Countering Maritime Piracy: The Naval War College Report.pdf

U.S. NAVAL WAR COLLEGE

The Report on the U.S. Naval War College Workshop on Somali Piracy Fresh Thinking for an Old Threat Commander James Kraska, JAGC, USN 28 April 2009

The Naval War College thanks Booz Allen Hamilton, Science Applications International Corporation (SAIC) and the Naval War College Foundation for generous support for the Workshop.

Key Insights • Piracy has emerged from a complex political, economic and cultural milieu. No single response will solve the problem. • Regional capacity-building and collective maritime action are required to contend with the challenge of piracy so long as pirates enjoy sustained sanctuary in Somalia. Proposals to stop piracy by “fixing” Somalia, however, beg the question—it is doubtful the international community has the capability or will to transform Somalia quickly into a stable and viable state. • Major maritime powers should rapidly expand coastal and littoral security assistance to the regional states, including training and provision of patrol craft and eventually corvettes, in order to shift responsibility for maintaining rule of law at sea to the regional powers. • The civil shipping industry will have to take a greater role in protecting merchant vessels, including provision of armed security in appropriate circumstances.

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n April 7 and 8, the International Law Department of the Center for Naval Warfare Studies at the U.S. Naval War College conducted a Counter-piracy Workshop comprised of 50 legal and policy experts from across the globe. The Workshop was designed to take a fresh look at the threat of maritime piracy off the Horn of Africa, assess the tremendous progress in international law and diplomacy that has transpired to address the problem, and to take a measure of the way forward. By collecting many of the world’s top experts to consider the threat of maritime piracy, and by providing a forum to discuss the issue in a frank and open dialogue, the Workshop revisited some conventional thinking and

explored new approaches. The participants brought significant diversity and depth of expertise. Many are involved in day-today decision-making on counter-piracy operations, policy and international law in Europe, Asia and the United States. This point was underscored on the second day of the Workshop, when a number of attendees joined a U.S. Government interagency phone conference to plan a course of action for dealing with the overnight hijacking and ensuing hostage stand-off involving the M/V Maersk Alabama. The Workshop was conducted in the Naval War College’s Decision Support Center, a state-of-the-art briefing center which can anonymously tabulate participants’ responses to issues under consideration, creating a nonattribution record of the proceedings. 1

I. The Threat The Workshop opened with a prominent irregular maritime warfare expert who provided a threat assessment for the group. The threat assessment concluded that although Somalia is a failed state, it is not a failed society. Central government has collapsed but other forms of authority remain. Some forms of authority are local, restricted to individual towns and villages. Other forms of authority derive from clan or sub-clan positions, and elders are often able to exercise their authority using traditional means. Power also flows from political figures who exercise authority through negotiation or patronage of largely self-interested supporters or allies. Finally, militias and Islamic courts exercise considerable influence in Somali society. Clan organization is a context rather than a determinant of piracy.

On November 21, 2008, the UN released a report by the Special Representative of the Secretary-General on piracy off the coast of Somalia based on meetings held in Nairobi, Kenya.1 The Nairobi Report suggests that piracy off the coast of Somalia is driven by the volatile security and political situation inside the country, rampant poverty and other factors. Using the Nairobi Report as a point of departure, the NWC Workshop considered the leading contributors to maritime piracy in East Africa. The causal factors contained in the Nairobi Report were considered as potential drivers of Somali piracy. The Workshop participants independently scored the drivers of Somali piracy according to the level of perceived importance. The data are presented in Figure 1, which displays the results of the exercise. A score of 100 represents a factor of very high importance, whereas a score of 1 signifies a factor of very low importance.

1 Workshop Commissioned by the Special Representative of the Secretary General of the UN to Somalia, Nairobi, Kenya, Nov. 10–21, 2008, Piracy off the Somali Coast: Final Report: Assessment and Recommendations (prepared by Ambassador Ahmedou Ould-Abdallah).

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The aggregated scores show that the average of the participants was highest in relation to the volatile security and political situation in Somalia and lowest in regard to environmental hardship. The scores were sorted into quintiles and are reproduced in Figure 1.

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1: Drivers of Somali Piracy Figure 1: Drivers of SomaliFigure Piracy

In addition to considering the listthat of drivers containedcontinues in the UN’stoNairobi several The aggregated scores show the averdrawReport, Somalis intoNWC the illicit Workshop experts suggested additional factors that were important in fostering permissive age of the participants was highest in relabusiness. The risk-reward calculus is faconditions in which piracy can flourish. First, the availability of pirate sanctuary ashore provides tion to the volatile security and political vorable to piracy and has to be changed. a safe haven from which pirates operate with apparent impunity. Second, the opportunity to situation in Somalia and lowest in regard to conduct piracy is presented by the geographic location of the nation of Somalia and close environmental hardship. The scores were andAEyl, number of situated nationsalong havethefacilitated payproximity of the major piracy hubs of Haradhere which are sorted into quintiles reproduced in Third, ment ransoms in order to obtain the international shipping and routeare from the Suez Canal. the of availability of legions of destitute, young1. men combines with numerous unpaid or underpaid complicit and nationals corrupt officials Figure release of their and toships held populate the piracy enterprise. Finally, the low level by of risk associated with Some piracy, states, and the including Somali pirates. of high rewards, continues to draw SomalisDenmark, into the illicithave business. The risk-reward Inprospect addition to considering the list of drivreleased captured pirates calculus is favorable to piracy and has to be changed. ers contained in the UN’s Nairobi Report, unpunished due to legal and diplomatic several NWC Workshop experts suggested confusion or difficulty with detaining and A number of nations have facilitated payment of ransoms in order to obtain the release of their additional factors that were important in prosecuting the perpetrators nationals and ships held by Somali pirates. Some states, including Denmark, have releasedin criminal fostering permissive conditions in and which court. The or Nairobi suggests that captured pirates unpunished due to legal diplomatic confusion difficultystudy with detaining piracy can flourish. First, thein availability these practices have encouraged and prosecuting the perpetrators criminal court. The Nairobi study suggested that these piracy. Alhave encouraged piracy. Although the wider international community has universally ofpractices pirate sanctuary ashore provides a safe though the wider international community condemned piracy activity off the coast of Somali, the Nairobi Report indicates that the same haven from which pirates operate with has universally condemned piracy activity nations have been tolerant of the existence of piracy off by either sanctioning the crime apparent impunity. Second, the opporthe coast of Somalia, theorNairobi Report facilitating payment piracy of ransoms. In some cases, appear tothat havethe deployed the been tunity to conduct is presented bynations indicates same warships nations to have area without authority to take robust action to arrest or detain pirates or use force to disrupt the geographic location of the nation of tolerant of piracy by either sanctioning the Somalia and close proximity of the major crime or facilitating payment of ransoms. piracy hubs of Haradhere and Eyl, which In some cases, nations appear to have . are situated along the international shipdeployed warships to the area without auping route from the Suez Canal. Third, the thority to take robust action to arrest or deavailability of legions of destitute, young tain pirates or use force to disrupt attacks. men combines with numerous unpaid or The NWC Workshop experts were asked to underpaid complicit and corrupt officials characterize whether they agreed with the to populate the piracy enterprise. Finally, description of the response by the internathe low level of risk associated with pitional community contained in the Nairobi racy, and the prospect of high rewards, Report. Many of the NWC experts—30 of

