Consolidated.docx

Republic vs Mercadera GR No. 186027 Facts: Merlyn Mercadera (Mercadera), represented by her sister Evelyn Oga (Oga), sought the correction of her given name as it appeared in her Certificate of Live Birth from Marilyn L. Mercadera to Merlyn L. Mercadera before the Office of the Local Civil Registrar of Dipolog City. Under RA 9048, the city or municipal civil registrar or consul general is now authorized to effect the change of first name or nickname and the correction of clerical or typographical errors in civil registry entries. The Office of the Local Civil Registrar of Dipolog City, however, refused to effect the correction unless a court order was obtained "because the Civil Registrar therein is not yet equipped with a permanent appointment before he can validly act on petitions for corrections filed before their office as mandated by RA 9048. Mercadera then filed a Petition For Correction of Some Entries as Appearing in the Certificate of Live Birth under Rule 108 before RTC of Dipolog City. Upon receipt of the petition for correction of entry, the RTC issued an order for the hearing of said petition. The OSG deputized the Office of the City Prosecutor to assist in the case. Without any objection from the City Prosecutor, the testimony of Oga and several photocopies of documents were formally offered and marked as evidence to prove that Mercadera never used the name "Marilyn" in any of her public or private transactions. Consequently RTC granted the petition and ruled that the documentary evidence presented by Mercadera sufficiently supported the circumstances alleged in her petition. Considering that she had used "Merlyn" as her given name since childhood until she discovered the discrepancy in her Certificate of Live Birth, the RTC was convinced that the correction was justified. The OSG timely appealed praying setting aside of the RTC decision. For the OSG, the correction in the spelling of Mercadera’s given name "is in truth a material correction as it would modify or increase substantive rights", which would have been proper had she filed a petition under Rule 103 and proved any of the grounds therefor. The CA was not persuaded and affirmed the questioned RTC order. Hence, this petition. Issues: Whether the CA erred on question of law in granting the change in respondent’s name under Rule 103. Held: No. Rule 103 procedurally governs judicial petitions for change of given name or surname, or both, pursuant to Article 376 of the Civil Code. This rule provides the procedure for an independent special proceeding in court to establish the status of a person involving his relations with others, that is, his legal position in, or with regard to, the rest of the community. Essentially, a change of name does not define or effect a change of one’s existing family relations or in the rights and duties flowing therefrom. It does not alter one’s legal capacity or civil status. Rule 108, on the other hand, implements judicial proceedings for the correction or cancellation of entries in the civil registry pursuant to Article 412 of the Civil Code. Entries in the civil register refer to "acts, events and judicial decrees concerning the civil status of persons," also as enumerated in Article 408 of the same law. In the case at bench, the OSG posits that the conversion from "MARILYN" to "MERLYN" is not a correction of an innocuous error but a material correction tantamount to a change of name which entails a modification or increase in substantive rights. For the OSG, this is a substantial error that requires compliance with the procedure under Rule 103, and not Rule 108. A change of one’s name under Rule 103 can be granted, only on grounds provided by law, there must be a proper and compelling reason for the change and proof that the person requesting will be prejudiced by the use of his official name. In petitions for correction, only clerical, spelling, typographical and other innocuous errors in the civil registry may be raised. Considering that the enumeration in Section 2, Rule 108 also includes

"changes of name," the correction of a patently misspelled name is covered by Rule 108. Suffice it to say, not all alterations allowed in one’s name are confined under Rule 103. Corrections for clerical errors may be set right under Rule 108. Thus, the petition filed by Mercadera before the RTC correctly falls under Rule 108 as it simply sought a correction of a misspelled given name. From the allegations in her petition, Mercadera clearly prayed for the lower court "to remove the faults or error" from her registered given name "MARILYN," and "to make or set aright" the same to conform to the one she grew up to, "MERLYN." The CA did not allow Mercadera the change of her name. What it did allow was the correction of her misspelled given name which she had been using ever since she could remember.

Oshita vs. Republic GR G.R. No. 21180 Facts: Antonina B. Oshita filed with the Court of First Instance of Davao a petition to have her name changed from "Antonina B. Oshita" to "Antonina Bartolome". The petition was signed by the petitioner herself and was "subscribed and sworn to" by her before the Deputy Clerk of Court. The requirements for the publication of the hearing of the petition were duly complied with. Asst. City Attorney Roque M. Barnes, acting in behalf of the

Solicitor General, filed a motion to dismiss the petition upon the grounds (1) of lack of jurisdiction, in that although the petition was subscribed and sworn to by petitioner, it was not verified in accordance with the provisions of Section 6, Rule 15 of the Rules of Court; and (2) that the petition does not state a cause of action. The petitioner-appellee filed an opposition to the motion to dismiss. The lower court denied the motion to dismiss and set the case for hearing.As found by the lower court, the evidence has established that appellee Antonina B. Oshita is the legitimate daughter of Kishimatsu Oshita, a Japanese citizen, now deceased, and Buena Bartolome, a Filipino; that upon reaching the age of majority, appellee elected Philippine citizenship and took her oath of allegiance; that being already a Filipino citizen she desired to have her family name changed from "Oshita" to "Bartolome", the latter being the family name of her mother, and because she felt embarrassed when introduced as one bearing a Japanese surname. The Assistant City Attorney of Davao City did not present any evidence in support of his opposition to the petition, but simply reiterated his motion to dismiss. The trial court rendered a decision granting the petition. Hence this appeal by the Solicitor General. Issue: 1. Wether the lower court had jurisdiction to the case because the petition was not verified as required by Section 2 of Rule 103 of the Rules of Court. 2. Wether there is sufficient reason to justify the change of the surname of the appellee. Held: 1. Yes. While it is true that under Section 2, Rule 103, it is required that the petition for change of name be verified, nevertheless, no provision exists in the rules which declares that such a requirement regarding verification is jurisdictional. The requirement regarding verification of a pleading is simply a condition affecting the form of pleading, the non-compliance of which does not necessarily render the pleading fatally defective. The court may order the correction of the pleading if the verification is lacking, or act on the pleading although it is not verified if the attending circumstances are such that the strict compliance with the rule may be dispensed with in order that the ends of justice or the law may thereby be served. In this case, the petitioner was not verified, it was, however, subscribed and sworn to by the petitioner, and the court believe that the lower court did not commit a reversible error when it denied the motion to dismiss the petition upon the ground of lack of jurisdiction. The jurisdiction of the court was not affected by the absence of the proper verification of the petition. 2. Yes. It is true that Article 364 of the Civil Code provides that legitimate children shall principally use the surname of the father. But this rule is not absolute. Article 264 of the Civil Code provides that legitimate children have the right to bear the surname of the father and of the mother. Hence, if there is sufficient reason, the change of a child's surname from that of the father, to that of the mother, may be authorized by the court. In the instant case, it has been shown that Oshita is the legitimate daughter of Buena Bartolome and Hishimatsu Oshita; that upon reaching the age of majority she elected Philippine citizenship and took her oath of allegiance; that being already a Filipino citizen she desires to adopt a Filipino surname; that her older brother and sister who had also elected Philippine citizenship have been using the surname "Bartolome"; and that shedesires to have the surname "Bartolome" instead of "Oshita", because she felt embarrassed when introduced as one bearing Japanese surname. In Re Petition for Change of Name and/or Correction of Entry in the Civil Registry of Julian Lin Carulasan Wang G.R. No. 159966 Facts: The parents of Julian Lin Carulasan Wang, Anna Lisa Wang and Sing-Foe Wang,were not yet married to each other when he was born. When his parents subsequently got married they executed a deed of legitimation of their son so that the child’s name was changed from Julian Lin Carulasan to Julian Lin Carulasan W ang. So,

