CASE
DIGEST
ISSUE: Whether or not the decision of administrative bodies, the Bureau of Mines and Department of Agriculture and Natural Resources, must be
IV. POWERS AND FUNCTIONS OF ADMINISTRATIVE AGENCIES
overturned? A. Rule Making B. Adjudication C. Incidental
HELD: No. The officers of the Executive Department tasked with administering the Mining Law have found that there is neither encroachment nor overlapping OF
in respect of the claims involved. Accordingly, whatever may be the answers
AGRICULTURE AND NATURAL RESOURCES, DIRECTOR OF MINES,
to the questions will not materially serve the interests of the petitioner. In
JUSAN TRUST MINING COMPANY, and J & S PARTNERSHIP
closing it is useful to remind litigation prone individuals that the interpretation
SIERRA
MADRE
TRUST
vs.
HONORABLE
SECRETARY
by officers of laws which are entrusted to their administration is entitled to great G.R. Nos. L-32370 & 32767 April 20, 1983
respect.' In his decision, the Secretary of Agriculture and Natural Resources said: "This Office is in conformity with the findings of the Director of Mines that
FACTS: Sierra Madre Trust (SMT) filed two adverse claims over 12 separate lode mineral claims with the Bureau of Mines. On July 26, 1962, the SMTfiled
the mining claims of the appellees were validly located, surveyed and registered.
with the Bureau of Mines an Adverse Claim against LLA No. V-7872 of the Jusan Trust Mining Company over six (6) lode mineral claims, all situated in Sitio Maghanay, Barrio Abaca Municipality of Dupax, Province of Nueva
overlapped the eleven (11) lode mineral claims of SMT.
ANTIPOLO REALTY CORPORATION, petitioner, vs. THE NATIONAL HOUSING AUTHORITY, HON. G.V. TOBIAS, in his capacity as General Manager of the National Housing Authority, THE HON. JACOBO C. CLAVE, in his capacity as Presidential Executive Assistant and VIRGILIO A. YUSON, respondents.
SMT also filed an adverse claim against J and S Partnership (JSP) over
G.R. No. L-50444 August 31, 1987
Vizcaya. The adverse claim prayed that the claims of respondent Jusan Trust Mining Company (JTMC) be denied and declared null, void, and illegal as the said lode minerals claims covered by LLA No. V-7872 (Amd) encroached and
another six (6) lode mineral situated in Sitio Gatid, Barrio of Abaca Municipality of Dupax, Province of Nueva Vizcaya on July 26, 1966, claiming that they encroached and overlapped the thirteen (13) lode mineral claims of SMT. These two (2) adverse claims were jointly heard in the Bureau of Mines, and also jointly considered in the appeal in the Department of Agriculture and Natural Resources. The Director of Mines and the Secretary of Agriculture and Natural Resources dismissed the claims. They said that there exists no conflict or overlapping between the SMT's and JTMC's and JSP’s mining claims. Administrative Law Judge Augusto Jose Arreza
FACTS: Jose Hernando acquired prospective and beneficial ownership over Lot. No. 15, Block IV of the Ponderosa Heights Subdivision in Antipolo, Rizal, from the petitioner Antipolo Realty Corporation under a Contract to Sell. On 28 August 1974, Hernando transferred his rights over the said lot to private respondent Virgilio Yuson, embodied in a Deed of Assignment and Substitution of Obligor. However, for failure of Antipolo Realty to develop the subdivision project in accordance with its undertaking under Clause 17 of the Contract to Sell (subdivision beautification), Mr. Yuson paid only the arrearages pertaining to the period up to, and including, the month of August 1972 and stopped all monthly installment payments falling due thereafter.