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34—either agreed or strongly agreed with system, with no single nation bearing the the Nairobi Report’s characterization that burden. Consequently, organizing a rethe international community has either to thwart piracy represents a classic attacks. The NWC Workshop experts were asked tosponse characterize whether they agreed with the sanctioned or tolerated maritime piracy collective action problem. The need to shift description of the response by the international community contained in the Nairobi report. Many off the coast of Somalia, and the responses the outcome of this equation is obvious, of the NWC experts—30 of 34—either agreed or strongly agreed with the Nairobi Report’s provided by the are contained in has buteither the means to doorsotolerated are more debatable. characterization thatexperts the international community sanctioned maritime Figure 2. the coast of Somalia, and the responses provided This conclusion givesare rise to the in division piracy off by the experts contained of responsibility among regional states, Page | 5 Figure 2. The Nairobi Report also suggested that the 1 2 3 4 5 wider international community has universally Strongly Disagree Neutral Agree Strongly condemned piracy activity off the coast of Disagree Agree Somalia, but then has generally been tolerant by either sanctioning or facilitating payment of ransoms or deploying warships to the area without authority to take robust action (arrest and detain, use of force). What is your level of agreement with this 1 3 0 18 12 characterization of the response of the international community? (Number of experts responding under each column.) Figure 2: Condemning International Piracy Figure 2: Condemning International Piracy

The NWC Workshop received a detailedThe NWC Workshop received a detailed brief on brief on the political, social and economicthe political, social and economic motivations of motivations of Somali pirates. Pirates areSomali pirates. Pirates are exploiting the vacuum exploiting the vacuum created by anarchycreated by anarchy in Somalia. The lack of rule of in Somalia. The lack of rule of law insidelaw inside the nation spills offshore. Somali the nation spills offshore. Somali piratespirates are driven by the goal of pecuniary gain. are driven by the goal of pecuniary gain.Moreover, the crime of maritime piracy has some Moreover, the crime of maritime piracyamount of acceptance in a society whose values have been distorted by conflict and violence. has some amount of acceptance in a soPiracy in the offshore areas of Somalia is ciety whose values have been distorted perpetrated by organized criminal gangs who by conflict and violence. Piracy in the benefit from political protection, so solutions will offshore areas of Somalia is perpetrated have to account for the wider political context inside the country. The rational risk-reward by organized criminal gangs benefitby ensuring distant piracy states isand privatewhile sector. The calculus of the pirate gangs has towho be changed lessthe rewarding at the from political protection, so greater solutions experts individual assesssame time infusing piracy with risk.will So far NWC there has been aprovided high tolerance for piracy have to account for the wider political conments of the likely impact of Somali because costs are diffuse throughout the international system, with no single nation bearingpiracy the text inside the country. The rational riskon international trade from Europe to burden. Consequently, organizing a response to thwart piracy represents a classic collective Asia reward calculusThe of the pirate gangs has to beof these overequations the next isfive years.but Figure 3 provides action problem. need to shift the outcome obvious, the means to do changed by ensuring piracy is less rewardthe data on the anticipated risk of Somali so are more debatable. This conclusion gives rise to the division of responsibility among regional ing while at the same infusing piracy piracy which on thenations Europe-Asia trademost route. states, distant states and time the private sector. In considering might serve with greater risk. Sopiracy far there a effectively to counter in the has Hornbeen of Africa, the NWC experts provided individual high tolerance piracy In international Figure 3, the experts assessments of thefor likely impactbecause of Somalicosts piracy on trade from individually Europe to Asiacharover the next five years. Figure provides the dataacterized on the anticipated risk of Somali piracypiracy on are diffuse throughout the 3international the likely impact of Somali the Europe-Asia trade route. 4 .

The impact of Somali piracy is likely to be severe on 1 2 3 4 5 Europe to Asia maritime trade through the Suez Strongly Disagree Neutral Agree Strongly Canal, Strait of Bab el Mandeb, and the Gulf of Disagree Agree Aden over the next five years. Page | 6 Number of experts responding in each column. 1 12 1 17 3 Figure 3: Anticipated of Somali Piracy on on Europe-to-Asia Trade Trade Figure 3: Anticipated ImpactImpact of Somali Piracy Europe-to-Asia

