Causes Of Wwi And Its Effect

Aleksandra Leśniewska The causes, course and effects of the First World War

Nobody really wanted war in 1914 First and foremost, it is important whether a word 'war' in this statement is related to world war or war with another country because, for instance, Austria wanted to wage a war against Serbia. First World War broke out in Europe in 1914, so this statement should be corrected 'Nobody really wanted world war in 1914'. The first country to consider is Great Britain. She usually did not take part in quarrels and wars on the continent, preferring defence of her colonial empire. But she, worried about aggressive policy of Germany and increase of German navy, signed agreements with France, Russia and Japan to secure own position despite conflict with Russia about Afghanistan and Persia and with France about colonies in Africa. The next point to make is about France. After being defeated by Germany in 1871, she wanted to be prepared militarily and diplomatically in case of next war with winner. She also wanted by the way to regain ill-treated by Germans Alsace-Lorraine and lost honour. It might also be mentioned that Russia was in conflict with Germany because of German trials to solve Balkan problem and later backing Austria in this quarrel. Russia was pursuing a Pan-Slav policy to extend her influences in the Black Sea region and the Eastern Question was a flashpoint for her. She signed agreements with France and Britain in spite of her quarrel with Great Britain about influences in Asia. What is more, according to Tsar Nicholas II of Russia, every proposal he put forward to find peaceful solution was rejected by Germany and Austria. It is also worth mentioning that Austria signed an alliance with Germany to have an ally in disputes with Russia over the Balkans. Later she considered Serbians as her main enemy because of their trials to create Great Serbia on territories of her influences. Worth mentioning is also a position of Germany. Her main enemy was France because they suspected that French would try to regain Alsace-Lorraine. On the other hand, Germans wanted to have better colonies to improve their economy. It could not be reached without a war because colonial cake was already divided. Germans considered Great Britain as a main obstacle to achieve this aim and started arms race. Above all, they were making relationship with Russia worse and worse because of their trials to solve the Eastern Question. Consequently, politicians of Great Powers created a chain of reaction in the way that no country could go over to somebody’s side in the block system. For example, if Russia attacks Austria, Germany, France and Great Britain will react at once, each in a way earlier arranged. No politician thought about consequences of creating block system because they were thinking only about achieving their aims. Most German politicians were generals who saw one solution for everything – war and the rest of politicians reacted in the same way. None of them wanted to cause world war because they all assumed it would last a few months. The July Crisis (1914) Sunday 28 June 1914 The month of June was coming to a glorious conclusion. All over Europe people were basking under a prolonged heatwave which showed no sign of coming to an end. Prospects for the summer were superb. Although the season had only just begun, seaside towns were already crowded with visitors, many eager to display the latest daring fashions in below-the-knee swimwear. In the leafy suburb of Wimbledon the groundsmen spent all of Sunday watering the courts in preparation for the lawn tennis championships which were due to resume the next day. Meanwhile, butlers and manservants across the continent put the finishing touches to their employers' traditional routine of hunting expeditions, holidays, spas and cures which characterised the summer months. In Germany, Kaiser William II had left behind weighty matters of state, donned his sailing outfit and spent the day under the blazing sun racing his yacht 'Meteor' at Kiel. Meanwhile, several hundred miles to the south, Archduke Franz Ferdinand – heir to the throne of Austria-Hungary and nephew to the Emperor Franz Josef – was spending his wedding anniversary with his wife, Countess Sophie, on a state visit to Sarajevo. It was the worst date to visit because this visit seemed provocative for the Serbians for whom it was a day of national mourning (anniversary of Serbian defeat by the Turks at Kosovo in 1386). Serbian authorities secretly warned Austrians but there was no answer and the security was not improved. The royal couple received a very warm welcome and the glorious weather enabled them to drive through the crowded streets in an open-topped car. However, Sarajevo was the capital of the former Turkish province of Bosnia-Herzegovina, a state inhabited by Slavs but occupied since 1908 by the Austro-Hungarian Empire. A south Slav terrorist organisation consisting of ultra-nationalist officers and student intellectuals (calling itself the 'Black Hand' gang) regarded the Austrian prince as the figurehead of an occupying empire which stood in the way of Slav independence. At the centre of this radical group, was Gavrillo Princip who had decided to lead an assassination attempt against the Austrian prince. They wanted to show that this land belonged to them. The bungling nature of these amateur assassins meant that two attempts on the Heir Apparent's life were necessary. After a hand grenade had missed its intended target but injured 20 onlookers, officials decided that the visit should be cut short and the route home changed. In retrospect, one of the most startling aspects of that fateful day in Sarajevo is that the authorities were unable to guarantee Franz Ferdinand's safety after the first assassination attempt had failed. Crucially, the driver of the first vehicle in the four-car entourage did not follow fresh instructions and made a right turn

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Aleksandra Leśniewska back along the original route. It was only when the second car, containing the royal couple had followed suit that officials shouted out instructions to stop and turn back. As the driver of Franz Ferdinand's car tried in vain to find reverse gear, Princip stepped out of the crowd and onto the running board. With his victim helpless and within a few feet, Princip almost lost his nerve. The sight of Countess Sophie made him hesitate but then nationalism overcame chivalry and at point-blank range he fired several shoots. A few minutes later the couple were dead. William II was still aboard his yacht when Admiral Muller, the Chief of the Naval Secretariat, pulled alongside in a launch and shouted that he had a telegram to pass across. William, never a man renowned for his patience, demanded that the news should simply be shouted across immediately. Observers were struck by the calm, almost a off-hand manner in which the Kaiser reacted. William requested advice on whether it would now be good form to call off the yachting race. Yet the time for graver decisions was almost at hand. Franz Ferdinand's blood splattered blue tunic and his car with its famous running board have now become museum exhibits. The spot from where Princip fired his shots in Sarajevo is a popular tourist attraction. However, the central questions about the political consequences of his murder remain controversial. Why did an isolated act of terrorism in an area of which few Europeans had even heard lead to a prolonged and widespread political crisis throughout July? Why did this culminate in the wholesale declarations of war which scarred the first days of August and led to the most horrendous conflict in European history? It is unlikely that any period in the history of mankind has been subject to more intensive historical research than that between 28 June and 4 August 1914. There is no shortage of primary evidence and with one or two important exceptions, diaries, diplomatic exchanges and private memoirs, varying in accuracy, abound. What does it all reveal? Who was making the key decisions in German foreign policy during the July Crisis? The role played in the crisis by the Chancellor, Theobald von Bethmann-Hollweg, has aroused intense debate. The traditional view saw the Chancellor as a peace-loving, liberal statesman who reminded some people of Abraham Lincoln. Supporters of this viewpoint praise Bethmann-Hollweg for his valiant efforts to keep the radical militarists at bay and prevent them from indoctrinating the Kaiser with their warlike talk. This viewpoint has been sustained by extracts (the accuracy of which are now very much under review) from the diary of Kurt Reizler, Bethmann-Hollweg's personal assistant and confidant. These extracts portray the Chancellor as a helpless victim of circumstances beyond his control, trying at all costs to avoid war but being dragged to the brink by inflexible military strategies, belligerent generals and a headstrong Emperor. Fritz Fischer's formidable study 'Griff Nach der Weltmacht' ('Grasping at World Power'), published in 1961, presents a radically different picture of Bethmann-Hollweg. Fischer places the Chancellor much closer to military extremists like General Ludendorff. He claims that Bethmann-Hollweg had far-reaching war aims which followed closely the ideas put forward by leading German industrialists and by the radical lobbying of the Pan German League. These ideas, Fischer argues, were there for all to see in an influential memorandum of 9 September 1914 in which Bethmann-Hollweg stated that the aim of the war must be: 'The security of the German Empire in the West and in the East for the foreseeable future. To this end, France must be so weakened that she cannot rise again as a Great Power, Russia must be pushed as far as possible from the German frontier, and her rule over non-Russian subject peoples must be broken'. Fisher is convinced that these ideas must have been formulated before the war had begun. Moreover, he provides damaging evidence of close personal links between the Chancellor and Walter Rathenau, director of the powerful German electrical combine: the A.E.G. Fisher shows that Rathenau was a regular guest at the Chancellor's magnificent country estate in Hohenfinow. Other like-minded industrialists and merchant bankers were also made welcome there. Perhaphs as they sat by the open fire and chatted into the small hours, their expansionist ideas came to exert a powerful influence over the Chancellor. You should now consider which view of Bethmann-Hollweg is most accurately reflected in his conduct during the build-up to war. There is no doubt that long before the July Crisis the Chancellor found himself full of doubts and apprehension. In 1913 he remarked to a friend that 'the more distant future is distant'. Overlooking the park of his estate near Berlin, the gloomy Chancellor told his son that there was no point in planting new trees for 'in a few years the Russians would be here anyway'. Bethmann-Hollweg confessed that the pressures of high office had taken their toll and made him weary. In particular, the Chancellor complained that 'the men who should lighten my burden professionally, His Majesty and the Conservatives, made things as difficult as they can'. Germany's international isolation cannot have relieved the Chancellor's growing sense of pessimism. As a gloomy military memorandum of May 1914 put it: 'At the moment Italy is still on the side of the Triple Alliance and Emperor Franz Joseph's personality still holds the hotch-potch Danubian monarchy together... But for how long? Will these things perhaps not change in favour (of the Entente Powers) quite soon?' This growing sense of urgency tinged with gloom and pessimism was heightened by the events in Sarajevo on 28 June 1914. When Kaiser William II received an official report on the assassination from the German ambassador in Vienna, his reaction was less restrained than it had been when he had first heard the news on his yacht. The vitriolic comments which the Kaiser scribbled in pencil in the margins of the memorandum have become history in themselves. 'Now or never' exclaimed the Kaiser, 'The Serbs will have to be straightened out and soon'. William II had set the tone for the regime's reaction and had personally added a dreadful monumentum to events. The crucial issue was whether action of whatever type against Serbia could be carried out without Russian intervention.

