Iraq Lessons: Looking Back To Look Forward

Considering Iraq: a Balanced Retrospective, Future Framework & Lessons for Other Areas By Dave Livingston. Dave is a management consultant with almost 30 years of experience with analyzing complex business problems and developing solutions and new businesses. He blogs on public affairs at his blog Parts, Systems, Structures and Outcomes (http://llinlithgow.com/PtW/ ) where he attempts to apply that toolkit to current affairs and public policy.

We propose a test, offer up a toolkit for thinking about “nation-building” and, hopefully, provide some lessons for the current situation in Afghanistan. The test we propose is this – can we analyze complex socio-political policy problems by providing a useful framework? Or are we forever doomed to be trapped by simple answers, ideologies and shibboleths. In the current debates in the US over Healthcare and other policies certain partisans have staked out positions that are almost entirely polemical, where slogans and pejorative labels are being substituted for analysis, disciplined decision-making and civility. Yet we could just as easily have made those same statements about foreign policy debates during the Bush Administration where harsh criticisms were driven as much by ill-considered emotion as they were by reasoned, informed and experienced policy-making. In three other essays we look at the warp and woof of those issues by looking at the policies we think are required across the board (Crisis in the Public Square [http://www.pdfcoke.com/doc/19153835/Crisis-in-the-Public-Square-Thinking-AboutFutures-Policy-and-Politics ], the role of values and public leadership in moderating debates and ensuring a positive outcome (Heroes, Leaders and Public Morality [http://www.pdfcoke.com/doc/19370588/Heroes-Leaders-and-Public-Morality-Values-and-a-HealthyPublic-Square ] and a general approach to thinking about the future of the Middle East and US strategic policy (Middle East Solutions [http://www.pdfcoke.com/doc/19012245/Middle-East-Solutions-IssuesRelationships-Frameworks-and-Approaches ]. Just for the record the later piece sets a broader strategic context for this piece and argues that the ME is a vital national interest for the US because our, and the world economy, is utterly reliant on ME energy supplies. That means that stability and progress in Afghanistan is important and, even more so, that a stable and prosperous Pakistan is a vital strategic goal. Further, as we debate these sorts of issues, we should recognize that the Bush and Obama administrations have more continuity than differences on their policies. What’s evolved are changes in strategies, doctrine, operations and resource commitments. Also just for the record we thought that going into Iraq was necessary, in our national interest – for these same reasons, badly flawed in execution thru nearly malfesant executive management but eventually reversed itself thru that same leadership, a huge shift in strategy, doctrine and operations and laid the foundations of a successful effort. One that could see a viable and independent state emerge in a critical part of the world. But don’t take our word for it – read the following essays that start with fundamental questions, ask what are the alternatives, frameworks, status & outlooks and strategies required. We’ll also note that our start on this piece of work predated any public knowledge or discussion of a change in Iraqi strategy and worked out to be an accurate assessment. We’ve got a long way to go but the game has been changed for the better. That means this framework provides a useful toolkit and blueprint for future planning. We also would like to suggest that a similar approach is required, with adaptation and customization it should go without saying, to Afghanistan. And, with major changes, to Pakistan, ever the entire Middle East. Which the essay collection of ME Solutions attempts to apply.

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Thinking About Iraq: a Balanced Perspective? April 7, 2007 http://llinlithgow.com/PtW/2007/04/thinking_about_iraq_a_balanced.html Or is it a partisan debate based on already established, pre-conceived and hardened positions? One based on domestic political concerns rather than a careful investigation into our own long-term bests interests and those of Iraq, the Iraqis and the region? With all the back and forth on Iraq it' s hard to get the mental distance to think about it clearly and with all the factors weighted, weighed and balanced. And we seem to be more focused on what sounds good in Peoria, or the Upper West Side for that matter, than on where our own best interests might lie. Very hard to sort out. But almost all of the discussions seem to me to ignore the long-term consequences and the risks, irrespective of where you stand on the original decisions.
When we look at major policy issues like this our approach is often an important, indeed critical part of the examination. And especially worth doing if you happen to believe, as I do, that this is one of the most important foreign policy issues that will impact our place in the world for decades. Put that another way - the risks are enormous, the consequences of not considering them could be severe and it’s in our own personal interests to invest a little time in thinking about those issues.
By and large in huge-scale issues of this sort the original and continuing decisions are made based on our (actually politicians and policy-makers) intent for the outcome rather than asking what processes are going to be put in motion. There’s one critical question that should be repeated multiple times: WHAT HAPPENS THEN ? That is, what is the next step in our examination, and the next and the next. Thinking beyond stage one – time-consuming, difficult and expensive. But all too often un-intended consequences are not so much unintended as a failure to ask that question. One can argue that the initial decision likely was taken without such consideration, aside from ‘normal’ military planning and post-conflict civil affairs planning. One can further argue that as the conflict has evolved, major shifts in our opponents strategies and tactics haven’t received the broad examination they deserve. Though we should recognize the superb efforts, spirit and adaptive ingenuities of our military forces. While questioning the broader policy and operational contexts they' ve struggled to make good on. Iraq: the Big Questions Earlier we tried to ‘set the table’, so-to-speak by carefully outlining the approach to assessing the strategic situation in Iraq. As important as this is to the well-being of America and the world, and out of respect for ourselves, our troops, the Iraqis and the dead and injured, we owe it all of us to be judicious.

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The biggest problem I see by all parties is the pursuit of simple minded solutions without examining the trade-offs, implications or consequences that taking many of those solutions as sound policy requires. That is stopping at the first step in a chain of analysis, preferably with an intent that supports your pre-judgments and prejudices and ignores all the issues and trade-off considerations of those choices as you imply. We need to take several more turns of the crank, starting with the few big, critical questions that are not being addressed. And then taking each of them in turn through several steps of asking, "so what then?" Here' s my list of big strategic questions I don' t see on the table:

1. If we leave what are the consequences of exiting? Admitting beforehand that the style, timing and circumstances are important. 2. If we stay what needs to be accomplished to achieve our strategic goals? 3. Who are the relevant parties in Iraq, what are their interests and what are the likely to do? 4. What kind of international and regional support/interference is likely and how do we best influence it? 5. What kind of US domestic politics are likely and what can we do to create the necessary support to make our strategic choices workable? There may be more but that seems a long enough and careful enough list to not only get started but to move far ahead of where we are or where we' ve ever been. Tom Sowell makes that comment that most policy debates are over intent and don' t just neglect but completely ignore the actual incentives and constraints of selected policies and the several steps beyond the first necessary to map out the likely consequences. It' s certainly characteristic of this situation.

Big Question #1: What Happens if We Leave April 18, 2007 http://llinlithgow.com/PtW/2007/04/big_question_1_what_happens_if.html#more In an earlier entry we put up the five big questions that ought to be and aren’t being asked regarding the situation in Iraq. Let me defer questions #2-5 for follow-on and list the serial consequences that would appear to be risks and possibly escalating ones that ensure from a badly handled and/or too rapid US withdrawal. And preface this short, “pungent” little list by saying that the reason for it is that, to me, all the sound bite political discussions seem to be pretty explicitly assuming that we can walk away and there won’t be any serious consequences. I couldn’t disagree more and think, if anything, this is an even more dangerous situation than when we entered.
But let’s be honest here as well. Likely we all wish the situation had never come up but that’s a historical debate which we can have another day and place and time. Today we’re faced with situation as it is – not as we wish it to be. And continuing with the honesty, and guessing that everyone shares my view on this, I sure wish it were possible to walk away with no consequences. Or that there were a simple, workable, practical answer to our dilemmas. Or even better one that was fast and cheap. Let’s admit that to ourselves and more on.
The fact is that there is no sound-bite simple answer to this one. All our options are ugly and difficult. And carry enormous risks. So be it – let’s deal with it and move on.