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On 14 October 1976, the president of Antipolo Realty sent a notice to private respondent Yuson advising that the required improvements in the subdivision had already been completed, and requesting resumption of payment of the monthly installments on Lot No. 15. For his part, Mr. Yuson replied that he would conform with the request as soon as he was able to verify the truth of the representation in the notice. In a second letter dated 27 November 1976, Antipolo Realty reiterated its request, citing the decision rendered by the National Housing Authority (NHA) on 25 October 1976 in Case No. 252 (entitled "Jose B. Viado Jr., complainant vs. Conrado S. Reyes, respondent") declaring Antipolo Realty to have "substantially complied with its commitment to the lot buyers pursuant to the Contract to Sell. A formal demand was made for full and immediate payment of the amount of P16,994.73, representing installments which, Antipolo Realty alleged, had accrued during the period while the improvements were being completed
the National Labor Relations Commission) is well recognized in our jurisdiction, basically because the need for special competence and experience has been recognized as essential in the resolution of questions of complex or specialized character and because of a companion recognition that the dockets of our regular courts have remained crowded and clogged. As provided by Presidential Decree No. 1344, the NHA is empowered to regulate the real estate trade and business, and has jurisdiction over cases of unsound real estate business practices, refund claims and those involving specific performance of contractual and statutory obligations filed by buyers of subdivision lots or condominium units against the owner, developer, dealer, broker or salesman.
City of Baguio vs. Nino —
FACTS:
i.e., between September 1972 and October 1976. Yuson refused to pay the September 1972 - October 1976 monthly installments but agreed to pay the post October 1976 installments. Antipolo Realty responded by rescinding the Contract to Sell, and claiming the forfeiture of all installment payments previously made by Mr. Yuson. Yuson brought his dispute with Antipolo Realty before NHA. Antipolo Realty filed a motion to dismiss, which NHA denied. After hearing, the NHA rendered a decision on 9 March 1978 ordering the reinstatement of the Contract to Sell under the conditions of: 1) ARC shall sent Yuson statement of account for mothly amortizations from November 1976 to present; 2) No penalty interest shall be charged from November 1976 until the date of issuance of said statement of account; 3) Yuson shall be given 60 days to pay arrears. A motion for reconsideration filed by Antipolo Realty was also denied. On October 2, 1978, they also petitioned for certiorari and certiorari and prohibition with writ of preliminary injunction, the same being denied.
The decision of the Director of Lands having become final and executory, the then-Executive Director of the Department of Environment and Natural Resources-Cordillera Autonomous Region (DENR-CAR), on petition of Narcisa, issued an Order of Execution directing the Community Environment and Natural Resources Office (CENRO) Officer to enforce the decision "by ordering Petitioner Niño and those acting in his behalf to refrain from continuously occupying the area and remove whatever improvements they may have introduced thereto." Domogan thru the Demolition Team and City Engineer’s Office are ordered to cease and desist from enforcing the amended order of executionissued by Oscar N. Hamada, Regional Executive Director of the Department of Environmental and Natural Resources, concerning the demolition or removal of the structures made by petitioners until private respondent applied for a special order Mayor Mauricio abovementioned with the proper court.
ISSUE: Whether or not in hearing the complaint of Yuson and in ordering the reinstatement of the Contract to Sell between the parties NHA assumed the performance of judicial or quasi-judicial functions which it was not authorized to perform
ISSUE: Whether or not the enforcement of the Amended Order of Execution needs a hearing and court order which Sec. 10(d) of Rule 39 of the Rules of Court requires despite the fact that an the administrative agency which is clothed with quasi-judicial functions issued the Amended Order of Execution.
Held: No. It is by now commonplace learning that many administrative agencies exercise and perform adjudicatory powers and functions, though to a limited extent only. Limited delegation of judicial or quasi-judicial authority to administrative agencies (e.g., the Securities and Exchange Commission and
HELD: Yes. In general, the quantum of judicial or quasi-judicial powers which an administrative agency may exercise is defined in the enabling act of such agency. In other words, the extent to which an administrative entity may exercise such powers depends largely, if not wholly, on the provisions of the statute creating or empowering such agency.
Administrative Law Judge Augusto Jose Arreza
2nd Semester Academic Year 2018-2019
Wednesday 6:00-9:00 pm
There is, however, no explicit provision granting the Bureau of Lands (now the Land Management Bureau) or the DENR (which exercises control over the Land Management Bureau) the authority to issue an order of demolition — which the Amended Order of Execution, in substance, is. While the jurisdiction of the Bureau of Lands is confined to the determination of the respective rights of rival claimants to public lands or to cases which involve the disposition of public lands, the power to determine who has the actual, physical possession or occupation or the better right of possession over public lands remains with the courts.
