Cases For Criminal Law.docx

ENRIQUE “TOTOY” RIVERA Y DE GUZMAN VS. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES G.R. No. 138553. June 30, 2005 Facts: On May 6, 1993, in the Regional Trial Court at La Trinidad, Benguet an information for direct assault was filed against petitioner, allegedly committed, as follows: That on or about the 20th day of March, 1993, at Tomay, Shilan, Municipality of La Trinidad, Province of Benguet, Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused, did then and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously attack, employ force and seriously resist one Lt. EDWARD M. LEYGO, knowing him to be a policeman, by then and there challenging the latter to a fistfight and thereafter grappling and hitting the said policeman on his face, thus injuring him in the process while the latter was actually engaged in the performance of his official duties. The trial court convicted petitioner of the crime of direct assault. The Court of Appeals affirmed the decision of the trial court. Issue: Whether or not the Court of Appeals erred in affirming the judgment of conviction rendered by the trial court. Held: Direct assault, a crime against public order, may be committed in two ways: first, by any person or persons who, without a public uprising, shall employ force or intimidation for the attainment of any of the purposes enumerated in defining the crimes of rebellion and sedition; and second, by any person or persons who, without a public uprising, shall attack, employ force, or seriously intimidate or resist any person in authority or any of his agents, while engaged in the performance of official duties, or on occasion of such performance. Unquestionably, petitioner’s case falls under the second mode, which is the more common form of assault and is aggravated when: (a) the assault is committed with a weapon; or (b) when the offender is a public officer or employee; or (c) when the offender lays hand upon a person in authority. In any event, this Court has said time and again that the assessment of the credibility of witnesses and their testimonies is best undertaken by the trial court, what with reality that it has the opportunity to observe the witnesses first-hand and to note their demeanor, conduct, and attitude while testifying. Its findings on such matters, absent, as here, of any arbitrariness or oversight of facts or circumstances of weight and substance, are final and conclusive upon this Court and will not to be disturbed on appeal. Gelig vs. People of the Philippines GR No. 173150 July 28, 2010 FACTS: Petitioner Lydia Gelig impugns the Decision promulgated by the Court of Appeals that vacated and set aside the Decision of the RTC, Cebu City, Br23, RTC Decision convicted Lydia for committing the complex crime of direct assault with unintentional abortion but the CA found her guilty only of the crime of slight physical injuries. Lydia and Gemma B. Micarsos, were public school. Lydia's son, Roseller, was a student of Gemma at the time material to this case. On July 17, 1981, at around 10:00 o'clock in the morning, Lydia confronted Gemma after learning from Roseller that Gemma called him a "sissy" while in class. Lydia slapped Gemma in the cheek and pushed her, thereby causing her to fall and hit a wall divider. As a result of Lydia's violent assault, Gemma suffered a contusion in her "maxillary area", as shown by a medical certificate issued by a doctor in the Bogo General Hospital. However, Gemma continued to experience abdominal pains and started bleeding two days after the incident. On August28, 1981, she was admitted in the Southern Islands Hospital and was diagnosed, to her surprise, to have suffered incomplete abortion. Accordingly,a medical certificate was issued. ISSUES: 1. WON the Honorable Court of Appeals erred in finding that the petitioner is liable for Slight Physical Injuries pursuant to Article 266 (1) of the Revised Penal . 2. WON the Honorable Court of Appeals erred in finding that the petitioner can be convicted of Slight Physical Injuries under the information charging her for Direct Assault with Unintentional Abortion. HELD: 1. Liable for Direct Assault – It is clear from the foregoing provision that direct assault is an offense against public order that may be committed in two ways: first, by any person or persons who, without a public uprising, shall employ force or intimidation for the attainment of any of the purposes enumerated in defining the crimes of rebellion and sedition; and second, by any person or persons who, without a public uprising, shall attack, employ force, or seriously intimidate or resist any person in authority or any of his agents, while engaged in the performance of official duties, or on occasion of such performance. On the day of the commission of the assault, Gemma was engaged in the performance of her official duties, that is, she was busy with paperwork while supervising and looking after the needs of pupils who are taking their recess in the classroom to which she was assigned. Lydia was already angry when she entered the classroom and accused Gemma of calling her son a "sissy". Lydia refused to be pacified despite the efforts of Gemma and instead initiated a verbal abuse that enraged the victim. Gemma then proceeded towards the principal's office but Lydia followed and resorted to the use of force by slapping and pushing her against a wall divider. The violent act resulted in Gemma's fall to the floor. Gemma being a public school teacher, belongs to the class of persons in authority expressly mentioned in Article 152 of the Revised Penal Code, as amended.

2. NOT liable of Unintetional Abortion - There is no evidence on record to prove that the slapping and pushing of Gemma by Lydia that occurred on July 17, 1981 was the proximate cause of the abortion. While the medical certificate of Gemma's attending physician, Dr. Susan Jaca (Dr. Jaca),was presented to the court to prove that she suffered an abortion, there is no data in the document to prove that her medical condition was a direct consequence of the July 17, 1981 incident. It was therefore vital for the prosecution to present Dr. Jaca since she was competent to establish a link, if any, between Lydia's assault and Gemma's abortion. Without her testimony, there is no way to ascertain the exact effect of the assault on Gemma's abortion.

