Conflicts Of Law Cases.docx

Foreigner and former Filipino seeking the adoption of the siblings of the latter. Art, 184 and 185 of the Family Code G.R. No. 95551

March 20, 1997

REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, petitioner, vs. HON. CONCEPCION S. ALARCON VERGARA, in her capacity as Presiding Judge of the Regional Trial Court, Third Judicial Region, Branch 62, Angeles City and SPOUSES SAMUEL ROBERT DYE, JR. and ROSALINA D. DYE, respondents.

adopt, possess good moral character, sufficient financial capability and love and affection for the intended adoptees. The Republic filed this petition for review on a pure question of law, contending that the spouses Dye are not qualified under the law to adopt Maricel and Alvin Due. The Court finds the petition meritorious and hereby grants it. As a general rule, aliens cannot adopt Filipino citizens as this is proscribed under Article 184 of the Family Code which states: Art. 184.

The following persons may not adopt:

ROMERO, J.:

xxx

xxx

xxx

On June 25, 1990, the spouses Samuel R. Dye, Jr. and Rosalina Due Dye filed a petition before the Regional Trial Court of Angeles City 1 to adopt Maricel R. Due and Alvin R. Due, ages 13 and 12 years old, respectively, younger siblings of Rosalina. Samuel R. Dye, Jr. a member of the United States Air Force, is an American citizen who resided at the Clark Air Base in Pampanga. His wife Rosalina is a former Filipino who became a naturalized American. They have two children. Both Maricel and Alvin Due, as well as their natural parents, gave their consent to the adoption.

(3)

An alien, except:

After trial, the lower court rendered its decision on September 10, 1990 granting the petition and declaring Alvin and Maricel to be the children of the spouses Dye by adoption. 2 Respondent Regional Trial Court disregarded the sixteen-year age gap requirement of the law, the spouses being only fifteen years and three months and fifteen years and nine months older than Maricel Due, on the ground that a literal implementation of the law would defeat the very philosophy behind adoption statutes, namely, to promote the welfare of a child.3 The court also found that the petitioning spouses are mentally and physically fit to

(a) A former Filipino citizen who seeks to adopt a relative by consanguinity; (b) One who seeks to adopt the legitimate child of his or her Filipino spouse; or (c) One who is married to a Filipino citizen and seeks to adopt jointly with his or her spouse a relative by consanguinity of the latter. Aliens not included in the foregoing exceptions may adopt Filipino children in accordance with the rules on inter-country adoption as may be provided by law. Samuel Robert Dye, Jr. who is an American and, therefore, an alien is disqualified from adopting the minors Maricel and Alvin Due because he does not fall under any of the three aforequoted exceptions laid down by the law. He is not a former Filipino citizen who seeks to adopt a relative by consanguinity. 1

Nor does he seek to adopt his wife's legitimate child. Although he seeks to adopt with his wife her relatives by consanguinity, he is not married to a Filipino citizen, for Rosalina was already a naturalized American at the time the petition was filed, thus excluding him from the coverage of the exception. The law here does not provide for an alien who is married to a former Filipino citizen seeking to adopt jointly with his or her spouse a relative by consanguinity, as an exception to the general rule that aliens may not adopt. On her own, Rosalina Dye cannot adopt her brother and sister for the law mandates joint adoption by husband and wife, subject to exceptions. Article 29 of Presidential Decree No. 603 (Child and Youth Welfare Code) retained the Civil Code provision 4 that husband and wife may jointly adopt. The Family Code amended this rule by scrapping the optional character of joint adoption and making it now mandatory. Article 185 of the Family Code provides: Art. 185. Husband and wife must adopt, except in the following cases: (1) When one spouse seeks to adopt his own illegitimate child; (2) When one spouse seeks to adopt the legitimate child of the other.

being a former Filipino who seeks to adopt a relative by consanguinity, she could not jointly adopt with her husband under Article 185 because he was an alien ineligible to adopt here in the Philippines. We are not unmindful of the main purpose of adoption statutes, which is the promotion of the welfare of children. Accordingly, the law should be construed liberally, in a manner that will sustain rather than defeat said purpose. 6 The law must also be applied with compassion, understanding and less severity in view of the fact that it is intended to provide homes, love, care and education for less fortunate children. 7 Regrettably, the Court is not in a position to affirm the trial court's decision favoring adoption in the case at bar, for the law is clear and it cannot be modified without violating the proscription against judicial legislation. Until such time however, that the law on the matter is amended, we cannot sustain the respondent-spouses' petition for adoption. WHEREFORE, the instant petition is hereby GRANTED. The Decision of the Regional Trial Court of Angeles City in Special Proceeding No. 4203 (In the Matter of the Petition for Adoption of the minors Maricel R Due and Alvin R. Due), dated September 10, 1990 is REVERSED AND SET ASIDE. SO ORDERED.

None of the above exceptions applies to Samuel and Rosalina Dye, for they did not petition to adopt the latter's child but her brother and sister. The Court has previously recognized the ineligibility of a similarly situated alien husband with a former Filipino wife seeking to adopt the latter's nephews and niece in the case of Republic v. Court of Appeals.5 Although the wife in said case was qualified to adopt under Article 184, paragraph 3 (a), she 2

Spanish citizen seeking to adopt a Filipino citizen who is residing in Spain. Local Civil Registrar of Manila refuses to record the adoption. Not sure if dapat ito isama. G.R. No. L-24006 November 25, 1967 JOSEFINA JUANA DE DIOS RAMIREZ MARCAIDA, petitioner-appellant, vs. LEONCIO V. AGLUBAT, in his capacity as Deputy Local Civil Registrar of Manila, respondent-appellee. Jose W. Diokno for petitioner-appellant. Office of the Solicitor General for respondent-appellee. SANCHEZ, J.: Refusal of the Local Civil Registrar of Manila to record an Escritura de Adopcion executed in Madrid, Spain, is now challenged before this Court on appeal by registrant-adoptee from a judgment of the Court of First Instance of Manila confirmatory of such refusal. The disputed deed of adoption had its inception, thus: Prior to October 21, 1958, proceedings for adoption were started before the Court of First Instance of Madrid, Spain by Maria Garnier Garreau, then 84 years of age, adopting Josefina Juana de Dios Ramirez Marcaida, 55 years, a citizen of the Philippines. Both were residents of Madrid, Spain. On that date, October 21, 1958, the court granted the application for adoption and gave the necessary judicial authority, once the judgment becomes final, to execute the corresponding adoption document "con arreglo al articulo 177 del Codigo Civil." The adoption document became necessary for the reason that under Article 177 of the Civil Code of Spain, "[a]probada definitivamente la adopcion por el Juez, se otorgara escritura, expresando en ella las condiciones con que se haya hecho, y se inscribira en el Registro Civil correspondiente." In compliance, on November 29, 1958, the notarial document of adoption — which embodies

