Chinese Shift In Policy Towards The Unpkos

Chinese policy towards the UNPKOs during the Cold War era A study of Chinese voting behavior

I.

Introduction

These two sets of data provide sound indicators for assessing China’s overall participation in the U.N. peacekeeping regime since both reflect a political decision made in Beijing. When the vote on a resolution is finally cast after behind-the-door negotiations, all members of the UNSC can not only express their views on the document presented before them by the show of hands but also in their public explanation issued before or after the vote is taken. The P-5—China, France, Great Britain, Russia, and the United States—can thus qualify their support or abstention with a dissociating or sympathetic comment rather than vetoing the adoption of the draft resolution.9 In combination with its explanation of vote, China’s voting behavior on UNPKO can therefore indicate its support for the U.N. peacekeeping regime as a whole Beijing is well aware of the different levels of support that can be conveyed in the U.N. Security Council: “In the course of consultations, though the countries concerned had accepted some of our principal views or had deleted certain contents at our request, we were still dissatisfied with the draft. Only after taking account of overall interests did we decide not to veto the draft resolution but to abstain from voting on it. Sometimes, even after the countries concerned had accepted all our views, we still found the draft resolution unacceptable to us as a whole. Given the fact that the countries concerned had agreed to our views, we decided to abstain from vote.” See Ambassador Shen Guofang quoted in Shi Jiangmin, “Ambassador Shen Guofang Speaks of ‘United Nations in New Century’ Held by www.people.com.cn on 6 January,” Beijing Renmin Ribao (Internet-Version) in Chinese, January 6, 2001, FBIS-CHI-2001-0108, January 6, 2001.

ere is also a clear correlation between the decreasing number of civil wars and the increase in UNmissions. e number of UN peacekeeping operations has increased bymore than 400% since the end of the ColdWar.

As this upsurge of international activismgrew in scope and intensity through the 1990s and 2000s, the number of armed conflicts has begun to decline James Dobbins et al., “The UN’s Role in Nation-Building: From the Congo to Iraq”, RAND Corporation, 2005; Andrew Mack, “Peace on Earth? Increasingly, Yes”, The Washington Post, 28 December 2005. See UNPKO fact sheet for statistics on personnel, contributions as of 2007

II.

The Korean War

Some History Between the Second World War and the end of the Cold War (from 1945 to about 1990), there were over 100 major conflicts that took the lives of more than 20 million people. Most were conflicts between sovereign States or former colonies. Many conflicts during this period were evidence of cold war tensions between the world’s major powers— particularly the former Soviet Union and the United States—and their allies. In many cases, the United Nations was powerless to deal with these crises because the Security Council (where China, France, the Soviet Union, the United Kingdom and the United States had 'veto power') could not agree on a course of action. On a number of crucial occasions, however, the countries of the world turned to the United Nations as a means for preventing conflicts from spreading and leading to direct confrontation between the world’s so-called 'superpowers'. For instance, during the 1973 Arab-Israeli war, tension between the two superpowers escalated to the level of nuclear alert. The UN Security Council demanded a cease-fire and UN peacekeepers were sent to separate the warring sides and calm down the situation. From the Congo to Lebanon, UN peacekeepers played this role repeatedly during the cold war. Although the cold war was a source of international tensions, it also tended to keep many potential conflicts 'on ice'. Once the cold war ended, new hostilities emerged, often between different ethnic, racial or religious groups. Such hostilities erupted in civil wars

and international conflicts like those in the former Yugoslavia, and in parts of the former Soviet Union, as well as in Africa. Decades of political oppression and neglect during the cold war years led to the collapse and disintegration of some States, like Somalia, from within. Tension in and between countries has also grown as the gap between rich and poor has grown; and as people have become frustrated with undemocratic institutions and violations of human rights. After the Cold War In the post-cold war period, countries have turned to the UN with new aims for peacekeeping. Rather than simply keeping fighting groups apart, UN peacekeepers have been called upon to help former enemies work peacefully together in order to: a. rebuild the institutions and infrastructures of nations torn by civil war, as well as international conflict; b. address the deepest causes of conflict: economic despair, social injustice and political oppression. Two examples—in Haiti and in the Eastern Slavonia region of Croatia—demonstrate how UN peacekeeping has attempted to translate these goals into action:

III.

1971 and the regaining of its lawful seat

IV.

Voting behavior and support

A change in situation and perception in the international system made the decision of Beijing to instead of opposing to the PKOS, gradually accept its relevance in the quest for maintaining power interests in foreign economies. The decision changed from opposing a UN manipulated by the US to one of supporting the UN in order to create the proper conditions for economic development. The initiative to oppose any armed approach to conflicts, an experience learnt not easily, was no longer practical for Chinese interests. The Cold War

V.