Department of Agrarian Reform vs. Sutton G.R. No. 162070, October 19, 2005, PUNO, J.: Facts: Delia Sutton, Ella Sutton-Soliman and Harry Sutton inherited a land in Aroroy, Masbate which has been devoted exclusively to cow and calf breeding. In order to avail certain incentives under the law, they made a voluntary offer to sell (VOS) of the land to the petitioner Department of Agrarian Reform (DAR). On December 27, 1993, DAR issued A.O. No. 9, series of 1993 by virtue of Republic Act (R.A.) No. 6657, also known as the Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Law (CARL) of 1988, which provided that only portions of private agricultural lands used for the raising of livestock, poultry and swine as of June 15, 1988 shall be excluded from the coverage of the CARL by providing retention limits viz.: 1:1 animal-land ratio (i.e., 1 hectare of land per 1 head of animal shall be retained by the landowner), and a ratio of 1.7815 hectares for livestock infrastructure for every 21 heads of cattle shall likewise be excluded from the operations of the CARL As such, respondents wrote the DAR Secretary to consider as final and irrevocable the withdrawal of their VOS, but the then DAR Secretary Ernesto D. Garilao issued an Order partially granting the application of respondents for exemption from the coverage of CARL, wherein it exempted 1,209 hectares of respondents’ land for grazing purposes, and a maximum of 102.5635 hectares for infrastructure. Due to this, the respondents moved for reconsideration wherein they contended that their entire landholding should be exempted as it is devoted exclusively to cattle-raising. In respondent’s appeal to the Office of the President, the latter ruled that DAR A.O. No. 9, s. 1993, does not run counter to the Luz Farms case as the A.O. Administrative Law Judge Augusto Jose Arreza
provided the guidelines to determine whether a certain parcel of land is being used for cattle-raising. Then, the Court of Appeals ruled in favor of the respondents wherein it declared DAR A.O. No. 9, s. 1993, void for being contrary to the intent of the 1987 Constitutional Commission to exclude livestock farms from the land reform program of the government. Issue: Whether or not DAR A.O. No. 9, series of 1993, which prescribes a maximum retention limit for owners of lands devoted to livestock raising is unconstitutional. Held: Yes. We find that the impugned A.O. is invalid as it contravenes the Constitution. The A.O. sought to regulate livestock farms by including them in the coverage of agrarian reform and prescribing a maximum retention limit for their ownership. However, the deliberations of the 1987 Constitutional Commission show a clear intent to exclude, inter alia, all lands exclusively devoted to livestock, swine and poultry-raising. The Court clarified in the Luz Farms case that livestock, swine and poultry-raising are industrial activities and do not fall within the definition of “agriculture” or “agricultural activity.” The raising of livestock, swine and poultry is different from crop or tree farming. It is an industrial, not an agricultural, activity. A great portion of the investment in this enterprise is in the form of industrial fixed assets, such as: animal housing structures and facilities, drainage, waterers and blowers, feed-mill with grinders, mixers, conveyors, exhausts and generators, extensive warehousing facilities for feeds and other supplies, anti-pollution equipment like bio-gas and digester plants augmented by lagoons and concrete ponds, deepwells, elevated water tanks, pumphouses, sprayers, and other technological appurtenances. Petitioner DAR has no power to regulate livestock farms which have been exempted by the Constitution from the coverage of agrarian reform. It has exceeded its power in issuing the assailed A.O. The subsequent case of Natalia Realty, Inc. v. DAR reiterated our ruling in the Luz Farms case. In Natalia Realty, the Court held that industrial, commercial and residential lands are not covered by the CARL. It is doctrinal that rules of administrative bodies must be in harmony with the provisions of the Constitution. They cannot amend or extend the Constitution. To be valid, they must conform to and be consistent with the Constitution. In case of conflict between an administrative order and the provisions of the Constitution, the latter prevails. The assailed A.O. of petitioner DAR was
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properly stricken down as unconstitutional as it enlarges the coverage of agrarian reform beyond the scope intended by the 1987 Constitution.
NBIs functions are merely investigatory and informational in nature. NBI has no prosecutorial functions or quasi-judicial power and is incapable of granting relief or remedy. The NBI cannot be an agency contemplated by the circular.
IN VIEW WHEREOF, the petition is DISMISSED. The assailed Decision and Resolution of the Court of Appeals, dated September 19, 2003 and February 4, 2004, respectively, are AFFIRMED. No pronouncement as to costs.