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Aleksandra Leśniewska The critical contribution of the military at this stage was to urge the Kaiser to meet the risk head-on and launch a preventive war against Russia. They argued that with Russia still a few years away from being at full military capacity, a much greater chance of victory was to be had in 1914 than a few years later. They undoubtedly succeeded in getting their views across but for the time being at least, it was the more sophisticated counsel of the Chancellor which prevailed. In his book 'Germany and the Approach of War in 1914', Volker Berghahn estimates that within Germany no more than 12 people were consulted over the main decisions. Moreover, the crucial steps in the July Crisis were made by individuals within the Court, the German Foreign Office and the General Staff. The leading industrialists, despite their power and influence, do not appear to have been consulted at this stage. Meanwhile, the Austrian monarchy had not reacted to the assassination with as much zeal as its German counterpart. In marked contrast to their official anguish and despair, the private actions of the Austrian royal family suggested that Franz Ferdinand would not be sorely missed. The fallen prince was buried with such an astonishing lack of pomp and ceremony that it was referred to as a 'third-class funeral'. Rather than seeking out immediate revenge, Emperor Franz Joseph made it clear that he would prefer to hear the results of an inquiry into the assassination before approving any action against the Serbs. Only Conrad, the chief of the General Staff, proposed immediate action. Meanwhile Berchtold, the Austro-Hungarian foreign minister, was concerned that Germany 'would leave us in the lurch' and this prompted Franz Joseph to write a personal letter to William II asking for clarification of the German position at the highest level. Count Berchtold's personal envoy was sent to deliver the letter in person and after lunch with the Kaiser in the Royal Palace, emphatic clarification was forthcoming: 'I gave the autograph letter and the enclosed memoir into the hands of His Majesty. In my presence the Kaiser read both with the greatest attention. The first thing he assured me was, that he had expected some serious step on our part towards Serbia, but at the same time he must confess that the detailed statement of His Majesty made him regard a serious European complication possible and that he could give no definite answer before having taken council with the Imperial Chancellor. After lunch, when I again called attention to the seriousness of the situation, the Kaiser authorised me to inform our gracious Majesty that we might in this case, as in all others, rely upon Germany's full support. He must, as he said before, first hear what the Imperial Chancellor has to stay, but he did not doubt in the least that Herr von Bethmann Hollweg would agree with him. Especially as far as our action against Serbia was concerned.' This offer of support to Austria from the Kaiser was so wholehearted that it has become known as the 'blank cheque' (based on assumption that Russians would not react so the Kaiser did not see possibility of global war). It represented a key step in unlocking the complex mechanisms of treaty obligations which would ultimately unleash a world war. The Kaiser, without obtaining prior approval from the Chancellor but assuming it would be given later, had personally issued full, unconditional support to the Austrians and had underlined this 'blank cheque' with the advice that the Dual Monarchy should not hesitate to take action against the Serbs. The Kaiser's bellicose mood was not dimished by the holiday atmosphere. Indeed as William prepared to set sail for Norway on the evening of 6 July he told the industrialist, Krupp, 'This time, I shall not chicken out'. Krupp regarded this more as a pathetic show of bravado than genuine aggression but nevertheless, the Kaiser's nervous energy was having a profound effect on those around him. Bethmann-Hollweg quickly realised that the sort of 'action' against Serbia which the Kaiser envisaged could easily trigger the whole process of alliance commitments and lead to a major war. It is to Bethmann-Hollweg's credit that he was quickly able to come up with an alternative plan which had sufficient credibility to persuade the Kaiser to take his holiday as planned and leave things to the Chancellor. The military men were pressuring him but Bethmann-Hollweg had at least obtained some breathing space. William II explained the plan to officials with some enthusiasm: 'the Austrian Government will demand the most farreaching satisfaction from Serbia and will, as soon as this is not given, move its troops into Serbia'. Russian intervention was regarded as highly unlikely 'because Russia is at the present moment, militarily and financially unprepared for war'. What could go wrong? Ingenuity had been provided by the Chancellor. Two further ingredients, secrecy and speed, were necessary to ensure complete success. There was a greater degree of ostentation than usual therefore when the Kaiser set off on his annual cruise while the military men also went their separate ways on vacation. They could hardly have gone to greater lengths to assure the watching world that nothing was amiss. Now it was up to the Austrians to draw up a definitive ultimatum to Serbia. Finally, it took until 19 July for the AustroHungarian ministerial council to approve a suitably-worded ultimatum. Surely now it could be passed on and the initiative regained? It was not to be. Chance intervened when the Austrians realised that between 20 and 23 July, Raymond Poincare, the French President, would be on a state visit to St Petersburg. If the ultimatum were presented to Serbia during this period then there was every possibility that the response would come not just from the Serbs alone but as a coordinated move from Serbia, her protector Russia and Russia's ally France. The ultimatum would have to be shelved until Poincare left Russia. Yet even before Poincare arrived in St Petersburg the Russians had cracked the cipher used by the Austro-Hungarian Foreign Ministry and had a clear idea that the Austrians were planning some sort of decisive action against Serbia so there was no speed and secrecy needed to make Austro-German plans work.

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Aleksandra Leśniewska Nevertheless, when the ultimatum was finally delivered to Serbia on 23 July, its harsh terms and 48-hour time limit for a reply sent shock waves through the foreign offices of Europe. The British foreign secretary, Sir Edward Grey, described the ultimatum as 'the most formidable document I had ever seen addressed by one State to another that was independent'. The hard-pressed Serbs skilfully produced a reply which while conciliatory in tone did not meet all of the demands. The Serbian reply was delivered to the Austrian representative moments before the 6 pm deadline on 25 July. Its contents were scarcely considered. Following prior instructions the Austrian official immediately announced his dissatisfaction and returned to Vienna on the 6.30 pm train. Austria announced that it had broken off relations with Serbia but the real intentions behind the smokescreen of the ultimatum had been laid bare. Meanwhile, in Germany, Bethmann-Hollweg remained at the helm, lamenting the lethargy of the Austrian response and realising the risks inherent in his plan. He began to sink into his familiar melancholy. According to Reizler, BethmannHollweg said on 7 July: 'An action against Serbia can lead to world war'. A week later he admitted that he was taking 'a leap into the dark' but this constituted his 'gravest duty'. By now Bethmann-Hollweg seemed to think that there was no way out: 'Secret intelligence gives a shattering picture ... the military might of Russia is growing fast'. By 25 July it was becoming painfully apparent that Russia and Britain were not prepared to stand by and observe the defeat of Serbia. Universal diplomatic condemnation of the ultimatum and the way it had been handled by the Austrians ensured that Bethmann-Hollweg's elaborate plan had failed. Over his shoulder the harassed Chancellor could sense Moltke and the other leading military figures gathering against him. By 26 July they had all returned to Berlin. Their time had come. The struggle between the General Staff and the civilian politicians lasted for three days. One account tells us that Moltke 'uses all his influence that the singularly favourable situation be exploited for military action'. The prospect of a swift military victory resolving Germany's complex foreign and domestic problems was an intoxicating one, and the optimism of the General Staff ensured that the military now gained the ascendancy over the civilians. The Chancellor exclaimed that he now saw the 'force of fate, stronger than the power of humans, hanging over Europe and our people'. On the same day Bethmann-Hollweg informed the Kaiser of his new priorities: 'in all events Russia must be ruthlessly be put in the wrong'. The events of the last few days of July and the first few days of August now took on an alarming European dimension. On 28 July Austria-Hungary declared war on Serbia and shelled Belgrade, although general mobilisation against Russia had not yet occurred so there is no place for compromise. When the French took the precaution of recalling soldiers from Morocco the Germans warned that further steps would force Germany to proclaim the 'state of imminent danger of war' which directly preceded mobilisation. In Russia, two alternative decrees – one for partial mobilisation and one for general mobilisation – had already been signed by the Tsar. Germany's firm warning to Russia now followed, but backfired since the Russian foreign minister, the war minister and the chief of staff unanimously agreed to respond with general mobilisation. The Tsar only hesitated because of the intervention of William II. Evidence that the Kaiser was now beginning to have second thoughts is provided by his personal telegram to his cousin the Tsar which ended: 'I am exerting my utmost influence to induce the Austrians to deal straightly to arrive to a satisfactory understanding with you. I confindently hope you will help me in my efforts to smooth over difficulties that may still arise. Your very sincere and devoted friend and cousin Willy'. Events were now moving with such pace and complexity that it becomes difficult and perhaps unfair at this stage to attach personal responsibility for war guilt to any one individual. It may be that for their conduct in the last days of July and the first days of August, Europe's decision-makers should be burdened with a collective responsibility because they had allowed the control of events to slip from their grasp and assume an inexorable monumentum. When analysing the leaders involved in the July Crisis, the Italian historian Luigi Albertini was alarmed by 'the disproportion between their intellectual and moral endowments and the gravity of the problems which faced them, between their acts and the results thereof'. More specifically many individuals who tried to deal with Berlin at this stage in the crisis were struck by the sense of chaos and helplessness. The experience of the Austrians in the last days of peace illustrates the point and suggests that at the eleventh hour the Kaiser and the Chancellor were having serious misgivings. On 27 July Grey – the British foreign secretary – sent an urgent message to Bethmann-Hollweg asking Germany to persuade the Austrian government to accept Serbia's reply to the ultimatum. In return, Grey was urging the Russians to act with restraint. The telegram was passed to the Kaiser who replied that the Serbian response had indeed removed grounds for war but nevertheless recommended that Austria should occupy Belgrade and stay there to provide some guarantee that the Serbs would fulfil their promises. However, while the civilian Berchtold was weighing up the Kaiser's 'halt in Belgrade' proposal, General Conrad was being reminded by Moltke (the chief of the German general staff) that any further delay in Austrian action against the Serbs would have disastrous consequences. It is no wonder that such conflicting advice had Berchtold in despair, to the extent that he is said to have exclaimed: 'Who actually rules in Berlin, Bethmann or Moltke?' Austria's subsequent announcement that it was too late to delay operations against Serbia suggests that the advice of the German military was now carrying more weight. On 30 July Austria-Hungary ordered general mobilisation for the next day. Russia immediately followed suit. At noon on 31 July news of Russian general mobilisation became known in Berlin. The news moved the civilian and military factions in Germany together. Bethmann-Hollweg was satisfied that the press would be able to bring together the German people in a wave of anti-Russian patriotism. The generals knew that their