a petition was filed his mother for the change of name and/or correction/cancellation of entry in the Civil Registry of her son, a minor, Julian Lin Carulasan Wang before the RTC. The parents of Julian wanted to change his name since they intend for Julian to study in Singapore and in Singapore middle names or the maiden surname of the mother are not carried in a person’s name. They anticipated that will lead to discrimination. They also anticipated that it will lead to confusion on the part of Julian since his sibling have different surnames. The RTC denied the petition. Petitioner then filed this Petition for Review on Certiorari (Under Rule 45). Issue: Whether or not dropping of middle name of a minor child is allowed under Philippine laws. Held: No. The State has an interest in the names borne by individuals and entities for purposes of identification, and that a change of name is a privilege and not a right, so that before a person can be authorized to change his name given him either in his certificate of birth or civil registry, he must show proper or reasonable cause, or any compelling reason which may justify such change. The valid grounds for change of name are as follows: : (a) when the name is ridiculous, dishonorable or extremely difficult to write or pronounce; (b) when the change results as a legal consequence, as in legitimation; (c) when the change will avoid confusion; (d) when one has continuously used and been known since childhood by a Filipino name, and was unaware of alien parentage; (e) a sincere desire to adopt a Filipino name to erase signs of former alienage, all in good faith and without prejudicing anybody; and (f) when the surname causes embarrassment and there is no showing that the desired change of name was for a fraudulent purpose or that the change of name would prejudice public interest. Middle names serve to identify the maternal lineage or filiation of a person as well as further distinguish him from others who may have the same given name and surname as he has. Our laws on the use of surnames state that legitimate and legitimated children shall principally use the surname of the father. The Family Code gives legitimate children the right to bear the surnames of the father and the mother. Only an illegitimate child whose filiation is not recognized by the father does not have a middle name. Thus, the registered name of a legitimate, legitimated and recognized illegitimate child thus contains a given or proper name, a middle name, and a surname. In relation to the present case, the only reason advanced by petitioner for the dropping his middle name is convenience. This is not one of the valid grounds for petition for change of name to be granted. In addition, petitioner is only a minor. It is best that the matter of change of his name be left to his judgment and discretion when he reaches the age of majority. As he is of tender age, he may not yet understand and appreciate the value of the change of his name and granting of the same at this point may just prejudice him in his rights under our laws.

Republic vs Tañada G.R. No. L-31563 Facts: Lua Ong, private respondent filed a petition for the change of the name of his son Baby Ong to Lua An Jok. The court ordered the hearing and the publication of the said order in a newspaper of general circulation in Cebu City. On the day of the hearing, no one object therefore the court ordered authorizing Baby Ong to use the name An Jok Lua. Consequently, the assistance provincial fiscal, on behalf of the government, interposed an appeal.

In its petition, petitioner claimed that both the caption of the published order and the title of the respondent's petition failed to include the name An Joc Lua, the name allowed by the court a quo for use by applicant. The non-inclusion of the name An Joc Lua, or properly, the name of Lua An Jok, in the caption of the published order and in the title of the petition, constitutes a jurisdictional omission, and hence the respondent judge erred in assuming jurisdiction to hear and determine the respondent's petition. On the other hand, the respondent avers that the name Lua An Jok is not an alias of Baby Ong and therefore should not be included in the title of the petition and in the published order. He alleges that Lua An Jok is the true and correct name of the applicant Lua as the surname, and An Jok the first name. Petitioner also raised that there is no proper and reasonable cause or compelling reason to justify the change of name. Issues: 1. Whether the court a quo has the jurisdiction on the respondent’s petition. 2. Whetther there is compelling reason to justify the change of name of the respondent. Held: 1. No. An action for change of name constitutes a judicial proceeding in rem, and a court acquires jurisdiction to hear and determine the corresponding petition only, after publication of the order reciting the purpose of the petition and setting the date and place for the hearing thereof at least once a week for three successive weeks in a newspaper of general circulation. Such publication, however, to be valid and effective, should contain the correct information as to (1) the name or names of the applicant, (2) the cause for the change of name, and (3) the new name sought. Moreover, the title of the petition should include (1) the applicant's real name and (2) his aliases or other names, if any. The title should recite the name sought to be adopted. All these, notwithstanding that the body of the petition or of the order includes all the information aforementioned. In this case, the non-inclusion of the name Lua An Jok in the title of the petition and in the caption of the published order, persons who know the applicant Lua An Jok and who have an interest contra the petition, upon reading the title of the petition or the caption of the punished order, would not readily know that Lua An Jok and Baby Ong refer to one and the same person and would not thereby be afforded the opportunity to come forward with anything affecting the petition. The incomplete and, consequently, invalid publication of the order dated June 25, 1968 does not effectively confer jurisdiction upon the court a quo to take cognizance of the respondent's petition. 2. No. To justify a change of name there must exist a proper and reasonable cause or compelling reason. The following have been held to constitute proper and reasonable causes or compelling reasons: (1) a ridiculous name, a name tainted with dishonor, a name extremely difficult to write or pronounce; (2) a change of civil status; and (3) need to avoid confusion. In this case, the uncontroverted fact that the private respondent’s son has been known since birth as Lua An Jok and by no other name, pointing to the improbability that a child would at birth be given a name such as "Baby Ong." Under the circumstances above stated, the insistence of the respondent that the entry "Baby Ong" in the civil registry be changed to "Lua An Jok" could very well be motivated, there being no evidence to the contrary, solely by an honest desire to make the civil registry speak the truth. Gerbert Corpuz vs Daisylyn Tirol Sto. Tomas G.R. No. 186571 Facts: Petitioner Gerbert R. Corpuz was a former Filipino citizen who acquired Canadian citizenship through naturalization on November 29, 2000. On January 18, 2005, Gerbert married respondent Daisylyn T. Sto. Tomas, a Filipina, in Pasig City. Due to work and other professional commitments, Gerbert left for Canada soon after the wedding. He returned to the Philippines sometime in April 2005 to surprise Daisylyn, but was shocked

