Goldstein.consolidated Answer Brief On The Merits Goldstein V Superior Court

C©?V

O

SUPREME

COURT CASE NO. S155944

SUPREME

IN THE OF THE STATE

COURT

OF CALIFORNIA

THOMAS LEE GOLDSTEIN Petitioner, VS.

LOS ANGELES

COUNTY

SUPERIOR

COURT Respondent,

CITY OF LONG BEACH; JOHN HENRY MILLER; WILLIAM COLLETTE; LOGAN WREN; WILLIAM MacLYMAN; THE COUNTY OF LOS ANGELES; JOHN VAN DE KAMP; CURT LIVESAY, Real Parties in Interest.

SUPREMECOURT

FILED

After a Decision By the Court of Appeal, 2na Appellate District, Division 3 Appellate Court Case No. B199147 (Hon. Joan Dempsey Klein, Presiding Justice)

DEC1 2 2007 FrederickK. Ohldch Clerk Deputy

CONSOLIDATED

ANSWER

RONALD

BRIEF

ON THE

MERITS

O. KAYE (No. 145051)

DAVIDS. McLANE(No. 124952)

FILEDWITil ,r"-"',, ,,,''_' -

MARILYN E. BEDNARSKI (No. 105322) MATTHEW N. SIROLLY (No. 239984) (of counsel) KAYE, McLANE & BEDNARSKI, LLP 128 North Fair Oaks Avenue Pasadena, California 91103 Telephone: (626) 844-7660 Facsimile: (626) 844-7670 Attorneys for Appellant THOMAS LEE GOLDSTEIN

TABLE OF CONTENTS PAGE TABLE OF AUTHORITIES

...................................

iii

REQUEST FOR EXPEDITED REVIEW AND PREFERENTIAL CALENDARING ............................. ADDITIONAL

ISSUE PRESENTED

INTRODUCTION

FOR REVIEW

................

............................................

STATEMENT

OF FACTS

ARGUMENT

...............................................

I.

1

3

.....................................

6 11

THE APPELLATE COURT' S DECISION STRIKES THE APPROPRIATE BALANCE BETWEEN THE NEED FOR GRAND JURY SECRECY AND COURTS' INTEREST IN TRUTH AND FAIRNESS IN LEGAL PROCEEDINGS ....... A.

B.

California Litigants Should Have the Same Rights to Access Grand Jury Materials as Federal Court Litigants...

THE APPELLATE WITH

CALIFORNIA

PRACTICE A°

11

13

The Law of Other States and the Federal Case Law Support the Standard Adopted by the Appellate

II.

2

COURT'S

DECISION

COURTS

STANDING

...................

The Appellate Court's Decision Is Consistent with this Court's Holdings in Daily Journal Corp. and McClatchy Newspapers ...................................... i°

15

IS CONSISTENT

LAW AND THE LONG

OF CALIFORNIA

Court ....

18

18

County's Argument that Release of these Materials to Goldstein Will Lead to Public Disclosure of the Materials Is Wrong ..........................

20

TABLE OF CONTENTS

(CONT.) PAGE

B.

C*

D°

III.

The Appellate Court's Decision Is Supported by a Long History of Decisions of this Court and by the Longstanding Practice of California Trial Courts ........

21

The County's Reliance on People v. Gonzalez Is Misplaced .......................................

24

Despite the County's Claim's to the Contrary, the Appellate Court's Decision Does Not Conflict with the Statutory Scheme or Upset the Principle of Separation of Powers .......................................

27

EVEN IF THE COURT OF APPEALS

DECISION

IS

REVERSED, THIS COURT SHOULD FIND THAT A CALIFORNIA TRIAL COURT HAS STATUTORY AUTHORITY TO ALLOW GOLDSTEIN ACCESS TO THE GRAND JURY MATERIALS ........................ A.

B°

Penal Code 924.2 Authorizes the Release of Grand Jury Materials that Goldste'm Requests .................... Penal Code Section 929 Also Authorizes

30

the Release of Grand

Jury Materials that Goldstein Requests ................ IV.

30

34

REGARDLESS OF WHETHER THE CALIFORNIA SUPERIOR COURT HAS THE POWER TO GRANT GOLDSTEIN ACCESS TO THE GRAND JURY MATERIALS, THE APPELLATE COURT'S ORDER SHOULD BE AFFIRMED TO THE EXTENT THAT IT DIRECTS THE SUPERIOR COURT TO COOPERATE WITH THE FEDERAL COURT BY REVIEWING THE MATERIALS AND PREPARING A STATEMENT ......................

CONCLUSION

.............................................

ii

38 40

TABLE OF AUTHORITIES CALIFORNIA

PAGE

CASES

Cummiskey v. Superior Court (1992) 3 Cal. 4th 1018

..................................

Daily Journal Co1_. v. Superior Court (1999) 20 Cal. 4th 1117 .............................. Estate of Lindquist (1944) 25 Cal. 2d 697 ................................... Ex Parte Sontag (1884) 64 Cal. 525 ............................. Fitts v. Superior Court (1936) 6 Cal. 2d 230 .................................... Goldstein

v. Superior

(2007)

23

passim

40

4, 19, 20, 21

17

Court

154 Cal. App. 4th 482

..........................

MeClatehy Newspapers v. Superior Court (1988) 44 Cal. 3d 1162 ...............................

passim

passim

People v. Baekus (1979) 23 Cal. 3d 360 ...................................

23

People v. Coleman (1978) 84 Cal. App. 3d 1016

23

People v. Gonzalez (1990) 51 Cal. 3d 1179

.............................

.................................

People v. Holloway (2004) 33 Cal. 4th 96 ............................. People v. Laney (1981) 115 Cal. App. 3d 508

..............................

iii

23

12, 20, 22

2

TABLE OF AUTHORITIES CALIFORNIA People

People

54 Cal. App. 3d918

36

v. Snow (1977) 72 Cal. App. 3d 950

...............................

23

v. Superior Court (2000) 78 Cal. App. 4th 403

..........................

CASES

v. State Farm

Metzler

334 F.3d 345

384 U.S. 855

.....................................

Oil Co. v. Petrol Stops Northwest (1979) 441 U.S. 211 ..........................

14, 39

15

6, 11, 13, 15, 31

v. United States (9th Cir. 1933) 64 F.2d 203

Socialist

...........................

v. United States (1966)

Douglas

passim PAGE

(3rd Cir. 2003) Dennis

PAGE

...............................

FEDERAL Camiolo

CASES

v. McAlister (1976)

People

(CONT.)

Workers

.................................

Inc. v. United States District

(1972)

38

Court

(9th Cir. 1965) 345 F.2d 18 .................................. United States

15

Party v. Grubisic

(7th Cir 1980) 619 F.2d 641 U.S. Industries,

...............................

15

v. Giglio 405 U.S.

150

United States v. Procter (1958) 356 U.S. 677

.......................................

7

& Gamble .....................................

iv

15, 22

TABLE OF AUTHORITIES FEDERAL

(CONT.)

CASES

PAGE

United States v. Socony-Vacuum Oil Co. (1940) 310 U.S. 150 ........................................ SISTER-STATE

15

CASES

PAGE

Diamen v. U.S. (D.C.1999)

725 A.2d 501

.................................

15

Euresti v. Valdez (Tex.App.

1989) 769 S.W.2d 575 ...........................

15

Hinojosa v. State (Ind. 2003) 781 N.E.2d 677 ................................

15

In re Grand Jury of Douglas County (2002) 263 Neb. 981 .....................................

15

In re Investigatory Grand Ju_y No.2004-01 (2006) 50 Conn. Supp. 23 ........................ In re Jessup's Petition (1957) 50 Del. 530

. .........

.......................................

15

15

Keen v. State (Fla. 1994) 639 So. 2d 597 .................................

15

Mannon v. Frick (1956) 365 Mo. 1203

................................

15

Milliean v. State, 423 So. 2d 268 (Ala.Crim.App. 1982) ..................................... State ex reL Ronan v. Superior Court In and For Marieopa (1964) 95 Ariz. 319 ......................................

15 County 15

TABLE OF AUTHORITIES SISTER-STATE

(CONT.)

CASES

PAGE

People v. Di Napoli (1970) 27 N.Y.2d 229 ....................................

15

State v. Beck (1960) 56 Wash. 2d 474 ...................................

15

State v. Carillo (1973) 112 R.I. 6 .........................................

15

State v. Doliner (1984) 96 N.J. 236

.......................................

15

State v. Greer (1981) 66 Ohio St. 2d 139 .................................

15

State v. HarO%ld (1981) 290 Or. 583 .......................................

15

State v. Higgins (La. 2005) 898 So. 2d 1219

15

................................

Sutton v. State (1975) 25 Md. App. 309 .................................... STATUTES

PAGE

Cal. Evid Code § 1040

..........................................

Cal. Penal Code § 924.1

.........................................

Cal. Penal Code § 924.2

......................................

Cal. Penal Code § 924.6

......................................

Cal. Penal Code 9929

15

........................................

Cal. Penal Code Section 939.1 ...................................... vi

29 27 passim 32, 33 passim 38

IN TI-IE SUPREME

COURT

OF THE

STATE

OF CALIFORNIA

THOMAS LEE GOLDSTEIN Petitioner, VS.

LOS ANGELES

COUNTY

SUPERIOR

COURT Respondent,

CITY OF LONG BEACH; JOHN HENRY MILLER; WILLIAM COLLETTE; LOGAN WREN; WILLIAM MacLYMAN; THE COUNTY OF LOS ANGELES; JOHN VAN DE KAMP; CURT LIVESAY, Real Parties in Interest.

