Crim 4 Digest.docx

G.R. No. 73905

Dava v. People of the Philippines September 30, 1991

Facts: Because of a vehicular incident, the drivers license of the accused was confiscated. Because of this, accused asked his friend, Manalili, to procure a license for him stating that he has not, at any time, applied for a license. Manalili acceded. When he went to the office of the Land Transportation, he was approached by a fixer who offered Manalili an easier way of procuring a license. Wanting to help, Manalili accepted the offer and was able to procure the license. Later, accused was invited to the police precinct to be investigated for driving while his license was confiscated. There, the police officers found that the license is a fake. Dava was charged with falsification and use of falsified document. Issue: Whether accused is guilty as charged. Held: Yes. The elements of the crime of using a falsified document in transaction (other than as evidence in a judicial proceed penalized under the last paragraph of Article 172 are following: (a) the offender knew that a document was falsified by another person; (b) the false document is embraced in Article 171 or in any of subdivisions Nos. 1 and 2 of Article 172; (c) he used such document (not in judicial proceedings), and (d) the use of the false document caused damage to another or at last it was used with intent to cause such damage. However, since the document falsified in this case is a public document, the last element is not necessary. A driver's license is a public document within the purview of Articles 171 and 172. The blank form of the drivers license becomes a public document the moment it is accomplished. Thus, when driver's license No. 2706887 was filled up with petitioner's personal data and the signature of the region of the San Fernando LTC agency was affixed therein, even if the same was simulated, the driver's license became a public document. In this case, it is not disputed that it was petitioner himself who requested Manalili to get him a license. He misrepresented to Manalili that he has not at any time been issued a driver's license. Through this misrepresentation and capitalizing on Manalili awareness of the dire necessity of obtaining a driver's license the shortest time possible to enable petitioner to perform duties as detailman, petitioner was able, in a very subtle clever manner, to induce Manalili to deal with "fixers" in securing the subject driver's license. For indeed, there was no way Manalili could obtain a drivers license in so short a without having to deal with "fixers." Thus, as petitioner calculated, Manalili, who appeared to have been motivated by a sincere desire to help a friend, did not hesitate to deal with three fixers whom he knew were not employees of the LTC to whom he paid P70.00 for the license even if the legal fee then was only P15.00. As it was in truth petitioner who induced and left Manalili with no choice but to seek the aid of fixers, the fact that it was Manalili and not petitioner who dealt directly with said fixers cannot exculpate petitioner from the charge of falsification. He is, beyond reasonable doubt, a principal by inducement in the commission of said crime

DAVA v. PEOPLE FACTS: Michael Dava bumped pedestrians Bernadette Roxas Clamor and Dolores E. Roxas, causing death to former and physical injuries to the latter. As a consequence, his driver's license was confiscated and he was charged with homicide and serious physical injuries. One day, the brother of Bernadette and the father of Dolores, saw Dava driving a Volkswagen. Knowing that Dava's driver's license was used as an exhibit in court and that no traffic violation receipt had been issued to Dava, they had Dava apprehended for driving without a license. When he was apprehended, he showed the police officers - non-professional driver's license No. 2706887 with official receipt No. 0605870 issued by Agency Pampanga in the name of Michael T. Dava. When asked about the source of his license, Dava informed them that his officemate (Manalili) had secured it for him. He was brought to the police station and charged w falsification of a public document. Prosecution witnesses: Caroline Vinluan of the Angeles City branch of the Bureau of Land Transportation (BLT). He testified that the license was earlier brought to him and he was asked whether it was fake or genuine. He examined it and found that it was "fake or illegally issued" because form No. 2706887 was one of the 50 forms which had been reported missing from their office sometime in November, 1976 and that it was never issued to any applicant for a license. He added that any license that was not included their office index card was considered as "coming from illegal source' and "not legally issued by any agency." Although the form used for the license was genuine, the signature of the issuing official was fake. Defense witness: Manalili. He said he obtained the license by paying fixers ISSUE: WON Dava can be convicted of falsification? – YES RATIO: Elements of the crime of using a falsified document in transaction (other than as evidence in a judicial proceed penalized under the last paragraph of Article 172) are following: 1) the offender knew that a document was falsified by another person;

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2) the false document is embraced in Article 171 or in any of subdivisions Nos. 1 and 2 of Article 172; 3) he used such document (not in judicial proceedings), and 4) the use of the false document caused damage to another or at last it was used with intent to cause such damage. Except for last, all of these elements have been proven beyond reason doubt in this case. a. Petitioner himself requested officemate Manalili to get him a license. He misrepresented to Manalili that he has not at any time been issued a driver's license. Through this misrepresentation petitioner was ableto induce Manalili to deal with "fixers" in securing the subject driver's license. b. A driver's license is a public document. The blank form of the drivers license becomes a public document the moment it is accomplished. Thus, when driver's license No. 2706887 was filled up with petitioner's personal data and the signature of the region of the San Fernando LTC agency was affixed therein, even if the same was simulated, the driver's license became a public document. c. When petitioner was apprehended he presented the license to the officer. Because he was a detailman who did his job with the use of a car, it is probable that he’s been using the license. d. The driver's license being a public document, proof of the fourth element of damage caused to another person or at least an intent to cause such damage has become immaterial. In falsification of public or official documents, the principal thing being punished is the violation of the public faith and the destruction of the truth proclaimed therein. People vs. Sendaydiego, The rule is that if a person had in his possession a falsified document and he made use of it (uttered it), taking advantage of it and profiting thereby, the presumption is that he is the material author of the falsification… In the absence of a satisfactory explanation, one who is found in possession of a forged document and who used or uttered it is presumed to be the forger We agree with the petitioner that the presumption enunciated in the Sendaydiego case is not absolute as it is subject to the exception that the accused should have a satisfactory explanation why he is in possession of a false document. His explanation, however, is unsatisfactory as it consists mainly in passing the buck to his friend, Manalili. LAYNO VS PEO FACTS: Petitioner Hernando C. Layno, Sr., the duly elected Municipal Mayor of Lianga, Surigao del Sur, was accused “of grave abuse of authority and evident bad faith in the exercise of his official and/or administrative duties” for “knowing fully well that he has no authority,” he suspended and prohibited Vice-Mayor Bernardita Resus and three Sangguniang Bayan members from participating and exercising their official functions” as such thus causing them injury “consisting of the salaries due to said officials not [being] received by them.” Respondent Sandiganbayan suspended him on October 26, 1983, notwithstanding petitioner’s opposition to the same. ISSUE(S): Whether or not petitioner’s suspension pendente lite violates the due process and equal protection clauses of the Constitution. RULING: YES. Suspension “does not impair petitioner’s foregoing constitutional right since the same is not a penalty or a criminal punishment, because it was not imposed by the court in a judgment of conviction or as a result of judicial proceeding.” Further: “The suspension is merely a precautionary or preventive measure issued even before the case is tried on its merits, purposely to ensure the fair and just trial of the case.” Its continuance, however, for an unreasonable length of time raises a due process question. For even if thereafter he were acquitted, in the meanwhile his right to hold office had been nullified. Clearly, there would be in such a case an injustice suffered by him. Nor is he the only victim. There is injustice inflicted likewise on the people of Lianga. “In all cases, preventive suspension shall not extend beyond sixty days after the start of said suspension.” Petition is GRANTED and the preventive suspension imposed on petitioner is SET ASIDE. [G.R. No. 93842, September 07, 1992] HERNANDO C. LAYNO, PETITIONER, VS. THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES AND SANDIGANBAYAN, RESPONDENTS

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FACTS: 

petitioner was the incumbent municipal mayor of Lianga, Surigao del Sur

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petitioner appointed Fernando Y. Layno, his legitimate son, meat inspector in the office of the municipal treasurer of Lianga  He signed the appointment document -- Civil Service Form No. 35 -- twice, first as the appointing authority and second, as the personnel officer, certifying "(t)hat all the required supporting papers pursuant to MC 5, s. 1974, as amended, have been complied with, reviewed and found to be in order."  Among the supporting papers required for the appointment is the Certification (Exh. "B") signed by the petitioner