the court order of adoption — whereunder Maria Garnier Garreau formally adopted petitioner, was executed before Notary Public Braulio Velasco Carrasquedo of Madrid. In that document, Maria Gernier Garreau instituted petitioner, amongst other conditions as here unica y universal heredera de todos sus bienes, derechos y acciones, presentes y futuros. In conformity with our law, this escritura de adopcion was, on December 10, 1953, authenticated by Emilio S. Martinez, Philippine Vice Consul, Philippine Embassy, Madrid, who issued the corresponding certificate of authentication.1 The document of adoption was filed in the Office of the Local Civil Registrar of Manila on January 15, 1959. The Registrar, however, refused to register that document upon the ground that under Philippine law, adoption can only be had through judicial proceeding. And since the notarial document of adoption is not a judicial proceeding, it is not entitled to registration. Failing in her move to reconsider, petitioner went to the Court of First Instance of Manila on mandamus.2 As adverted to earlier, the mandamus petition did not prosper. The lower court in its decision of February 28, 1964, dismissed said petition. Petitioner's lone assignment of error reads: "The lower court erred in declaring the 'escritura de adopcion' as authenticated by the Philippine Vice Consul in Madrid, Spain, as not registrable in the Philippines." 1. Act 3753 of the Philippine Legislature, entitled "An Act to establish a civil register," in Section 1 thereof, recites that a "civil register is established for recording the civil status of persons, in which shall be entered," amongst others, "(g) adoptions." It provides for local civil registrars. Complementary thereto are Article 407 of our Civil Code which commands that "[a]cts, events and judicial decrees concerning the civil status of persons shall be recorded in the civil register;" and Article 408 of the same Code which, in language similar, directs that "[t]he following shall be entered in the civil register: . . . (8) adoptions; . . ." The law is clear. The compulsory tenor of the word "shall" leaves no alternative. It is a command. 3

2. But the Solicitor General, hewing to the line drawn by the court below, argues that petitioner's case does not come within the purview of Article 409 of the Civil Code, which states that: Art. 409. In cases of legal separation, adoption, naturalization and other judicial orders mentioned in the preceding article it shall be the duty of the clerk of the court which issued the decree to ascertain whether the same has been registered, and if this has not been done, to send a copy of said decree to the civil registry of the city or municipality where the court is functioning. and Section 11 of Act 3753, which reads: Sec. 11. Duties of clerks of court to register certain decisions. — In cases of legitimation, acknowledgment, adoption, naturalization, and change of given or family name, or both, upon the decree of the court becoming final, it shall be the duty of the clerk of the court which issued the decree to ascertain whether the same has been registered, and if this has not been done, to have said decree recorded in the office of the civil registrar of the municipality where the court is functioning. It is at once apparent that the cited legal provisions refer to adoptions effected in the Philippines. For, indeed, Article 409 of the Civil Code and Section 10 of the Registry Law speak of adoption which shall be registered in the municipality or city where the court issuing the adoption decree is functioning. But, the trial court concluded that what is registrable is only adoption obtained through a judgment rendered by a Philippine court. We are not persuaded to adopt the Government's theory. We are at a loss to understand how it could be concluded that the structure of the law did not authorize registration of foreign adoptions. We perceive that Article 409 and Section 10 aforesaid were incorporated into the statute books merely to give effect to our law3 which required judicial proceedings for adoption. Limitation of registration of adoptions to those granted by Philippine courts is a misconception which a broader view allows us now to correct. For, if registration is to be narrowed down to local adoptions, it is the function of Congress, not of this Court, to spell out such limitation. We cannot carve out a

prohibition where the law does not so state. Excessive rigidity serves no purpose. And, by Articles 407 and 408 of our Civil Code, the disputed document of adoption is registrable. 3. No suggestion there is in the record that prejudice to State and adoptee, or any other person for that matter, would ensue from the adoption here involved. The validity thereof is not under attack. At any rate, whatever may be the effect of adoption, the rights of the State and adoptee and other persons interested are fully safeguarded by Article 15 of our Civil Code which, in terms explicit, provides that: "Laws relating to family rights and duties, or to the status, condition and legal capacity of persons are binding upon citizens of the Philippines even though living abroad." 4. Private international law offers no obstacle to recognition of foreign adoption. This rests on the principle that the status of adoption, created by the law of a State having jurisdiction to create it, will be given the same effect in another state as is given by the latter state to the status of adoption when created by its own law.4It is quite obvious then that the status of adoption, once created under the proper foreign law, will be recognized in this country, except where public policy or the interests of its inhabitants forbid its enforcement and demand the substitution of the lex fori. Indeed, implicit in Article 15 of our Civil Code just quoted, is that the exercise of incidents to foreign adoption "remains subject to local law." 5 It is high time for this Court to formulate a rule on the registration of foreign adoptions. We hold that an adoption created under the law of a foreign country is entitled to registration in the corresponding civil register of the Philippines. It is to be understood, however, that the effects of such adoption shall be governed by the laws of this country.6 Conformably to the foregoing, the lower court's decision of February 28, 1964 dismissing the mandamus petition appealed from, is hereby reversed; and the Local Civil Registrar of Manila is hereby directed to register the deed of adoption (Escritura de Adopcion) by Maria Garnier Garreau in favor of petitioner Josefina de Dios Ramirez Marcaida. 4

No costs. So ordered. Former Filipina, now a US citizen seeks adopt 3 minor children of her brother. Section 9, par (b) of RA 8552.(Domestic Adoption Act) DIWATA RAMOS LANDINGIN G.R. No. 164948 Petitioner, Present PANGANIBAN, C.J., Chairperson, YNARES-SANTIAGO, - versus - AUSTRIA-MARTINEZ, CALLEJO, SR., and CHICO-NAZARIO, JJ. Promulgated: REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, Respondent. June 27, 2006 x- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -----x DECISION CALLEJO, SR., J.: Assailed in this petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court is the Decision [1] of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 77826 which reversed the Decision [2] of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Tarlac City, Branch 63 in Civil Case No. 2733 granting the Petition for Adoption of the petitioner herein. The Antecedents On February 4, 2002, Diwata Ramos Landingin, a citizen of the United States of America (USA), of Filipino parentage and a resident of Guam, USA, filed a petition [3] for the adoption of

