Consti-digested (from Gov't To Justiciable & Political Questions).docx

Villavicencio v. Lukban, 39 Phil 778 (GOVERNMENT OF LAWS AND NOT OF MEN) Facts: Justo Lukban, who was then the Mayor of the City of Manila, ordered the deportation of 170 prostitutes to Davao. His reason for doing so was to preserve the morals of the peope of Manila. He claimed that the prostitutes were sent to Davao, purportedly, to work for a haciendero Feliciano Ynigo. The prostitutes were confined in houses from October 16 to 18 of that year before being boarded, at the dead of night, in two boars bound for Davao. The women were under the assumption that that were being transported to another police station while Ynigo, the haciendero from Davao, had no idea that the women being sent to work for him were actually prostitutes. The families of the prostitutes came forward to file charges against Lukban, Anton Hohmann, the Chief of Police, and Francisco Sales, the Governor of Davao. They prayed for a a writ of habeas corpus to be issued against the respondents to compel them to bring back the 170 women who were deported to Mindanao against their will. During the trial, it came out that, indeed, the women were deported without their consend. In effect, Lukban forcibly assigned them a new domicile. Most of all, there was no law or order authorizing Lukban's deportation of the 170 prostitutes. Issues: 1. Whether we are a government of laws or a government of men 2. The writ of Habeas Corpus was filed by the petitioner, with the prayer that the respondent produce around 170 women whom Justo Lukban et, al deported to Davao. Liberty of abode was also raised versus the power of the executive of the Municipality in deporting the women without their knowledge in his capacity as Mayor Ruling: 1. We are clearly a government of laws. Lukban committed a grave abuse of discretion by deporting the prostitutes to a new domicile against their will. There is no law expressly authorizing his action. On the contrary, there is a law punishing public officials, not expressly authorized by law or regulation, who compels any person to change his residence. Furthermore, the prostitutes are still, as citizens of the Philippines, entitled to the same rights, as stipulated in the Bill of Rights, as every other citizen. Their choice of profession should not be a cause for discrimination. It may make some, like Lukban, quite uncomfortable but it does not authorize anyone to compel said prostitutes to isolate themselves from the rest of the human race. These women have been deprived of their liberty by being exiled to Davao without even being given the opportunity to collect their belongings or, worse, without even 2. The court concluded the case by granting the parties aggrieved the sum of 400 pesos each, plus 100 pesos for nominal damage due to contempt of court. Reasoning further that if the chief xecutive of any municipality in the Philippines could forcibly and illegally take a private citizen and place him beyond the boundaries of the municipality, and then, when called upon to defend his official action, could calmly fold his hands and claim that the person was under no restraint and that he, the official, had no jurisdiction over this other municipality. We believe the true principle should be that, if the respondent is within the jurisdiction of the court and has it in his power to obey the order of the court and thus to undo the wrong that he has inflicted, he should be compelled to do so. Even if the party to whom the writ is addressed has illegally parted with the custody of a person before the application for the writ is no reason why the writ should not issue. If the mayor and the chief of police, acting under no authority of law, could deport these women from the city of Manila to Davao, the same officials must necessarily have the same means to return them from Davao to Manila. The respondents, within the reach of process, may not be permitted to restrain a fellow citizen of her liberty by forcing her to change her domicile and to avow the act with impunity in the courts, while the person who has lost her birthright of liberty has no effective recourse. The great writ of liberty may not thus be easily evaded