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Fernando Y. Layno took his oath of office with the petitioner as the administering officer

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Civil Service Commission approved the appointment of Fernando Layno and 3 days later, the approved appointment was returned to the office of the petitioner

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The appointee, however, neither assumed the position to which he was appointed nor collected the salary corresponding to it

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petitioner was charged before the Sandiganbayan with the crime of falsification of public document and was found guilty said offense

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Petitioner assails the Sandiganbayan in not giving weight nor credence to his defense that he did not sign nor issue the certification in question.  He claims that the lone witness for the prosecution, Amando R. Pandi, Jr., who identified his signature on the said certification is incompetent to testify on the matter because he admitted during the trial that he never saw him (petitioner) actually signing (affixing) his signature on the questioned certification.  Petitioner further claims that the said witness is biased and prejudiced and that his testimony is incredible, unreliable and undeserving of belief. He argues that Pandi did not testify voluntarily but was actually instructed by the incumbent mayor who was his (petitioner's) political opponent for the mayorship of the Municipality of Lianga in the last local election and that he (Pandi) is a relative of the incumbent vice-mayor against whom he (petitioner) has a long-standing political feud

ISSUE: Whether or not petitioner is guilty of falsification HELD:

YES

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any witness may be called who has, by sufficient means, acquired knowledge of the general character of the handwriting of the party whose signature is in question

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Prosecution witness Amando R. Pandi, Jr. was competent to testify on the signature of petitioner on the certification, Exhibit "B" because in the course of his employment as municipal secretary and designated personnel officer in the municipal government of Lianga, Surigao del Sur, he had seen records under his charge bearing the long and short signatures of the petitioner, and, as such, he had acquired knowledge of the general character of the handwriting of the petitioner  Pandi has seen in the course of his employment in the Municipal Government of Lianga as Municipal Secretary since July 15, 1988, and as designated Personnel Officer from February 1, 1989, appointment records of municipal employees and old resolutions of the Municipal Council bearing the full and abbreviated signatures of the accused as Municipal Mayor. For this reason, he became familiar with those signatures. He could therefore identify and did identify the full signature on the Certification, Exhibit "B", to be that of the accused

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Moreover, the Sandiganbayan's conclusion that the signature on the certification in question is the signature of the petitioner was not only based on the testimony of Amando R. Pandi, Jr. Section 22, Rule 132 of the Revised Rules on Evidence further provides that "evidence respecting the handwriting may also be given by a comparison, made by the witness or the court, with writings admitted or treated as genuine by the party against whom the evidence is offered, or proved to be genuine to the satisfaction of the judge. Pursuant thereto, the Sandiganbayan compared the signature on the certification with the signatures of the petitioner on documents filed with the court, and which were proved to be genuine

LEONILA BATULANON VS. PEOPLE

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Facts: Leonila was employed as a cashier/manager of Polomolok Credit Cooperative Incorporated (PCCI). She was in charge of receiving deposits from and releasing loans to the members of the cooperative. During an audit in 1982 certain discrepancies were discovered in relation to the release of loans. 4 informations for estafa through falsification of commercial documents were filed against Leonila. In summary, these informations stated that Leonila falsified cash/check vouchers in the name of 4 different persons, thereby making it appear that these persons were granted loans when in fact they did not even apply for them, and moreover, they did not sign any of the said vouchers. The witnesses testified that 3 out of the 4 persons were not even members of PCCI and that one of them [the non-members] was the son of Leonila who was, at that time, only 3 years old. Eventually, the TC found her guilty of estafa through falsification of commercial documents. On appeal however, the CA affirmed with modification, finding her guilty instead of falsification of private documents (Art. 172, par2). Issue: What crimes were committed? Held/Ratio: 3 counts of falsification of private documents and one estafa. Elements of the crime: 2.

Offender committed any of the acts of falsification enumerated in Art. 171, except par7;

3. 4.

Falsification was committed in any private document; and Falsification caused damage to a 3rd party OR at least the falsification was committed with intent to cause such damage.

Leonila’s act falls under par2 of Art. 171 – causing it to appear that persons have participated in any act or proceeding when they did not in fact so participate. Re: third element PCCI only grants loans to its bona fide members with no subsisting loans. As mentioned earlier, 3 out of the 4 persons were not members. The remaining one had actually settled the loan but only for the purpose of avoiding legal prosecution, with the understanding however that she will be reimbursed once the money is collected from Leonila. Re: second element The vouchers were indeed private documents because they were not documents used by merchants or businessmen to promote or facilitate trade or credit transactions, nor are they defined and regulated by the Code of Commerce or other commercial laws. Rather they are private documents, which have been defined as deeds or instruments executed by a private person without the intervention of a public notary or of other persons legally authorized, by which some disposition or agreement is proved, evidenced, or set forth. No complex crime of estafa through falsification of private document! If the falsification is done as a means to commit estafa, then the crime would be falsification. On the other hand, if estafa could have been committed without the necessity of falsifying the document, the proper crime would be estafa. NB: SC didn’t say why but it cited Gregorio, citing Cuello Calon. And according to J. Callejo (feeling ko ancestor niya si Cuello Calon… Cuello Calon = Callejo), both crimes share a similar element – damage or intent to cause damage. So what crimes were committed? As to the 3 persons – falsification of private documents (3 counts) As to Leonila’s 3-year-old child – estafa! Why estafa??? Because Leonila did not falsify the signature of her son. In fact, it appeared in the voucher that she wrote “by: Batulanon,” indicating that she received the proceeds of the loan in behalf of her son. Such act does not fall under any of the instances of falsification enumerated in Art. 171. Nonetheless, such representation caused damage to PCCI which makes her liable for estafa!

LEONILA BATULANON VS. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES G.R. NO. 139857 September 15, 2006

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FACTS: Polomok Credit Cooperative Incorporated (PCCI) employed Leonila Batulanon as its Cashier/Manager from May 1980 up to December 22, 1982. She was in charge of receiving deposits from and releasing loans to the member of the cooperative.

During an audit conducted in December 1982, certain irregularities concerning the release of loans were discovered. It was found that Batulanon falsified four commercial documents, all checks/cash vouchers representing granted loans to different persons namely: Omadlao, Oracion, Arroyo and Dennis Batulanon, making it appear that said names were granted a loan and received the amount of the checks/cash vouchers when in truth and in fact the said persons never received a grant, never received the checks, and never signed the check vouchers issued in their names. In furtherance, Batulanon released to herself the checks and received the loans and thereafter misappropriated and converted it to her own use and benefit.

Thereafter, four Informations for Estafa through Falsification of Commercial Documents were filed against Batulanon. The prosecution presented Medallo, Gopio, Jr. and Jayoma as witnesses. Medallo, the posting clerk whose job was to assist Batulanon in the preparation of cash vouchers testified that Batulanon forged the signatures of Omadlao, Oracion and Arroyo. Gopio, Jr. stated that Oracion is Batulanon’ sister-in-law and Dennis Batulanon is her son who was only 3 years old in 1982. He averred that membership in the cooperative is not open to minors.

On April 15, 1993, the trial court rendered a Decision convicting Batulanon of Estafa through Falsification of Commercial Documents. The Court of Appeals affirmed the decision of the trial court, hence this petition.

ISSUE: Whether the crime committed by Batulanon was Falsification of Private Documents.

HELD: Yes. Although the offense charged in the Information is Estafa through Falsification of Commercial Documents, Batulanon could be convicted of Falsification of Private Documents under the well-settled rule that it is the allegation in the information that determines the nature of the offense and not the technical name given in the preamble of the information.

As there is no complex crime of Estafa through Falsification of Private Documents, it is important to ascertain whether the offender is to be charged with Falsification of a Private Document or with Estafa. If the falsification of a private document is committed as a means to commit estafa, the proper crime to be charged is falsification. If the Estafa can be committed without the necessity of falsifying a document, the proper crime is Estafa. We find that the Court of Appeals correctly held Batulanon guilty beyond reasonable doubt of Falsification of Private Documents in the cases of Omadlao, Oracion and Arroyo.

