Clavero-statconcasedigests.docx

Statutory Construction Case Digests Role of Punctuation Marks in Constructing and Interpreting Statutes US vs. Hart, 26 Phil. 149 Feliciano vs. Aquino, 102 Phil. 1159 In Re Johnson, 39 Phil. 156

In the interpretation of a statute, the punctuation thereof is not seriously regarded. It is a minor and not a decisive or controlling element in the interpretation of the statute. It is especially true that obvious mistake in punctuation will be corrected where it is necessary to make the statute intelligible.

Construction of a statute should be based on something more substantial than mere punctuation. Case: US vs. Hart, 26 Phil. 149 Facts: Defendants were charged with vagrancy under Act No. 519, which penalized "Every person found loitering about saloons or dram shops or gambling houses, or tramping or straying through the country without visible means of support x x x." It is to be noticed that said portion of the law is divided into two parts: (1) every person found loitering about saloons or dram shops or gambling houses, and (2) "tramping or straying through the country without visible means of support." It was under the first paragraph that the defendants were prosecuted and convicted. It was proven that they had means of support. However, the prosecution insisted that "without means of support" applied only to "tramping or staying through the country" and not to the other part under which the defendants were convicted, otherwise the comma after "gambling houses" would have been omitted or else a comma after "country" would have been inserted. Issue: Whether or not the comma after the term "gambling houses" produced such effect as to divide the provision into two parts, such that "without visible means of support" would only apply to "tramping or straying through the country", and not to the earlier clause of being "found loitering about saloons or dram shops or gambling houses". Held: No. The construction of a statute should be based upon something more substantial than mere punctuation. If the punctuation gives it a meaning which is reasonable and in apparent accord with legislative will, it may be used as an

additional argument for adopting the literal meaning of the words of the statute as thus punctuated. An argument based upon punctuations alone is not conclusive and the court will not hesitate to change the punctuation when necessary to give to the act the effect intended by the legislature, disregarding superfluous or incorrect punctuation marks, or inserting others when necessary. Inasmuch as defendant, had "visible means of support" and we think this phrase also refers to the first part of the pertinent clause, the decision of the lower court is reversed and defendants are acquitted. [US vs. Hart, 26 Phil. 149]

Punctuation mark may be disregarded to arrive at the natural meaning of the words employed in a statute. Case: Feliciano vs. Aquino, 102 Phil. 1159 Facts: On November 11, 1995, the respondent-appellant Benigno Aquino, Jr. was proclaimed elected to the position of mayor of Concepcion, Tarlac. Four days after proclamation, the defeated candidate Nicolas Feliciano instituted quo warranto proceedings challenging the eligibility of the respondent on the ground that he was not at least 23 years old at the time of the election. The lower court declared Aquino's election illegal and enjoined him from assuming office. Appellant brought this appeal contending that the age requirement applies only to the assumption of office. He averred that the existence of a semicolon, converted into a comma in the 1951 edition of the Revised Administrative Code, after the first two requirements, prove that he need not possess the remaining qualifications at the time of the election but at the time of the assumption of office. Issue: Whether or not the semicolon after the first two requirements mean that the qualifications no longer need to be at the time of the election but at the time of the assumption of office. Held: No. The primary rule of statutory construction is that punctuation marks cannot be disregarded unless there is reason to the contrary. Courts may, therefore, disregard punctuation marks to arrive at the natural meaning of the words employed. It is inconceivable that the lawmakers considered semi-colon sufficient to refer to the loyalty and age requirement at the assumption of office without words to that effect, when voting and residence conditions are expressly required as of the time of the election. This court affirms the decision of the lower court declaring the election of the respondent unlawful and illegal. [Feliciano vs. Aquino, 102 Phil. 1159]

Punctuations and capitalization are aids of low degree. Case: In Re Johnson, 39 Phil. 156 Facts: Sec. 635 of the Code of Civil Procedure allowed the admission to probate here in the Philippines of wills made by foreign citizens, residents herein. It reads: "Will made here by alien- a will made within the Philippine Islands by a citizen or subject of another state or country, which is executed in accordance with law of the state or country of which he is a citizen or subject, and which might be proved and allowed by law of his state or country, may be proved, allowed, recorded in the Philippine Islands, and shall have the same effect as if executed according to the laws of these Islands." The will of a citizen of the state of Illinois, USA was presented for probate under this section. Probated and allowed in the lower court, it was contended on appeal that this section applies only to wills of aliens as evidenced by the fact that the epigraph of this section speaks only of the will made here by an alien and to the further fact that the word "state" in the body of the section is not capitalized. The testator not being an alien, the section did not apply to him. Issue: Whether or not the non-capitalization of the word “state” produced such effect as to exclude the testator from the coverage of Sec. 635 of the Code of Civil Procedure so as not to probate his will executed abroad. Held: No. It is a rule of hermeneutics that punctuation and capitalization are aids of low degree in interpreting that language of a statute and can never control against the intelligible meaning of the written words. The epigraph or heading of the section is only a convenient index to the contents of the section and cannot limit the operative words of the body. The testator being a citizen of the United States, and therefore an alien, is covered by the above section. The will was duly probated. [In Re Johnson, 39 Phil. 156]

Reference Statutory Construction, Sixth Edition Ruperto G. Martin

Submitted to ATTY. Submitted by

FAIRY FAITH RABAGO- AGUSTIN KRISTINA MARIE A. CLAVERO

October 24, 2015 ***