Joson V. Executive Secretary

Joson v. Executive Secretary Facts: On Sept. 17, 1996, some SB members of Nueva Ecija filed with the Office of the President a letter-complaint charging Edno Joson with grave misconduct and abuse of authority. They allege that in the morning of Sept. 12, 1996, they were at the session hall of the provincial capitol for a scheduled session of the Sangguniang Panlalawigan when Joson belligerently barged in to the hall, kicked the door and chairs and uttered threatening words at them; and that Edno was with several men with firearms who encircled the area. They claim that this incident was an offshoot of their resistance to a pending legislative measure supported by petitioner that the province of Nueva Ecija obtain a loan of P150 M. The President acted on the complaint by noting on the margin that the “use of force, intimidation or armed followers” were unjustified and instructed Sec. Barbers of the DILG to take preemptive and investigative actions. Sec. Barbers directed the petitioner to submit an answer but Edno failed to submit even after several extensions granted by the DILG. On April 22, 1997, Usec Sanchez, then acting Sec., issued an order declaring Edno in default and to have waived his right to present evidence. 2 days later, Edno’s counsel entered appearance causing Usec Sanchez to reconsider his order and gave petitioner, for the last time, 15 days to filed his answer. But still, Edno failed to file his answer. The order of default was thus reinstated. Joson then filed a Motion to Dismiss alleging that the complaint was not verified and that the DILG has no jurisdiction over the case. On July 11, 1997, on recommendation of Sec. Barbers, Exec. Sec.Torres issued an order, by authority of the President, placing Edno Joson under preventive suspension for 60 days pending investigation of the charges against him. Vice-Governor Tinio was designated as Acting Governor. Edno, on the other hand, filed a petition for certiorari and prohibition with the Court of Appeals challenging the order of preventive suspension and the order of default. Edno also filed, among others, a Motion to Conduct Formal Investigation pursuant to the provisions of the LGC and Rule 7 of Administrative Order No. 23. The petition for certiorari with the CA was later dismissed. The Motion to Conduct Formal Investigation with the DILG was also denied. The DILG Secretary found the affidavits of complainants’ witnesses to be “more natural, reasonable, and probable” than those of Edno Joson. The Exec. Secretary, by authority of the President, adopted the finding and recommendation of the DILG and imposed on petitioner the penalty of suspension from office for 6 months without pay. The Supreme Court, however, issued a TRO enjoining the implementation of said order. That notwithstanding, Tinio was installed as Acting Governor. Issue: Whether the DILG Secretary had jurisdiction over the case Held: Yes. Jurisdiction over administrative disciplinary actions against elective local officials is lodged in 2 authorities: the Disciplining Authority and the Investigating Authority. Pursuant to Secs. 2 and 3 of A.O. No. 23, the Disciplining Authority is the President, whether acting by himself or through the Exec. Secretary. The Sec. of the DILG is the Investigating Authority, who may act by himself or constitute an Investigating

Committee. He is not, however, the exclusive Investigating Authority for the DILG Sec. may designate a Special Investigating Committee. The power of the President over administrative disciplinary cases against local officials is derived from his power of general supervision over local governments as provided under Sec. 4, Art. X, 1987 Constitution. And the power of supervision means “overseeing or the authority of an officer to see that the subordinate officers perform their duties. If the subordinate officers fail or neglect to fulfill their duties, the official may take such action or step as prescribed by law to make them perform their duties. The President’s power of general supervision means no more than the power of ensuring that laws are faithfully executed, or that subordinate officers act within the law. Supervision is not incompatible with discipline. This power must be construed to authorize the President to order an investigation of the act or conduct of local officials when in his opinion the good of the public service requires. A.O. No. 23 delegates the power to investigate to the DILG or a Special Investigating Committee, as may be constituted by the Disciplining Authority. This is not undue delegation, contrary to petitioner’s claim. The President remains the Disciplining Authority. And the power of the DILG to investigate administrative complaints is based on the alter-ego principle or the doctrine of qualified political agency. Under this doctrine, all executive and administrative organizations are adjuncts of the Exec.Dept., the heads of which are assistants and agents of the President. And this doctrine is corollary to the control power of the President as provided in the Constitution. The procedure under the LGC and A.O. No. 23, however, is that when an administrative complaint is filed, the Disciplining Authority shall issue an order requiring the respondent to submit his verified answer within 15 days from notice. And upon filing of the answer, the Disciplining Authority shall refer the case to the Investigating Authority for investigation. In the case at bar, the Office of the President did not comply with this requirement since it should have first required petitioner to file his answer and this, together with the complaint, to be referred to the Investigating Authority. Be that as it may, this procedural lapse is not fatal. The filing of the answer is necessary merely to enable the President to make a preliminary assessment of the case. The President found the complaint sufficient in form and substance to warrant its further investigation. The judgment of the President on the matter is entitled to respect in the absence of grave abuse of discretion. Issue: Whether the DILG Sec. erred in recommending to the Discipling Authority the preventive suspension of petitioner during the investigation. Held: No. Preventive suspension is authorized under Sec. 63 of the LGC. It may be imposed by the Disciplining Authority at any time (a) after the issues are joined; (b) when the evidence of guilt is strong; and (c) given the gravity of the offense, there is great probability that the respondent, who continues to hold office, could influence the witnesses or pose a threat to the safety and integrity of the records and other evidence. Exec. Sec. Torres found that all requisites for the imposition of preventive suspension had been complied with. Petitioner’s failure to file his answer despite several opportunities given him was construed as a waiver of his right to file answer and present evidence; and as a result of this waiver, the issues were deemed to have been joined. It was also found that the evidence of petitioner’s guilt was strong and that his continuance in office during

the pendency of the case could influence the witnesses and pose a threat to the safety and integrity of the evidence against him. Issue: Whether the Resolution finding petitioner guilty and imposing the 6-month suspension is valid. Held: Yes. Settled is the rule that in administrative proceedings, technical rules of procedure and evidence are not strictly applied. The essence of due process is to be found in the reasonable opportunity to be heard and to submit evidence one may have in support of one’s defense. To be heard does not only mean verbal arguments in court; one may be heard also through pleadings. Where opportunity to be heard, either through oral arguments or pleadings, is accorded, there is no denial of due process. Thus, when petitioner failed to submit his position paper as directed and insisted for the conduct o formal investigation, he was not denied of his right of procedural process.