In figure 3, the experts individually likely of Somali on Europeon Europe-to-Asia maritime tradecharacterized through the 2012. In impact 2008, more thanpiracy 100 vessels were to-Asia maritime trade through the Suez Canal and the Gulf of Aden. Although 13 experts either the Suez Canal and the Gulf of Aden. In attacked and more than 40 were hijacked strongly disagreed or disagreed, 20 were in agreement or strong agreement. thisthe question considering whether the impact is likely successfully in watersOnoff Hornit is of safe to say there was a lack of consensus on the severity of the impact of Somali piracy along the to be severe, 13 experts either strongly Africa. When asked, “By 2012, how many critical tradeorroute connecting Europe and Asia. disagreed disagreed, while 20 were in vessels do you expect to be successfully hiagreement or strong agreement. On this jacked in the region?,” the estimates among The Workshop also considered the anticipated impact Somaliranged piracy on global shipping question it is safe to say there was a lack of the of experts from a low of 2 orover 3 per the next fiveon years, and the results that question are contained 4. consensus the severity of theofimpact of year to a highinofFigure 450 attacks per year, with Somali piracy along the critical trade route most responses in the 50 to 250 range. The impact of Somaliand piracy is likely to be severe on 1 2 3 4 5 connecting Europe Asia. global shipping trade over the next five years. Strongly Neutral There was, Disagree however, quite Agree strongStrongly agreeDisagree Agree The Workshop also considered the anment that in order for Somali piracy to Number ofimpact expertsofresponding in each 2 14 7 the11rule of0law ticipated Somali piracy oncolumn. global be successfully addressed, Figure 4:over Anticipated Impact Somali Global Shipping Trade shipping the next five years,of and the Piracy has to on be restored in Puntland. Puntland results of that question are contained in is the region of Somalia that serves as Regarding over the next five years, results Figure 4. the impact of Somali piracy on global shipping the primary staging area for the most piracy displayed in Figure 4 were even more circumspect emanating than those infrom Figure 3. A greater number of the country. Thirty-three experts—16—either disagreed or strongly disagreed with the proposition that the likely impact Regarding the impact of Somali piracy on out of 34 experts agreed or strongly agreed The impactpiracy of Somali piracyshipping is likelywill to be severe on Seven 1 participants 2 3 5 of Somali on global be “severe.” registered a4 “neutral” global shipping over the next five years, that restoration of the rule of law in SomaEurope to Asia maritime trade through the Suez Strongly Disagree Neutral Agree Strongly response. and no expertinwas in strong agreement the results displayed Figure 4 were even with lia the wasstatement. essential for curbing piracy. The Canal, Strait of Bab el Mandeb, and the Gulf of Disagree Agree more circumspect than those in Figure 3. actual numbers in response to the question Aden over the next five years. Similarly, the Workshop experts were not in agreement on the number of piracy attacks A greater number of experts—16—either appear in Figure 5, and indicate that only Page | 6 Number of experts in each column. 1 100 12 1 attacked 17 and3 anticipated to occurresponding in the region in 2012. In 2008, more than vessels were disagreed or strongly disagreed with one expert disagreed with the statement more than3:40Anticipated were hijackedImpact successfully in watersPiracy off the Horn of Africa. When “By Figure of Somali Europe to piracy Asia asked, Trade the that the likely impact that “Inon order toincurb inthe theestimates offshore 2012,proposition how many vessels do you expect to beof successfully hijacked the region?,” Somali piracy on global shipping will be region, it is necessary for law and order among of the anticipatedcharacterized level of piracy a low of 2 orpiracy 3 per year to a to In figurethe 3,experts the experts individually theranged likely from impact of Somali on Europe“severe.” Seven participants registered a bethe restored inrange. Puntland and the coastal high of 450 attacks per through year, with 50 to to-Asia maritime trade themost Suezresponses Canal andinthe Gulf of250 Aden. Although 13 experts either “neutral” response, and no expert was in areas of Somalia.” strongly disagreed or disagreed, 20 were in agreement or strong agreement. On this question it is strong agreement the Theretowas, however, strong agreement thatseverity in orderoffor to bepiracy successfully safe say there waswith aquite lack ofstatement. consensus on the theSomali impactpiracy of Somali along the Question 5 poses a broader challenge—if addressed, the rule of law has to be restored in Puntland. Puntland is the region of Somalia that critical trade route connecting Europe and Asia. Similarly, the Workshop experts were not it is necessary to restore law and order serves as the primary staging area for most piracy emanating from the country. Thirty-three outin in agreement on considered thestrongly number of that piracy Somalia, can that goalshipping bewas achieved? of 34 experts agreed or agreed restoration thehow rule of law inglobal Somalia The Workshop also the anticipated impact ofofSomali piracy on over attacks to occur in the in inare There isto an absence of international essential for curbing piracy. The actual response the question in Figure 5, the next anticipated five years, and the results of region thatnumbers question contained in Figure 4. appear and indicate that only one expert disagreed with the statement that, “In order to curb piracy in the offshore region, it is necessary lawtoand order toonbe restored in Puntland and areas The impact of Somali piracy is for likely be severe 1 2 3 the coastal 4 5 of Somalia” global shipping trade over the next five years. Strongly Disagree Neutral Agree Strongly Disagree Agree Number of experts responding in each column. 2 14 7 11 0 . Figure 4: Anticipated ImpactImpact of Somali Piracy onGlobal Global Shipping Figure 4: Anticipated of Somali Piracy on Shipping Trade Trade Regarding the impact of Somali piracy on global shipping over the next five years, the results displayed in Figure 4 were even more circumspect than those in Figure 3. A greater number of experts—16—either disagreed or strongly disagreed with the proposition that the likely impact of Somali piracy on global shipping will be “severe.” Seven participants registered a “neutral”

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In order to curb piracy in the offshore region, it is necessary for law and order to be restored in Puntland and the coastal areas of Somalia. Number of experts responding in each column.

1 2 3 4 5 Strongly Disagree Neutral Agree Strongly Disagree Agree 0 1 0 10 23

Figure 5: Necessity ofLaw Restoring and Order in Somalia Figure 5: Necessity of Restoring andLaw Order in Somalia

