Civrev Final (arts.1-51).docx

EFFECTIVITY OF LAWS TAÑADA v. TUVERA G.R. No. L-63915 April 24, 1985 ESCOLIN, J.

Should a distinction be made between laws of general applicability and laws which are not as to their publication? The clause “unless it is otherwise provided” refers to the date of effectivity and not to the requirement of publication itself, which cannot in any event be omitted. This clause does not mean that the legislature may make the law effective immediately upon approval, or in any other date, without its previous publication. “Laws” should refer to all laws and not only to those of general application, for strictly speaking, all laws relate to the people in general albeit there are some that do not apply to them directly. A law without any bearing on the public would be invalid as an intrusion of privacy or as class legislation or as an ultra vires act of the legislature. To be valid, the law must invariably affect the public interest eve if it might be directly applicable only to one individual, or some of the people only, and not to the public as a whole. Should a publication be made in publications of general circulation? All statutes, including those of local application and private laws, shall be published as a condition for their effectivity, which shall begin 15 days after publication unless a different effectivity date is fixed by the legislature. Publication must be in full or it is no publication at all, since its purpose is to inform the public of the content of the law. Article 2 of the Civil Code provides that publication of laws must be made in the Official Gazette, and not elsewhere, as a requirement for their effectivity. The Supreme Court is not called upon to rule upon the wisdom of a law or to repeal or modify it if it finds it impractical. The publication must be made forthwith, or at least as soon as possible. DE ROY v. CA G.R. No. 80718 January 29, 1988 CORTES, J. Is the Supreme Court required to publish its decisions? There is no law requiring the publication of Supreme Court decisions in the Official Gazette before they can be binding and as a condition to their becoming effective. It is the bounden duty of counsel as lawyer in active law practice to keep abreast of decisions of the Supreme Court particularly where issues have been clarified, consistently reiterated, and published in the advance reports of Supreme Court decisions (G. R. s) and in such publications as the Supreme Court Reports Annotated (SCRA) and law journals.

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PEOPLE v. QUE PO LAY G.R. No. 6791 March 29, 1954 Montemayor, J. Whether or not circulars issued by the Central Bank Should be published as required by the Civil Code to be effective. Yes. As a rule, circular and regulations of the Central Bank in question prescribing penalty for its violation should be published before becoming effective. This is based on the theory that before the public is bound by its contents especially it's penal provisions, a law, regulation or circular must first be published for the people to be officially and specifically informed of its contents including penalty. NERI v. SENATE COMMITTEE G.R. No. 180643 March 25, 2008 Leonardo-De Castro, J.: Is the Senate required to re-publish its rules of procedure regarding its conduct of inquiries in aid of legislation pursuant to Sec.21, Art. VI of the Constitution? Yes. The power of Congress to conduct inquiries in aid of legislation is broad. To be valid, it is imperative that it is done in accordance with the Senate or House duly published rules of procedure and that the rights of the persons appearing in or affected by such inquiries be respected. Publication of the rules of the inquiry is an essential requirement of due process. The Senate under the 1987 Constitution is not a continuing body. Rules of Procedure must be republished by the Senate after every expiry of the term of twelve Senators. The failure of the Senate to publish its Rules of Procedure as required in Section 21, Art. VI of the Constitution renders the Rules of Procedure void.

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IGNORANCE OF THE LAW GARCIA v. RECIO G.R. No. 138322 October 2, 2001 Panganiban, J. Whether or not a divorce procured abroad by an alien spouse can be recognized under the jurisdiction of the Philippines. Yes. To be recognized, the decree of divorce must be valid according to the national law of the foreigner. Also, it is necessary that the divorce decree and the governing personal law of the alien spouse who obtained the divorce must be proven. The Philippine courts do not take judicial notice of foreign laws and judgments; hence, like any other facts, both the divorce decree and the national law of the alien must be alleged and proven according to our law on evidence. WAIVER OF RIGHTS DMCI v. COURT OF APPEALS G.R. No. 137873 20 April 2001 Kapunan, J. Was the widow precluded from recovering damages under the Civil Code after having previously availed of the death benefits of her husband under the Labor Code? Yes. An injured worker has a right of selection between availing of the worker’s right under the Workmen’s Compensation Act and suing under the Civil Code for higher damages, but he cannot pursue both at the same time. When a party makes an election, it becomes final and results in a waiver of election. But, if there is a lack of knowledge of fact, the waiver is not applicable. There was no proof that the widow knew how exactly her husband died nor the remedies available before claiming damages under the Labor Code. Therefore, it was held that the employer should pay the widow, provided that whatever she already received from the Insurance Fund be deducted from the court’s award of damages. CUI v. ARELLANO UNIVERSITY G.R. No. L-15127 May 30, 1961 Concepcion, J. Whether the provision of the contract between plaintiff and the defendant, whereby the former waived his right to transfer to another school without refunding to the latter the equivalent of his scholarships in cash, is valid or not. The stipulation in question is contrary to public policy and, hence, null and void. It has been consistently held in America that under the principles relating to the doctrine of public policy, as Page 3

applied to the law of contracts, courts of justice will not recognize or uphold a transaction which its object, operation, or tendency is calculated to be prejudicial to the public welfare, to sound morality or to civic honesty. If Arellano University understood clearly the real essence of scholarships and the motives which prompted this office to issue Memorandum No. 38, s. 1949, it should have not entered into a contract of waiver with Cui on September 10, 1951, which is a direct violation of our Memorandum and an open challenge to the authority of the Director of Private Schools because the contract was repugnant to sound morality and civic honesty. In order to declare a contract void as against public policy, a court must find that the contract as to consideration or the thing to be done, contravenes some established interest of society, or is inconsistent with sound policy and good morals or tends clearly to undermine the security of individual rights. The policy enunciated in Memorandum No. 38, s. 1949 is sound policy. Scholarships are awarded in recognition of merit not to keep outstanding students in school to bolster its prestige. In the understanding of that provision, university scholarships award is a business scheme designed to increase the business potential of an education institution. Thus conceived it is not only inconsistent with sound policy but also good morals. REPEAL OF LAWS BESO v. DAGUMAN A.M. No. MTJ-99-1211, 323 SCRA 566 January 28, 2000 Ynares-Santiago, J.: Whether Judge Daguman had jurisdiction to solemnize the marriage in this case. No. A marriage can only be solemnized by a judge outside his chamber or courtroom: (1) at the point of death; (2) in remote places in accordance with Article 29 of the FC; or (3) upon the request of both parties in writing in a sworn statement to this effect. None of these instances apply in this case. Considering further that Judge Daguman’s jurisdiction only covers the municipalities of Sta. Margarita, Tarangan and Pagsanjan, Samar, he was bereft of authority to solemnize a marriage in Calbayog City. Whether Judge Daguman was negligent for failing to retain a copy of the marriage contract and for failing to register the marriage with the local civil registrar. Yes. Article 23 of the Family Code states, to wit: It shall be the duty of the person solemnizing the marriage to furnish either of the contracting parties, the original of the marriage contract referred to in Article 6 and to send the duplicate and triplicate copies of the certificates not later than fifteen (15) days after the marriage, to the local civil registrar of the place where the marriage was solemnized. Proper receipts shall be issued by the local civil registrar to the solemnizing officer transmitting copies of the marriage certificate. The solemnizing officer shall retain in his file the quadruplicate copy of the marriage certificate. The records show that the loss of the original marriage contract was occasioned by the carelessness of Judge Daguman.

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DOCTRINE OF STARE DECISIS PEOPLE v. LICERA G.R. No. L-39990 July 22, 1975 Castro, J. Whether or not the ruling in People v Macarandang formed part of the law of the land at the time of defendant’s designation as secret agent and at the time of his apprehension for possession of the rifle. Yes. Article 8 of the Civil Code of the Philippines decrees that judicial decisions applying or interpreting the laws or the Constitution form part of this jurisdiction's legal system. These decisions, although in themselves not laws, constitute evidence of what the laws mean. The application or interpretation placed by the Court upon a law is part of the law as of the date of the enactment of the said law since the Court's application or interpretation merely establishes the contemporaneous legislative intent that the construed law purports to carry into effect. At the time of Licera's designation as secret agent in 1961 and at the time of his apprehension for possession of the rifle without the requisite license or permit therefor in 1965, the Macarandang rule — the Courts interpretation of section 879 of the Revised Administrative Code - formed part of our jurisprudence and, hence, of this jurisdiction's legal system. Mapa revoked the Macarandang precedent only in 1967. Certainly, where a new doctrine abrogates an old rule, the new doctrine should operate respectively only and should not adversely affect those favored by the old rule, especially those who relied thereon and acted on the faith thereof. PEOPLE v. JABINAL G.R. No. L-60031 February 27, 1974 Antonio, J. What is the nature of a Court's decision? What is the effect of the decision of the Court reversing its previous decisions? Decisions the Supreme Court, although in themselves not laws, are nevertheless evidence of what the laws mean, and this is the reason why under Article 8 of the New Civil Code "Judicial decisions applying or interpreting the laws or the Constitution shall form a part of the legal system.". The interpretation upon a law by this Court constitutes, in a way, a part of the law as of the date that law originally passed, since this Court's construction merely establishes the contemporaneous legislative intent that law thus construed intends to effectuate. The settled rule supported by numerous authorities is a restatement of legal maxim "legis interpretatio legis vim obtinet" — the interpretation placed upon the written law by a competent court has the force of law. Also, when a doctrine of this Court is overruled and a different view is adopted, the new doctrine should be applied prospectively, and should not apply to parties who had relied on the old doctrine and acted on the faith thereof. This is especially true in the construction and application of criminal laws, where it is necessary that the punishability of an act be reasonably foreseen for the guidance of society.