Villar v. Technological Institute of the Phil, 135 SCR 706 (EDUCATION) Facts: Petitioners Villar, Recitis, Barreto, Salcon, de Leon, Laxamana and Guilatco were all refused enrollment at the Technological Institute of the Philippines (TIP) due to their exercise of their constitutional right to freedom of assembly. As held in MALABANAN vs RAMENTO, petitioners cannot be barred from enrollment for their exercise of their freedom of assembly. In opposition to the petition filed by petitioners, respondent made reference to the academic records of petitioners, invoking the constitutional provision on academic freedom enjoyed by institutions of higher learning .Petitioners Barreto, de Leon, Jr. and Laxamana all obtained failing grades while petitioners Villar, Salcon, Guilatco and Recitis met the requirements for retention in the said institute, entitling them to the writs of certiorari and prohibition against TIP. Issues: 1. Whether or not petitioners can be barred from enrollment for their exercise of their freedom of assembly. 2. Whether or not TIP is under no obligation to admit the students with failing grades under the constitutional provision on academic freedom regarded to institution of higher learning Ruling: 1. NO. Petitioners have a valid cause for complaint if the exercise of the constitutional rights to free speech and peaceable assembly was visited by their expulsion from respondent College. 2. YES. The academic freedom enjoyed by "institutions of higher learning" includes the right to set academic standards to determine under what circumstances failing grades suffice for the expulsion of students. Once it has done so, however, that standard should be followed meticulously. It cannot be utilized to discriminate against those students who exercise their constitutional rights to peaceable assembly and free speech. If it does so, then there is a legitimate grievance by the students thus prejudiced, their right to the equal protection clause being disregarded. To that extent therefore, there is justification for excluding three of the aforementioned petitioners because of their marked academic deficiency. Tagonan v. Cruz Pano, 137 SCRA 245 (EDUCATION) Facts: Petitioner Mely Tangonan was temporarily admitted in May 1975 at the Capitol Medical School of Nursing for the school year 1975-1976, as a second year student. In her second semester, she flunked in Psychiatric Nursing but was allowed to cross-enroll in said subject in Summer 1976 at the De Ocampo Memorial School. Then she was reported to have attempted to bribe Dean Florencia Pagador as confirmed by petitioner's letter of apology, saying sorry for offering 50 to the dean in exchange for admitting her officially in the said school. When she applied for reenrolment at respondent school (Capitol Medical Center School of Nursing), she was not accepted after evaluating her academic and clinical performance as well as her attitudes and behaviors, which included bribing and not writing a letter to the Board of Admission requesting for re-admission and apologizing for what she did. Informed of the said board's decision disallowing her re-admission, petitioner lodged a complaint against the school before the Department of Education, Regional Office No. 4. Petitioner filed a petition for mandamus 6 before the Court of First Instance of Rizal, Branch XVIII, presided over by respondent Judge, praying that pending adjudication of the case on the merit, an ex-parte order be issued commanding respondents to admit petitioner to enroll and attend classes upon payment of the prescribed fees; and after hearing, judgment be rendered requiring respondents to pay damages and attorney's fees. Issues: 1. Whether or not the petitioner has the right to mandamus 2. Whether respondent school had any legal ground for refusing to admit the petitioner Ruling: 1. No. Petitioner's case in the court below is that of mandamus, to compel respondent to admit petitioner in its School of Nursing. Under Rule 65, Section 3 of the Rules of Court, mandamus lies under any of the following cases: (1) against any tribunal which unlawfully neglects the performance of an act which the law specifically enjoins as a duty; (2) in case any corporation, board or person unlawfully neglects the