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Aleksandra Leśniewska demands for full German mobilisation could no longer be resisted. Allegations in the German press that Russian patrols trespassed on to German soil on 2 August ensured that left-wing opposition to the war was brushed aside amid alarmist talk of the imminent invasion by the 'Russian barbarians'. On 1 August Germany declared war on Russia and mobilised her troops. The harsh logic of the alliance system meant that on 3 August Germany also declared war on France. Germany's military strategy, based on a plan drawn up in 1892 by General Schlieffen, made it unlikely that Britain would remain neutral. In the expectation that it would be several weeks before the Russian mobilisation would take full effect, Germany's soldiers would outflank the French army by marching through southern Belgium. This was in direct violation of the Treaty of London, Britain's guarantee to Belgium made in 1839. Britain declared war on Germany on 4 August. Austria-Hungary declared war on Russia on 6 August. The chain was complete. The mood of 1914 Russia ● prestige of the Tsar was very low because of lost war with Japan, but it increased at the outbreak of the next war – an attempt to regain honour and prestige ● peasants = sad soldiers and their families crying – they are afraid that they would not see him again (experience of war with Japan) ● the reservists were very happy Germany ● most people happy: nationalists, conservatives and even socialists are for war – no opposition to war ● panicky run on savings banks and grocery shops: some people were downcast, as if they were to be beheaded on the following day Austria ● enthusiasm: vast crowds parading the streets and singing patriotic songs ● socialists in despair Britain ● enthusiasm ---> volunteers to the army ● gratitude for war ---> no lost war for a century ● strained solemnity on every face War is supported by majority 1) self-confidence (about power), e.g. Germany 2) belief that the war would be quick 3) no experience of large conflict: 1815 Napoleonic wars – a century earlier, next wars were very quick without Russo-Japanese war 4) nationalism (national feelings: pride) 5) revenge, e.g. France 6) directed by the State, e.g. Russia 7) la belle epoque (1815 – 1914) – a peaceful period of inventions and new technologies – – – –

people lived in relative luxury Europe – the centre of the world machine gun – 100-200 bullets for minute inventions will be used in the war

The summary – the main causes of the Great War 1.

2.

3. 4. 5.

Germany's desire for world power a) pursuit of colonies b) expansion of trade c) naval development d) German claims about encirclement German support for Austria-Hungary a) encouragement against Serbia b) the alliance c) the blank cheque The alliance system a) the Triple Alliance b) the Entente Cordiale The widespread ignorance of war The arms race a) Germany vs Great Britain b) Germany vs France c) others

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Aleksandra Leśniewska 6. 7.

The nationalism The imperial conflicts of the Great Powers leading to frustration, e.g. a) Morocco b) Alsace-Lorraine 8. The Balkan Powder Keg 9. The military plans (“must” and “have to”) 10. Sarajevo The July Crisis = the domino effect

The course of the Great War The general overview of the conflict 28.06.1914 --11.11.1918 the end of fighting 28.06.1919 the Versailles Settlement Entente Cordiale The Triple Alliance Russia + France + Great Britain vs Germany + Austria-Hungary 1915 Italy Turkey (because of Serbia) 1917 USA Bulgaria (because of Serbia) 1917 Bolsheviks took part and withdrew from a war => 03.1918 peace treaty with Germans at Brest Litovsk The Trench Warfare (only in Western Front) modern equipment => stop the enemy => deadlock This phenomenon did not exist in the Eastern Front because of the distance – the front was very long, bigger than the Western Front. At the beginning there were neighbourhood batallions: people from one village, but 10 per cent from them returned home and the morale of the civilians became very low, so they resigned from this concept. Front-line dugouts provided protection but not against a direct hit from an artillery shell. Deep dugouts – German ones could be 15 metres below ground and well enough constructed to withstand shell fire. Communication trenches allowed supplies and reserves to be brought forward without exposing them to enemy fire. Long-range artillery is placed about 5 km behind the front line. These guns fired at advancing enemy troops. Aircrafts warned of troops and artillery build up. Soldiers could not attack through artillery bombardment. Occasionally the soldiers were ordered to leave their trenches, where they were reasonably safe, to attack the enemy trenches across 'no-man's-land' (stretch of land between the trenches of the opposing sides), already churned up by shell fire, which in wet weather becomes a mass of mud what made it even harder for troops to cross. The chances of an attack like this succeeding, in full view of the enemy, were slight. A machine gun could fire 8-10 bullets a second and the attackers had no protection against the hail of steel fired at them. The worst part was waiting for the order 'go over the top' of your own trench and advance through the paths cut in your own barbed wire (metres deep and an impassable obstacle for any troops able to reach it – especially that both yours' and enemy's artillery was bombarding) and trenches. However, once the officer blew his whistle for the attack, soldiers often commented that their fear left them as their training took over. There was a quite high rate of death among lowest ranks of officers because they had to show that they were brave and not show others their own fear. After any battle, there always had been men lying out in no-man's-land, crying in agony and lying out there all night long in the dark, in the rain. Another soldiers couldn't get them in and in any case their friends would never have survived. But soldiers had a choice. Their friends could die in agony or they could shoot them. The soldiers were shown how to do the thing very cleanly. A man put his .45 revolver muzzle against the back of a wounded soldier and pulled the trigger and immediately the whole of the front skull came away and exposed the brain, just blown off. A lead bullet hit the inside of the skull, and they were dead instantly. There was no pain about it, but some soldiers never had the courage to shoot a wounded soldier. Daily Death in the Trenches Death was a constant companion to those serving in the line, even when no raid or attack was launched or defended against. In busy sectors the constant shellfire directed by the enemy brought random death, whether the victims were lounging in a trench or lying in a dugout (many men were buried as a consequence of such large shell-bursts). Similarly, novices were cautioned against their natural inclination to peer over the parapet of the trench into No Man's Land. Many men died on their first day in the trenches as a consequence of a precisely aimed sniper's bullet. It has been estimated that up to one third of Allied casualties on the Western Front were actually sustained in the trenches. Aside from enemy injuries, disease wrought a heavy toll. Rat infestation Rats in their millions infested trenches. There were two main types, the brown and the black rat. Both were despised but the brown rat was especially feared. Gorging themselves on human remains (grotesquely disfiguring them by eating their eyes and liver) they could grow to the size of a cat. Men, exasperated and afraid of these rats (which would even scamper across their faces in the dark), would attempt to rid the trenches of them by various methods: gunfire, with the

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Aleksandra Leśniewska bayonet, and even by clubbing them to death. It was futile however: a single rat couple could produce up to 900 offspring in a year, spreading infection and contaminating food. The rat problem remained for the duration of the war (although many veteran soldiers swore that rats sensed impending heavy enemy shellfire and consequently disappeared from view). Frogs, Lice and Worse Rats were by no means the only source of infection and nuisance. Lice were a never-ending problem, breeding in the seams of filthy clothing and causing men to itch unceasingly. Even when clothing was periodically washed and deloused, lice eggs invariably remained hidden in the seams; within a few hours of the clothes being re-worn the body heat generated would cause the eggs to hatch. Lice caused Trench Fever, a particularly painful disease that began suddenly with severe pain followed by high fever. Recovery – away from the trenches – took up to twelve weeks. Lice were not actually indentified as the culprit of Trench Fever until 1918. Frogs by the score were found in shell holes covered in water; they were also found in the base of trenches. Slugs and horned beetles crowded the sides of the trench. Many men chose to shave their heads entirely to avoid another prevalent scourge: nits. Trench Foot was another medical condition peculiar to trench life. It was a fungal infection of the feet caused by cold, wet and unsanitary trench conditions. It could turn gangrenous and result in amputation. Trench Foot was more of a problem at the start of trench warfare; as conditions improved in 1915 it rapidly faded, although a trickle of cases continued throughout the war. The Trench Cycle Typically, a battalion would be expected to serve a spell in the front line. This would be followed by a stint spent in support, and then in reserve lines. A period of rest would follow – generally short in duration – before the whole cycle of trench duty would start afresh. In reality the cycle was determined by the necessities of the situation. Even while at rest men might find themselves tasked with duties that placed them in the line of fire. Others would spend far longer in the front line than usual, usually in the more 'busy' sectors. As an example – and the numbers varied widely – a man might expect in a year to spend some 70 days in the front line, with another 30 in nearby support trenches. A further 120 might be spent in reserve. Only 70 days might be spent at rest. The amount of leave varied, with perhaps two weeks being granted during the year. Stand to and the Morning Hate The daily routine of life in the trenches began with the morning 'stand to'. An hour before dawn everyone was roused from slumber by the company orderly officer and sergeant and ordered to climb up on the fire step to guard against a dawn raid by the enemy, bayonets fixed. This policy of stand to was adopted by both sides, and despite the knowledge that each side prepared itself for raids or attacks timed at dawn, many were actually carried out at this time. Accompanying stand to, as the light grew, was the daily ritual often termed the 'morning hate'. Both sides would often relieve the tension of the early hours with machine gun fire, shelling and small arms fire, directed into the mist to their front: this made doubly sure of safety at dawn. Rum, rifles and the breakfast With stand to over, in some areas rum might then been issued to the men. They would then attend to the cleaning of their rifle equipment, which was followed by its inspection by officers. Breakfast would next be served. In essentially every area of the line at some time or other each side would adopt an unofficial truce while breakfast was served and eaten. This truce often extended to the wagons which delivered such sustenance. Truces such as these seldom lasted long; invariably a senior officer would hear of its existence and quickly stamp it out. Nevertheless it persisted throughout the war, and was more prevalent in quieter sectors of the line. Inspection and Chores With breakfast over the men would be inspected by either the company or platoon commander. Once this had been completed NCOs would assign daily chores to each man (except those who had been excused duty for a variety of reasons). Example – and necessary – daily chores included the refilling of sandbags, the repair of the duckboards on the floor of the trench and the draining of trenches. Particularly following heavy rainfall, trenches could quickly accumulate muddy water, making life ever more miserable for its occupants as the walls of the trench rapidly became misshapen and were prone to collapse. Pumping equipment was available for the draining of the trenches; men would also be assigned to the repair of the trench itself. Still others would be assigned to the prepation of latrines. Daily Boredom Given that each side's front line was constantly under watch by snipers and look-outs during daylight, movement was logically restricted until night fell. Thus, once man had concluded their assigned tasks they were free to attend more personal matters, such as the reading and writing of letters home. Meals were also prepared. Sleep was snatched wherever possible – although it was seldom that men were allowed sufficient time to grab more than a few minutes rest before they were detailed to another task. Dusk: Stand to, Supply and Maintenance With the onset of dusk the morning ritual of stand was repeated, again to guard against a surprise attack launched as light fell. This over, the trenches became a hive of activity. Supply and maintenance activities could be undertaken, although danger invariably accompanied these as the enemy would be alert for such movement. Men would be sent to the rear lines to fetch rations and water. Other men would be assigned sentry duty on the fire step. Generally men would