After a Decision By the Court of Appeal, 2ndAppellate District, Division 3 Appellate Court Case No. B199147 (Hon. Joan Dempsey Klein, Presiding Justice)

CONSOLIDATED

REQUEST

ANSWER

BRIEF

FOR EXPEDITED REVIEW CALENDARING

ON THE

MERITS

AND PREFERENTIAL

Goldstein filed his federal lawsuit in November

of 2004 and has

been seeking access to the grand jury materials at issue since February of 2006. His federal lawsuit, now set for trial in January of 2009, has been delayed due to the litigation of this issue. Goldstein needs to resolve this issue sufficiently

in advance of trial to complete discovery and trial

perpetration.

Therefore,

federal-state

comity, support _anting

calendaring.

both the interests of justice and principles

of

expedited review and/or preferential

ADDITIONAL

ISSUE PRESENTED

FOR REVIEW

There are two issues before this court. Los Angeles County Counsel's

Opening Brief stated one of these issues. (See County Counsel

Opening Br. at 1.)_ However, for reasons that are unclear, neither of the County's two Opening Briefs state or address the additional

issue that was

raised by Goldste'm in his Answer to the Petition of Review. (See Answer to Pet. for Review at 7.) This additional issue is properly before this Court, see Cal. Rule of Ct. 8.500(a)(2): authorize disclosure

"Do Penal Code sections 929 and 924.2

of the grand jury materials to Goldstein?

In particular

does, Penal Code section 924.2 create a statutory basis for application particularized

need test (as formulated in Douglas Oil) by California

of the courts

and does Penal Code section 929 create a statutory basis for the disclosure of grand jury materials from an investigation

into punic

the Grand Jury clearly intended to make these materials

malfeasance

where

available to future

litigants?"

For the reasons explained below, see infra note 2, Goldstein refers to the "Opening Brief of Real Party in Interest Grand Jury of the County of Los Angeles," which was written by the office of Los Angeles County Counsel, as "County Counsel Opening Br." The brief submitted by the private firm hired (presumably by the office County Counsel) to represent Los Angeles County, John Van De Kamp and Curt Livesay in Goldstein's civil rights suit referred to as "Private Counsel Opening Br."

INTRODUCTION This is a case of ftrst impression, and is not, as the Countf

tries

desperately to portray it, contrary to this Court's decisions in Daily Journal Corp. v. Superior Newspapers

Court (1999) 20 Cal. 4th 1117 andMcClatchy

v. Superior

Court (1988) 44 Ca!.3d 1162. As the appellate

court explained in its opinion, the issue in these two cases was public disclosure of grand jury materials, not the limited use of grand jury materials in an ongoing court proceedings Goldstein v. Superior Goldstein--who

that Goldstein

Court (2007) 154 Cal.App.4th was wrongfully

seeks. See

482, 485, 494.

convicted and incarcerated

for

more than 24 years based in large part on the false testimony of ajailhouse informant--needs

access to the jailhouse

informant

grand jury materials in

order to vindicate, in a court of law, his fundamental

constitutional

rights

and to hold accountable

those who were responsible

for the grave injustice

inflicted on him. He seeks access to these materials

for the limited purpose

of using them in his pending federal civil rights case and will aNde by a

2 Goldstein continues to object to County Counsel appearing on behalf of the Grand Jury in this proceeding since the County of Los Angeles, for which County Counsel acts as the primary legal representative, is a defendant in Goldstein's civil rights lawsuit. This appears to create a conflict of interest. In fact, County Counsel is asserting a position that, although it aligns well with the interests of the County of Los Angeles as a defendant in Goldstein's civil rights lawsuit, is in direct conflict with the actual position of the 1989-1990 Los Angeles County Grand Jury, which (according to the special counsel who worked directly with it) intended to make these materials available to future litigants. Although Goldstein does not impugn the integrity of County Counsel, Goldstein continues to believe that under the conditions of the current proceeding it is unjust to characterize County Counsel's position as that of the Grand Jury, as opposed to that of the County of Los Angeles.

protective order limiting their useto that context. The interestsof justice demandthat Goldstein be given accessto thesegrandjury materials. The appellate court's decision strikes the appropriatebalance betweenthe need for grandjury secrecyandthe court's interestin promoting troth andfairness in legal proceedings. This decision doesnot threatentraditional California grandjury secrecy,as the County attemptsto argue.To the contrary, it allows the California courts to continue exercisingpowers to releasegrandjury materials that they have always exercised--powers that the Los Angeles Superior Court has in fact usedto give other litigants accessto the very grandjury materials that Goldstein seeksto access,andpowers that the Los Angeles County Grand Jury itself andthe judge presiding over it in 1990 believed existed when they preservedthesematerials for useby furore litigants. See Goldstein, 154 Cal.App.4th at 487, 488, n.1 The appellate court's decision is in fact consistent with California

law and court practice,

both of which support releasing of grand jury materials when necessary for use in court proceedings.

See, e.g., Ex Parte Sontag (1884) 64 Cal. 525,

526; People v. Superior Court (2000) 78 Cal.App.4th

403,421-25;

Penal

Code §§ 924.1(a), 924.2, 924.6. Far from changing the practices of California decision harmonizes

courts, the appellate

these practices of releasing grand jury materials for use

in pending litigation with the law expressed in Daily Journal Corp. and McClatchy Newspapers. The experience

of federal courts and the courts of sister states have

similarly borne out the wisdom of allowing litigants to access grand jury materials where they are needed for use in court proceedings outweighs the interests in keeping the materials secret.

and this need

As the record makesplain, no real threat to grandjury secrecyis posedby providing Goldstein accessto the jailhouse informant grandjury materials.Not only is his requestlimited to using thesematerials under a protective order in ongoing litigation, but the grandjury proceedingsat issueoccurredmore than 17years agoand involved evidenceandtestimony on eventsthat, in many cases,transpiredwell over 20 years ago. See Goldstein, 154 Cal.App.4th

at 487.

Although the threat to grand jury secrecy posed by Goldstein's request is virtually nonexistent,

Goldstein's

need for these grand materials

is great. These materials contain evidence and information directly on point with the allegations in Goldstein's unavailable

that is not only

case, but that is

anywhere else. Without access these materials Goldstein will be

denied the opportunity

to fully and fairly present his civil rights case to the

trier of fact. Although Goldstein strongly believes this Court should affirm the appellate court's holding that the superior court's

inherent authority gives it

the power to grant Goldstein's

request, even if this court rejects that

position, it should nonetheless

fred that statuto1:7 authority exists to grant

Goldstein's

request under Penal Code sections 924.2 and 929. Penal Code

section 924.2 explicitly authorizes a court to disclosure

grand jury testimony

for the purpose of verifying the truth and accuracy of a witness's

testimony.

Meanwhile, Penal Code section 929 authorizes the release of raw grand jury materials from a watchdog grand jury investigation approval and the identities ofwimesses jailhouse informant

if there has been court

are protected.

The release of the

grand jury materials to Goldstein

for use in his civil

rights case is fully consistent with the statutory scheme for grand jury secrecy created by the legislature.

Finally, as was concededby County Counsel,the federal court will have the power to apply the well developedparticularized needstandard andorder the superior court to releasethesematerials, evenif it is determinedthat the superior court lacks this power. (County Counsel Opening Br. at 20-23.) For this reason,regardlessof whether the other portions of the appellate court opinion are overturned, the appellatecourt's opinion should be affirmed to the extent that it ordersthe superior court to review the grandjury materials andpreparewritten findings analyzing the secrecyconcernsraised by thesematerials for use by the federal court in applying the federal particularized needtest describedin Douglas Oil Co. v. Petrol Stops Northwest

(1979) 441 U.S. 211. STATEMENT

On November

16, 1979, Thomas Lee Goldstein was arrested without

probable cause, and falsely imprisoned, See Goldstein,

154 Cal.App.4th

for a crime that he did not commit.

at 486-87.

Marines who was studying engineering prior convictions

OF FACTS

Goldstein,

a veteran of the

at Long Beach City College, had no

and no history of violence. Id. at 486. He served more

than 24 years in.prison before his conviction was reversed on habeas corpus petition. Id. at 487. Goldstein

was wrongfully

testimony of a notorious jailhouse

imprisoned

due, in large part, to the

informant, Edward Floyd Fink, who

falsely claimed to have received a confession from Goldstein while they shared a cell together. See id. at 486. This false statement was either purposely or recklessly

elicited by Long Beach police detectives, who were

aware of Fink's history of dishonesty. (Writ Pet. ¶ 32.)

3 These

same police

detectives helped Fink obtain substantial benefits in exchange for his testimony. (See id. ¶¶ 27, 30, 32.) Because information

on Fink's history as

an informant and the substantial benefits he received for testifying in Goldstein's Attorney's

case were not memorialized office--in

contravention

or indexed by the District

of the U.S. Supreme Court's directive

eight years earlier in United States v. Giglio, 405 U.S. 150 (1972)--the deputy district attorney who prosecuted

Goldstein was unaware that Fink

lied about these issues on the stand, and Goldstein's

defense attorney had

no specific evidence with which to impeach Fink. (See id. ¶¶ 30, 33.) In 1990, after two years of investigation,

the Los Angeles County

Grand Jury issued a report finding that, for more than a decade, Los Angeles County law enforcement jailhouse informants

agencies had pervasively

and fostered a system that encouraged

falsely testify that they had received confessions whose cells they were placed in. Goldstein, Grand Jury specifically Attorney's

to

from criminal defendants

154 Cal.App.4th

at 487. The

by its "deliberate

to take the action necessary

house informant testimony."

and

to curtail the misuse ofjaiI

id.