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DUTY OF JUDGES Chua Jan vs. Lucio Bernas No. 10010 August 01, 1916 ARAULLO, J.: Whether or not the decision of the judge of the Court of First instance of Albay dismissing the action on the ground of his lack of knowledge of any laws that govern the rights of the parties in a cockfight is correct.

No. The ignorance of the court or his lack of knowledge regarding the law applicable to a case submitted to him for decision, the fact that the court does not know the rules applicable to a certain matter that is a subject of an appeal which must be decided by him and his not knowing of where to find the law relative to the case, are not reasons that can serve to excuse the court for termination the proceedings by dismissing them without deciding the issues. Such an excuse is the less acceptable because, foreseeing that a case might arise to which no law would be applicable, the Civil Code,min the second paragraph of Article 6, provides that the customs of the place shall be observed, and, in the absence thereof, the general principles of law. PEOPLE v. VENERACION G.R No. 119987-88 12 October 1995 Kapunan, J. Did the judge commit an act with grave abuse of discretion and in excess of jurisdiction when he imposed the penalty of reclusion perpetua instead of the mandatory penalty of death under Republic Act No. 7659, after finding the accused guilty of the crime of Rape with Homicide? YES. If judges, under the guise of religious or political beliefs were allowed to roam unrestricted beyond boundaries within which they are required by law to exercise the duties of their office, then law becomes meaningless. A government of laws, not of men excludes the exercise of broad discretionary powers by those acting under its authority. Under this system, judges are guided by the Rule of Law, and ought “to protect and enforce it without fear or favor, resist encroachments by governments, political parties, or even the interference of their own personal beliefs. As long as that penalty remains in the statute books, and as long as our criminal law provides for its imposition in certain cases, it is the duty of judicial officers to respect and apply the law regardless of their private opinions. It is a well settled rule that the courts are not concerned with the wisdom, efficacy or morality of laws. That question falls exclusively within the province of the Legislature which enacts them and the Chief Executive who approves or vetoes them. The only function of the judiciary is to interpret the laws and, if not in disharmony with the Constitution, to apply them.

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DOUBTFUL STATUTES PEOPLE v. PURISIMA G.R. No. L-42050-66 November 20, 1978 Munoz, Palma, J.: In case of doubt, how is a provision of law interpreted? It is a salutary principle in statutory construction that there exists a valid presumption that undesirable consequences were never intended by a legislative measure, and that a construction of which the statute is fairly susceptible is favored, which will avoid all objectionable, mischievous, indefensible, wrongful, evil, and injurious consequences. CUSTOMS MARTINEZ v. VAN BUSKIRK G.R. No. L-5691 December 27, 1910 MORELAND, J. Whether or not an employer who has furnished a gentle and tractable team and a trusty and capable driver is liable for the negligence of such driver in handling the team. No. There is no general law of negligence in the Philippine Islands except that embodied in the Civil Code. The provisions of that code pertinent to this case are — Art. 1902. A person who by an act or omission causes damage to another when there is fault or negligence shall be obliged to repair the damage so done. Art. 1903. The obligation imposed by preceding article is demandable, not only for personal acts and omissions, but also for those of the persons for whom they should be responsible. xxx Owners or directors of an establishment or enterprise are equally liable for the damages caused by the employees in the service of the branches in which the latter may be employed or on account of their duties. xxx The liability referred to in this article shall cease when the persons mentioned therein prove that they employed all the diligence of a good father of a family to avoid the damage. The duty, a violation of which is claimed to be negligence in the respect in question, is to exercise reasonable care and prudence. Where reasonable care is employed in doing an act not itself illegal or inherently likely to produce damage to others, there will be no liability, although damage in fact ensues. YAO KEE v. SY-GONZALES G.R. No. L-55960 November 24, 1988 CORTES, J. Whether or not the marriage of Sy Kiat to Yao Kee in accordance with Chinese law and custom was conclusively proven.

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No. Custom is defined as "a rule of conduct formed by repetition of acts, uniformly observed (practiced) as a social rule, legally binding and obligatory." The law requires that "a custom must be proved as a fact, according to the rules of evidence" [Article 12, Civil Code.] On this score the Court had occasion to state that "a local custom as a source of right can not be considered by a court of justice unless such custom is properly established by competent evidence like any other fact." The same evidence, if not one of a higher degree, should be required of a foreign custom. Court has held that to establish a valid foreign marriage two things must be proven, namely: (1) the existence of the foreign law as a question of fact; and (2) the alleged foreign marriage by convincing evidence. In the case at bar petitioners did not present any competent evidence relative to the law and custom of China on marriage. The testimonies of Yao and Gan Ching cannot be considered as proof of China's law or custom on marriage not only because they are
 self-serving evidence, but more importantly, there is no showing that they are competent to testify on the subject matter. For failure to prove the foreign law or custom, and consequently, the validity of the marriage in accordance with said law or custom, the marriage between Yao Kee and Sy Kiat cannot be recognized in this jurisdiction. COMPUTATION OF PERIOD AND TIME GARCIA v. RECIO G.R. No. 138322 October 2, 2001 PANGANIBAN, J. Whether or not the divorce between respondent and Editha Samson was proven. No. A divorce obtained abroad by an alien may be recognized in our jurisdiction, provided such decree is valid according to the national law of the foreigner. However, the divorce decree and the governing personal law of the alien spouse who obtained the divorce must be proven. Our courts do not take judicial notice of foreign laws and judgments; hence, like any other facts, both the divorce decree and the national law of the alien must be alleged and proven according to our law on evidence. Philippine law does not provide for absolute divorce; hence, our courts cannot grant it. A marriage between two Filipinos cannot be dissolved even by a divorce obtained abroad, because of Articles 15 and 17 of the Civil Code. In mixed marriages involving a Filipino and a foreigner, Article 26 of the Family Code allows the former to contract a subsequent marriage in case the divorce is “validly obtained abroad by the alien spouse capacitating him or her to remarry.” A divorce obtained abroad by a couple, who are both aliens, may be recognized in the Philippines, provided it is consistent with their respective national laws. A comparison between marriage and divorce, as far as pleading and proof are concerned, can be made. Van Dorn v. Romillo Jr. decrees that “aliens may obtain divorces abroad, which may be recognized in the Philippines, provided they are valid according to their national law.” Therefore, before a foreign divorce decree can be recognized by our courts, the party pleading it must prove the divorce as a fact and demonstrate its conformity to the foreign law allowing it. Presentation solely of the divorce decree is insufficient. We agree with petitioner’s contention that the court a quo erred in finding that the divorce decree ipso facto clothed respondent with the legal capacity to remarry without requiring him to Page 8