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Aleksandra Leśniewska be expected to provide sentry duty for up to two hours. Any longer and there was a real risk of men falling asleep on duty – for which the penalty was death by firing squad. Patrolling No Man's Land Patrols would often be sent out into No Man's Land. Some men would be tasked with repairing or adding barbed wire to the front line. Others however would go out to assigned listening posts, hoping to pick up valuable information from the enemy lines. Sometimes enemy patrols wold meet in No Man's Land. They were then faced with the option of hurrying on their separate ways or else engaging in hand to hand fighting. They could not afford to use their handguns while patrolling in No Man's Land, for fear of the machine gun fire it would inevitable attract, deadly to all members of the patrol. Relieving Men at the Front Men were relieved front-line duty at night-time too. Relieving units would wind their weary way through numerous lines of communications trenches, weighed down with equipment and trench stores (such as shovels, picks, corrugated iron, duckboards, etc.). The process of relieving a line could take several frustrating hours. ... And the Smell Finally, no overview of trench life can avoid the aspcet that instantly struck visitors to the lines: the appalling reek given off by numerous conflicting sources. Rotting carcases lay around in their thousands. For example, approximately 200,000 men were killed on the Somme battlefields, many of which lay in shallow graves. Overflowing latrines would similarly give off a most offensive stench. Men who had not been afforded the luxury of a bath in weeks or months would offer the pervading odour of dried sweat. The feet were generally accepted to give off the worst odour. Trenches would also smell of creosol or chloride of lime, used to stave off the constant threat of disease and infection. Add to this the smell of cordite, the lingering odour of poison gas, rotting sandbags, stagnant mud, cigarette smoke and cooking food... yet men grew used to it, while it thoroughly overcame first-time visitors to the front. Arms The aim of introducing tanks in 1916 was to protect infantry, but these tanks gave no protection as they were very slow. Soon there were minefields and other barriers. Dreadful invention: poison gases and all chemical arms – first time they were used at the battle of Ypres. Gas masks were very difficult to put on and very unreliable and treacherous, as the gases keep on ground and during bombarding people fell down – as the result many soldiers became blind or their lungs became polluted by gases what caused death from the lack of air as the gases were eating lungs. Gases were also treacherous as the wind cold blow in your side, not the enemy. Cannon: howitzer – bigger calibre, range and other trajectory than the normal field cannon. The Sea Warfare As trade routes should be secured, the fleet was sent to block German posts. The lack of self-sufficient economy caused the blockade of Germany. The only battle which was fought by battleships (main force of fleet in those times) on the sea was the Battle of Jutland (31 May 1916) where there were huge loses on both sides: Germans did not break the blockade. However, the Germans achieved great successes in the military action of small submarines (U-boats) which in this time spent the majority of time on the water. The Germans announced the 'unrestricted submarine warfare' what meant that each ship sailing to the Great Britain would be sink. The Americans lost many their ships in that way and they joined the war from this reason. The American fleet was able to control the Atlantic Ocean. Meanwhile the Alllies changed tactics: ships were travelling in the convoy. The Austro-Hungarian fleet did not count: it was not able to have control over Adriatic Sea and Black Sea because the Russian and Italian fleets were stronger. War in the air Beginnings (1903 – a flight of Wright brothers). The role of planes: 1) reconnaissance 2) directing fire of artillery 3) ancillary role to the infantry These planes had small velocity and ceiling. They were made from wood and linen. Anti-aircraft artillery dealt very easy with shooting these planes. Types of planes: 1) bi-planes 2) fighters 3) bombers The Total War First 'Total War' – Napoleon's times First World War – more developed – the war of masses and base, industrialisation => new phenomenon: 1) a military muscle 2) economy muscle 3) mobilisation of society the home front – should be united

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Aleksandra Leśniewska Britain Cheerful, flag-waving crowds filled the streets of London in August 1914. By 1916 and 1917, though, the people were not so happy. They had learned that the whole nation was involved in modern war. And they found that the government controlled their lives much more than before. In August 1914 the parliament issued 'Defence of realm act' (DORA), allowing the government to: 1) introduce censorship 2) stop spreading rumours 3) nationalise 4) control alcohol production and selling For the first year of the war, Britain had a Liberal government, and Herbert Asquith was Prime Minister ('business as usual' policy). But in 1915, Asquith asked Labour and the Conservatives to share the work of government, and join the Liberals in a coalition. Later there was created Ministry of Munitions because of demand for war supplies (reserves were not enough) – at the head of the Ministry David Lloyd George. Then in late 1916, when the war was going badly, a lot of M.P.s turned against Asquith. They forced him to resign, and got David Lloyd George to take over as head of the coalition government. And Lloyd George's energy and drive played a big part in winning the war. There was extension of government control over economic life. Agreement with trade unions: giving up the right to strike, accepting arbitration, accepting unskilled workers. Some key factories were taken under control of state: the National Factories (which were promised to be returned to the owners after the happy ending of the war). As soon as the war began, the government called for volunteers for the army. (The peace-time army of 250,000 men was far too small.) So posters went up, urging men to enlist 'for King and Country'. Women were told to press their sons and husbands to join up. Most of them did so, (there were objectors but...) and some handed out white feathers to men who were not in uniform. The campaign was a great success – two million men volunteered by the end of 1914. This propaganda (on both sides) showed that the enemy behaved like animals, not humans as it is easier to shoot an animal, not a person and hate people who behave in this way. The flood of volunteers slowed down in 1915. And by 1916 the losses were so heavy that the army was short of men. So the government started conscription – men between 18 and 41 were compelled to enlist – first all single men, then all married. Only workers in vital industries (e.g. arms-making and coalmining) were exempt. Women took over a lot of jobs when the men went to war. They worked on farms, drove buses and trams, cleaned windows, and 'manned' the fire brigade. Others made guns, shells and tanks in the factories, worked as clerks in government offices, or joined the new women's services. Hundreds of thousands of women served as nurses, some on the front line in France. The war was a monster which consumed men. It took women's husbands and children's fathers, often for good. It made country children into wage-earners – they left school at eleven or twelve to work on the land. In town schools, boys' classes were taken by women. Some boys and girls had part-time schooling, sharing their schools and teachers with other children. The German U-boats caused a food shortage in Britain (she needed foreign – colonial - food), but not a famine. The bread turned strange colour, because it was made from a mixture of wheat and potatoes, and butter vanished from sight. But rationing did not begin until 1918. Helpful experts advised people to chew their food slowly to make it last longer! The government tried to increase food production by using all available land. As the result the production of wheat raised by 60 per cent and the production of potatoes increased by 40 per cent, what was impossible in other conditions. Meanwhile the blockade was starting to be more ineffective. The government restrictions: 1) hours of opening the restaurants 2) hotels had one week without meat 3) use of sugar in sweets was banned 4) ration books But there was also, as always, the black market. The government introduced summer time, what increased amount of working hours in a daylight. If it was a people's war, what did the people get out of it? Lloyd George said that his government's aim was to make Britain 'a land fit for heroes'. And the first thing that the 'heroes' got was the right to vote for their leaders. In 1918, Parliament passed an act which gave the vote to all men over 21, and to men under 21 who had fought in the war. But women had also played a big part in the war. And Parliament recognized that fact when it gave some women (those over 30) the vote as well. So while the campaign for 'Votes for Women' before the war had failed, women's war work had own the M.P.s (who were all men) over to the women's cause. Germany and the USA also gave women the vote at the end of the First World War. But women in France had to wait until 1945. What about the children of the 'heroes' and 'heroines'? Before the war, some boys and girls left school at twelve or thirteen. And during the war, many children got even less schooling. But an act passed in 1918 paved the way to a better system of education. It said that all children would stay at school at least to the age of fourteen. It also promised part-time education after fourteen, but that was one of the promises that were not kept. The 'heroes' needed homes and work. It was soon clear that there were not enough jobs, and that the government could not find work for everyone. It did try, though, to help the unemployed, when it said that all workers without jobs were entitled to 'the dole'. It also tried to deal with the shortage of houses. It helped local councils to get rid of slums and build new, solid homes – the first 'council houses'. But money was short, so not enough