Question 5 on poses a broader challenge—if it is necessary to restore lawMany and order in Somalia, how consensus how to engineer the stabiliSoutheast Asia. observers credit can that goal be achieved? There is an absence of international consensus for how to engineer the zation and reconstruction of Somalia, with these efforts with reducing the incidence stabilization andsoreconstruction Somalia, with some analyststhroughout so discouragedthe thatAsia-Pacific, they are some analysts discouraged of that they are of piracy doubtful the country can be stabilized any time soon. The elusive quest for crafting a “Somalia doubtful the country can be stabilized any and these efforts have knit the nations policy,” has persisted since the collapse of the country in 1991. Although neither the United time soon. The elusive quest for crafting a together in a regional counter-piracy comStates nor other nations have successfully implemented a coherent approach for revitalizing the “Somalia policy” has persisted since the munity. Asian counter-piracy cooperation country, the issue of piracy has attracted greater public attention toward the plight of Somalia. collapse of the country in 1991. Although has emerged from three mutually supportOn April 23 2009, thirty nations participated in a UN meeting in Brussels and developed a $250 neither the United States nor other nations ing initiatives. First, under the leadership million plan to rebuild stability in the fractured state. Strengthening regional maritime security in have implemented a coherent in 2004,The sixteen nations signed ordersuccessfully to reduce piracy was among the top concernsofatJapan the conference. international approach the adversity country, into the opportunity the “Regional Agreement on some Combating communityfor hasrevitalizing a chance to turn and perhaps try to bring 2 issue of piracy has order attracted public Piracy and Armed measure of law and to thegreater country. Most NWC Workshop experts Robbery” agreed that (ReCAAP). restoring attention toward was the essential plight oftoSomalia. On andReCAAP dedicated solely order in Puntland curb piracy, it remainsistothe be first seen treaty whether the donor’s April 23, 2009, thirtya nations participated to combating piracy. The treaty established conference will make positive and marked difference. in a UN meeting in Brussels and developed an organization that operates an advanced a $250 million plan to rebuild stability in information fusion and sharing center in the fractured state. Strengthening regional Singapore. The Information Sharing Centre maritime security in order to reduce piracy (ISC) helps individual nations take action to During the past five years, a large group of Asian states have come together toto cooperate order was among the top concerns at the conferavoid piracy attacks, and respondinmore to counter piracy in the Straits of Malacca and Singapore and throughout Southeast Asia. Many ence. The international community has a effectively to piracy when it occurs. Secobservers credit these efforts with reducing the incidence of piracy in throughout the Asia-Pacific, chance to turn adversity into opportunity ond, beginning 2005, more than twentyand these efforts have knit the nations together in a regional counter-piracy community. Asian and perhaps try to bring some measure of five states that regularly use the Straits of counter-piracy cooperation has emerged from three mutually-supporting initiatives. First, under law and order to the country. Most NWC Malacca and Singapore, including the large the leadership of Japan in 2004, sixteen nations signed the “Regional Agreement on Combating Workshop experts agreed that restoring trading nations of China, Japan, the United Piracy and Armed Robbery” (ReCAAP).2 ReCAAP is the first treaty dedicated solely to order in Puntland was essential to curb States and Korea, began meeting with the combating piracy. The treaty established an organization that operates an advanced information piracy, andsharing it remains seen whether littoralSharing states Centre of Malaysia, Indonesia and fusion and centertoinbe Singapore. The Information (ISC) helps individual the donors’ conference will make a positoeffectively develop atocombined nations take action to avoid piracy attacks, and to Singapore respond more piracy whenframeit tive and marked difference. work for improving maritime safety in the occurs. Second, beginning in 2005, more than twenty-five states that regularly use the Straits of 3 Straits. The meetings were sponsored Malacca and Singapore, including the large trading nations of China, Japan, the United States by International Maritime Organization, and Regional Korea, began meeting with the littoral states ofthe Malaysia, Indonesia, and Singapore to II. 3 the UN specialized agency for maritime develop a combined framework for improving maritime safety in the Straits. The meetings were Responses matters and shipping regulation located in London. After several years, the user 2 The sixteen countries were the People’s Republic of Bangladesh, Brunei Darussalam, the Kingdom of Cambodia, During theRepublic past five years,thea Republic large group ofthe Republic nationsof and littoral states signed “Cothe People’s of China, of India, Indonesia, Japan, the Republic of the Korea, the Asian statesDemocratic have come together to cooperan agreement that Lao People’s Republic, Malaysia, the Union of operative Myanmar, theMechanism,” Republic of the Philippines, the Republic of Singapore, Socialistin Republic of Sri Lanka, the Kingdom Thailand, Socialist Republic of ate in orderthe toDemocratic counter piracy the Straits enables userofstates tothehelp littoral states Viet Nam. of develop maritime security capacity for 3 Malacca and Singapore and throughout Kuala Lumpur Meeting on the Straits of Malacca and Singapore: Enhancing Safety, Security, and Environmental

II. Regional Responses

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Protection, Sept. 18–20, 2006, Kuala Lumpur Statement on Enhancement on Safety, Security and Environmental

The sixteen countries were the People’s Republic of Bangladesh, Brunei Darussalam, the Kingdom of Cambodia, the People’s Republic of China, the Republic of India, the Republic of Indonesia, Japan, the Republic of Korea, the Lao People’s Democratic Republic, Malaysia, the Union . of Myanmar, the Republic of the Philippines, the Republic of Singapore, the Democratic Socialist Republic of Sri Lanka, the Kingdom of Thailand, the Socialist Republic of Viet Nam. 3 Kuala Lumpur Meeting on the Straits of Malacca and Singapore: Enhancing Safety, Security, and Environmental Protection, Sept. 18–20, 2006, Kuala Lumpur Statement on Enhancement on Safety, Security and Environmental Protection in the Straits of Malacca and Singapore, IMO Doc. KUL 1/4 (Sept. 20, 2006), available at http://www.imo.org/includes/blastDataOnly.asp/data_id%3D15677/kualalumpurstatement.pdf.

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littoral states develop maritime security capacity for better management of the straits.4 Third, the three littoral states along the Straits of Malacca and Singapore also began coordinating surface and air patrols throughout the straits in order to improve security in the area. Recently Thailand Page | 8 has joined the efforts. The NWC Workshop experts considered whether these three East Asian initiatives could be transplanted successfully to East Africa. Although the benefits of doing so were potentially significant, the responses represented in Figure 6 indicate that the experts were 4 betterdivided management of the straits. Third, the but evenmodel they face a startling lack of goverquite on the feasibility of transplanting “Asian” of counter-piracy cooperation sponsored by the International Maritime Organization, the UN specialized agency for maritime the international three littoralinstitutions states along theHorn Straits of nance, security bureaucratic capacity. and to the of Africa. Thirteen experts and disagreed or strongly matters shipping regulation locatedcoordiin London. Afterregion severalisyears, the user nationsdynamic, and Malaccaand and Singapore also began not economically disagreed that the Asian initiatives were a suitable The model for East Africa. littoral states signed the “Cooperative Mechanism,” an agreement that enables user states to help nating surface and air patrols throughout like East Asia. Consequently, the area littoral states develop maritime security capacity for better management of the straits.4 Third, the the straits in order to improve security suffers1from a low base, The responses to piracy Asia are aofmodel thatand can 2 tax coordinating 3 low4penetration 5 three littoral states alonginthe Straits Malacca Singapore also began surface in transplanted the area. Recently Thailand has joined of technology and difficulty in integrating be to the Horn of Africa. Strongly Disagree Neutral Agree Strongly and air patrols throughout the straits in order to improve security in the area. Recently Thailand Page | 8 the efforts. The NWC Workshop experts from different backgrounds. Disagree Agree has joined the efforts. The NWC Workshop expertscitizenry considered whether these three East Asian considered whether these three East Asian Number of experts responding in each column. 4 9 7 11 1 initiatives could be transplanted successfully to East Africa. Although the benefits of doing so initiatives be transplanted successSimilarly, all to ofEast theexperts discussants Figure 6: could Transplanting “Asian” Counter-piracy Africa were potentially significant, thethe responses represented in Figurenearly 6 Model indicate that the were fully to East Africa. Although the benefits disagreed or strongly disagreed that no quite divided on the feasibility of transplanting the “Asian” model of counter-piracy cooperation of doing so were potentially significant, the bethe required even Figure 7 show thatinstitutions the expertstowere nearly however, inwould rejecting notion that no if and international the Horn ofunanimous, Africa.modifications Thirteen experts disagreed or strongly responses represented in Figure 6off indicate the “Asian” of key differences exist between piracy the coast of Somalia andmodel piracy infighting Southeastpiracy Asia. could disagreed that the Asian initiatives were a suitable model for East Africa. Somalia has been characterized as a “failed state,” embroiled in crime, ethnic and tribal conflict, endemic corruption and in a suffering a woeful lack of 1effective governance, The responses to piracy Asia are from a model that can 2 3 predictability 4 5 and the rule of law. The social fabric and governance of the country is in disrepair. The Strongly be transplanted to the Horn of Africa. Strongly Disagree Neutral Agree neighboring nations of East Africa are comparatively more functional, but still even they face a Disagree Agree startling lack of governance, security and bureaucratic capacity. The region is not economically Number of experts responding in each column. 4 9 7 11 1 dynamic, like East Asia. Consequently, the area suffers from a low tax base, low penetration of Figure 6: Transplanting the “Asian” Counter-piracy Model to Eastto Africa Figure 6: Transplanting the “Asian” Counter-piracy Model East Africa technology and difficulty in integrating the citizenry from different backgrounds.