minors Elaine Dizon Ramos who was born on August 31, 1986; [4] Elma Dizon Ramos, who was born on September 7, 1987; [5] and Eugene Dizon Ramos who was born on August 5, 1989. [6] The minors are the natural children of Manuel Ramos, petitioners brother, and Amelia Ramos. Landingin, as petitioner, alleged in her petition that when Manuel died on May 19, 1990, [7] the children were left to their paternal grandmother, Maria Taruc Ramos; their biological mother, Amelia, went to Italy, re-married there and now has two children by her second marriage and no longer communicated with her children by Manuel Ramos nor with her in-laws from the time she left up to the institution of the adoption; the minors are being financially supported by the petitioner and her children, and relatives abroad; as Maria passed away on November 23, 2000, petitioner desires to adopt the children; the minors have given their written consent[8] to the adoption; she is qualified to adopt as shown by the fact that she is a 57-year-old widow, has children of her own who are already married, gainfully employed and have their respective families; she lives alone in her own home in Guam, USA, where she acquired citizenship, and works as a restaurant server. She came back to the Philippines to spend time with the minors; her children gave their written consent[9] to the adoption of the minors. Petitioners brother, Mariano Ramos, who earns substantial income, signified his willingness and commitment to support the minors while in petitioners custody. Petitioner prayed that, after due hearing, judgment be rendered in her favor, as follows: WHEREFORE, it is most respectfully prayed to this Honorable Court that after publication and hearing, judgment be rendered allowing the adoption of the minor children Elaine Dizon Ramos, Elma Dizon Ramos, and Eugene Dizon Ramos by the petitioner, and ordering that the minor childrens name follow the family name of petitioner. 5

Petitioner prays for such other reliefs, just and equitable under the premises.[10] On March 5, 2002, the court ordered the Department of Social Welfare and Development (DSWD) to conduct a case study as mandated by Article 34 of Presidential Decree No. 603, as amended, and to submit a report thereon not later than April 4, 2002, the date set for the initial hearing of the petition. [11] The Office of the Solicitor General (OSG) entered its appearance[12] but deputized the City Prosecutor of Tarlac to appear in its behalf.[13] Since her petition was unopposed, petitioner was allowed to present her evidence ex parte.[14] The petitioner testified in her behalf. She also presented Elaine Ramos, the eldest of the adoptees, to testify on the written consent executed by her and her siblings. [15] The petitioner marked in evidence the Affidavit of Consent purportedly executed by her children Ann, Errol, Dennis and Ricfel Branitley, all surnamed Landingin, and notarized by a notary public in Guam, USA, as proof of said consent.[16] On May 24, 2002, Elizabeth Pagbilao, Social Welfare Officer II of the DSWD, Field Office III, Tarlac, submitted a Child Study Report, with the following recommendation: In view of the foregoing, undersigned finds minors Elaine, Elma & Eugene all surnamed Ramos, eligible for adoption because of the following reasons: 1. Minors surviving parent, the mother has voluntarily consented to their adoption by the paternal aunt, Diwata Landingin this is in view of her inability to provide the parental care, guidance and support they need. An Affidavit of Consent was executed by the mother which is hereto attached.

2. The three minors subject for adoption have also expressed their willingness to be adopted and joins the petitioners in Guam, USA in the future. A joint Affidavit of consent is hereto attached. The minors developed close attachment to the petitioners and they regarded her as second parent. 3. The minors are present under the care of a temporary guardian who has also family to look after. As young adolescents they really need parental love, care, guidance and support to ensure their protection and well being. In view of the foregoing, it is hereby respectfully recommended that minors Elaine D. Ramos, Elma D. Ramos and Eugene D. Ramos be adopted by their maternal aunt Diwata Landingin. Trial custody is hereby further recommended to be dispensed with considering that they are close relatives and that close attachments was already developed between the petitioner and the 3 minors.[17] Pagbilao narrated what transpired during her interview, as follows: The mother of minors came home together with her son John Mario, this May 2002 for 3 weeks vacation. This is to enable her appear for the personal interview concerning the adoption of her children. The plan for the adoption of minors by their paternal aunt Diwata Landingin was conceived after the death of their paternal grandmother and guardian. The paternal relatives including the petitioner who attended the wake of their mother were very much concerned about the well-being of the three minors. While preparing for their adoption, they have asked a cousin who has a family to stay with minors and act as their temporary guardian. 6

The mother of minors was consulted about the adoption plan and after weighing the benefits of adoption to her children, she voluntarily consented. She realized that her children need parental love, guidance and support which she could not provide as she already has a second family & residing in Italy. Knowing also that the petitioners & her children have been supporting her children up to the present and truly care for them, she believes her children will be in good hands. She also finds petitioners in a better position to provide a secured and bright future to her children.[18] However, petitioner failed to present Pagbilao as witness and offer in evidence the voluntary consent of Amelia Ramos to the adoption; petitioner, likewise, failed to present any documentary evidence to prove that Amelia assents to the adoption. On November 23, 2002, the court, finding merit in the petition for adoption, rendered a decision granting said petition. The dispositive portion reads: WHEREFORE, it is hereby ordered that henceforth, minors Elaine Dizon Ramos, Elma Dizon Ramos, Eugene Dizon Ramos be freed from all legal obligations obedience and maintenance from their natural parents and that they be declared for all legal intents and purposes the children of Diwata Ramos Landingin. Trial custody is dispensed with considering that parent-children relationship has long been established between the children and the adoptive parents. Let the surnames of the children be changed from Dizon-Ramos to Ramos-Landingin. Let a copy of this decision be furnished the Local Civil Registrar of Tarlac, Tarlac for him to effect the corresponding changes/amendment in the birth certificates of the abovementioned minors. SO ORDERED.[19]

The OSG appealed[20] the decision to the Court of Appeals on December 2, 2002. In its brief[21] for the oppositor-appellant, the OSG raised the following arguments: I THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN GRANTING THE PETITION FOR ADOPTION DESPITE THE LACK OF CONSENT OF THE PROPOSED ADOPTEES BIOLOGICAL MOTHER. II THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN GRANTING THE PETITION FOR ADOPTION DESPITE THE LACK OF THE WRITTEN CONSENT OF THE PETITIONERS CHILDREN AS REQUIRED BY LAW. III THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN GRANTING THE PETITION FOR ADOPTION DESPITE PETITIONERS FAILURE TO ESTABLISH THAT SHE IS IN A POSITION TO SUPPORT THE PROPOSED ADOPTEES. On April 29, 2004, the CA rendered a decision [22] reversing the ruling of the RTC. It held that petitioner failed to adduce in evidence the voluntary consent of Amelia Ramos, the childrens natural mother. Moreover, the affidavit of consent of the petitioners children could not also be admitted in evidence as the same was executed in Guam, USA and was not authenticated or acknowledged before a Philippine consular office, and although petitioner has a job, she was not stable enough to support the children. The dispositive portion of the CA decision reads: WHEREFORE, premises considered, the appealed decision dated November 25, 2002 of the Regional Trial Court, Branch 7

63, Tarlac City in Spec. Proc. No. 2733 is hereby REVERSED and SET ASIDE. SO ORDERED.