In the case of Dennis Batulanon, records show that Batulanon did not falsify the signature of Dennis. What she did was to sign: “by: Ibatulanon” to indicate that she received the proceeds of the loan in behalf of Dennis. Said act does not fall under any of the modes of Falsification under Article 171 because there is nothing untruthful about the fact that she used the name of Dennis and that as representative of the latter, obtained the proceeds of the loan from PCCI. The essence of falsification is the act of making untruthful or false statements, which is not attendant in this case. As to whether, such representation involves fraud which caused damage to PCCI is a different matter which will make her liable for estafa, but not for falsification. Hence, it was an error for the courts below to hold that Batulanon is also guilty of Falsification of Private Document with respect to the case involving the cash voucher of Dennis Batulanon. Machination in Public Auctions Art. 171. Falsification by public officer, employee or notary or ecclesiastic minister. FULLERO VS. PEOPLE ERNESTO M. FULLERO, petitioner, vs. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, respondent. GG.R. No. 170583 September 12, 2007 Ponente: CHICO-NAZARIO

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Nature of Case: Petition for Review on Certiorari BRIEF This is a Petition for Review on Certiorari seeking to set aside the decision Court of Appeals affirming the RTC decision finding petitioner guilty of falsification of public document as defined and penalized in paragraph 4, Article 171 of the Revised Penal Code. FACTS Sometime in 1988, in the City of Legazpi, Philippines, the accused, with intent to prejudice and defraud, being then the Acting Chief Operator of Iriga City Telecommunication’s Office, while acting in said capacity and taking advantage of his official function, did then and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously falsify and/or caused to be falsified a genuine public document, that is when he prepared his CSC 212 (Personal Data Sheet) for submission to Bureau of Telecommunication Regional Office No. 5, Legazpi City, he made it appear that he passed the Civil Engineering Board Examinations given by Professional Regulation Commission on May 30 and 31, 1985 with a rating of 75.8%; however, upon inquiry made by Florenda B. Magistrado (Magistrado), a subordinate of petitioner in the BTO, Iriga City, with the Professional Regulation Commission (PRC), it was verified that petitioner never passed the board examination for civil engineering and that petitioner’s name does not appear in the book of registration for civil engineers. The verification issued by PRC, said accused took the examination in May 1984 and another one [in] May, 1985 with general ratings of 56.75% and 56.10% respectively. Petitioner denied executing and submitting the personal data sheet (PDS) containing that he passed the 30-31 May 1985 board examination for civil engineering and likewise disowned the signature and thumbmark appearing therein. He claimed that the stroke of the signature appearing in the PDS differs from the stroke of his genuine signature. He added that the letters contained in the PDS he accomplished and submitted were typewritten in capital letters since his typewriter does not have small letters. As such, the subject PDS could not be his because it had both small and capital typewritten letters. Moreover, petitioner claimed that Magistrado had an ill motive in filing the instant case against him because he issued a memorandum against her for misbehavior. He further argued that the RTC had no jurisdiction to try him there being no evidence that the alleged falsification took place in Legazpi City. ISSUE/S of the CASE Whether accused-petitioner committed the crime of falsification under Art. 171 of the RPC. ACTIONS of the COURT RTC: The accused Ernesto M. Fullero is hereby found guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of Falsification defined and penalized under Art. 171 (4) of the Revised Penal Code. CA: The appeal is DISMISSED for lack of merit. The Court finds that the prosecution has successfully established all the elements of the offense of falsification of a public document and that the trial court correctly rendered a judgment of conviction against appellant. COURT RATIONALE ON THE ABOVE FACTS Article 171, paragraph (4) of the Revised Penal Code, provides: ART. 171. Falsification by public officer, employee or notary or ecclesiastic minister. – The penalty of prision mayor and a fine not to exceed 5,000 pesos shall be imposed upon any public officer, employee, or notary who, taking advantage of his official position, shall falsify a document by committing any of the following acts. xxxx 4. Making untruthful statements in a narration of facts. The elements of falsification in the above provision are as follows: a) the offender makes in a public document untruthful statements in a narration of facts;

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b) he has a legal obligation to disclose the truth of the facts narrated by him; and c) the facts narrated by him are absolutely false. In addition to the aforecited elements, it must also be proven that the public officer or employee had taken advantage of his official position in making the falsification. In falsification of public document, the offender is considered to have taken advantage of his official position when (1) he has the duty to make or prepare or otherwise to intervene in the preparation of a document; or (2) he has the official custody of the document which he falsifies.45 All of the foregoing elements of falsification of public documents under paragraph 4, Article 171 of the Revised Penal Code, have been sufficiently established. First, petitioner was a public officer, being then the Acting Chief Operator of the BTO, Iriga City, when he accomplished and submitted his PDS on 4 January 1988 at the BTO, Legazpi City. It is settled that a PDS is a public document. Second, in Inting v. Tanodbayan, we ruled that the accomplishment of the PDS being a requirement under the Civil Service Rules and Regulations in connection with employment in the government, the making of an untruthful statement therein was, therefore, intimately connected with such employment. Hence, the filing of a PDS is required in connection with promotion to a higher position and contenders for promotion have the legal obligation to disclose the truth. Otherwise, enhancing their qualifications by means of false statements will prejudice other qualified aspirants to the same position. Third, petitioner’s statement in the PDS that he passed the civil engineering board examination given on 30-31 May 1985 in Manila with a rating of 75.8% is absolutely false. As Officer-in-Charge of the Records Section of the PRC, Manila, Francisco declared that petitioner was included in the master list of examinees in the May 1984 civil engineering licensure examination wherein petitioner obtained a failing grade. She affirmed that petitioner’s name also appears in the list of examinees for the May 1985 and May 1990 civil engineering licensure examinations where petitioner also got failing marks. She also submitted certifications and authentic documents in support of her statements. Further, petitioner admitted that he never passed the board examination for civil engineering. Finally, as a public officer, petitioner is duty-bound to prepare, accomplish and submit his PDS pursuant to the Civil Service Rules and Regulations. Were it not for his position and employment in the government, he could not have accomplished the PDS. The law is clear that wrongful intent on the part of the accused to injure a third person is not an essential element of the crime of falsification of public document.53 It is jurisprudentially settled that in the falsification of public or official documents, whether by public officers or private persons, it is not necessary that there be present the idea of gain or the intent to injure a third person for the reason that, in contradistinction to private documents, the principal thing punished is the violation of the public faith and the destruction of truth as therein solemnly proclaimed. SUPREME COURT RULING: WHEREFORE, the petition is hereby DENIED. The Decision of the Court of Appeals, dated 19 October 2005, in CA-G.R. CR. No. 28072, is hereby AFFIRMED in toto. Costs against petitioner. TAN VS MATSUURA??

Norma Delos Reyes vs People GR 186030 March 21 2012 Topic: Facts Norma Delos Reyes was charged with falsification under RPC 172 of a Deed of Succession when she and the other accused were the only heirs of Rafael Del Prado when in fact, Ma. Corazon Del Prado is also an heir entitled to inherit. Corazon is a daughter of Rafael while Norma is the suriviving spouse. MTC, RTC and CA found the petitioners as guilty.