Soria vs Desierto GR No. 153524-25 January 31, 2005 Facts: Petitioners Rodolfo Soria and Edimar Bista were arrested on May 13, 2001 (a Sunday and the day before May 14 elections) without a warrant by respondents for alleged illegal possession of firearms and ammunition. One police identified Bista to have a standing warrant of arrest for violation of BP Blg. 6.From the time of Soria’s detention up to the time of his release, 22 hours had already elapsed and Bista was detained for 26 days. The crimes for which Soria was arrested without warrant are punishable by correctional penalties or their equivalent, thus, criminal complaints or information should be filed with the proper judicial authorities within 18 hours of his arrest. The crimes for which Bista was arrested are punishable by afflictive or capital penalties, or their equivalent, thus, he could only be detained for 36 hours without criminal complaints or information having been filed with the proper judicial authorities. Article 125 stated that Delay in the delivery of detained persons to the proper judicial authorities. - The penalties provided in the next preceding article shall be imposed upon the public officer or employee who shall detain any person for some legal ground and shall fail to deliver such person to the proper judicial authorities within the period of: twelve (12) hours, for crimes or offenses punishable by light penalties, or their equivalent; eighteen (18) hours, for crimes or offenses punishable by correctional penalties, or their equivalent; and thirty-six (36) hours, for crimes or offenses punishable by afflictive or capital penalties, or their equivalent. Petitioners filed with the Office of the Ombudsman for Military Affairs a complaint-affidavit for violation of Art. 125 of the Revised Penal Code against herein private respondents. The office dismissed the complaint for lack of merit. Petitioners then filed their motion for reconsideration which was denied for lack of merit in the second assailed Resolution. Issue: W/O officers of the Office of the Ombudsman gravely abused their discretion in dismissing the complaint for violation of Article 125 of the Revised Penal Code (Delay in the delivery of detained persons) Held: Grave abuse of discretion is such capricious and whimsical exercise of judgment on the part of the public officer concerned which is equivalent to an excess or lack of jurisdiction. The abuse of discretion must be so patent and gross as to amount to an evasion of a positive duty or a virtual refusal to perform a duty enjoined by law. No grave abuse of discretion can be attributed to the respondents. Their disposition of petitioners' complaint for violation of Article 125 of the Revised Penal Code cannot be said to have been conjured out of thin air as it was properly backed up by law and jurisprudence. Regarding the complaint of Soria, based on applicable laws and jurisprudence, an election day or a special holiday, should not be included in the computation of the period prescribed by law for the filing of complaint/information in courts in cases of warrantless arrests, it being a 'no-office day. Hence, there could be no arbitrary detention or violation of Article 125 of the Revised Penal Code. In the same vein, the complaint of Bista against the respondents for Violation of Article 125, will not prosper because the running of the thirty-six (36)-hour period prescribed by law for the filing of the complaint against him from the time of his arrest was tolled by one day (election day). Moreover, he has a standing warrant of arrest for Violation of B.P. Blg. 6 and he could only be released if he has no other pending criminal case requiring his continuous detention.

People of the Philippines vs Recto GR No. 129069 October 17, 2001

FACTS: RTC of Romblon found Julio Recto y Robea guilty of (1) two counts of the complex crime of qualified direct assault with frustrated homicide the complex crime of qualified direct assault with murder and (3) homicide. accused, with intent to kill, did by means of treachery attack, assault, and shoot with a shotgun locally called pugakang one MELCHOR RECTO, knowing that the latter is a duly appointed barangay chief tanod of Romblon, while he was engaged in the performance of his official duties, inflicting upon the latter gunshot wounds in different parts of his body. ISSUE:

Whether or not petitioner is guilty of direct assault. HELD: No. The trial court erred in convicting appellant of qualified direct assault with frustrated homicide Direct assault may be committed in two ways: first, by any person or persons who, without a public uprising, shall employ force or intimidation for the attainment of any of the purposes enumerated in defining the crimes of rebellion and sedition; and second, by any person or persons who, without a public uprising, shall attack, employ force, or seriously intimidate or resist any person in authority or any of his agents, while engaged in the performance of official duties. In the case at bar, the victim, Melchor Recto -- being then the barangay chief tanod of Ambulong, Magdiwang, Romblon -- was clearly an agent of a person in authority. However, contrary to the findings of the trial court, he was not engaged in the performance of his official duties at the time he was shot. Neither was he attacked on the occasion of such performance. Thus, the attack on him did not amount to direct assault appellants liability amounted only to attempted, not frustrated, homicide. The penalty that is lower by two degrees than that prescribed by law for consummated homicide shall be imposed upon appellant. After applying the Indeterminate Sentence Law, it shall be taken from the medium period, since there were no aggravating or mitigating circumstances proven. In Criminal Case No. 1971, the trial court was correct in ruling that the attack on Percival Orbe then a barangay captain, a person in authority. In his other criminal case, Considering that Antonio Macalipay was a kagawad who was in the actual performance of his duties when he was shot, the attack on him constituted direct assault. appellant should be held liable for the complex crime of qualified direct assault with homicide. The penalty to be imposed on him should be for homicide, which is the more serious crime, to be imposed in the maximum period.