Dudley 99 British Steel & Govt Since Privatization

BRITISH STEEL AND GOVERNMENT SINCE PRIVATIZATION: POLICY 'FRAMING' AND THE TRANSFORMATION OF POLICY NETWORKS GEOFFREY DUDLEY Privatization has its own distinctive dynamics, resulting particularly from the institutional restructuring which tends to transform policy networks and communities. This happens principally for two reasons. Firstly, the crucial balance of resource dependencies is changed irrevocably, and established policy communities break down. Secondly, the separation between the principal actors tends to produce a 'reframing' of major policy issues. Here, Schon and Rein's (1994) concept of issue 'framing' offers a useful metaphor for how actors give a coherent organization to a complex reality by selecting for attention a few salient features. At the same time, they argue also that the nature of 'objective' reality might be found in the world's tendency to resist our interpretations, leading to a discovery of the limitations of particular frames. The case of British Steel offers a good example of the dynamics of this process. In the days of state ownership, the British Steel Corporation and government generally shared similar 'frames' on major issues. Since privatization, however, the two actors have tended to adopt separate 'frames' and have become more independent of each other. Multi-arena politics, such as Europeanization, can drive them still further apart. Nevertheless, in recent years British Steel has come to appreciate some of the limitations of its own frame, and has sought to reconstruct its relationship with government. There is an imbalance in the resource dependencies, however, which precludes the reconstruction of a policy community. INTRODUCTION As time passes since the initial phase of privatization of the former nationalized industries (for example, the Hrst tranche of British Telecommunications shares was sold by govemment in 1984; British Gas was privatized in 1986; British Airways in 1987; and British Steel in 1988), it becomes possible to gain a clearer picture of the changes brought about by privatization, not only to the companies themselves, but also to their networks of relationships, particularly those with govemment. In assessing the actual type and degree of change brought about by privatization, it is important to appreciate that it is not in itself a necessary pre-condition of major policy change. As Plender points out, the privatized British Steel (BS) now ranks as one Geoffrey Dudley is a Research Associate at Staffordshire University, UK, Public Administration Vol, 77, No, 1, 1999 (51-71) © Blackwell Publishers Ltd, 1999, 108 Cowley Road, Oxford OX4 IJF, UK and 350 Main Street, Maiden, MA 02148, USA,

52 GEOFFREY DUDLEY of the lowest cost steel producers in the world, while the renaissance in the fortunes of British Airways (BA) has been similarly impressive. Yet, ironically, much of the improvement took place while these companies were still in the public sector. Where state enterprise operated in competitive product markets, the introduction of more commercial management given the go-ahead to address extensive overmanning was probably more important than privatization (Plender 1997). Nevertheless, privatization does have its own characteristic dynamics of change. In particular, the enforced institutional restructuring engineers the destruction of established policy networks and communities, but then reconstructs these networks in a new form. Rhodes emphasizes the structural relationship between political institutions as the crucial element in a policy network, rather than the interpersonal relations between individuals within those institutions (Rhodes and Marsh 1992, p. 9). When the structural relationship between government and industry changes radically, therefore, as in privatization, then we would expect the networks of relationships between them to change also. For example, the crucial balance of resource dependencies is changed irrevocably. Rhodes employs Benson's definition of a policy network as 'a cluster or complex of organizations connected to each other by resource dependencies and distinguished from other clusters or complexes by breaks in the structure of resource dependencies' (Rhodes and Marsh 1992, p. 13). During the days of state ownership, the relationship between the British Steel Corporation (BSC) and govemment was indeed characterized by resource dependencies, with the BSC dependent on the govemment for the provision of finance (particularly subsidies to meet mounting operational losses during the late 1970s and early 1980s), and govemment dependent on the BSC for technical and financial expertise (see Bryer et al. 1982; Abromeit 1986; and Dudley and Richardson 1990). Given the predominance of the BSC within the steel sector, there existed a typical policy community (Richardson and Jordan 1979) characterized by stability of relationships, continuity of a highly restricted membership, vertical interdependence based on shared service delivery responsibilities, and insulation from both other networks and, invariably, the general public (including Parliament) (Rhodes and Marsh 1992, p. 13). With privatization, as these resource dependencies fell away, so the community was destroyed. In a wider sense, privatization itself must be perceived as part of a long term trend within British govemment towards a 'hollowing out of the state.' In addition to privatization, this 'hollowing out' includes the loss of functions by central and local govemment departments to alternative delivery systems (such as agencies); the loss of functions by British govemment to European Union institutions; and limits set to the discretion of public servants through the new public management, with its emphasis on managerial accountability, and clearer political control © Blackwell Publishers Ltd. 1999

BRITISH STEEL AND GOVERNMENT SINCE PRIVATIZATION 53 through a sharper distinction between politics and administration (Rhodes 1996, p. 666). It is not just a matter of restructuring, however, for privatization also has the effect of introducing fresh interests and agents of change, as well as opening up sectors to new ideas. As Baumgartner and Jones point out, noting the structure of bias inherent in any set of political institutions not only shows who is advantaged, it also shows what changes might come about from the destruction or alteration of an existing arrangement. Consequently, if the structures are changed, then dramatic changes in the mobilization of bias may result, leading to redefinition of an issue, and a jump from one partial equilibrium to another (Baumgartner and Jones 1993, pp. 1-25). For example, as Baldwin emphasizes, in the case of the privatized utilities regulatory bodies such as the Office of Telecommunications, the Office of Electricity Regulation, the Office of Gas Supply and the Office of Water Services now play a key role in national economic management, with consumers and the public asking newly urgent questions about the regulators' ability to harness private operations to the public interest (Baldwin 1995, pp. 14-15). The result is that, in the post-privatized world, the salience of sectors such as water has increased rather than declined, with public conflict between some of the key actors (Maloney and Richardson 1995, p. 103). Govemment has also suffered several political embarrassments, being reduced largely to the role of the 'spectator state' (Grant 1995, pp. 75-96) in a succession of controversial large salary increases and share options given to senior management of the utilities. Steel has lacked the political salience found in other sectors, and BS remains by far the dominant actor, but the company has developed distinctive ideas and values w^hich have placed it at a distance from those of govemment. The institutional change brought about by privatization has the effect of reshaping sectoral networks and constructing fresh relationships between established actors. One possible effect of restructuring is that policy monopolies break down. Baumgartner and Jones argue that policy monopolies have two important characteristics. First, a definable institutional structure is responsible for policy-making, and that structure limits access to the policy process. Second, a powerful supporting idea is associated with the institution (Baumgartner and Jones 1993, p. 7). In the days of state ownership, the BSC and govemment maintained a policy monopoly which largely excluded other interests. To a significant extent, the provision of huge sums of public finance to support the BSC rested on the image of the Corporation as a 'national champion' which must be supported in order to retain domestic supply in a basic industry. This article is concemed with tracing and analysing the dynamics of a process which led initially to the destruction of the established steel policy community and the breakdown of a policy monopoly, with BS and govemment holding separate ideas and values. The principal interests remain, but the networks are transformed as these interests vie for supremacy in a range