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petitioners invoke the existence and contents of the several documents which they had presented before the MTC. filed by Norma, in which documents they claim to have indicated and confirmed that Corazon is also an heir of the late Rafael. Given these documents, the petitioners insist that they cannot be charged with falsification for having excluded Corazon as an heir of their decedent. Issue: WON The elements of RPC 172 were satisfied by the petitioners Held: we find no cogent reason to reverse the CA decision appealed from, considering that the elements of the crime of falsification under Art. 171, par. 4 of the Revised Penal Code, in relation to Art. 172 thereof, were duly proved during the proceedings below. Said elements are as follows: (a) The offender makes in a public document untruthful statements in a narration of facts; (b) The offender has a legal obligation to disclose the truth of the facts narrated by him; and (c) The facts narrated by the offender are absolutely false. The material document claimed to be falsified in this case is the Deed of Succession dated July 19, 1991 The first and third elements were committed by the inclusion in the subject deed of the clause that states, "(w)hereas, the parties hereto are the only heirs of the decedent, the first name, is the surviving spouse and the rest are the children of the decedent."22 The untruthfulness of said statement is clear from the several other documents upon which, ironically, the petitioners anchor their defense, such as the deed of extrajudicial partition dated October 29, 1979, the parties’ confirmation of subdivision, deed of exchange and Norma’s petition for guardianship of her then minor children. Specifically mentioned in these documents is the fact that Corazon is also a daughter, thus an heir, of the late Rafael. The obligation of the petitioners to speak only the truth in their deed of succession is clear, taking into account the very nature of the document falsified. The deed, which was transformed into a public document upon acknowledgement before a notary public, required only truthful statements from the petitioners. We cannot subscribe to the petitioners’ claim of good faith because several documents prove that they knew of the untruthful character of their statement in the deed of succession. Decision: Petition Denied. CA Decision Affirmed. Layug vs. Sandiganbayan Petitioner applied with the Division Office of Davao del Sur for a permanent teaching position in the Digos Provincial High School. He stated in his application letter that he obtained the degrees of Associate in Arts and Bachelor of Arts in Psychology. Petitioner claimed having taught for 7 years in high school and college level. At the Davao del Sur National High School (DSNHS), petitioner taught English, Literature and Social Studies. Principal Ramon Presto authorized the head of the Science Department to assign any science course to petitioner. Lourdes Magbanua of the Science Department issued a memorandum detailing petitioner’s schedule for Science IV classes. Jovencio Tablang, the assistant principal in charge of academic affairs, noted the memorandum. Petitioner refused to receive the memorandum, Magbanua informed Presto through a letter that petitioner refused to teach 3 Science IV classes assigned to him for the reason that he was "inexperienced and incompetent to teach the subject." Magbanua mentioned in that letter that petitioner's science load had been unattended to for one week already and thus she referred the matter to Tablang. Magbanua would see petitioner in campus, talking with friends or with the security guards. Petitioner filed a daily time record showing that he reported for work within his daily official working hours. Petitioner signed the daily time record but the principal did not sign it. The daily time records showed that, except for reasons of court appearances in certain mornings and afternoons, petitioner regularly reported for work within his official time. Presto filed with the Ombudsman a complaint for estafa through falsification of public documents against petitioner. Presto alleged that petitioner made it appear that he had completed the required number of hours of work in his daily time records, notwithstanding that he only worked for a short period of time. Presto noted that as a result of petitioner's refusal to the science subjects assigned to him, petitioner was short of 15 hours per week. Petitioner was instructed to report to Ruperto Escarcha but didn’t comply. Presto issued a memorandum calling petitioner's attention to his failure to follow instructions from his superiors. Presto warned him that should he fail to explain within 5 days, he would be constrained to recommend petitioner's preventive suspension or summary dismissal to higher authorities. Petitioner filed complaints for harassment and oppression and for unjustifiable refusal to release vacation salaries against Presto. The cases were consolidated with the complaint filed by Presto against petitioner for dishonesty. 8

The DECS regional office detailed petitioner to the Division Office. Petitioner filed a motion for reconsideration. The regional office denied the motion thereby sustaining the order detailing him to the Division Office. Petitioner did not report to the Division Office pursuant to those orders. Neither did he file a leave of absence. Date had been fixed by this Court in the Decision arising from petitioner's preventive suspension by the DECS Regional Director and approved by DECS Secretary Lourdes Quisumbing. In that case, interruptions in the administrative investigation caused by petitioner's own fault or upon his own request would not be counted in computing the 90-day statutory limit of suspension. Hence, for his refusal to accept assignments given to him by the regional director, petitioner was not entitled to receive salary for the period of idleness; he may receive salary when he reported for work.

The issue in this case is whether or not petitioner is guilty of falsification of public documents for filling up his daily time record as a teacher which reflected his actual teaching time and also those when he was within the school facilities.

Acts and omissions punishable by law are felonies. The elements of felonies in general are (1) that there must be an act or omission, (2) that the act or omission are punishable by the RPC, and (3) that the act is performed or the omission incurred by means of dolo or culpa.1 All of the said elements are applied in this case.

The act of the petitioner filing a daily time record showing that he reported for work within his daily official working hours is an act of falsification of document because it is contrary to the statement of Magbanua which mentioned in a letter that petitioner's science load had been unattended to for one week already and she added that she would see petitioner in campus, talking with friends or with the security guards. Petitioner made it appear that he had completed the required number of hours of work in his daily time records, notwithstanding that he only worked for a short period of time. Petitioner was short of 15 hours per week as a result of his refusal to the science subjects assigned to him. The act of the petitioner is punishable by article 171 of the RPC. Penalty of prision mayor and a fine not to exceed P5,000 pesos shall be imposed upon any public officer, employee, or notary who, taking advantage of his official position, shall falsify a document by making untruthful statements in a narration of facts. 2 Petitioner made untruthful statement when he filed a daily time record showing that he reported for work within his daily official working hours but his science load had been unattended for one week already and he was short of 15 hours per week.

The act of the petitioner is performed by means of dolo or malice. The requisites of dolo are (1) he must have freedom while doing an act or omitting to do an act, (2) he must have intelligence while doing the act, (3) he must have intent while doing the act or omitting to do the act.3 All the requisites are present in this case.

Layug had freedom while doing the act of falsification of document. A person who acts under the compulsion of an irresistible force is exempt from criminal liability.4 Also, a person who acts under the impulse of an uncontrollable fear of an equal or greater injury is exempt from criminal liability.5 The act of the petitioner is not under the compulsion of an irresistible force nor under the

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impulse of an uncontrollable fear of an equal or greater injury thus he is not exempted from criminal liability and it is clear that the petitioner acted with freedom.

Layug has intelligence while doing the acts of falsification of document. Without this power, necessary to determine the morality of human acts, no crime can exist.6 Intelligence is the ability to determine what is right and what is wrong. Petitioner is a holder of 2 degrees and graduated in both prestigious universities. He is also an educator who provides education and intelligence to students. It is impossible for a man to be an educator without intelligence. Layug had intent while doing the act of falsification of document. Intent to commit the act with malice, being purely a mental process, is presumed and the presumption arises from the proof of the commission of an unlawful act.7 In this case, presumption is made true when petitioner acted with dishonesty in putting false entries in his DTR. Dishonesty’s intention is to contradict what is true. The mere fact that the petitioner acted with dishonesty in putting false entries in his DTR, intention to contradict what is true, meaning the intent to falsify a document that is supposed to be reporting a true and correct hours of work performed, existed.

Criminal liability has been proven through the elements of article 3 of the RPC in connection with the act done by the petitioner. Thus, conviction of the petitioner is proper. Union Bank of the Philippines v. People of the Philippines G.R. No. 192565

February 28, 2012

Facts: Union Bank filed two complaints for sum of money against spouses Tamondong and a John Doe. The first complaint was filed in RTC, Branch 109, Pasay City while the second, to the MeTC, Branch 47, Pasay City. Both complaints showed that the accused Desi Tomas executed and signed the Certification against Forum Shopping. The Certificate against Forum Shopping was subscribed in Makati City. Because of this, an Information was filed charging Tomas before the MeTC Makati. Tomas filed a Motion to Quash the Information alleging that venue was improperly laid since it is the Pasay City court (where the Certificate against Forum Shopping was submitted and used) and not the MeTC-Makati City (where the Certificate against Forum Shopping was subscribed) that has jurisdiction over the perjury case. Issue: Whether venue was improperly laid. Held: No. In relation to the crime of perjury, the material matter in a Certificate against Forum Shopping is the truth of the required declarations which is designed to guard against litigants pursuing simultaneous remedies in different fora. Article 183 refers to either of two punishable acts – (1) falsely testifying under oath in a proceeding other than a criminal or civil case; and (2) making a false affidavit before a person authorized to administer an oath on any material matter where the law requires an oath. Under the circumstances, Article 183 of the RPC is indeed the applicable provision; thus, jurisdiction and venue should be determined on the basis of this article which penalizes one who "make[s] an affidavit, upon any material matter before a competent person authorized to administer an oath in cases in which the law so requires." The constitutive act of the offense is the making of an affidavit; thus, the criminal act is consummated when the statement containing a falsity is subscribed and sworn before a duly authorized person. SPOUSES SERGIO C. PASCUAL and EMMA SERVILLION PASCUAL, Petitioners vs. FIRST CONSOLIDATED RURAL BANK (BOHOL), INC., ROBINSONS LAND CORPORATION and ATTY. ANTONIO P. ESPINOSA, Register of Deeds, Butuan City, Respondents G.R. No. 202597 February 8, 2017