On August 30, 1990, shortly after completion investigation

informants

found that the Los Angeles County District

Office failed in its responsibilities

informed declination

misused

into the misuse ofjailhouse

informants,

of the Grand Jury's the Los Angeles

County Superior Court issued a standing order stating that the grand jury materials amassed during this investigation

were to be preserved in the

Throughout this brief "Writ Pet." refers to Goldstein's "Petition for Writ of Mandate or Other Appropriate Relief" filed with the appellate court on May 21, 2007.

superior court's archives andkept separatefrom other grandjury materials. Id. Although the materials were preserved

for use by future litigants, the

order indicated that the materials were not "to be viewed, inspected or copied except by order of the Presiding Judge, Assistant Presiding Judge, or the Supervising

Judge of the Criminal Division." Id.

Since this time, the presiding judge of the superior court has on at least two prior occasions relied on this standing order to direct the superior court archives to produce these grand jury material to judges presiding habeas corpus proceedings,

who then allowed the habeas petitioners to

access materials that were relevant to the proceedings. According

over

Id.

to Douglas Dalton, Special Counsel appointed to assist

the Grand Jury in its investigation

into the misuse ofjailhouse

informants,

[i]t was the intent of the Grand Jury that the underlying materials upon which the Report was based be made available to anyone affected byjailhouse informant abuses as may be necessary to pursue their remedies. This was a reason for the records to be preserved. Id. at 488, n.1. In 2004, upon Goldstein's federal magistrate

release on writ of habeas corpus, the

who recommended

his release found that the testimony

of the informant who testified against him was unreliable

as a whole and

was a clear example of the sort of informant testimony addressed by the Los Angeles County Grand Jury: "[I]t is readily apparent to this Court that Fink fits the profile of the dishonest jailhouse

informant that the Grand Jury

Report found to be highly active in Los Angeles County at the time of petitioner's

conviction."

On November

Id. at 487.

29, 2004, Goldstein

filed a civil suit in the Federal

District for the Central District of California,

stating causes of action under

the federal civil rights statutearising from his over 24 yearsof wrongful imprisonment. Id. at 487-88. In his federal suit Ooldstein is seeking redress for his wrongful imprisonment be held accountable

and to ensure that those responsible

for this grave injustice.

The grand jury materials from the jailhouse

informant investigation

are directly on point with the allegations in Goldstein's

civil rights suit. In

line with the findings of the Los Angeles County Grand Jury, Mr. Goldstein has alleged that the Los Angeles County District Attorney's Long Beach Police Department,

and the individual

pattern and practice of similar misbehavior

defendants perpetrated

a

in other criminal cases: They

worked with dishonest jallhouse informants, signific .ant benefits,

Office, the

provided these informants

with

and did not disclose these benefits to the court, the

defense, or even the line deputy district attorney using the informant's testimony in the People's prosecution. grand jury materials that Petitioner

(Writ Pet. ¶ 30.) Additionally,

the

seeks to access probably contain

testimony from and concerning the defendants

and witnesses in Ooldstein's

civil rights case. Goldstein

first sought access to these grand jury materials directly

from the superior court almost two years ago, on February Goldstein, 154 Cal.App.4th

1, 2006.

at 488. He explained his particularized

the grand jury materials and offered to enter into a protective his use of the materials to the narrowest

need for

order limiting

scope possible and guarding against

disclosure of the materials to the public-at-large. Ooldstein attempted to follow the procedures

(Writ Pet. ¶¶ 36-37.)

for accessing this material

dictated by the superior court, ftrst serving a federal subpoena requested by Superior Court Counsel and then withdrawing

it and filing a motion before

the superior court in deference to a subsequent

request by Superior Court

Counsel.

4 Goldstein,

Additionally,

154 Cal.App.4th

at 488-89.

he repeatedly requested that the superior court make

findings regarding the specific secrecy concems raised by these materials and explained that such findings would be necessary to litigate this issue in federal court if the superior court refused to grant him access to the material. (Writ Pet. ¶ 36.) On March 22, 2007, well over a year after Goldstein had originally requested access to the grand jury materials, the superior court denied Goldstein's

request access to the grand jury materials, hoIding that it lacked

authority under California law to release the materials.

(Id. ¶ 50.) It denied

Goldstein access to all of the materials, even the indexes and summaries that were prepared to help facilitate litigants'

access to these material.

(Id.)

It did not find that there was any specific need to maintain the secrecy of these materials-

despite County Counsel's

request that such a finding be

made. (Id. ¶ 51.) In response to this ruling, Goldstein filed a writ of mandate in the Second District Appellate

Court, requesting

that the superior court be

ordered to either review and release the materials to Goldstein or review the materials and provide to the federal court a'written evaluation of the specific secrecy concerns raised by the materials to help the federal court evaluate which materials should be disclosed generally,

under federal law. (See,

id.). On August 23, 2007, the appellate

court granted this writ of

4 On March 23, 2007, after his motion was denied the superior court, Goldstein served a second federal court subpoena on the superior court. (Writ Pet. ¶ 53.) This subpoena is still outstanding. The federal court has delayed acting on it, as a matter of federal-state comity, until Goldstein's state court proceedings are resolved. (Writ Pet. ¶ 55.) 10

mandate, holding that the trial court had inherent authority to release these materials to Goldstein if Goldstein could show a particularized

need for the

materials under the standards of Douglas Oil Co. v. Petrol Stops Northwest (1979) 441 U.S. 2l l. Id. at 493-94. Goldstein,

I54 Cal.App.4th

at 495.

Further, it held that if the superior court did not release the materials it was required to prepare a statement regarding the needs of secrecy inhering in the materials in order to facilitate federal court review of the issue. ]d. at 496. ARGUMENT

Io

THE APPELLATE COURT' S DECISION STRIKES THE APPROPRIATE BALANCE BETWEEN THE NEED FOR GRAND JURY SECRECY AND COURTS' INTEREST IN TRUTH

AND FAIRNESS

IN LEGAL

PROCEEDINGS

The interests of justice demand that Goldstein be granted access to jailhouse

informant grand jury materials. Without these materials Goldstein

will be deprived of the opportunity to fairly present his federal civil rights case and the trier of fact will be deprived of the evidence it needs to grasp the math of who is responsible Goldstein

for the grave injustice inflicted on Goldstein.

does not seek access to the grand jury materials for idle

purposes.

He lost more than 24 years of his life to the lies of ajailhouse

informant

and the practices of law enforcement

lies to go unchecked.

agencies that allowed these

When his wrongful conviction was overturned

federal court specifically

found that the jailhouse

informant who testified

against him "fit the profile of the dishonest jailhouse focus of the relevant grand jury materials. (2007) 154 Cal.App.4th investigation

informant"

that is the

Goldstein v. Superior Court

482, 487. The period of the grand jury's

includes Goldstein's

1980 conviction. 11

the

The grand jury

materials contain the evidence that is needed to demons_ate of law enforcement's

the full extent

culpability for the wrong that Goldstein suffered.

Goldste'm has no other way to obtain similar evidence. The Grand Jury conducted,

by its own assessment,

the misuse ofjailhouse

the most comPrehensive

informants in Los Angeles County ever conducted;

it heard testimony from 120 witnesses and received

147 exhibits into

evidence. (Writ Pet. ¶ 16.) There is no way that Goldstein, grand jury investigation,

of these individuals

17 years after the

can obtain close to the type of the evidence that the

Grand Jury had available to it. Witnesses testify in Goldstein's

inquiry into

who would otherwise be called to

case are dead or otherwise unavailable, (such as the jailhouse

informants

and for many

and lower-level

st_ "_f

of Long Beach and the County), the only formal statements they ever made in regard to the jailhouse

informant system may have been before the Grand

Jury. Without this testimony, Mr. Goldstein will be denied the opportunity to present the information Moreover, jury--including, case--will

these individuals

knew.

several of the witnesses who testified before the grand quite possibly,

undoubtably

the defendants

in Goldstein's

be called to testify in Goldstein's

civil rights

case. Their

testimony before the Grand Jury is needed to ensure the accuracy and veracity of these same witnesses'

testimony in Goldstein's

case. Even

forthright witnesses are likely to have difficulty remembering

incidents with

the same clarity of memory they had 17 years ago. Although Goldstein realizes that grand jury secrecy serves important policies, these policies, as this Court has recognized, to some extent in order to accommodate

"must be made to yield

the demands of truth and faLrness

in civil litigation."

Shepherd v. Superior Court (1976) 17 Cal. 3d 107, 127,

partially overruled

on different grounds by, People v. Holloway 12

(2004) 33

O

Cal. 4th 96, 131. The appellate court's decision should be upheld because it struck the appropriate system's

balance between the policies of grand jury secrecy and the legal

need to access crucial evidence. It adopted the balancing test

endorsed by the United States Supreme Court in Douglas Oil Co. v. Petrol Stops Northwest

(1979) 441 U.S. 21--a

case that this Court has approvingly

quoted to explain the policies motivating jury secrecy. See McClatchy Newspapers, The rationales

California's

own rule of grand

44 Cal.3d at 1174-75.

underlying grand jury secrecy in Califomia

and the

federal courts are identical. See id. Indeed, in Daily Journal Corp. and McClatchy

Newspapers,

this Court approvingly polices motivating

the cases most heavily relied upon by the County, cites and quotes Douglas

grand jury secrecy in California.