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Here’s my breakdown of Question #1 – what happens if we leave laid out as a series of steps and consequences. One after the other as a first step cascades into a next. This isn’t just my thinking – in fact it captures the best I’ve been able to gather up from generals and analysts looking for answers based on facts. Not political advantage. 1.1 Domestic partisanship inside Iraq escalates into widespread sectarian violence and a stable state is prevented from developing. 1.1.1 Iraq splits into loosely coupled federalism but the risk of devolving to a failed state is high to very high. 1.2 A "failed" Iraq (at whatever level) ends up as a terrorist haven in the Sunni and Shia sections with rising export of aggressive violence. 1.3 Escalating tensions and threats draw in the associated regional powers: Saudia Arabia and Jordan on the Sunni side and Iran on the Shia 1.3.1 Background: it is Iranian money, weapons and support that is enabling the Sadr militias and has been growing exponentially over the last three years as deliberate strategic policy that' s accelerating under the current regime Iranian regime.

1.3.1.a It’s likely that Iran sees instability in Iraq as a strategic opportunity. If for no other reason than to bog down the US and divert world attention from it’s other initiatives. Including nuclear weapons and support for terrorists in Lebanon and Palestine. 1.3.2 Iranian covert intelligence and operations teams have been found laying the groundwork for insurrection in all the minor Gulf States. 1.3.3 Iranian support for Hamas and Hizbollah appears to have been a major factor, if not the primary trigger, in the recent war in Lebanon. While Hizbollah failed in an objective sense they disrupted Lebanon and distracted the UN from Iranian sanctions. Hizz. is pursing a follow-on strategy of disrupting Lebanese stability and political cooperation, refusing to be disarmed and attempting to gain major representation in the government preparatory to over-throwing the legitimate government. 1.4 Regional tensions involve Jordan/Saudia vs Iran in a wider, perhaps covert but likely to be overtly violent regional conflict of growing intensity. 1.5 A regional conflict reduces worldwide access to the regions oil supplies significantly. Upto and including cutting off access to the only marginal swing production capacity and proven reserves in the world oil market thereby causing a major worldwide economic dislocation. 1.5.1 Given that the world oil market is one single pool with shared demand & supply China and India as well as Russia may be able to retain access thereby partially mitigating worldwide excess demand if the West can draw on other sources. 1.5.2 At the least oil shows a major price surge, magnitude unknown but one can envision it as being of the same order as the surge during the 70s from $10 oil to $30 oil. In other words we need to ask could oil surge to over $100/barrel ?

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1.6 Resource and focus diversions created by the regional conflict increase the pressures on Pakistan and Saudia Arabia to where they suffer major internal outbreaks of violence. 1.6.1 A protracted and relatively severe civil collapse in Pakistan creates the risk of another major failed state, increases safe heavens for terrorists and, at some point, increases the risks of terrorist and rouge state access to WMD, particularly nuclear weapons. For example after NKor' s fizzle it' s not clear that the Iranians have the technical wherewithal to create a nuclear weapons program. It' s also not clear that they don' t. Pak. has been successful and access to it' s technologies would be increase by orders of magnitude. 1.7 Long-term demographic pressures from a exponentially growing population, under 25, with limited education, no decent job prospects and increasingly failing state societies raises the likelihood of a demographically driven implosion throughout the ME. This would include Egypt, Palestine, Syria, et.al. 1.8 As long as the US and other major world economies are dependent on oil for the bulk of their transportation energy and for much of the rest of their energy supplies their economies are highly vulnerable. Preserving access, unless we all want to literally freeze in the dark, is a VITAL national interest of the US, the West and the rising powers. That would include China and India. Only Russia might be relatively immune from direct impacts. 1.8.1. Serious alternative energy infrastructures, e.g. nuclear power for electricity, etc., would take a concerted national effort AND three decades. 1.8.2 Under these circumstances the major international powers are likely to do whatever they find necessary, upto and including sending major military forces into the ME to seize control of the oil fields. 1.8.2.1 - BTW one of the reasons that the Saudi' s proved so reasonable about increasing supplies in ' 79 was that the then Def. Secretary Schleisinger threatened to send in the 18th Airborne Corp immediately. At least according to well-found rumor in the military and intelligence communities.

That would seem to carry the likely and probably next steps of a failure and precipitate withdrawal out far enough to make the strategic cost/benefits much clearer. It would seem fair to me, to the extent you find the listing accurate and the assessments credible, that we ought to come to two major conclusions: 1. The risks of withdrawal may actually exceed those of staying – particularly and especially if that withdrawal is precipitate, hasty and ill-executed. 2. A stable Iraq, of some form, coupled to a stable Middle East is an increasingly important vital national interest of the United States. o To which I’ll add that a prosperous Iraq and ME, more concerned with developing itself into a set of modern states and focused on nurturing the well-being of it’s citizens and societies, is (at least) a significant national interest as well. All of that being the case so then what do we do ? We’ll take up that question in our next entry but may I suggest that you really….really owe it to yourselves to ask your next favorite politician, public representative or presidential candidate what they think the answers are to the original question. And insist on testing each and every simple-sounding throw-away soundbite against these. I’m not asking in other words for you to agree with the question or my assessments. Rather I’m suggesting it’s in your own best interests to insist on public answers that satisfy you.

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Big Question #2: What Needs to Be Done If We Stay? April 25, 2007 http://llinlithgow.com/PtW/2007/04/big_question_2_what_needs_to_b.html In two previous entries I listed the major questions that do not seem to be a part of the debate over Iraq policy and then dove down into the first one: what happens if we leave. In this entry I’d like to look at what happens if we stay – that is, how can we achieve our strategic goals ? Which the last post identified as a viable, secure and prosperous Iraq that provides a better environment for it’s own citizens and stability and access to oil in the Middle East. None of these are easy questions though you can find them discussed here and there. But any debate about the subject should – and to the best of my knowledge no pundit, talking head, columnist, politician nor official has said much, if anything, in a broad public forum. So with those limitations in mind I’d like to offer a series of considerations that might get us started, and are subject to extension and revision as more is brought forth. The basic goals include Security and Stability of the country, establishment of effective governance and administration, including dealing as best as possible but realistically with the endemic corruption problem and spoils-based sectarianism, getting the economy going again starting with necessary reconstruction, the re-establishment of public services and development of public infrastructure such as schools, college, highways and hospitals. While we build this shopping list there are three other things to keep in mind. One is that the Iraqis have been a hard-working, educated and secular society who are likely to do well for themselves and others if given decent government. That should also recognize the immense oil wealth they should be able to draw on to fund economic development. Next this is neither solely the responsibility of the US nor likely to work without our active support. Disingenuous policies that lay full responsibilities on the Iraqi system before it’s capable of bearing the load are self-deceiving. Finally, in the ‘we broke it, we should fix it’ school of moral responsibility we would seem to have some obligations to put in a best-faith effort here. Iraq seems to be split into three regions with the North mostly Kurdish and having both oil reserves along with over a decade’s development to show it can be done. The South/Southeast is largely Shia who have been the poor and oppressed under Baathist and Sunni rule; and who also have the closest ties and have been receiving extensive sub-rosa but quasi-official support from their fellow Shia in Iran. And the West is largely Sunni, desert, un-developed and tribal, sparsely settled and with little in the way of oil reserves. And then there’s Baghdad which is likewise split between Shia and Sunni. 1. Security and Stability will need to be provided in each region as well as Baghdad. It’s likely best based on local forces backed up by US ones. Which requires time and effort to develop though considerable progress has been made. In the interim the US has re-discovered and re-developed Counter-Insurgency doctrine and operations (COIN) which we’ve actually got over two centuries of successful experience with.