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Aleksandra Leśniewska houses were built, and the 'dole' was always a very small amount. At first people were grateful – the leaders got the credit for winning the war. Then unemployment and poverty changed the people's mood. More working men joined trade unions than ever before, and more working days were lost in strikes. And in 1924, for a few months, the Labour Party for the first time formed the government of Britain. German Before the war, the Kaiser, not the people, chose the government in Germany. But as soon as the war began, the army took command. For the last two years of the war, General Ludendorff was almost a dictator. At first, they led the politics of 'Bunkfrieden' – unification and peace in the fortress, but later SPD was contesting the system and wanting more freedom. In 1916, there was created the Supreme-War Office under the leadership of Hindenburg – he controlled the home front and the civil politicians had nothing to do with handling the war. In 1918 General Ludendorff and Hindenburg wrote a letter (which was kept secret) to Kaiser which stated that they were not able to conduct the war any longer and proposed to create a civil government which would start peace negatiations. Germany had conscription even in peace-time. All young men had to do a period of service in the army, followed by a spell in the army reserve. When war broke out, those under 40 had to report for duty. And a law passed in 1916 said that men up to 60 could be called on to serve, either in the army or in the arms factories. The law applied just to men, but women and children were urged to take jobs to help the war effort. German propaganda was so successful that there was no knowledge among the civilians – people were convinced that the victory was close especially that Russia signed a peace treaty with their contry. Germany led the war on two fronts (because of geographical position), but she did not have self-sufficient economy (autarchy, autarky). Because of the British blockade, German factories were short of raw materials. But the army's conquests put the coal and iron of Belgium and north-east France into German hands. And German investors found ways of making cloth from wood-pulp and aluminium from clay. They even discovered how to make nitrates (fore fertilizers and explosives) from the air. What investors could not overcome was the shortage of food. Bread was rationed from 1915, and most other foods soon followed. There was no real hardship, though, until the winter of 1916-1917. Then an early frost killed the potatoes, and the people had to live on turnips. By 1918, food supplies for the poor were really short. (The rich could buy meat, coffee and sugar at three times the normal price on the 'black market'.). The consumption of food between 1914 and 1918 (taking numbers from 1914 as 100 per cent): -flour 48% -butter (fats) 28% -eggs 13% -meat 12% -potatoes 98% This led to revolutionary feelings and dissatisfaction amongst people what caused an increase of support for SPD. There was no prestige of the Kaiser. There were a lot strikes what led to abandoning the production of the food. Above all, there was no morale in reserve troops which did not want to fight at all. The home front was collapsing. The First World War as the first war 1) many countries 2) fought in many parts of the world 3) new war technology 4) the first total war -drawing all the material and human resources of its participants -larger, than ever before, backup -the idea of home front The Western Front 1914-1918 1914 1) the failure of the von Schlieffen plan 2) the support of British Expeditionary Force 3) the strong resistance of the French and the Belgian troops 4) the Entente troops counter-attack at the River Marne (September 1914) 5) the German offensive failed autumn 1914 the deadlock 1915 the attempts of both sides to break the deadlock to change course of the war 1916 change the tactics ---> decisive battle February – December 1916 Verdun: 600 000 soldiers killed on both sides but French defended Verdun July 1916 the Allies also changed tactics the River Somme battle: British offensive with largest artillery bombardment before the attack: 7 days and 7 nights, but

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Aleksandra Leśniewska -the artillery men were not experienced -German trenches were deeper • heavy rain • German position was higher and consisted of 4 lines military failure the River Somme battle + Verdun – 1mln soldiers killed but no change in front line 1917 Russia in chaos a) Tsar Nicholas II abdicated b) Provisional Government c) Bolsheviks – peace German hopes for a victory increased April 1917 USA, large country with huge resources, joined the conflict • industry • troops • moral support Germans knew that they had no time - “win this war quickly!” - before American troops appear in Europe despite: gases, trenches, machine guns and artillery – no general breakthrough till 1918 The entry of USA into First World War 1776-1783 – appearance of USA 1787 first constitution in the world the Civil War – USA – a federation (industrial power) / a confederation (based on farms) USA became a federation and industrial power. 1) the Monroe Doctrine (policy of isolationism) – their sphere of influences are both Americas and they do not interfere in the Old Continent, so the countries of the Old Continent should not interfere in their country. 2) The Pacific – the open-door policy in China 3) 'mission' – conviction that they are the first country in the world which created itself and it is based on universal values which should be spread throughout the world 4) anti-colonial attitudes – they contradict with 'mission' 5) economy links with Europe, especially Great Britain, because it was earlier British colony At the outbreak of war, USA announced neutrality (in the American society were German immigrants) but it was difficult to maintain it because of the German unrestricted submarine warfare. Some American ships sank and American public opinion thought that they were not safe sailing on their own ships and there was no market to sell their products as there were blockades. British passenger liner – the Lusitania 30th April 1915 the Lusitania was loaded at New York NOTICE! Travellers intending to embark on the Atlantic voyage are reminded that a state of war exists between Germany and her allies and Great Britain and her allies; that the zone of war includes the waters adjacent to the British Isles; that, in accordance with formal notice given by the Imperial German Government, vessels flying the flag of Great Britain, or any of her allies, are liable to destruction in those waters and that travellers sailing in the war zone on ships of Great Britain or her allies do so at their own risk. IMPERIAL GERMAN EMBASSY WASHINGTON, D.C., APRIL 22, 1915. This notice was thought by most passengers as an idle threat. 1st May 1915 the Lusitania embarked with 1257 passengers and a crew of 702 (captain William Turner). 19 of the 25 boilers were utilised. 5th May 1915 Kapitänleutnant Walter Schwieger on his U-boat-20 destroyed a small schooner, the 'Earl of Lathom'. 6th May 1915 He fired two torpedoes at the 'Candidate', a 5858-ton steamer from Liverpool. About two hours later, he destroyed another ship, the 'Centurion'. The British never warned the Lusitania of these sinkings which were taking place near where the Lusitania was about to travel through. 7th May 1915 the Lusitania entered the Irish Channel in the fog at smaller speed than indicated in the orders. He posted extra lookouts and swung the lifeboats out. The old war cruiser the 'Juno' escaped the U-20 due to zigzagging. The Lusitania did not do this because the captain felt that it wasted time and fuel. Lookouts noticed submarine and torpedo and raised alarm. Two explosions and the ship tilted. The power, rudder, engines failed. The watertight doors and the wireless room could not be used as they needed electricity. As a result of the tilt of the ship, the lifeboats on the left side could not be launched. The starboard-side boats were swung out so far as a result of the list that many passengers had to jump from the deck to the lifeboats, risking falling into the water many storeys below. Many crew members panicked and a few lifeboats were launched that contained only crew members. Other lifeboats capsized, and one or two were damaged when the torpedo hit the ship. The Lusitania sank below the waves.

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Aleksandra Leśniewska 19 January 1917 Zimmermann Telegram In 1916 Woodrow Wilson was elected President for a second term, largely because of the slogan: 'He kept us out of war.' Events in early 1917 would change that hope. In frustration over the effective naval blockade, in February Germany broke its pledge to limit submarine warfare. In response to the breaking of the 'Sussex' pledge, the United States severed diplomatic relations with Germany. In January 1917, British cryptographers deciphered a telegram from German Foreign Minister Arthur Zimmermann to the German Minister to Mexico, von Eckhardt, offering United States territory to Mexico in return for joining the German cause. He also suggested that the President of Mexico should communicate with Japan suggesting adherence at once to this plan and offer to mediate between Germany and Japan. Zimmermann himself dispelled initial suspicions regarding the telegram's authenticity by giving a speech in which he confirmed its existence. This message helped draw the United States into the war and thus changed the course of history. The telegram had such impact on American opinion that, according to David Kahn, author of 'The Codebreakers', 'No other cryptanalysis has had such enormous consequences.'. It is his opinion that 'never before or since has so much turned upon the solution of a secret message.'. In an effort to protect their intelligence from detection and to capitalize on growing anti-German sentiment in the United States, the British waited until 24 February to present the telegram to Woodrow Wilson. The American press published news of the telegram on 1 March. On 6 April 1917, the United States Congress formally declared war on Germany and its allies. As USA was not prepared for the war (economy – of peace period - was not touched by war and it was not homefront) and did not start mobilisation yet, the time bomb for the Germans started to tick – they had approximately a year of time to win this war before American soldiers and supplies will arrive in Europe as the Americans needed time to recruit, train and send over their armies through Atlantic. But: • Within a few months they were sending over 50,000 men a month. • They had few munitions factories, tanks or aeroplanes, but their navy was quickly in use in the Atlantic. • American money loans (and supplies) were particularly useful. • Perhaps most importantly, they gave the allies a boost in morale and a hope of victory in 1918. The Eastern Front In 1917 German chances for victory were growing – because of Russia. Provisional Government was for war, while the Petrograd Soviet was against. From that reason Russian participation in war was more ineffective. The slogan of Bolsheviks' was: 'peace, bread and land' which was their programme. Russian troops were weaker and weaker so the Triple Entente was growing weaker because of complete failure of the summer offensive. The Provisional Government tried to sign a peace treaty with Germany but German conditions were too harsh for them (Germans after transfering Lenin wanted to benefit from that). The Bolsheviks seized power in October 1917 – they wanted peace to secure their power. Lenin hoped that the general feeling of war weariness among the demoralised troops at the front would lead to desertion on a vast scale among Germans as well as Russian troops. Russia's western allies were not even prepared to recognise the Bolshevik Government let alone join in negotiations for a general European peace as the morale would fall, there would be no encirclement of Central Powers – what was realisation of the Bismarck's dream. The separate peace which Russia would therefore have to conduct with Germany and Austria-Hungary would be negotiated with the old military and political establishment, not the representatives of the soldiers in the trenches. So it was that Leon Trotsky, the revolutionary People's Commissar for War came face to face with the aristocratic German officer corps. The setting was the small provincial town of Brest-Litovsk close to the Russian border with Germany. At stake was all the territory gained by Russia in the previous 300 years. Negotiations lasted from December 1917 to the March 1918. Trotsky was initially optimistic that he would be able to resist Germany's territorial demands, but for Germany revolution in Russia was the crown of their military and political campaign against Russia since the autumn of 1914. The German government knew that the new rulers in Petersburg had come to power under the slogan of peace and needed an immediate end to hostilities, but they could not accept peace at any price, for fear of strengthening the rightwing Social Revolutionaries and the Mensheviks. So the German government decided exploit this dilemma ruthlessly, in order not only to secure the comprehensive solution in the east for which it had so long been working, but also by concluding a separate peace with Russia, to decide the issue in the west and thus achieve the whole of their war aims. Trotsky had proved himself to be a brilliant revolutionary, a supremely gifted writer and orator. At Brest-Litovsk his inexperience in diplomacy and foreign affairs was to be put to the test. He invented formula 'Neither Peace Nor War'. Approaching the negotiations at Brest-Litovsk a) Russia had: advantages -size -xenophobic and patriotic society (will fight for mother Russia and land) -the Bolsheviks: belief in ideology (that there would be a worldwide revolution) disadvantages -desertions -weak homefront (weak: morale, economy, industry) -inexperience in diplomacy