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54 GEOFFREY DUDLEY of policy-making arenas. At the same time, there is also evidence that, in recent years, although separate ideas and institutional commitments remain, a new type of network is being constmcted between BS and govemment, largely on the initiative of the former . Consequently, in its desire to re-build its relationship with govemment, BS is of necessity required to re-learn how the machinery of govemment works, and to appreciate the distinctive perspective of ministers and officials. As an aid to understanding this complex process, the concept of policy 'framing' is valuable in analysing the dynamics of the interrelationship between structural change, policy change, and the dynamics of networks. POLICY 'FRAMING' AND NETWORK DYNAMICS

Rhodes argues that the policy network approach is a modern variant of the institutional approach and that institutional complexity and competing institutional agendas are the stuff of policy networks (Rhodes 1997, p. 12). In this context, radical stmctural change, such as privatization, opens up a network to fresh ideas, which sow the seeds of the former's transformation. This process can be an important element in explaining policy change, for new ideas can act as chisels which prise open existing communities, and hence break up policy monopolies. One useful explanation of the dynamics of this process is provided by Kingdon, who believes that the separate streams of problems, policies and politics come together at certain critical times. Solutions become joined to problems, and both of them are joined to favourable political forces. This coupling is most likely when policy windows - opportunities for pushing pet proposals or conceptions of problems - are open (Kingdon 1995, p. 20). Nevertheless, it is not just a matter of privatization providing the policy window for problems to be coupled to solutions, the enforced restructuring can produce a 're-framing' of key policy issues. Schon and Rein (1994) describe a dynamic whereby different actors construct a view of social reality through a complementary process of naming and framing. Things are selected for attention and named in such a way as to fit the frame constructed for the situation. In other words: They select for attention a few salient features and relations from what would otherwise be an overwhelming complex reality. They give these elements a coherent organization, and they describe what is wrong with the present situation in such a way as to set the direction for its future transformation. Through the process of naming and framing, the stories make the 'normative leap' from data to recommendations, from fact to values, from 'is' to 'ought' (Schon and Rein 1994, p. 26). Schon and Rein argue that the general relevance of frame-reflective policy inquiry is constructed around the central idea of a reflective policy conversation. Participants in such a conversation must be able to put themselves in the shoes of other actors in the environment, and they must have a complementary ability to consider how their own action frames may contribute © BlackweU Publishere Ltd, 1999

BRITISH STEEL AND GOVERNMENT SINCE PRIVATIZATION 55 to the problematic situations in which they find themselves (Schon and Rein 1994, p. 187). It can also be the case, however, that actors holding separate 'frames' discourage a reflective policy conversation, and are not inclined to put themselves in the shoes of others. A cognitive gap emerges in which they occupy separate 'orders of comprehension'. On any particular 'plane', therefore, one may expect to find a 'cognitive community' of people who 'talk the same language', understand the world in a mutually recognizable way, inhabit the same 'universe of discourse', and have heard of one another's concems and interests. Conversely, if one moves to another 'plane', one may find communication somewhat difficult (Dunsire 1978, p. 158). Schon and Rein refer to the relativist trap, and pose fundamental questions, such as is there an objective basis for choosing among frames, or reframing policy issues, in one way rather than another? How can we possibly resolve frame conflicts when frames themselves determine what counts as evidence and what interpretations of evidence are acceptable? They concede that if no credible answers can be found to these questions, we are caught in the predicament of epistemological relativism. There can be no reasonable basis for deciding among policy frames, all of which may be intemally consistent and compelling in their own terms and, hence, equally worthy of choice. They solve this conundrum by quoting Scheler's proposal that the nature of 'objective' reality might be found in the world's tendency to resist our interpretations. Thus if the world resists our acts of willing and interpreting, stubbomly presenting us with phenomena mismatched to our frames, then we may be able to discover the limitations of our frames, even though it is only through them that we can detect their mismatch to reality (Schon and Rein 1994, p. 41-2). This solution to the relativist trap provides a key insight into understanding the dynamics of network destruction and reconstruction in the case of BS and govemment. Here, three phases can be identified. First, in the days of state ownership, the British Steel Corporation (BSC) and govemment held similar 'frames' to reality on most (but not quite all) major issues. Thus there was a common identity generally on matters such as investment, management style and corporate objectives (although significant differences on crisis management did emerge during the threemonth national steel strike of 1980 and, as we will see, the closure of the Ravenscraig steelworks). This symmetry between BSC and government was particularly evident during the mid-to-late 1980s, where the govemment took pride in portraying the tumaround in BSC fortunes as a triumph for managerialism, i.e. the introduction of private sector management methods to the public sector which stress hands-on professional management, explicit standards and measures of performance; managing by results; value for money; and closeness to the customer (Rhodes 1996, p. 655). Second, superficially, it might have been expected that this close identity of 'frames' would have continued between the privatized BS and govern-