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•

Baghdad is a special case complicated by the prevention of successful interventions on the part of US forces by internal Iraqi politics; i.e. the prevention of actions against Muqtada al-Sadr’s Mahdi Army by the sitting prime minister. However the slowly growing surge has been accompanied by intelligence reports that al-Sadr has fled to sanctuary in Iran, which is progress.

2. Effective governance starts with, as the generals have put it, ‘standing up the major Iraqi ministries. Heretofore they’ve been regarded as prizes in a political spoils game and allocated based on political influence; and further, run for the private benefit of the faction and tribes who gain control of the ministry. The resulting corruption is endemic to Iraqi, one is tempted to say Arab, society but must at least be mitigated. •

•

Setting, establishing and maintaining minimal standards of effectiveness and honesty will be a major challenge and one not natural to the society. Both culturally and as the result of the hangovers from Saddam’s Stalinist regime. This is an area where we can and should put pressure on the central government as well as doing our best to educate the administrators and ministers in the long-term benefits of reasonably honest government. Unfortunately they have had little prior exposure to an effective civil service – something we take for granted. Both Generals Abizaid and Petreus have observed that military force is 20% of the solution and 80% lies in civil development. Very…very unfortunately the military has been asked to step up to these responsibilities and has done its’ level best without having the proper background. The integration of DoD, State Dept., AID and other agencies goes by the label “Unified Action” and internecine bureaucratic conflicts in the US government (turf-wars and self-interest) have interfered significantly. This is the area least developed and served to date yet a critical part of any successful nation-building exercise.

3. Reconstruction and economic development are the critical next phases that build on the foundations of security and minimally effective governance. In actual fact great strides have been made but face two major obstacles. One is a peaceful enough environment which progress on points #1 and #2 will help with. The second, and again one not touched on much, is that Saddam’s regime diverted its’ available resources into palaces, bribes and weapons and allowed the economic infrastructure of the country to decay. Development and public services, as well as providing jobs and growth, are both dependent on stability and security. 4. Long-term development of schools, healthcare and other public resources would naturally build on some success in #3. We should be around so long to see it come about. In looking at these preliminary strategic requirements there are things that can be seen as immediate requirements and things that will take much more time. But progress on the earlier requirements will be encouraging for the later. At the same time we have to have realistic expectations of what can be accomplished when. While that’s unclear, to me and I suspect others, making progress on the first two in the next 18 months will be great progress. If at the end of 4-5 years the economy has achieved significant progress then it’s possible that a self-sustaining virtuous cycle will be established. And conversely if we aren’t prepared to commit to the point where economic growth in a stable civil environment is beginning to take hold our strategic goals will remain in jeopardy.

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It seems clear to me that the massive turnouts for the two general elections, at the risk of voter’s lives and those of their families, are very strong indicators of their interests in peace and prosperity, as well as in democracy. Nonetheless we must face the policy question of is democracy the best alternative in the immediate future. Adam Smith was right when he said, "Little else is required to carry a state to the highest degree of opulence from the lowest barbarism but peace, easy taxes, and a tolerable administration of justice." If we can put in place a civil infrastructure that provides those things Iraq will begin to move ahead at its’ own pace. As progress continues the opening for a greater role for democratic institutions, from the local to province to national levels, will improve. We can summarize this first pass on a multi-component ‘model’ of strategic policy as follows:
Security & Stability Governance
Reconstruction
Long-term Development


South (Shia)
C+/B-
C
C
TBD


North (Kurd)
B/B+
B+/A
B
TBD


West (Sunni)
C-/D+
D
D
TBD


Baghdad
National
D/D-
D
D
TBD


C/C+
C/C+
C/C-
TBD


The ‘grades’ are artificial (I made them up based on my best impressions) and will change as more is learned. But, give or take the key requirements and the key areas, expecting a C or a D to suddenly leap to an A is completely unrealistic. If in 18 months we manage to reach a C+ on security in Baghdad and a C on governance and re-construction, and the weighted national grades follow suite then we will have made amazing but real progress. The questions are do we have the patience and commitment to make realistic policies and commitments, can we bring the Iraqis along with us – or more accurately coach them to bring themselves along and will we decide to make the investments. And if you believe any of the previous post on the consequences that investment has to be weighted not against a cost-free withdrawal but against the consequences of a major regional conflict. Resources and Sources: Harvard’s Kennedy School has distinguished public guests address topics of major importance: · Petraeus: Reflections & Observations: http://ksgaccman.harvard.edu/iop/events_forum_video.asp?ID=2994 · Abizaid on the Long War: http://ksgaccman.harvard.edu/iop/events_forum_video.asp?ID=3048 (Magnificent, deeply insightful, direct - even blunt) · Negroponte on global security challenges: http://ksgaccman.harvard.edu/iop/events_forum_listview.asp?Type=PS Unified Action: Col. Austin Bey is one of the few commentators addressing this issue and has written about it on both his blog and StrategyPage.com . The latter is highly recommended as a well-grounded resources for security and stability information. Col. Bey’s most recent column:

http://www.strategypage.com/onpoint/articles/200721444410.asp

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Big Question #3: What Needs to Happen in Iraq? May 9, 2007 http://llinlithgow.com/PtW/2007/05/big_question_3_what_needs_to_h.html This is the third in a series of five Big Questions about the Iraq situation and its’ viability – that is what are our chances for pulling it off without a catastrophe that will haunt us. Actually in an earlier post listing the questions it was phrased a bit differently: Who are the relevant parties in Iraq, what are their interests and what are they likely to do ? The prior post started to answer the first two parts so we can dig deeper into the last one. Re-phrasing it as, “what needs to happen and who’s doing what to whom ?”. It’s taken a while to get to this post because of the Sturm und Drang surrounding the discussions plus the accumulation of existing and new materials to accumulate and review from After-Action reports by Barry McCaffrey to Gen. David Petreus’ and Pres. Bush’s appearances on Charlie Rose (with the revamping of his web site the archives of past shows are easily available and these are highly recommended as is the briefer appearance of ABC’s Chief Correspondent). But my earlier assessment and framework appears to be holding up very well as a tool for examining what’s going on and as a way to think about the issues and challenges. Earlier I’d suggested that a simple but coherent framework for summarizing all the disparities and complexities was useful and, perhaps, somewhat unique. By and large my last few weeks of reviews support that view. As well as the associated one that more attention is being paid to the security issues, especially in Baghdad – as perhaps it should in the very short-term, to the damage of keeping aware of and some focus on bigger issues. While clearly attention and effort is going into civil affairs, re-construction and economic redevelopment and political development it seems, at least to me, that these are still under-resourced and piecemeal and ARE NOT receiving the attention necessary. Of course one always faces resources shortcomings and has to make trade-off decisions between priorities as well as considering timeframes. In other words if we focus on security now that may establish the stability necessary to shift attention and resources to the other areas.
Security & Stability

Governance
Reconstruction
Long-term Development


South (Shia)
C+/B-


North (Kurd)
B/B+


West (Sunni)


Baghdad
National


C/C+(C-/D+)
C-/C(D/D-)


C/C+


C
C
TBD


B+/A
B
TBD


D
D
TBD


D
D
TBD


C/C+
C/C-
TBD


If we re-visit the evaluation framework from the prior post it still appears fair and accurate both as a template for evaluation and on most of the specifics. There are a few early signs of significant improvement however, though it’s likely to early to make a strong assessment. Two keys are the so-far earlier successes of the “Surge” in Baghdad (which raises the grade from D/D- to C-/C) and very effective successes in Anbar province, the desert stronghold west of Baghdad which has been a tribal areas that’s served as a major areas of strength and operational support for alQueda and the Baathist irredentists. Which raises that grade to a C/C+.