to discover that his wife was having an affair with another man. Hurt and disappointed, Gerbert returned to Canada and filed a petition for divorce. The Superior Court of Justice, Windsor, Ontario, Canada granted Gerberts petition for divorce on December 8, 2005. The divorce decree took effect a month later. Two years after the divorce, Gerbert has moved on and has found another Filipina to love. Desirous of marrying his new Filipina fiance in the Philippines, Gerbert went to the Pasig City Civil Registry Office and registered the Canadian divorce decree on his and Daisylyns marriage certificate. Despite the registration of the divorce decree, an official of the National Statistics Office (NSO) informed Gerbert that the marriage between him and Daisylyn still subsists under Philippine law; to be enforceable, the foreign divorce decree must first be judicially recognized by a competent Philippine court, pursuant to NSO Circular No. 4, series of 1982. Accordingly, Gerbert filed a petition for judicial recognition of foreign divorce and/or declaration of marriage as dissolved (petition) with the RTC. Although summoned, Daisylyn did not file any responsive pleading but submitted instead a notarized letter/manifestation to the trial court. She offered no opposition to Gerberts petition and, in fact, alleged her desire to file a similar case herself but was prevented by financial and personal circumstances. She, thus, requested that she be considered as a party-in-interest with a similar prayer to Gerberts. In its October 30, 2008 decision,the RTC denied Gerberts petition. The RTC concluded that Gerbert was not the proper party to institute the action for judicial recognition of the foreign divorce decree as he is a naturalized Canadian citizen. It ruled that only the Filipino spouse can avail of the remedy, under the second paragraph of Article 26 of the Family Code,in order for him or her to be able to remarry under Philippine law. Issue: Whether or not the Pasig City Civil Registry Office was correct in registering the decree prior to any judicial order as yet recognizing the foreign divorce decree. Held: No. As a matter of housekeeping concern, we note that the Pasig City Civil Registry Office has already recorded the divorce decree on Gerbert and Daisylyns marriage certificate based on the mere presentation of the decree. We consider the recording to be legally improper; hence, the need to draw attention of the bench and the bar to what had been done. Article 407 of the Civil Code states that [a]cts, events and judicial decrees concerning the civil status of persons shall be recorded in the civil register. The law requires the entry in the civil registry of judicial decrees that produce legal consequences touching upon a persons legal capacity and status, i.e., those affecting all his personal qualities and relations, more or less permanent in nature, not ordinarily terminable at his own will, such as his being legitimate or illegitimate, or his being married or not. A judgment of divorce is a judicial decree, although a foreign one, affecting a persons legal capacity and status that must be recorded. In fact, Act No. 3753 or the Law on Registry of Civil Status specifically requires the registration of divorce decrees in the civil registry: Sec. 1. Civil Register. A civil register is established for recording the civil status of persons, in which shall be entered: (a) births; (b) deaths; (c) marriages; (d) annulments of marriages; (e) divorces; (f) legitimations; (g) adoptions; (h) acknowledgment of natural children; (i) naturalization; and (j) changes of name. Sec. 4. Civil Register Books. The local registrars shall keep and preserve in their offices the following books, in which they shall, respectively make the proper entries concerning the civil status of persons: (1) Birth and death register; (2) Marriage register, in which shall be entered not only the marriages solemnized but also divorces and dissolved marriages. (3) Legitimation, acknowledgment, adoption, change of name and naturalization register. But while the law requires the entry of the divorce decree in the civil registry, the law and the submission of the decree by themselves do not ipso facto authorize the decrees registration. The law should be read in relation with the requirement of a judicial recognition of the foreign judgment before it can be given res judicata effect. In the context of the present case, no judicial order as yet exists recognizing the foreign divorce decree. Thus, the Pasig City Civil Registry Office acted totally out of turn and without authority of law when it annotated the

Canadian divorce decree on Gerbert and Daisylyns marriage certificate, on the strength alone of the foreign decree presented by Gerbert. Evidently, the Pasig City Civil Registry Office was aware of the requirement of a court recognition, as it cited NSO Circular No. 4, series of 1982, and Department of Justice Opinion No. 181, series of 1982 both of which required a final order from a competent Philippine court before a foreign judgment, dissolving a marriage, can be registered in the civil registry, but it, nonetheless, allowed the registration of the decree. For being contrary to law, the registration of the foreign divorce decree without the requisite judicial recognition is patently void and cannot produce any legal effect. Another point we wish to draw attention to is that the recognition that the RTC may extend to the Canadian divorce decree does not, by itself, authorize the cancellation of the entry in the civil registry. A petition for recognition of a foreign judgment is not the proper proceeding, contemplated under the Rules of Court, for the cancellation of entries in the civil registry. Article 412 of the Civil Code declares that no entry in a civil register shall be changed or corrected, without judicial order. The Rules of Court supplements Article 412 of the Civil Code by specifically providing for a special remedial proceeding by which entries in the civil registry may be judicially cancelled or corrected. Rule 108 of the Rules of Court sets in detail the jurisdictional and procedural requirements that must be complied with before a judgment, authorizing the cancellation or correction, may be annotated in the civil registry. It also requires, among others, that the verified petition must be filed with the RTC of the province where the corresponding civil registry is located; that the civil registrar and all persons who have or claim any interest must be made parties to the proceedings; and that the time and place for hearing must be published in a newspaper of general circulation. As these basic jurisdictional requirements have not been met in the present case, we cannot consider the petition Gerbert filed with the RTC as one filed under Rule 108 of the Rules of Court. We hasten to point out, however, that this ruling should not be construed as requiring two separate proceedings for the registration of a foreign divorce decree in the civil registry one for recognition of the foreign decree and another specifically for cancellation of the entry under Rule 108 of the Rules of Court. The recognition of the foreign divorce decree may be made in a Rule 108 proceeding itself, as the object of special proceedings (such as that in Rule 108 of the Rules of Court) is precisely to establish the status or right of a party or a particular fact. Moreover, Rule 108 of the Rules of Court can serve as the appropriate adversarial proceeding by which the applicability of the foreign judgment can be measured and tested in terms of jurisdictional infirmities, want of notice to the party, collusion, fraud, or clear mistake of law or fact. The petition for review on certiorari granted. REMAND of the case to the trial court for further proceedings in accordance with our ruling above. Let a copy of this Decision be furnished the Civil Registrar General.

Republic vs Julian Edward Emerson Coseteng-Magpayo G.R. No. 189476 Facts: Born in Makati on September 9, 1972, Julian Edward Emerson Coseteng Magpayo (respondent) is the son of Fulvio M. Magpayo Jr. and Anna Dominique Marquez-Lim Coseteng who, as respondent’s certificate of live birth shows, contracted marriage on March 26, 1972. Claiming, however, that his parents were never legally married, respondent filed on July 22, 2008 at the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Quezon City a Petition to change his name to Julian Edward Emerson Marquez