Issue: Is NBI one of the agencies contemplated in the Circular No. 28-91, Revised Circular No. 28-91, and administrative Circular No. 04-94 on forum shopping?
A.C. No. 4634. September 24, 1997 JESUS CABARRUS, JR. vs. JOSE ANTONIO BERNAS
Ruling: No. Firstly, there is no forum shopping to speak of Atty. Bernas, as counsel of Mr. Pascual, Jr., merely requested the assistance of the NBI to investigate the the alleged fraud and forgery committed by Mr. Jesus Cabarrus.[5] The filing of the civil case for conveyance and damages before the Regional Trial Court of Pasig City does not preclude respondent to institute a criminal action. The rule allows the filing of a civil case independently with the criminal case without violating the circulars on forum shopping.
Facts: On August 30, 1996, Mr. Jesus Cabarrus, Jr. filed and administrative complaint for disbarment against Atty. Jose Antonio Bernas for alleged violations of Article 172 of the Revised Penal Code or Falsification by private individual and use of falsified documents. That on April 16, 1996, respondent Ramon B. Pascual, Jr., subscribe under oath, a verification and certification of non-forum shopping in a civil case, filed before the RTC in Pasay. Subsequently, respondent counsel, Jose Antonio Bernas filed a written complaint at the NBI for the same cause of action – as that of the civil case. That respondent Ramon B. Pascual, Jr. knowingly subverted and perverted the truth when he falsify certified and verified under oath in the verification and certification of non-forum shopping, that: He has not commenced any other action or proceeding involving the same issues in any court, including the Supreme Court, the Court of Appeals, or any other Tribunal or agency, where verification-certification was placed under oath in both cases at Branch 159 of the RTC in Pasig and at the NBI, an agency within the ambit and purview of the circular of the Supreme Court prohibiting forum shopping. Respondents Jose Antonio Bernas avers that he has not committed forum shopping because the criminal action is not an action that involves the same issue as those in the civil action and both suits can exist without constituting forum shopping so long as the civil aspect has not yet been prosecuted in the criminal case. He emphasized that forum shopping only exist when identical reliefs are issued by the same parties in multiple fora.
Secondly, Act No. 157 [7], which created the Bureau of Investigation under the Department of Justice, explicitly states that the function of the National Bureau of Investigations are merely investigatory and informational in nature. It has no judicial or quasi-judicial powers and is incapable of granting any relief to a party. It cannot even determine probable cause. It is an investigative agency whose findings are merely recommendatory. It undertakes investigation of crimes upon its own initiative and as public welfare may require. It renders assistance when requested in the investigation or detection of crimes which precisely what Atty. Bernas sought in order to prosecute those person responsible for defrauding his client. The courts, tribunal and agencies referred to under Circular No. 28-91, revised Circular No. 28-91 and Administrative Circular No. 04-94 are those vested with judicial powers or quasi-judicial powers and those who not only hear and determine controversies between adverse parties, but to make binding orders or judgments. As succinctly put it by R.A. 157, the NBI is not performing judicial or quasi-judicial functions. The NBI cannot therefore be among those forums contemplated by the Circular that can entertain an action or proceeding, or even grant any relief, declaratory or otherwise. WHEREFORE, premises considered, the instant complaint is hereby DISMISSED. SO ORDERED.
It was contended that Pascual merely requested the NBI to assist in the investigation or prosecution, and left it to the NBI to determine whether the filing of an endorsement to the prosecutor, who would determine probable caused, would be appropriate. Respondent reiterates that the letter transmitted to the NBI cannot constitute an action or proceeding because the Administrative Law Judge Augusto Jose Arreza
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D. Requirements for enforcement of administrative issuances GMA NETWORK, vs. MOVIE AND TELEVISION REVIEW BOARD, Respondent.
INC., Petitioner, AND
CLASSIFICATION
Doctrine:“ Administrative issuances which are not published or filed with the Office of the National Administrative Register (ONAR) of the UP law Center are ineffective and may not be enforced (Sec.3, 1987 Administrative Code)”
2.) NO , Memorandum Circular no. 98-17 has not been registered with the ONAR, as of January 27, 2000. Hence, the same is yet to be effective, it is just unenforceable since it has not been filed in the ONAR. The 1987 Administrative Code, section 3, expressly requires each agency to file with the Office of the National Administrative Remedies (ONAR) of the UP Law Center three certified copies of every rule adopted by it. Administrative issuances which are not published or filed with the ONAR are ineffective and may not be enforced.