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56 GEOFFREY DUDLEY ment. In the event, ideological, political and institutional elements combined to push the two parties further apart. For example, after privatization BS supplemented managerialism with a 'frame' of its own dedicated to efficiency and profit, but with no specific commitment to investment and employment in Britain. In fact, this globalization strategy has become a common feature of the privatized industries, particularly those which operate in an intemationally competitive environment. As Grant points out, many former national enterprises in Britain have had to make relatively late adjustments to an increasingly intemationalized economy (Grant 1995, p. 84). For example, British Airways (BA) has instigated controversial alliances with US Air and, more recently, a proposed link with American Airlines. Similarly, British Telecommunications (BT) now has more than 25 equity joint ventures world-wide. Most ambitiously, it had a proposed (but eventually aborted) £12 billion acquisition of the US company MCI which would have created one of the world's largest telecoms operations (known as Concert). These types of alliances, combined with strategies of overseas investment, give companies such as BS, BA and BT a much more ambivalent identity than that of 'national champions' (see Hayward, 1995, pp. 34673), although govemment can derive political capital from the continued promotion of this image. On the other hand , this ambivalent national identity is mirrored by the British govemment's primary industrial strategy of attracting inward investment, particularly from Japan. As Grant notes, 39 per cent of Japanese direct investment in the EC in the post-war period has gone to Britain (Grant 1995, p. 91). Although the British govemment is prepared to accept, at least tacitly, globalization strategies of former nationalized industries such as BS, it does create delicate political dilemmas in terms of domestic employment and investment. Occasionally, these often submerged differences rise to the surface, such as in the case of the closure of the Ravenscraig steelworks in Scotland. This issue was unusual in that, even prior to privatization, the BSC and govemment held separate 'frames'. For the BSC, by the 1980s, Ravenscraig was perceived as a works at the periphery of its interests, and with no commercial future. For govemment, however, and particularly the Scottish Office, Ravenscraig was a sensitive political issue. The works held a central strategic and symbolic importance for a wide spectrum of Scottish interests, and any suggestion of closure was likely to cany a political penalty for govemment. In the 1980s, therefore, govemment insisted that the BSC should retain steel making at all its five main plants, including Ravenscraig. During these years, the govemment imposed its own 'frame' on the issue. After privatization, however, BS re-defined the issue in terms of its own 'frame', and closure of the plant took place in 1992. The separate 'frames' of former nationalized industries and govemment can be further exposed and aggravated by the institutional dynamics of other policy arenas. In the case of BS, events in the European arena in the 1990s, have demonstrated © BlackweU Publishere Ltd, 1999

BRITISH STEEL AND GOVERNMENT SINCE PRIVATIZATION 57 that the company can no longer regard the British govemment as 'reliable'. Instead, ministers have their own agenda priorities. As Mazey and Richardson conclude, the unique institutional structure of the EU, far from 'strengthening the autonomy of national leaders vis-a-vis particularistic social groups within the domestic polity' (quoting Moravcsik 1993, p. 507) is, logically, just as likely to undermine it. This is because in the context of multi-level, multi-arena and nested games, the uncertainty principle is of enormous importance (Mazey and Richardson 1996, p. 212, original emphasis). The complexity and uncertain outcomes of these multi-level games can indeed have the effect of pushing domestic actors further apart. In order to counteract its more problematic relationship with government, BS has sought transnational alliances on specific issues with like-minded companies. There is a paradox, therefore, in that, although BS has enjoyed relative commercial success since privatization, it has also appeared more politically isolated and vulnerable since the days of state ownership. In commercial and financial terms, BS may retain the identity of a national champion. Politically, however, although it has enjoyed some significant successes in furthering its expansionist and free-market strategy, at other times it also appears as something of a 'lonely giant' searching the globe for new partners and alliances. Given the unpredictable outcomes of this multi-arena environment, it can no longer turn to the British govemment as a reliable ally. For its part the govemment , more tied to a domestic and European institutional agenda, and with the steel industry generally less politically salient than in the 1970s and 1980s, holds a different 'frame' to reality. Third, although BS holds separate policy 'frames' to those of government, the company has come to realize that it is too politically isolated. On such issues as state aids and the value of the pound (which has a profound effect on the finances of the company) it must lobby govemment and forge new alliances. In order to do this effectively, it has embarked on a systematic process of 'frame reflection', in which it seeks to put itself in the shoes of other actors, particularly govemment, and to consider how its own actions can improve the relationship. This does not mean that BS will necessarily shift its core values, but does indicate the development of a refiective policy conversation. For government, however, the steel industry is less politically salient than in the days of state ownership, and so there is some imbalance in terms of resource dependencies. Consequently, five main arguments emerge from the BS case study: • State ownership tended towards the construction of stable policy communities. • Privatization and the 're-framing' of key policy issues go hand in hand, and fundamentally destabilize the established policy communities. • Privatization affects the two main actors differently. They become more © BlackweU Publishere Ltd. 1999

58 GEOFFREY DUDLEY independent of each other, yet have to operate in different policy-making arenas, which neither of them can really control. • Europeanization can force actors holding separate 'frames' still further apart, as neither is 'reliable' any longer. • When the privatized companies find that the world presents them with phenomena which mismatch their frames, so they will seek to reconstruct networks through a process of frame refiection. The next section explores further the changes in post-privatization network structure, in particular the contrast with the (at least nominal) arm'slength relationship of nationalization. The following three sections examine briefiy the evolution of the separate 'frames' between BS and government in the context of three case studies: the BS strategy to build global alliances; the closure of the Ravenscraig steelworks; and differences between BS and the British government in the European arena. The final section analyses the process by which BS has embarked on a period of frame refiection. BRITISH STEEL AND GOVERNMENT: A NEW ARM'S-LENGTH RELATIONSHIP

For the large majority of nationalized industries, the chosen model of ministerial control was the arm's-length Morrisonian public corporation (named after the Labour minister who played a great part in successfully promoting this policy idea), where govemment would agree overall strategy with the corporation while leaving day-to-day implementation in the hands of management. In reality, this official demarcation of responsibilities rarely operated as intended. First, there was a correlation between ministerial intervention and the political salience of the industry and the issue at hand (Dudley 1994). Secondly, ministers and officials generally lacked the expertise to truly evaluate the policy proposals on investment and rationalization proposed by the management of the industry (see, for example, Foster 1971; Hannah 1982; Abromeit 1986; and Dudley and Richardson 1990). This was particularly evident in the case of the British Steel Corporation where, in the early 1970s, an over-ambitious investment plan recommended by management was accepted by ministers wedded to over-optimistic hopes for the future demand for steel by British industry (see Abromeit 1986, pp. 12935; Bryer et al. 1982, pp. 101-32; Dudley and Richardson 1990, pp. 37-55). The case of the BSC and corporate strategy (with the exception of Ravenscraig) illustrates well the link between structure and restricted policy options. The nominal arm's-length relationship allowed Corporation management to lead ministers and officials towards the former's policy 'frame' and consequent policy solutions. Thus Beauman, writing from the perspective of a key 'insider' in BSC policy-making during the late 1970s and early 1980s reveals that, when Corporation management first proposed a rolling programme of works closures in Autumn 1977, the Labour govemment was prepared to accept this, provided it was done without outright confiict with the unions. In successfially adopting this strategy BSC management