adduce sufficient evidence to show the Australian personal law governing his status; or at the very least, to prove his legal capacity to contract the second marriage. COMMISSIONER OF INTERNAL REVENUE and ARTURO V. PARCERO versus PRIMETOWN PROPERTY GROUP, INC. G.R. No. 162155 August 28, 2007 Corona, J. In case of leap years, how should you compute the two-year prescriptive period for the filing of tax credit under Section 229 of the NIRC? There obviously exists a manifest incompatibility in the manner of computing legal periods under the Civil Code and the Administrative Code of 1987. Under the Civil Code, a year is equivalent to 365 days whether it be a regular year or a leap year. Under the Administrative Code of 1987, however, a year is composed of 12 calendar months. Needless to state, under the Administrative Code of 1987, the number of days is irrelevant. Section 31, Chapter VIII, Book I of the Administrative Code of 1987, being the more recent law, governs the computation of legal periods. Lex posteriori derogat priori. Moreover, there is an implied repeal as provided under Section 27, Book VII of the same code. Section 31, Chapter VIII, Book I thereof provides: Sec. 31. Legal Periods. — “Year” shall be understood to be twelve calendar months; “month” of thirty days, unless it refers to a specific calendar month in which case it shall be computed according to the number of days the specific month contains; “day”, to a day of twenty-four hours and; “night” from sunrise to sunset. A calendar month is “a month designated in the calendar without regard to the number of days it may contain.” It is the “period of time running from the beginning of a certain numbered day up to, but not including, the corresponding numbered day of the next month, and if there is not a sufficient number of days in the next month, then up to and including the last day of that month.” RENVOI DOCTRINE MICIANO VS. BRIMO G.R. No. 22595 November 1, 1924 Romualdez, J. Whether or not the provision of Joseph G. Brimo's will, conditionally instituting the legatees to dispose such will in accordance with Philippine laws, is void, being in violation of Article 10 of the Civil Code (now Article 16 NCC) because the said provision in Brimo’s will is not in accordance with the laws of his Turkish nationality. YES. Such provision in Joseph G. Brimo's will, conditionally instituting the legatees to dispose his will in accordance with Philippine laws, is void. Such condition is contrary to law because it expressly ignores the testator's national law, when according to Article 10 of the Civil Code (now Article 16 NCC), such national law of the testator is the one to govern his testamentary dispositions. Said condition then is considered unwritten, and the institution of legatees in said will is considered unconditional. Page 9

In this case, the Court reiterated the ruling in Lim and Lim vs. Collector of Customs, that since the oppositor did not prove that said testimentary dispositions are not in accordance with the Turkish laws, inasmuch as he did not present any evidence showing what the Turkish laws are on the matter, and in the absence of evidence on such laws, they are presumed to be the same as those of the Philippines. ALICIA REYES VAN DORN v. HON. MANUEL ROMILLO, JR. G.R. No. L-68470 Oct. 8, 1985 Melencio-Herrera, J.: Whether a divorce between a Filipino citizen and a foreigner, decreed by a foreign court, is valid and binding in Philippine jurisdiction. While Philippine nationals are covered by the policy against divorces under Article 15 of the Civil Code, aliens (even if married to Philippine nationals) may obtain divorces abroad, which may be recognized in the Philippines, provided they are valid according to their national law. If validly recognized, the marriage is considered severed and the foreigner is estopped from asserting his right over any conjugal property under the previous marriage. IMELDA MANALAYSAY PILAPIL v. HON. CORONA IBAY-SOMERA G.R. No. 80116 June 30, 1989 Regalado, J. Whether or not the court is without jurisdiction to try and decide the charge of adultery since the purported complainant, a foreigner, does not qualify as an offended spouse having obtained a final divorce decree under his national law prior to his filing the criminal complaint. Under Article 344 of the Revised Penal Code, the crime of adultery, as well as four other crimes against chastity, cannot be prosecuted except upon a sworn written complaint filed by the offended spouse. Verily, after a divorce has been decreed, the innocent spouse no longer has the right to institute proceedings against the offenders where the statute provides that the innocent spouse shall have the exclusive right to institute a prosecution for adultery. The person who initiates the adultery case must be an offended spouse, and by this is meant that he is still married to the accused spouse, at the time of the filing of the complaint. In the present case, the fact that private respondent obtained a valid divorce in his country, the Federal Republic of Germany, is admitted. Said divorce and its legal effects may be recognized in the Philippines insofar as private respondent is concerned in view of the nationality principle in our civil law on the matter of status of persons. Citing the case of Van Dorn vs. Romillo, Jr., et al., the Supreme Court said that "It is true that owing to the nationality principle embodied in Article 15 of the Civil Code, only Philippine nationals are covered by the policy against absolute divorces the same being considered contrary to our concept of public policy and morality. However, aliens may obtain divorces abroad, which may be recognized in the Philippines, provided they are valid according to their national law." Page 10

Under the same considerations and rationale, private respondent, being no longer the husband of petitioner, had no legal standing to commence the adultery case under the imposture that he was the offended spouse at the time he filed suit. Manuela Barretto Gonzalez v. Agusto Gonzalez G.R. No. L-37048 March 7, 1933 Hull, J. Is the lower court correct in granting the foreign divorce secured by defendant in Reno, America? No. Art. 11 of the Civil Code (restated in Art. 17 of the Civil Code) in part states that “the prohibitive laws concerning persons, their acts and their property, and those intended to promote public order and good morals, shall not be rendered without effect by any foreign laws or judgments or by anything done or any agreements entered into a foreign country.”

The lower court in granting relief as prayed for frankly stated that the securing of the divorce, the contracting of another marriage and the bringing into the world of innocent children brings about such a condition that the court must grant relief. The hardships of the existing divorce laws of the Philippine Islands are well known to the members of the Legislature. It is of no moment in this litigation what the personal views of the writer on the subject of divorce may be. It is the duty of the courts to enforce the laws of divorce as written by the Legislature if they are constitutional. Courts have no right to say that such laws are too strict or too liberal. Litigants by mutual agreement can not compel the courts to approve of their own actions or permit the personal relations of the citizens of these Islands to be affected by decrees of foreign courts in a manner which our Government believes is contrary to public order and good morals. THE GOVERNMENT OF THE PHILIPPINE ISLANDS vs. GEORGE I. FRANK G. R. No. 2935. March 23, 1909 JOHNSON, J. Whether a contract entered into by a person who has legal capacity in one country, but is considered a minor in another where the same is to take effect, be invalidated by alleging minority. NO. No rule is better settled in law than that matters bearing upon the execution, interpretation and validity of a contract are determined by the law of the place where the contract is made. Matters connected with its performance are regulated by the law prevailing at the place of performance. Matters respecting a remedy, such as the bringing of suit, admissibility of evidence, and statutes of limitations, depend upon the law of the place where the suit is brought.

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The Defendant’s claim that he was an adult when he left Chicago but was a minor when he arrived at Manila; that he was an adult at the time he made the contract but was a minor at the time the Plaintiff attempted to enforce the contract, more than a year later, is not tenable. BARNUEVO vs. FUSTER G.R. No. L-7487 December 29, 1913 Johnson, J.: Whether or not the Courts of the Philippines are competent or have jurisdiction to decree the divorce in the case at bar? YES. The authority of jurisdictional power of courts to decree a divorce is not comprised within the personal status of the husband and wife, simply because the whole theory of the statutes and of the rights which belong to everyone does not go beyond the sphere of private law, and the authority and jurisdiction of the courts are not a matter of the private law of persons, but of the public or political law of the nation. "The jurisdiction of courts and other questions relating to procedure are considered to be of a public nature and consequently are generally submitted to the territorial principle. . . . All persons that have to demand justice in a case in which foreigners intervene, since they can gain nothing by a simple declaration, should endeavor to apply to the tribunales of the state which have coercive means (property situated in the territory) to enforce any decision they may render. Otherwise, one would expose himself in the suit to making useless expenditures which, although he won his case, would not contribute to secure his rights because of the court's lack of means to enforce them." (Torres Campos, "Elementos de Derecho International Privado," p. 108.) "Justice," says the same professor, "is a principle superior to that of nations, and it should therefore be administered without taking into any account whatsoever the state to which the litigants belong. . . . In order to foster their relations and develop their commerce, all civilized nations are interested in doing justice, not alone to their own people, but to those foreigners who contract within the country or outside of it juridical ties which in some manner effect their sovereignty. (Ibid, p. 107.) Might its courts, in some cases, in suits between foreigners residing in its territory, apply the personal law of the parties, but abdicate their jurisdiction, refrain from administering justice because the personal law of the foreigner gave the jurisdiction of the given case to some court that is not the territorial one of the nation? This has never yet been claimed in any of the theories regarding the conflict of laws arising out of questions of nationality and domicile; it would be equivalent to recognizing extraterritorial law in favor of private persons. The provisions of article 80 of the Civil Law of Spain is only binding within the dominions of Spain. It does not accompany the persons of the Spanish subject wherever he may go. He could not successfully invoke it if he resided in Japan, in China, in Hongkong or in any other territory not subject to the dominion of Spain. Foreign Catholics domiciled in Spain, subject to the ecclesiastical courts in actions for divorce according to the said article 80 of the Civil Code, could not allege lack of jurisdiction by invoking, as the law of their personal statute, a law of their nation which gives jurisdiction in such a case to territorial courts, or to a certain court within or without the territory of their nation. In the present action for divorce the Court of First Instance of the city of Manila did not lack jurisdiction over the persons of the litigants, for, although Spanish Catholic subjects, they were residents of this city and had their domicile herein. The Courts of First Instance of the Philippine Islands have the power and the jurisdiction to try actions for divorce. That of the city of Manila did not lack jurisdiction by reason of the subject matter of the litigation. Page 12

