Barbara Slavin - Bitter Friends, Bosom Enemies (2007) - Synopsis

UFPPC (www.ufppc.org) Digging Deeper XXXIX @ Mandolin Café (Tacoma, WA) December 10, 2007, 7:00 p.m. Barbara Slavin, Bitter Friends, Bosom Enemies: Iran, the U.S., and the Twisted Path to Confrontation (New York: St. Martin’s Press, 2007). Acknowledgments. Book written after her sixth visit to Iran with encouragement of Haleh Esfandiari, arrested in Iran on May 8, 2007 (and since released). Book written at Wilson International Center for Scholars in D.C. In Iran: Yahyia Fiuzi, Pani Farkhan, Goli & Karim Emami, Hadi Semati, Mohammad Javad Zarif, Sadegh Kharrazi, and translators, fixers, and drivers in Iran. In U.S.: Kenneth Katzman (Congressional Research Service), Vali Nasr, Trita Parsi, William Miller, Karim Sadjadpour, Patrick Clawson, Colin Powell, Brent Scowcroft, Richard Haass, Richard Armitage, Martin Indyk, Bruce Riedel, Flynt Leverett, Hillary Mann, Condoleezza Rice, Nick Burns, Zalmay Khalilzad. Agent Gail Ross. St. Martin’s editor Michael Flamini. Husband Michael, son Andrew, friend Deirdre (Didi) Carson.

Introduction. Experiences in Iran (1-5). Book based on “extraordinary access to senior figures in both countries, including three Iranian presidents and dozens of current and former U.S. officials” (5). Compares U.S. & Iran to “a longmarried couple that has gone through a bitter divorce . . . may never get back together with the same intimacy, but they may acknowledge that they have wronged each other and learn to interact in a less destructive way” (6; cf. 177). Ch. 1: “Death to America” and “Can I Have Your Autograph? Revolution Day 2006 holiday (Feb. 11) (7-9). U.S.-Iran “estrangement”; Iran “at least equally to blame” (9); deleterious effect of Bush’s “axis of evil” statement (9-13). Iran’s long history of empire and being invaded (13-14). Twentieth century (15-16). Iranian revolution (16). Hostage crisis (17). Iraq-Iran war (18). “In many respects, the United States and Iran have been in a state of undeclared war for most of the last three decades” (18; 18-20). Ch. 2: Iran and the Bomb. Natanz, site designed to hold 50,000 centrifuges (23). “[I]t is probably already too late to prevent Iran from acquiring the ability to make nuclear weapons” (24). U.S. neglected Iran till Iraq went sour (25). An account of Iran’s nuclear program that comforts Bush administration perspectives (2628). U.S. encouraged Iran’s nuclear program, 1957-1979 (28). Iran resumed its program in 1984 (29). “Iran’s efforts to enrich uranium technically do not violate international law” and the Non-Proliferation Treaty (30). Basis for suspicion that Iran has pursued weapons, despite denials (30-31). Iran’s nuclear program is reasonable (31-33). Parallels with North Korea (33-34). U.S. double standard (34-35). A possible bargaining chip (35-36). U.S. and Israeli military

options (36-38). Iran may be pursuing not a bomb but “strategic ambiguity” (38-39). [This chapter has no thesis or even consistent point of view, though it is mostly pro-Western; it takes no position and gives some comfort to a variety of points of view, but not the argument that attacking Iran would violate the U.N. Charter, which is not mentioned.] Ch. 3: The Blacksmith’s Son. Hour-long interview with Iranian President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad on Feb. 11, 2006 (41-43). “Ahmadinejad is not the commander-in-chief and does not direct Iran’s nuclear program,” but is not without importance (42-43). Portrays himself as siding with the Third World, like Chavez (43-44). Ahmadinejad’s background: wonkish, diligent student (eventually earned doctorate in traffic engineering), religious radical during the revolution, Revolutionary Guard during the IranIraq war, subsequent political career, facilitated by the anti-Khatami movement, which won Tehran city council elections and made Ahmadinejad mayor (44-48). His popularity and election were due to reputation for probity, religious humility (48-50). Anti-Israel speech [mistranslation not noted] (50-52). Opposition (52-53). Ahmadinejad’s ffect on Iran’s economy (53-54). He is comparable to Jerry Falwell or Pat Robertson, relatively ignorant and tending to think dogmatically―rather like George W. Bush (54-58). Anti-Israel views “appear to be genuine,” but most Iranians are more prejudiced against Arabs than against Jews (59). Ahmadinejad has gained in self-assurance since his Aug. 2005 election (60-61). Ch. 4: Iranian Square Dance. [On Iran’s political system.] Political system like a square dance with the Supreme Leader in the middle, while a surprisingly large number of diverse groups circulate around him (63). Roots of democracy go back to the 1890s (64). Revolution was genuinely popular (64-65). The present political system is a unique creation, largely due to the Ayatollah Khomeini (65-67). His successor, Ali Khamenei, was a weak figure ill-suited to role of Supreme Leader and has had to act as arbiter and has “become extremely dependent on repressive institutions” (68). “Khamenei’s method has been to allow other figures to float trial balloons, then intervene to confirm or deny policy changes” (69). The presidency has varied in its importance (69-70). Key foreign policy