Cal.4th at 1126; McClatchy The Douglas

Oil when explaining the

Newspapers,

Oil test appropriately

Daily Journal Corp, 20

44 Cal.3d at 1173, 1175. protects the policies of grand

jury secrecy in both the federal court system and in California.

Indeed, as is

discussed more throughly below (infi_a § II.B), it seems clear that some version of this balancing test has been being routinely applied by California courts for well over a century. A.

California Litigants Should Have the Same Rights to Access Grand Jury Materials as Federal Court Litigants.

If the appellate court's decision is reversed, this will mean that litigants in the California

courts will not be able to access California

grand

jury materials that litigants in federal court can access. The parties do not dispute that federal law authorizes a litigant to access grand jury materials when he or she has demonstrated

that a particularized

need for the materials

outweighs the need to maintain the veil of secrecy. (See County Counsel 13

Opening Br. at 20-21.) Likewise, it is undisputed that, under the Supremacy Clause of the Constitution,

federal courts have the power to compel state courts to

disclose grand jury materials for use in federal proceedings, whether state law forbids disclosing the material. Opening Br. at 21-22.)

regardless

of

(See County Counsel

However, in line with federal law, Goldstein first

sought access to these materials in state court in deference to the principles of federal-state

comity and in recognition

of the California court system's

interest in regulating the release of its own grand jury materials. See, e.g., Camiolo v. State Farm (3rd Cir. 2003) 334 F.3d 345, 357-60. County Counsel vehemently pursue access to the jailhouse

argues because Goldstein wiU be able to

informant grand jury materials through the

federal courts even if his state court request is ultimately denied, a state court remedy is unnecessary

and the interests of justice will not be injured

by denying Goldstein these materials in state court. (County Counsel Opening Br. at 20-23.) Such a ruling would create a disturbing

outcome. If Goldstein

blocked from accessing these grand jury materials in the California

is courts

and can only obtain access through a federal subpoena, it wiII mean that federal court litigants have a greater right to access California state grand jury materials than individuals outcome is particularly policies underlying

litigafmg in California's

own courts. Such an

disturbing since the common law history and

California grand jury secrecy are, as this Court has

made so clear, identical to those of the federal system. See, e.g., McCIatehy Newspapers,

44 Cal.3d at 1174-75.

Moreover,

such an outcome would ultimately

diminish California's

ability to regulate the disclosure of its own grand jury materials, since it 14

would effectively instruct federal litigants seeking California grand jury materials to avoid the state court system altogether and go straightto

the

federal court. California

litigants and courts should not have such disabilities

placed on them.

Bo

The Law of Other States and the Federal Case Law Support the Standard Adopted

by the Appellate Court

Since this Court has not directly addressed the issue presented case at bar, it is important to look to the law of other jurisdictions, strongly supports providing

by the

which

Goldstein with the grand jury materials he

seeks. Both the federal courts and the courts of numerous other states, recognizing

that there are cases in which need overcomes secrecy, have

adopted versions of the particularized

need balancing

test. 5These other

See, e.g., Metzler v. United States, (9tu Cir. 1933) 64 F.2d 203; United States v. Socony-Vaeuum Oil Co. (1940) 310 U.S. 150, 233-34; Dennis v. United States (1966) 384 U.S. 855; United States v. Procter & Gamble (1958) 356 U.S. 677; U.S. Industries, Inc. v. United States District Court (9th Cir. 1965) 345 F.2d 18, 21; Douglas Oil Co. v. Petrol Stops Northwest (1979) 441 U.S. 211;Mannon v. Frick(1956) 365 Mo. 1203; In re Jessup's Petition (1957) 50 Del. 530; State v. Beck (1960) 56 Wash.2d 474, 489-91; State ex rel. Ronan v. Superior Court In and For Maricopa County (1964) 95 Ariz. 319, 332-33; People v. Di Napoli (1970) 27 N.Y.2d 229; State v. Carillo (1973) 112 R.I. 6, 11-12; Sutton v. State (1975) 25 Md.App. 309, 314-15, 334; State v. Greer (1981) 66 Ohio St.2d 139; State v. Hartfield (1981) 290 Or. 583,592; Millican v. State, 423 So.2d 268 (Ala.Crim.App.1982); State v. Doliner (1984) 96 N.J. 236, 246-48; Euresti v. Valdez (Tex.App. 1989) 769 S.W.2d 575, 578-79; Keen v. State (Fla. !994) 639 So.2d 597, 600; Diamen 1,. U.S. (D.C.1999) 725 A.2d 501,53233; In re GrandJwy of Douglas County (2002) 263 Neb. 981,987-89; Hinojosa v. State (Ind. 2003) 781 N.E.2d 677; State v. Higgins (La. 2005) 898 So.2d 1219, 1241; In re Investigatory Grand Jwy No.2004-01 (2006) 15

jurisdictions

share with California the common law heritage of grand jury

secrecy and, as explained above, they share the same traditional policies underlying

set of

this secrecy. These policies and traditions have not

prevented them from adopting a version of the particularized is not because these jurisdictions

need test. This

are heedless of the policies and traditions

of secrecy, but because the particularized

need test fully conforms with

these policies and traditions. Although the County vigorously jurisdictions

argues that the laws of these other

and the common law are irrelevant when considering

California grand jury secrecy (Private Counsel Opening Br. at 5-7, 10-16), the County's position is refuted by this Court's own case law. When considering supervises

the relationship

between the grand jury and the court that

it, this Court has often _rned to common law, the law of other

states, and the federal law. See, e.g., McClatchy

1172-73 (turning to federal

case law after noting that "In 1973 Grand Jury we considered principles pertaining

common law

to the grand jury to facilitate our analysis of applicable

statutes"); People v. Superior Court (1975) 13 Cal.3d 430, 440-41 (mining to common law and the decisions of other states' courts to determine the absence of statutory authority, the court has the power to suppress

if, in a

grand jury report). Moreover, this Court has "rejected the contention that the California grand jury [is] a 'purely' statutory body, wholly distinct from its common law predecessor."

People v. Superior

Court (1975) 13 Cal.3d 430, 441. 6

50 Corm.Supp. 23. G In People v. Superior Court (1975) this court stated: The [California] grand jury system is a product of the common law .... The members of the [1849] constitutional convention in 16

Although the California grand jury may be a product of legislative enactment this does not mean, as the County attempts to ague, California grand jury is an institution version of this institution

Nat the

wholly distinct from the common law

shared with other jurisdictions.

Indeed, this Court

has indicated that the principles of secrecy in the California grand jury system are really those adopted from the common law. Daily orournal Corp, 20 Cal.4th at 1122, 1125; McClatchy

Newspapers,

In sum, the standard that the appellate Goldstein's test--is

44 Cal.3d at 1172-73.

court adopted for evaluating

request for grand jury materials--the

particularized

need

well tested and well suited to vindicate the important interests of

grand jury secrecy that are shared by California

and many other

jurisdictions. // // // // //

providing for a grand jury must have had in mind the grand jury as known to the common law .... The Constitution of 1879 did not attempt to change the historic character of the grand jury, and the system its members had in mind was evidently the same system that had come down to them from the common law. It is in no sense a statutory grand jury as distinguished from the common-law grand jury .... We must conclude ... that the Constitution of 1879 when it refers to the grand jury refers to it as it had always been known and understood prior thereto. 13 Cal.3d 430, 441(qutoing Fitts v. Superior Court (1936) 6 Cal.2d 230, 240-41 (omissions and bracketed text in original)). 17

II.

THE APPELLATE COURT'S DECISION IS CONSISTENT WITH CALIFORNIA LAW AND THE LONG STANDING PRACTICE OF CALIFORNIA COURTS Ao

The Appellate

Court's

Court's Holdings Newspapers

Despite the County's

Decision

in Daily

Journal

Is Consistent

with this

Corp. and McClatehy

claims, the appellate court's decision does not

conflict with the holdings of Daily Journal Corp. and McClatchy Newspapers. proposition

The County reads these two cases as authority for the that California courts lack any authority whatsoever to provide

grand jury materials to litigants in the absence of express statutory authorization.

(Private Counsel Opening Br. at 3; County Counsel Opening

Br. at 5-6.) But this is not what these cases hold. Daily Journal Corp., as the appellate court correctly identified, holds that California

courts lack the inherent authority to freely divulge

secret grand jury materials to the general public, e.g., for publication newspapers.

in

Daily Journal Co;T, 20 Cal.4th at 1120, 1124. It absolutely

does not hold that California courts lack the power to provide grand jury materials to litigants for use in ongoing litigation. In fact, this Court explicitly defined the issue in Daily Journal Corp. as that of public disclosure: We granted review to determine whether the superior court, in the absence of a statutory provision for disclosure under these circumstances, properly released the grand jury materials to the public. Daily Journal Corp., supra, 20 Cal.4th at 1120 (emphasis added). Similarly McClatchy Newspapers

holds that, since a _and jury is not

statutorily authorized to freely divulge raw evidentiary material to the 18

public, the superior court has the power to prohibit a grand jury from attempting to make such a disclosure]

McClatchy

Newspapers,

44 Cal.3d

1162 at 1167. Critically, in both McClatchy

Newspapers

and Daily Journal Corp.

the parties seeking access to grand jury materials were media outlets who wanted to disseminate these materials to the general public through their publications.