[23]

Petitioner filed a Motion for Reconsideration [24] on May 21, 2004, which the CA denied in its Resolution dated August 12, 2004.[25] Petitioner, thus, filed the instant petition for review on certiorari[26] on September 7, 2004, assigning the following errors: 1. THAT THE HONORABLE LOWER COURT HAS OVERLOOKED AND MISAPPLIED SOME FACTS AND CIRCUMSTANCES WHICH ARE OF WEIGHT AND IMPORTANCE AND WHICH IF CONSIDERED WOULD HAVE AFFECTED THE RESULT OF THE CASE. 2. THAT THE HONORABLE LOWER COURT ERRED IN CONCLUDING THAT THE PETITIONERAPPELLEE IS NOT FINANCIALLY CAPABLE TO SUPPORT THE THREE CHILDREN.[27] The issues raised by the parties in their pleadings are the following: (a) whether the petitioner is entitled to adopt the minors without the written consent of their biological mother, Amelia Ramos; (b) whether or not the affidavit of consent purportedly executed by the petitioner-adopters children sufficiently complies with the law; and (c) whether or not petitioner is financially capable of supporting the adoptees.

The Courts Ruling

The petition is denied for lack of merit. It has been the policy of the Court to adhere to the liberal concept, as stated in Malkinson v. Agrava,[28] that adoption statutes, being humane and salutary, hold the interest and welfare of the child to be of paramount consideration and are designed to provide homes, parental care and education for unfortunate, needy or orphaned children and give them the protection of society and family in the person of the adopter as well as to allow childless couples or persons to experience the joys of parenthood and give them legally a child in the person of the adopted for the manifestation of their natural parental instincts. Every reasonable intendment should thus be sustained to promote and fulfill these noble and compassionate objectives of the law.[29] However, in Cang v. Court of Appeals, [30] the Court also ruled that the liberality with which this Court treats matters leading to adoption insofar as it carries out the beneficent purposes of the law to ensure the rights and privileges of the adopted child arising therefrom, ever mindful that the paramount consideration is the overall benefit and interest of the adopted child, should be understood in its proper context and perspective. The Courts position should not be misconstrued or misinterpreted as to extend to inferences beyond the contemplation of law and jurisprudence. Thus, the discretion to approve adoption proceedings is not to be anchored solely on best interests of the child but likewise, with due regard to the natural rights of the parents over the child.[31] Section 9 of Republic Act No. 8552, otherwise known as the Domestic Adoption Act of 1998, provides: Sec. 9. Whose Consent is Necessary to the Adoption. - After being properly counseled and informed of his/her right to give or withhold his/her approval of the adoption, the written consent of the following to the adoption is hereby required: 8

(a)

The adoptee, if ten (10) years of age or over;

(b) The biological parent(s) of the child, if known, or the legal guardian, or the proper government instrumentality which has legal custody of the child; (c) The legitimate and adopted sons/daughters, ten (10) years of age or over, of the adopter(s) and adoptee, if any; (d) The illegitimate sons/daughters, ten (10) years of age or over, of the adopter, if living with said adopter and the latters souse, if any; (e) The spouse, if any, of the person adopting or to be adopted. The general requirement of consent and notice to the natural parents is intended to protect the natural parental relationship from unwarranted interference by interlopers, and to insure the opportunity to safeguard the best interests of the child in the manner of the proposed adoption.[32] Clearly, the written consent of the biological parents is indispensable for the validity of a decree of adoption. Indeed, the natural right of a parent to his child requires that his consent must be obtained before his parental rights and duties may be terminated and re-established in adoptive parents. In this case, petitioner failed to submit the written consent of Amelia Ramos to the adoption. We note that in her Report, Pagbilao declared that she was able to interview Amelia Ramos who arrived in the Philippines with her son, John Mario in May 2002. If said Amelia Ramos was in the Philippines and Pagbilao was able to interview her, it is incredible that the latter would not require Amelia Ramos to execute a Written Consent to the adoption of her minor

children. Neither did the petitioner bother to present Amelia Ramos as witness in support of the petition. Petitioner, nonetheless, argues that the written consent of the biological mother is no longer necessary because when Amelias husband died in 1990, she left for Italy and never came back. The children were then left to the guidance and care of their paternal grandmother. It is the paternal relatives, including petitioner, who provided for the childrens financial needs. Hence, Amelia, the biological mother, had effectively abandoned the children. Petitioner further contends that it was by twist of fate that after 12 years, when the petition for adoption was pending with the RTC that Amelia and her child by her second marriage were on vacation in the Philippines. Pagbilao, the DSWD social worker, was able to meet her, and during the meeting, Amelia intimated to the social worker that she conformed to the adoption of her three children by the petitioner. Petitioners contention must be rejected. When she filed her petition with the trial court, Rep. Act No. 8552 was already in effect. Section 9 thereof provides that if the written consent of the biological parents cannot be obtained, the written consent of the legal guardian of the minors will suffice. If, as claimed by petitioner, that the biological mother of the minors had indeed abandoned them, she should, thus have adduced the written consent of their legal guardian. Ordinarily, abandonment by a parent to justify the adoption of his child without his consent, is a conduct which evinces a settled purpose to forego all parental duties. [33]The term means neglect and refusal to perform the filial and legal obligations of love and support. If a parent withholds presence, love, care, the opportunity to display filial affection, and neglects to lend support and maintenance, the parent, in effect, abandons the child.[34] 9

Merely permitting the child to remain for a time undisturbed in the care of others is not such an abandonment. [35] To dispense with the requirement of consent, the abandonment must be shown to have existed at the time of adoption.[36] In this case, petitioner relied solely on her testimony and that of Elaine Ramos to prove her claim that Amelia Ramos had abandoned her children. Petitioners testimony on that matter follows: Q Where is the mother of these three children now? A She left for Italy on November 20, 1990, sir. Q At the time when Amelia Ramos left for Italy, was there an instance where she communicated with the family? A None, sir.

Q Where is your mother now? A In Italy, sir. Q When did your mother left for Italy? A After my father died, sir. Q How old were you when your mother left for Italy in 1990? A Two years old, sir. Q At the time when your mother left for Italy, did your mother communicate with you? A No, sir.[38] However, the Home Study Report of the DSWD Social Worker also stated the following: IV.

Q How about with her children? A None, sir. Q Do you know what place in Italy did she reside? A I do not know, sir. Q Did you receive any news about Amelia Ramos? A What I know, sir, was that she was already married with another man. Q From whom did you learn that? A From others who came from Italy, sir.