Becoming the enemy

VI.

Conclusions

China’s image, anti-hegemonist, and security concerns are obviously interrelated and merge increasingly into one single concept in the Chinese discourse as attested by the White Paper on “China’s Development Road.” Since Beijing realizes that its national security interests increasingly overlap with those of the international community, multilateral security cooperation becomes more attractive. China’s embrace of multilateralism will then not only enhance its image and reputation among developing countries but may also increase its legitimacy to condemn U.S. unilateralism

Congo (July 1960) was the first examples when the UNPKO decided to be impartial. That may be a consequence of the Korean War, US not directly involved. Rhodesia and South Africa were the only two cases were mandatory sanctions during the Cold War ( no such measures were taken during Korea) Page159 2nd paragraph, divisions in the security council The main reason behind the councils in ability to adopt enforcement measures during the cold war era, as mentioned by many scholars, was the confront between the great powers. [why? Korea?]

The Indo-Pakistani war of 1971 was the first conflict situation which China faced just after a couple of weeks of its gaining membership to the UN. China, which had looked to growing Indo-Soviet relations with apprehension, was further alarmed when the two countries signed in August 1972 the Treaty of Friendship and Cooperation. On its part, China had already moved closer to Pakistan, particularly since early 1960’s, partly following the principle that “an enemy of my enemy is a friend”. Further, India being a strong contender pf leadership among the Third World and a great power in Asia, China had additional reasons to form an axis against India. The evermore troubling Indo-Pakistani crisis, beginning in 1972 encouraged China to start condemning India, saying it was a lackey of the USSR. When the war broke out, Beijing extended full support to Pakistan’s claims. Greater parts of Beijing’s statements at the UN were directed against India and the Soviet Union, accusing of interference in internal affairs of Pakistan. In this way, it projected itself as the champion of the principles of national integrity of all small and medium sized countries. China’s representative at the Security Council, in collaboration with the US, countered Soviet support to India on the conflict-situation. When Bangladesh applied for membership to the UN, China exercised its veto power to block it, position which maintained for four consecutive years to increase Pakistan’s leverage in the negotiation with India and Bangladesh on POW case and outstanding issues (Choedon, 1990). Later Beijing decided to ease its stand and Bangladesh gained its membership and also moved towards normalization of relationships with both Bangladesh and India in order to win them over from the Soviet’s influence. Similarly Beijing’s policy towards the Arabi-Israeli conflict has been motivated not only by its interest in establishing relations with Arab countries but also to prevent domination of the region by a power hostile to it. The latter concern has been prompted by its perception that the region was not only a crucial link in any attempt to encircle China by an ambitious power but also a bridgehead for control of the intermediate zone and to establish hegemony in Asia. By the end of the 70’s, China’s obsession of Soviet influence in this region had prompted China to approve the US policy, initiated by Kissinger, which resulted in the Camp David agreement between Israel and Egypt. It is obviuos that China was

motivated, not by any progress made towards paving a path for settlement, but primarily because of the dent it made on the Soviet position in the Middle East. Policy towards UNPKO China abandoned its long standing “non-participating” diplomacy on the questions of UNPKOs. For the first time in 1982, it voted for the extension of the UN Interim Force in Lebanon –UNIFIL- and UN Disengagement Observer Force –UNDOF-. Since then, it has not only continued to vote for the extension but paid its apportionment towards the expenditure on the UNPKOs. Beijing has not given any explicit reason for the change in regard to what it used to call “principled stand”. The plausible explanation seems to be that China has come to appreciate the usefulness of PKOS as interim measures for maintaining international peace and security. The UN operations timeline points 3 major missions during the period of 1971-1987. UNEF II Oct 1973–July 1979 Second UN Emergency Force Egyptian and Syrian forces attack Israeli positions. As fighting between Egypt and Israel reaches critical stage, Security Council demands ceasefire, sets up Second Emergency Force. UNEF II stabilizes situation in Canal sector and Sinai, supervises disengagement of forces and forms buffer between them. UNDOF June 1974–Present UN Disengagement Observer Force

Uneasy truce on the Golan Heights after 1973 war is replaced by agreed disengagement of Israeli and Syrian forces. Security Council establishes UNDOF to supervise implementation of agreement and maintain ceasefire. UNIFIL March 1978–Present UN Interim Force in Lebanon Israel invades southern Lebanon in retaliation for Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO) raid launched from Lebanese territory. Security Council creates UNIFIL to confirm Israeli withdrawal from Lebanon, restore international peace and security and help Lebanese Government restore its effective authority in area.