Daily Journal Corp., 20 Cal.4th at 1120; MeClatehy

Newspapers

44 Cal.3d 1162 at 1169. Neither case involved a request by a

litigant to access grand jury materials for use at trial. In contrast, Goldstein requests access for the limited purpose of reviewing undisputably

evidence which is

relevant to his lawsuit, and which is completely inaccessible

from any other source. Nonetheless, Goldstein's

the County argues there is no distinction between

request and that of the newspapers

in Daily Journal Corp.,

asserting that Goldstein is a member of the public who is seeking access to grand jury materials. (Private Counsel Opening Br. at 8-10.) The crucial point ignored by the County is the use that Goldstein intends for the grand jury materials--ongoing

litigation. This is a categorically

grand jury materials than the publication

different use of

of the materials in newspapers

that

was the focus of Daily Journal CoiT. The distinction is critical. This Court recognized

as much in Ex Parte

Sontag (1884) 64 Cal. 525. Goldstein does not seek to use the grand jury materials to "gratify idle curiosity," but rather because he needs to use the

It be should noted that Penal Code section 929, which was enacted after McClatchy Newspapers, now gives a grand jury the explicit statutory authorization to release raw evidentiary materials under certain circumstances and subject to judicial approval. 19

materials "in a court of justice", "for the purposesof public justice", and "the protection of private rights." 64 Cal. at 526. Goldstein is seekingthe use of materials in orderpresenthis casein a court of law; this is a use that goesto the very essenceof the purposeof the civil justice and implicates a much more compelling interest than the media's interest in public disclosure Thus, it is not surprisingthat the use of grandjury materials that Goldstein seeks correspondswith California commonlaw and the California statutory schemeitself (see inf!'a §§ II.B, ILD, and III), both of which

support

_anting

justice

require

their disclosure

Ex Parte Sontag,

access to grand jury materials

64 Cal. at 526; Shepherd

3d 107, 127, partially Holloway

(2004)

for use in an ongoing

overruled

on different

when the interests proceeding.

v. Superior grounds

33 Cal. 4th 96, 131; Penal Code §§ 924.1(a),

The County's

briefs

materials together. i. County's Goldstein

mistakenly

See e.g.,

Court (1976) by, People

of

17 Cal.

v. 924.2,

924.6.

blur all uses of secret grand jury

Argument that Release of these Materials to Will Lead to Public Disclosure of the Materials

Is Wrong.

The County also blurs the distinction between public disclosure of grand jury materials and use of the grand jury materials in litigation by arguing that use of these materials in Goldstein's

case would necessarily

result in their public disclosure at trial. (County Counsel Opening Br. at 67.) The County is wrong. To the extent that any disclosure would occur at trial, it would be very limited and controlled by the terms of a protective

order. First,

even

before being disclosed to the litigants in this case, the materials will be reviewed by the court to determine

if the need for disclosure outweighs the 20

O

need for secrecy. Second, prior to disclosure at trial, the court could again review the limited subset of materials that the litigants intend to use and reapply the balancing test. At this point, the court could further protect secrecy through redacting the material or limiting its use or even requiring that the material be submitted to the jury under seal. Moreover, available witnesses'

grand jury testimony could only be

used at trial for the purposes of impeachment

or refreshing

recollection,

because the direct use of this testimony would violate the hearsay rule. 8 Such use of grand jury testimony is incontestabIy legislature

authorized by the

under Penal Code section 924.2, which explicitly allows "any

court" to "require a grand juror to disclose the testimony of a witness examined before the grandjury,

for the purpose of ascertaining

whether it is

consistent with that given by the witness before the court." Penal Code § 924.2. B*

The Appellate Court's Decision Is Supported by a Long History of Decisions of this Court and by the Longstanding Practice of California Trial Courts.

The appellate court's decision will not effect a radical change in the law nor upset the traditions of grandjury by the County.

secrecy in California, as claimed

In at least two instances, this Court has explicitly indicated

that it supports releasing grand jury materials to litigants who have shown a

8 Similarly, most, if not all, of the useful documentary evidence obtained from the grand jury records would not be subject to the rule of grand jury secrecy at all, since it would consist of documents that were produced independently of the Grand Jury, e.g., memos or correspondence from the District Attorney's office created prior to the impaneling of the grandjury (but which have been lost or destroyed during the ensuing 17 years). These documents would not become subject to the rule of grand jury secrecy simply because copies of them were submitted to the grand jury as evidence. 21

particularized

need for these materials. As far back as 123 years ago, in Ex

Parte Sontag, this Court said: [W]hen for the purposes of punic justice, or for the protection of private rights, it becomes necessatT, in a court of justice, to disclose the proceedings of the grand jury, the better authorities now hold that this may be done. (1884) 64 Cal. 525,526 Merriam).

(emphasis in original) (quoting Thompson

and

County makes much of the fact this Court's statement in Ex

Parte Sontag was dicta. But the County cannot deny that this Court's statement in Ex Parte Sontag clearly shows that as early as 1884 this Court had embraced the fundamental

principle that California courts have the

power to release grand jury materials to litigants who had shown a particularized

need for the materials.

More recently, in 1976, this Court explicitly endorsed of the federal particularized

need test (the same test embraced in the appellate court's

decision): In any event, as the high court was careful to point out, there may be cases of urgent and particularized need in which [the policies of grand jury secrecy] must be made to yield to some extent in order to accommodate the demands of troth and fairness in civil litigation. Although the 'indispensable secrecy of grand jury proceedings' [citation] must not be broken except where there is a compelling necessity [,] [there] are instances when that need will outweigh the countervailing policy.' Shepherd v. Superior Court (1976) 17 Cal. 3d 107, 127 (quoting United States v. Proctor and Gamble 365 U.S. 677, 682),partially different grounds by, People v. Holloway

overruled

on

(2004) 33 Cal. 4th 96, 131.

Beyond these two cases, there are a number of other examples of cases, both from this Court and the California 22

appellate courts, implicitly

afftrming a trial court's power to release grand jury materials for use in ongoing litigation despite a lack of express statutory authorization. People v. Superior Court (2000) 78 Cal.App.4th Appellate

403,421-25,

the Sixth

District Court describes at least five such cases: People v. Backus

(1979) 23 Cal.3d 360, 393; Cummiskey

v. Superior Court (1992) 3 Cal.4th

1018, 1031-32; People v. Snow (1977) 72 Cal.App.3d Laney (1981) 115 Cal.App.3d Cal.App.3d

In

950, 958; People v.

508, 512-13; People v. Coleman (1978) 84

1016, 1019. 9

In fact, as the record of the case at bar demonstrates, courts have been in the practice of releasing

California

trial

grand jury materials for use in

ongoing litigation despite the absence of express statutory authorization: The same grand jury materials that were denied to Goldstein have been provided to other litigants without question by the Los Angeles Superior Court.

Goldstein v. Superior Court (2007) 154 Cal. App. 4th 482, 488.1°

Moreover,

it is evident that in 1990 the Los Angeles County Grand Jury and

the judge presiding

over it preserved

the grand jury materials at issue for the

In all of these cases the reviewing court accepted, without question, that a trial court had properly provided litigants with access to nontestimonial portions of the grand jury record, even though no explicit statutory authority allows non-testimonial portions of the grand jury record to be disclosed. See People v. Superior Court (2000) 78 Cal.App.4th 403, 421-22. z0 "On July 5, 2006, Goldstein sent court counsel further information about the case including the declaration ofVema Wefald, an attorney who had accessed the grand jury materials in connection with two federal habeas corpus proceedings. Wefald asserted that Douglas Dalton, special counsel appointed to assist the grand jury in its investigation into the misuse of jailhouse informants, told her the grand jury materials were indexed and organized for the express purpose of facilitating review of the material by future litigants." 23

O

specific purpose of making them available to future litigants. Id. at 487 II, 488 n.1. Clearly, in 1990 the Los Angeles County Superior Court believed it had the power to provide these materials to future litigants. Thus, affirming the appellate court's decision in the case at bar would not cause a significant change in the practices of California courts. On the other hand, if the County's position is adopted and the appellate court is reversed, this would radically diminish the traditional powers of the California courts and the accepted notion of access by litigants. 12 C.

The County's

Reliance

on People v. Gonzalez Is Misplaced.

County Counsel relies heavily on People v. Gonzalez (1990) 51 CaI.3d 1179, devoting more than four pages of its brief to this case. (County Counsel Opening Br. at 12-16.) However People v. Gonzales has no pertinence

whatsoever to the issues

presented in the case at bar. It is not a case that in arty way discusses the law of _andjury

secrecy. People v. Gonzalez held that a trial court lacks

jurisdiction

to order post-judgment

discovery

in the absence of a pending

proceeding

in which the discovery is to be used.