Background of the Case:

xxxx Since the mother left for Italy, minors siblings had been under the care and custody of their maternal grandmother. However, she died in Nov. 2001 and an uncle, cousin of their deceased father now serves as their guardian. The petitioner, together with her children and other relatives abroad have been supporting the minor children financially, even during the time that they were still living with their natural parents. Their mother also sends financial support but very minimal. [39] xxxx

Q Did you come to know whether she has children by her second marriage? A Yes, sir, she got two kids.[37]

V. Background Information about the Minors Being Sought for Adoption: xxxx

Elaine, the eldest of the minors, testified, thus: 10

As the eldest she tries her best to be a role model to her younger siblings. She helps them in their lessons, works and has fun with them. She also encourages openness on their problems and concerns and provides petty counseling. In serious problems she already consult (sic) her mother and petitioner-aunt.[40] xxxx In their 5 years of married life, they begot 3 children, herein minors, Amelia recalled that they had a happy and comfortable life. After the death of her husband, her in-laws which include the petitioner had continued providing support for them. However being ashamed of just depending on the support of her husbands relatives, she decided to work abroad. Her parents are also in need of financial help as they are undergoing maintenance medication. Her parents mortgaged their farm land which she used in going to Italy and worked as domestic helper. When she left for Italy in November 1990, she entrusted her 3 children to the care & custody of her mother-in-law who returned home for good, however she died on November 2000. While working in Italy, she met Jun Tayag, a married man from Tarlac. They became live-in partners since 1995 and have a son John Mario who is now 2 years old. The three of them are considered Italian residents. Amelia claimed that Mr. Tayag is planning to file an annulment of his marriage and his wife is amenable to it. He is providing his legitimate family regular support. Amelia also sends financial support ranging from P10,000P15,000 a month through her parents who share minimal amount of P3,000-P5,000 a month to his (sic) children. The petitioner and other paternal relatives are continuously providing support for most of the needs & education of minors up to present.[41]

Thus, when Amelia left for Italy, she had not intended to abandon her children, or to permanently sever their mother-child relationship. She was merely impelled to leave the country by financial constraints. Yet, even while abroad, she did not surrender or relinquish entirely her motherly obligations of rearing the children to her now deceased mother-in-law, for, as claimed by Elaine herself, she consulted her mother, Amelia, for serious personal problems. Likewise, Amelia continues to send financial support to the children, though in minimal amounts as compared to what her affluent in-laws provide. Let it be emphasized, nevertheless, that the adoption of the minors herein will have the effect of severing all legal ties between the biological mother, Amelia, and the adoptees, and that the same shall then be vested on the adopter. [42] It would thus be against the spirit of the law if financial consideration were to be the paramount consideration in deciding whether to deprive a person of parental authority over his/her children. More proof has to be adduced that Amelia has emotionally abandoned the children, and that the latter will not miss her guidance and counsel if they are given to an adopting parent.[43] Again, it is the best interest of the child that takes precedence in adoption. Section 34, Rule 132 of the Rules of Court provides that the Court shall consider no evidence which has not been formally offered. The purpose for which the evidence is offered must be specified. The offer of evidence is necessary because it is the duty of the Court to rest its findings of fact and its judgment only and strictly upon the evidence offered by the parties. Unless and until admitted by the court in evidence for the purpose or purposes for which such document is offered, the same is merely a scrap of paper barren of probative weight. Mere identification of documents and the markings thereof as exhibits 11

do not confer any evidentiary weight on documents unless formally offered.[44] Petitioner failed to offer in evidence Pagbilaos Report and of the Joint Affidavit of Consent purportedly executed by her children; the authenticity of which she, likewise, failed to prove. The joint written consent of petitioners children [45] was notarized on January 16, 2002 in Guam, USA; for it to be treated by the Rules of Court in the same way as a document notarized in this country it needs to comply with Section 2 of Act No. 2103, [46] which states: Section 2. An instrument or document acknowledged and authenticated in a foreign country shall be considered authentic if the acknowledgment and authentication are made in accordance with the following requirements: (a) The acknowledgment shall be made before (1) an ambassador, minister, secretary of legation, charg d affaires, consul, vice-consul, or consular agent of the Republic of the Philippines, acting within the country or place to which he is accredited, or (2) a notary public or officer duly authorized by law of the country to take acknowledgments of instruments or documents in the place where the act is done. (b) The person taking the acknowledgment shall certify that the person acknowledging the instrument or document is known to him, and that he is the same person who executed it, and acknowledged that the same is his free act and deed. The certificate shall be under his official seal, if he is by law required to keep a seal, and if not, his certificate shall so state. In case the acknowledgment is made before a notary public or an officer mentioned in subdivision (2) of the preceding paragraph, the certificate of the notary public or the officer taking the acknowledgment shall be authenticated by an ambassador, minister, secretary of legation, charg de affaires, consul, viceconsul, or consular agent of the Republic of the Philippines,

acting within the country or place to which he is accredited. The officer making the authentication shall certify under his official seal that the person who took the acknowledgment was at the time duly authorized to act as notary public or that he was duly exercising the functions of the office by virtue of which he assumed to act, and that as such he had authority under the law to take acknowledgment of instruments or documents in the place where the acknowledgment was taken, and that his signature and seal, if any, are genuine. As the alleged written consent of petitioners legitimate children did not comply with the afore-cited law, the same can at best be treated by the Rules as a private document whose authenticity must be proved either by anyone who saw the document executed or written; or by evidence of the genuineness of the signature or handwriting of the makers.[47] Since, in the instant case, no further proof was introduced by petitioner to authenticate the written consent of her legitimate children, the same is inadmissible in evidence. In reversing the ruling of the RTC, the CA ruled that petitioner was not stable enough to support the children and is only relying on the financial backing, support and commitment of her children and her siblings.[48] Petitioner contradicts this by claiming that she is financially capable as she has worked in Guam for 14 years, has savings, a house, and currently earns $5.15 an hour with tips of not less than $1,000.00 a month. Her children and siblings have likewise committed themselves to provide financial backing should the need arise. The OSG, again in its comment, banks on the statement in the Home Study Report that petitioner has limited income. Accordingly, it appears that she will rely on the financial backing of her children and siblings in order to support the minor adoptees. The law, however, states that it is the adopter who should be in a position to provide support in keeping with the means of the family. 12

Since the primary consideration in adoption is the best interest of the child, it follows that the financial capacity of prospective parents should also be carefully evaluated and considered. Certainly, the adopter should be in a position to support the would-be adopted child or children, in keeping with the means of the family.