Facts: On February 14, 2011, the petitioners filed a petition for annulment of judgment in the Court of Appeals (CA) in order to nullify and set aside the decision rendered in Special Proceedings Case No. 4577 by the Regional Trial Court in Butuan City (RTC) ordering

10

the cancellation of their notice of lis pendens recorded in Transfer Certificate of Title No. RT-42190 of the Register of Deeds of Butuan City. On November 16, 2011, the CA promulgated the first assailed resolution dismissing the petition for annulment of judgment. Considering that a Petition for Annulment of Judgment is an original action before the Court of Appeals, pre-trial is mandatory, per Section 6 of Rule 47 of the Rules of Court, whereby the failure of the plaintiff to appear would mean dismissal of the action with prejudice. The filing of a pre-trial brief has the same import. The Supreme Court has invariably ruled that while "litigation is not a game of technicalities," it is equally important that every case must be prosecuted in accordance with the procedure to insure an orderly and speedy administration of justice. Hence, this appeal by petition for review on certiorari.

Issues: Whether or not the court erred in its decision of dismissing the action with prejudice due to petitioner’s failure to appear during the Preliminary Conference.

Ruling: The petitioners received the assailed resolution of November 16, 2011 on November 24, 2011. The CA actually received the motion on December 12, 2011. Considering that Section 1 (d) of Rule III of the 2009 Internal Rules of the Court of Appeals provided that motions sent through private messengerial services are deemed filed on the date of the CA's actual receipt of the same, the motion was already filed out of time by December 12, 2011. Needless to remind, the running of the period of appeal of the final resolution promulgated on November 16, 2011 was not stopped, rendering the assailed resolution final and executory by operation of law.14 To be clear, the rule only spells out that unless the motion for such judgment has earlier been filed the pre-trial may be the occasion in which the court considers the propriety of rendering judgment on the pleadings or summary judgment. If no such motion was earlier filed, the pre-trial judge may then indicate to the proper party to initiate the rendition of such judgment by filing the necessary motion. Indeed, such motion is required by either Rule 34 (Judgment on the Pleadings) or Rule 35 (Summary Judgment) of the Rules of Court. The pre-trial judge cannot motu proprio render the judgment on the pleadings or summary judgment. In the case of the motion for summary judgment, the adverse party is entitled to counter the motion. Preliminary Conference and Pre-trial Bayas vs Sandiganbayan (2002) FACTS: • Three informations were filed against Petitioners Ernesto T. Matuday and Sixto M. Bayas charging them with malversation through falsification penalized under Article 217, in relation to Article 171, of the Revised Penal Code in their capacities as municipal mayor and municipal treasurer • They pleaded not guilty during arraignment. • Pretrial • October 15, 1999 - cancelled because the counsel for the accused, Atty. Molintas was not prepared • November 5, 1999 - cancelled because of the absence of the counsel due to flu. Nonetheless, the Sandiganbayan urged the accused to discuss with their counsel the stipulation of facts drafted by Ombudsman Prosecutor II Evelyn T. Lucero. • December 10, 1999 - parties submitted a Joint Stipulation of Facts and Documents, which had been duly signed by the two accused (herein petitioners), Atty. Molintas and Prosecutor Lucero (this was supposedly the day the pre-trial should resume so they could pass upon all other matters) • January 14, 2000 - Atty. Molintas was again absent; rescheduled to Feb 14. • Feb 7, 2000 - Att. Molintas moved to withdraw as counsel for the accused. Granted on Feb 14, 2000, pretrial rescheduled to March 31. • March 31 - new counsel (Atty. Cinco) moved to withdraw joint stipulation of facts specifically when they admitted disbursement of funds. Invoked consti right to be presumed innocent until proven guilty. • SB: denied motion to withdraw stipulation of facts • no vitiation of consent through fraud or mistake of a serious character • The fact that the stipulation of facts leaves less or no room for the accused to defend himself is not a ground for setting aside a pre-trial order

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ISSUE/HOLDING: 1.

W/N pretrial stipulations may be unilaterally withdrawn by the accused because allegedly, they are not binding until after the trial court has issued a pretrial order approving them. a.

NO. Rules on Criminal Procedure mandate parties to agree on matters of facts, issues and evidence. Such stipulations are greatly favored because they simplify, shorten or settle litigations in a faster and more convenient manner. They save costs, time and resources of the parties and, at the same time, help unclog court dockets.

b.

Once validly entered into, stipulations will not be set aside unless for good cause. They should be enforced especially when they are not false, unreasonable or against good morals and sound public policy. When made before the court, they are conclusive. And the party who validly made them can be relieved therefrom only upon a showing of collusion, duress, fraud, misrepresentation as to facts, and undue influence; or upon a showing of sufficient cause on such terms as will serve justice in a particular case. Moreover, the power to relieve a party from a stipulation validly made lies in the courts sound discretion which, unless exercised with grave abuse, will not be disturbed on appeal.

c.

Validity of joint stipulation: They wanted to be relieved of it without alleging falsity, fraud, mistake. They did not even dispute the finding of the SB of no vitiation of consent. In fact, they admitted that they freely gave their consent in signing the joint stipulation of facts. a.

They blame incompetence of previous counsel; he failed to consider their legal interests. To be a ground for relief against a stipulation, a mistake must be one of fact not, as in this case, a mere lack of full knowledge of fact because of failure to exercise due diligence in ascertaining it.

b.

Hornbook doctrine applies: parties are bound by the action or the inaction of their counsel. To all intents and purposes, the acts of a lawyer in the defense or the prosecution of a case are the acts of the client. The rule extends even to the mistakes and the simple negligence committed by the counsel.

Preliminary Conference and Pre-trial d.

Presumption of innocence: However, the Rules were amended in 1985, precisely to enable parties to stipulate facts. The amendment was carried over to the 2000 Revised Rules on Criminal Procedure. The acceptability of stipulating facts has long been established in our jurisprudence. There is nothing irregular or unlawful in stipulating facts in criminal cases. The policy encouraging it is consistent with the doctrine of waiver, which recognizes that x x x everyone has a right to waive and agree to waive the advantage of a law or rule made solely for the benefit and protection of the individual in his private capacity, if it can be dispensed with and relinquished without infringing on any public right and without detriment to the community at large. In this case, there could have been no impairment of petitioners right to be presumed innocent, right to due process or right against self-incrimination because the waiver was voluntary, made with the assistance of counsel and is sanctioned by the Rules on Criminal Procedure.

e.

Necessity of a pretrial order: Not necessary. Section 2 of Rule 118

f.

a.

for a pretrial agreement to be binding on the accused, it must satisfy the following conditions: (1) the agreement or admission must be in writing, and (2) it must be signed by both the accused and their counsel. Such approval is necessary merely to emphasize the supervision by the court over the case and to enable it to control the flow of the proceedings.

b.

Once the stipulations are reduced into writing and signed by the parties and their counsels, they become binding on the parties who made them. They become judicial admissions of the fact or facts stipulated. Even if placed at a disadvantageous position, a party may not be allowed to rescind them unilaterally; it must assume the consequences of the disadvantage. If the accused are allowed to plead guilty under appropriate circumstances, by parity of reasoning, they should likewise be allowed to enter into a fair and true pretrial agreement under appropriate circumstances.

c.

Moreover, SB could not be faulted for not approving the stipulations as the pretrial was rescheduled 6 times.

