David Charles: "aristotle On Perception: Touch, Taste And Smell"

Aristotle on Perception: Touch, Taste and Smell 1. Introduction In this essay I shall consider first Aristotle’s account of the interconnection between ‘passions of the soul’ and states of the body in De Anima A.1. This discussion, in my view, provides the resources to understand central aspects of his account of perception and of ‘functions common to the body and the soul’ On this basis, I shall investigate his description of how the animals are affected by touch and perceive smells and tastes in De Anima and parts of De Sensu. Aristotle’s view on these issues is, or so I shall argue, a distinctive one. Indeed, it seems unsatisfactory to contemporary interpreters precisely because it is not one of the familiar options of post-Cartesian philosophy (dualism, materialism, functionalism or spiritualism). It should be seen rather as offering a radical alternative to these traditional accounts, challenging the basic assumptions that drive them. PostCartesian theories normally make two common assumptions: [1]* There is a purely psychological feature or process involved in perceiving or a purely psychological description), such as being aware of a smell or taste [2]* All relevant processes and features essentially involved in desiring are either purely psychological or purely physical or a combination of the two. These assumptions have been taken for granted in the exegetical debates of the past two decades (and more) about De Anima. Thus, broadly materialist interpreters represent Aristotle’s account of desire as follows: [1] Perception is to be defined as the psychological process it is without reference to any physical phenomena (in purely psychological terms). [2] Perceiving is realised in (or constituted by/ or supervenes on) a particular process of a physical/material type. [3] The relevant type of physical/material process can be defined without reference to any psychological state or description. The rival ‘spiritualist’ interpretation represents Aristotle as holding that: [1] Perceiving is to be defined as the psychological process it is without reference to any physical phenomena (in purely psychological terms) [2] Perceiving is not realised in any physical process at all (although it may require the presence of certain physical necessary conditions). [3] Aristotle did not require perceiving to be realised in any physical process because he understood the relevant matter as primitively endowed with capacities for ungrounded psychological activity.

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2. De Anima A.1: fear and anger: an overview ‘We have said that the affections of the soul are inseparable from the physical matter of living beings in the way in which anger and fear are inseparable and not in the way in which line and plane are.’ (403bl7-19) In this passage, he distinguishes these cases in terms of distinct types of separability: anger and fear:

they are existentially inseparable and inseparable in definition from perceptual matter

mathematical objects: they are existentially inseparable from but separable in definition from perceptual matter In the latter case, the mathematician initially abstracts and then separates his objects from all perceptual matter in thought and no error arises (in his purely mathematical reasoning) when he does so (see also Meta M.3, 1078al7: Physics B.1, 193b34-5.) By contrast, in the case of anger, [A] The psychological features that are essential to being angry (that is, desiring revenge) are inseparable in definition from the processes with physical properties to which they belong: the relevant features are inextricably psycho-physical features. [B] The psycho-physical features (specified in [A]) are essential to the identity of the processes to which they belong: the processes to which the psycho-physical features belong are essentially psycho-physical processes. [C] There is no other process (other than the one specified in [B]) which is essential to being angry. 3. Considerations in favour of [A]: (i) (ii) (iii)

absence of bodily state no suffering (403a19-20) nature of bodily state affects nature of suffering (403a20-4) one kinesis of some type present (403a26-7):

Examples of enmattered formulae: support for [A] (1) In Physics B.2, Aristotle understands physical form (the type of form the physicist studies) on the model of the snub: concavity in the nose (194a5-8

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(2) In De Anima A.1, Aristotle introduces a dialectical definition of a house as covering designed to prevent damage from wind and rain (403b4-6). (3) Aristotle compares various affections of the soul, including anger, with weaving in De Anima A.4, 408b11-13. Anger: a boiling of the blood type of desire for revenge [contrast: the cold, calculating, desire for revenge of the aged, who are not at angry: See Rhetoric 1390a15ff.] Modification in (iii): completions (epiteleioseis): Physics VII.3 (246b3ff, 246a15ff): material completions: examples: (i) putting the roof on: (ii) nutrition [stage 2]

4. Are touching, tasting and smelling inextricably psycho-physical completions? (i) (i)

absence of bodily state, no suffering nature of bodily state affects nature of suffering

Some examples of claim (i) [A]

Some blows stronger than sense organ can bear (424a30ff) So no sense organ, no perception

[B]

Taste: the organ of taste (in Β. 10 the tongue) is not too wet or too dry but must be capable of being moistened by the flavour in question (422b5ff)

[C]

Blindspot arg: temperature of internal organ has to be different from that of object sensed. If the same temperature, no impact from heat of object (424a3ff)

Examples of claim (ii): nature of bodily state affects nature of suffering [D] [E]

Nature of taste perception affected by moisture on the tongue (422b7ff) Sickness: pre-tasters (422b8ff) Flavours: different effects of different dry elements in liquids: oily/ salty (422b10ff). Flavours dependent on mixture of water and salt etc (like juices) The tongue is affected qua possessing the power to be affected by such mixtures (oily flavours/juices are sweet/ salty flavours/juices are bitter: 442a19ff)

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Sensing flavour = differential response of the organ of taste to these types of flavours/ juices Given that flavours are in the medium (water) as material mixtures, the patient’s response to them will be a material completion [one which is the pathesis brought about by the medium] [F]

Smell : The medium is air and water, both of which are moist, qua possessing the power to wash out dry substance with flavour (443a7ff) In the case of smells, the effect of dry substances in air and water is similar to that of dry things when placed in water to create flavours (443b7ff) As Aristotle remarks: ‘Smell in air and water is what flavour is in water’ (443b15ff)

[G]

Touch: the sense organ is said to be affected by the blow struck as a man is struck through his shield (423b15ff). Compare the lyre (424b32ff).

5. What is the basis of Aristotle’s account? (i) (ii)

Physical form: why round things roll… The capacity realized in the process [completion] of being angry [tasting] is an essentially an [intentional] goal directed bodily causal capacity

How to resist it? (i) (ii)

Functionalism or Platonism: unpalatable choices. Grounds for resisting the very idea of intentional goal directed bodily capacities. [How is football possible?]

David Charles Athens December 2009

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