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Aleksandra Leśniewska -all socialists did not want peace (the Soviet was ruling) -civil war -living Tsar -weak position of Bolsheviks -national minorities b) Germany had: advantages -soldiers were on the Russian ground -weak resistance of the Russians -strong morale -confidence: we are better than these Asian barbarians with whom we are fighting -experience in diplomacy disadvantages -time: Tempus fugit! -Marxism is from Germany -Russian weather The anatomy of a peace conference 1) Russia's aims at Brest-Litovsk November 1917 Trotsky: honourable peace – we are not servants of imperialism January 1918 Trotsky: 'Neither Peace Nor War' – expectation of the near moment when the oppressed working classes of all nations will take power in their own hands February 1918 – Stalin's view of Trotsky's formula: no policy at all; 'peace' would cause sacred revolutionary war in whole world – it has not come to pass Lenin: 'If the Germans should demand the overturn of the Bolshevik Government, then, of course, we should have to fight. All other demands can and should be granted. We have heard the statement made that the Germans are going to take Livonia and Estonia. We can very well sacrifice these for the sake of the Revolution. If they demand the removal of our troops from Finland, well and good. Let them take revolutionary Finland. Even if we give up Finland, Livonia and Estonia we shall retain the Revolution. I recommend that we sign the peace terms offered to us by the Germans.' Lenin was a leader with charisma - he was able to convince all to his opinion while later Stalin ordered. 2) Russia's view of German war aims Peace delegation, headed by Joffe and Trotsky as reported in the Petrograd press: 'The principles of a general democratic peace without annexations are accepted by the nations of the Central Powers... Germany and its allies have no plans whatsoever of territorial aggrandizement.' - a complete misunderstanding of German aims, in opposite to Lenin. The Germans could not get a logical word (no progress) from the Russians so they attacked and stopped some kilometres from Petrograd. Terrified Russians signed treaty in Brest-Litovsk on 3rd March 1918. Germans gained: -Georgia -Ukraine -former Poland -Latvia -Estonia -Finland -independence of Lithuania. The Russians lost main industrial resources, railway system and main food supplies (well-developed European part). The Struggle for Peace 1918-20 Collapse in the West: the peace of 1918-19 and the aims of the peacemakers Indeed, the allegedly brutal manner in which the Russians were treated by Germany was often brought up to defend the Versailles peace against German accusations of unfairness. The Germans were convinced that there will be next victories after this victory. Germans relocated their troops to the Western Front and started Germany's Spring Offensive. They were stopped 50 km from Paris due to American troops. Germans were pushed back. General Ludendorff and Hindenburg wrote a letter (which was kept secret) to Kaiser which stated that they were not able to conduct the war any longer and proposed to create a civil government which would start peace negatiations. September 1918 was a catastrophe for the Germans. The First World War finally came to an end on 11 November 1918 when the Germans surrendered to the Allies. The armistice was signed aat 5 am in a railway carriage in a forest clearing at Compiégne. The peace took effect at 11 am when the guns finally felt silent on the Western Front. However, Britain and France had channelled all their energies into winning the war and had given little prior thought to planning the peace. The sudden collapse of the German war effort took everyone by surprise, and so it was agreed that the details of the peace settlement would be drawn up at a conference to be held in the New Year. Germany would be obliged to send representatives to receive and agree to the terms, but they would not be invited to take part in the meetings or

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Aleksandra Leśniewska discussions. Nevertheless, Germans lost war but the paradox was that the lands of Germany were not touched by the Entente soldiers. Germans fully expected that 14 points from Woodrow Wilson's address made in January 1917 (which stated the vision of world after the war) would be the base to the peace negotiations after the truce – a policy of wilsonianism. They thought that each will resign from something and gain something. Apart from 14 points, the peace settlement should be based on the principle of 'Peace without victory' announced by US President Wilson; a principle which had been at the centre of the preliminary talks leading to German surrender. A Summary of Woodrow Wilson's Fourteen Points 1. Open covenants of peace, openly arrived at, after which there shall be no private international understandings of any kind. 2. Absolute freedom of navigation upon the seas... alike in peace and in war. 3. The removal, so far as possible, of all economic barriers. 4. Adequate guarantees given and taken that national armaments will be reduced to the lowest point consistent with domestic safety. 5. A free, open-minded and impartial adjustment of all colonial claims, based upon a strict observance of the principle that the interests of the population concerned must have equal weight with the equitable claims of the government whose title is to be determined. 6. The evacuation of all Russian territory and... a settlement of all questions affecting Russia. 7. Belgium... must be evacuated and restored. 8. All French territory should be freed and the invaded portions restored, and the wrong done to France by Prussia in 1871 in the matter of Alsace-Lorraine... should be righted. 9. A readjustment of the frontiers of Italy should be effected along clearly recognizable lines of nationality. 10. The peoples of Austria-Hungary... should be accorded the freest opportunity of autonomous development. 11. Romania, Serbia and Montenegro should be evacuated; occupied territories restored; Serbia accorded free and secure access to the sea; ... and international guarantees of the political and economic independence and territorial integrity of the several Balkan States should be entered into. 12. The Turkish portions of the present Ottoman empire should be assured a secure sovereignty, but the other nationalities which are now under Turkish rule should be assured... an absolutely unmolested opportunity of autonomous development, and the Dardanelles should be permanently opened as a free passage to the ships and commerce of all nations under international guarantees. 13. An independent Polish State should be erected which should include the territories inhabited by indisputably Polish populations, which should be assured a free and secure access to the sea. 14. A general association of nations must be formed under specific covenants for the purposes of affording mutual guarantees of political independence and territorial integrity to great ans small states alike. From Ruth Henig, 'Versailles and After (1919-1933)' (1984) • democracy • openess • no secret treaties • overall conferences • free trade • checking rights of colonial powers • disarmament • ethnic rule should be applied to the borders (rights of nations) • the problem of the Black Sea Straits should be regulated • League of Nations – platform for discussions and solving problems, first organisation with convenant and strict rules It was the best option for the Germans because the French would want more harsh conditions and the British would want compensation. The Great War had cost the lives of more than 8 million men while over 21 million others were wounded. Russia lost 1.75 million men and the Germans almost 2 million. 250,000 French buildings were destroyed and 8,000 square miles of agricultural land were laid waste. It was estimated that the war had cost Britain almost 9 billion pounds. The horrendous casualty figures and the enormous physical damage had two major political consequences. First and perhaps not surprisingly they combined to create among the victors an overwhelming desire for revenge against Germany. Secondly, it would soon became apparent that the so-called victors were physically and economically exhausted. The European powers were completely drained and in retrospect it was plain to see that the power-base had shifted towards the emerging powers of the USA and Japan. Those who desired revenge were particularly keen to see Kaiser William II brought to justice, and the slogan 'Hang the Kaiser' seemed to dominate the popular press in the build-up to the conference. However, two days (9 November) before the armistice was signed, the Kaiser abdicated and slipped across the border to the Netherlands where he was to live out his political exile in the comfort of an imposing castle. Meanwhile, General Ludendorff, second only to