Role of Lawyers in pretrial: The Rules on Criminal Procedure provide that if the counsel for the accused and/or the prosecutor do not appear at the pretrial and do not offer an acceptable excuse for their lack of cooperation, the court may impose proper sanctions or penalties. a.

attorneys must make a full disclosure of their positions as to what the real issues of the trial would be. They should not be allowed to embarrass or inconvenience the court or injure the opposing litigant by their careless preparation

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for a case; or by their failure to raise relevant issues at the outset of a trial; or, as in this case, by their unilateral withdrawal of valid stipulations that they signed and that their clients fully assented to. b.

They were the ones who validly and voluntarily entered into the joint stipulation. If the Court allows it to be withdrawn, there would be no end to litigations. Lawyers can wiggle in and out of agreements the moment they are disadvantaged. Lawyers should remember, however, that they are not merely representatives of the parties but, first and foremost, officers of the court. As such, one of their duties assisting in the speedy and efficient administration of justice is more significant than that of acquitting their client, rightly or wrongly.

g.

GAD: the power to relieve a party from a stipulation validly made lies at the sound discretion of the court. Unless exercised with grave abuse, this discretion will not be disturbed on appeal. a.

Petitioners in this case failed to prove that the Sandiganbayan committed grave abuse of discretion in disallowing them to withdraw the stipulations that they had freely and voluntarily entered into. Also, no bad faith or malice was or can be imputed to the antigraft court for failing to immediately act upon the Joint Stipulation. The delay was due, not to its deliberate evasion of its duty, but to the continued absence of petitioners counsel.

PETITIONERS: SIXTO M. BAYAS and ERNESTO T. MATUDAY RESPONDENTS: SANDIGANBAYAN (FIRST DIVISION), THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES and THE OFFICE OF THE SPECIAL PROSECUTOR G.R. Nos. 143689-91 November 12, 2002 DOCTRINE: Stipulations freely and voluntarily made are valid and binding and will not be set aside unless for good cause. The Rules of Court mandate parties in a criminal case to stipulate facts. Once they have validly and voluntarily signed the stipulations, the accused and their counsel may not set these aside on the mere pretext that they may be placed at a disadvantage during the trial. FACTS: Three Informations were filed before the Sandiganbayan, charging Petitioners Ernesto T. Matuday and Sixto M. Bayas with violation of Section 3(e) of RA No. 3019 and malversation through falsification in their capacities as municipal mayor and municipal treasurer of Kabayan, Province of Benguet. During their arraignment, petitioners pled "not guilty." The parties submitted a "Joint Stipulation of Facts and Documents," duly signed by the two accused and their counsel Atty Molintas Later on, the accused, represented by their new counsel, Atty. Cinco, moved to withdraw the Joint Stipulation of Facts and Documents. Specifically, they sought to withdraw, first, Stipulation 1(b) which states that "Both the accused admit the disbursement of the amount of P510,000.00 and P55,000.00"; and second, Exhibits "1" to "8-a". They invoked their constitutional right to be presumed innocent until proven guilty. The Sandiganbayan denied the petitioners’ Motion to Withdraw Joint Stipulation. ISSUE: Whether accused be allowed to withdraw unilaterally from the Joint Stipulation of Facts and Documents. RULING: Petitioners fail to appreciate the indispensable role of stipulations in the speedy disposition of cases. The new Rules on Criminal Procedure mandate parties to agree on matters of facts, issues and evidence. Such stipulations are greatly favored because they simplify, shorten or settle litigations in a faster and more convenient manner. They save costs, time and resources of the parties and, at the same time, help unclog court dockets. Once validly entered into, stipulations will not be set aside unless for good cause. They should be enforced especially when they are not false, unreasonable or against good morals and sound public policy. When made before the court, they are conclusive. And the party who validly made them can be relieved therefrom only upon a showing of collusion, duress, fraud, misrepresentation as to facts, and undue influence; or upon a showing of sufficient cause on such terms as will serve justice in a particular case. Moreover, the power to relieve a party from a stipulation validly made lies in the court’s sound discretion which, unless exercised with grave abuse, will not be disturbed on appeal. Once the stipulations are reduced into writing and signed by the parties and their counsels, they become binding on the parties who made them. They become judicial admissions of the fact or facts stipulated. Even if placed at a disadvantageous position, a party may not be allowed to rescind them unilaterally; it must assume the consequences of the disadvantage.

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Verily, during pretrial, attorneys must make a full disclosure of their positions as to what the real issues of the trial would be. They should not be allowed to embarrass or inconvenience the court or injure the opposing litigant by their careless preparation for a case; or by their failure to raise relevant issues at the outset of a trial; or, as in this case, by their unilateral withdrawal of valid stipulations that they signed and that their clients fully assented to. Furthermore, a new counsel cannot justify such withdrawal by the simple expedient of passing the blame on the previous counsel, who had supposedly not sufficiently discharged his duty to the client. DISPOSITION: Petition is DENIED

ALFERO C. BAGANO v. JUDGE AGAPITO L. HONTANOSAS and REGIONAL TRIAL COURT 458 SCRA 59 (2005) To hold a judge administratively liable for gross ignorance of the law, the assailed act must not only be contrary to existing law or jurisprudence, but must also be motivated by bad faith, fraud, dishonesty or corruption on his part. Complainant Alfero C. Bagano (Bagano) charges respondent Judge Agapito L. Hontanosas (Judge Hontanosas) for gross ignorance of the law and procedure, undue delay in rendering an order, and grave abuse of discretion. This complaint rooted from Judge Hontanosas’ sudden approval of an earlier denied ―Motion to Cancel Statutory Lien‖ by Claudio Reyes without even Reyes filing for motion for reconsideration and without setting the same for hearing and posting of notice of hearing in the locality where the lot is situated. In addition to the complaint of Bagano, the ―Motion to Cancel Subsequent Titles‖ was resolved only after four (4) months following the submission of resolution when it should be within 30 days, while the motion for reconsideration was resolved only after five months following its submission. Finally, complainant faults Judge Hontanosas for grave abuse of discretion and gross ignorance of the law in denying his “Motion to Cancel Subsequent Certificates of Titles.” Judge Hontanosas thus asks for the dismissal of the complaint which, so he claims, was intended purely for harassment. Both the Office of the Court Administrator and the Court found Judge Hontanosas guilty of the Gross Ignorance of the law. ISSUES: Whether or not respondent Judge Agapito L. Hontanos committed gross ignoranceof the law and procedure, undue delay in rendering an order, and grave abuse of discretion HELD: It is a basic rule that all written motions should be heard. Excepted from this rule are non-litigious motions – those which may be acted upon by the court without prejudice the rights of the adverse party. As correctly found by the OCA, the “Motion to Cancel Statutory Lien” filed by Reyescannot be considered a non-litigious motion to exempt it from the requirement of a hearing or notice to complainant, the lawful possessor of Lot No. 7708. To hold a judge administratively liable for gross ignorance of the law, the assailed act must not only be contrary to existing law or jurisprudence, but must also be motivated by bad faith, fraud, dishonesty or corruption on his part. This is the general rule. When, however, the law or rule is so elementary, as that which requires written motions to be heard, not knowing about it constitutes gross ignorance of the law even in the absence of malicious intent.