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However, it’s too early to tell if those increases in security will result in increases in civil peace and economic development. There the jury is still very much out. Nationally there have been some puts and takes on governance – Moqtada al-Sadr has withdrawn his adherents from the National Gov’t which may actually be to the good since it removes more extremist and parochial faction members farther from the levers of power. Supporting that the President of Iraq, Talabani, has allowed security forces to act against Shia militias during the surge. Which is long-overdue and very difficult given the hatreds that were exponentially grown by the insurgent destruction of the Samarra mosque as well as longsimmering hatreds. Conversely staff close to Talabani has been active in removing police and military commanders who are Sunni from their commands, despite their being judged by Americans as among the best and most honest. In addition more Provincial Reconstruction Teams (PRTs) have been deployed. These are teams of military forces, military civil affairs troops and civilian experts, including folks from the State Dept., who provide a core of expertise to help coach the Iraqis. Re-development strategy has also been shifted from big-bang projects which went nowhere to more local projects that are more feasible, affordable and involve more immediate local employment, and thereby, favorable impacts. Also progress has been made on establishing a National Law on oil management and revenue sharing – which is a major sticking point between the various factions. All of these internecine faction politics, that put faction ahead of national interest, are a key sticking point and perhaps the most dangerous.

Big Question #3(a): What's Been Happening in Iraq July 23, 2007 http://llinlithgow.com/PtW/2007/07/iraq_status_update_and_assessm.html It’s probably about time and then some to update and reflect on what’s been going on in Iraq, from the last posts that laid out the approach and status. The biggest problems seem to be that there are three clocks running on separate timescales: US/Iraq Security Forces, Iraqi domestic government and US domestic politics. In particular while the Iraqis continue to make progress on putting together the right institutional foundations a lot of internal squabbling and back-stabbing politics is making progress difficult. Also, corruption continues to be a major…major problem. But let’s start by updating our little evaluation matrix, provide a brief summary of some recent interesting materials and point you to some stuff you ought to check out for yourselves. First, let’s take another look at and do a little updating of the evaluation matrix from the last #3 examination. South North West Baghdad
National

(Shia)
(Kurd)
(Sunni)
Security & Stability C/C-
B/B+
C-/C
C/C-
C/C+
Governance
C
B+/A
C-
C-
C/C+
Reconstruction
C
B
D
D
C/C-
Long-term TBD
TBD
TBD
TBD
TBD
Development
Again, for the record, this are my best impressions and judgments derived therein based on reading and some poking around. Unfortunately there continues to be an apparent shortage of publicly accessible resources that provides information across these ranges of issues. Let’s hope the policy-makers have more comprehensive resources and much more thoughtful ones.

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Not a lot of change in the North – things continue to move ahead well though problems with Turkey are growing because of the continuing use of northern Iraq as a Kurdish refuge for guerillas inside Turkey. Most of the changes are positive with the exception of Security in southern Iraq as Shia internecine conflicts begin to escalate between pro- and anti-Iranian groups. BtW – no matter how many “alleged” you hear the Iranians have been providing extensive support for the Shia militias for years. As well as, it now appears, money and munitions to the Sunni/alQ types in Western Iraq. On the other hand there’s been a major breakthrough in Anbar province with many of the Sunni tribes throwing in their lot with the US after revulsion over excessive alQ violence which has led to a major improvement in security (D to C/C- being an optimist). The surge has finally reached targeted troops levels with the last month though some significant progress was visible in Baghdad prior to that so S&S improves significantly there. As it IS early days yet we’ll keep the national average the same. Those S&S improvements led to some short-term gains in governance though we’ll have to see how they hold up. However the overall ranking remains the same despite significant progress in drafting a new oil law there’s been a lot of sectarian battles. Early indictors are that some progress is being made in reconstruction in the West and Baghdad but it’s too early to tell so it’ll stay the same for now. Let me point you at some recent major interviews on Charlie Rose which are readily viewable and highly recommended. A conversation about Iraq with Thomas Ricks of The Washington Post discussing recent assessments of withdrawal scenarios and wargame results. A conversation about Iraq with John Burns of The New York Times discussing Iraqi politicians attitudes and understandings. I was extremely glad to see both of these because taken together they indicate that an understanding of the regional problems that are in view, the level of catastrophic sectarian violence that might ensue with an abrupt withdrawal happens and the growing awareness of the Iraqi politicians that the clocks are indeed running at different timescales. It’s not clear they’re prepared to start acting in the broader interests instead of spoiled children but the possibility is opening up. So let me try and summarize some of the recent changes as I see them: 1. Significant progress on security – not least because the American military has undergone a major shift in adapting it’s doctrines to new circumstances. Sadly it’s taken a long…long time to rediscover what we learned in ‘Nam or what the Marines wrote up in the Small Wars Manual in the 1930s. 2. Significant progress on the civil front with the drafting of the Oil Law. 3. Clocks are ticking at very different speeds with US domestic politics moving rapidly ahead on a withdrawal of some sort because of domestic political difficulties. Agree or disagree this is strategic reality and must be treated accordingly. o Iraq’s clock is ticking much more slowly partly because this takes time (consider how long we were nurturing Germany, Japan, Taiwan or South Korea). And partly because the politicians continue to pursue narrow, partisan interests at the expense of the greater good. Which leads to toleration, indeed business-as-usual, for extensive and endemic corruption. 4. There continues to be, the underlying cause, as it were a pronounced lack of trust in general government and more reliance on either old tribal structures or traditional baksheesh and personal networks. Under the circumstances and given centuries or more of history, not all surprising.

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5. Plan B, wargaming withdrawals and the resultant characteristics of various alternative split up states assessments have been going on and are accelerating. 6. Regional problems in multiple flavors are escalating: o Iran continues to provide heavy support for the Shia militias including sophisticated explosives, training and funding. On a larger scale they themselves face a growing set of problems that threatened their socio-economic stability. o The Israel-Palestine-Lebanon Triangle is going thru increasingly difficult times o Pakistan is being strained to it’s limits by the conflicts between the military which is the only competent social institution, democracy advocates who have a long…long history of corruption, bad government and predatory behaviors, and the Islamic fundamentalists. Things don’t look particularly good there.