Lim Coseteng. The petition, docketed as SPP No. Q-0863058, was entitled "IN RE PETITION FOR CHANGE OF NAMEOF JULIAN EDWARD EMERSON COSETENG MAGPAYO TO JULIAN EDWARD EMERSON MARQUEZ-LIM COSETENG." In support of his petition, respondent submitted a certification from the National Statistics Office stating that his mother Anna Dominique "does not appear in [its] National Indices of Marriage.” Respondent also submitted his academic records from elementary up to college showing that he carried the surname "Coseteng," and the birth certificate of his child where "Coseteng" appears as his surname. In the 1998, 2001 and 2004 Elections, respondent ran and was elected as Councilor of Quezon City’s 3rd District using the name "JULIAN M.L. COSETENG." On order of Branch 77 of the Quezon City RTC, respondent amended his petition by alleging therein compliance with the 3-year residency requirement under Section 2, Rule 103] of the Rules of Court. The notice setting the petition for hearing on November 20, 2008 was published in the newspaper Broadside in its issues of October 31-November 6, 2008, November 7-13, 2008, and November 14-20, 2008. And a copy of the notice was furnished the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG). No opposition to the petition having been filed, an order of general default was entered by the trial court which then allowed respondent to present evidence ex parte By Decision of January 8, 2009, the trial court granted respondent’s petition and directed the Civil Registrar of Makati City to: 1. Delete the entry "March 26, 1972" in Item 24 for "DATE AND PLACE OF MARRIAGE OF PARTIES" [in herein respondent’s Certificate of live Birth]; 2. Correct the entry "MAGPAYO" in the space for the Last Name of the [respondent] to "COSETENG"; 3. Delete the entry "COSETENG" in the space for Middle Name of the [respondent]; and 4. Delete the entry "Fulvio Miranda Magpayo, Jr." in the space for FATHER of the [respondent]… (emphasis and underscoring supplied; capitalization in the original) The Republic of the Philippines (Republic) filed a motion for reconsideration but it was denied by the trial court by Order of July 2, 2009, hence, it, thru the OSG, lodged the present petition for review to the Court on pure question of law. Issue: Whether or not the petition for change of name involving change of civil status should be made through appropriate adversarial proceedings OR WHETHER OR NOT RULE 103 OR RULE 108 SHALL APPLY Held: RULE 108 1. A person can effect a change of name under Rule 103 (CHANGE OF NAME) using valid and meritorious grounds including (a) when the name is ridiculous, dishonorable or extremely difficult to write or pronounce; (b) when the change results as a legal consequence such as legitimation; (c) when the change will avoid confusion; (d) when one has continuously used and been known since childhood by a Filipino name, and was unaware of alien parentage; (e) a sincere desire to adopt a Filipino name to erase signs of former alienage, all in good faith and without prejudicing anybody; and (f) when the surname causes embarrassment and there is no showing that the desired change of name was for a fraudulent purpose or that the change of name would prejudice public interest. *** Respondent’s reason for changing his name cannot be considered as one of, or analogous to, recognized grounds, however. The present petition must be differentiated from Alfon v. Republic of the Philippines. In Alfon, the Court allowed the therein petitioner, Estrella Alfon, to use the name that she had been known since childhood in order to avoid confusion. Alfon did not deny her legitimacy, however. She merely sought to use the surname of her mother which she had been using since childhood. Ruling in her favor, the Court held that she was lawfully entitled to use her mother’s surname, adding that the avoidance of confusion was justification enough to allow her to do so. In the present case, however, respondent denies his legitimacy. The change being sought in respondent’s petition goes so far as to affect his legal status in relation to his parents. It seeks to change his legitimacy to that of illegitimacy. Rule 103 then would not suffice to grant respondent’s supplication.

Labayo-Rowe v. Republic categorically holds that "changes which may affect the civil status from legitimate to illegitimate . . . are substantial and controversial alterations which can only be allowed after appropriate adversary proceedings . . ." ******** Since respondent’s desired change affects his civil status from legitimate to illegitimate, Rule 108 applies. It reads: SECTION 1. Who may file petition.—Any person interested in any act, event, order or decree concerning the civil status of persons which has been recorded in the civil register, may file a verified petition for the cancellation or correction of any entry relating thereto, with the [RTC] of the province where the corresponding civil registry is located. SEC. 3. Parties.—When cancellation or correction of an entry in the civil register is sought, the civil registrar and all persons who have or claim any interest which would be affected thereby shall be made parties to the proceeding. SEC. 4. Notice and publication. –Upon the filing of the petition, the court shall, by an order, fix the time and place for the hearing of the same, and cause reasonable notice thereof to be given to the persons named in the petition. The court shall also cause the order to be published once a week for three (3) consecutive weeks in a newspaper of general circulation in the province. (emphasis, italics and underscoring supplied) 2. Rule 108 clearly directs that a petition which concerns one’s civil status should be filed in the civil registry in which the entry is sought to be cancelled or corrected – that of Makati in the present case, and "all persons who have or claim any interest which would be affected thereby" should be made parties to the proceeding. As earlier stated, however, the petition of respondent was filed not in Makati where his birth certificate was registered but in Quezon City. And as the above-mentioned title of the petition filed by respondent before the RTC shows, neither the civil registrar of Makati nor his father and mother were made parties thereto. Rule 103 regarding change of name and in Rule 108 concerning the cancellation or correction of entries in the civil registry are separate and distinct. "A petition for a substantial correction or change of entries in the civil registry should have as respondents the civil registrar, as well as all other persons who have or claim to have any interest that would be affected thereby." Rule 108 clearly mandates two sets of notices to different "potential oppositors." The first notice is that given to the "persons named in the petition" and the second (which is through publication) is that given to other persons who are not named in the petition but nonetheless may be considered interested or affected parties, such as creditors. That two sets of notices are mandated under the above-quoted Section 4 is validated by the subsequent Section 5, also above-quoted, which provides for two periods (for the two types of "potential oppositors") within which to file an opposition (15 days from notice or from the last date of publication). The purpose precisely of Section 4, Rule 108 is to bind the whole world to the subsequent judgment on the petition. The sweep of the decision would cover even parties who should have been impleaded under Section 3, Rule 108 but were inadvertently left out The Court then laid down the rule that “when a petition for cancellation or correction of an entry in the civil register involves substantial and controversial alterations including those of citizenship, legitimacy of paternity or filiation, or legitimacy of marriage, a strict compliance with the requirements of Rule 108 of the Rules of Court is mandated.” Republic of the Philippines vs. Nisaida Sumera Nishina G.R. No. 186053 Facts: Nisaida Sumera Nishina (respondent), represented by her mother Zenaida Sumera Watanabe (Zenaida), filed before the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Malolos, Bulacan a verified petition for cancellation of birth record and change of surname in the civil registry of Malolos, Bulacan, docketed as Special Proceedings No. 106-M-2007. In her petition, respondent alleged the following: She was born on October 31, 1987 in Malolos, Bulacan to her Filipino mother Zenaida and Japanese father Koichi Nishina who were married on February 18, 1987. Her father later died. On July 19, 1989, her mother married another Japanese, Kenichi Hakamada. As they could not find any record of her birth at the Malolos civil registry, respondents mother caused the late registration of her birth in 1993 under the surname of her mothers second husband, Hakamada. Her mother and Hakamada eventually divorced.