TESTATE ESTATE OF C. O. BOHANAN vs. MAGDALENA C. BOHANAN G.R. No. L-12105 January 30, 1960 LABRADOR, J.: Whether or not the testamentary dispositions by the testator depriving his wife and children of what should be their legitimes under Philippine Laws are valid. Yes. The old Civil Code, which is applicable to this case because the testator died in 1944, expressly provides that successional rights to personal property are to be earned by the national law of the person whose succession is in question. In the proceedings for the probate of the will, it was found out and it was decided that the testator was a citizen of the State of Nevada because he had selected this as his domicile and his permanent residence. As in accordance with Article 10 of the old Civil Code, the validity of testamentary dispositions are to be governed by the national law of the testator, and as it has been decided and it is not disputed that the national law of the testator is that of the State of Nevada, which allows a testator to dispose of all his property according to his will. Section 9905 of Nevada Compiled Laws of 1925 provides that every person over the age of eighteen years, of sound mind, may, by last will, dispose of all his or her estate, real and personal, the same being chargeable with the payment of the testator's debts. BELLIS V. BELLIS G.R. No. L-23678 June 6, 1967 Bengzon, J. Whether or not the Philippine law be applied in the case in the determination of the illegitimate children’s successional rights. Court ruled that provision in a foreigner’s will to the effect that his properties shall be distributed in accordance with Philippine law and not with his national law, is illegal and void, for his national law cannot be ignored in view of those matters that Article 10 — now Article 16 — of the Civil Code states said national law should govern. Where the testator was a citizen of Texas and domiciled in Texas, the intrinsic validity of his will should be governed by his national law. Since Texas law does not require legitimes, then his will, which deprived his illegitimate children of the legitimes, is valid. The Supreme Court held that the illegitimate children are not entitled to the legitimes under the texas law, which is the national law of the deceased. IN THE MATTER OF THE TESTATE ESTATE OF EDWARD E. CHRISTENSEN, DECEASED. ADOLFO C. AZNAR, Executor and LUCY CHRISTENSEN v. HELEN CHRISTENSEN GARCIA G.R. No. L-16749 January 31, 1963 LABRADOR, J. How shall the terms residence and domicile be construed?

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The terms "'residence" and "domicile" might well be taken to mean the same thing, a place of permanent abode. But domicile, as has been shown, has acquired a technical meaning. Thus one may be domiciled in a place where he has never been. And he may reside in a place where he has no domicile. The man with two homes, between which he divides his time, certainly resides in each one, while living in it. But if he went on business which would require his presence for several weeks or months, he might properly be said to have sufficient connection with the place to be called a resident. It is clear, however, that, if he treated his settlement as continuing only for the particular business in hand, not giving up his former "home," he could not be a domiciled New Yorker. Acquisition of a domicile of choice requires the exercise of intention as well as physical presence. "Residence simply requires bodily presence of an inhabitant in a given place, while domicile requires bodily presence in that place and also an intention to make it one's domicile." Residence, however, is a term used with many shades of meaning, from the merest temporary presence to the most permanent abode, and it is not safe to insist that any one use et the only proper one. ROEHR v. RODRIGUEZ G.R. No. 142820 June 20, 2003 Quisumbing, J. A divorce decree was obtained by a German national in Germany, dissolving his marriage with a Filipina. Can such a decree be automatically given the effect of res judicata by our local courts? No. As a general rule, divorce decrees obtained by foreigners in other countries are recognizable in our jurisdiction, but the legal effects thereof, e.g., on custody, care and support of the children, must still be determined by our courts. Before our courts can give the effect of res judicata to a foreign judgment, such as the award of custody to petitioner by the German court, it must be shown that the parties opposed to the judgment had been given ample opportunity to do so on grounds allowed under Rule 39, Section 48 of The 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure. It is essential that there should be an opportunity to challenge the foreign judgment, in order for the court in this jurisdiction to give effect to it. Our Rules of Court clearly provide that with respect to actions in personam, as distinguished from actions in rem, a foreign judgment merely constitutes prima facie evidence of the justness of the claim of a party and, as such, is subject to proof to the contrary. GARCIA v. RECIO G.R. No. 138322 October 2, 2001 PANGANIBAN, J. Whether or not a divorce obtained abroad by an alien may be recognized in our jurisdiction. Yes. A divorce obtained abroad by an alien may be recognized in our jurisdiction, provided such decree is valid according to the national law of the foreigner. However, the divorce decree and the governing personal law of the alien spouse who obtained the divorce must be proven. Our courts do not take judicial notice of foreign laws and judgment; hence, like any other facts, both the divorce decree and the national law of the alien must be alleged and proven according to our law on evidence. Page 14

The divorce decree, like any other foreign judgment, may be given recognition in this jurisdiction only upon proof of the existence of (1) the foreign law allowing absolute divorce and (2) the alleged divorce decree itself. Based on the first paragraph of Article 26 of the Family Code, marriages solemnized abroad are governed by the law of the place where they were celebrated (the lex loci celebrationist). In effect, the Code requires the presentation of the foreign law to show the conformity of the marriage in question to the legal requirements of the place where the marriage was performed. Philippine law does not provide for absolute divorce; hence, our courts cannot grant it. A marriage between two Filipinos cannot be dissolved even by a divorce obtained abroad, because of Articles 15 and 17 of the Civil Code. In mixed marriages involving a Filipino and a foreigner, Article 26 of the Family Code allows the former to contract a subsequent marriage in case the divorce is "validly obtained abroad by the alien spouse capacitating him or her to remarry." A divorce obtained abroad by a couple, who are both aliens, may be recognized in the Philippines, provided it is consistent with their respective national laws. A comparison between marriage and divorce, as far as pleading and proof are concerned, can be made. Van Dorn v. Romillo Jr. decrees that "aliens may obtain divorces abroad, which may be recognized in the Philippines, provided they are valid according to their national law." Therefore, before a foreign divorce decree can be recognized by our courts, the party pleading it must prove the divorce as a fact and demonstrate its conformity to the foreign law allowing it. Presentation solely of the divorce decree is insufficient. HUMAN RELATIONS DEVELOPMENT BANK OF THE PHILIPPINES v. CA G.R. No. 137916 December 8, 2004 Callejo, SR., J. Whether or not respondents spouses is entitled to the award of moral damages based on Article 19 of the NCC as a result of petitioner’s application for foreclosure of real estate mortgage pendente lite. NO. Respondents spouses is not entitled to the award of moral damages based on Article 19 of the NCC despite the Court’s finding that the initiation of extrajudicial foreclosure by the petitioner of the real estate mortgage pendente lite was premature; hence, inappropriate. Abuse of right under Article of the NCC, on which the RTC anchored its award for damages and attorney’s fees, provides: Art. 19. Every person must, in the exercise of his rights and in the performance of his duties, act with justice, give everyone his due, and observe honesty and good faith. The elements of abuse of rights are the following: (a) the existence of a legal right or duty; (b) which is exercised in bad faith; and (c) for the sole intent of prejudicing or injuring another. Malice of bad faith is at the core of said provision. Good faith is presumed and he who alleges bad faith has the duty to prove the same. Good faith refers to the state of mind which is manifested by the acts of the individual concerned. It consists of the intention to abstain from taking an unconscionable and unscrupulous advantage of another. Bad faith does not simply connote bad judgment or simple negligence, dishonest purpose or some moral obliquity and Page 15