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BRITISH STEEL AND GOVERNMENT SINCE PRIVATIZATION 59 benefited from the lead given by Michael Edwards, Chairman of the stateowned British Leyland motor company, who helped to create public sympathy for rolling back the power of the unions and for factory closures in the public sector. Consequently, the constant factor at each stage of the recovery in the commercial and financial fortunes of the BSC during the 1980s was the senior management team. As in the previous Labour period, the Conservative govemment was the accomplice, rather than the instigator of charge. The key factors in the recovery plan were the emphasis on plantlevel operational improvement and plant-based performance-related bargaining, together with the maintenance of a dominant position within the UK market (Beauman 1996, pp. 27-9). As a result of this major policy change, the numbers employed by the BSC fell from 207,900 in 1977 to 51,600 in 1988. The major policy change initiated by BSC management in the late 1970s was undertaken, like that at British Leyland, as a response to a deep commercial and financial crisis. As Kingdon argues, sometimes crises come along that simply bowl over everything of prominence standing in the way on the agenda (Kingdon 1995, p. 96). The loss of the official arms-length relationship derues BS management the institutional connection to impose its own 'frame' on govemment. For its part, govemment no longer has the power to assert the dominance of its 'frame' on matters such as the Ravenscraig closure. On the other hand, the privatized BS has been less politically salient than its public sector predecessor, although the relatively stable management of the company does provide an important thread of continuity. Nevertheless, the complexity and uncertainty of BS's environment is illustrated particularly well by its post-privatization quest for a new global identity. BS AND THE GLOBAL 'FRAME'

The BS Chairman 1986-92, Sir Robert Scholey, personified the changes in company culture and strategy between the 1970s and 1990s. A career steelman, who had served as BSC Chief Executive from 1973, and Deputy Chairman from 1976, Scholey played a prominent part in developing the more aggressively commercial strategy from the late 1970s (Beauman 1996, p. 28). Scholey himself took the initiative in persuading ministers to go ahead with privatization of the BSC in 1988, and the continuity he brought to the indusfry was employed as a public relations tool in the period leading up to the public sale of shares. Nevertheless, as Chairman of the privatized BS, Scholey saw an opportunity for the company to invest abroad which he considered would have been much more difficult to accomplish under the political constraints of nationalization (interview 4 November 1996). It could be said that there was an element of managerial fashion in the idea of overseas joint ventures and take-overs. Just as in the 1970s the BSC management based their large-scale development strategy on the giant steelworks they had seen in Japan, so in the 1990s there was a desire to copy

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60 GEOFFREY DUDLEY some of the joint ventures between Japanese and US companies, and which were also taking place on a limited basis within Europe. This BS strategy was derived from a policy 'frame' of the steel industry, which envisaged a set of multinational companies operating in a free market. Scholey had a particular ambition for BS expansion into Europe, not only in terms of physical assets, but also exporting what he considered to be the company's distinctive brand of US style liberal capitalism (interview 4 November 1996). The steel industry, however, like airlines, is one where the 'national champion' culture is traditionally strong. Even in the case of BS itself, the govemment held a 'golden' share which restricted the size of individual share holdings to 15 per cent of the equity, and which ran for five years after privatization. In the case of many other EC counfries, governments had an even more protective attitude to their 'national champion' steel companies, and were not willing to see policy through the same 'frame' as BS. For example, BS encountered enormous political difficulties when it attempted to take over the Arisfrain group, the largest producer of steel sections in Spain. Although Spain had accepted more than £12.4 billion of inward acquisitions since joining the EC in 1986, BS's bid of £250 million for Arisfrain was regarded as a step too far in a culture where govemment fraditionally has an interventionist approach to the steel industry. The state Ensidesa company feared BS gaining a toe-hold in the domestic Spanish market, and together with the indirectly state-owned Altos Hormos de Vizcaya Company (AHV) launched a rival bid for Arisfrain through the state bank, the Instituto de Credito Oficial (ICO). BS was sensitive to the political situation, and orgartized a joint bid with Banco Espanal de Credito, in which each would hold 40 per cent of the company, and Ensidesa could acquire 5 per cent if it wished to join. The family owners of Arisfrain were keen to sell, and initially accepted the deal, but in September 1990 pulled out. When BS re-opened negotiations, the Spanish govemment openly expressed its enormous concem about the deal, and the threat it would pose to Ensidesa. Consequently, BS found itself excluded from ownership of a significant Spanish steel producer. Around this time, BS had also set its sights on acquiring a German company. As the largest market in the EC, BS had long-standing ambitions to improve its position in Germany, but had not enjoyed great success. As the largest of the former West German steel companies were all privately owned, it might have been thought that foreign acquisitions would be more easily accepted. Once again, however, BS was to find the political obstacles too high to overcome. BS was successful in acquiring the relatively small Troisdorf plant, but when it began preliminary negotiations with the large Hoesch company, the infiuential German interests closed ranks. Significantly, the President of the German Steel Industry Association complained about increased BS imports into the country, and referred to the 'British giant' (Financial Times, 10 October 1990). In 1991, therefore, with the encour-

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BRITISH STEEL AND GOVERNMENT SINCE PRIVATIZATION 61 agement of the German govemment, Krupp launched a friendly take-over of Hoesch. When the deal was completed, it was explicitly acknowledged that the impetus for the take-over had come from a wish to exclude foreign companies such as BS {Financial Times, 11 October 1991) (a similar phenomenon was evident in 1998 when the govemment of Lower Saxony purchased the Preussag steel company). Scholey had dearly wished to see BS become a pan-European company after privatization, but the policy 'frame' which held this ambition did not exist in political reality. Now a disillusioned Scholey declared: 'We are not going to knock on any more doors in Europe. We have had enough of being told no. If they want to invite us in, fine, but from now on we will be looking elsewhere' (Financial Times, 25 January 1991). Scholey, therefore, turned his attention to the US, where a number of the largest companies had undertaken joint ventures with Japanese companies. One which had not was the Bethlehem company, and so Scholey, who placed great store by personal contact, began negotiations with the Chairman, Walt Williams, who was a personal friend. The initial proposition was a joint venture in structural and rail steels, but would involve major restructuring of Bethlehem's product lines and the loss of around 2,000 jobs. Consequently, agreement would be required with the United Steelworkers Union to accept job cuts and new working practices. In addition, the deal would put pressure on other large US steel companies such as USX and Nucor. In the event, union opposition to the Bethlehem plan proved too sfrong, and it too fell through. BS did conclude deals in the US, including purchase of the Tuscaloosa mill in Alabama, and a joint venture (Trico) with US and Japanese companies to build a fiat product mini-mill. As the 1990s progressed, however, it became clear that, although BS might be successful with relatively small-scale joint ventures and acquisitions, the 'national champion' culture, combined with opposition from competitors and unions, prevented it from gaining a hold over companies such as Aristrain, Hoesch and Bethlehem. By the mid-1990s, therefore, BS had turned its attention once more to the domestic scene. In 1991, a joint venture (European Electrical Steels) was formed with Swedish Steel AB. A much larger joint venture with Sweden was Avesta Sheffield AB, formed by the merger of Avesta AB and BS's stainless steel interests to become one of the world's largest manufacturers of stairUess steel products. In 1995, BS increased its shareholding in Avesta from 49.9 per cent to a confrolling 51 per cent. Also in 1995 BS significantly consolidated its UK interests by paying GKN £93 million for its share in UES Holdings. Ironically, UES had been created in 1986 as part of the Phoenix privatization programme, whereby a number of BSC assets were sold off. It is significant that BS sought to strengthen its hold over its domestic steel industry in this way. It could be said that, at least to some extent, the © Blackwell Publishers Ltd. 1999