On May 29, 1996, her mother married another Japanese, Takayuki Watanabe, who later adopted her by a decree issued by the Tokyo Family Court of Japan on January 25, 2001. The adoption decree was filed and recorded in the civil registry of Manila in 2006. In 2007, it surfaced that her birth was in fact originally registered at the Malolos Civil Registry under the name Nisaida Sumera Nishina, hence, her filing before the RTC of her petition praying that her second birth certificate bearing the surname Hakamada, issued through late registration in 1993, be cancelled; and that in light of the decree of adoption, her surname Nishina in the original birth certificate be changed to Watanabe. After hearing the petition, Branch 83 of the RTC, by Order of October 8, 2007, granted respondents petition and directed the Local Civil Registry of Malolos to cancel the second birth record of Nisaida Sumera Hakamada issued in 1993 [bearing] Registry No. 93-06684 and to change it [in its stead] Registry No. 87-04983, particularly the surname of [respondent] from NISAIDA SUMERA NISHINA to NISAIDA SUMERA WATANABE. OSG filed, on behalf of petitioner, a notice of appeal. Before the Court of Appeals, respondent filed a motion to dismiss the appeal, alleging that petitioner adopted a wrong mode of appeal since it did not file a record on appeal as required under Sections 2 and 3, Rule 41 (appeal from the RTCs) of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure reading: SEC. 2. Modes of appeal. (a) Ordinary appeal. The appeal to the Court of Appeals in cases decided by the Regional Trial Court in the exercise of its original jurisdiction shall be taken by filing a notice of appeal with the court which rendered the judgment or final order appealed from and serving a copy thereof upon the adverse party. No record on appeal shall be required except in special proceedings and other cases of multiple or separate appeals where the law or these Rules so require. In such cases, the record on appeal shall be filed and served in like manner. SEC. 3. Period of ordinary appeal. The appeal shall be taken within fifteen (15) days from notice of the judgment or final order appealed from. Where a record on appeal is required, the appellant shall file a notice of appeal and a record on appeal within thirty (30) days from notice of the judgment or final order. However, an appeal in habeas corpus cases shall be taken within forty-eight (48) hours from notice of the judgment or final order appealed from. (A.M. No. 01-1-03- SC, June 19, 2001) The period of appeal shall be interrupted by a timely motion for new trial or reconsideration. No motion for extension of time to file a motion for new trial or reconsideration shall be allowed. (emphasis, underscoring and italics supplied) SEC. 9. Perfection of appeal; effect thereof. x x x. A partys appeal by record on appeal is deemed perfected as to him with respect to the subject matter thereof upon the approval of the record on appeal filed in due time. Opposing the motion, petitioner countered that a record on appeal is required only in proceedings where multiple appeals may arise, a situation not obtaining in the present case. By Resolution of September 2, 2008, the appellate court dismissed petitioners appeal, holding that since respondents petition before the RTC is classified as a special proceeding, petitioner should have filed both notice of appeal and a record on appeal within 30 days from receipt of the October 8, 2007 Order granting respondents petition, and by not filing a record on appeal, petitioner never perfected its appeal. Its motion for reconsideration having been denied by Resolution of December 22, 2008, petitioner filed the present petition for review on certiorari. Section 1, Rule 109 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure specifies the orders or judgments in special proceedings which may be the subject of an appeal, viz: SECTION 1. Orders or judgments from which appeals may be taken. An interested person may appeal in special proceedings from an order or judgment rendered by a Court of First Instance or a Juvenile and Domestic Relations Court, where such order or judgment: (a) Allows or disallows a will; (b) Determines who are the lawful heirs of a deceased person, or the distributive share of the estate to which such person is entitled;

(c) Allows or disallows, in whole or in part, any claim against the estate of a deceased person, or any claim presented on behalf of the estate in offset to a claim against it; (d) Settles the account of an executor, administrator, trustee or guardian; (e) Constitutes, in proceedings relating to the settlement of the estate of a deceased person, or the administration of a trustee or guardian, a final determination in the lower court of the rights of the party appealing, except that no appeal shall be allowed from the appointment of a special administrator; and (f) Is the final order or judgment rendered in the case, and affects the substantial rights of the person appealing unless it be an order granting or denying a motion for a new trial or for reconsideration. The above-quoted rule contemplates multiple appeals during the pendency of special proceedings. A record on appeal in addition to the notice of appeal is thus required to be filed as the original records of the case should remain with the trial court to enable the rest of the case to proceed in the event that a separate and distinct issue is resolved by said court and held to be final. In the present case, the filing of a record on appeal was not necessary since no other matter remained to be heard and determined by the trial court after it issued the appealed order granting respondents petition for cancellation of birth record and change of surname in the civil registry. The appellate courts reliance on Zayco v. Hinlo, Jr. in denying petitioners motion for reconsideration is misplaced. In Zayco which was a petition for letters of administration of a deceased persons estate, the decedents children appealed the trial courts order appointing the grandson of the decedent as administrator of the estate. Their notice of appeal and record on appeal were denied due course by the trial court on the ground that the appealed order is interlocutory and not subject to appeal. But even if the appeal were proper, it was belatedly filed. On certiorari by the decedents children, the appellate court sustained the trial court. On petition for review, this Court reversed the appellate court, holding that [a]n order appointing an administrator of a deceased persons estate is a final determination of the rights of the parties in connection with the administration, management and settlement of the decedents estate, hence, the order is final and appealable.The Court also held that the appeal was filed on time. In Zayco, unlike in the present case, a record on appeal was obviously necessary as the proceedings before the trial court involved the administration, management and settlement of the decedents estate matters covered by Section 1 of Rule 109 wherein multiple appeals could, and did in that case, call for them. WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. The Court of Appeals Resolutions of September 2, 2008 and December 22, 2008 in CA G.R. CV No. 90346 are REVERSED and SET ASIDE. The appeal of petitioners before the appellate court is REINSTATED.

Ma. Cristina Torres Braza vs. The City Civil Registrar of Himamaylan City G.R. No. 181174 Facts: Petitioner Ma. Cristina Torres Braza is the wife of Pablo Sicad Braza Jr., the latter died in a vehicular accident in Bandung, West Java, Indonesia. During the wake following the repatriation of his (Pablo’s) remains in the Philippines, Respondent Lucille Titular and her son, Patrick Alvin Titutar showed up and introduced themselves as the wife and son respectively, of the deceased. Petitioner Cristina thereupon made inquiries and in the course of which she obtained Patrick Alvin’s birth certificate from the Local Civil Registrar of Negros Occidental which had states that: 1. Pablo S. Braza as the father of Patrick Alvin; the latter was acknowledged by the father on January 13, 1997; 2. Patrick Alvin was legitimated by virtue of the subsequent marriage of his parents. Therefore, his name is changed to Patrick Alvin Titular Braza. Cristina likewise obtained a copy of a marriage contract showing Pablo and Lucille were married.