conscious doing of a wrong, a breach of known duty to some motives or interest or ill-will that partakes of the nature of fraud. Malice connotes ill-will or spite and speaks not in response to duty. It implies an intention to do ulterior and unjustifiable harm. Malice is bad faith or bad motive. The Spouses Gotangco failed to prove malice on the part of the petitioner. There was, for sure, a divergence of opinion between the petitioner, on the one hand, and the Spouses Gotangco, on the other, relative to the issue of whether Cucio's payments were mere deposits or partial payments for the lot covered by TCT No. NT-177647, and whether the respondents Spouses Gotangco had agreed to the offer of the pool of insurers to pay the amount of P167,149.14 as indemnity for the loss of their poultry farm. However, the bare fact that the petitioner filed its application of the extrajudicial foreclosure of the mortgage, notwithstanding those differences, cannot thereby give rise to the conclusion that the petitioner did so with malice, to harass the Spouses Gotangco. The records show that, time and again, the petitioner had sent notices to the respondent spouses and demanded the updating of their account and the payment of the balance thereof, but the respondents spouses failed to comply. In the meantime, interests and penalties on the loan considerably accrued. Under the terms of the real estate mortgage and its charter, the petitioner had the right to foreclose the said mortgage extrajudicially. Hence, the petitioner was constrained to file its application for the extrajudicial foreclosure of the mortgage for the Spouses Gotangco's past due obligation. Instead of settling their account, the Spouses filed their petition for a writ of preliminary injunction. Because of the preliminary injunction issued by the trial court, the foreclosure was aborted. Under the circumstances, it cannot be gainsaid that the petitioner acted in bad faith or with malice in seeking the extrajudicial foreclosure of the mortgage in its favor. UYPITCHING v. QUIAMCO G.R. No. 146322 December 6, 2006 CORONA, J.: Whether the filing of a complaint for qualified theft and/or violation of the Anti-Fencing Law in the Office of the City Prosecutor warranted the award of moral damages, exemplary damages, attorney’s fees and costs in favor of respondent. Yes. They were held liable for damages not only for instituting a groundless complaint against respondent but also for making a slanderous remark and for taking the motorcycle from respondent’s establishment in an abusive manner. Petitioner corporation failed to bring the proper civil action necessary to acquire legal possession of the motorcycle. Instead, petitioner Uypitching descended on respondent’s establishment with his policemen and ordered the seizure of the motorcycle without a search warrant or court order. Worse, in the course of the illegal seizure of the motorcycle, petitioner Uypitching even mouthed a slanderous statement. Petitioners’ acts violated the law as well as public morals, and transgressed the proper norms of human relations. (Art.19 CC) In this case, the manner by which the motorcycle was taken at petitioners’ instance was not only attended by bad faith but also contrary to the procedure laid down by law. Considered in conjunction with the defamatory statement, petitioners’ exercise of the right to recover the

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mortgaged vehicle was utterly prejudicial and injurious to respondent. On the other hand, the precipitate act of filing an unfounded complaint could not in any way be considered to be in accordance with the purpose for which the right to prosecute a crime was established. Thus, the totality of petitioners’ actions showed a calculated design to embarrass, humiliate and publicly ridicule respondent. Petitioners acted in an excessively harsh fashion to the prejudice of respondent. Contrary to law, petitioners willfully caused damage to respondent. BEATRIZ P. WASSMER v. FRANCISCO X. VELEZ G.R. No. L-20089 December 26, 1964 BENGZON, J.P., J.: Is a breach of promise to marry an actionable wrong? Mere breach of promise to marry is not an actionable wrong. But to formally set a wedding and go through all the preparation and publicity, only to walk out of it when the matrimony is about to be solemnized, is quite different. This is palpably and unjustifiably contrary to good customs for which defendant must be held answerable in damages in accordance with Article 21 of the Civil Code. NIKKO HOTEL MANILA GARDEN vs. REYES G.R. No. 154259 February 28, 2005 Chico-Nazario, J.: Whether or not Ruby Lim acted abusively in asking Roberto Reyes, a.k.a. “Amay Bisaya,” to leave the party where he was not invited by the celebrant thereof thereby becoming liable under Articles 19 and 21 of the Civil Code. Article 19, known to contain what is commonly referred to as the principle of abuse of rights, is not a panacea for all human hurts and social grievances. Elsewhere, we explained that when “a right is exercised in a manner which does not conform with the norms enshrined in Article 19 and results in damage to another, a legal wrong is thereby committed for which the wrongdoer must be responsible.” The object of this article, therefore, is to set certain standards which must be observed not only in the exercise of one’s rights but also in the performance of one’s duties. These standards are the following: act with justice, give everyone his due and observe honesty and good faith. Its antithesis, necessarily, is any act evincing bad faith or intent to injure. Its elements are the following: (1) There is a legal right or duty; (2) which is exercised in bad faith; (3) for the sole intent of prejudicing or injuring another. When Article 19 is violated, an action for damages is proper under Articles 20 or 21 of the Civil Code. Article 20 pertains to damages arising from a violation of law which does not obtain herein as Ms. Lim was perfectly within her right to ask Mr. Reyes to leave. Article 21 refers to acts contra bonus mores and has the following elements: (1) There is an act which is legal; (2) but which is contrary to morals, good custom, public order, or public policy; and (3) it is done with intent to injure. A common theme runs through Articles 19 and 21, and that is, the act complained of must be intentional. As applied to herein case and as earlier discussed, Mr. Reyes has not shown that Ms. Lim was driven by animosity against him. These two people did not know each other personally before the evening of 13 October 1994, thus, Mr. Reyes had nothing to offer for an explanation for Ms. Lim’s alleged abusive conduct except the statement that Ms. Lim, being “single at 44 Page 17

years old,” had a “very strong bias and prejudice against (Mr. Reyes) possibly influenced by her associates in her work at the hotel with foreign businessmen.” The lameness of this argument need not be belabored. Suffice it to say that a complaint based on Articles 19 and 21 of the Civil Code must necessarily fail if it has nothing to recommend it but innuendos and conjectures. BAKSH VS. COURT OF APPEALS G.R. No. 97336 February 19, 1993 Davide, Jr., J Whether or not Article 21 of the Civil Code can be resort to in a case of breach of promise to marry? YES. In the light of the above laudable purpose of Article 21, We are of the opinion, and so hold, that where a man's promise to marry is in fact the proximate cause of the acceptance of his love by a woman and his representation to fulfill that promise thereafter becomes the proximate cause of the giving of herself unto him in a sexual congress, proof that he had, in reality, no intention of marrying her and that the promise was only a subtle scheme or deceptive device to entice or inveigle her to accept him and to obtain her consent to the sexual act, could justify the award of damages pursuant to Article 21 not because of such promise to marry but because of the fraud and deceit behind it and the willful injury to her honor and reputation which followed thereafter. It is essential, however, that such injury should have been committed in a manner contrary to morals, good customs or public policy. In the instant case, respondent Court found that it was the petitioner's "fraudulent and deceptive protestations of love for and promise to marry plaintiff that made her surrender her virtue and womanhood to him and to live with him on the honest and sincere belief that he would keep said promise, and it was likewise these fraud and deception on appellant's part that made plaintiff's parents agree to their daughter's living-in with him preparatory to their supposed marriage. CECILIO PE, ET AL. vs. ALFONSO PE G.R. No. L-17396 May 30, 1962 BAUTISTA ANGELO, J.: Whether or not the defendant Alfonso Pe committed injury to Lolita's family in a manner contrary to morals, good customs and public policy as contemplated in Article 21 of the New Civil Code. Yes. “The circumstances under which defendant tried to win Lolita’s affection cannot lead to any other conclusion than that it was he who, thru an ingenious scheme or trickery, seduced the latter to the extent of making her fall in love with him. Indeed, no other conclusion can be drawn from this chain of events than that defendant not only deliberately, but through a clever strategy, succeeded in winning the affection and love of Lolita to the extent of having illicit relations with her. The wrong he has caused her and her family is indeed immeasurable considering the fact that he is a married man. Verily, he has committed and injury to Lolita’s family in a manner contrary to morals, good customs and public policy as contemplated in Article 21 of the New Civil Code.”