performance of an act which the law enjoins as a duty resulting from an office, trust or station; and (3) in case any tribunal, corporation, board or person unlawfully excludes another from the use and enjoyment of a right or office to which such other is legally entitled and there is no other plain, speedy and adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law. In the case at bar, the petitioner has miserably failed to show a clear legal right to be admitted and be enrolled in respondent's School of Nursing. Thus, petitioner is not legally entitled to the issuance of the writ prayed for. 2. It does not appear to this Court that the act of the school is merely a ministerial duty; it is rather a duty involving the exercise of discretion. Every school has a right to determine the students it should accept for enrolment. It has the right to judge the fitness of students. The Court, after weighing all the facts, does not find that the present case is one that calls for the application of Article 26 of the Declaration of Human Rights. She is not being prevented from completing her Nursing course. There are many nursing schools in Metropolitan Manila where she can finish her course. But she must enroll under the term, policies and conditions imposed by the schools, rather than on her own terms. On the contrary, respondent School appeared perfectly justified in refusing to admit petitioner in its School of Nursing. Its refusal is sanctioned by law. Section 107 of the Manual Regulations for Private Schools considers academic delinquency and violation of disciplinary regulations as valid grounds for refusing reenrolment of a student. DECS v. San Diego, 180 SCRA 533_1989 (EDUCATION) Facts: Respondent San Diego has flunked the NMAT (National Medical Admission Test) three times. When he applied to take again, petitioner rejected his application based on the “three-flunk-rule”. He then filed a petition before the RTC on the ground of due process and equal protection and challenging the constitutionality of the order. The petition was granted by the RTC therefore this petition. Issue: Whether or not the NMAT “three-flunk-rule” order is valid and constitutional. Ruling: Yes. It is the right and responsibility of the State to insure that the medical profession is not infiltrated by incompetents to whom patients may unwarily entrust their lives and health. The method employed by the challenged regulation is not irrelevant to the purpose of the law nor is it arbitrary or oppressive. The right to quality education is not absolute. The Constitution provides that “ every citizen has the right to choose a profession or course of study, subject to fair, reasonable and equitable admission and academic requirements”. It is not enough to simply invoke the right to quality education as a guarantee of the Constitution but one must show that he is entitled to it because of his preparation and promise. Petition was granted and the RTC ruling was reversed. Tablarin v. Gutierrez, 152 SCRA 730 (EDUCATION) Facts: Teresita Tablarin, Ma. Luz Ciriaco, Ma. Nimfa B. Rovira, and Evangelina S. Labao sought admission into colleges or schools of medicine for the school year 1987-1988. However, they either did not take or did not successfully take the National Medical Admission Test (NMAT) required by the Board of Medical Education and administered by the Center for Educational Measurement (CEM). On 5 March 1987, Tablarin, et. al., in behalf of applicants for admission into the Medical Colleges who have not taken up or successfully hurdled the NMAT, filed with the Regional Trial Court (RTC), National Capital Judicial Region, a Petition for Declaratory Judgment and Prohibition with a prayer for Temporary Restraining Order (TRO) and Preliminary Injunction, to enjoin the Secretary of Education, Culture and Sports, the Board of Medical Education and the Center for Educational Measurement from enforcing Section 5 (a) and (f) of Republic Act 2382, as amended, and MECS Order 52 (series of 1985), dated 23 August 1985 [which established a uniform admission test (NMAT) as an additional requirement for issuance of a certificate of eligibility for admission into medical schools of the Philippines, beginning with the school year 19861987] and from requiring the taking and passing of the NMAT as a condition for securing certificates of eligibility for admission, from proceeding with accepting applications for taking the NMAT and from administering the NMAT as scheduled on 26 April 1987 and in the future. After hearing on the petition for issuance of preliminary injunction, the trial court denied said petition on 20 April 1987. The NMAT was conducted and administered as previously scheduled. Tablarin, et. al. accordingly filed a Special Civil Action for Certiorari with the Supreme Court to set aside the Order of the RTC judge denying the petition for issuance of a writ of preliminary injunction.