62 GEOFFREY DUDLEY company had returned to its 'home' base after the frusfrations of overseas adventures. Nevertheless, Scholey's successor as BS Chairman, Sir Brian Moffat, has expanded his predecessors' global ambitions. Where Scholey saw BS as primarily a European company, Moffat has sought to increase the company's involvement in the growing Asian market. In this respect, BS is following the lead of its customers such as General Motors (GM), the biggest US vehicle manufacturer. Thus, GM's Director of Steel Purchasing for North American Operations has urged steelmakers to follow his company in constmcting plants in the Asia-Pacific region, particularly China (Schuster 1996). Again, however, although BS has set up a number of relatively smallscale joint ventures and acquisitions in counfries such as Malaysia and India, as in Europe and the US, the company has found penefrating national markets to be a difficult proposition. Consequently, BS continues to campaign for a change in the 'policy frame' elsewhere. For example, in 1995, Sir Brian Moffat called for a new management culture in the steel companies of the Organization for Economic Co-operation and Development, which he believed should be less defensive and instead more imaginative and financially driven. His words continued to echo those of Scholey: The successful steel companies of the future are Ukely to have a wide, international spread of assets, to be embracing new technologies, to be intemationally cost competitive in their areas of operations and to be financially driven. They are also likely to have a number of partners, in a variety of joint ventures, requiring a much greater fiexibility of approach than has been exhibited by the industry in the past (Steel News, April 1996). This excellent summary of the BS management culture, as it had developed over the previous decade, demonsfrated how BS retained its policy 'frame' and dreams about the future. It had discovered, however, that in the world generally by no means everyone shares this dream. In many counfries, national steel networks remained sfrong, particularly where issues of large company ownership were concemed (we will see below that companygovernment splits could occur on other issues in at least some EU counfries). For BS domestically, the old arm's-length relationship with govemment had disappeared. At least on matters such as works closures, this institutional change favoured the BS 'frame'. THE RAVENSCRAIG CLOSURE AND THE OFFICIAL ARM'SLENGTH PRINCIPLE IN OPERATION

As Hudson and Sadler comment, the steel industry has played a prominent and often symbolic role in the twin processes of de-industrialization and re-indusfrialization which have characterized the period since the late 1970s in many advanced economies. Equally, many of the communities affected by these changes have become the focal point of media attention and polit© Blackwell Publishers Ltd. 1999

BRITISH STEEL AND GOVERNMENT SINCE PRIVATIZATION 63 ical debate (Hudson and Sadler 1989, p. 1). Nevertheless, during the 1970s and 1980s, successive British govemments normally preferred to invoke the arm's length principle on the matter of individual steelworks' closures, and claim officially that such operational matters were the responsibility of BSC management. There were two significant exceptions to this rule. The first of these occurred in 1974-75, when the Labour govemment ordered a review of all proposed BSC closures to be undertaken by a junior Industry Minister, Lord Beswick. The outcome of the Beswick Review did postpone some closures, although the BSC crisis of the late 1970s eventually led to the cessation of steelmaking at all these works (see Bryer et al. 1982, pp. 24953; Dudley and Richardson 1990, pp. 57-78). The second exception proved to be of more long-lasting political salience and significance. In 1982 the govemment instructed the BSC to keep all of its five main integrated works open for another three years. These five included the Ravenscraig works in Scotland, which BSC management had been seeking to close. Ravenscraig had been born in political confroversy through a political decision made by the govemment in 1958 to split new sfrip mill development between there and Llanwem in South Wales (see Vaizey 1974, pp. 169-77). The political character of this decision, taken nearly a decade before steel nationalization in 1967, is a good example of how a type of arm's-length relationship existed between the industry and government even in the days of private ownership. This political element was to haunt Ravenscraig in the 1980s and 1990s, so that it was not difficult for BSC, and later BS, management to brand it with the image of an 'outsider' plant, with most of the markets for its products lying hundreds of miles away in Cenfral England. A key element in the govemment's decision in 1982 was a threat by the Scottish Secretary, George Younger, to resign if the plant closed. This departure would obviously have been a considerable embarrassment to the govemment within a few months of a likely general election in 1983. The govemment also claimed that Britain had already made enough sacrifices on steel closures, and that it was now the turn of other counfries within the European Coal and Steel Community to close steelworks and cut capacity (HC Debs, 21 December 1982, Cols. 672-74). As in 1958, therefore, the perceived sfrategic economic and political significance of steel had led ministers towards the interventionist approach. The arms-length relationship assumed a more official orthodoxy, with the govemment directing a sfrategy for the BSC to execute. The government might support the BSC on its overall objectives and management style, but on Ravenscraig they held separate 'frames'. On this occasion, however, the BSC was reluctantly compelled to accept the govemment's more political 'frame'. When the three-year guarantee ran out in 1985, Ravenscraig once again became vulnerable. In addition to the earlier political factors, there was the added element that Ravenscraig had played a prominent role in maintaining national steel output during the year-long miners' sfrike of 1984-

