Is There A Flaw In Equaling Taxation To Forced Labour?

Is There A Flaw In Equaling Taxation To Forced Labour? SHI Wei Aug 12, 2009 Philosophy 101 - B1 Introduction to Philosophy University of Alberta Summer 2009 Instructor: Mr. Bartlomiej Lenart Student ID Number: 1252181 Essay Topic: 4: Libertarianism Word Count: 1012 Robert Nozick’s political philosophy can be seen as a libertarian critic on John Rawls’ Theory

of Justice, arguing that Rawls’ ”end-of-state” system implies redistribution of property which is illegitimate. He even goes as far to claim that there is no fundamental difference between taxation and forced labour. However, this conclusion is established on dubious premises and this paper will show that individual liberty may not best preserved with minimal state intervention. Nozick believes every rational being (person) should be regarded as an end in itself. Person has complete property rights in herself and such right cannot be compromised without her consent. Citing the natural rights advocated by John Locke, a person has the natural right to own property and because she owns herself, she has absolute rights over her property. In order to determine whether it is legitimate for her to claim property rights on an object, Nozick proposed three principles on acquisition, transfer of property and rectification of past injustice (Nozick , 1996, pg. 236). As long as these principles are satisfied, she is entitled to the object. For example, if one earns her salary from legitimate means, she thus has absolute property rights over it. Therefore taxation which takes away a portion of her salary violates her property rights and some of her labour has been used to pay for the tax, thus taxation is equivalent to forced labour. Taxation violates individual liberty, even if it is taken from the rich to help the needy. The transfer of property is justified only if it is voluntary or if it conforms to the principle of rectification. One obvious objection to Nozick’s argument is to deny the relevance of discussing individual liberty, i.e. question if one really owns herself (Okin , 1989). Okin argues that were we to accept

Nozick’s three principles on just property ownership, we would have concluded that a child is owned by her mother insofar as the woman has used justly acquired resources to ”produce” the baby. Such world is inconceivable and constitutes a reductio ad absurdum. Accepting other people can claim partial rights on ourselves, we would have some form of duty to them, perhaps in the form of paying taxes. Nozick would respond by relying on Kantian ethics in which it is a categorical imperative that person is an end in itself. Nevertheless this reply is not satisfactory as an infant is not considered as a person due to lack to rationality but usually an adult is and confusion arises as to determine when would an infant turn to person, therefore the time of selfownership would seem to be arbitrary at best. Now suppose one has full self-ownership. Her job is to push a button on a machine and the machine would churn out robots. The factory pays her 1 million every month, out of which she has to deduct $100 as tax to help the unemployed, but she is not willing to do so. Assume somehow she does not use any public services e.g. she is strong enough to protect herself from any aggression. Nozick would consider this $100 tax an illegitimate violation of her liberty. However, objections can still be made on the grounds that she does not have absolute ownership over the 1 million she received. Nozick would think if the factory justly owns the means of production and voluntarily pays her the salary, she would be entitled to it. But examining the production process more closely, one could argue that it is not certain the factory justly owns the means of production. Anything but human labour ultimately comes from natural resources, be it wood, coal etc. If we trace back the machine used in such production to its source, there must be some agent who has appropriated some natural resources in order to build the machine. Questions can be raised on whether such act is just. Nozick could argue that as long as that first person conforms to the principle of acquisition, her act is just. In reality, complications arise as to determine whether such principal is followed. Consider oil sands in Alberta. Should the person who first discovered them be able to justly claim property rights over them? Or should the aboriginal people be given some portions of them? Nozick coined the term ”Lockean Proviso” (Nozick , 1974) which means that as long as one leaves ”enough and as good” resources to others, it is just for her to take away her share. It is again an arbitrary limit on how much can be considered as ”enough and as good” for those resources that are limited in amount. Nozick would argue that insofar as others are not made worse off from her turning common property into private property, she is just. However, one could also argue that the point of comparison should not be set to the time before the use of natural resources. If the acquisition of natural resources has violated someone’s liberty, then the factory may not justly

own the machine and that worker may not justly own her salary. In this scenario, the principle of rectification should be applied. But who should pay for such compensation and to whom? Ruling all taxation as infringement of personal liberty is too rash a conclusion. Thus far, liberty is considered as free from intervention, or ”negative liberties”. As the term implies, there are ”positive liberties” which concern the removal of constraints, e.g. poverty, irrationality, etc. (MacCallum , 1967) Admittedly liberty is an essentially contested concept. Despite many would agree that liberty can be seen as a lack of constraints, disagreements abound in what are counted as constraints (Garner et al. , 2009, pg. 92). Should we follow the idea of Rousseau that we can be ”forced to be free” if we are ”educated” to be more rational (Garner et al. , 2009, pg. 93)? Then the state could use tax to finance schools and claim that such act has increased individual liberty because individuals become more intelligent through better education. At this point, Nozick’s view on redistributive taxation and individual liberty seems to be an exaggeration, not only because there is no consensus on what liberty is, but also absolute ownership over oneself or one’s holdings can be disputed.

References Garner, R., Ferdinand, P., & Lawson, S. Introduction to Politics, Oxford University Press, Oxford, 2009. MacCallum, G., Negative and Positive Freedom, in Philosophical Review, vol. 76. Nozick, R., Anarchy, State, and Utopia, Basic Books, New York, 1974. Nozick, R., Distributive Justice, in Stewart, R.M. ed., Readings in Social and Political Philosophy, Oxford University Press, Oxford, 1996. Okin, S.M., Libertarianism: Matriarchy, Slavery, and Dystopia, in Okin, S.M., Justice, Gender, and the Family, Basic Books, New York, 1989.