FACTS: Petitioner GMA Network, Inc. operates and manages the UHF television station, EMC Channel 27. The respondent MTRCB issued an order of suspension against petitioner for airing "Muro Ami: The Making" without first securing a permit from it as provided in Section 7 of PD 1986. The penalty of suspension was based on Memorandum Circular 98-17 dated December 15, 1998 which provided for the penalties for exhibiting a program without a valid permit from the MTRCB. Petitioner move for the reconsideration of the suspension and informed the respondent that it had complied with the suspension order by going off the air. Respondent deny the motion, likewise, the CA also dismissed the complaint upon petitioner ’s appeal to them. ISSUE: 1.) Whether or not the MTRCB has the authority to review the show “Muro Ami: The Making” prior to its broadcast by television;? 2.) Whether or not Memorandum Circular No. 98-17 was enforceable and binding on the petitioners? HELD: 1.) YES, Sec. 3 of PD 1986 empowers the MTRCB to screen, review, and examine all motion pictures, television programs, including publicity materials. The only exceptions from it are (1) television programs imprinted or exhibited by the Philippine Government and/or other departments, and (2) newsreels. “Muro Ami: The Making” was a publicity for the movie“ Muro Ami” , therefore it did not fall under any of the exemptions and was therefore within the power of review of the MTRCB. Administrative Law Judge Augusto Jose Arreza
TAÑADA VS. TUVERA - 146 SCRA 446 (December 29, 1986) FACTS: This is a motion for reconsideration of the decision promulgated on April 24, 1985. Respondent argued that while publication was necessary as a rule, it was not so when it was “otherwise” as when the decrees themselves declared that they were to become effective immediately upon their approval. ISSUES: 1. Whether or not a distinction be made between laws of general applicability and laws which are not as to their publication; 2. Whether or not a publication shall be made in publications of general circulation. HELD: The clause “unless it is otherwise provided” refers to the date of effectivity and not to the requirement of publication itself, which cannot in any event be omitted. This clause does not mean that the legislature may make the law effective immediately upon approval, or in any other date, without its previous publication. “Laws” should refer to all laws and not only to those of general application, for strictly speaking, all laws relate to the people in general albeit there are some that do not apply to them directly. A law without any bearing on the public would be invalid as an intrusion of privacy or as class legislation or as an ultra vires act of the legislature. To be valid, the law must invariably affect the public interest eve if it might be directly applicable only to one individual, or some of the people only, and not to the public as a whole.
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All statutes, including those of local application and private laws, shall be published as a condition for their effectivity, which shall begin 15 days after publication unless a different effectivity date is fixed by the legislature. Publication must be in full or it is no publication at all, since its purpose is to inform the public of the content of the law. Article 2 of the Civil Code provides that publication of laws must be made in the Official Gazette, and not elsewhere, as a requirement for their effectivity. The Supreme Court is not called upon to rule upon the wisdom of a law or to repeal or modify it if it finds it impractical. The publication must be made forthwith, or at least as soon as possible. J.
Cruz:
Laws must come out in the open in the clear light of the sun instead of skulking in the shadows with their dark, deep secrets. Mysterious pronouncements and rumored rules cannot be recognized as binding unless their existence and contents are confirmed by a valid publication intended to make full disclosure and give proper notice to the people. The furtive law is like a scabbarded saber that cannot faint, parry or cut unless the naked blade is drawn.
Whenever a banking institution persists in violating its charter or by-laws or any law, or orders, instructions, rules or regulations legally issued by the Monetary Board, or whenever a banking institution persists in carrying on its business in an unlawful or unsafe manner, the Board shall, by the Solicitor General, and without prejudice to the penalties provided in the preceding paragraph of this section, file a petition in the Court of First Instance praying the assistance of the court to compel the banking institution to discontinue the violations or practices objected to in the petition of the Board. The Monetary Board may, with the approval of the court, take such action as the court may deem necessary compel the banking institution complained against to discontinue the violations or practices set forth in the Boards petition, and, if necessary, the Board may, under order of the court, direct the Superintendent of Banks to liquidate the business of the institution.) He was sentenced to suffer six months imprisonment, to pay a fine of P1,000 with subsidiary imprisonment in case of insolvency, and to pay the costs.