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Spouses Quisumbing v MERALCO G.R. No. 142943. April 3, 2002 Justice Panganiban Whether such disconnection entitled petitioners for damages. Petitioners are asking for the reinstatement of the RTC Decision, which awarded them actual, moral and exemplary damages as well as attorney’s fees. All these were overturned by the CA. As to actual damages, we agree with the CA that competent proof is necessary before our award may be made. The appellate court ruled as follows: “Considering further, it is a settled rule that in order for damages to be recovered, the best evidence obtainable by the injured party must be presented. Actual and compensatory damages cannot be presumed but must be duly proved and proved with reasonable degree and certainty. A court cannot rely on speculation, conjecture or guess work as to the fact and amount of damages, but must depend upon competent proof that they have been suffered and on evidence of actual amount thereof. If the proof is flimsy and unsubstantial, no damages will be awarded.” Actual damages are compensation for an injury that will put the injured party in the position where it was before it was injured. They pertain to such injuries or losses that are actually sustained and susceptible of measurement. Except as provided by law or by stipulation, a party is entitled to an adequate compensation only for such pecuniary loss as it has duly proven. Basic is the rule that to recover actual damages, not only must the amount of loss be capable of proof; it must also be actually proven with a reasonable degree of certainty, premised upon competent proof or the best evidence obtainable. No other evidence has been proffered to substantiate her bare statements. She has not shown how she arrived at the amount of P50,000; it is, at best, speculative. Her self-serving testimonial evidence, if it may be called such, is insufficient to support alleged actual damages. While respondent does not rebut this testimony on the expenses incurred by the spouses in moving the dinner out of their residence due to the disconnection, no receipts covering such expenditures have been adduced in evidence. Neither is the testimony corroborated. To reiterate, actual or compensatory damages cannot be presumed, but must be duly proved with a reasonable degree of certainty. It is dependent upon competent proof of damages that petitioners have suffered and of the actual amount thereof. The award must be based on the evidence presented, not on the personal knowledge of the court; and certainly not on flimsy, remote, speculative and unsubstantial proof. Consequently, we uphold the CA ruling denying the grant of actual damages. Having said that, we agree with the trial court, however, that petitioners are entitled to moral damages, albeit in a reduced amount. Observance of the rights of our people is sacred in our society. We cannot allow such rights to be trifled with or trivialized. Although the Court sympathizes with respondent’s efforts to stamp out the illegal use of electricity, such action must be done only with strict observance of the rights of our people. As has been we succinctly said: “there is a right way to do the right thing at the right time for the right reason.” However, the amount of moral damages, which is left largely to the sound discretion of the courts, should be granted in reasonable amounts, considering the attendant facts and circumstances. Moral damages, though incapable of pecuniary estimation, are designed to compensate the claimant for actual injury suffered and not to impose a penalty. Moral damages are not intended to enrich a plaintiff at the expense of the defendant. They are awarded only to obtain a means, a diversion or an amusement that will serve to alleviate the moral suffering the Page 19

injured party has undergone by reason of the defendant’s culpable action. They must be proportionate to the suffering inflicted. It is clear from the records that respondent was able to restore the electrical supply of petitioners on the same day. Verily, the inconvenience and anxiety they suffered as a result of the disconnection was thereafter corrected. Thus, we reduce the RTC’s grant of moral damages to the more equitable amount of P100,000. Exemplary damages, on the other hand, are imposed by way of example or correction for the public good in addition to moral, temperate, liquidated or compensatory damages. It is not given to enrich one party and impoverish another, but to serve as a deterrent against or as a negative incentive to socially deleterious actions. In this case, to serve an example -- that before a disconnection of electrical supply can be effected by a public utility like Meralco, the requisites of law must be faithfully complied with -- we award the amount of P50,000 to petitioners. Finally, with the award of exemplary damages, the award of attorney’s fees is likewise granted. It is readily apparent that petitioners needed the services of a lawyer to argue their cause, even to the extent of elevating the matter to this Court; thus, an award of P50,000 is considered sufficient. GLOBE MACKAY CABLE AND RADIO CORP. AND HERBERT HENDRY V. COURT OF APPEALS AND RESTITUTO TOBIAS G.R. NO. 81262 AUGUST 25, 1989 CORTES, J.: Is petitioner-employer liable to Tobias, their employee, for damages for his illegal dismissal from Globe Mackay? Petitioners contend that they could not be made liable for damages in the lawful exercise of their right to dismiss respondent Tobias. On the other hand, private respondent contends that because of petitioners’ abusive manner in dismissing him as well as for the inhumane treatment he got from them, petitioners must indemnify him for damages that he suffered. The Supreme Court, however, ruled in favour of respondent Tobias, stating that Article 19, the Principle of Abuse of Rights, sets certain standards which must be observed not only in the exercise of one’s rights but also in the performance of one’s duties. When a right is exercised in a manner which does not conform with the norms enshrined in Article 19 and results in damage to another, a legal wrong is thereby committed for which the wrongdoer must be held responsible. But while Article 19 lays down a rule of conduct for the government of human relations and for the maintenance of social order, it does not provide a remedy for its violation. Generally, an action for damages under either Article 20 or Article 21 would be proper. In the instant case, the Court found that all petitioners have indeed abused the right that they invoke, causing damage to private respondent and for which the latter must now be indemnified. Notwithstanding the fact that it was private respondent Tobias who reported the possible existence of anomalous transactions, petitioner Hendry "showed belligerence and told Tobias that he was the number one suspect and to take a one week vacation leave, not to communicate with the office, to leave his table drawers open, and to leave his keys to Hendry. This, petitioners do not dispute. But regardless of whether or not it was private respondent Tobias who reported the anomalies to petitioners, the latter's reaction towards the former upon uncovering the anomalies was less Page 20

than civil. Petitioners were not content with just dismissing Tobias. Several other tortious acts were committed by petitioners against Tobias like the filing of the first of six criminal complaints against Tobias and threatening him that he would file a hundred more cases against him until he landed in jail. The next tortious act committed by petitioners was the writing of a letter to RETELCO sometime in October 1974, stating that Tobias had been dismissed by GLOBE MACKAY due to dishonesty. Because of the letter, Tobias failed to gain employment with RETELCO and as a result of which, Tobias remained unemployed for a longer period of time. For this further damage suffered by Tobias, petitioners must likewise be held liable for damages consistent with Article 2176 of the Civil Code. UNIVERSITY OF THE EAST v. JADER G.R. No. 132344 February 17, 2000 YNARES-SANTIAGO, J.: Whether or not the University of the East Should be held liable for moral damages for misleading a student into believing he had satisfied all the requirements for graduation. No. The Supreme Court held that petitioner was guilty of negligence and is liable to respondent for the latter's actual damages. Educational institutions are duty-bound to inform the students of their academic status and not wait for the latter to inquire from the former. However, respondent should not have be awarded moral damages although JADER suffered shock, trauma, and pain when he was informed that he could not graduate and will not be allowed to take the bar because it is also respondent’s duty to verify for himself whether he has completed all necessary requirements to be eligible for the bar examinations. As a senior law student, he should have been responsible in ensuring that all his affairs specifically those in relation with his academic achievement are in order. Before taking the bar examinations, it doesn’t only entail a mental preparation on the subjects but there are other prerequisites such as documentation and submission of requirements which prospective examinee must meet. Art. 19 was intended to expand the concept of torts by granting adequate legal remedy for the untold number of moral wrongs which is impossible for human foresight to provide specifically in statutory law.8 In civilized society, men must be able to assume that others will do them no intended injury — that others will commit no internal aggressions upon them; that their fellowmen, when they act affirmatively will do so with due care which the ordinary understanding and moral sense of the community exacts and that those with whom they deal in the general course of society will act in good faith. UNJUST ENRICHMENT SPS. MARIO & CORAZON VILLALVA v. RCBC SAVINGS BANK G.R. No. 165661 August 28, 2006 PUNO, J. May the mortgagors’ property be foreclosed in the absence of a demand or notice? No. As a rule, demand is required before a party may be considered in default. However, demand by a creditor is not necessary in order that delay may exist: (1) when the obligation or Page 21

the law expressly so declares; (2) when from the nature and the circumstances of the obligation it appears that the designation of the time when the thing is to be delivered or the service is to be rendered was a controlling motive for the establishment of the contract; or (3) when demand would be useless, as when the obligor has rendered it beyond his power to perform. None of the exceptions are present in this case. It is clear from the records that the first and third exceptions are inapplicable. The second exception cannot also be applied in light of our ruling in Servicewide Specialists, Incorporated v. Court of Appeals. In that case, this Court observed that the Deed of Chattel Mortgage required that two conditions should be met before the mortgagee could secure the required insurance: (1) default by the mortgagors in effecting renewal of the insurance, and (2) failure to deliver the policy with endorsement to mortgagee. The mortgagee contended that notice was not required due to the nature of the obligation, and that it was entitled to renew the insurance for the account of the mortgagors without notice to the latter should the mortgagors fail to renew the insurance coverage. To substantiate its claim, the mortgagee relied on the Chattel Mortgage provision that the car be insured at all times. This Court rebuffed the mortgagee’s arguments: If petitioner was aware that the insurance coverage was inadequate, why did it not inform private respondent about it? After all, since petitioner was under no obligation to effect renewal thereof, it is but logical that it should relay to private respondents any defect of the insurance coverage before itself assuming the same. Due to the mortgagee’s failure to notify the mortgagors prior to application of the latter’s payments to the insurance premiums, this Court held that the mortgagors had not defaulted on their obligation to secure insurance over the mortgaged vehicle, and affirmed the Regional Trial Court’s decision dismissing the mortgagee’s complaint for replevin. RESPECT FOR OTHER’S PRIVACY TENCHAVEZ VS. ESCANO G.R. No. L-19671 November 29, 1965 REYES, J.B.L., J. Are the charges against Vicenta Escaño’s parents sufficient for them to be liable for damages? No. Tenchavez’ charge against Vicenta’s parents are not supported by credible evidence. There is no evidence that the parents of Vicenta, out of improper motives, aided and abetted her original suit for annulment, or her subsequent divorce; she appears to have acted independently, and being of age, she was entitled to judge what was best for her and ask that her decisions be respected. Her parents, in so doing, certainly cannot be charged with alienation of affections in the absence of malice or unworthy motives, which have not been shown, good faith being always presumed until the contrary is proved. The testimony of Tenchavez about the Escaño’s animosity toward him strikes the court to be merely conjecture and exaggeration, and were belied by Tenchavez’ own letters written before the suit had begun. An action for alienation of affections against the parents of one consort does not lie in the absence of proof of malice or unworthy motives on their part. Plaintiff Tenchavez, in falsely charging Vicenta's aged parents with racial or social discrimination and with having exerted efforts and pressured her to seek annulment and divorce, unquestionably caused them unrest and anxiety, entitling them to recover damages. While this suit may not have been impelled by actual malice, the charges were certainly reckless in the Page 22