Cristina and her co-petitioner (her three legitimate children with Pablo) filed before the RTC of Negros a petition to correct the entries in the birth certificate record of Patrick in the Local Civil Registry. They contended that Patrick could not have been legitimated by the supposed subsequent marriage between Lucille and Pablo because said marriage is bigamous on account of a valid and subsisting marriage between her (Cristina) and Pablo. Petitioner prayed for the:  Correction of the entries in Patrick’s birth record with respect to his legitimation, the name of the father and his acknowledgment and the use of the last name “BRAZA”;  A directive to Leon, Cecilia and Lucille, all surnamed Titular, as guardians of the minor Patrick, to submit Patrick to DNA testing to determine his paternity and filiation;  The declaration of nullity of the legitimation of Patrick as stated in his birth certificate and, for this purpose, the declaration of the marriage between Lucille and Pablo as bigamous. Respondent filed a motion to dismiss for lack of jurisdiction. RTC: Trial Court dismissed the petition without prejudice, holding that in a special proceeding for correction of entry, the court, which is not acting as a family court, has no jurisdiction over an action to annul the marriage of Lucille and Pablo, impugn the legitimacy of Patrick, and order Patrick to be subjected to a DNA test, hence, the controversy should be ventilated in an ordinary adversarial action. MR: denied. Hence, this petition for review. Issue: May the court pass upon the validity of marriage and questions on legitimacy in an action to correct entries in the civil registrar? Held: No. In a special proceeding for correction of entry under Rule 108 (Cancellation or Correction of Entries in the Original Registry), the trial court has no jurisdiction to nullify marriages and rule on legitimacy and filiations. Rule 108 of the Rules of Court vis-a-vis Article 412 of the Civil Code charts the procedure by which an entry in the civil registry may be cancelled or corrected. The proceeding contemplated therein may generally be used only to correct clerical, spelling, typographical and other innocuous errors in the civil registry. A clerical error is one which is visible to the eyes or obvious to the understanding; an error made by a clerk or a transcriber; a mistake in copying or writing, or a harmless change such as a correction of name that is clearly misspelled or of a misstatement of the occupation of the parent. Substantial or contentious alterations may be allowed only in adversarial proceedings, in which all interested parties are impleaded and due process is properly observed. The petitioners’ cause of action is actually to seek the declaration of Pablo and Lucille’s marriage as void for being bigamous and impugn Patrick’s legitimacy, which causes of action are governed not by Rule 108 but by A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC which took effect on March 15, 2003, and Art. 171 of the Family Code, respectively; hence, the petition should be filed in a Family Court as expressly provided in said Code. It is well to emphasize that, doctrinally, validity of marriages as well as legitimacy and filiation can be questioned only in a direct action seasonably filed by the proper party, and not through collateral attack such as the petition filed before the court a quo. Petition to correct the entries (Rule 108) is a wrong remedy in this case because the trial court herein has no jurisdiction to nullify marriages and rule on legitimacy and filiation. The allegations of the petition filed before the TC clearly show that petitioners’ seek to nullify the marriage between Pablo and Lucille on the ground that it is bigamous and impugn Patrick’s filiation in connection with which they ask the court to order Patrick to be subjected to a DNA test. It is well settled doctrine that validity of marriages as well as legitimacy and filiation can be questioned in a direct action seasonably filed by the proper party, and not through a collateral attack such as the petition filed before the court a quo. RULE 108 OF THE RULES OF COURT (vis a vis Art. 412 of the Civil Code)  It charts the procedure by which an entry in the civil registry may be cancelled or corrected. The proceeding contemplated therein may generally be used ONLY TO CORRECT CLERICAL, SPELLING, TYPOGRAPHICAL AND OTHER INNOCUOUS ERRORS IN THE CIVIL REGISTRY. CLERICAL ERROR/SUBSTANTIAL ERROR 3. A clerical error is one which is visible to the eyes or obvious to the understanding; an error made by a clerk or a transcriber; a mistake in copying or writing; or a harmless change such as a correction of name that is clearly misspelled or of a misstatement of the occupation of the parent.

4. Substantial or contentious alterations may be allowed only in adversarial proceedings, in which all interested parties are impleaded and due process is properly observed.

Republic of the Philippines vs Merlinda L. Olaybar G.R. No. 189538 Facts: Respondent requested from the National Statistics Office (NSO) a Certificate of No Marriage (CENOMAR) as one of the requirements for her marriage with her boyfriend of five years. Upon receipt thereof, she discovered that she was already married to a certain Ye Son Sune, a Korean National. She denied having contracted said marriage and claimed that she did not know the alleged husband; she did not appear before the solemnizing officer; and, that the signature appearing in the marriage certificate is not hers Thus, she filed a petition for Cancellation of Entries in the Marriage Contract, especially the entries in the wife portion. Judgment was rendered in favor of petitions. Registrar is directed to cancel all entries in the WIFE portion of the allged marriage contract. Finding that the signature appearing in the subject marriage contract was not that of respondent, the court found basis in granting the latter’s prayer to straighten her record and rectify the terrible mistake. Issue: (1) there was no clerical spelling, typographical and other innocuous errors in the marriage contract for it to fall within the provisions of Rule 108 of the Rules of Court; (2) granting the cancellation of all the entries in the wife portion of the alleged marriage contract is, in effect, is declaring the marriage void ab initio correct?

Held: Petitions are denied; 1. Rule 108 of the Rules of Court provides the procedure for cancellation or correction of entries in the civil registry. The proceedings may either be summary or adversary. If the correction is clerical, then the procedure to be adopted is summary. If the rectification affects the civil status, citizenship or nationality of a party, it is deemed substantial, and the procedure to be adopted is adversary. An appropriate adversary suit or proceeding is one where the trial court has conducted proceedings where all relevant facts have been fully and properly developed, where opposing counsel have been given opportunity to demolish the opposite party’s case, and where the evidence has been thoroughly weighed and considered. It is true that in special proceedings, formal pleadings and a hearing may be dispensed with, and the remedy [is] granted upon mere application or motion. However, a special proceeding is not always summary. The procedure laid down in Rule 108 is not a summary proceeding per se. It requires publication of the petition; it mandates the inclusion as parties of all persons who may claim interest which would be affected by the cancellation or correction; it also requires the civil registrar and any person in interest to file their opposition, if any; and it states that although the court may make orders expediting the proceedings, it is after hearing that the court shall either dismiss the petition or issue an order granting the same. Thus, as long as the procedural requirements in Rule 108 are followed, it is the appropriate adversary proceeding to effect substantial corrections and changes in entries of the civil register. 2. To be sure, a petition for correction or cancellation of an entry in the civil registry cannot substitute for an action to invalidate a marriage. A direct action is necessary to prevent circumvention of the substantive and procedural safeguards of marriage under the Family Code, A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC and other related laws. Among these safeguards are the requirement of proving the limited grounds for the dissolution of marriage, support pendente lite of the spouses and children, the liquidation, partition and distribution of the properties of the spouses and the investigation of the public prosecutor to determine collusion. A direct action for declaration of nullity or annulment of marriage is also necessary to prevent circumvention of the jurisdiction of the Family Courts under the Family Courts Act of 1997 (Republic Act No. 8369), as a petition for cancellation or correction of entries in the civil registry may be filed in the Regional Trial Court where the corresponding civil registry is located. In other words, a Filipino citizen cannot dissolve his marriage by the mere expedient of changing his entry of marriage in the civil registry.

Rommel Jacinto Dantes Silverio vs Republic of the Philippines G.R. No. 174689 Facts: Rommel Jacinto Dantes Silverio filed a petition for the change of his first name and sex in his birth certificate Petitioner alleged in his petition that he was born in the City of Manila to the spouses Melecio Petines Silverio and Anita Aquino Dantes on April 4, 1962. His name was registered as "Rommel Jacinto Dantes Silverio" in his certificate of live birth (birth certificate). His sex was registered as "male." He further alleged that he is a male transsexual, that is, "anatomically male but feels, thinks and acts as a female" and that he had always identified himself with girls since childhood.On January 27, 2001 when he underwent sex reassignment surgery in Bangkok, Thailand. He was thereafter examined by Dr. Marcelino Reysio-Cruz, Jr., a plastic and reconstruction surgeon in the Philippines, who issued a medical certificate attesting that he (petitioner) had in fact undergone the procedure. The trial court rendered a decision4 in favor of petitioner. The Republic of the Philippines, thru the OSG, filed a petition for certiorari in the Court of Appeals. It alleged that there is no law allowing the change of entries in the birth certificate by reason of sex alteration. On February 23, 2006, the Court of Appeals rendered a decision in favor of the Republic. Issue: Can a person's first name be changed on the ground of sex reassignment?

