO-Z in chapter 7.1.3). According to some of the foreign and Vietnamese observers however, the VNGOs do not “… speak the language of development” (IAA-10) and work in “old fashioned ways” (IAA-13). It appears to me from my talks with foreign observers that they find that the VNGOs replicate the approaches of the official system, which has traditionally viewed the ethnic minorities as backward and which works in a top-down manner. Thus, according to the foreign and Vietnamese observers from the international aid agencies the VNGOs do not truly represent the interests of the poor – or at least the ethnic minorities – at the local levels and there is generally a concern with the weak link between the VNGOs and the communities they serve. Based on the above discussion about the characteristics of the VNGOs, let us now turn to discuss their development abilities.

9.2 What are the development abilities of the Vietnamese NGOs? In the following section I discuss the three development abilities identified in chapter 3, namely the ability to innovate, the ability to reach the poor and the ability to empower the poor.

9.2.1

The ability to innovate

The literature on civil society and NGOs highlights the ability to innovate, experiment and adapt as one of the special abilities of civil society and its organisations. We have seen that in fact the VNGOs themselves are products of innovative minds and they have emerged in a process of experimentation. Whether they in turn will be able to function as innovators in relation to the activities they carry out, however, is a slightly different question. It is clear from my talks with the VNGOs that they are founded by entrepreneurial individuals who feel that they have some ideas, which they could not carry out within the structures of the official system. The assistant to the director of a VNGO explains the motivation of the director to establish the VNGO in the following way: “… he/she was tired of not being able to recognise his/her reports because of so 92

The Art of Manoeuvring in Changing Rules of Traffic many corrections” (ref. also the quotes presented in section 9.1.2). The operational independence of the VNGOs from the state discussed in section 9.1.1 means that they are able to carry out some of these ideas without the close scrutiny of the official authorities. In addition, just like the VNGOs have adopted and adapted the NGO label, they seem to adopt and adapt some of the ideas and working methods they are being exposed to in the course of their co-operation with the international aid agencies. Although we have heard that the VNGOs work in an old fashioned manner and do not speak “the language of development” and although some of the VNGOs note that they face challenges in the cooperation with the international aid agencies because of “… difference in thinking and working methods between Vietnamese and some foreign experts” and difference in “… way to organise and views on work”, the VNGOs claim to co-operate with the international aid agencies not only to obtain funding, but also to learn and develop new working methods. A number of VNGOs point out how they have benefited from the co-operation with the foreign organisations: “… methods for checking, investigating and choosing samples for experiments”; and “… improve the research and experimental ability of our cadres”; and “… learn experience and working methods”. It is thus clear that although different ideas exist about how to approach development, the VNGOs are oriented towards learning and experimenting with new working methods. On this basis the VNGOs can be seen as a sort of “melting pot” in which new ideas and approaches are adapted and combined with knowledge of the local Vietnamese context to solve local development challenges. Even so, the potential of the VNGOs to innovate and experiment should not be overestimated. The organisations are formalised and professional and they depend on continuous development of new project proposals to keep running. Many of the interviewed VNGOs are run as “professional project organisations” more concerned with writing project proposals to foreign donors than with experimentation and innovation. Even so, the VNGOs seem to be in an obvious position as local “facilitators” or “interpreters” of ideas and approaches introduced by international aid agencies.

9.2.2

The ability to reach the poor

The literature on civil society and NGOs highlights the ability to provide social welfare services as another of the special abilities of civil society and its organisations. Social development seems to be at the heart of most VNGO activity, whether it is in the field of health, education, sustainable income generation or other, but could the VNGOs potentially become “alternative service providers”? If we by that mean provision of social services on a permanent basis, the answer seems to be “no”, first of all because the party-state is not willing to let them. Vietnamese leaders find it unthinkable to leave service delivery to actors outside the official system even 93

The Art of Manoeuvring in Changing Rules of Traffic though this already is the case (ref. chapter 5.2). In addition, with a few exceptions most of the VNGO activities are project based (ref. chapter 6) and therefore not continuous. This may have to do with their orientation towards funding from the international aid agencies, which encourages project activities as opposed to more continuous activity. It may also be instructive to consider the size and outreach of the VNGOs when assessing their potential as alternative service providers. According to the questionnaire survey the average number of staff of around 20 and I estimate that their budgets are in the area of anything from a few ten thousand dollars to a few hundred thousand dollars annually. While this is apparently enough to keep the VNGOs running it is questionable whether the VNGOs will be able to provide continuous and substantial services based on the current organisational and financial configuration. In addition to this the VNGOs are based in Hanoi, far from the communities they aim to serve, making cost-efficient service delivery difficult. On this basis it seems more likely that the VNGOs have potential as “intermediaries”, channelling activities and resources from the central level (foreign donors and to some extent central level agencies) to the localities and - much like VNGO-Z pictures itself as “support organisations” building local capacity to provide social welfare services.