Issue: Whether NMAT requirement for admission to medical colleges contravenes the Constitutional guarantee for the accessibility of education to all, and whether such regulation is invalid and/or unconstitutional. Ruling: No. Republic Act 2382, as amended by Republic Acts 4224 and 5946, known as the “Medical Act of 1959″ defines its basic objectives to govern (a) the standardization and regulation of medical education; (b) the examination for registration of physicians; and (c) the supervision, control and regulation of the practice of medicine in the Philippines. The Statute created a Board of Medical Education and prescribed certain minimum requirements for applicants to medical schools. The State is not really enjoined to take appropriate steps to make quality education “accessible to all who might for any number of reasons wish to enroll in a professional school but rather merely to make such education accessible to all who qualify under “fair, reasonable and equitable admission and academic requirements.” The regulation of the practice of medicine in all its branches has long been recognized as a reasonable method of protecting the health and safety of the public. The power to regulate and control the practice of medicine includes the power to regulate admission to the ranks of those authorized to practice medicine. Legislation and administrative regulations requiring those who wish to practice medicine first to take and pass medical board examinations have long ago been recognized as valid exercises of governmental power. Similarly, the establishment of minimum medical educational requirements for admission to the medical profession, has also been sustained as a legitimate exercise of the regulatory authority of the state. Casibang v. Aquino, 92 SCRA 642 (JUSTICIABLE AND POLITICAL QUESTIONS) Facts: Yu was proclaimed on November 1971 as the elected mayor of Rosales, Pangasinan. Casibang, his only rival, filed a protest against election on the grounds of rampant vote buying, anomalies and irregularities and others. During the proceedings of this case, the 1973 Constitution came into effect. Respondent Yu moved to dismiss the election protest of the petitioner on the ground that the trial court had lost jurisdiction over the same in view of the effectivity of the new Constitution and the new parliamentary form of government. Issues: 1. Whether Section 9, Article XVII of the 1973 Constitution rendered the protest moot and academic; and 2. Whether Section 2, Article XI thereof entrusted to the National Assembly the revamp of the entire local government structure. Ruling: 1. As stated in Santos vs. Castaneda, “the constitutional grant of privilege to continue in office, made by the new Constitution for the benefit of persons who were incumbent officials or employees of the Government when the new Constitution took effect, cannot be fairly construed as indiscriminately encompassing every person who at the time happened to be performing the duties of an elective office, albeit under protest or contest" and that "subject to the constraints specifically mentioned in Section 9, Article XVII of the Transitory Provisions, it neither was, nor could have been the intention of the framers of our new fundamental law to disregard and shunt aside the statutory right of a candidate for elective position who, within the time-frame prescribed in the Election Code of 1971, commenced proceedings beamed mainly at the proper determination in a judicial forum of a proclaimed candidate-elect's right to the contested office.” 2. Section 2 of Article XI does not stigmatize the issue in that electoral protest case with a political color. For simply, that section allocated unto the National Assembly the power to enact a local government code "which may not thereafter be amended except by a majority of all its Members, defining a more responsive and accountable local government allocating among the different local government units their powers, responsibilities, and resources, and providing for their qualifications, election and removal, term, salaries, powers, functions and duties of local officials, and all other matters relating to the organization and operation of the local units" but "... any change in the existing form of local government shall not take effect until ratified by a majority of the votes cast in a plebiscite called for the purpose." Tanada v. Cuenco, 100 Phil 1101 (JUSTICIABLE AND POLITICAL QUESTIONS) Facts: After the 1955 national elections, the membership in the Senate was overwhelmingly occupied by the Nacionalista Party. The lone opposition senator was Lorenzo Tañada who belonged to the Citizen’s Party. Diosdado Macapagal on the other hand was a senatorial candidate who lost the bid but was contesting it before the Senate Electoral Tribunal (SET). But prior to a decision the SET would have to choose its members. It is