Held: No. Petitioner believes that after having acquired the physical features of a female, he became entitled to the civil registry changes sought. The court disagrees. The State has an interest in the names borne by individuals and entities for purposes of identification. A change of name is a privilege, not a right. Petitions for change of name are controlled by statutes. RA 9048 provides the grounds for which change of first name may be allowed: SECTION 4. Grounds for Change of First Name or Nickname. – The petition for change of first name or nickname may be allowed in any of the following cases: (1) The petitioner finds the first name or nickname to be ridiculous, tainted with dishonor or extremely difficult to write or pronounce; (2) The new first name or nickname has been habitually and continuously used by the petitioner and he has been publicly known by that first name or nickname in the community; or (3) The change will avoid confusion. Petitioner’s basis in praying for the change of his first name was his sex reassignment. He intended to make his first name compatible with the sex he thought he transformed himself into through surgery. However, a change of name does not alter one’s legal capacity or civil status. RA 9048 does not sanction a change of first name on the ground of sex reassignment. Rather than avoiding confusion, changing petitioner’s first name for his declared purpose may only create grave complications in the civil registry and the public interest. Before a person can legally change his given name, he must present proper or reasonable cause or any compelling reason justifying such change. In addition, he must show that he will be prejudiced by the use of his true and official name. In this case, he failed to show, or even allege, any prejudice that he might suffer as a result of using his true and official name.

No Law Allows The Change of Entry In The Birth Certificate As To Sex On the Ground of Sex Reassignment Under RA 9048, a correction in the civil registry involving the change of sex is not a mere clerical or typographical error. It is a substantial change for which the applicable procedure is Rule 108 of the Rules of Court. The entries envisaged in Article 412 of the Civil Code and correctable under Rule 108 of the Rules of Court are those provided in Articles 407 and 408 of the Civil Code: ART. 407. Acts, events and judicial decrees concerning the civil status of persons shall be recorded in the civil register. ART. 408. The following shall be entered in the civil register: (1) Births; (2) marriages; (3) deaths; (4) legal separations; (5) annulments of marriage; (6) judgments declaring marriages void from the beginning; (7) legitimations; (8) adoptions; (9) acknowledgments of natural children; (10) naturalization; (11) loss, or (12) recovery of citizenship; (13) civil interdiction; (14) judicial determination of filiation; (15) voluntary emancipation of a minor; and (16) changes of name. The acts, events or factual errors contemplated under Article 407 of the Civil Code include even those that occur after birth. However, no reasonable interpretation of the provision can justify the conclusion that it covers the correction on the ground of sex reassignment.

To correct simply means "to make or set aright; to remove the faults or error from" while to change means "to replace something with something else of the same kind or with something that serves as a substitute." The birth certificate of petitioner contained no error. All entries therein, including those corresponding to his first name and sex, were all correct. No correction is necessary. Neither May Entries in the Birth Certificate As to First Name or Sex Be Changed on the Ground of Equity The trial court opined that its grant of the petition was in consonance with the principles of justice and equity. It believed that allowing the petition would cause no harm, injury or prejudice to anyone. This is wrong. The changes sought by petitioner will have serious and wide-ranging legal and public policy consequences. First, marriage, one of the most sacred social institutions, is a special contract of permanent union between a man and a woman. Such decision would prejudice the laws on marriage and family relations. Second, laws which apply particularly to womens such as provisions of the Labor Code on employment of woman, certain felonies under the Revised Penal Code, presumption of survivorship in case of calamities, among others. The statutes define who may file petitions for change of first name and for correction or change of entries in the civil registry, where they may be filed, what grounds may be invoked, what proof must be presented and what procedures shall be observed. If the legislature intends to confer on a person who has undergone sex reassignment the privilege to change his name and sex to conform with his reassigned sex, it has to enact legislation laying down the guidelines in turn governing the conferment of that privilege.

Republic of the Philippines vs Jennifer B. Cagandahan G.R. No. 166676 Facts: Jennifer Cagandahan filed a Petition for Correction of Entries in Birth Certificate before the RTC, Branch 33 of Siniloan, Laguna. She was registered as a female in the Certificate of Live Birth but while growing up, she developed secondary male characteristics and was diagnosed to have Congenital Adrenal Hyperplasia (CAH) which is a condition where persons thus afflicted possess both male and female characteristics. She further alleged that she was diagnosed to have clitoral hyperthropy in her early years and at age six, underwent an ultrasound where it was discovered that she has small ovaries. At age thirteen, tests revealed that her ovarian structures had minimized, she has stopped growing and she has no breast or menstrual development. She then alleged that for all interests and appearances as well as in mind and emotion, she has become a male person. Thus, she prayed that her birth certificate be corrected such that her gender be changed from female to male and her first name be changed from Jennifer to Jeff. To prove her claim, respondent testified and presented the testimony of Dr. Michael Sionzon of the Department of Psychiatry, University of the Philippines-Philippine General Hospital. Dr. Sionzon issued a medical certificate stating that respondents condition is known as CAH. He explained that genetically respondent is female but because her body secretes male hormones, her female organs did not develop normally and she has two sex organs female and male. He testified that this condition is very rare, that respondents uterus is not fully developed because of lack of female hormones, and that she has no monthly period. He further testified that respondents condition is permanent and recommended the change of gender because respondent has made up her mind, adjusted to her chosen role as male, and the gender change would be advantageous to her.

The RTC granted the petition. The OSG seeks the reversal of the abovementioned ruling. Issues: Correction of entry under Rule 108 does not allow change of sex or gender in the birth certificate, while respondents medical condition, i.e., Congenital Adrenal Hyperplasia does not make her a male. Held: CAH is one of many conditions that involve intersex anatomy. Intersex individuals are treated in different ways by different cultures. In most societies, intersex individuals have been expected to conform to either a male or female gender role. The current state of Philippine statutes apparently compels that a person be classified either as a male or as a female, but this Court is not controlled by mere appearances when nature itself fundamentally negates such rigid classification. Biologically, nature endowed respondent with a mixed (neither consistently and categorically female nor consistently and categorically male) composition. Respondent has female (XX) chromosomes. However, respondents body system naturally produces high levels of male hormones (androgen). Respondent here thinks of himself as a male and considering that his body produces high levels of male hormones (androgen) there is preponderant biological support for considering him as being male. Sexual development in cases of intersex persons makes the gender classification at birth inconclusive. It is at maturity that the gender of such persons, like respondent, is fixed. Respondent here has simply let nature take its course and has not taken unnatural steps to arrest or interfere with what he was born with. And accordingly, he has already ordered his life to that of a male. Respondent could have undergone treatment and taken steps, like taking lifelong medication, to force his body into the categorical mold of a female but he did not. He chose not to do so. Nature has instead taken its due course in respondents development to reveal more fully his male characteristics. In the absence of a law on the matter, the Court will not dictate on respondent concerning a matter so innately private as ones sexuality and lifestyle preferences, much less on whether or not to undergo medical treatment to reverse the male tendency due to CAH. The Court will not consider respondent as having erred in not choosing to undergo treatment in order to become or remain as a female. Neither will the Court force respondent to undergo treatment and to take medication in order to fit the mold of a female, as society commonly currently knows this gender of the human species. Respondent is the one who has to live with his intersex anatomy. To him belongs the human right to the pursuit of happiness and of health. Thus, to him should belong the primordial choice of what courses of action to take along the path of his sexual development and maturation. In the absence of evidence that respondent is an incompetent and in the absence of evidence to show that classifying respondent as a male will harm other members of society who are equally entitled to protection under the law, the Court affirms as valid and justified the respondents position and his personal judgment of being a male.