GUTIERREZ, Jr., J., concurring:
Appellant appeals on the claim that the said circular had no force or effect because the same was not published in the official Gazette prior to the act or omission imputed to said appellant. The Solicitor General counters that Commonwealth Act. No. 638 and 2930 do not require the publication in the Official Gazette of said circular issued for the implementation of a law in order to have force and effect.
I concur insofar as publication is necessary but reserve my vote as to the necessity of such publication being in the Official Gazette.
ISSUE: Whether or not circulars and regulations should be published in order to have force and effect.
PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee,
HELD: Yes, circulars and regulations especially like Circular No. 20 of the Central Bank which prescribes a penalty for its violation should be published before becoming effective. Before the public is bound by its contents, especially its penal provisions, a law, regulation or circular must first be published and the people officially and specifically informed of said contents and its penalties.
Que Po Lay was charge in possession of foreign exchange consisting of US dollors, US checks and US money orders amounting to about $7,000. He failed to sell the same to the Central Bank after one day of receiving it as required by Circular No. 20 of the Central Bank. Que Po Lay was found guilty of violating the Circular in connection with Section 34 of RA 265 (SEC. 34. Proceedings upon violation of laws and regulations.— Whenever any person or entity willfully violates this Act or any order, instruction, rule or regulation legally issued by the Monetary Board, the person or persons responsible for such violation shall be punished by a fine of not more than twenty thousand pesos and by imprisonment of not more than five years.
Section 11 of the Revised Administrative Code provides that statutes passed by Congress shall, in the absence of special provision, take effect at the beginning of the fifteenth day after the completion of the publication of the statute in the Official Gazette. Article 2 of the new Civil Code (Republic Act No. 386) equally provides that laws shall take effect after fifteen days following the completion of their publication in the Official Gazette, unless it is otherwise provided. SC reversed the decision of the Court of First Instance of Manila and acquit Que Po Lay.
THE PEOPLE OF THE vs. QUE PO LAY, defendant-appellant.
Administrative Law Judge Augusto Jose Arreza
2nd Semester Academic Year 2018-2019
Wednesday 6:00-9:00 pm
PEOPLE VS. MACEREN Administrative regulations adopted under legislative authority by a particular department must be in harmony with the provisions of the law, and should be for the sole purpose of carrying into effect its general provisions. By such regulations, the law itself cannot be extended. An administrative agency cannot amend an act of Congress. FACTS: The respondents were charged with violating Fisheries Administrative Order No. 84-1 which penalizes electro fishing in fresh water fisheries. This was promulgated by the Secretary of Agriculture and Natural Resources and the Commissioner of Fisheries under the old Fisheries Law and the law creating the Fisheries Commission. The municipal court quashed the complaint and held that the law does not clearly prohibit electro fishing, hence the executive and judicial departments cannot consider the same. On appeal, the CFI affirmed the dismissal. Hence, this appeal to the SC. ISSUE: Whether the administrative order penalizing electro fishing is valid? HELD: NO. The Secretary of Agriculture and Natural Resources and the Commissioner of Fisheries exceeded their authority in issuing the administrative order. The old Fisheries Law does not expressly prohibit electro fishing. As electro fishing is not banned under that law, the Secretary of Agriculture and Natural Resources and the Commissioner of Fisheries are powerless to penalize it. Had the lawmaking body intended to punish electro fishing, a penal provision to that effect could have been easily embodied in the old Fisheries Law. The lawmaking body cannot delegate to an executive official the power to declare what acts should constitute an offense. It can authorize the issuance of regulations and the imposition of the penalty provided for in the law itself. Where the legislature has delegated to executive or administrative officers and boards authority to promulgate rules to carry out an express legislative purpose, the rules of administrative officers and boards, which have the effect of extending, or which conflict with the authority granting statute, do not represent a valid precise of the rule-making power.
Administrative Law Judge Augusto Jose Arreza
2nd Semester Academic Year 2018-2019
Wednesday 6:00-9:00 pm