Gonzalez, 51 Cal.3d

at

_ "On August 30, 1990, the Superior Courtof Los Angeles County issued an order stating the 'material accumulated and used by the 1988-89 Grand Jury and the 1989-90 Grand Jury in their investigations of the jailhouse informants is to be kept secure by the court. [_ The material is not to be viewed, inspected or copied except by order of the Presiding Judge, Assistant Presiding Judge, or the Supervising Judge of the Criminal Division.'" a2 In fact such a ruling would call into question the propriety of the common practice of disclosing non-testimonial grand jury material for use in motions to vacate an indictment, since no express statutory authority authorizes this. See People v. Superior Court (2000) 78 Cal.App.4th 403,421-22. 24

1256. Specifically, enforcement proceeding

this case overruled a trial court's order directing law

agencies

13 to

turn over records to a prisoner whose criminal

had long-since been concluded and who had no other viable

actions pending in which he could use these records if they were _al"ned over to him. )'d. After the trial court ordered this discovery, the prisoner filed a habeas corpus petition (apparently more to support the requested discovery than vice versa); however this Court found that the petition did not even state a prima facie case for relief and summarily denied the petition. Id. at 1258. Clearly, Gonzalez is irrelevant to the issue at hand, since there is no dispute that Goldstein seeks grand jury materials for use in a viable, pending

action: his federal civil rights case. Goldste'm's civil rights action

has already survived two motions to dismiss and been upheld by both the federal district court and the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeal. Goldstein's civil rights action is unquestionably contrast to Gonzalez's

viable and will proceed to trial, in sharp

habeas petition.

In fact, in sharp contrast to the petitioner in Gonzalez, Goldstein has already been released from prison because the jailhouse testified against him was -found to have fabricated Goldstein's jailhouse

habeas proceeding

154 Cal.App.4th

who

his testimony. During

the federal court specifically

informant was an emblematic

system investigated

informant

found that this

example of the j ailhouse informant

by the grand jury. Goldstein v. Superior Court (2007)

482, 487.

Thus, unlike Gonzalez, Goldstein has not requested free-floating

13 Los Angeles County Counsel, Los Angeles Colmty District Attorney, Los Angeles County Sheriff, and the Attorney General. Id at 1256. 25

discovery for the purpose of an ill-defined,

yet-to-be-filed

action.

Moreover, Goldstein, unlike the prisoner in Gonzalez, did not actually request that the superior court exercise its discovery powers at all. That is, while the prisoner in Gonzalez asked the superior court to order the Attorney General and other law enforcement

agencies to turn over their

records to him, Goldstein did not ask for an order compelling

an

independent

third party, such as the Attorney General, to turn over

documents.

Rather, Goldstein requested that the superior court release its

own records _4 records that are under the custody and control of the superior court and whose release are allowed, under the terms of a standing order of the Los Angeles Superior Court, with approva! of the Presiding Supervising

and

Judges of that court.

People v. Gonzalez is a case about the trial court's power to order discovery under the discovery statutes in the absence of an action pending before it. Id at 1257. It is decidedly not a case about the trial court's power to release records in its own possession

to an individual,

such as Goldstein,

who intends to use the records in a pending action. For this reason, County Counsel's

discussion

of People v. Gonzalez is irrelevant.

N !!t //

z4 "[T]here is no doubt that a grand jury is part of the court by which it is convened, and that it is under the control of the court." People v. Superior Court (1975) 13 Cal.3d 430, 438; see also Penal Code § 888 (implicitly defining grand jury as part of the superior court). Moreover, the records at issue are, apparently, under the actual, physical custody of the Los Angeles Superior Court: They are held in the Superior Court Archives. 26

Dt

Despite the County's Claims to the Contrary, the Appellate Court's Decision Does Not Conflict with the Statutory Scheme or Upset the Principle of Separation of Powers. In its briefs, the County argues that the appellate court's decision in

Goldstein

attempts to thwart the statutory scheme regarding grand jury

secrecy. (Private Counsel Opening Br. at 7; County Counsel Opening Br. at 10.) This is simply untrue. The appellate court's decision is well within the spirt of the statutory scheme, which attempts to balance grand jury secrecy with the need to pierce this secrecy to achieve justice in court proceedings ,see, e.g., Penal Code §§ 924.1,924.2, interest in correcting governmental

924.6., and vindicate the punic

abuses, see, e.g., Penal Code § 929.

Although the appellate court rejected the view that there is express statutory authority authoriz'mg Goldstein's materials

request to access the grand jury

and instead found the requisite authority in the court's inherent

powers, the particular inherent power identified is not at all inconsistent with the statutory scheme for grand jury secrecy. The appellate court held that California

courts have the inherent power to release _and jury

materials to litigants, in the interests of justice, when there was a particularized

need to use these materials in ongoing litigation.

Superior Court (2007) 154 Cal.App.4th

Goldstein v.

482, 485. No statute explicitly

denies a court this power At most, the Appellate Court's scheme in this area--adding

decision supplements

the statutory

a power that if not explicitly endorsed, is

hardly explicitly denied the courts. While the Penal Code does prohibit grand jurors

from disclosing grand jury information

court order, no statutes specifically

in the absence of a

prohibit the court from releasing

grand

jury materials. Quite to the contrary, a number of statutes actually suggest 27

that courts have the power compelling

grand jurors to divulge grand jury

secrets for the purpose of a court proceeding.

See Penal Code §§ 924. l(a),

924.2, 924.6. For much the same reason, the County's separation of powers is a red herring.

invocation of principles

(See County Counsel Opening Br. at

17.) Far from overriding the legislative

scheme for protecting

secrecy, the appellate court's decision actually effectuates purpose. The County's unsupportable privilege,

of

grand jury

the legislature's

separation of powers argument is premised

on the

claim that grand jury secrecy is equivalent to an evidentiary

and thus, that the court's piercing of this secrecy is equivalent to

the judicial elimination of a statutorily enacted privilege.

(Id.)

Nothing supports the claim that grand jury secrecy is an evidenfiary privilege.

To begin with, although a grand juror is prohibited

from freely

divulging grand jury secrets to the general public, no statute prevents a court from ordering a grand juror to testify regarding secret matters. On the contrary, numerous statutes actually authorize a grand juror to disclose secret information

when "required by a court." Penal Code § 924.1 (a); see

also Penal Code §§ 924.2, 924.6. The County cites to Daily Journal Corp. in support of its claim that the legislature

has enacted an absolute

evidentiary privilege for grand jury material (see County Counsel Opening Br. at 17, n.53.), but Daily Journal Corp. does not make any such statement, but instead describes grand jury secrecy as a "tradition,"

not an

evidentiary privilege. Daily Journal Corp, 20 Cal.4th at 1122. Thus, when called to testify in court, grand jurors are not privileged from revealing secret grand jury information.

If the rule of secrecy does not

privilege a grand juror from revealing the information to see how this rule of secrecy can be considered 28

in court, it is difficult

an evidentiary

privilege.

County

Counsel

also cites to the official

information

privilege,

Evidence

Code section

1040, as a basis for its belief that grand jury secrecy

of evidentiary

privilege.

(County

Counsel

of this statute cited by the County privileged

from disclosing

information

that a public

if "disclosure

statute of this state." Evid. Code § 1040(b)(1). statute explicitly requests--i.e., official

prohibits

information Moreover,

considered

privilege

applicable

necessity

for preserving

Code § 1040(b)(2). statutorily,

adopts

In other words

for grand jury materials. privilege,

same exception applied

request,

that Goldstein

privilege

in the interest

the official

for a court to apply an exception

there

the principle

that was explicitly

Cal. Evid

privilege,

evaluating

has explicitly

"is a

that

need balancing

that the appellate

in this case. It call not offend

is only a

of justice."

information

Thus, with regard

the legislature

where

1040(b)(1) is

of

of the information

court as the framework

to the privilege

test that was Goldstein's

to the official authorized court

the exact

held should be

of separation authorized

of powers by the

legislature. Far from offending appellate legislature

court's

decision

in devising

a

since no California

this privilege

a form of the particularized

request

information

information

for disclosure

by the appellate

by...

from its own archives--the

the confidentiality

adopted

is forbidden

However,

By its own terms it only applies

the necessity

is

is not applicable.

to Goldstein's

privilege.

official

of grand jury materials

records

even if the official

qualified

outweighs

the release

the court releasing

17, 11.52.) The subsection

Br. at

provides

is a form

the principles advances

the legislative

of separation

of powers,

the transparent intentions scheme for the California

29

the

of the _and

jury.

III.

EVEN

IF THE

COURT

OF APPEALS

DECISION

IS

REVERSED, THIS COURT SHOULD FIND THAT CALIFORNIA TRIAL COURT HAS STATUTORY AUTHORITY TO ALLOW GOLDSTEIN ACCESS GRAND JURY MATERIALS

k.

A TO THE

Penal Code 924.2 Authorizes the Release of Grand Materials that Goldstein Requests

Jury

Penal Code section 924.2 allows a court to disclose grand jury testimony "for the purpose of ascertaining

whether it is consistent with that

given by the witness before the court." Cal. Penal Code § 924.2 is This section of the Penal Code clearly authorizes a California

court

to release grand jury materials to a litigant for the purpose of impeachment or refreshing

recollection.

Although

Penal Code section 924.2 states a court

may require "a grand juror to disclose" testimony given before the grand jury, naturally this should be read to extend to a ordering the release of grand jury transcripts. "transcripts"

This section does not specifically

mention

because at the time that this statute was originally

adopted (in

1872) California grand jury testimony was not recorded. See People v. Superior Court (2008) 78 Cal.App.4th

403, 416 (recording

of grand jury

_s The full text of section 924.2 reads as follows: Each grand juror shall keep secret whatever he himself or any other grand juror has said, or in what manner he or any other grand juror has voted on a matter before them. Any court may require a grand juror to disclose the testimony of a witness examined before the grand jury, for the purpose of ascertaining whether it is consistent with that given by the witness before the court, or to disclose the testimony given before the grand jury by any person, upon a charge against such person for perjury in giving his testimony or upon trial therefor.