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Aleksandra Leśniewska Hindenburg in the German military establishment, had donned false whiskers and spectacles and made his escape to a safe haven in Sweden. Ludendorff could not accept that Germany had lost the war and placed the blame on the socialists in the Reichstag. Before his hasty departure he commented: 'I have asked His Majesty to bring those circles into the government to whom we mainly owe it that we are in this position. We will therefore now see these gentlemen assume ministerial posts. They are now to make the peace which must now be made. They shall now eat the soup they have brewed for us.' Many of the factors that were to dominate the peace settlement were already falling into place. The trauma of defeat had led the old political German's embryonic democracy to face the stigma of accepting defeat and punishment. The desire for revenge felt by the people of France and Britain was only heightened by the Kaiser's exile. Pressure for severe antiGerman measures from the press represented a relatively new but highly significant ingredient. In these circumstances it was clear that the Americans – who had occupied the high moral ground as the only disinterested party – would play a key role in the making of the peace. Russia's dramatic withdrawal from the war in the east served to heighten the importance of the US entry in April 1917. Having played such an important part in swinging the balance of the war towards the Allies, America now sought to play an equally important role in the peacemaking process. On 4 December 1918 the US cruiser 'George Washington' set sail from New York harbour for the port of Brest in France. On board was Woodrow Wilson, 62 years old, leader of the Democratic Party and, since 1912, President of the United States of America. In the following extract J.A. Thompson highlights the importance of his mission: 'Woodrow Wilson was the first American President to leave the Western Hemisphere during his period of office, and, as befitted him, the circumstances in which he did so were neither casual nor frivolous. He went to Europe in late 1918 to take part in the peace conference following a war that the United States had played a crucial part in bringing to a decisive end. His aim was to secure a peace that accorded with the proposals he had set out in his Fourteen Points address of January 1918 and in other speeches – a peace that would be based upon justice and thus secure consent, that would embody liberal principles (the self-determination of peoples as far as practicable, the prohibition of discriminatory trade barriers) and that would be maintained by a new international organisation in which the United States, breaking its tradition of isolation, would take part – a league of nations that would provide a general guarantee of “'political independence and territorial integrity to great and small states alike.”' As the 'George Washington' sailed out of Hoboken harbour in New York it was passed by a shipload of American troops returning home from the battlefields of the Great War. It was rather ironic that the President who wanted to step up American intervention in Europe was heading in one direction while the dead and the wounded were being brought back home in the other. The psychological impact on the American public of seeing the wounded and the dead brought back home was immense. Even though the USA had not joined in the war until April 1917, almost three years after the fighting in Europe had started, 115,000 American troops were killed before the war was brought to a close by the German surrender of November 1918. It seems fair to say that at this stage, Wilson's preoccupation with Europe may have led him to underestimate the increasing desire for isolationism in America. However, the high casualty figures were enough to convince most Americans that the USA should never again become involved in a European conflict. To make matters worse, Wilson had caused a political storm when he made clear that his diplomatic team in Paris would not include any members of the Senate and would contain only one member of the Republican Party. Wilson had ignored the convention of consultation with the Senate and had made powerful enemies who were eager for revenge when he returned to Washington in July 1919 – elections. The 'George Washington' arrived in Brest on 13 December 1918. The French President, Raymond Poincaré sent his own train to bring Wilson from the port to Paris and he arrived in the capital to a hero's welcome. The French people made their gratitude to America clear but it was also apparent that they expected the American President to support them in their desire for revenge. Indeed the choice of Paris as a venue for the peace conference seemed solely designed to heighten anti-German sympathies. Wilson's stead-fast refusal to commit himself to the French point of view highlighted the fact that there was a substantial difference between the French, with their desire for revenge, and the Americans who stood for a more abstract 'Peace without victory'. The polarity of these positions meant that the stance adopted by Britain would be absolutely vital. The importance of public opinion in influencing the politicians was heightened by the fact that a general election was being fought out in December 1918. It was difficult for any politician to resist climbing onto the popular bandwagon of 'Hang the Kaiser' and 'Make Germany Pay' (and 'squeezing the German lemon until the pips squeak') which was being whipped up by the popular press in the build-up to the election at home and the peace conference in Paris. That's why the policy of David Lloyd-George was not consistent (despite he knew Germany could not pay anything like the indemnity which the British and French demanded). But, however, the statement which sums up the best Lloyd-George's aims at the Versailles Conference is 'Make Germany Pay'. Meanwhile, French, at the beginning, were talking about their losses as if the whole country was destroyed, not North-Eastern part of France. David Lloyd-George (1863-1945) British Liberal Statesman.

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Aleksandra Leśniewska 1890-1945 Member of Parliament 1915-16 Minister of Munitions 1916 Secretary for War 1916-22 Prime Minister. Dynamic and efficient wartime leader 1919 Attended Paris Peace Conference Georges Clemenceau (1841-1929) French radical statesman. 1871 Entered National Assembly 1876 Elected Deputy 1876-93 Leader of the extreme Left 1893 Lost seat in chamber – returned after supporting Dreyfus 1902-20 Senator 1906 Minister of the Interior 1906-09 Prime Minister 1917-20 Appointed Prime Minister again and Minister of War 1919 Presided at Paris Peace Conference 1920 Lost presidential election The Versailles settlement: a bitter peace The preliminary peace conference was opened at the French Foreign Ministry in the Quai d'Orsay on 18 January 1919 and concluded when the peace terms were presented to the German delegation on 7 May. Although 32 states were officially represented, the whole conference only came together six times. There had been five major countries: the USA, Great Britain, France, Italy and Japan but the last withdrew after gaining colonies. Politics were making policies, not countries. Ultimately the talks were dominated by the 'big four': President Wilson of the USA (very idealistic person), Prime Minister Lloyd-George of Great Britain (old British diplomacy school – balance of power), Premier Clemenceau of France (very hostile towards Germany and a pragmatist) and Prime Minister Vittorio Orlando of Italy. Much of the historical verdict on the manner in which the negotiations were carried out has been critical. The historian Sally Marks describes how the big four 'proceeded in slipshod fashion without agenda, minutes, or any record of decisions until the secretary of the British delegation, the supremely efficient Colonel Sir Maurice Hankey, insinuated himself into their midst and rescued them from disaster. Even then, the agenda darted from topic to topic, and the big four were startlingly erratic in either accepting, ignoring or rejecting expert reports.' The range of problems facing the main protagonists (domestic situation in different countries influenced political situation) 1) fall of Romanov dynasty, October 1917 – the Soviet Russia appeared, 1919 civil war 2) fall of Hohenzollern dynasty – chaos in Germany; government of prince Max von Baden / Social Democrats (revolution) 3) fall of Habsburg dynasty – chaos in Austria-Hungary 4) Turkey vanished 5) shield against the Soviet Russia – Germany / Poland; only Lloyd-Geroge was ware of the Soviet threat but the public opinion was against Germany was immense but the range of agreement was narrow. Relations between Wilson, Lloyd-George and Clemenceau began coolly and got worse. Clemenceau, nicknamed 'the Tiger' and with a fearsome appearance that matched his reputation, soon made it clear that he was not impressed by Wilson's idealism: 'God gave us the Ten Commandments and were broke them, Wilson gave us the Fourteen Points. We shall see.' On another occasion Clemenceau asked: 'How can I talk to a fellow who thinks himself the first man for two thousand years who has known anything about peace on earth?' Wilson soon began to feel the strain of dealing with Clemenceau and fell ill on 3 April. Clemenceau was scarcely able to conceal his delight, telling Lloyd-George, 'He is worse today', before doubling up with laughter. Clemenceau particularly despised the idea of self-determination of nations as it would lead to the conflict between colonial powers. Clemenceau showed that his ill-feeling was not confined to Wilson when, after a heated debate, he threatened to assault Lloyd-George. An assassination attempt on Clemenceau that left the 78-year-old premier with a grazed lung added to the morbid atmosphere that seems to have characterized the conference. Lloyd-George rescued the conference from collapse in March 1919 by publishing the Fontainableau Memorandum. He was a mediator. Great Britain supported the League of Nations. France agreed for final terms concerning Saar, Rhineland, Danzig and questions of reparations. It is when this personal animosity is set against the background of the range of technical problems which were faced that the shortcomings of the conference can be most easily understood. The historian A. Lentin in his book 'Guilt at Versailles' highlights the practical problems encountered by Wilson in seeking to implement the worthy ideal of national self-determination. 'He was ignorant, when he promised Italy the South Tyrol, that its population was Austrian. When he approved the boundaries of Czechoslovakia, he had no idea that they contained three million Germans. When he assented to the incorporation of Transylvania within Roumania, he was unaware of sanctioning an act of annexation.'

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Aleksandra Leśniewska Ultimately the complexities of the problem were pushed aside in order to produce a finished treaty. After four months of argument the treaty was hurriedly brought together at the end of April. When it was rushed to the printers at the beginning of May nobody had read the document – with its 440 clauses and more than 200 pages – in full or obtained a clear idea of its overall stance. The treaty was presented to the Germans, essentially in the form of an ultimatum, at a tense ceremony on 7 May 1919. It was made clear to Germany that refusal to sign the treaty would mean that they would once again be at war. It was hard for the Germans to see any common ground between the 14 points and the severity of the new treaty. In a terse speech the head of the German delegation, Brockdorff-Rantzau, set the tone of bitterness and resentment which was to characterize the German response. 'We are under no illussions as to the extent of our defeat and the degree of our powerlessness.' Germany's outspoken resentment at the manner in which the terms had been dictated to them only served to harden the position on both sides, and the only amendments made to the treaty were minor ones. On 28 June 1919 the conference finally came to an end when the Germans signed the treaty in the Hall of Mirrors in the glittering Palace of Versailles. The very room that had been the scene of German's unification and triumphant victory over France in 1871 now symbolised national humiliation. The fate of Germany had been decided and when the terms were made public they dismayed the German nation. Versailles: the verdict The main terms of the Versailles Peace Treaty Among the 440 Articles of the Treaty were: Article 42: Germany is not to maintain or construct any fortifications either on the left bank of the Rhine or on the right bank to the west of a line drawn 50 kilometres to the east. - improve French security. An Allied army of occupation would be stationed there until 1935. Article 45: As compensation for the destruction of the coal mines in the north of France, and as part payment towards the total reparations due, Germany gives to France the coal mines of the Saar (national mixture). At the end of 15 years, its inhabitants shall be asked under which government they wish to be placed. - reward the victors. Saar voted to saty German in 1935. Article 80: Germany acknowledges and will respect strictly the independence of Austria... she agrees that this independence will be inalienable. - punish Germany. Anschluss - German union with Austria – the old Austrian Empire contained more than 50 million people. Now reduced to 6.5 million. Article 102: The Principal Allied and Associated Powers undertake to establish the town of Danzig... as a Free City. It will be placed under the protection of the League of Nations. - punish Germany Article 119: Germany renounces in favour of the Principal Allied and Associated Powers all her rights and titles over her overseas possessions. - reward the victors. Germany lost all her colonies worldwide as they became the Mandates of League of Nations. Article 160: By a date not later than 31 March 1920, the German army must not consist of more than seven divisions of infantry and three of cavalry (ie, not more than 100,000 men). No tanks and planes. - improve French security and punish Germany. German armed forces reduced to: Army 100 000 Navy 15 000 Germans scuttled their own fleet at Scape Flow rather than surrender their ships to the Allies. The war guilt cause: Article 231 (hidden the most important): The Allied governments affirm, and Germany accepts, the responsibility of Germany and her allies for causing all the loss and damage to which the Allied governments and their peoples have been subjected as a result of the war. - punish Germany Article 232: The Allied governments recognise that the resources of Germany are not adequate to make complete reparation for all such loss and damage... But they require, and Germany undertakes, that she will make compensation for all the damage done to the civilian population of the Allied powers and to their property during the war. - reward the victors, blank cheque Article 428: As a guarantee that the treaty shall be carried out, the German territory to the west of the Rhine will be occupied by... Allied troops for 15 years. -Minor frontier adjustments in favour of Belgium – to improve French security -Pomerania and Wielkopolska – 1.5 million Germans came under Polish rule -Silesia: Plebiscite held in 1921. 700 000 voted to stay German. 480 000 voted to join Poland. The area was divided. Poland gaining the main industrial regions (though less land – over one third). -East Prussia was separated from the rest of Germany by the Polish Corridor The contemporary response John Maynard Keynes (1883-1946) British economist. Worked at Treasury during First World War. Chief representative at negatiations prior to Treaty of Versailles. Criticised reparations plans in 'The Economic Consequences of the Peace', 1919. Resigned from the British delegation at Paris with the words that he was walking away from the scene of a nightmare. a) revenge – it would not end wars