9.2.3

The ability to empower the poor

The literature on civil society and NGOs highlights the ability to empower the poor and further a process of democratisation as a third special ability of civil society and its organisations. This ability rests on the assumed representative function and the assumed independence of civil society organisations from the state. I have already discussed the issue of independence and representativeness and found that depending on the exact definition of independence the VNGOs are more or less independent. I have also found that the VNGOs do not directly represent the people at local levels, although they seem dedicated to work to help them. We have seen that in relation to the question of raising the concerns of the people and participation in the policymaking process the VNGOs do participate, although their participation is based on personal relations rather than institutionalised processes. While most foreign observers interviewed seem to find that this limits the potential of the VNGOs to create a process of democratisation, one interviewee points out that Vietnamese do not talk to the government in the presence of foreigners and notes that “… the VNGOs have their own indirect channels and ways of conveying opinions…” (IAA-10). Recalling the concept of “fence-breaking” introduced in chapter 5, which informed us that informal processes may indeed prove very effective in influencing government policies, there seems to be a potential for the VNGOs to influence government policies through informal channels. Whether this will lead directly to a process of democratisation is doubtful. 94

The Art of Manoeuvring in Changing Rules of Traffic However, as noted in chapter 8, it is one activity in a chain of activities, which adds to a process of liberalisation and decentralisation, which in the Vietnamese context - characterised by “democratic centralism” - can be seen as a small step towards democratisation. Given the sociopolitical context it seems that keeping a low profile and using informal ways to influence government policy is the only way in which the VNGOs may be able to have any kind of influence in policy-making processes. In fact, if the VNGOs manage to establish themselves as co-operative and trustworthy, the central government might find them useful as informal informers about the situation at the local levels. The question is who the VNGOs really represent if a topic becomes politically sensitive: themselves and their organisational interests or the interest of the poor and marginalised? It is clear that the VNGOs do not have any political objectives. They seem less concerned with doing advocacy that with their own day-to-day survival and it is unlikely that they will compromise their own concern to promote the interests of the poor. As a result their democratising effect may be limited. Even so the VNGOs may have considerable “demonstration value” showing that activity outside the strict control of the government need not to constitute a threat to the political regime.

9.3 Summing up – what are the characteristics and development abilities of the Vietnamese NGOs? Having reflected upon the characteristics and development abilities of the VNGOs seen in relation to the characteristics and development abilities commonly associated with civil society and NGOs in the literature, I can now sum up my findings. We have seen that the VNGOs are able to operate independently of the state, but at the same time they are highly dependent on continued official approval for their long term survival. They are committed to help the poor and disadvantaged, but they are not directly representative of the people and they are situated far away from the communities they serve. They are able to attract resources to support their activities, but their activities are project based and their organisational survival depends on their ability to continuously develop new project proposals. The VNGOs themselves are products of innovative minds and although they partly replicate the traditional working methods of the official system they seem interested in learning and developing new working methods. Their independent status combined with their strategic position in between the central level authorities and the local authorities and in between the 95

The Art of Manoeuvring in Changing Rules of Traffic international aid agencies and the local communities thus makes the VNGOs a sort of “melting pot”, bringing together, “interpreting” and adapting ideas. Based on their current organisational and financial set up the VNGOs seem less geared towards permanent and large scale social delivery. But based on their strategic position referred to above they seem to have a potential role as “intermediary organisations” facilitating activities, resources and ideas from the centre to the localities – and communicating the results and the experience gained back. On this basis the VNGOs and their activities may be seen as pilots testing and developing new ways of providing social services, which may then be replicated elsewhere and on a larger scale. In addition the VNGOs seem well suited to function as “support organisations”, building the capacity to provide social services at local levels. Given the socio-political situation and the VNGOs’ compliance with the overall expectation of showing loyalty to the government the VNGOs seem to have a limited role as formally recognised democratising agents. Even so, they may - through informal channels - influence government policies and contribute to a process of decentralisation – for example of the relations between the centre and the localities. If the VNGOs can win the trust of the government they may have a significant demonstration value, showing the government that activity outside the formal system need not to be considered a threat to the political system.