Iraq, ROME/ROW & the Strategic Context: a Picture and a Few Words July 30, 2007 http://llinlithgow.com/PtW/2007/07/iraq_and_romerow_the_strategic.html While thinking about Iraq, the specific linkages to Iran and Iran' s broader challenges as well as the broader situation in the Middle East the result was a preliminary "picture" of how all the pieces sorta inter-relate to one another. Call it a first pass conceptual diagram which tries to depict most of the critical linkages, players/entities and impressionistic magnitude of the problem. But before we get to that there' s another rather startling piece of information which is worth your while. Two very respected military analysts (Michael O' Hanlon of Brookings and Kenneth Pollack ex-intel analyst) published an editorial reporting on their assessments of a recent visit there. While they' ve been harsh critics of the war, especially the lack of adaptability of our leadership, this recent column is much more upbeat. I strongly urge you to read it for yourselfs (click on the URL) but here' s an excerpt: A War We Just Might Win VIEWED from Iraq, where we just spent eight days meeting with American and Iraqi military and civilian personnel, the political debate in Washington is surreal. The Bush administration has over four years lost essentially all credibility. Yet now the administration’s critics, in part as a result, seem unaware of the significant changes taking place. Here is the most important thing Americans need to understand: We are finally getting somewhere in Iraq, at least in military terms. This picture and its'interpretation will keep getting worked on but let' s take a first pass. To start with the major entities are shown sized with respect to their influence on the current situation and strategic outlook for Iraq - not evaluated against their own problems or other strategic concerns, e.g. the chances of Pakistani collapse and the release of nuclear weapons to terrorists. As I' ve been saying based on StrategyPage and O' Hanlon and Pollack confirm there' s a great deal of complexity in the Iraqi situation but progress is being made on many fronts, though political dysfunction and corruption continue to be major challenges. Iran has a similarly complicated - or much more so - set of internal issues which the Economist just surveyed ( Bombs Away - free). Iran is a huge challenge and reading this piece will help but the key two problems are the split government and a

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declining (actually, failing) economy. Which are not separate events. The theocrats actually control the gov' t and are pursuing their own ideological/religious foreign policy designed to restore and enhance the sprit of the Revolution. As a result they are supporting Hamas, Hizbollah, the Taliban, Shia militias in Iraq AND alQ/Sunni terrorists with arms, training, and money as well as intelligence and people. It' s fair to say that continued Iranian support for these folks is probably as big a problem as we face in Iraq and does not serve the interests of Iraqis or Iranians, just the theocrats. We' ll build on the other components later but see what you think so far.

Weekly Reader 9Sep07: Iraq September 9, 2007 http://llinlithgow.com/PtW/2007/09/weekly_reader_9sep07_iraq.html Time flies while you’re having fun, distracted by holidays and short weeks or get wrapped up in other things. Despite collecting a bunch of addresses to really interesting stuff I neglected to post last week’s Weekly Reader(s) and have combined this and last week’s together. And then, because there is so much stuff, re-split them into four entries. This one will focus on Iraq and the ME. As usual the Special section contains the read these if no other specials but two particularly interesting articles. The first, and perhaps the over-whelmingly most important is that a multi-sectarian religious conclave of Sunni, Shia and Kurd clerics have issued a joint fatwa against the violence. If that sounds really….really important it’s not – it’s much more. Perhaps the critical problem(s) are finding a common center that the different factions can agree to share after centuries of mutual hostilities and exploitations, exacerbated by Saddam’s (& no dying well doesn’t redeem a life of irretrievable evil – first time I’ve wished that both Hell and re-incarnation were simultaneously true so he could come back as camel dung while serving in the th 9 Circle). The section on Iraq domestic talks about other efforts but has major links to the various domestic US partisan political attacks on Maliki where our domestic internecine agendii were put ahead of good public policy. Fortunately that seems to have not played well and is dying down. The critical questions there are a) if not him then who and b) remembering Diem’s ouster in ‘Nam why we commit that stupidity again before giving a reasonably qualified incumbent all our support. Overall progress continues to be made resulting in growing decreases in violence, in the West of all places, and increased cooperation from Sunni tribal leadership and others. Leading the US to shift it’s nation-building efforts, which have foundered on a lack of skills and resources and faction squabbling at the national level, to local projects in conjunction with local leadership. Unlike ‘Nam where our political and military leadership lacked the moral courage to take responsibilities for the failures of policy and strategy and, in a strong spirit of denial, refuse to adopt and adapt we’re making some small amount of progress. It may still be too little to late but then anybody who thought this was a short-term exercise has had that theory tested. The sad parts of this are that re-discovering counter-insurgency doctrine is re-learning the lessons of Vietnam and specops. It’s also re-discovering that the military is great at it’s core tasks but is having to step into the breach on civil affairs because NO other arm of the government has been able to – largely due to no resources, lack of skills and unwillingness. The changes in the military in particular are huge and get their own section. The other interesting set of links points to Iranian intransigence on maintaining support for subversion in pursuit of internal Iranian factions policies, against the overall best interests of their people and country. Their country suffers increasingly from a collapsing economy brought about by a combination of wrong-headed economic policy along with endemic exploitation and corruption sponsored by the theocratic faction. Meanwhile their president has graciously allowed as how Iran is eager and willing to step into the power vacuum created and abandoned by the Great Satan. It might be worth your while to refresh your memory on why these are the critical touch points by looking at the list of issues, the evaluation framework and the context.

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Iraq Statii Refresh: the Surge is Working Well, Now What ? December 21, 2007 http://llinlithgow.com/PtW/2007/12/iraq_staii_refresh_the_surge_i.html The WSJ just released its'latest joint poll with NBC and Iraq is now the top priority of only 18% of the voters and in the top two priorities of 36%. What' s really interesting is that in the immediately prior survey those numbers were 26% and 46% respectively. Clearly Iraq is coming off center stage and moving to a back burner. If you haven' t noticed the candidates in general have quit beating that drum on either side all of a sudden, including the Dems, who have rapidly retreated from their position of it' s a terrible idea, doomed to fail and we should get out as rapidly as possible. Even more interesting his recent appearance on the Charlie Rose show Pres. Bill Clinton spent some time discussing, albeit grudingly, how well things are going. Much more importantly he also ennunciated a clear and balanced strategy of not withdrawing abruptly but instead pulling out as rapidly as possible yet making absolutely sure that we stay long enough and with enough force to make sure something better than chaos comes into existence. Which is my preferred policy option, could be argued to be the strategic goal of the administration (again come to late, with blinders and grudingly but at least realism triumphs). At the end of the day this is a startling about face however rationalized but deeply encouraging (btw the whole show is well worth watching as the outline of key issues, the role of foreign policy and security and the mandate for workable policies are discussed; among several reactions a major one of mine was to wonder where was this statesman in the ' 90s ?). Just to put this all in context here' s Fareed Zakaria' s interesting oped column from a few months ago - wrong in his assessments of the Iraq situation and interpreations but prescient on the US politics so we think but worth reading nonetheless: This Won’t Be The Iraq Election The Presidential campaign has jostled this way and that, contenders have risen and fallen, but the one fixture in the political firmament has been Iraq. Polls have consistently said Iraq would be the central issue of the 2008 campaign. The candidates have developed elaborately studied and rehearsed positions on the war. But what if the subject moves off center stage? In the new NEWSWEEK Poll, the economy now tops Iraq as the issue that voters say will most influence their choice for president, 22 percent to 19 percent. For two years, Iraq dominated these kinds of surveys. Only a month ago, in a CBS News poll, 28 percent of respondents wanted Iraq to be the campaign' s most-discussed issue, while the economy came in second at 16 percent. One can' t make too much of one poll, but other evidence also suggests that the gap seems to be closing. The questions then become what' s going on ? How did we get here, what new strategy and tactics are being used and what' s the outlook ? What conditions will be required to put in a new and stable govermnet that promotes the welfare of all the citizenry ? We' ve looked at those questions previously, of course, (Iraq, Rome/ROW and the Strategic Context, What' s Been Happening in Iraq) and on the continuation put up our evaluation matrix updated for your reading pleasures. As well as point you to some valuable info resources. In the meantime you might start by watching the interview with Gen. Petraeus on the Rose show - it' s honest, comprehensive and pulls no punches. But briefly we think the answers are as follows: These changes are reflected in the refreshed Iraq strategic status evaluation table and the reasons are basically discussed below.