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Aleksandra Leśniewska -frontiers -nationalities -balance of power -imperial aggrandizements -enfeeblement of a strong and dangerous enemy -shifting financial burdens onto the defeated, not regarding abilities of the countries b) nobody cares about means of livelihood and help from the USA c) peace pushes Germans to next wars d) very punitive treaty e) people are disgusted The verdict of historians a) revenge – emotional, not rational b) national humiliation c) It was a wise precept of Machiavelli (author of 'The Prince') that the victor should either conciliate his enemy or destroy him. The Treaty of Versailles did neither. It was by no means fatal. d) it could be much morse if Clemenceau had had his way: Rhineland – an independent state, Saarland – French annexation, Danzig – an integral part of Poland e) punishment was much more psychological than psychical: -Germans did not feel the moral stigma of sole war-guilt -treaty was not negotiated but dictated to Germany -treaty was signed in humiliating circumstances f) the Versailles settlement would last only as long as the victorious powers were in a position to enforce it on a bitterly resentful people. There is nothing worse in international relations than a humiliated nation. Situation in Germany • Kaiser flight • government of Prince Max von Baden • Communist Revolution • Social-Democrat government – consisted only of socialists • Weimar constitution – Republic of Weimar • How to deal with a) humiliation b) economy burdens c) keeping country intact (internal conflicts) League of Nations -around 60 countries -Council: major states and 6 temporary members. From the major states joined Great Britain, France and Japan. The USA did not join, the Soviet Russia was not invited and Germany was not allowed (a punishment). -right of intervention -1926 Germany joined -1934 Soviet union joined -later Germany and Italy left while Russia was expelled -the organisation survived Second World War (Geneva, Switzerland – the oldest neutral country in Europe: not engaged in alliances) Woodrow Wilson: America fails to join the League Four months of bitter negotiations with Clemenceau had taken their toll on Wilson and on 29 June, with the ink scarcely dry on the Treaty of Versailles, he set sail for home. A band played the Star Spangled Banner as the 'George Washington' pulled out of Brest harbour, but Wilson was weary and in no mood for celebration. To many observers he had been unable to restrain the French president in his overwhelming desire for revenge. Wilson's personal correspondence from this time seems to reveal a man who was close to the end of his tether. He complained to his personal physician of sleeplessness, headaches and indigestion. The feeling of euphoria which had accompanied his arrival in France must have seemed a distant memory to him as he contemplated the struggle which he knew awaited him back in the USA. When Wilson finally arrived at the Union Station in Washington DC on 8 July he was welcomed by a crowd of 100,000 well-wishers. He knew that when he presented the treaty and the Covenant to the Senate for signature the reception would be less warm. America could only join the League of Nations if the Senate gave its approval but Wilson's failure to consult the Senate before he went to Paris had not been forgotten or forgiven. Within the Senate a group known as the Irreconcilables had been formed under the leadership of Senator Borah. These politicians would not consider American membership under

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Aleksandra Leśniewska any circumstances. A second, more moderate group of senators led by Henry Cabot Lodge wanted Wilson to remove Article 10 of the Covenant of the League of Nations before they would sign. 'The members of the League undertake to respect and preserve as against external aggression the territorial integrity and existing political independence of all Members of the League. In case of any such aggression or in case of any threat or danger of such aggression the Council shall advise upon the means by which this obligation shall be fulfilled.' On 10 July Wilson was ready to present the Treaty of Versailles to the Senate. As he walked into the Senate Chamber with the treaty under his arm, Senator Lodge, who was walking by his side, inquired, 'Mr President, can I carry the treaty for you?' Wilson is reputed to have smiled and said 'Not on your life', making everyone around him laugh. Yet the time for humour was almost over. Wilson refused to compromise over the content of the Covenant, as he regarded Article 10 as the cornerstone of the League, and at the end of August he decided to tour America in a bid to gain public support in place of the political support which he was being denied. The schedule which the ageing President now faced was awesome. In 22 days it was proposed to cover 8,000 miles and deliver 37 hour-long speeches. Jolting train journeys, searing temperatures, and the fact that even in large arenas Wilson's voice received no amplification, combined to make the whole venture seem ill-advised. He collapsed after the Pueblo speech (he was crying) on 25 September and, unable to persuade his doctor and his secretary not to cancel the trip, returned to Washington. Compromise of some kind was essential to save the treaty, but from his sickbed Wilson refused it implacably; his will hurled the Democrats into unsuccessful battle against the Republicans and when the Lodge amendments were passed, he forced his supporters to vote against entire document. Borah and his irreconcilables voted against too. It were the first steps back down the isolationist path (American public opinion, already knowing about casualties: isolate ourselves – we do not want to intervene anymore in Europe). In 1919 the United States was strong enough to have made the world safe for democracy. It possessed one of the richest portions of the globe, the world's largest economy, had created the largest army, and was building the largest navy. Treaty in the USA 1) signing by the president 2) ratification (approval) by the Senate The peace settlement in Eastern Europe The leading statesman had hurried away from Paris as soon as the Peace of Versailles was signed, leaving completion of remaining treaties to their diplomats and officials. A huge amount of work remained and was carried out piecemeal until its completion in August 1920. The future of Austria, Hungary, Bulgaria and Turkey constituted the bulk of the work which remained. Rather than writing out four entirely new treaties it was decided that much of the material and ideas from the Versailles Treaty could be re-applied. Each of the subsequent treaties incorporated the League Covenant. Disarmament clauses, reparations, customs restrictions and economic clauses very similar to those at Versailles were employed on a smaller scale. Finally, written into all four treaties was an acknowledgement of the transformation of Serbia into the new kingdom of the Serbs, Croats and Slovenes which was eventually to become known as Yugoslavia. Treaty of St. Germain – September 1919 (Austria) – ethnic rule; have been dealt with most severely Austria was severed from Hungary and reduced to a tiny rump state, land-locked and with nearly one third of its population concentrated in Vienna and the rest scattered in fairly unproductive, German-speaking Alpine lands. Much of Austria's wealthiest territory went to create the Czech portions of Czechoslovakia. The rest was redistributed as follows: Galicia went to Poland; Istrian Peninsula, Trentino, South Tyrol to Italy; Bukovina to Romania; BosniaHerzegovina, Dalmation Coast to Yugoslavia. Austria's grand capital remained but the economy to support it had been destroyed. Treaty of Neuilly: November 1919 (Bulgaria) Its territorial losses were relatively lenient (it did not lose important lands and small reparations): Western Thrace went to Greece; Southern Dobrujan went to Romania; Border areas – several of these went to Yugoslavia; access to the Aegean Sea and the Mediterranean lost. Reparations debts expressly limited to 90 million pounds, payable in instalments over 37 years. Treaty of Trianon: June 1920 (Hungary) – ethnic rule Reduced to a rump state. Territorial losses even more severe than Austria: Slovakia and Ruthenia went to Czechoslovakia; Croatia – Slavonia and part of the Banat – to Romania. Hungary also surrendered its last remaining outlet to the sea, Fiume, although this became the subject of a dispute within Italy and the other powers. Treaty of Sèvres: August 1920 (Turkey) – ratification; have been dealt with most severely The important straits from the Black Sea to the Mediterranean were opened in peace and war to the merchant and war ships of all nations. Control of the straits was placed in the hands of an international commission. The Treaty confirmed many aspects of the pre-war situation. Therefore Turkey: renounced all rights in the Sudan and Libya; recognised French protectorates in Morocco and Tunisia; recognised the British protectorate in Egypt; accepted that the Hedjaz (henceforth Saudi Arabia) was to become an independent kingdom; accepted Palestine, Syria and Mesopotamia were to become mandated territories under major power control. (Mandate was now a new term which applied to former Turkish and Greek colonies which were now transferred to the victors under the nominal authority of the League of Nations.) Later, there was a revolution led by army with Attatürk at the head. They overthrew sultanat and introduced

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Aleksandra Leśniewska republic. Problems in the future -relations between the countries -self-determination not followed consistently

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