face of the proven facts and circumstances. Court actions are not established for parties to give vent to their prejudices or spleen ST. LOUIS REALTY VS. CA 133 SCRA 179 November 14, 1984 Aquino, J: Can Saint Louis Realty Corporation be held liable for damages under Article 26 of the Civil Code for a wrongful advertisement in the Sunday Times where Saint Louis Realty Corporation misrepresented that the house of Doctor Conrado J. Aramil belonged to Arcadio S. Arcadio? Yes. Judge Jose M. Leuterio observed that St. Louis Realty should have immediately published a rectification and apology. He found that as a result of St. Louis Realty's mistake, magnified by its utter lack of sincerity, Doctor Aramil suffered mental anguish and his income was reduced by about P1,000 to P1,500 a month. Moreover, there was violation of Aramil's right to privacy (Art. 26, Civil Code). The trial court awarded Aramil P8,000 as actual damages, P20,000 as moral damages and P2,000 as attorney's fees. St. Louis Realty appealed to the Court of Appeals.The Appellate Court reasoned out that St. Louis Realty committed an actionable quasi-delict under articles 21 and 26 of the Civil Code because the questioned advertisements pictured a beautiful house which did not belong to Arcadio but to Doctor Aramil who, naturally, was annoyed by that contretemps. "Prying into the privacy of another's residence" and "meddling with or disturbing the private life or family relations of another" and "similar acts", "though they may not constitute a criminal offense, shall produce a cause of action for damages, prevention and other relief.” The damages fixed by Judge Leuterio are sanctioned by Articles 2200, 2208 and 2219 of the Civil Code. Article 2219 allows moral damages for acts and actions mentioned in Article 26. The acts and omissions of the firm fan under Article 26. St. Louis Realty's employee was grossly negligent in mixing up the Aramil and Arcadio residences in a widely circulated publication like the Sunday Times. To suit its purpose, it never made any written apology and explanation of the mix-up. It just contented itself with a cavalier "rectification.” Persons, who know the residence of Doctor Aramil, were confused by the distorted, lingering impression that he was renting his residence from Arcadio or that Arcadio had leased it from him. Either way, his private life was mistakenly and unnecessarily exposed. He suffered diminution of income and mental anguish. PREJUDICIAL QUESTION CHING v. CA G.R. No. 110844 April 27, 2000 BUENA, J. Does the pendency of a civil action for damages and declaration of nullity of documents constitute a prejudicial question as to warrant the suspension of criminal proceedings? NO. As defined, a prejudicial question is one that arises in a case the resolution of which is a logical antecedent of the issue involved therein, and the cognizance of which pertains to another tribunal. The prejudicial question must be determinative of the case before the court but the jurisdiction to try and resolve the question must be lodged in another court or tribunal. It is a Page 23

question based on a fact distinct and separate from the crime but so intimately connected with it that it determines the guilt or innocence of the accused, and for it to suspend the criminal action, it must appear not only that said case involves facts intimately related to those upon which the criminal prosecution would be based but also that in the resolution of the issue or issues raised in the civil case, the guilt or innocence of the accused would necessarily be determined. It comes into play generally in a situation where a civil action and a criminal action are both pending and there exists in the former an issue which must be preemptively resolved before the criminal action may proceed, because howsoever the issue raised in the civil action is resolved would be determinative juris et de jure of the guilt or innocence of the accused in the criminal case. More simply, for the court to appreciate the pendency of a prejudicial question, the law requires the concurrence of two essential requisites, to wit: a) The civil action involves an issue similar or intimately related to the issue raised in the criminal action; and b) The resolution of such issue determines whether or not the criminal action may proceed. Verily, under the prevailing circumstances, the alleged prejudicial question in the civil case for declaration of nullity of documents and for damages, does not juris et de jure determine the guilt or innocence of the accused in the criminal action for estafa. Assuming arguendo that the court hearing the civil aspect of the case adjudicates that the transaction entered into between the parties was not a trust receipt agreement, nonetheless the guilt of the accused could still be established and his culpability under penal laws determined by other evidence. To put it differently, even on the assumption that the documents are declared null, it does not ipso facto follow that such declaration of nullity shall exonerate the accused from criminal prosecution and liability. Therefore, the civil action for declaration of nullity of documents and for damages does not constitute a prejudicial question to the criminal cases for estafa filed against petitioner. TE v. CA G.R. No. 126746 November 29, 2000 KAPUNAN, J. Will the pendency of a declaration of nullity of marriage case against the first wife suspend the proceedings in the bigamy case? No. The outcome of the civil case for annulment of petitioner’s marriage to private respondent had no bearing upon the determination of petitioner’s innocence or guilt in the criminal case for bigamy, because all that is required for the charge of bigamy to prosper is that the first marriage be subsisting at the time the second marriage is contracted. Petitioner’s argument that the nullity of his marriage to private respondent had to be resolved first in the civil case before the criminal proceedings could continue, because a declaration that their marriage was void ab initio would necessarily absolve him from criminal liability, is untenable. MERCADO v. TAN G.R. No. 137110. August 1, 2000 PANGANIBAN, J.: Whether or not there was a prejudicial question. Page 24

None. In the instant case, petitioner contracted a second marriage although there was yet no judicial declaration of nullity of his first marriage. In fact, he instituted the Petition to have the first marriage declared void only after complainant had filed a letter-complaint charging him with bigamy. By contracting a second marriage while the first was still subsisting, he committed the acts punishable under Article 349 of the Revised Penal Code. That he subsequently obtained a judicial declaration of the nullity of the first marriage was immaterial. To repeat, the crime had already been consummated by then. Moreover, his view effectively encourages delay in the prosecution of bigamy cases; an accused could simply file a petition to declare his previous marriage void and invoke the pendency of that action as a prejudicial question in the criminal case. MORIGO v. People of the Philippines G.R. No. 145226 February 6, 2004 Quisimbing, J. Whether or not Morigo should have filed a declaration of nullity of his marriage before contracting a second marriage to be free from the bigamy case? No. In the instant case, however, no marriage ceremony at all was performed by a duly authorized solemnizing officer. Petitioner and Lucia Barrete merely signed a marriage contract on their own. The mere private act of signing a marriage contract bears no semblance to a valid marriage and thus, needs no judicial declaration of nullity. Such act alone, without more, cannot be deemed to constitute an ostensibly valid marriage for which petitioner might be held liable for bigamy unless he first secures a judicial declaration of nullity before he contracts a subsequent marriage. SPS. YU VS. PCIB G.R. No. 147902 17 March 2006 Austria-Martinez, J.

Whether or not a civil case for annulment of a cerificate of sale is a prejudicial question to a petition for issuance of writ of possession. No. A prejudicial question comes into play only when a civil action and a criminal action are both pending and there exists in the former an issue that must be preemptively resolved before the criminal action may proceed because the issue raised in the civil action is determinative of the guiltor innocence of the accused in the criminal case. In the present case, both actions are civil in nature and can proceed separately because they have different issues. Hence, no prejudicial question can arise from the two actions. DONATO vs. LUNA G.R. No. L-53642 April 15, 1988 Gancayco, J.