Figure 7 show that the experts were nearly unanimous, however, in rejecting the notion that no There are no key differences between countering 1 2 3 4 5 key differences exist between piracy off the coast of Somalia and piracy in Southeast Asia. piracy in the Horn of Africa and countering piracy in Strongly Disagree Neutral Agree Strongly Somalia has been characterized as a “failed state,” embroiled in crime, ethnic and tribal conflict, Southeast Asia. Disagree Agree endemic corruption and a suffering from a woeful lack of effective governance, predictability Number of experts in eachand column. 17 country13is in disrepair. 0 1 1 and the rule of law.responding The social fabric governance of the The Figure KeyAfrica Differences between Horn of Africa andand Southeast Asia Figure 7: Key Differences between thethe Horn of Africa Southeast Asia neighboring nations of 7: East are comparatively more functional, but still even they face a startling lack of governance, security and bureaucratic capacity. The region is not economically that the experts divided on be transplanted tobase, Africa. if East dynamic, like Eastwere Asia.quite Consequently, the the area suffers from a low tax low Clearly, penetration of feasibility and of difficulty transplanting the “Asian” Asian and institutions are to technology in integrating the citizenry from approaches different backgrounds. model of counter-piracy cooperation and be adopted in East Africa, they will have international institutions to the Horn of Afto2meet local There are no key differences between countering to be tailored 3 conditions. 4 5The 1 rica. Thirteen experts disagreed or strongly in Figure 8 nearly replipiracy in the Horn of Africa and countering piracy results in Strongly Disagree Neutralperfectly Agree Strongly disagreedAsia. that the Asian initiatives were a cateDisagree those in Figure 7, and only oneAgree expert Southeast suitableof model forresponding East Africa. that13 no modification would Number experts in each column. suggested 17 0 1 1 Protection in the Straits of Malacca and Singapore, IMO Doc. KUL 1/4, (Sept. 20, 2006), available at be needed for and transplanting “Asian Figure 7: Key includes/blastDataOnly.asp/data_id%3D15677/ Differences between the Horn ofkualalumpurstatement.pdf. Africa Southeastthe Asia http://www.imo.org/ model” to the Horn of Africa. 4Figure 7 shows that the experts were nearly The Singapore meeting also recognized the contributions of the straits states in the development of Malacca Strait unanimous, however, in rejecting the nosecurity initiatives. tion that no key differences exist between III. Diplomatic .piracy off the coast of Somalia and piracy in Southeast Asia. Somalia is a “failed state,” Responses embroiled in crime, ethnic and tribal conflict, endemic corruption and a suffering Given that it is unlikely that quick progress from a woeful lack of effective governance, can be made in changing the fundamental Protection in the Straits of Malacca Singapore, IMO Doc. KUL 1/4, (Sept. 20, are 2006),abetting available atpiracy, the predictability and the rule ofand law. The social conditions that http://www.imo.org/ includes/blastDataOnly.asp/data_id%3D15677/ kualalumpurstatement.pdf. fabric and governance of the country are in immediate focus must be on containing it 4 The Singapore meeting also recognized the contributions of the straits states in the development of Malacca Strait disrepair. The neighboring nations of East and taking cost-effective measures to resecurity initiatives. Africa are comparatively more functional, duce or manage the risk. The international . The Singapore meeting also recognized the contributions of the straits states in the development of Malacca Strait security initiatives. 4

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piracy could be transplanted to Africa, they disagreed or strongly disagreed that no modifications would be required. Clearly, if East Asian approaches and institutions were to be adopted in East Africa, they would have to be tailored to meet local conditions. The results in Figure 8 nearly perfectly replicate those in Figure 7, and only one expert suggested that no modification would Page | 9 be needed for transplanting the “Asian model” to the Horn of Africa. No modifications of the approaches in Asia would be 1 2 3 4 5 needed for countering piracy in the Horn of Africa. Strongly Disagree Neutral Agree Strongly Disagree Agree Number of experts responding in each column. 18 13 0 1 0 Figure 8: No Modification Asian ApproachesNeeded Needed forfor Somalia Figure 8: No Modification of Asianof Approaches Somalia

III. Diplomatic Responses In the 90 days from November 2008

Contact Group on Piracy off the Coast of Somalia (“Contact Group”) and a regional counter-piracy agreement, the through January 2009, greatercan be nonbinding Given that it is unlikely that quickaprogress made in changing the fundamental conditions Djibouti Code of Conduct. With a view that are abetting the immediate focus must be on containing it and taking cost-effective number of piracy, positive developments toward building on this progress, the measures to reduce or manage the risk. The international community already has achieved occurred in international countersignificant diplomatic success in countering piracy.experts were asked to consider how much responsibility various global actors had piracy law and diplomacy than had for 2009, addressing problem of piracy off Inunfolded the 90 daysinfrom through January a greaterthe number of positive the November previous 2008 90 years. the coast of Somalia. Among the choices developments occurred in international counter-piracy law and diplomacy than had unfolded in were regional states, the shipping industhe previous 90 years. The recent efforts include development of the previously mentioned UN and flag states, under or thechapter nations with the community alreadyReport—plus has achievedtwo significant study—the Nairobi UN Securitytry Council resolutions VII of the largest number of registered vessels at diplomatic success in countering piracy. UN charter (authorizing states to take “all necessary measures”), two bilateral agreements from attack. aggregated between the United States and the United Kingdomrisk on the onepiracy hand and Kenya,The on the other, to arein presented in Figure with a The recent efforts of scores facilitate transfer of include detained development pirates from warships to courts Mombasa, creation of a9,UN of 1Group) indicating a low nonbinding responsibilthe previously UNCoast study—the Contact Group onmentioned Piracy off the of Somalia score (“Contact and a regional counter-piracy agreement, two the Djibouti Code of Conduct. a viewoftoward building on athis ity andWith a score 100 indicating high Nairobi Report—plus UN Security progress, resolutions the experts were asked to consider how much responsibility various global actors had responsibility. Council under chapter VII of for addressing the problem of piracy off the coast of Somalia. Among the choices were regional the UN charter (authorizing states to take states,necessary the shipping industry andtwo flag states, or the nations with theinlargest number of registered Interestingly, Figure 9 the average score “all measures”), bilateral vessels at risk from piracy attack. The aggregated scores are presented in Figure 9, with a score agreements between the United States among the Workshop experts for placing figure 9 the average score among the Workshop for placing of 1 Interestingly, indicating a in low responsibility a score of 100 indicatingexperts a high responsibility. responsibility with regional states, the and the United Kingdom, onand the one responsibility with regional states, the shipping industry and flag states was fairly similar, shipping industry and flag states was hand, and Kenya, on the other, to facilitate ranging from an average of 60 to 65. transfer of detained pirates from warships fairly similar, ranging from an average of to courts in Mombasa, creation of a UN 60 to 65. Page | 10