decisions are made by the Supreme Council of National Security, with about a dozen members (70). The parliament can reject ministers and conduct investigations (70-71). “Iran’s system is a maze of checks and balances” (71). The Expediency Council, introduced in 1988, can resolve disputes (71-72). The Revolution overturned Iran’s class structure, as 500,000 emigrated and about 10,000 were executed; a new ruling élite was generated: “clerics, traditional merchants from the Tehran bazaar, officers of the Revolutionary Guards, heads of religious foundations that took over royal and private property, and technocrats, . . . held together by patronage, ideology, and personal relationships” (72). Personalities are important, e.g. Rafsanjani family (73-74). Survey of political groupings: Militant Clerics Association, Developers’ Coalition, Executives of Construction, Militant Clerics Society, Islamic Participation Front, The National Trust, (74-75). Connections are absolutely key in Iran (76-77). Rise of neoconservatives largely due to post-9/11 developments (77). Regime has staying power and compares favorably with others in the Middle East (78-79). System has “elements of democracy,” much freedom of expression, and elections do matter (79-82). Iranians “question the true nature of American democracy and suggest Americans are naïve to believe that they are really in control of their political fate. ‘We have a Guardian Council and everyone knows them; you have one, too, but nobody knows them,’ Rafsanjani’s son Mehdi told me after Bush’s re-election. The U.S. council vetting candidates, Mehdi, said, is ‘people with money. In the future, we will become like you’” (82). Ch. 5: Guardians of the Revolution. Interview with Mohsen Rezaie, a key former commander of the Revolutionary Guards (83-84). The Guards’ 150,000 members fulfill the functions of “the U.S. Marines, the internal and external security and intelligence activities of the old Soviet KGB, the economic muscle of a Japanese trading consortium, and the black market expertise of the Cosa Nostra” (84-85). “If the United States and Iran ever reconcile, a substantial portion of the Guards will have to be onboard” (85). Early history (86). Transformed by the Iran-Iraq war; its Qods force (the “dark side of the Guards”) was formed in 1982, and has engaged in conflict, including terrorism, with the U.S. and Israel; Hezbollah its “surrogate” (86-89). Iran had connections with al-Qaeda (89-90). But Iran helped the U.S. overthrow the Taliban in Afghanistan (90-91). The Karine A arms shipment to Palestinians may have been designed by the Qods force to prevent Khatami’s rapprochement with the U.S. (91; cf. 200). In Iraq, the Guards formed the Supreme Council for the Islamic

Revolution in Iraq (SCIRI) party and have been very active (92-93). In the 1990s, the Guards became active economically (93-94). They represent a militarization of Iranian society, perhaps even a “creeping coup”; they may be a kingmaker in the next transition (94-96). The rank and file are more moderate than the leadership (96-97). Rezaie’s son, Ahmad, became a critic in exile in the late 1990s, then returned to Iran (98-99). Dissident Akbar Ganji was also formerly in the Guards (99). Accommodation with the U.S. is a reasonable possibility (99-101). [Note: this was written prior to the designation on Oct. 25, 2007, by the U.S. of the Qods force as a supporter of terrorism and the Revolutionary Guards themselves as involved in nuclear proliferation.] Ch. 6: The Reformers. Mohammed Khatami’s “accidental” presidency, 1997-2005 (103-05). Abdulkarim Soroush, born 1945, founder of Iran’s reform movement (106-07). Abbas Abdi, radical turned reformer (108-09). But the reform movement ran aground, making the major political mistake of alienating Rafsanjani (10910). The anti-Khatami movement involved judicial, political, and violent attacks (110-14). In July 1999, Khatami turned against student protesters, discrediting his presidency with the reform movement, though Khatami continued to serve through 2005 (114-18). Khatami believes his presidency contributed to Iran’s development toward moderation (118-20). Ch. 7: Children of the Revolution. Two thirds of Iran’s 70m people are under 30, and pressure for change in the system is immense (120-25). The dress code has been subverted (125-26). There is a shortage of jobs (126-27). Drug addiction (127-28). Youth are frustrated (129-30). Unrest (131-32). The Internet as an outlet (13233). Disenchantment with politics makes youth unlikely to overturn the regime (134-38). Ch. 8: The Mullahs. Qom, “mysterious and mystical,” and its importance (139-43). The educational curriculum, which teaches to “learn by questioning” (143-44). Shiism’s role in politics (144-46). Some clergy oppose Khomeini’s politicization of religion; the prestige of the clergy has declined (147-50). Others support the regime (150-51). Others avoid politics (151-52). Ideas for changing the system (152-53). Ch. 9: The Opposition. Akbar Ganji, dissident believes in reforming the system (155-57). Mohsen Sazegara, who turned against the regime, advocates civil disobedience, strikes, and demonstrations (157-58). Amir Abbas Fakhravar advocates nonviolent change, but has discredited himself in Iranians’ eyes by accepting support