While the Court recognizes that petitioner has only the best of intentions for her nieces and nephew, there are legal infirmities that militate against reversing the ruling of the CA.In any case, petitioner is not prevented from filing a new petition for adoption of the herein minors. WHEREFORE, premises hereby DENIED.

considered,

the

petition

is

SO ORDERED. According to the Adoption Home Study Report [49] forwarded by the Department of Public Health & Social Services of the Government of Guam to the DSWD, petitioner is no longer supporting her legitimate children, as the latter are already adults, have individual lives and families. At the time of the filing of the petition, petitioner was 57 years old, employed on a parttime basis as a waitress, earning $5.15 an hour and tips of around $1,000 a month. Petitioners main intention in adopting the children is to bring the latter to Guam, USA. She has a house at Quitugua Subdivision in Yigo, Guam, but the same is still being amortized. Petitioner likewise knows that the limited income might be a hindrance to the adoption proceedings. Given these limited facts, it is indeed doubtful whether petitioner will be able to sufficiently handle the financial aspect of rearing the three children in the US. She only has a part-time job, and she is rather of age. While petitioner claims that she has the financial support and backing of her children and siblings, the OSG is correct in stating that the ability to support the adoptees is personal to the adopter, as adoption only creates a legal relation between the former and the latter. Moreover, the records do not prove nor support petitioners allegation that her siblings and her children are financially able and that they are willing to support the minors herein. The Court, therefore, again sustains the ruling of the CA on this issue. 13

Historical Note on Prohibition. Art. 335 NCC G.R. No. L-28195 June 10, 1971 RE ADOPTION OF THE MINORS FRANCIS, ALEX, MARIA TERESA, JOSEPH, GREG and GERMAN, all surnamed MILLENDEZ, SINFOROSA T. MILLENDEZ, petitionerappellant. Celso B. Jamora petitioner-appellant. Office of the Solicitor General Felix V. Makasiar, 1st Assistant Solicitor General Esmeraldo Umali and Trial Attorney Diosdado Saavedra for oppositor-appellee. REYES, J.B.L., J.: Appeal from the decision of the Court of First Instance of Negros Occidental in Sp. Proc. No. 337, denying the petition of Sinforosa T. Vda. de Millendez for the adoption of her grandchildren, by reason of her disqualification under Article 335 of the New Civil Code. On 15 February 1967, Sinforosa T. Vda. de Millendez petitioned the Court of First Instance of Negros Occidental for adoption of minors Francis Millendez, Alex Millendez, Maria Teresa Millendez, Joseph Millendez, Greg Millendez and German Millendez. It was alleged in the petition that the minors were the children of her only son, Bobby Millendez, who had abandoned them for over three years; that petitioner's said son had been with bad company and did not have the welfare and future of the

children at heart; that her said son in fact was disinherited by his father (petitioner's deceased husband) in his will, 1 which will was duly probated by the court on 1 February 1965; that petitioner cherished and loved the minors as her own children and the adoption was prompted by her sincere desire to promote their welfare; that the minors' natural mother, Hannah A. Millendez had consented to the petition; and that petitioner was financially capable of making the adoption. The petition was published, and heard by the court. In its order of 10 July 1967, the court denied the petition. It was ruled that while the adoption would benefit the minors, the same can not be granted on account of the express prohibition of Article 335 of the new Civil Code. Petitioner, having a child — Bobby Millendez, the father of the minors — she is disqualified under the law to adopt anybody. At any rate, the court pointed out, the purpose of the minors' mother and grandmother can still be achieved by the latter's executing a will, or having Bobby Millendez declared a spendthrift. Petitioner thus appealed to this Court, contending that the circumstances of this case warrant a liberal interpretation of Article 335 of the new Civil Code. The Civil Code expressly provides: ART. 335. The following cannot adopt: (1) Those who have legitimate, legitimated, acknowledged natural children, or natural children by legal fiction; xxx xxx xxx There can be no question, in view of the explicit provision of the law, that petitioner-appellant having already a legitimate child, Bobby Millendez, is disqualified to adopt anyone. In urging the removal of this case from the legal prohibition, however, appellant points to the facts that her son has been prodigal and has not provided her with filial love and respect; that he was even disinherited by her husband, his own father, for having attempted on the latter's life that her said son, Bobby Millendez, had allegedly consented to the proposed adoption of his own children by herein appellant; that it is appellant's love for her grandchildren and her fear that Bobby Millendez would just 14

dissipate whatever properties he might inherit from her, leaving nothing to the said children, that prompted this petition for adoption. It is, therefore, maintained it with the foregoing facts, it would be precisely in pursuance of the purpose of adoption statutes — which is the promotion of the welfare of the children — the present petition for adoption should be granted. Adoption, as a privilege granted by law, can be exercised by any person of age and in full possession of his civil rights. 2 It is, however, from certain persons enumerated in Article 335 of the Civil Code, among whom are those who have children of their own whether the children are legitimate or illegitimate. And the provision being clear and explicit, had to be enforced although its suspension or waiver would have worked to the benefit or well-being of the child proposed to be adopted. Thus, in one case, where after the child was taken from his natural parents the adopting couple begot children of their own, a petition subsequently filed to make formal the adoption of the child was denied, on the ground that the adopters were already disqualified because of the presence of their own children. 3 It is for the same reason that the petition of a step-father to adopt his wife's child had by a previous marriage was refused, because there were already children of that second marriage. 4 For, while it is true that the intendment of adoption statutes is the promotion of the welfare of the children, such that the modern trend is to encourage adoptions5 by persons who can provide them with proper care and education, 6 adoption may be allowed only where it is possible without doing violence to the terms of the statute.7 It is of no significance in this case that appellant's child has consented to the adoption, or that such child has become wayward and led a dishonorable life. Article 335 of the Civil Code creates a disqualification on the adopter himself, not on the child, that there is nothing about the behaviour of the latter short of his losing the status of a child (if there is any such means in the law) that would remove the disqualification prescribed in the article.

The reason for the prohibition to adopt under Article 335 (1) of the Civil Code is not difficult to find. Not only would the adoption introduce a foreign conflicting element into the family unit, but it would, in the present case, result in the reduction of the legitime of the son to the benefit of the prospective adoptees, who are not forced heirs of the would-be adopter, thereby producing an indirect disinheritance in a manner not authorized by law 8, i.e., by a testament expressly stating the legal cause for the disinheritance. Not only this, but the adoption would make the disinheritance of the son permanent and irrevocable, contrary to the policy of the law that "a subsequent reconciliation between the offender and the offended person deprives the latter of the right to disinherit and renders, ineffectual any disinheritance that may have been made."9 This same policy inspires Article 1033, that permits an unworthy heir to succeed if the de cujus should condone the unworthiness in writing. The consent of the son to the adoption of his own children by his mother is likewise ineffective to circumvent the statutory bar, as by Article 905, of the Civil Code, every renunciation of a future legitime is void, and of no effect. Appellant's claim that no disqualification attaches to her having one legitimate child because Article 335 speaks of "children", is equally devoid of merit. The use of the word "children" in the law does not mean that an adopter must have more than one legitimate, legitimated or illegitimate child before the disqualification to adopt shall attach. No such intention can be discerned from the provision. The use of the word "children", instead of "child", appears more to have been called for by grammatical correctness than anything else, to complement the plural subject "those". WHEREFORE, finding no error in order appealed from, the dismissal of the petition is affirmed, with costs against the appellant.