30

proceedings

began in 1897). Thus, at the time that the language in Penal

Code section 924.2 was drafted, the only way to know what had been said by a grand jury witness was to call a grand juror to testify as to what the wimess said. This is no longer true and Penal Code section 924.2 clearly extends to the release of written grand jury transcripts

as well as the live

testimony of a grand juror. Similarly, these transcripts

should be available to a litigant before

trial (during the discovery phase of an action) so the litigant can adequately prepare for trial. If the material could only be revealed during the trial proceeding

itself- when a live grand juror is before the court, this would

make presentation

of such evidence impossibly haphazard.

pretrial discovery proceedings,

such as depositions,

Moreover,

are testimony "given by

the witness before the court," in so far as they are sworn proceedings

that

are used to develop evidence that will be placed before a court at trial. Additionally,

section 924.2 should not be read to limit disclosure

solely to testimony given by a live witnesses before the grand jury. Under both California law and federal law, trial courts are generally considered

to

have great latitude and discretion in deciding which grand jury materials to disclose (even though the question of whether grand jury materials may be disclosed is generally controlled by statute in California). See People v. Superior

Court (2000) 78 Cal.App.4th

403,407-408;

Stops North West (1979) 441 U.S. 211,223. 924.2 can and should be interpreted of grand jury transcripts

Douglas

Oil v. Petrol

Thus, Penal Code section

to authorize a court to order disclosure

and evidentiary

materials.

This section should also be considered

to implicitly authorize

a

California trial court to release materials to litigants in other court systems, such as Goldstein, who have shown a particularized 31

need for the materials.

Section 924.2 explicitly authorizes grand jury information,

"any court" to order disclosure

of secret

not merely that court which happens to have

custody over the materials.

Cal. Penal Code § 924.2. If the court with

custody over the materials cannot release them to other courts (as the standing order of the Los Angeles

Superior court apparently prevents here),

the only way logically consistent way to apply Penal Code 924.2 is to see it as requiring the court with custody over the materials (here, the Los Angeles Superior Court) to release the materials to the litigants in other court systems standing in the shoes of the other court. Such a judicial division of labor is explicitly incorporated Code section 924.6 which authorizes

into Penal

a California Court with custody of

criminal grand jury materials to hold an in camera hearing to release the materials in connection with a "criminal proceeding

before any court. ''16

Penal Code section 924.6 was adopted much later than section 924.2 and the legislature

actively considered

the problem that would arise where the

court with custody over grand jury materials was different from the court where the materials would be used. Although

section 924.2 does not expressly provide for a procedure to

be followed in such a situation, it is entirely consistent with the intention of

16Penal Code section 924.6 reads: If no indictment is returned, the court that impaneled the grand jury shall, upon application of either party, order disclosure of all or part of the testimony of a witness before the grand jury to a defendant and the prosecutor in connection with any pending or subsequent criminal proceeding before any court if the court fmds following an in camera hearing, which shall include the court's review of the grand jury's testimony, that the testimony is relevant, and appears to be admissible.

32

O

the statute to adopt the procedure

described in section 924.6. Grand jury

statutes should be read in a way that accords with common sense, avoids interpretations

"which might lead to mischief or absurdity, including

literal

meanings which would lead to a result not intended by the Legislature.'" People v. Superior Court, 78 Cal.App.4th Retirement,

68 Cal.Rptr.2d

403,428

607); see also McClatchy

(citing Board of Newspapers,

44

Cal.3d at 1172-73. Thus if a literal reading of one statutory provision regarding gand jury proceedings would render it inconsistent with other statutes, such an interpretation may be rejected in favor of one which is in harmony with other parts of the statutory scheme. Id. at 428 (citations omitted). Nothing in section 924.2 suggests that access to California

grand

jury materials should be a benefit reserved solely to the court that happens to have physical possession

of the materials.

Although Penal Code section 924.2 does not provide any standard to guide a court's decision as to when to release grand jury materials, the most restrictive standard that should be adopted is that laid out in Douglas Oil, which was adopted by the appellate court in this case to guide the determination

of which materials Goldstein should be allowed to access.

Arguably, an even less restrictive by the legislature

standard should apply: the standard used

in 924.6, which directs a court to release grand jury

testimony if it is "relevant,

and appears to be admissible"

and does not

require the court to consider the interests of grand jury secrecy at all. Cal. Penal Code § 924.6. "Goldstein's request for grand jury materials fits the primary requirement

of Penal Code section 924.2: He seeks access to these materials

33

for use in an ongoing court proceeding.

Thus, this statute should be found to

authorize his request. B.

Penal Code Section

929 Also Authorizes

Grand Jury Materials

that Goldstein

Requests.

Penal Code section 929 authorizes a civil watchdog as the grand jury that investigated

the Release of

the misuse ofjailhouse

grand jury, such informants,

to

disclose the evidentiary materials complied during its investigation, provided that the identities of witness testifying before the grand jury are not disclosed to the public. Cal. Penal Code § 929.17 Although this section was passed by the legislature jury that investigated

several years after the dissolution

the jailhouse

should be applied to Goldstein's

of the grand

informant scandal, this section can and request for thejailhouse

informant grand

jury materials.. Nothing in the legislative

history of section 929 suggests that it should not

_TThe full text of section 929 reads as follows: As to any matter not subject to privilege, with the approval of the presiding judge of the superior court or the judge appointed by the presiding judge to supervise the grand jury, a grand jury may make available to the public part or all of the evidentiary material, findings, and other information relied upon by, or presented to, a grand jury for its final report in any civil grand jury investigation provided that the name of any person, or facts that lead to the identity of any person who provided information to the grand jury, shall not be released. Prior to granting approval pursuant to this section, a judge may require the redaction or masking of any part of the evidentiary material, findings, or other information to be released to the public including, but not limited to, the identity of witnesses and any testimony or materials of a defamatory or libelous nature.

34

be applied retroactively. 396-408.)

(See Legislative

History, Exhibit W to Writ. Pet. at

The primary purpose of passing this statute was to ensure that

evidentiary materials supporting a grand jury's report would be available to avoid wasted effort replicating

grand jury investigations

and to substantiate

grand jury reports. (Id. at 396-98.) In the case at bar, it is clear that the grand jury conducting jailhouse

informant investigation

(and the judge presiding

the

over it) intended

to make its evidentiary materials available for future litigants, presumably for the purpose of facilitating

their investigations

efforts replicating the grand jury investigation..

and avoiding wasted In fact, according to the

special counsel appointed to assist the Grand Jury in the jailhouse investigation,

the material was indexed and preserved

informant

separately from other

materials precisely so it could be accessed easily by litigants. Although section 929 places the gate-keeping

authority for

disclosure in the hands of the grand jury, it seems evident that the grand jury investigating

the jailhouse

informant scandal exercised this gate-

keeping power and chose to make these materials available to future litigants.

Although section 929 had not yet been enacted when this grand

jury was dissolved, the basic perquisites

of the law are met- the Los

Angeles County Grand Jury intended to disclose the material and the Presiding Judge sought to limit the scope of the disclosure to protect those involved in the proceedings disclosure).

(by issuing a standing order to control

Thus, at some level, application

case would not even be a retroactive direct application

of section 929 to Petitioner's

application

of the law, but rather a

of the elements of the law to Petitioner's

current request:

The elements are met since section 929 does not require the grand jury to have made the decision to disclose the materials after 1998 (when the law 35

was passed), but only that it made a decision to disclose the materials. Even if this is construed

as a retroactive

application

section 929 can and should be applied retroactively. (Cal.Ct.App.

1976) 54 Cal.App.3d

must be considered

of section 929,

See People v. McAlister

918, 925. There are three factors that

in deciding whether to apply a law retroactively:

(1) the

purpose to be served by the new law, (2) the extent of reliance on old standards, and (3) the effect on the administration application

of justice that retroactive

would have. Id.

Here, aI1 of these factors weigh in favor of retroactive application

of

section 929. The first factor (the purpose of the rule) is by far the most important. Id. Section 929's purpose was to facilitate the work of watchdog grand juries in correcting public abuses by allowing them to substantiate their findings and to avoid wasted effort replicating investigations.

(See Legisiative

Release of the jailhouse

grand jury

History, Exhibit X to Writ Pet. at 396-398.)

informant grand jury materials to Mr. Goldstein

would further both of these purposes by (1) helping substantiate evidentiary

the

record in a civil rights lawsuit that is focused on remedying the

exact same abuses that the grand jury investigation

focused on and (2)

avoiding wasted effort replicating the grand jury's investigation. The second factor (the extertt of reliance on old standards) also weighs in favor of disclosure. jailhouse

The witnesses who appeared before the

informant grand jury did not adversely rely on old standards.

These witnesses'

expectations

of secrecy will not be being thwarted since

the material would be being disclosed under a protective

order.

Moreover,

the Grand Jury and presiding judge in 1990 clearly thought that they did have the power to make these materials available for future litigants (since the way the materials were organized demonstrate 36

an intent and awareness

-

@

that the materials could be disclosed for future use), so these witnesses could not have detrimentally

relied on the expectation

that the materials

would not be made available to future litigants. Finally, the third factor (the effect on the administration

of justice)

also weighs in favor of disclosure in this situation since the materials will actually be used to help facilitate the presentation record to the court in Goldstein's particularly

burdensome

of the full evidentiary

civil rights case and it would not be

for the superior court to make these materials

available to Goldstein. Moreover, allowing the release of these materials to Goldstein would support the legislative intent underlying

section 929-facilitating

correction of governmental

by allowing watchdog

malfeasance

the grand juries

to disclose evidentiary materials supporting their reports and recommendations. 396-398.)