from Richard Perle and Michael Ledeen (159-60). Dissidents have been effectively marginalized (160). Ethnic sources of unrest: Arabs, the Baluch, Kurds, Azeris (161-65). The Mujahedin eKhalq (MEK) (166-71). Reza Pahlavi, son of the shah (171-72). U.S. support for opposition groups (172-73). Daunting difficulties face the opposition (173-74).

for a Cold War of nerves and sanctions; at worst, to a conflict that would destabilize what is left of the ‘old’ Middle East” (226). Concludes by citing a 35-year-old mother ready for war or peaceful relations, but who adds: “We don’t want anything bad to happen. Pray for us. We always pray for you” (227). Notes. 11 pp.

Ch. 10: Out of Sync: Iran and the United States. Examples of frustrated efforts at rapprochement (175-79). Bush I administration tried to improve relations with Iran (178-81). “Dual containment” of Iraq and Iran under Clinton (181-83). U.S. enthusiasm for Khatami (183-91). Ch. 11: The War on Terrorism and the Axis of Evil. The Bush administration was uninterested in Iran before 9/11 and did not respond to Iran’s outreach after the attacks (19398). Slavin has an anonymous source for information on meetings of U.S. & Iranian diplomats regularly from 2001 through May 2003 (to which Cheney and Rumsfeld were opposed); these were undermined by the “axis of evil” speech (198-203). Iran’s proposal for comprehensive talks got no response in 2003 (204-06; see proposal text on 229-31). Richard Armitage favored better relations with Iran (20608). Ch. 12: Unintended Consequences and What Lies Ahead. U.S. failed to plan for aftermath of Iraq (209-11). When difficulties arose, Iran benefited (211-12). U.S.’s “malevolent neglect” of the EU-3 nuclear negotiations with Iran (212-15). As Ahmadinejad became president, Iran grows more confident of its strategic position (215-18). Development of U.S. diplomacy (219-26). “As of this writing, the United States and Iran appear headed, at best,

Select Bibliography. 13 books. Index. 12 pp. [On the Author. Senior diplomatic correspondent for USA Today, where she has worked since 1996. Born around 1956? Slavin is a mainstream diplomatic reporter who fully embraces the “doctrine of good intentions.” From www.barbaraslavin.net (2007): “Barbara Slavin . . . is a regular commentator on U.S. foreign policy on National Public Radio, the Public Broadcasting System and C-Span. In October [2007], she joined the U.S. Institute of Peace as a Jennings Randolph fellow, to continue her research on Iran. Prior to joining USA TODAY, she was a Washington-based writer for The Economist and the Los Angeles Times, covering domestic and foreign policy issues, including the 1991-93 Middle East peace talks in Washington. From 1985-89, she was The Economist correspondent in Cairo. She traveled widely in the Middle East, covering the Iran-Iraq war, the 1986 U.S. bombing of Libya, the political evolution of the Palestine Liberation Organization and the resurgence of Islamic fundamentalism. Earlier in the 1980s, she served as The Economist correspondent in Beijing and also reported from Japan and South Korea. Prior to moving abroad, she was a writer and editor for The New York Times Week in Review section and a reporter and editor for United Press International in New York City. She got her B.A. in Russian language and literature at Harvard University and also studied at Leningrad State University. She is a member of the Council on Foreign Relations and a former public policy scholar at the Woodrow Wilson International Center for Scholars.”]