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64 GEOEFREY DUDLEY 85. This gave the govemment a still greater sense of political obligation to the worl«. Nevertheless, although the five main steelmaking plants were given a further guaranteed life of three years, the BSC significantly secured the govemment's agreement to the closure of the Gartcosh cold sfrip rolling mill in March 1986. As Gartcosh took one-third of Ravenscraig's hot mill steel, many of the interests which had fought to save the major Scottish plant now feared that the loss of Gartcosh was the thin end of the wedge which would eventually see off Ravenscraig (Dudley and Richardson 1990, p. 216). Notwithstanding its potential importance, the Scottish Secretary chose not to make the Gartcosh closure a resigning matter, and despite a vigorous campaign to save the works, it closed as scheduled in March 1986. Although the political 'frame' of govemment still held sway in guaranteeing the future of Ravenscraig, the BSC had asserted its typical power to manipulate ministers towards its own 'frame' which envisaged no future for Ravenscraig. In 1987, however, Scholey was compelled to give one final political commitment to govemment before privatization when he agreed that Ravenscraig would remain in operation for at least another seven years, subject to market conditions (a proviso which would obviously allow a considerable degree of discretion to a privatized BS). On the other hand, Scholey encountered little difficulty in persuading ministers that the BSC should be privatized as a whole, so precluding a plan proposed by a wide spectrum of Scottish interests that a materials group, which would include Ravenscraig, Shotton, Clydesdale and Dalzell, should be fioated off separately. The BSC did not want to retain Ravenscraig, but also had no intentions of allowing it to become a competitor. Once privatization had taken place, BS initiated the process of securing the final 're-framing' of the Ravenscraig issue by marginalizing and running down the Scottish steel industry. Politically, Scholey referred to the Scottish lobby as the 'Ravenscraig claque' (Financial Times, 19 December 1989), and took every opportunity to emphasize the plant's weaknesses. There was one more major political obstacle for BS to overcome, however, when in 1990 the company announced that the Ravenscraig hot sfrip mill would close in 1991. The Scottish Secretary, Malcolm Rifkind, immediately declared that he deplored the decision, which he found arbifrary and unreasonable. He added that BS might have to be pressured to sell the plant to a competitor in order to retain the Scottish steel industry (Financial Times, 17 May 1990). To Rifkind's disappointment, it soon became clear that, unlike a decade earlier, ministers were sensitive about challenging Scholey. Privatization had been promoted by the govemment as a means of freeing the industry from political interference, and so there would be considerable political embarrassment in now challenging the BS 'frame'. Scholey himself put this point plainly: 'Following privatization my responsibility is to BS shareholders. It is my understanding that when we were privatized this was very much the idea of govemment. I would have thought the govem© BUckwell Publishere Ltd. 1999

BRITISH STEEL AND GOVERNMENT SINCE PRIVATIZATION 65 ment were very keen to encourage us to continue being as efficient as possible' (Financial Times 17 May 1990). Rifkind's isolation was also aggravated by the presence of Nicholas Ridley as Trade and Industry Secretary. Ridley had a sfrong ideological commitment to the free market, which led him to give his support to Scholey. In view of the lack of support from other ministers, Rifkind back-fracked somewhat from his initial stance, and said that BS's investment and operational decisions were a matter for the commercial judgement of the company, although he would ask BS to explain and defend its decisions, and hoped that they would reconsider (Financial Times 22 May 1996). Instead, Rifkind commissioned the Scottish Development Agency to analyse the prospects for the steel industry in Scotland. The key problem for any solutions proposed by Rifkind, however, was that prospective purchasers of the Ravenscraig plant would have to negotiate with the highly reluctant BS, while the govemment generally, although sensitive about the whole issue, was not willing to intervene. Scholey himself recognized his political advantage when he told Rifkind that BS would only consider a sale once the whole Ravenscraig plant closed, correctly guessing that by that time much of the high political salience would have disappeared from the issue. The final closure of Ravenscraig took place in 1992, with BS pointing out that its 1987 commitment to keep the works open for at least another seven years had been made subject to 'market conditions'. Nevertheless, the timing of the closure did cause political embarrassment to the govemment in Scotland, coming as it did a few months before a general election. It could be argued that BS insensitivity in this case was a confributory factor in rrunisters' later reluctance to support BS in the EU arena. The BS 'frame' might have prevailed ultimately on Ravenscraig, but in other arenas the govemment could continue to exert significant infiuence. SEPARATE 'FRAMES' IN THE EU ARENA

In the European arena, steel has long held a status as a 'special case', owing to the foundation of the European Coal and Steel Community (ECSC) and the signing of the Treaty of Paris in 1951. The key role of the steel industry in the foundation of the European institutions, together with its traditional status as a sfrategic industry, has allowed it to be given particular attention by the European Commission, and for national govemments and the steel companies themselves to believe that, in times of crisis, a pan-European solution is required (Dudley and Richardson 1996). The enthusiasm for Commission confrol in the form of a pan-European solution achieved its zenith in the early 1980s, when the Industry Commissioner, Etierme Davignon, led a crisis plan of official output and price confrols and co-ordinated rationalization (see Meny and Wright 1987). During the period of the Davignon Plan (1980-88), the BSC and British govemment generally worked in concert. The financial crisis at the BSC itself was of such severity, that both steel managers and ministers were pleased to

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66 GEOFFREY DUDLEY support a plan that would help create a more stable environment and assist in returning the Corporation to viability. In the 1990s, however, European steel policy has driven a wedge between BS and the British govemment. As noted above, steel offers a good example of the uncertainty principle at work in multi-arena politics, with events in the European arena having the effect of pushing domestic actors further apart. In this problematic and unstable environment, BS has sought fransnational alliances in seeking to avoid being placed in a politically isolated and vulnerable position. Two examples in particular illusfrate how BS and the British govemment come to hold separate 'frames' within the EU. First, there was the ultimate failure of a Commission led pan-European solution to a fresh crisis in the steel industry in the early 1990s. As part of this plan, steel companies from eastern Germany, Italy, Spain and Portugal sought permission for nearly £5.33 biUion in fresh subsidies, and in retum were prepared to offer five million tonnes of capacity cuts. BS was totally opposed to the payment of these subsidies, and sought assistance in its campaign from French and former West German steel companies. Article 95 of the Treaty of Paris allowed a loophole for the subsidies to be paid, but a unanimous vote was required in the Council of Ministers. The British government was not willing to be isolated on this issue, and in December 1993 agreed to the payment of the subsidies in return for strict monitoring conditions. BS considered that it had been deserted by its own govemment, and called the package ' . . . a compromise driven by political expedience' (Financial Times 18 December 1993), but the British govemment had been forced to concede a deal under heavy pressure from other industry rrunisters and the Commission. BS refused to let the matter rest, however, and in 1994 took the matter to the European Court, maintaining that the subsidies granted to Ilva of Italy and CSI of Spain fell outside the State Aid Code agreed in 1985 by the Council of Ministers (Steel News, June 1994) (in 1997 the European Court came down in favour of the Commission, although BS intended to appeal). The company argued that it could not operate in a Single European Market in which different cultures existed. Where BS had developed a sfrong corporate culture which depended on a free market 'frame', the British govemment took a more pragmatic approach (it should be noted, however, that BS's deeds did not always match its public 'frame'. For example, BS was fined £24 nullion by the Commission for its part in a cartel selling beams to the construction industry). Also in 1994, the fransnational alliance of BS, Usinor Sacilor of France, and the steel companies of Western Germany, fiatly refused to co-operate with the Commission in any co-ordinated plan to rationalize output. These companies argued that the subsidies allowed to state-owned steel makers had distorted fair frade, and so any capacity cuts made by themselves would be unjustified. The consensus which held together the Davignon © Blackwell Publishers Ltd. 1999