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Alien and former Filipina, now a US citizen seeks to adopt the latter’s younger brother. Inter-Country Adoption Act. G.R. No. 94147 June 8, 1994 REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, petitioner, vs. HONORABLE RODOLFO TOLEDANO, in his capacity as Presiding Judge of the Regional Trial Court, Third Judicial Region, Branch 69, Iba, Zambales and SPOUSES ALVIN A. CLOUSE and EVELYN A. CLOUSE, respondents. The Solicitor General for petitioner. R.M. Blanco for private respondents. PUNO, J.: Before us is a petition for review on certiorari of the decision1 of the Regional Trial Court of Iba, Zambales, Branch 69, in Special Proceeding No. RTC-140-I, entitled, "In the Matter of the Adoption of the Minor named Solomon Joseph Alcala", raising a pure question of law. The sole issue for determination concerns the right of private respondents spouses Alvin A. Clouse and Evelyn A. Clouse who are aliens to adopt under Philippine Law. There is no controversy as to the facts. On February 21, 1990, in a verified petition filed before the Regional Trial Court of Iba, Zambales, private respondents spouses Clouse sought to adopt the minor, Solomon Joseph Alcala, the younger

brother of private respondent Evelyn A. Clouse. In an Order issued on March 12, 1990, the petition was set for hearing on April 18, 1990. The said Order was published in a newspaper of general circulation in the province of Zambales and City of Olongapo for three (3) consecutive weeks. The principal evidence disclose that private respondent Alvin A. Clouse is a natural born citizen of the United States of America. He married Evelyn, a Filipino on June 4, 1981 at Olongapo City. On August 19, 1988, Evelyn became a naturalized citizen of the United States of America in Guam. They are physically, mentally, morally, and financially capable of adopting Solomon, a twelve (12) year old minor. Since 1981 to 1984, then from November 2, 1989 up to the present, Solomon Joseph Alcala was and has been under the care and custody of private respondents. Solomon gave his consent to the adoption. His mother, Nery Alcala, a widow, likewise consented to the adoption due to poverty and inability to support and educate her son. Mrs. Nila Corazon Pronda, the social worker assigned to conduct the Home and Child Study, favorably recommended the granting of the petition for adoption. Finding that private respondents have all the qualifications and none of the disqualifications provided by law and that the adoption will redound to the best interest and welfare of the minor, respondent judge rendered a decision on June 20, 1990, disposing as follows: WHEREFORE, the Court grants the petition for adoption filed by Spouses Alvin A. Clouse and Evelyn A. Clouse and decrees that the said minor be considered as their child by adoption. To this effect, the Court gives the minor the rights and duties as the legitimate child of the petitioners. Henceforth, he shall be known as SOLOMON ALCALA CLOUSE. The Court dissolves parental authority bestowed upon his natural parents and vests parental authority to the herein petitioners and makes him their legal heir. Pursuant to Article 36 of P.D. 603 as amended, the decree of adoption shall be effective as of the date when the petition was filed. In accordance with Article 53 of the same decree, let this decree of adoption be recorded in the corresponding government agency, particularly the Office of the Local Civil Registrar of Merida, Leyte where the minor was born. The said office of the Local Civil Registrar is hereby directed to issue an amended certificate of live birth to the minor adopted by the petitioners. 16

Let copies of this decision be furnished (sic) the petitioners, DSWD, Zambales Branch, Office of the Solicitor General and the Office of the Local Civil Registrar of Merida, Leyte. SO ORDERED.2 Petitioner, through the Office of the Solicitor General appealed to us for relief, contending: THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN GRANTING THE PETITION FOR ADOPTION OF ALVIN AND EVELYN CLOUSE, BECAUSE THEY ARE NOT QUALIFIED TO ADOPT UNDER PHILIPPINE LAW. We rule for petitioner. Under Articles 184 and 185 of Executive Order (E.O.) No. 209, otherwise known as "The Family Code of the Philippines", private respondents spouses Clouse are clearly barred from adopting Solomon Joseph Alcala. Article 184, paragraph (3) of Executive Order No. 209 expressly enumerates the persons who are not qualified to adopt, viz.: (3) An alien, except: (a) A former Filipino citizen who seeks to adopt a relative by consanguinity; (b) One who seeks to adopt the legitimate child of his or her Filipino spouse; or (c) One who is married to a Filipino citizen and seeks to adopt jointly with his or her spouse a relative by consanguinity of the latter. Aliens not included in the foregoing exceptions may adopt Filipino children in accordance with the rules on inter-country adoption as may be provided by law. There can be no question that private respondent Alvin A. Clouse is not qualified to adopt Solomon Joseph Alcala under any of the exceptional cases in the aforequoted provision. In the first place, he is not a former Filipino citizen but a natural born citizen of the United States of America. In the second place, Solomon Joseph Alcala is neither his relative by consanguinity nor the legitimate child of his spouse. In the third place, when private respondents spouses Clouse jointly filed the petition to adopt Solomon Joseph Alcala on February 21, 1990, private respondent Evelyn A. Clouse was no longer a Filipino citizen. She lost her Filipino citizenship when she was naturalized as a citizen of the United States in 1988. Private respondent Evelyn A. Clouse, on the other hand, may appear to qualify pursuant to paragraph 3(a) of Article 184 of E.O. 209. She was a former Filipino citizen. She sought to adopt her younger

brother. Unfortunately, the petition for adoption cannot be granted in her favor alone without violating Article 185 which mandates a joint adoption by the husband and wife. It reads: Article 185. Husband and wife must jointly adopt, except in the following cases: (1) When one spouse seeks to adopt his own illegitimate child; or (2) When one spouse seeks to adopt the legitimate child of the other. Article 185 requires a joint adoption by the husband and wife, a condition that must be read along together with Article 184.3 The historical evolution of this provision is clear. Presidential Decree 603 (The Child and Youth Welfare Code), provides that husband and wife "may" jointly adopt.4 Executive Order No. 91 issued on December 17, 1986 amended said provision of P.D. 603. It demands that both husband and wife "shall" jointly adopt if one of them is an alien. 5 It was so crafted to protect Filipino children who are put up for adoption. The Family Code reiterated the rule by requiring that husband and wife "must" jointly adopt, except in the cases mentioned before. Under the said new law, joint adoption by husband and wife is mandatory.6 This is in consonance with the concept of joint parental authority over the child, which is the ideal situation. 7 As the child to be adopted is elevated to the level of a legitimate child, it is but natural to require the spouses to adopt jointly. The rule also insures harmony between the spouses.8 In a distinctly similar case, we held: As amended by Executive Order 91, Presidential Decree No. 603, had thus made it mandatory for both the spouses to jointly adopt when one of them was an alien. The law was silent when both spouses were of the same nationality. The Family Code has resolved any possible uncertainty. Article 185 thereof expresses the necessity for a joint adoption by the spouses except in only two instances — (1) When one spouse seeks to adopt his own illegitimate child; or (2) When one spouse seeks to adopt the legitimate child of the other. It is in the foregoing cases when Article 186 of the Code, on the parental authority, can aptly find governance. Article 186. In case husband and wife jointly adopt or one spouse adopts the legitimate child of the other, jointly parental authority shall be exercised by the spouses in accordance with this Code.9 Article 185 is all too clear and categorical and there is no room for its interpretation. There is only room for application.10 17