Comparative Analysis for: Rommel Jacinto Dantest Silverio vs Republic of the Philippines; and Republic of the Philippines vs Jennifer B. Cagandahan For the Silverio and Cagandahan case, both tackled on the issue of changing their recorded genders. Silverio was a transgender who took the necessary steps in undergoing a gender reassignment procedure. He was born male, with plastic surgeries, along with the gender reassignment procedure, he made himself look like a female. This is in accordance to his feelings that although born in a male’s body, he felt as if he was a female. He then petitioned the court to change his recorded gender to female but was eventually denied. On the Cagandahan case, Jennifer Cagandahan was born with a natural condition called Congenital Adrenal Hyperplasia (CAH). The condition caused her to possess both features of a man and woman. At birth, she was

identified as a woman but eventually as she got older, she exhibited more features of a man. The Supreme Court granted her petition to change her gender because there was no unnatural intervention in her case. “Ultimately, we are of the view that where the person is biologically or naturally intersex the determining factor in his gender classification would be what the individual, like respondent, having reached the age of majority, with good reason thinks of his/her sex. Respondent here thinks of himself as a male and considering that his body produces high levels of male hormones (androgen) there is preponderant biological support for considering him as being male. Sexual development in cases of intersex persons makes the gender classification at birth inconclusive. It is at maturity that the gender of such persons, like respondent, is fixed. Respondent here has simply let nature take its course and has not taken unnatural steps to arrest or interfere with what he was born with. And accordingly, he has already ordered his life to that of a male. Respondent could have undergone treatment and taken steps, like taking lifelong medication, to force his body into the categorical mold of a female but he did not. He chose not to do so. Nature has instead taken its due course in respondent’s development to reveal more fully his male characteristics.” In the absence of a law on the matter, the Court will not dictate on respondent concerning a matter so innately private as one’s sexuality and lifestyle preferences, much less on whether or not to undergo medical treatment to reverse the male tendency due to CAH.

Silverio deliberately took the sex reassignment operations to change his body to that of a woman. Cagandahan, on the other hand, from birth had a female body, male hormones, two sex organs, and no monthly period.

Republic Act No. 9048, March 22, 2001 AN ACT AUTHORIZING THE CITY OR MUNICIPAL CIVIL REGISTRAR OR THE CONSUL GENERAL TO CORRECT A CLERICAL OR TYPOGRAPHICAL ERROR IN AN ENTRY AND/OR CHANGE OF FIRST NAME OR NICKNAME IN THE CIVIL REGISTER WITHOUT NEED OF A JUDICIAL ORDER, AMENDING FOR THIS PURPOSE ARTICLES 376 AND 412 OF THE CIVIL CODE OF THE PHILIPPINES Section 1. Authority to Correct Clerical or Typographical Error and Change of First Name or Nickname No entry in a civil register shall be changed or corrected without a judicial order, except for clerical or typographical errors and change of first name or nickname which can be corrected or changed by the concerned city or municipal civil registrar or consul general in accordance with the provisions of this Act and its implementing rules and regulations. Section 3. Who May File the Petition and Where. Any person having direct and personal interest in the correction of a clerical or typographical error in an entry and/or change of first name or nickname in the civil register may file, in person, a verified petition with the local civil registry office of the city or municipality where the record being sought to be corrected or changed is kept. Section 4. Grounds for Change of First Name or Nickname. The petition for change of first name or nickname may be allowed in any of the following cases: (1) The petitioner finds the first name or nickname to be ridiculous, tainted with dishonor or extremely difficult to write or pronounce.

(2) The new first name or nickname has been habitually and continuously used by the petitioner and he has been publicly known by that by that first name or nickname in the community: or (3) The change will avoid confusion. Section 5. Form and Contents of the Petition. The petition shall be in the form of an affidavit, subscribed and sworn to before any person authorized by the law to administer oaths. The affidavit shall set forth facts necessary to establish the merits of the petition and shall show affirmatively that the petitioner is competent to testify to the matters stated. The petitioner shall state the particular erroneous entry or entries, which are sought to be corrected and/or the change sought to be made. The petition shall be supported with the following documents: (1) A certified true machine copy of the certificate or of the page of the registry book containing the entry or entries sought to be corrected or changed. (2) At least two (2) public or private documents showing the correct entry or entries upon which the correction or change shall be based; and (3) Other documents which the petitioner or the city or municipal civil registrar or the consul general may consider relevant and necessary for the approval of the petition. Section 6. Duties of the City or Municipal Civil Registrar or the Consul General. The city or municipal civil registrar or the consul general to whom the petition is presented shall examine the petition and its supporting documents. He shall post the petition in a conspicuous place provided for that purpose for ten (10) consecutive days after he finds the petition and its supporting documents sufficient in form and substance. Section 7. Duties and Powers of the Civil Registrar General. The civil registrar general shall, within ten (10) working days from receipt of the decision granting a petition, exercise the power to impugn such decision by way of an objection based on the following grounds: (1) The error is not clerical or typographical; (2) The correction of an entry or entries in the civil register is substantial or controversial as it affects the civil status of a person; or (3) The basis used in changing the first name or nickname of a person does not fall under Section 4.

Flow: 1. File a Petition for the correction of a typographical error in an entry or change of first name If Abroad? : File to Philippine Consulates If not Abroad? : Local City or Municipal Civil Registrar 2. Petition shall be supported with documents. Published at least once a week for 2 weeks, in a newspaper of general circulation. Submit certification from appropriate law enforcement agencies that petitioner has no pending case or criminal record. 3. City or Municipal Civil Registrar or the Consul General shall post petition for 10 days 4. City or Municipal Civil Registrar or the Consul General shall render a decision not later thatn 5 working days after posting and/or publication.

If power to impugn is not exercised by the Civil Registrar General, decision shall become final and executory. Transmit a copy of decision to the Office of the Civil Registrar General within 5 days from decision 5. Civil Registrar General may exercise the power to impugn such decision within 10 working days from receipt. 6. The Civil Registrar General shall immediately notify the city or municipal civil registrar or the consul general of the decision. 7. The City or Municipal Civil or the consul shall notify the petitioner.

Remedies: If petition is denied by the City or Municipal Civil Registrar or the Consul General, the petitioner may appeal to the Civil Registrar General or file the appropriate petition with the proper court If the petition is impugned by the Civil Registrar General, the petitioner may seek reconsideration with the Civil Registrar General or file the appropriate petition with the proper court.