BRITISH STEEL AND GOVERNMENT SINCE PRIVATIZATION 67 Plan in the 1980s had broken apart, and in the 1990s BS and the British govemment were on opposite sides. The second example conceming subsidy being granted to an ailing European steel company caused BS to become even more embroiled with the British govemment than in 1993-94. In this second case, the Irish govemment wished to inject £39 million into Irish Steel prior to its privatization, but BS argued that this subsidy would threaten the continued existence of its own Shelton plant, and would once again breach the Steel Aid Code. For a period in late 1995 the British government held out within the Council of Ministers, but then withdrew its opposition. There were sfrong suggestions that the govemment feared continued opposition would endanger the Northem Ireland peace process, which was then gaining momentum. The govemment therefore had its own distinctive 'frame' and priorities, and some issues constituted more of a 'special case' than others. The British government believed that the agreement did not endanger Shelton jobs, but BS would not accept the decision, and once more took its case to the European Court on the grounds of illegal state aid. It is significant that BS was seeking redress in the Court. It could no longer rely on British ministers as loyal allies, and so had to seek new arenas where it hoped to find a more sympathetic ear. The fears of BS were also taken up by the British Iron and Steel Producers Association (BISPA), a group dominated by BS. In 1996 BISPA complained that many of the companies which had earlier been granted subsidies were now producing more steel than before restructuring, and had effectively compensated for the reduced capacity that was meant to be the price for aid. BISPA itself took the issue of a subsidy to Arbed to the European Court, and also lobbied the Commission on the question of aid to a number of German companies (Steel Times, February 1996). Consequently, British Steel interests were seeking to put their case directly in Bmssels, and had been compelled to accept that they could no longer rely on British ministers to successfully fight their case. In 1995, an apparent compromise between steel interests and government emerged when a joint group was set up to monitor state aids within the EU between the Department of Trade and Industry, BS, BISPA and other govemment departments. It could be argued, however, that although govemment might accept the BS free market 'frame' in principle, practical politics within the EU continued to give it a separate 'frame'! Ministers might be willing to help the steel industry in discovering subsidies, but were not necessarily prepared to help stop them. FRAME REFLECTION AND THE TRANSFORMATION OF POLICY NETWORKS

In its new arm's-length relationship with govemment, BS is now conforming to the more typical UK model of indusfrial policy. The dominant paradigm informing state thinking on industry and its needs throughout © Blackwell Publishers Ltd. 1999

68 GEOEEREY DUDLEY the post-war period is unambiguously a liberal one: one built on a belief that indusfrial performance is best left in private hands, assisted only at the margin by state activity of various kinds (Reynolds and Coates 1996, pp. 241-2, original emphasis). Yet the economic power of business is not matched by a capacity for developing a coherent political view point and articulating it to govemment (Grant 1993, p. 193). In the days of nationalization, therefore, the BSC was perhaps untypical in being able to successfully put its case to government, and to use the state to attain its objectives. Given the skill of the BSC in manipulating successive govemments, it was perhaps ironic that BS considered one of the chief benefits of privatization to be that the company could totally divorce itself from govemment and go its own way. For large private sector companies such as BS, with a globalization 'frame', and involved in a multi-arena strategy, it was not so much a matter of a failure to put its case to the British government, as a tendency to bypass the domestic political agenda altogether. For these companies, however, the 'hollowing out' of the state involves more than just a freedom to act independently of govemment. Instead, they have to come to terms with the 'rules of the game' in a variety of national and supranational arenas. The attention given to supranational arenas such as the EU by multinational companies apparently confirms Held's (1996) argument that global parliamentary, legal and police systems are required as the sovereignty of the nation state declines in the face of unchecked global economic scientific and social forces. On the other hand, the current position appears to be more complex, with companies compelled to deal with a large number of institutions in a wide range of arenas. The gap between the BS globalization 'frame' and reality tends to confirm Hirst and Thompson's (1996) argument that multinational firms are not necessarily as free to act as they might like to think, and that national govemments are still capable of exerting considerable infiuence over events. As the years progressed after privatization, BS came to realize that its initial policy of divorcing itself from the British govemment had been a mistake. As the previous sections indicate, it was not that BS intended to abandon its long-term globalization sfrategy. Nevertheless, there was a recognition that it still needed to infiuence govemment on such matters as state aids, exchange rates and regulation. For example, on some issues the company discovered that the powerful motor industry lobby could infiuence ministers at the expense of steel. Consequently, in 1993 BS appointed a senior manager as Director of Commercial and Intemational Affairs. Working closely with the Chairman, he has a wide range of responsibilities, including relations with govemment and the Commission, assisting in the organization of the steel producers' group Europer, and monitoring regulatory matters which concem the company. In other words, in the context of frame refiection, BS has found the nature of 'objective' reality in the world's tendency to resist its interpretations. ® Blackwell Publishere Led. 1999