provided that the SET should be composed of 9 members comprised of the following: 3 justices of the Supreme Court, 3 senators from the majority party and 3 senators from the minority party. But since there is only one minority senator the other two SET members supposed to come from the minority were filled in by the NP. Tañada assailed this process before the Supreme Court. So did Macapagal because he deemed that if the SET would be dominated by NP senators then he, as a member of the Liberalista Party will not have any chance in his election contest. Senator Mariano Cuenco et al (members of the NP) averred that the Supreme Court cannot take cognizance of the issue because it is a political question. Cuenco argued that the power to choose the members of the SET is vested in the Senate alone and the remedy for Tañada and Macapagal was not to raise the issue before judicial courts but rather to leave it before the bar of public opinion. Issue: Whether or not the issue is a political question. Ruling: No. The SC took cognizance of the case and ruled that the issue is a justiciable question. The term Political Question connotes what it means in ordinary parlance, namely, a question of policy. It refers to those questions which, under the Constitution, are to be decided by the people in their sovereign capacity; or in regard to which full discretionary authority has been delegated to the legislative or executive branch of the government. It is concerned with issues dependent upon the wisdom, not legality, of a particular measure. In this case, the issue at bar is not a political question. The Supreme Court is not being asked by Tañada to decide upon the official acts of Senate. The issue being raised by Tañada was whether or not the elections of the 5 NP members to the SET are valid – which is a judicial question. Note that the SET is a separate and independent body from the Senate which does not perform legislative acts. But how should the gridlock be resolved? The nomination of the last two members (who would fill in the supposed seat of the minority members) must not come from the majority party. In this case, the Chairman of the SET, apparently already appointed members that would fill in the minority seats (even though those will come from the majority party). This is still valid provided the majority members of the SET (referring to those legally sitting) concurred with the Chairman. Besides, the SET may set its own rules in situations like this provided such rules comply with the Constitution. Sanidad v. Commission on Elections, 73 SCRA 333 (JUSTICIABLE AND POLITICAL QUESTIONS) Facts: On 2 September 1976, President Ferdinand E. Marcos issued Presidential Decree 991 calling for a national referendum on 16 October 1976 for the Citizens Assemblies ("barangays") to resolve, among other things, the issues of martial law, the interim assembly, its replacement, the powers of such replacement, the period of its existence, the length of the period for the exercise by the President of his present powers. 20 days after or on 22 September 1976, the President issued another related decree, Presidential Decree 1031, amending the previous Presidential Decree 991, by declaring the provisions of Presidential Decree 229 providing for the manner of voting and canvass of votes in "barangays"(Citizens Assemblies) applicable to the national referendum-plebiscite of 16 October 1976. Quite relevantly, Presidential Decree 1031 repealed inter alia, Section 4, of Presidential Decree 991. On the same date of 22 September 1976, the President issued Presidential Decree 1033, stating the questions to he submitted to the people in the referendum-plebiscite on 16 October 1976. The Decree recites in its "whereas" clauses that the people's continued opposition to the convening of the interim National Assembly evinces their desire to have such body abolished and replaced thru a constitutional amendment, providing for a new interim legislative body, which will be submitted directly to the people in the referendum-plebiscite of October 16. The Commission on Elections was vested with the exclusive supervision and control of the October 1976 National Referendum-Plebiscite. On 27 September 1976, Pablo C. Sanidad and Pablito V. Sanidad, father and son, commenced L-44640 for Prohibition with Preliminary Injunction seeking to enjoin the Commission on Elections from holding and conducting the Referendum Plebiscite on October 16; to declare without force and effect Presidential Decree Nos. 991 and 1033, insofar as they propose amendments to the Constitution, as well as Presidential Decree 1031, insofar as it directs the Commission on Elections to supervise, control, hold, and conduct the Referendum-Plebiscite scheduled on 16 October 1976. They contend that under the 1935 and 1973 Constitutions