.

Figure 9: Responsibility for Countering Piracy ininthe Africa Figure 9: Responsibility for Countering Piracy theHorn Horn ofof Africa 8

The Workshop experts also were asked to score the importance of various international institutions in countering maritime piracy off the Horn of Africa. The experts each assigned a value to the relative importance of the particular international institution for addressing the problem of piracy off the coast of Somalia. Figure 10 illustrates the scores, which are explained

Figure 9: Responsibility for Countering Piracy in the Horn of Africa The Workshop experts also were asked to score the importance of various international institutions in countering maritime piracy off the Horn of Africa. The experts each assigned a value to the relative importance of the particular international institution for addressing the problem of piracy off the coast of Somalia. Figure 10 illustrates the scores, which are explained on the next page.

Figure of 10:International Importance of International Organizations Figure 10: Importance Organizations

The Workshop experts also were asked to . score the importance of various international institutions in countering maritime piracy off the Horn of Africa. The experts each assigned a value to the relative importance of the particular international institution for addressing the problem of piracy off the coast of Somalia. Figure 10 illustrates the scores.

underway were well integrated with the naval efforts to suppress piracy. Figure 11 indicates that there was not widespread agreement among the experts on whether diplomatic efforts were well integrated with operational naval activities, with two or more participants selecting each of the five possible responses.

In addition to responding to these quesA value of 1 means that the institution tions, the experts were able to provide has no importance, whereas a score of recommendations on other diplomatic 100 means that the institution is of critical initiatives that might offer some promise. importance. Figure the It was whereas noted that the Djibouti Code ofthe ConA value of 1 meant that10 thedisplays institutionthat had no importance, a score of 100 meant that institutionscores was ofof critical importance. Figure 10 displays that athe average scores of importance average importance for counterduct was nonbinding instrument, and that for counter-piracy of the United Nations Security Council topped list at states 78. Second, with an piracy of the United Nations Security the Arab andthe African that negotiated average score of 68, International Maritimethe Organization. European Union Council topped thewas listthe at 78. Second, with agreementThe should make it awas bindingPage | 11 scored third. score of 68, was the Internaan average treaty. Furthermore, states from outside tional Maritime Organization. The Eurothe area should be encouraged to provide The Workshop also considered the question of whether the diplomatic underway were in pean Union was scored third. maritime securityefforts capacity assistance well integrated with the naval efforts to suppress piracy. Figure 11 indicates that there was not the form of training, communications, widespread agreement among the experts on whether diplomatic efforts were well integrated The Workshop also considered the quessmall boats and security infrastructure to with operational naval activities, with two or more participants selecting each of the five possible tion of whether the diplomatic efforts the nations of the Horn of Africa. Just as responses. Diplomatic efforts and naval efforts are well integrated. Number of experts responding in each column.

1 2 3 4 5 Strongly Disagree Neutral Agree Strongly Disagree Agree 2 8 11 8 4

Figure 11: Integrating and Naval Efforts Figure 11: Integrating Diplomatic andDiplomatic Naval Efforts

In addition to responding to these questions, the experts were able to provide recommendations on other diplomatic initiatives that might offer some promise. It was noted that the Djibouti Code of Conduct was a nonbinding instrument, and that the Arab and African states that negotiated the agreement should make it a binding treaty. Furthermore, states from outside the area should be encouraged to provide maritime security capacity assistance in the form of training,

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Japan provided leadership in construction of a regional counter-piracy center in Singapore, one or more nations should assist the regional states in the construction and operation of a regional maritime security coordination center.

implement a counter-piracy “rewards for justice” program that helps to identify and apprehend the leading offenders.

IV. Operational Coordination

The UN Security Council should consider should implement a counter-piracy “rewards for justice” program thatlongest helps tocoastline identify and additional authorization for naval forces Somalia has the in Africa eventually apprehend the leading offenders. operating in the area to seize the accoutreand there are over 2 million square miles ments of piracy, such as high horsepower of water at risk of piracy, complicating outboard motors mounted on the stern naval strategy. The experts were divided of Somali skiffs. One method of enabling on whether the world’s naval forces were Page | 12 this strategy would be for the UN Security effective piracy Horn Somalia has the longest coastline in Africa and there are overin2 addressing million square miles in of the water at Council to declare a specifically tailored of Africa. Not one agreed risk of piracy, complicating naval strategy. The experts were divided on expert whetherstrongly the world’s naval forces were effective in addressing piracy the Horn of Africa. Not forces one expert strongly maritime exclusion zone adjacent to the So- in that the world’s naval are effectively agreed that the world’s naval forces areofeffectively addressing the piracy off off malia coastline, forbidding the use large addressing theissue issueofofmaritime maritime piracy the coast of Somalia (Figure 12). outboard motors throughout Somalia’s the coast of Somalia (Figure 12).