A.M. No. RTJ-05-1915

May 6, 2005

ALFERO C. BAGANO, complainant, vs. JUDGE AGAPITO L. HONTANOSAS, Regional Trial Court (RTC), Branch 16, Cebu City, respondent. DECISION

14

CARPIO-MORALES, J.: By a verified complaint1 dated March 3, 2003, Alfero C. Bagano (complainant) charges Judge Agapito L. Hontanosas (respondent), Presiding Judge of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Cebu City, Branch 16, for gross ignorance of the law and procedure, undue delay in rendering an order, and grave abuse of discretion. The antecedents of the case are as follows: In a forcible entry case filed by complainant against Claudio Reyes (Reyes), et al. involving Lot No. 7708, the Municipal Trial Court of Talisay, Cebu rendered judgment2 on November 27, 1995 in complainant's favor. On May 25, 2000, Reyes filed before the Cebu RTC a "Motion to Cancel Statutory Lien" 3 praying for the cancellation of the following annotations on Transfer Certificate of Title (TCT) No. 112336 of the Register of Deeds of the Province of Cebu, which title appears to have covered Lot No. 7708: Except in favor of the Government or any of its branches or institutions, or legally constituted banking corporations, be subject to encumbrances or alienation before five years after the date of the issuance of the transfer certificate of title to the purchaser, nor shall they become liable to the satisfaction of any debt contracted prior to the expiration of the said period; but temporary improvements or crops on the land may be mortgaged or pledged to qualified persons, corporations, or associations; and that every conveyance shall be subject to repurchase by the original purchaser or his legal heirs within a period of five (5) years from the date of the conveyance. It is hereby specifically agreed that notwithstanding the provisions of Article 652 of the New Civil Code, the Republic of the Philippines is exempted from the obligation to grant a right of way to the grantee herein. And subject further to the condition that the land granted therein shall not be used for any purpose other than for which the said land was applied and any change in land use shall be subject to the approval of the Housing and Land Use Regulatory Board. 4 In the motion, Reyes alleged that the annotations "were done illegally because Lot No. 7708 had long ceased to be public land the ownership of which had passed to Arcadio Reyes" of which he was the sole heir. On June 6, 2000, respondent, by Order5 of even date, denied the "Motion to Cancel Statutory Lien." Three days later or on June 9, 2000, respondent issued another Order6 granting the motion. Arcadio Reyes' TCT No. 112336 was later cancelled and TCT No. 112716 was issued in Reyes' name. On account of subsequent sales transactions involving TCT No. 112716, it was cancelled and TCT Nos. 114755, 114756, 114757 and 114758 were issued. On learning of the issuance by respondent of the June 9, 2000 Order canceling the statutory lien on the title covering Lot No. 7708, complainant filed a Petition for Relief from Judgment7 which was granted by respondent by Order8 of September 14, 2001. Said latter Order became final and executory on October 13, 2001 per Entry of Judgment 9 dated November 8, 2001. Complainant thereupon filed on December 7, 2001 a "Motion to Cancel Subsequent Titles" 10 which was set for hearing on December 17, 2001. By Order11 of June 11, 2002, respondent denied the "Motion to Cancel Subsequent Titles" as he did deny the Motion for Reconsideration filed on July 5, 2002 by Order of January 13, 2003.12 Hence, arose the administrative complaint at bar, complainant alleging that respondent's acts of "swiftly grant[ing] Reyes' motion to cancel statutory lien which he earlier denied [but which he later granted] even though there was no motion for reconsideration filed to that effect" and of "act[ing] on said motion without setting the same for hearing and posting of notices of hearing in the locality where the lot is situated" constitute a complete disregard of the procedure prescribed by law and are not in accordance with the Code of Judicial Conduct.13 Complainant also faults respondent for violating, among other things, Section 4, Rule 37 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure which provides that a motion for reconsideration shall be resolved within 30 days from the time it is submitted for resolution.14 He invites attention to the fact that his "Motion to Cancel Subsequent Titles" was resolved only after four months following its submission for resolution while his motion for reconsideration of the June 11, 2002 Order was resolved only after five months following its submission for resolution.15 Finally, complainant faults respondent for grave abuse of discretion and gross ignorance of the law in denying his "Motion to Cancel Subsequent Certificates of Titles." For, given the issuance of several titles arising from respondent's June 9, 2000 Order from which complainant was able to obtain relief, complainant contends that respondent should have granted his motion. 16

15

In his Comment17 dated June 26, 2003, respondent, branding complainant as a disgruntled losing litigant, proffers that complainant had the right to appeal his order denying the "Motion to Cancel Subsequent Certificates of Titles." At any rate, respondent argues that his questioned order and the issues raised in the complaint at bar are "judicial matters which were tackled and resolved by [him] in line with his functions as presiding judge trying and deciding the said special proceedings case, [hence,] the questioned act . . . was a judgment call and an act of judicial discretion which is the heart of the act of judging." Respondent thus asks for the dismissal of the complaint which, so he claims, was intended purely for harassment. The Office of the Court Administrator (OCA), by Report18 dated October 17, 2003, finds respondent guilty of gross ignorance of the law and procedure and undue delay in rendering a decision or order and gives the following recommendation: Respectfully submitted for the consideration of the Honorable Court is our recommendation that the present administrative complaint against Judge Agapito L. Hontanosas, Regional Trial Court, Branch 16, Cebu City be RE-DOCKETED as a regular administrative matter. Considering that respondent judge committed infractions classified as both serious and less serious charges under Rule 140 as amended, it is further recommended that he be DIRECTED to pay a FINE in the amount of Twenty Thousand Pesos (P20,000.00) with a STERN WARNING that a similar infraction in the future will be dealt with a more severe penalty. (Underscoring supplied) By Resolution19 of December 8, 2003, this Court required the parties to manifest whether they are submitting the case for resolution on the basis of the pleadings/records already filed. In separate Manifestations,20 complainant and respondent submitted the case for resolution on the basis of the pleadings/records already submitted. This Court finds no reason to disturb the findings of the OCA. It is a basic rule that all written motions should be heard. Excepted from this rule are non-litigious motions – those which may be acted upon by the court without prejudice the rights of the adverse party.21 As correctly found by the OCA, the "Motion to Cancel Statutory Lien" filed by Reyes cannot be considered a non-litigious motion to exempt it from the requirement of a hearing or notice to complainant, the lawful possessor of Lot No. 7708. To hold a judge administratively liable for gross ignorance of the law, the assailed act must not only be contrary to existing law or jurisprudence, but must also be motivated by bad faith, fraud, dishonesty or corruption on his part. 22This is the general rule. When, however, the law or rule is so elementary, as that which requires written motions to be heard, not knowing about it constitutes gross ignorance of the law even in the absence of malicious intent.23 Respecting the charge of failure to resolve the pending incidents within the required period, respondent did not deny the same or advance any reason therefor. He must thus be faulted for it. As for the allegation that the denial of the "Motion to Cancel Subsequent Titles" constitutes gross ignorance of the law, the same does not lie. As correctly found by the OCA, complainant should have availed of an ordinary or extraordinary judicial remedy to seek the reversal of the order. As De Guzman v. Pamintuan24 puts it: It is the established doctrine and policy of this Court that an administrative action is not the appropriate remedy for every irregular or erroneous order or decision issued by a judge where a judicial remedy is available, such as a motion for reconsideration, an appeal, or a petition for certiorari. Disciplinary proceedings against a judge are not complementary or suppletory of, nor a substitute for these judicial remedies, whether ordinary or extraordinary. x x x Besides, to hold a judge administratively accountable for every erroneous ruling or decision he renders, assuming he has erred, would be nothing short of harassment and would make his position doubly unbearable. To hold otherwise would be to render judicial office untenable, for no one called upon to try facts or interpret the law in the process of administering justice can be infallible in his judgment. x x x25 (Underscoring supplied) Undue delay in rendering a decision/order is a less serious charge. The delay having been committed in 2002, the penalties under Rule 140, as amended by Administrative Matter No. 01-8-10-SC which took effect on October 1, 2001, apply: Section 11. Sanctions. xxx B. If the respondent is guilty of a less serious charge, any of the following sanctions shall be imposed: 16