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10 Conclusion Inspired by the contemporary international debate on civil society and NGOs in the development literature on the one hand and the reform process of doi moi in Vietnam on the other hand, the purpose of this thesis has been to explore the following research question: How does the reform process of doi moi create space for the emergence of Vietnamese NGOs and can the Vietnamese NGOs be seen as a sign of an emerging civil society? Based on a study of a group of new Vietnamese NGOs based in Hanoi and guided by a combined institutional and strategic theoretical perspective I have examined how the Vietnamese NGOs manoeuvre in relation to interest groups in their immediate environment and the degree to which they gain recognition as independent civic actors. In this way I have thrown light on the first part of the research question. Considering the socio-political context in Vietnam it is clear that the Vietnamese NGOs emerge in an environment characterised by a strong and all-encompassing party-state, leaving very little scope for formally organised independent civic activity. However, the reform process - initiated with the introduction of doi moi in 1986 - is characterised by liberalisation and experimentation which creates space for new initiatives. Even so, political processes and organisation of social interest groups remains within the domain of the official system. Concurrently with doi moi the open door policy aiming to attract foreign investment and foreign aid was introduced leading to an influx of foreign donors and international NGOs. With the rapidly growing international development co-operation, financial resources and a range of new activities have been introduced into the Vietnamese context during the 1990s. With one exception, all the Vietnamese NGOs included in the study are established by senior government officials. There is no legal framework for independent civic activity in Vietnam and high status and personal relations within the official system are commonly used either to “link” with the official system to gain protection or to “de-link” and gain independence from the official system. The Vietnamese NGOs mainly manoeuvre directly in relation to the party-state and make extensive use of informal relations to negotiate the terms on which they operate and to raise their concerns. They primarily engage in relations with the international aid agencies to attract financial resources which allow them to work financially independent of the official 97

The Art of Manoeuvring in Changing Rules of Traffic system and there is very little networking among the Vietnamese NGOs, who view each other more as competitors (for funding) than as colleagues with common interests and concerns. Even so, the creative interpretation of a new legal frame for science and technology organisations has made it possible for individuals without high status and personal relations within the official system to establish and operate a Vietnamese NGO, based on what could be termed a strategy of “avoidance”. This strategy is seen combined with strategic association with other Vietnamese NGOs and the international aid agencies to create a kind of “buffer” in relation to the party-state. While the manoeuvres applied by the Vietnamese NGOs create space for the Vietnamese NGOs to emerge, their legal basis is weak and they are not officially recognised as independent civic actors. They are only tolerated because they are clearly not politically motivated and conform to the overall expectation to show loyalty to the government. As a result, the recognition gained by the Vietnamese NGOs is mainly based on their working efficiency as project implementers at local levels and who their leaders are. Thus, the reform process creates initial space in relation to the party-state for the Vietnamese NGOs to emerge. Through funding from international aid agencies and active manoeuvring in relation to the party-state, the Vietnamese NGOs are able to operate financially and managerially independently of the party-state. Even so, the space created through the manoeuvres applied by the Vietnamese NGOs is limited and mostly based on informal processes which leave the Vietnamese NGOs in a vulnerable position in relation to the party-state. The space created allowing the Vietnamese NGOs to emerge, is only “temporarily sanctioned” and the long term survival of the Vietnamese NGOs is not certain. Based on the first part of the analysis and informed by the contemporary literature on civil society and NGOs, I have reflected upon the characteristics of the Vietnamese NGOs and their development abilities. In this way I have thrown light on the second part of the research question. Although the Vietnamese NGOs operate independently of the state their long term survival depends on the position of the party-state towards independent civic activity generally and the Vietnamese NGOs specifically. Thus their real independence from the state is questionable. While the Vietnamese NGOs are committed to the cause of helping the poor, they are not rooted

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The Art of Manoeuvring in Changing Rules of Traffic in the communities they aim to serve and their operations are highly dependent on continued donor funding. On this basis the development abilities of the Vietnamese NGOs seen in relation to the development abilities commonly ascribed civil society and NGOs are limited. Given the sociopolitical context and the characteristics of the Vietnamese NGOs, they can work as “pilots” testing and developing new ways of providing social services and they can function as “intermediary organisations” facilitating flows of activities, resources and ideas between the centre and the localities. Due to their strategic position between the centre and the localities, they may add to the ongoing process of decentralisation taking place in Vietnamese society, but they do not have much potential as formal democratising agents. However, given the general character of political processes in Vietnam, they may be able to influence government policies informally. They could also have significant demonstration value, showing the government that development-oriented activity outside the official system need not constitute a challenge to the political regime. While the Vietnamese NGOs can not be seen as a sign of an emerging civil society according to western/liberal conceptualisations of civil society, I find that their presence is a clear indication that the dominance of the party-state in Vietnamese society is loosening up and “something is happening”. Furthermore, while the Vietnamese NGOs may not be seen as a sign of an emerging civil society according to a western/liberal definition, they may be seen as a sign of an emerging civil society according to a Vietnamese definition, which is still in the process of being formulated. It is clear that the Vietnamese NGOs alone do not and cannot constitute civil society and that the socio-political context places certain restraints on their development abilities, but this observation is made based on western/liberal ideas. Thus, instead of concluding that the Vietnamese NGOs cannot be seen as a sign of an emerging civil society because they do not fit the western/liberal ideas about civil society, it may be worth considering whether the western/liberal ideas about civil society fit the Vietnamese NGOs and the context in which they emerge.

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[krp1]Could

I make a 2-3 page summary of key points of the methodology and refer to an Annex with the

full description? [krp2]Could

I incorporate data from this section in the above section and scrap the rest?