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1. Change in Doctine and Strategy - under pressure the military completely revised it' s doctrine (that is their methods, operational techniques, etc. - think of it as their business model) to put more emphasis on Counterinsurgency (COIN). This was work was led by Petraeus, based on worldwide learnings and lessons, including especially the lessons learned and then discarded in ' Nam and on the USMC "Small Wars Manual" from the 1930s. It not only emphasizes establishing local security but re-establishing civil governance and working with the local population in its'own terms (cultural awareness and adaptation). 2. Cultural Awareness - a key driver was learning the local cultures and social structures in each area. For example the enormous progress in Anbar province in the West results from learning the tribes, their relative powers and issues and collaborating with them to jointly go after al Queda. 3. Civil Re-Development - complementing those two huge strategic/doctrinal shifts are an increased emphasis on working with the local authorities on local socio-economic redevelopment projects. This is well-funded, somewhat well-staffed though this is NOT the military' s primary mission or training (& alternative resources, e.g. the State Dept, suffer from "terminal" reluctance and miniscule staffs [Now THERE' s a strategic lession !] as well as policy mandate shortfalls), and making real progress. It also, strangely enough offers up a major benefit indirectly. Instead of waiting for the Central gov' t to make progress on coming together and establishing competent central mechanisms, e.g. ministries, it actually feeds from the local up to the national in a positive way. How twuly stwange, indeed. But fortunate, fortunate indeed. 4. Resource Shifting - the freeing up of troops in the West has allowed those resources to be moved to the West and the Iranian borders with the result that, while Iranian arms supplies are continuing to increase, more are being intercepted. Make no mistake Iran has adopted a strategic posture of disrupting Iraq as much as possible. The problem is that it' s not Iraq the nation-state but the power clique centerred around the radicals (we' re sufferring from their faction fights !) 5. Central governance improvements - the Iraqi central government continues to struggle but is making some major milestone progress. Our efforts to impose benchmarks and timetables were a domestic political manuver that was and is counter-productive. You can lay out a series of steps but their timings need to adjust to realities on the ground and the factions interests in the capital. Which is now being done AND enjoying the benefits mentioned above. Resources 1. Petraeus on Rose at the beginning (Video) •

Kissinger' s comments on counter-insurgency about then (Video)

2. Gen. Jones, USMC and Chief Ramsay on re-building Iraq' s police and security forces (Video) •

Kennedy School forum on the Petraeus report. This is fascinating because it' s some very bright and competent people who poo-poo the results and have now proven to be abysmally wrong thru getting trapped in their own ideological blinkers. (Video)

3. David Kilcullen on COIN, doctrine revisions, Iraq strategy and operations. He' s an ex-Australian combat officer with wide experience plus deep academic background. In other words he' s the goto guy. If you watch no other watch this (Video) 4. Foreign Minister of Iraq on the strategic outlook at the KSG (Video)

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Readings(Iraq Jul-Dec07): Catastrophe to Success to Not-discussed? Now that we' re getting back into the swing of things it seemed like it was time to re-visit Iraq. As part of that we reviewed all the prior ' 07 collections of stories and links and consolidated them below. It actually turns out to be much longer than anticipated and might have been better split into two major postings. However the number of major stories has dropped so precipitously that that may not be required in the future. We' ll see but in the meantime here' s a single central place to go. While you may not care to "read" them we' d suggest it' s worth a quick skim of the excerpts, at least the titles. What you' ll find, we believe, is a rather rapid and deep structural change in what' s going on. If you' ll cast you mind back to about this time last year the biggest headlines were about the plans for a "Surge" to support a major new counter-insurgency doctine. Which was bitterly opposed by all right thinking sorts, mainly the Democrats but certainly with the obvious exception of McCain almost silent Republican support. In fact many of them were bailing out. Yet talk about a withdrawl, even a precipitous one, was still a major headline thruout the summer. As you' ll be able to see below. It slowly began to be displaced by another meme of "Gen. Petraeus needs time". Actually given an initial surge and doctine change circa Feb/Mar to "neutral" results by mid-summer to a very strong status report in Oct. or so, which was still badly poo-poohed by most of the pundits, including the faculty at the Kennedy School (some of whom had helped shape it !) to now when, lo and behold, it' s come off the table. More interestingly it' s also come out of the candidates back of major themes to hammer on. Which in a way is really too bad since we should have a serious national debate. Meanwhile we' ll point you at the extensive listing of stories and links below the continuation, the two excerpts below and rather recent Charlie Rose appearance by the Bagdhad bureau chief of the NYT which has a certain tone of "gee, we didn' t expect this to work and we can' t tell you why it is but it is though there are still problems". Which is about what Petraeus and everybody has been saying for some time.

Iraq: the Emergence of Central Authority April 7, 2008 http://llinlithgow.com/PtW/2008/04/wrfest_30mar08iraq_the_emergen.html The other really big foreign policy story going on over the last two+ weeks is the effort by Iraq' s central government to bring Moqtada al-Sadr' s Mahdi Army (thugs, terrorists, sectarians, private army) under control. One of the biggest problems we' ve all, and all includes both the US and the Iraqis, have faced is the capacities of the central government. Which have sufferred from sectarianism, divided power and authority, corruption but most especially from the penchant of strong men to pursue their own agendas. Again we really don' t grasp how truly lucky and blessed we are that our politicians may pursue their own ends they do it within the context of making the system work. Rather than trying to work the system to meet their own ends. In fact there is a general principle hiding in their someplace - whatever the form of governance and government if those in power will act, on balance, for the betterment of the whole then historically it qualifies as good government. Well Iraq' s government ain' t great but it' s getting better. And the reporting, coverage and analysis of the Sadrist insurrections, who are supported and funded (at least in part) by Iran,has largely missed, ignored or distorted what by is a major step forward. Which should be front-page news. And is not divorced from the last year' s successes of the Surge. In fact you' re seeing major ripple effects where increased sophistication and knowledge in counter-insurgency has been combined with higher troop levels plus increased local cultural awareness and tactics to lead to vastly increased effectiveness, especially in the Suni areas. Those successes in turn have led to the freeing up of resources to strengthen the border security with Iran. And now, in the last few weeks, a major effort to suppress Sadr.

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We' ve always said that the surge wasn' t the total answer and the generals have been acknowledging and saying that for years. In fact they' ve all been on record a saying that military force was at best 20% of the solution while improvements in governance were a major part of the rest. Along with economic improvements. And a stronger and more effective central government is key. Yet the front-page coverage and editorial page opinions have been talking about what a failure this is. Well while we' ve been accumulating these clippings for a while our delay is rewarded with the following headline. Iraq's Sadr to disband Mehdi Army if clerics order Which, once you understand the context speaks for itself. But apparantly our press and politicians don' t do context.