1. Suspension from office without salary and other benefits for not less than one (1) nor more than three (3) months; or 2. A fine of more than P10,000.00 but exceeding P20,000.00. xxx As for gross ignorance of the law or procedure, it is considered a serious charge. The questioned act was committed on June 9, 2000, but the amended penalties cannot apply retroactively.26 The penalties under Rule 140 before the amendment must thus apply: Section 10. Sanctions A. If the respondent is found culpable of a serious charge, any of the following sanctions may be imposed: 1. Dismissal from service, with forfeiture of benefits (except accrued leaves) and disqualification from reinstatement or appointment to any public office including a government-owned and controlled corporation; 2. Suspension for three (3) months without salary or benefits; or 3. A fine of not less than P20,000.00 but not more than P40,000.00. xxx Respondent has, however, by Resolution of September 21, 2004 in A.M. No. RTJ-03-1802, "J. King & Sons Company, Inc. v. Judge Agapito L. Hontanosas, Jr.," been dismissed from the service. This does not prevent this Court from imposing a sanction against respondent a fine in the amount of Twenty Thousand (P20,000.00) Pesos. Were he still in the service, he would have been meted a more severe penalty. WHEREFORE, respondent, Judge Agapito L. Hontanosas, is found GUILTY of gross ignorance of the law or procedure and undue delay in rendering a decision or order and is hereby FINED in the amount of Twenty Thousand (P20,000.00) Pesos. SO ORDERED. City of Dumaguete vs PPA FACTS: Petitioner, through Mayor Remollo filed before the RTC an Application for Original Registration of Title over a parcel of land with improvements under the Property Registration Decree. The Republic of the Philippines, represented by the Director of Lands, and respondent, represented by the Office of the Government Corporate Counsel, filed separate Oppositions 6 to the application for registration of petitioner. Both the Republic and respondent averred that petitioner may not register the subject property in its name since petitioner had never been in open, continuous, exclusive, and notorious possession of the said property for at least 30 years immediately preceding the filing of the application; and the subject property remains to be a portion of the public domain which belongs to the Republic. Respondent filed a Motion to Dismiss on the ground that the RTC lacked jurisdiction to hear and decide the case. the RTC issued an Order12 granting the Motion to Dismiss to the respondent. In its Motion for Reconsideration15 and Supplemental Motion for Reconsideration. Petitioner contended that the dismissal of its application was premature and tantamount to a denial of its right to due process. It has yet to present evidence to prove factual matters in support of its application, such as the subject property already being alienable and disposable at the time it was occupied and possessed by petitioner. Respondent opposed the MR. Respondent based its Opposition on technical and substantive grounds. According to respondent, the Motion for Reconsideration of petitioner violated Sections 4 (Hearing of motion), 5 (Notice of hearing), and 6 (Proof of service necessary), Rule 15 of the Rules of Court. Petitioner did not set its Motion for Reconsideration for hearing even when the said Motion could not be considered as non-litigable. The RTC could not hear the motion for reconsideration ex parte as they are prejudicial to the rights of respondent. Petitioner also failed to comply with Section 11, Rule 13 of the Rules of Court when it did not attach to the Motion for Reconsideration a written explanation why it did not resort to personal service of the said Motion. Thus, respondent averred that the Motion for Reconsideration of the petitioner should be treated as a mere scrap of paper with no legal effect. RTC: Initially agreed with respondent that the Motion for Reconsideration of petitioner violated Sections 4, 5, and 6, Rule 15 and Section 11, Rule 13 of the Rules of Court. However, after taking into consideration the Supplemental Motion for Reconsideration 17

of the petitioner, the RTC issued another Order setting aside its Order in the interest of justice and resolving to have a full-blown proceeding to determine factual issues in LRC Case No. N-201. CA: Set aside the orders of the RTC. ISSUE: WON the CA erred in setting aside the orders promulgated by the RTC. RULING: YES. Under Section 11, Rule 13 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure, personal service and filing is the general rule, and resort to other modes of service and filing, the exception. Henceforth, whenever personal service or filing is practicable, in the light of the circumstances of time, place and person, personal service or filing is mandatory. Only when personal service or filing is not practicable may resort to other modes be had, which must then be accompanied by a written explanation as to why personal service or filing was not practicable, to begin with. In adjudging the plausibility of an explanation, a court shall likewise consider the importance of the subject matter of the case or the issues involved therein, and the prima facie merit of the pleading sought to be expunged for violation of Section 11. In this case, counsel for petitioner holds office in Dumaguete City, Negros Oriental, in the Visayas; while counsel for respondent holds office in Quezon City, Metro Manila, in Luzon. Given the considerable distance between the offices of these two counsels, personal service of pleadings and motions by one upon the other was clearly not practicable and a written explanation as to why personal service was not done would only be superfluous.43 In addition, we refer once more to the merits of the Motion for Reconsideration and Supplemental Motion for Reconsideration of the RTC Order dated September 7, 2000, filed by petitioner, which justify the liberal interpretation of Section 11, Rule 13 of the Rules of Court in this case. Moreover, records reveal that the notices in the Motion were addressed to the respective counsels of the private respondents and they were duly furnished with copies of the same as shown by the receipts signed by their staff or agents. Consequently, the Court finds that the petitioner substantially complied with the pertinent provisions of the Rules of Court and existing jurisprudence on the requirements of motions and pleadings. V2 FACTS On October 14, 1998, through Mayor Felipe Antonio B. Remollo (Remollo), the City of Dumaguete, filed before the RTC an Application for Original Registration of Title over a parcel of land with improvements, located at Barangay Looc, City of Dumaguete (subject property), under the Property Registration Decree. The City of Dumaguete alleged in support of its application that the applicant, City of Dumaguete through its Honorable Mayor Felipe Antonio B. Remollo, is the owner of the land subject of this application with all improvements and buildings comprising the Engineer's Compound where it is now situated that the land was acquired by possessory title in open, continuous, adverse occupation and possession in the concept of owner for more than thirty years since 1960. The Republic of the Philippines, represented by the Director of Lands, and Philippine Ports Authority(PPA), represented by the Office of the Government Corporate Counsel, filed separate Oppositions to the application for registration of the City of Dumaguete. Both the Republic and PPA averred that the City of Dumaguete may not register the subject property in its name since it had never been in open, continuous, exclusive, and notorious possession of the said property for at least 30 years immediately preceding the filing of the application; and the subject property remains to be a portion of the public domain which belongs to the Republic. PPA filed a Motion to Dismiss, seeking the dismissal of Land Registration Case on the ground that the RTC lacked jurisdiction to hear and decide the case. PPA argued that Section 14(1) of Presidential Decree No. 1529, otherwise known as the Property Registration Decree, refers only to alienable and disposable lands of the public domain under a bona fide claim of ownership. The subject property in LRC Case No. N-201 is not alienable and disposable, since it is a foreshore land, as explicitly testified to by City of Dumaguete's own witness, Engr. Dorado. A foreshore land is not registerable. The RTC decreed in the end that "the instant application for original registration is dismissed for lack of merit." ISSUE: Whether or not the dismissal of the RTC on the basis of lack of jurisdiction valid? HELD:

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No. Batas Pambansa Blg. 129, otherwise known as The Judiciary Reorganization Act of 1980, created the RTC35 in place of the CFI. Presently, jurisdiction over an application for land registration remains with the RTC where the land is situated, except when such jurisdiction is delegated by the Supreme Court to the Metropolitan Trial Court, Municipal Trial Courts, and Municipal Circuit Trial Courts under certain circumstances.36 It is not disputed that the Application for Original Registration of Title filed by petitioner before the RTC of the City of Dumaguete conformed to Section 15 of the Property Registration Decree, which prescribes the form and contents of such applications. In its Application, petitioner prayed that its title to the subject property, which it repeatedly alleged to have acquired through continuous and adverse possession and occupation of the said property for more than 30 years or since 1960, be placed under the land registration laws. The allegations and prayer in the Application of petitioner were sufficient to vest jurisdiction on the RTC over the said Application upon the filing thereof. Respondent sought the dismissal of LRC Case No. N-201 on the ground of lack of jurisdiction, not because of the insufficiency of the allegations and prayer therein, but because the evidence presented by petitioner itself during the trial supposedly showed that the subject property is a foreshore land, which is not alienable and disposable. The RTC granted the Motion to Dismiss of respondent in its Order dated September 7, 2000. The RTC went beyond the allegations and prayer for relief in the Application for Original Registration of petitioner, and already scrutinized and weighed the testimony of Engr. Dorado, the only witness petitioner was able to present. As to whether or not the subject property is indeed foreshore land is a factual issue which the RTC should resolve in the exercise of its jurisdiction, after giving both parties the opportunity to present their respective evidence at a full-blown trial.

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