there is no grant to the incumbent President to exercise the constituent power to propose amendments to the new Constitution. As a consequence, the Referendum-Plebiscite on October 16 has no constitutional or legal basis. On 30 September 1976, another action for Prohibition with Preliminary Injunction, docketed as L-44684, was instituted by Vicente M. Guzman, a delegate to the 1971 Constitutional Convention, asserting that the power to propose amendments to, or revision of the Constitution during the transition period is expressly conferred on the interim National Assembly under action 16, Article XVII of the Constitution. Still another petition for Prohibition with Preliminary Injunction was filed on 5October 1976 by Raul M. Gonzales, his son Raul Jr., and Alfredo Salapantan, docketed as L-44714, to restrain the implementation of Presidential Decrees relative to the forthcoming Referendum-Plebiscite of October 16. Issue: Whether the President may call upon a referendum for the amendment of the Constitution. Ruling: Section 1 of Article XVI of the 1973 Constitution on Amendments ordains that "(1) Any amendment to, or revision of, this Constitution may be proposed by the National Assembly upon a vote of three-fourths of all its Members, or by a constitutional convention. (2) The National Assembly may, by a vote of two-thirds of all its Members, call a constitutional convention or, by a majority vote of all its Members, submit the question of calling such a convention to the electorate in an election. "Section 2 thereof provides that "Any amendment to, or revision of, this Constitution shall be valid when ratified by a majority of the votes cast in a plebiscite which shall be held not later than three months a after the approval of such amendment or revision." In the present period of transition, the interim National Assembly instituted in the Transitory Provisions is conferred with that amending power. Section 15 of the Transitory Provisions reads "The interim National Assembly, upon special call by the interim Prime Minister, may, by a majority vote of all its Members, propose amendments to this Constitution. Such amendments shall take effect when ratified in accordance with Article Sixteen hereof." There are, therefore, two periods contemplated in the constitutional life of the nation, i.e., period of normalcy and period of transition. In times of normalcy, the amending process may be initiated by the proposals of the (1) regular National Assembly upon a vote of three-fourths of all its members; or (2) by a Constitutional Convention called by a vote of two-thirds of all theMembers of the National Assembly. However the calling of a Constitutional Convention may besubmitted to the electorate in an election voted upon by a majority vote of all the members of theNational Assembly. In times of transition, amendments may be proposed by a majority vote of all the Members of the interim National Assembly upon special call by the interim Prime Minister. The Court in Aquino v. COMELEC, had already settled that the incumbent President is vested with that prerogative of discretion as to when he shall initially convene the interim National Assembly. The Constitutional Convention intended to leave to the President the determination of the time when he shall initially convene the interim National Assembly, consistent with the prevailing conditions of peace and order in the country. When the Delegates to the Constitutional Convention voted on the Transitory Provisions, they were aware of the fact that under the same, the incumbent President was given the discretion as to when he could convene the interim National Assembly. The President's decision to defer the convening of the interim National Assembly soon found support from the people themselves. In the plebiscite of January 10-15, 1973, at which the ratification of the 1973Constitution was submitted, the people voted against the convening of the interim National Assembly. In the referendum of 24 July 1973, the Citizens Assemblies ("bagangays") reiterated their sovereign will to withhold the convening of the interim National Assembly. Again, in the referendum of 27 February 1975, the proposed question of whether the interim National Assembly shall be initially convened was eliminated, because some of the members of Congress and delegates of the Constitutional Convention, who were deemed automatically members of the interim National Assembly, were against its inclusion since in that referendum of January, 1973 the people had already resolved against it. In sensu striciore, when the legislative arm of the state undertakes the proposals of amendment to a Constitution, that body is not in the usual function of lawmaking. It is not legislating when engaged in the amending process. Rather, it is exercising a peculiar power bestowed upon it by the fundamental charter itself. In the Philippines, that power is provided for in Article XVI of the 1973 Constitution (for the regular National Assembly) or in Section 15 of the Transitory Provisions (for the interim National Assembly). While ordinarily it is the business of the legislating body to legislate for the nation by virtue of constitutional conferment, amending of the Constitution is not legislative in character. In political science a distinction is made between constitutional content of an organic character and that of a legislative character. The distinction, however, is one of policy, not of law. Such being the case, approval of the President of any proposed amendment is a misnomer. The prerogative of the President to approve or disapprove applies only to the ordinary cases of legislation. The President has nothing to do with proposition or adoption of amendments to the Constitution.