IV. Operational Coordination

The world’s naval forces are effectively addressing 1 2 3 4 5 the issue of maritime piracy off the coast of Somalia. Strongly Disagree Neutral Agree Strongly Disagree Agree Number of experts responding in each column. 3 13 4 10 0 Figure 12: World’s Naval Forces Effectively Addressing Piracy Piracy Figure 12: World’s Naval Forces Effectively Addressing

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exclusive iteconomic Fishermen and Moreover, it iswarships unlikelyfrom thatdistant the deployment Moreover, is unlikelyzone. that the deployment of large numbers of states into the areacivil is sustainable. Many of the nations that have sent warships areofunaccustomed to distant other traffic have little justification of large numbers warships from operating far from home watersmotors, and without logistical support unfamiliar for high-powered outboard which states into inthe area is regions. sustainable. Many Furthermore, it is notand clear fast that such a large area can patrolled, evenwarships by a large are propel the small pirate skiffs, of realistically the nationsbethat have sent multinational force. It would take more than 60 warships to providetoanoperating effective presence enabling them to overtake large merchant unaccustomed far from home throughout just a single narrow vessel transit corridor. Until other more effective approaches vessels. By banning the use of such high waters and without logistical supportarein developed and begin to show progress, however, there is no immediate for operational horsepower engines, the international unfamiliar regions.substitute Furthermore, it is not patrols by major maritime powers. In fact, Figure 13 indicates that a majority of Workshop community can reduce the availability of clear that such a large area can realistically experts—18 outpirate of 22—either strongly agreed that out-of-area forces should be the means of attack.agreed Such or engines be patrolled, even bynaval a large multinational doing even to counter piracy. should be more subject to seizure and destrucforce. It would take more than 60 warships tion on sight by the international naval to provide an effective presence throughout The out-of-area naval forces should be doing morejust in a single 2 3 transit 4 corridor. 5 1 forces operating in the area. narrow vessel countering piracy. Neutralapproaches Agree Strongly Strongly Until other Disagree more effective are Disagree Agree The Contact Group should adopt a means developed and begin to show progress, Number of experts responding in each column. 2 there 2is no immediate 8 16 substitute 2 of decoupling the Somali piracy gangs from however, Figure Naval Be Doing More the tribal13: andOut-of-area social structure of theForces countryShould for operational patrols by major maritime through targeted aid and increased support powers. In fact, Figure 13 indicates that a to alternative centers of authority inside the majority of Workshop experts—18 out of country. The donors’ conference is a first 22—either agreed or strongly agreed that step toward realizing this approach. Furout-of-area naval forces should be doing thermore, the international community, poseven more to counter piracy. sibly working through INTERPOL, should

throughout just a single narrow vessel transit corridor. Until other more effective approaches are developed and begin to show progress, however, there is no immediate substitute for operational patrols by major maritime powers. In fact, Figure 13 indicates that a majority of Workshop experts—18 out of 22—either agreed or strongly agreed that out-of-area naval forces should be doing even more to counter piracy. The out-of-area naval forces should be doing more in 1 2 3 4 5 countering piracy. Strongly Disagree Neutral Agree Strongly Disagree Agree Number of experts responding in each column. 2 2 8 16 2 Figure 13: Out-of-area Naval Forces Should Be Doing More Figure 13: Out-of-area Naval Forces Should Be Doing More

The Workshop experts narrated additional . operational options that might be implemented, and these include the use of: • Deception. “Q-ships”—warships disguised as civil merchant shipping. • Land strike. The use of armed force against safe havens and logistics activities on the shore. Land strikes against identified pirate staging areas would be difficult to conduct and likely ignite anti-western reaction and inflame Muslim passion—making the cure worse than the disease. • Blockade. Monitor the entrance and egress of shipping into and out of Somalia in order to cut pirates off from their bases on land. • Embargo. Prevent the introduction, by land, sea or air, of weapons, communications devices and other equipment destined for use by pirate gangs. • Tailored Exclusion Zone. Use naval forces to prevent the use of certain items or devices, such as high horsepower outboard motors, in designated areas, such as Somalia’s exclusive economic zone. • Unmanned Systems. Greater use of unmanned systems for detection and monitoring of piracy activity may reduce

warship requirements and serve as a force multiplier for intelligence, surveillance and reconnaissance. • Smaller Warships. Employment of smaller warships, such as patrol craft and corvettes, should be embraced over the long term, making the task of combating piracy more efficient. Maritime powers should develop simultaneously regional coastal maritime security capacity, complementing or eventually replacing the foreign presence. • Regional Coordination. In the near term, there is a need to identify a single contact point for vessels facing an immediate threat, such as UK Maritime Trade Operations (UKMTO) Dubai. Over the long term, creation of a regional maritime security coordination center to fuse intelligence and share information is essential to shift responsibility toward regional states. This presents an opportunity for regional states dependent on the safety of freedom of navigation in the Horn of Africa—specifically Egypt, Saudi Arabia and the Gulf states—to provide funding and training for such a center. • Somali Coast Guard. Development of a Somali coastal force is a necessary, but long-term, proposition.

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V. Focus on Somalia Regional and maritime action is required to contend with the challenge so long as pirates enjoy sustained sanctuary in Somalia. The last time the international community took military action to change the situation in Somalia, it did not go well. • Governance. It is unclear whether a stronger central government or stronger clan system would yield greater stability and governance. The dichotomy implicates all of the promise—and difficulty—experienced in Iraq and Afghanistan. • Somali Development. Providing greater development assistance to Somali clan elders who may have some influence in reducing piracy. • Piracy Financing. Explore the potential for disrupting the piracy financing and ransom system through coordinated banking security.

VI. Industry & Shipping Security The international civil shipping industry will have to take additional steps to ensure the safety of merchant shipping in the area of greatest risk. Merchant ships should continue to broaden their defensive responses, to include passive measures such barbed wire The international civil shipping industry will have to takeasadditional steps around to ensurethe the lifelines, safety of and ships consider employment of organic merchant shipping in the area of greatest risk. Merchant should continue to broaden their or Page | 15 defensive responses, to include passive measures such as barbed wire security around theonlifelines contract vessel boardand some consider employment of organic or contract vessel security on board some ships, such as ships, such as dredgers and barges or dredgers and barges or those carrying sensitive cargo. those carrying sensitive cargo.

VI. Industry & Shipping Security

Counter-piracy approaches by the private sector appear to align well with the threat assessment we heard this morning. Number of experts responding in each column.