BRITISH STEEL AND GOVERNMENT SINCE PRIVATIZATION 69 Schon and Rein (1994) distinguish between rhetorical and action frames. By the former they mean frames that underlie the persuasive use of story and argument in policy debate; by the latter, frames that inform policy practice. They then also distinguish three levels of action frames: metacultural, institutional action and policy. Metacultural frames, organized around generative metaphors, are at the root of the policy stories that shape both rhetorical and action frames; institutional action frames are local expressions of metacultural frames; while a policy frame is the frame an institutional actor uses to construct the problem of a specific policy situation (Schon and Rein 1994, pp. 32-4). If globalization and support for free markets represents the metacultural frame of BS, and these values have been expressed in EU arenas, then domestically its policy frame is more aware of the company's institutional weaknesses and the need to construct networks. The presence of frame refiection in the domestic arena is indicated by the company's new-found desire to understand the mechanics of Whitehall. For example, BS places great emphasis on understanding the relationship between the Department of Trade and Industry and the Treasury, and in reading the minds of key officials. The company has also targeted deliberately advisers in the Prime Minister's Policy Unit. During 1997-98, BS put this knowledge to use on the key issue of the high value of the pound, which has an adverse effect on the company's terms of frade. On this issue, however, the 'hollowing out of the state' was evident when in 1997 the new Labour govemment handed over to the Bank of England the responsibility for setting interest rates. Consequently, BS has also set about the task of cultivating relationships with the Bank, and understanding the nunds of its key individuals. A problem for BS in reconstructing networks, however, is that the system of resource dependencies is unbalanced. From the point of view of govemment, there is no longer the sense of responsibility for the welfare of the industry to be found in the days of nationalization, and consequently the need for frame refiection is lower. On such major issues as the value of the pound, although BS is listened to by government, its input is only one amongst many interests. In addition, the greatly reduced political salience of steel is refiected institutionally. In the days of nationalization. Iron and Steel occupied a whole Division in DTI. Now, steel matters are dealt with by one of five sections within the Metals, Minerals and Shipbuilding Directorate. Officially, the policy objectives of the DTI are to promote the interests and improve the competitiveness of the steel industry. In reality, although the department works with the industry on developing such techruques as benchmarking, it has neither the inclination nor the resources to involve itself on major policy issues such as investment or rationalization. The dynamics of institutional change mean that there is no possibility of reconstructing the old steel policy community. Instead, the new arm'slength relationship has a high level of uncertainty. There is a confrast between BS's rhetorical and action frames, and an evolving quest for frame

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70 GEOFFREY DUDLEY reflection on the part of the company, but institutional factors and the interlinked development of separate 'frames' also inhibit the development of netv^orks. Nevertheless, new pattems of relationships are emerging. BS and govemment may continue largely to circle in separate orbits, but there continues to be a gravitational pull between them which transforms the networks. ACKNOWLEDGEMENT

This article forms part of a project: Policy Change and Policy Stabihty in Britain: British Steel Policy 1987-1997, funded by the Economic and Social Research Council (Ref. No: R000236193). The author would like to thank Professor Jeremy Richardson and two anonymous referees for their valuable comments on earlier drafts of this paper. REFERENCES Abromeit, H. 1986. British Steel. An industry between the state and the private sector. Leamington: Berg. Baldwin, R, (ed.). 1995. Regulation in question. The growing agenda. London: LSE. Baumgartner, F.R, and B.D. Jones. 1993. Agendas and instability in American politics. Chicago: University Press, Beauman, C. 1996, 'British Steel: a tumaround under public ownership'. Business Strategy Review 7, 3,16-29. Bryer, R.A,, T,J. Brignall and A.R, Maunders, 1982, Accounting for British Steel. Aldershot: Gower, Dudley, G,F, 1994, T h e Next Steps agencies, political salience and the arm's-length principle: Barbara Castle at the Ministry of Transport 1965-1968', Public Administration 72, 2, pp, 219-40, Dudley, G,F, and J.J, Richardson, 1990, Politics and steel in Britain 1967-1988. Aldershot: Dartmouth, —, 1996, Policy change in European steel: the rise of free market ideas 1985-1996. Paper presented at Robinson College, Cambridge, 20 Nov, Dunsire, A. 1978, Implementation in a bureaucracy. Oxford: Martin Robertson, Foster, C D , 1971, Politics, finance and the role of economics. London: Allen and Unwin, Grant, W, 1993, Business and politics in Britain. London: Macmillan, —, 1995, 'Britain: the spectator state' in J, Hayward (ed,). Industrial enterprise and European integration. Oxford: University Press, Hannah, L. 1982, Engineers, managers and politicians. London: Macmillan, Hayward, J, 1995, 'International industrial champions' in J, Hayward and E,C, Page (eds,), Gmeming the new Europe. Cambridge: The Polity Press, Held, D, 1996. Democracy and the global order. Cambridge: The Polity Press, Hirst, P, and G, Thompson. 1996, Globalization in question. Oxford: Blackwell, Hudson, R. and D, Sadler, 1989, The intemational steel industry, restructuring state policies and localities. London: Routledge, Kingdon, J,W. 1995, Agendas, altematives, and public policies (2nd edn.). New York: Harper Collins. Maloney, W.A, and J,J, Richardson. 1995, Managing policy change in Britain. The politics of water. Edinburgh: University Press, Mazey, S, and J,J, Richardson, 1996, ITie logic of organisation, interest groups', pp, 200-15, in J,J, Richardson (ed.), European Union power and policy-making. London: Routledge. MSny, Y, and V, Wright, 1987, 'State and steel in Westem Europe', pp, 1-110, in Y. M t o y and V. Wright (eds.). The politics of steel: Westem Europe and the steel industry in the crisis years (1974-84). Berlin: de Gruyter, Moravcsik, A, 1993, 'Preferences and power in the European Community: a liberal intergovemmentalist approach', Joumal of Common Market Studies 3, 4, 473-524. Plender, J, 1997, 'An accidental revolution'. Financial Times, 17 Nov,, p. 21. Reynolds, P, and D, Coates, 1996, 'Conclusion', pp. 241-68, in D, Coates (ed,). Industrial policy in Britain. London: Macmillan,

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Rhodes, R.A.W, 1996, The new govemance: goveming without government'. Political Studies 44, 4, 652-67. —, 1997, Understanding govemance. Buckingham: Open University Press. Rhodes, R,A,W, and D, Marsh. 1992, 'Policy networks in British politics' in D, Marsh and R,A,W, Rhodes (eds,). Policy networks in British govemment. Oxford: Clarendon Press, Richardson, J,J, and A,G, Jordan, 1979, Goveming under pressure. Oxford: Martin Robertson, Schbn, D,A, and M, Rein, 1994, Frame reflection. Toward the resolution of intractable policy controversies. New

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