Abueva v. Wood, 45 Phil 612 (JUSTICIABLE AND POLITICAL QUESTIONS) Facts: By Act No. 2933 the Legislature of the Philippine Islands provided for a standing appropriation of one million pesos(P1,000,000) per annum, payable out of any funds in the Insular Treasury, not otherwise appropriated, to defray the expenses of the Independence Commission, including publicity and all other expenses in connection with the performance of its duties; that said appropriation shall be considered as included in the annual appropriation for the Senate and the House of Representatives, at the rate of P500,000 for each house, although the appropriation act hereafter approved may not make any specific appropriation for said purpose; with the proviso that no part of said sum shall be set upon the books of the Insular Auditor until it shall be necessary to make the payment or payments authorized by said act Petitioners averred that as members of the Independence Commission they are legally obliged to prevent the funds from being squandered, and to prevent any investments and illicit expenses in open contravention of the purposes of the law. Petitioners have verbally and by writing requested the respondents to permit them to examine the vouchers and other documentary proofs relating to the expenditures and payments made out of the funds appropriated for the use of the Independence Commission. Respondents have denied and continue denying to permit the petitioners from examining said vouchers and documentary proofs. Issue: Whether or not the Court can compel the respondents to address the claims of the petitioners Ruling: Leonard Wood, as Governor-General of the Philippine Islands and head of the executive department of the Philippine Government, is not subject to the control or supervision of the courts. Manuel L. Quezon and Manuel Roxas, as Chairman of the Independence Commission, are mere agents of the Philippine Legislature and cannot be controlled or interfered with by the courts. As for the auditor, the court has no jurisdiction of the subject of the action because section 24 of the Jones Law provides that: “The administrative jurisdiction of the Auditor over accounts, whether of funds or property, and all vouchers and records pertaining thereto, shall be exclusive” The determination of whether the accounts of the expenses of the Commission of Independence should be shown to the plaintiffs or not is a question of policy and administrative discretion, and is therefore not justiciable. Severino v. Governor-General, 16 Phil 336 (JUSTICIABLE AND POLITICAL QUESTIONS) Facts: The petioner, Lope Severino, is a resident, a duly qualified elector, and local chief of the Nacionalista party in the town of Silay, Province of Occidental Negros. He prayed for a writ of mandamus to the Governor-General of the Philippine Islands, one of the respondents, to compel him to call a special election for the purpose of electing a municipal president in the town of Silay, Province of Occidental Negros, and praying also that a preliminary injunction be issued restraining the respondents, the Governor-General of the Philippine Islands and the provincial board of the Province of Occidental Negros, from appointing a municipal president for the said municipality. Issue: Whether or not the court has jurisdiction to control by mandamus or injunction the official acts of the Governor-General Ruling: No. It has long been a maxim in this country that the legislature cannot dictate to the courts what their judgment shall be, or set aside or alter such judgments after they have been rendered. No jurisdiction shall interfere with the Governor-General of these Islands, as the head of the executive department, in the performance of any of his official acts Thus, the preliminary injunction prayed for in this case should not be issued. The facts alleged in the complaint do not constitute a cause of action and most importantly, the Court cannot entertain a complaint which seeks to control or interfere with the official duties of the Governor-General. The demurrer is, therefore, sustained, and the complaint dismissed, without special ruling as to costs.

Aytona v. Castillo, 4 SCRA 1 (JUSTICIABLE AND POLITICAL QUESTIONS) Facts: On December 29, 1961, Carlos P. Garcia, who was still President that time, made last minute appointments while the Commission on Appointments was not in session. Said last minute appointment included Dominador R. Aytona, who was appointed as ad interim Governor of Central Bank. The latter took oath on the same day. At noon on December 30, 1961, President-elect Diosdado Macapagal assumed office. He issued Administrative Order No. 2 on December 31, 1961 recalling, withdrawing and canceling all ad interim appointments made by President Garcia after December 13, 1961, which was the date when Macapagal was proclaimed President by the Congress. He then appointed Andres V. Castillo as ad interim Governor of the Central Bank and the latter qualified immediately. On January 2, 1962, both exercised the powers of their office. However, Aytona was prevented from holding office the following day and thus instituted a quo warranto proceeding, challenging Castillo’s right to exercise the powers of the Governor of the Central Bank. Aytona claims that he was validly appointed and had qualified for the post, therefore making Castillo’s appointment void. Castillo then contended that Aytona’s appointment had already been revoked by Administrative Order No. 2 issued by President Macapagal. Issue: Whether President Diosdado Macapagal had power to issue the order of cancellation of the ad interim appointments made by President Carlos P. Garcia even after the appointees had already qualified. Ruling: No. Upon the ground of separation of powers, the court resolved that it must decline and refuse jurisdiction in disregarding the Presidential Administrative Order No. 2, canceling such “midnight” or “last-minute” appointments. Case dismissed.