We are not unaware that the modern trend is to encourage adoption and every reasonable intendment should be sustained to promote that objective.11 Adoption is geared more towards the promotion of the welfare of the child and enhancement of his opportunities for a useful and happy life.12 It is not the bureaucratic technicalities but the interest of the child that should be the principal criterion in adoption cases.13 Executive Order 209 likewise upholds that the interest and welfare of the child to be adopted should be the paramount consideration. These considerations notwithstanding, the records of the case do not evince any fact as would justify us in allowing the adoption of the minor, Solomon Joseph Alcala, by private respondents who are aliens. WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. The decision of the lower court is REVERSED and SET ASIDE. No costs. SO ORDERED.

US Citizen and former Filipino, now a naturalized US citizen seeking to adopt the latter’s nephew and niece. Arts. 184 – 186 of the Family Code. G.R. No. 100835 October 26, 1993 REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, petitioner, vs. THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS and the SPOUSES JAMES ANTHONY HUGHES and LENITA MABUNAY HUGHES, respondents. The Solicitor General for petitioner. Westremundo y. De Guzman for private respondents. VITUG, J.: James Anthony Hughes, a natural born citizen of the United States of America, married Lenita Mabunay Hughes, a Filipino Citizen, who herself was later naturalized as a citizen of that country. On 29 June 1990, the spouses jointly filed a petition with the Regional Trial Court of Angeles City, Branch 60, to adopt Ma. Cecilia, Neil and Maria, all surnamed Mabunay, minor niece and nephews of Lenita, who had been living with the couple even prior to the filing of the petition. The minors, as well as their parents, gave consent to the adoption.

On 29 November 1990, the Regional Trial Court rendered a decision granting the petition. a petition for Review on Certiorari was filed with this Court, assailing the trial court's decision. This Court referred the case to the Court of Appeals which, on 09 July 1991, affirmed the trial court's decision. Hence, the present petition. The petitioner assigned a lone error on the part of the respondent court, thus — THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN GRANTING THE PETITION FOR ADOPTION OF SPOUSES JAMES ANTHONY HUGHES AND LENITA MABUNAY HUGHES BECAUSE THEY ARE NOT QUALIFIED TO ADOPT UNDER PHILIPPINE LAW. It is clear that James Anthony Hughes is not qualified to adopt. Executive Order No. 209, otherwise known as "The Family Code of the Philippines," is explicit. Art. 184. The following persons may not adopt : (1) The guardian with respect to the ward prior to the approval of the final accounts rendered upon the termination of their guardianship relation; (2) Any person who has been convicted of a crime involving moral turpitude; (3) An alien, except: (a) A former Filipino citizen who seeks to adopt a relative by consanguinity; (b) One who seeks to adopt the legitimate child of his or her Filipino spouse; or (c) One who is married to a Filipino citizen and seeks to adopt jointly with his or her Filipino spouse a relative by consanguinity of the latter. Aliens not included in the foregoing exceptions may adopt Filipino children in accordance with the rules in inter-country adoption as may be provided by law. While James Anthony unquestionably is not permitted to adopt under any of the exceptional cases enumerated in paragraph (3) of the aforequoted article, Lenita, however, can qualify pursuant to paragraph (3)(a). The problem in her case lies, instead, with Article 185 of Executive Order No. 209, expressing as follows: 18

Art. 185. Husband and wife must jointly adopt, except in the following cases: (1) When one spouse seeks to adopt his own illegitimate child; or (2) When one spouse seeks to adopt the legitimate child of the other. Lenita may not thus adopt alone since Article 185 requires a joint adoption by the husband and the wife, a condition that must be read along together with Article 184. The old law on adoption, Presidential Decree No. 603 (The Child and Youth Welfare Code), exactly adopted that found in then Article 336 of the Civil Code. Article 29, Section B, Chapter I, Title II, of the said decree provided : Art. 29. Husband and wife may jointly adopt. In such case, parental authority shall be exercised as if the child were their own by nature. Observe that the law then in force used the word "may" under which regime, a joint adoption by the spouses was apparently not made obligatory. The provision was later amended, however by Executive Order No. 91, dated 17 December 1986, of President Corazon C. Aquino. The new Article 29 expressed, thus — Art. 29. Husband and wife may jointly adopt. In such case, parental authority shall be exercised as if the child were their own by nature. If one of the spouses is an alien, both husband and wife shall jointly adopt. Otherwise, the adoption shall not be allowed. As amended by Executive Order 91, Presidential Decree No. 603, had thus made it mandatory for both the spouses to jointly adopt when one of them was an alien. The law was silent when both spouses were of the same nationality. The Family Code has resolved any possible uncertainty. Article 185 thereof now expresses the necessity for joint adoption by the spouses except in only two instances — (1) When one spouse seeks to adopt his own legitimate child; or (2) When one spouse seeks to adopt the legitimate child of the other.

It is in the foregoing cases when Article 186 of the Code, on the subject of parental authority, can aptly find governance. Article 186. In case husband and wife jointly adopt or one spouse adopts the legitimate child of the other, joint parental authority shall be exercised by the spouses in accordance with this Code. The respondent court, in affirming the grant of adoption by the lower court, has theorized that James Anthony should merely be considered a "nominal or formal party" in the proceedings. This view of the appellate court cannot be sustained. Adoption creates a status that is closely assimilated to legitimate paternity and filiation with corresponding rights and duties that necessarily flow from adoption, such as, but not necessarily confined to, the exercise of parental authority, use of surname of the adopter by the adopted, as well as support and successional rights. These are matters that obviously cannot be considered inconsequential to the parties. We are not unmindful of the possible benefits, particularly in this instance, that an adoption can bring not so much for the prospective adopting parents as for the adopted children themselves. We also realize that in proceedings of this nature, paramount consideration is given to the physical, moral, social and intellectual welfare of the adopted for whom the law on adoption has in the first place been designed. When, however, the law is clear and no other choice is given, 1 we must obey its full mandate. Even then, we find it difficult to conclude this opinion without having to call the attention of the appropriate agencies concerned to the urgency of addressing the issue on intercountry adoption, a matter that evidently is likewise espoused by the Family Code (Article 184, last paragraph, Family Code). WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED and the decision of the respondent court is REVERSED and SET ASIDE. No costs. SO ORDERED.

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