Three More for the Road: Iran, Sistani and the Big Snake April 10, 2008 Three stores have popped up in the last couple of days that are just startling, at least to me. So it seemed like a good idea for us to take a look at them in light of the MSM neglect of the real situation on the ground in Iraq and what its means for the long-term. We' ll presume some background based on these prior posts which might be worth reviewing (WRFest 30Mar08(Iraq): the Emergence of Central Authority, WRFest 6Apr08(National Security): the Surge, Iraq, the Military & Terrorism). In a way the three stories after the break are capstone indicators. And despite all the troubles and tribulations, or is that tribalations, and what' s still to come may mean a major turning point. Military men talk about a cusp point in operations when the momentum shifts in the strategic direction of a major operation. We reached that point sometime last summer with regard to Sunni abandonment of alQ and adoption of the Iraqi political process. But that' s been having repercussions, positive ones, across the country that speak to the glimmerings of a similar shift on the socio-politico-economic side of things. It ain' ta chequered flag just yet but the head timer is getting it out of it' s bag, at least for this race (which we need to remember is not a season).

Summary 1) It turns out that the sudden move by the Shia central gov' t against the Shia nutjobs of al Sadr' s wasn' t entirely a decision out of the blue. Instead it was in response to the Sadrists uprising which was thought up, designed and decided on by the Iranian Qods Force - the arm of the military/intelligence charged with spreading the revolution. And Iran has apparently admitted it. Which means that their telling Sadr to back down is about as big a black eye as you could manage. 2) Except for the other one where Grand Ayatollah al-Sistani, the most respected and reverred Shiite cleargyman in Iraq (& btw because of history where the Iraqis have always had wider authority) and also in Iran, has basically told Sadr to shut up, sit down and grow up. What he actually said was that the "law is the only authority". My God....take that anyway you want. But it' s the first time he' s spoken up on this monumental an issue since persuading the US not to flatten Falujah a few years ago. This means that the pinnacle of the establishment has a) stepped on the nutjob power-seeking, b) put one in Iran' s eye and c) conferred inestimable authority and legitimacy on the central government. 3) And the US has been pursuing a careful balanced strategy, called Anaconda, where more emphasis has been placed on strategic themes besides plain ' ol head-thumping. Especially politics, security, diplomacy, jobs, etc. In an integrated strategy. NONE of which is being discussed anywhere in the MSM of course. Apparently the Powerpoint Rangers worked overtime and managed to get the whole thing on some PPT graphics. If we ever can find a copy we' ll try and post it. Marvelous.

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Finally we' re going to take our "cheap shot" for the day, and by our normal standards for the YTD. Iraq has moved off the front-page and out of the central concerns of the campaign. Which in a way is good but it allows two things to happen. First we really do need to have a serious national debate on our long-term policy and strategy and we' re not getting it. Instead, second, we' re getting continued political posturing that puts the narrow and shortterm domestic political interests of certain parties and candidates ahead of facing up to realities. Which some people can' t avoid. While these folks are paying the piper for our dancing having that serious, realstic and honest debate seems like the least we owe them. One more point direct at you - yes, I mean you - the candidates are doing that because that' s what some people want to hear. Which means they' re in denial about the risks. Just walk away isn' t a viable solution and to suggest so as a major campaign platform is irresponsible. At the end of the day it' s WE who face reality - not THEM.

The Road Less Traveled: Petraeus, Iraq and Futures April 12, 2008 http://llinlithgow.com/PtW/2008/04/the_road_less_traveled_petraeu.html Well this seems to be a string of Iraq, ME and National Security posts. But then between the Shia uprising in Basra and it' s defeat by the Central government, the Petraeus/Crocker Report and other associated ME and Defense concerns it should be. At least there was certainly a wealth of news. After the break is a set of excerpts that start with a review of the surge, the associted political debates and contrasting takes on the Petraeus Report. Perhaps one of the most balanced and interesting however is the recent appearance on Rose of John Burns and Dexter Filkins of the NYT, who collectively have more time in the heat than almost any other reporters or analysts. Normally they' re both pretty negative and report on the current facts as they see them but without putting them into a larger analytical or interpretative context. Which makes their comments all the more surprising. So after you skim over the excerpts we suggest you watch the show, and come back. [PAUSE] These guys are bright, informed, courageous and good but I recently criticized them for not having seen the events they reported on in a larger context. For example last year when what we see today was being put in place yet they were still reporting negatively without understanding the SEE changes taking place all around them. A friend has called me to task on at least two grounds as being unfair. First off they' re reporters not analysts. And second their tendency to report from their own worldviews is common among everybody involved - in fact we made policy on the foundations of appalling ignorance about the culture and the history. What' s that line from Shakespeare ? "Caesar forgive him for he is a Briton and thinks the customs and manners of his tribe are laws of the universe". At the same time we are coming to a fork in the road with three paths leading away. As you skimmed the excerpts you could see the symptoms of that with one set of commentators lauding the progress and another saying it' s not enough. Or that we still don' t know where we' re going. Now actually the administration has been very clear, relatively, about it' s strategy. Which has evolved. And we' ve made our own best effort but basically the goal is a stable, peaceful, prosperous society with the rule of law and governed with the overall balance of the best interests of all the citizens in mind. There are two pieces of extremely good news though. First we seem to have learned enough about how to incorporate cultural, political, economic and other factors that we are implementing a balanced and unified strategy. And second, as Burns and others note, some sense of reality is creeping back into the candidates heads when they realize there' s not a magic wand to wave of "leave now". Or "stay forever". Though so far it' s not made it into the public forum which is where we need to have a serious discussion. What' s lacking IMHO is not an overall strategy nor even a sense of where we' re going. That' s evolved, partly as it must, pragmatically and with experience. What' s lacking is a clear framework that organizes and structures all the moving parts into a whole so everyone can see how they all fit together. Now one doesn' t reveal a strategy in details publicly of course. But a sense of how to fit day to day events into a bigger picture and judge our progress would be exactly what' s required to motivate and justify the kind of longer term commitment we' re converging on.

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Two final observations or stories. First, it used to be said about NATO (where we had a huge multi-decade commitment) that it' s goal was to keep American in, the Germans down and the Russians out. Wry but completely true. Without American presence in Europe the Europeans would have been at each other' s throats all over again. They almost were right after the war and it was the Marshall Plan that created the foundations of Europe today. Jim Stockdale, who won the CMH as the leader of the prisoners in the Hanoi Hilton wrote a wonderful book, "Reflections of a Philosophical Fighter Pilot" in which he traces his survival to the grounding he got from the Stoics and especially Epictetus (also a central meme in Wolfe' s novel "a Man in Full"). But some of his most powerful, moving and scary essays are on the failures of the then leadership to learn from its'mistakes and adapt. He correctly characterizes their failings as a collapse of moral courage. When McNamara knew in ' 67 that his strategy wasn' t working instead of re-thinking he continued to feed our soldiers into the meat grinder. And now has his own apologia out attempting to redeem the unredeemable. In contrast we' ve seen more deep adaptation on the part of our leadership, accompanied by profound learnings from error than we saw thruout that whole two decades. We may still not have it entirely right but we' re moving in the right direction. In fact, a case can be made that we' ve deeper and bigger re-thinkings regarding Iraq than the US high command made thruout either WW2 or the Cold War. The difference being of course that they original thinking was pretty darn good and allowed for adaptation. Now the question is do the next generation of leadership have the moral character to tack the third path opening up before us ? Or will they let themselves be locked into two unworkable and dangerous backward-looking ones ? Ones that are easy because they don' t require change. And hard because they' ll require sacrifices and risk catastrophe for no good purpose. So do we take the "Road Less Traveled" or not ?