18(See Legislative

Goldstein's

governmental

civil rights case seeks to redress precisely the same

abuses that the relevant grand jury investigation

on: the misuse ofjailhouse is inconceivable investigation

History, Exhibit X to Writ. Pet.. at

informants

leading to wrongful convictions.

that the grand jury concluding

ever undertaken

informants

would

that all of the carefully

and indexed fruits of this Grand Jury's investigation

forever locked away and made inaccessible

It

the most comprehensive

of the misuse ofjailhouse

be reduced to a dead letter upon its conclusionpreserved

was focused

for use in combating

would be the wrongs

_8Penal Code Section 939.1 bolsters this understanding of the legislative scheme. It allows for public grand jury sessions where a grand jury investigation "affects the general public welfare, involving the alleged corruption, misfeasance, or malfeasance in office or dereliction of duty of public officials or employees or of any person allegedly acting in conjunction or conspiracy with such officials or employees in such alleged acts." 37

the Grand Jury labored to expose. In line with the requirements stipulate to a protective

of section 929, Goldstein

is willing to

order that would prevent the release to persons

outside of his civil rights case of the "name of any person, or facts that lead to the identity of any person who provided information

to the grand jury,"

Penal Code § 929, except to the extent necessitated by use of the evidence at trial. Notably, almost all of the release of this information Goldstein's

trial would be authorized

would occur at

by Penal Code section 924.2, since it

would be being used as a basis to verify the accuracy and troth of the defendants

and other witness (the grand jury testimony of available

wimesses would be hearsay and thus could only be used for impeachment refi'eshing recollection). IV.

REGARDLESS OF WHETHER SUPERIOR COURT HAS THE

THE CALIFORNIA POWER TO GRANT

GOLDSTEIN ACCESS TO THE GRAND JURY MATERIALS, THE APPELLATE COURT'S ORDER SHOULD BE AFFIRMED TO THE EXTENT THAT IT DIRECTS THE SUPERIOR COURT TO COOPERATE WITH COURT BY REVIEWING THE MATERIALS PREPARING A STATEMENT

THE AND

FEDERAL

As the County itself admits, a federal court may order disclosure of state grand jury materials under federal law, even if it is deemed inappropriate requirement

under state law. (County Counsel Opening Br. at 20-23.) The that a litigant first attempt to obtain disclosure

of grand jury

materials through state court channels "does not give the state courts a veto over disclosure in [a] federal civil rights case." Socialist Grubisic (7 _ Cir 1980) 619 F.2d 641,644.

Workers Party v.

All federal case law of which

Goldstein is aware supports the power of the federal court to override state

38

or

grand jury secrecy laws for the purposes of a federal proceeding.19 This Court can, and should, in addition to affirming the court of appeal's

decision on state law grounds, order the state court to review the

materials and apply the Douglas

Oil test. Alternatively,

require the state court to commence

.this Court can

a review of the materials to make

findings on the issue of the need for secrecy so that the federal court can conduct the Douglas Oil balancing test. Since his first letter to the Superior Court, Goldstein has requested the Superior Court either disclose the grand jury materials or make findings regarding the need for secrecy so that the federal court would be in a better position to apply federal law governing disclosure

of the materials.

The appellate court ordered the superior court to cooperate with the federal court by reviewing

the grand jury materials and creating a written

statement assessing the specific secrecy concerns raised by the materials. This propriety of this portion of the appellate court's decision has not been raised as an issue for review. The state court clear has a duty to cooperate

19 County Counsel continues to misstate the law in this regard, claiming that "there is minority U.S. Circuit Court of Appeals authority suggesting, as a matter of federalism, that a federal court seeking state court's Grand Jury materials lacks jurisdiction to compel production." (County Counsel Br. At 22). County Counsel cities to Camiolo v. State Farm (3_aCir. 2003) 334 F.3d 345,357-60 for this claim. But this is absolutely not what Camiolo holds; instead Camiolo holds that a federal court litigant mustfirst approach the state court when seeking access to state grand jury materials. Id. at 359. In Camiolo the court explicitly left open the question of whether a federal court may overrule a state court's refusal to disclose grand jury materialsthe issue was not directly presented in that case. Id. 358-59. However, Camiolo does cite to the numerous decisions holding that the federal courts have this power. Id. at 357. Goldstein has pointed out this mistake in County Counsel's reading of this case in briefing before the appellate court and in Goldstein's Answer to the Petition for Review directed to this court. 39

O

with the federal court in carrying out the implementation See, e.g., Estate of Lindquist

of federal law.

(1944) 25 Cal.2d 697, 704-05. Indeed, this

duty to cooperate in enforcing federal law could well be seen as an independent

source of authority for the superior court to disclose grand jury

materials to federal litigants, such as Goldstein, using federal standards. The appellate court opinion should be upheld to the extent that it orders the state court to review the materials under federal law in order to facilitate disclosure by the federal court. CONCLUSION For the foregoing reasons Goldstein requests that the appellate court decision be upheld. If this Court rejects the appellate court's holding that the trial court has inherent authority to release the grand jury materials at issue, Goldstein requests that this Court find that statutory authority exists under Penal Code sections 924.2 and 929 to grant this request. Finally, regardless of the this Court's holding in vis-a-vi the power of the state court to release these grand jury materials, Goldstein

requests that this

Court hold that the state trial court is required to cooperate

with the federal

court in reviewing

the materials and releasing them to the extent demanded

by federal law.

DATED: December 7, 2007

Respectfully submitted, KAYE, McLANE & BEDNARSKI,

By: Attorneys Thomas

40

LLP

CERTIFICATE

OF WORD COUNT

The text of this Answer Brief consists of 11,579 words as counted by the Corel Wordperfect

word-processing

program used to generate it.

DATED: December 7, 2007

MATTHEW

41

N.

PROOF

I

I, Veronica

Aguilar,

2

Los

3

McLANE

4

California

5

not

a party

to

6

Law

Offices

of KAYE,

7

of

8

District

Angeles &

County,

the

Bar

LLP,

that

the

of

declare

California;

BEDNARSKI, 91103;

OF SERVICE

128

United

if California,

that

my

the

above-entitled

the

I am a resident

North

I am over

McLANE

that

Fair age

& BEDNARSKI,

Oaks

that

Avenue,

is

years;

partners

Court

direction

for

I served

in

KAYE,

Pasadena, that

I am employed

whose

District

at whose

address

of eighteen

action;

Stabes

and

business

or employed

in

I am the

are

members

the

Central

the:

9 10

Consolidated

Answer

Brief

On The Merits

11 12

On December

13

[ ] Placed in a closed envelope, for collection and interoffice delivery addressed as follows:

14 15

7, 2007,following

ordinary

business

IX] By handdelivery addressed as follows: Theresa Traber ONLY

practice,

service

was:

IX] Placed in a sealed envelope for collection and mailing via United States Mail, addressed as follows:

16 [ ] By

facsimile

as

follows:

[ ] By

electronic

mail:

17 18

*SEE

SERVICE

LIST

ATTACHED*

19 20

This

proof

of service

21

December

7,

22

foregoing

is true

2007.

I and

is executed

declare correct

under to the

at Los Angeles, penalty best

of

of my

California,

perjury

knowledge.

23 24 25 :a 26' 27 28

Aguilar

that

on the

SERVICE

LIST

1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28

Theresa M. Traber Traber & Voorhees 128 N. Fair Oaks Avenue, Suite 204 Pasadena, CA 91103 (Co-Counsel for Petitioner Thomas L. Goldstein) Belinda R. Mayes, Esq. Principal Deputy City Attorney OFFICE OF THE CITY ATTORNEY 333 West Ocean Boulevard, Ii th Floor Long Beach, CA 90802-4664 (Attorney for Real Parties in Interest the City of Long Beach and Logan Wren) Thomas J. Feeley, Esq. LAW OFFICES OF THOMAS J. FEELEY, P.C. 600 Wilshire Blvd., Suite 900 Los Angeles, CA 90017 (Attorney for Real Party in Interest William Michael M. Peters, Esq. TAUBMAN, SIMPSON, YOUNG & SULENTOR One World Trade Center, Suite 400 P.O. Box 22670, Long Beach, CA 90801 (Attorney for Real Party in Interest

John

Peter J. Ferguson, Esq. FERGUSON, PRAET & SHERMAN 1631 East 18 th Street Santa Aria, CA 92705-7101 (Attorney for Real Party in

William

McLyman)

Interest

John J. Collins, Esq. Collins, Collins, Muir & Stewart, LLP I!00 E1 Centro Street South Pasadena, CA 91030 (Attorney for Real Parties in Interest John Van de Kamp, and Curt Livesay)

Henry

Los

Gordon W. Trask, Principal Deputy County 648 Kenneth Hahn Hall Of Administration 500 W. Temple Street Los Angeles, CA 90012-2713 (Attorney for Los Angeles County and the County Grand Jury)

Miller)

Collette)

Angeles

Counsel

Los

Angeles

County,

SERVICE

LIST

1 2 3 4

D. Brett Bianco Court Counsel Los Angeles Superior Court Iii N. Hill Street, Room 546 Los Angeles, CA 90012-3014 (Attorney for Los Angeles County

Superior

5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28

Honorable Peter Espinoza Los Angeles Superior Court Department 123 210 W. Temple Street Los Angeles, CA 90012 Clerk Second Appellate Court, 300 N. Spring Street Los Angeles, CA 90012

Division

3

Court)