1 2 3 4 5 Strongly Disagree Neutral Agree Strongly Disagree Agree 0 3 9 16 4

14: Private Sector Approaches Figure 14: Private SectorFigure Approaches

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VII. The U.S. Government

VIII. Conclusion

The depth of discussion and variety and originality of the discourse, conducted In considering the U.S. interagency in a non-attribution environment, were process, the experts had mixed views on productive. The seizure of the Maersk Alawhether the disparate departments and bama, in particular, has elicited numerous agencies were working together successcommentators who suggest meaningless fully to address Somali piracy, with more prescriptions, such as “time to get tough,” experts characterizing the level of success or “we have to change the risk-reward calas neutral or successful. culus” of the pirates. Ultimately, everyone agrees that the best solution is for a restoraFinally, the majority of experts believed tion of law and order to develop within the that the interagency community was workcountry of Somalia, but neither the intering well to counter piracy. national community nor the United States has been able to devise such an outcome. The finding in Figure 16 is particularly The much harder questions lie behind encouraging since the experts also rejected In considering the U.S. interagency process, the experts mixedand views on whether the thinkthosehad slogans, require patiently the idea that there were no impediments disparate departments and agencies were working together successfully address Somali piracy, ing through specifictoalternative courses of that more had to be overcome in order to faciliwith experts characterizing the level of success as neutral or successful. action based on an accurate picture of the Page | 16 tate interagency cooperation. In considering the U.S. interagency process, the experts hadand mixed views on whether the piracy. causes motivators of Somali Within thedepartments US government, the interagency 2 to 3 4 illustrated 5 1 successfully disparate and agencies were working together address Somali piracy, Furthermore, the Workshop community is working successfully to Disagree Neutral Agree Strongly Strongly with more experts theprocess, level of the success as neutral or successful. In considering the characterizing U.S. together interagency experts had mixed views on whether the that no single solution will solve the prob- Page | 16 counter disparatepiracy. departments and agencies were working together successfully to address piracy, lemDisagree of Somali piracy. If thereSomali is theAgree desire with more characterizing the of success as neutral or successful. Number ofexperts experts responding eachlevel column. 1 5 8 10 05 Within the US government, theininteragency 2 3 4 Page | 16 to find progress in adversity, the rampant community is working together successfully to Disagree Neutral Agree Strongly Strongly Figure 15: The Success of the U.S. Interagency Process counter piracy. Disagree Agree Within the US government, the interagency 1 2 3 4 5 community is working together successfully to Strongly Disagree Neutral Agree Strongly Number of experts responding in each column. 1 5 8 10 Finally, the majority experts believed that the interagency community was working well to 0 counter piracy. Disagree Agree counter Figurepiracy. 15: The Success of the U.S. Interagency Process Number of experts responding in each column. 1 5 8 10 0 Figure TheU.S. Success ofinteragency the U.S. Interagency Process Within US government, the interagency 1community 2 was working 3 4 to 5 Finally, the majority experts believed that the well Figurethe 15: The Success of15: the Interagency Process community is working together well to counter Strongly Disagree Neutral Agree Strongly counter piracy. piracy. Disagree Finally, the majority experts believed that the interagency community was working well toAgree counterthe piracy. Number of US experts responding each column. 01 32 53 16 05 Within government, theininteragency 4 community working together well to counter Works Strongly Disagree Neutral Agree Strongly Figure 16:isThe Interagency Community Well piracy. Disagree Agree Within the US government, the interagency 1 2 3 4 5 community is tocolumn. counter Strongly Disagree Agree Strongly Number of experts responding inwell each 0 experts 3 alsoNeutral 5 16idea 0 The finding in working figure 16together is particularly encouraging since the rejected the that piracy. Disagree Agree Figure The Interagency Community Works Well interagency there were no The impediments that 16: hadCommunity to be overcome in orderWell to facilitate Figure 16: Interagency Works Number of experts responding in each column. 0 3 5 16 0 cooperation. The finding figure 16 is particularly encouragingWorks since the experts also rejected the idea that Figure 16:inThe Interagency Community Well There are no UShad government efforts in order 1 to facilitate 2 3 4 5 there were noimpediments impedimentstothat to be overcome interagency to achieve Strongly Disagree Strongly cooperation. The findinginteragency in figure 16cooperation. is particularly encouraging since the experts alsoNeutral rejectedAgree the idea that Agree there were no impediments that had to be overcome inDisagree order to facilitate interagency cooperation. Number responding in government each column.efforts 31 16 43 14 15 There areofnoexperts impediments to US 2 Figure 17: Interagency Impediments to achieve interagency cooperation. Strongly Disagree Neutral Agree Strongly Figure 17: Interagency Impediments Agree There are no impediments to US government efforts Disagree 1 2 3 4 5 to achieve cooperation. Strongly Disagree Agree Number ofinteragency experts responding in each column. 3 16 Neutral 4 1 Strongly 1 13 Disagree Agree Number of experts responding in each column. Number respondingImpediments in each column. 3 16 4 1 1 Figure of 17:experts Interagency The depth of discussion and variety and originality of the discussion, conducted in a nonNumber of experts responding in each column. attribution environment, was much more productive than typical analysis of the problem. The

VII. The U.S. Government

VII. The U.S. Government VII. The U.S. Government

VIII. Conclusion

piracy off the coast of Somalia, stretching from the seizure of the very large crude carrier Sirius Star in November 2008 to the capture of the Maersk Alabama in April 2009, has focused world attention on an often ignored corner of the globe. One of the most promising courses of action is to build the rule of law and capacity for governance and the maintenance of security throughout the region. All of the regional states, and Somalia in particular, would benefit from increased security assistance and, just as importantly, development of long-lasting governance, economic and security partnerships with neighbors, friends and allies. Operationally, the threat of piracy has presented the first—and by any measure successful—test of the concept of a spontaneous Global Maritime Partnership (GMP) and a validation of the Cooperative Strategy for 21st Century Seapower.5 The follow-through, moving from coordination among the larger out-of-area naval forces and toward regional efforts and local capacity-building, requires commitment, generous resources and political will in East Africa and throughout the globe.

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Participants and Credits The Workshop was comprised of participants from South and East Asia, Europe and the United States. The participants represented a variety of eclectic professional experiences, including international law attorneys, advisers in the areas of oceans policy, irregular maritime warfare and maritime piracy from several continents, representatives of the international civil shipping industry and maritime piracy and naval experts from academic and policy research institutions. A list of the workshop participants, an agenda for the workshop and selected briefs presented may be found on the Internet website of the International Law Department, Naval War College, at http://www.usnwc.edu/cnws/ild/ild .aspx.

James Kraska and Brian Wilson, The Co-operative Strategy and the Pirates of the Gulf of Aden, The RUSI Journal 74–81 (April 2009).

Special thanks to CDR Sandra Selman, USCG, and Mr. Lawrence Modisett for their valuable roles in conducting the Workshop. The International Law Department is thankful to Dr. Stephen DownesMartin for his generous assistance in analyzing the data, to Charlene Bary-Ingerson for operating the Decision Support Center during the event and to Jayne Van Petten for arranging the travel for the Workshop participants.

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