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Whether or not a criminal case for bigamy pending before the Court of First Instance of Manila should be suspended in view of a civil case for annulment of marriage pending before the Juvenile and Domestic Relations Court on the ground that the latter constitutes a prejudicial question. A prejudicial question has been defined to be one which arises in a case, the resolution of which question is a logical antecedent of the issue involved in said case, and the cognizance of which pertains to another tribunal. It is one based on a fact distinct and separate from the crime but so intimately connected with it that it determines the guilt or innocence of the accused, and for it to suspend the criminal action, it must appear not only that said case involves facts intimately related to those upon which the criminal prosecution would be based but also that in the resolution of the issue or issues raised in the civil case, the guilt or innocence of the accused would necessarily be determined. A prejudicial question usually comes into play in a situation where a civil action and a criminal action may proceed, because howsoever the issue raised in the civil action is resolved would be determinative juris et de jure of the guilt or innocence of the accused in a criminal case. The requisites of a prejudicial question do not obtain in the case at bar. It must be noted that the issue before the Juvenile and Domestic Relations Court touching upon the nullity of the second marriage is not determinative of petitioner Donato's guilt or innocence in the crime of bigamy. PERSONS QUIMIGUING v. ICAO G.R. No. 26795 July 31, 1970 Reyes, J.B.L., J.: Whether plaintiff-appellants can pray for the award of support and damages against defendant, despite the former’s failure to allege the fact of birth in their complaint. Yes. Plaintiff-appellant Carmen Quimiguing has the right to receive support for the child she was carrying. Article 40 of the Civil Code recognizes the provisional personality of an unborn child, which guarantees its right to receive support from its parents, while still en ventre de sa mere, “in its mother’s womb.” Article 742 of the same Code holds that a conceived yet still unborn child may receive donations through persons that legally represent it. Additionally, “for a married man to force a woman not his wife to yield to his lust xxx constitutes a clear violation of the rights of his victim that entitles her to claim compensation for the damage caused” correlating Articles 21 and 2219 of the Civil Code, which awards moral damages to victims of seduction, abduction, rape or other lascivious acts. Judgment was reversed, set aside and remanded for proceedings conformable to the instant decision; with costs against Icao.

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GELUZ v. CA G.R. No. L-16439 July 20, 1961 Reyes, J.B.L., J. Whether or not the husband of a woman, who voluntarily procured her abortion, could recover damages from the physician who caused the same. No. The provisional personality of a conceived child (conceptus pro nato habetur) under Art. 40 cannot be invoked because the article expressly limits such provisional personality by imposing the condition that the child should be subsequently born alive: "provided it be born later with the condition specified in the following article". In the present case, there is no dispute that the child was dead when separated from its mother's womb. The child should be born before the parents can seek any recovery for damages. Action for pecuniary damages on account of personal injury or death pertains primarily to the one injured. There could be no action for such damages that can be instituted on behalf of the unborn child for the injuries it received because it lacked juridical personality. The damages which the parents of an unborn child can recover are limited to moral damages, in this case, for the act of the appellant Geluz to perform the abortion. However, moral damages cannot also be recovered because the wife willingly sought the abortion, and the husband did not further investigate on the causes of the abortion. Furthermore, the husband did not seem to have taken interest in the administrative and criminal cases against the appellant, but was more concerned in obtaining from the doctor a large money payment. LIMJOCO v. FRAGANTE G.R . No. L-770 April 27, 1948 Hilado, J. Whether the estate of Pedro O. Fragrante is a "person" within the meaning of the Public Service Act? Whether his citizenship shall extend to his estate? YES. The estate of Pedro O. Fragrante should be considered an artificial or juridical person for the purposes of the settlement and distribution of his estate which, of course, include the exercise during the judicial administration thereof of those rights and the fulfillment of those obligations of his which survived after his death. The reason for this legal fiction, that the estate of the deceased person is considered a "person", as deemed to include artificial or juridical persons, is the avoidance of injustice or prejudice resulting from the impossibility of exercising such legal rights and fulfilling such legal obligations of the decedent as survived after his death unless the fiction is indulged. With respect to his citizenship the Supreme Court said that "we cannot perceive no valid reason for holding that within the intent of the constitution (Article IV), its provisions on Philippine citizenship exclude the legal principle of extension adverted to.". His estate was that of a Filipino citizen. Dionisio Dumlao vs. Quality Plastics Inc G.R. No. L-27956 April 30, 1975 AQUINO, J. Whether or not the lower court's judgment against the deceased Pedro Oria, being already dead Page 27

and was never served with summons, is valid. No. Since no jurisdiction was acquired over Oria, the judgment against him is a patent nullity. As far as Oria was concerned, the lower court’s judgment against him in the case is void for lack of jurisdiction over his person. He was not and he could not have been, validly served with summons. He had no more civil personality. His juridical capacity, which is the fitness to be the subject of legal relations, was lost through death. MO YA LIM YAO v. CID G.R. No. L-21289 4 October 1971 Barredo, J. Whether or not an alien woman become a Filipino citizen upon her marriage to the latter. YES. Under Section 15 of Commonwealth Act 473, an alien woman marrying a Filipino, native born or naturalized, becomes ipso facto a Filipina provided she is not disqualified to be a citizen of the Philippines under Section 4 of the same law. Likewise, an alien woman married to an alien who is subsequently naturalized here follows the Philippine citizenship of her husband the moment he takes his oath as Filipino citizen, provided that she does not suffer from any of the disqualifications under said Section 4. If the widow of an applicant for naturalization as Filipino, who dies during the proceedings, is not required to go through a naturalization proceeding, in order to be considered as a Filipino citizen hereof, it should follow that the wife of a living Filipino cannot be denied the same privilege. The point that bears emphasis in this regard is that in adopting the very phraseology of the law, the legislature could not have intended that an alien wife should not be deemed a Philippine citizen unless and until she proves that she might herself be lawfully naturalized. Far from it, the law states in plain terms that she shall be deemed a citizen of the Philippines if she is one "who might herself be lawfully naturalized." The proviso that she must be one "who might herself be lawfully naturalized" is not a condition precedent to the vesting or acquisition of citizenship; it is only a condition or a state of fact necessary to establish her citizenship as a factum probandum, i.e., as a fact established and proved in evidence. The word "might," as used in that phrase, precisely replies that at the time of her marriage to a Philippine citizen, the alien woman "had (the) power" to become such a citizen herself under the laws then in force. That she establishes such power long after her marriage does not alter the fact that at her marriage, she became a citizen. Frivaldo v. COMELEC G.R. No. 120295 June 28,1996 Panganiban, J. Can a person granted or denied citizenship subsequently lose or reacquire the same, respectively? How may citizenship be reacquired? Yes. Decisions declaring the acquisition or denial of citizenship cannot govern a person’s future status with finality. This is because a person may subsequently reacquire, or for that matter lose, his citizenship under any of the modes recognized by law for the purpose.Citizenship may be reacquired by direct act of Congress, by naturalization or by repatriation.

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What are the steps in reacquiring citizenship by repatriation? When is a person deemed to have reacquired Philippine citizenship? The steps to reacquire Philippine citizenship by repatriation under the decree are: (1) filing the application; (2) action by the committee; and (3) taking of the oath of allegiance if the application is approved. It is only UPON TAKING THE OATH OF ALLEGIANCE that the applicant is deemed ipso jure to have reacquired Philippine citizenship. If the decree had intended the oath taking to retroact to the date of the filing of the application, then it should not have explicitly provided otherwise. MARCOS v.COMELEC G.R. No. 119976 September 18, 1995 KAPUNAN, J. Whether or not petitioner was a resident, for election purposes, of the First District of Leyte for a period of one year at the time of the May 9, 1995 elections. Yes. Article 50 of the Civil Code decrees that "for the exercise of civil rights and the fulfillment of civil obligations, the domicile of natural persons is their place of habitual residence." In Ong vs. Republic this court took the concept of domicile to mean an individual's "permanent home", "a place to which, whenever absent for business or for pleasure, one intends to return, and depends on facts and circumstances in the sense that they disclose intent." Based on the foregoing, domicile includes the twin elements of "the fact of residing or physical presence in a fixed place" and animus manendi, or the intention of returning there permanently. Residence, in its ordinary conception, implies the factual relationship of an individual to a certain place. It is the physical presence of a person in a given area, community or country. The essential distinction between residence and domicile in law is that residence involves the intent to leave when the purpose for which the resident has taken up his abode ends. One may seek a place for purposes such as pleasure, business, or health. If a person's intent be to remain, it becomes his domicile; if his intent is to leave as soon as his purpose is established it is residence. It is thus, quite perfectly normal for an individual to have different residences in various places. However, a person can only have a single domicile, unless, for various reasons, he successfully abandons his domicile in favor of another domicile of choice. For political purposes the concepts of residence and domicile are dictated by the peculiar criteria of political laws. As these concepts have evolved in our election law, what has clearly and unequivocally emerged is the fact that residence for election purposes is used synonymously with domicile.

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