Iraq Resartus (Readings): Stability, Progress and Will May 10, 2008 http://llinlithgow.com/PtW/2008/05/iraq_resartus_readings_stabili.html It' s time for another slightly deep dive on Iraq, both for its' own sake and for the value of the lessons learnable. We say learnable because the lessons are there if one wants to pay attention to them. Or one can focus on the popular mythology that' s grown up under political pressures and partisan posturing. In actual point of fact something of a miracle has occurred but we' ll get to that and our reasons for saying. Let' s start with this fascinating appearance on the Rose program of Meghan O' Sullivan who served on the NSC for Iraq and is now at the Kennedy School. She lays out a balanced, informed and "feet-on-the-ground" assessment of where we were and the challenges facing us. Interestingly, and evidence for the learnability conundrum, is that it was a rather low-rated show, despite the balance and honesty on a critically important issue. Eine Kleine Nachthistorische...a Little Night History Just to review the bidding we' ll make three points. First, as a counter-factual. Saddam was undoing the sanctions rather rapidly leveraging Oil-for-Food, corrupting politicians around the world and enlisting the support of both France and Russia. He did in fact have a weapons program if no inventory that was re-startable and scalable and he did have extensive contacts with terrorists. And for those who further forget their history we' d had an extensive no-fly near-combat and troops on the ground for a decade and to get his grudging appearances of new cooperation put 140,000 troops on his borders. Unsustainable.

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Second we conducted a brief, lightening fast and brilliant blitzkrieg to seize the country, remove Saddam and turn it over to a civilian government. And therein lies the most fundamental problem. But we should also mention that leading up to the war we struggled with the diplomatic air cover which was nowhere near as good as it should be but also not much worse, given the aforementioned corruption, than it could be. We didn' t lay out a clear and motivating national objective and instead used the WMD maneuver instead of laying out the true depth and breadth of the challenges. And third we completely mis-judged the nature of the problem, the fundamental problem. There was no government, stable socio-politico class or other source of potential "turnover". Instead Iraq collapsed into a primitive tribal state. No you can wave your arms all you want about those failures - and we have - but it' s also fair to say nobody could have estimated the true depth of dysfunction that Saddam had created. Much worse than Stalin in the old Soviet Union. What was needed was an "American Caesar" to go in, assume supreme authority and re-build the institutional infrastructure of the country. Much as we did in Japan or Germany after WW2. Only it took us almost two years to come to that realization. Third, and there' s the ebb-n-flow of the Baathist/alQuada insurgency, the overt and covert subversion of Iraqi stability by Iran and the diabolically clever triggerring of Shia-Sunni conflict by alQ. Clever not brilliant because their intransigence, cruelty and abuse eventually led to their complete rejection by the people. Who in fact do want a better society. As a sidenote btw we' d also mention the notion of a Rat Trap - for everybody who claims we neglected Afghanistan we' ll point out that every nutjob who wanted to be a Jihadi terrorist who might have had to be hunted down in those mountains they all came to Iraq, got themselves killed and, with their indifference to civilian lives, alienated the Arab street across the ME. Net net not bad in the cruel calculus that applies. Nontheless we made two further major mistakes, that built on the vacuum mis-understanding. We approached the tactics and strategy via the lens of conventional warfare and we completely ignored and neglected the real nature of Iraqi culture and the role of tribes. And Then a Miracle Occurs The miracle is that we completely re-thought, re-tooled and re-directed our policy, strategy, tactics and training. The military that when into Iraq had learned the lessons of nation-building and counter-insurgency multiple times, most recently on this scale in Nam. As an old military history buff I spent a lot of time reading up on all that but never realized that as soon as they disengaged all those painfully bought lessons were thrown away to return to their roots of heavy armored warfare. Worse yet, as we' ve learned, the senior leadership of the Army during that era learned and knew the lessons of COIN but was never able to change the institution at the time. As Jim Stockdale points out in his book, "Philosophical Fighter Pilot" the greatest difficulty, calling for the most profound moral courage and leadership, is not to just admit when you' re wrong. It' s to stick with the problem and it' s metastasized new forms and figure out what to do with the real situation. Not only the Army refused to change. Worse people, especially, like McNamara realized in ' 67 that they were wrong. And refused to adapt thru an utter failure of moral courage and leadership responsibilities. One should view "Fog of War" as the apologia of a man who sent thousands to their deaths because he failed in his duties. Well we' ve learned, adopted, adapted and changed. We' ve previously discussed the work of Col. David Kilcullen who was instrumental in this process. For a fair and balanced assessment of the situation his Rose appearance is as good as it gets and perfectly complements O' Sullivan' s. But if you read/look at no other thing take a look at his presentation to the COIN think tank of the US Army: Kilcullen’s Presentation on COIN and Iraq (!!!!!). It doesn' t get any better than that in terms of lessons, history, assessment, examples and the role of "kinetics" vs the other 90%. To give you a flavor we' ve extracted a couple of his charts. Which use Iraq as their case but look back widely at all the history of COIN operations and draw on everybody from Lawrence on down. Kilcullen lays out a complete framework for what it takes to establish peach and security, how old cultures and societies break under the lack, how

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economic and socio-political initiatives have to function and some specific lessons. Here' s the real rub: the framework works to understand, analyze and strategize any effort to build a peaceful and prosperous society. In fact it not only applies to other nation-building challenges, e.g. Africa, but could serve as a useful platform for understanding, suitably adapted, of the challenges facing the leaderships of Russia or China. Or for that matter ourselves as we wrestle with re-building our own inner cities. This second chart more specifically lays out the multiple layers of effort required from Counter-Terror to Count-Insurgency to Peace-keeping Operations to true Nation-building. Fortunately our inner city challenges aren' t as dire as the top two layers but sure bear a lot of resemblance to the bottom one. And when people keep urging us to go into Darfur it' s not going to be solved with a few "Western" troops. In fact that' s as naive, arrogant and wrong a mis-conception as the nay-sayers always claimed Kipling was. If you want to know how well he understood things from Kilcullen' s perspective and how little the wishful thinkers get it go s School) read some of his poetry.(Kitchener' As you skim over the readings below please keep all this in mind. The standard popular mythology and MSM reporting has gotten the recent efforts by the Iraqi central government to suppress the Sadrists completely wrong. In fact this is one of the single most encouraging things to have happened in Iraq since the beginning. It shows that first off the Sunni west is coming into the fold and beginning to rejoin the government and the society. So that, secondly, suppression of the most dangerous Shia power-seekers can now absorb the efforts and resources of a newly confident central authority who was able to use a newly built and hugely more competent national security force. And that Iran, the proximate source of the problem, is now on the table to be dealt with. As Kilcullen points out we' ve got a long way to go to get a stable, secure, peaceful and prosperous Iraq. But a lot of the right things are slowly moving into place and we' re more on the right path than we' ve even been.

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